Germany's role in the Second World War (its causes)

register entry the-causes-of-the-german-roke-in-wwii-20261007 OBS-580246987509 · file as first run sha256 98815fb7befded3a…

• T1 frame: the causes of the war in Europe and the factors behind Germany's eventual collapse ('roke' / defeat), divided into the outbreak and the reasons for defeat
• T2 Treaty of Versailles (1919): harsh terms, massive reparations, severe military cutbacks, territorial losses; deep national resentment and a desire for revision
• T3 economic instability: the Great Depression of 1929 shattered the German economy, causing massive unemployment and hyperinflation, destabilizing the Weimar Republic
• T4 Nazi ideology and Lebensraum: Hitler and the Nazi Party promised to restore pride, overturn Versailles and conquer Lebensraum in Eastern Europe for the Aryan race
• T5 appeasement: Britain and France's concessions (parts of Czechoslovakia) emboldened Hitler's aggression
• T6 the invasion of Poland, September 1, 1939, prompting Britain and France to declare war
• T7 defeat: overextended supply lines across the Soviet Union; shortages of fuel, food and warm clothing (the halt before Moscow, 1941)
• T8 two-front war split the Wehrmacht's forces and industrial output
• T9 economic and industrial disparity: the US (Lend-Lease), Soviet human and material resources and the British Empire far outproduced the German war economy
• T10 catastrophic setbacks: Stalingrad (1943) and the failed offensive at Kursk halted expansion and forced a permanent retreat
• T11 Allied air superiority: round-the-clock strategic bombing devastated cities, infrastructure, industrial production and civilian morale
• T12 offer: the Ruhr Pocket (1945), if a specific event was meant

• B1 The National WWII Museum | New Orleans — How Did Adolf Hitler Happen? fetched in full 2026-10-07 (HTTP 200; text extracted locally from the page HTML; quotes copied from it); no byline, attributed to The National WWII Museum
• B2 The Holocaust Explained — Causes of the Second World War – The Holocaust Explained: Designed for schools fetched in full 2026-10-07 (HTTP 200, the Wiener Holocaust Library's schools site; text extracted locally)
• B3 History Hit — 5 Major Causes of World War Two in Europe | History Hit fetched in full 2026-10-07 (HTTP 200; Simon Parkin, 17 Jan 2023; text extracted locally)
• B4 The Holocaust Explained — Why did Germany lose? – The Holocaust Explained: Designed for schools fetched in full 2026-10-07 (HTTP 200; text extracted locally)
• B5 History.com — World War II: Causes, Timeline, Key Battles, Facts & Legacy | HISTORY fetched in full 2026-10-07 (HTTP 200; HISTORY.com Editors, published October 29, 2009, last updated July 15, 2026; text extracted locally)
• B6 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum — World War II and the Holocaust, 1939–1945 fetched in full 2026-10-07 (HTTP 200; chapter 4 of 'Learn about the Holocaust', summary and film transcript; text extracted locally)
• B7 YouTube · HistoryExtra — Why did Germany lose WW2? Expert explains the road to the Allies' win not fetchable: video (3m); title only, per the brief
• B8 The Guardian — Why Hitler's grand plan during the second world war collapsed | Second world war | The Guardian fetched in full 2026-10-07 (HTTP 200; Richard J Evans, Tue 8 Sep 2009; text extracted locally)
• B9 www.richardjevans.com — Why Did Germany Lose the Second World War? | Richard J Evans fetched in full 2026-10-07 (HTTP 200; lecture outline in note form, 'Lecture Texts'; no lecture date on the page; text extracted locally)
• B10 Facebook · German Embassy Port of Spain — The causes for World War II lie in the ideology of National Socialism. Under ... not fetchable: Facebook video post (2:06), login wall; the card's title/snippet is the only quote
• B11 Facebook · German Embassy Beirut — Germany was responsible for the outbreak of World War II not fetchable: Facebook video post (1m), login wall; the card's title is the only quote

Germany's role in the Second World War is, in the field's accounts, that of a war of conquest: upon achieving power Hitler smashed the nation's democratic institutions and transformed Germany into a war state intent on conquering Europe for the benefit of the so-called Aryan race, with the active support, the National WWII Museum adds, of the powerful German officer class and of millions of everyday citizens, and his invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, triggered the European phase of the war, France and Britain declaring war on Germany two days later. The causes are called neither singular nor straightforward: one schools site judges Germany's aggressive foreign policy 'not the sole cause' and 'a large contributing factor', decisive in the outbreak while the failure or inability of other countries to react was also key; History Hit calls Hitler's rise and his determination to build a dominating Third Reich the ultimate cause, though not the only one; and two German embassies' posts, by their titles, place the causes in the ideology of National Socialism and state that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of the war. Hitler and other patriotic Germans were outraged and humiliated by the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which carried an obligation to pay $33 billion in war reparations, radically downsized the army and forbade submarines and an air force, terms History Hit calls punitive in the extreme, leaving Germany destitute and its people feeling victimised; paying the crushing reparations, by the museum's account, destabilized the economy into ruinous, runaway inflation, four billion German marks to one American dollar by September 1923. The worldwide economic depression and the rising power of labor unions and communists convinced increasing numbers of Germans to turn to the Nazi Party, which fed on bank failures and unemployment; the Wall Street Crash of 1929 is said to have turned economic instability into political instability and support for extremist parties, and History.com holds that political and economic instability in the Weimar Republic and lingering resentment over Versailles fueled Hitler's rise, the party going from 2.6 percent of the vote in 1928 to the largest party in the Reichstag by 1932, and Hindenburg appointing Hitler chancellor in January of the following year. The Nazi Party's ultimate aim, in the museum's account, was to seize power, install Hitler as dictator and create a community of racially pure Germans to be led in a campaign of racial cleansing and world conquest; Hitler believed that war was the only way to gain the necessary Lebensraum, or living space, for the German race to expand, and in May 1939 he explicitly referred to the oncoming war as bound up with the pursuit of Lebensraum to the east, the whole of Central Europe and Russia up to the Volga. A conquered Soviet Union was to be ruled by the German master race, which would exterminate or subdue millions of Slavs to create Lebensraum, with model farms and factories in a racially cleansed Russia; Richard J Evans sets Hitler's war aims as the basis for the conquest of Eastern Europe and its racial reordering into a European version of the American West, with Germans as settlers and the indigenous population enslaved and eventually eliminated, its key feature the destruction of the Jewish 'world-enemy', and the General Plan for the East, drafted in 1941-2, envisaged 30 to 45 million Slavs perishing through starvation and disease, or being worked to death, with German settlers replacing them. From 1935 onwards, by the schools site's account, Germany pursued an aggressive foreign policy, reintroducing conscription, creating the Luftwaffe, planning for war in the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937 and occupying Austria, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia before invading Poland in 1939; the expanded army, conscription and new air force are called violations of the Treaty of Versailles, and the rearmament went without sanction or protest from Britain or France, which, hoping to avoid war, chose a policy of appeasement, Hitler counting on their reluctance to intervene and appeasement, the same site holds, boosting his confidence; the Nazi-Soviet pact, History Hit holds, paved the way for the German invasion of Poland, Hitler facing no war on two fronts once he invaded, and the schools site adds that it allowed the Nazis to start the war for Lebensraum with Soviet support. The Nazis' persecution of the Jews predated the war, and Nazi policy towards the Jews became genocidal during it: the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum states that under conditions of war and military occupation the regime could pursue racial goals with more radical measures, that the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 was a war of annihilation that targeted tens of millions of civilians, and that those whom the SS judged unable to work were killed, often within two or three hours of arrival, while those who could work were used for forced labor under punishing conditions and put to death when they could no longer work; History.com calls the extermination of the Jews from throughout German-occupied Europe the other half of Hitler's strategy. On why Germany lost, the question a HistoryExtra video also puts, one schools site names a combination of German weaknesses and Allied and Soviet strengths, the weaknesses the lack of productivity of the war economy, the weak supply lines, the start of a war on two fronts and the lack of strong leadership; for Evans the fundamental problem was that Germany simply did not have the resources to fight on so many different fronts at the same time, and above all the Reich was short of fuel; slow, overextended supply lines hindered the German advance into Russia and led to a huge lack of supplies on the front line, and the war economy, devoting 75 percent of GDP to the war by 1944 on a figure the site quotes from Evans, peaked in mid-1944, which the site calls too late. Evans names two key factors, US involvement boosting the allies' arms-producing capabilities and sheer Soviet manpower leading to catastrophic defeat in Russia: Germany produced 15,000, 26,000 and 40,000 new combat aircraft in 1942, 1943 and 1944, the US 48,000, 86,000 and 114,000, and the Soviet Union had a constant ready supply of men; under Lend-Lease Britain received thirty-one billion dollars of aid and the Soviet Union eleven billion; Paulus's surrender at Stalingrad on 31 January 1943 is called the turning point of the war, the last German troops there surrendering, by History.com's date, on February 2, 1943, and the sustained bombing of German cities decided at Casablanca severely affected arms production, Evans estimating a 25 per cent drop in planned tank production and 31 per cent in aircraft. Conquest, in Evans's account, brought a failure to gain economically in western and southern Europe, harsh treatment, ruthless exploitation and the requisitioning of labour crippling the French and other western economies and sparking resistance, the subjugated economies unable and, with their workers ever more refractory, unwilling to contribute significantly to German war production; in the Soviet war, where the Soviet regime did not collapse, mass murder and the labour draft sparked a partisan fightback, more than three million Soviet prisoners of war were deliberately left to die of starvation and disease, and civilians were drafted into forced labour; 650,000 Italian soldiers were shipped to Germany as forced labourers to join millions of others drafted in from Poland and the Soviet Union to replace German workers sent to the front, and there were 8 million foreign, mostly forced labourers in Germany 'by mid-44'.

Germany's role in the Second World War is, in the field's accounts, that of a war of conquest: upon achieving power Hitler smashed the nation's democratic institutions and transformed Germany into a war state intent on conquering Europe for the benefit of the so-called Aryan race, with the active support, the National WWII Museum adds, of the powerful German officer class and of millions of everyday citizens, and his invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, triggered the European phase of the war, France and Britain declaring war on Germany two days later. The causes are called neither singular nor straightforward: one schools site judges Germany's aggressive foreign policy 'not the sole cause' and 'a large contributing factor', decisive in the outbreak while the failure or inability of other countries to react was also key; History Hit calls Hitler's rise and his determination to build a dominating Third Reich the ultimate cause, though not the only one; and two German embassies' posts, by their titles, place the causes in the ideology of National Socialism and state that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of the war. Hitler and other patriotic Germans were outraged and humiliated by the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which carried an obligation to pay $33 billion in war reparations, radically downsized the army and forbade submarines and an air force, terms History Hit calls punitive in the extreme, leaving Germany destitute and its people feeling victimised; paying the crushing reparations, by the museum's account, destabilized the economy into ruinous, runaway inflation, four billion German marks to one American dollar by September 1923. The worldwide economic depression and the rising power of labor unions and communists convinced increasing numbers of Germans to turn to the Nazi Party, which fed on bank failures and unemployment; the Wall Street Crash of 1929 is said to have turned economic instability into political instability and support for extremist parties, and History.com holds that political and economic instability in the Weimar Republic and lingering resentment over Versailles fueled Hitler's rise, the party going from 2.6 percent of the vote in 1928 to the largest party in the Reichstag by 1932, and Hindenburg appointing Hitler chancellor in January of the following year. The Nazi Party's ultimate aim, in the museum's account, was to seize power, install Hitler as dictator and create a community of racially pure Germans to be led in a campaign of racial cleansing and world conquest; Hitler believed that war was the only way to gain the necessary Lebensraum, or living space, for the German race to expand, and in May 1939 he explicitly referred to the oncoming war as bound up with the pursuit of Lebensraum to the east, the whole of Central Europe and Russia up to the Volga. A conquered Soviet Union was to be ruled by the German master race, which would exterminate or subdue millions of Slavs to create Lebensraum, with model farms and factories in a racially cleansed Russia; Richard J Evans sets Hitler's war aims as the basis for the conquest of Eastern Europe and its racial reordering into a European version of the American West, with Germans as settlers and the indigenous population enslaved and eventually eliminated, its key feature the destruction of the Jewish 'world-enemy', and the General Plan for the East, drafted in 1941-2, envisaged 30 to 45 million Slavs perishing through starvation and disease, or being worked to death, with German settlers replacing them. From 1935 onwards, by the schools site's account, Germany pursued an aggressive foreign policy, reintroducing conscription, creating the Luftwaffe, planning for war in the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937 and occupying Austria, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia before invading Poland in 1939; the expanded army, conscription and new air force are called violations of the Treaty of Versailles, and the rearmament went without sanction or protest from Britain or France, which, hoping to avoid war, chose a policy of appeasement, Hitler counting on their reluctance to intervene and appeasement, the same site holds, boosting his confidence; the Nazi-Soviet pact, History Hit holds, paved the way for the German invasion of Poland, Hitler facing no war on two fronts once he invaded, and the schools site adds that it allowed the Nazis to start the war for Lebensraum with Soviet support. The Nazis' persecution of the Jews predated the war, and Nazi policy towards the Jews became genocidal during it: the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum states that under conditions of war and military occupation the regime could pursue racial goals with more radical measures, that the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 was a war of annihilation that targeted tens of millions of civilians, and that those whom the SS judged unable to work were killed, often within two or three hours of arrival, while those who could work were used for forced labor under punishing conditions and put to death when they could no longer work; History.com calls the extermination of the Jews from throughout German-occupied Europe the other half of Hitler's strategy. On why Germany lost, the question a HistoryExtra video also puts, one schools site names a combination of German weaknesses and Allied and Soviet strengths, the weaknesses the lack of productivity of the war economy, the weak supply lines, the start of a war on two fronts and the lack of strong leadership; for Evans the fundamental problem was that Germany simply did not have the resources to fight on so many different fronts at the same time, and above all the Reich was short of fuel; slow, overextended supply lines hindered the German advance into Russia and led to a huge lack of supplies on the front line, and the war economy, devoting 75 percent of GDP to the war by 1944 on a figure the site quotes from Evans, peaked in mid-1944, which the site calls too late. Evans names two key factors, US involvement boosting the allies' arms-producing capabilities and sheer Soviet manpower leading to catastrophic defeat in Russia: Germany produced 15,000, 26,000 and 40,000 new combat aircraft in 1942, 1943 and 1944, the US 48,000, 86,000 and 114,000, and the Soviet Union had a constant ready supply of men; under Lend-Lease Britain received thirty-one billion dollars of aid and the Soviet Union eleven billion; Paulus's surrender at Stalingrad on 31 January 1943 is called the turning point of the war, the last German troops there surrendering, by History.com's date, on February 2, 1943, and the sustained bombing of German cities decided at Casablanca severely affected arms production, Evans estimating a 25 per cent drop in planned tank production and 31 per cent in aircraft. Conquest, in Evans's account, brought a failure to gain economically in western and southern Europe, harsh treatment, ruthless exploitation and the requisitioning of labour crippling the French and other western economies and sparking resistance, the subjugated economies unable and, with their workers ever more refractory, unwilling to contribute significantly to German war production; in the Soviet war, where the Soviet regime did not collapse, mass murder and the labour draft sparked a partisan fightback, more than three million Soviet prisoners of war were deliberately left to die of starvation and disease, and civilians were drafted into forced labour; 650,000 Italian soldiers were shipped to Germany as forced labourers to join millions of others drafted in from Poland and the Soviet Union to replace German workers sent to the front, and there were 8 million foreign, mostly forced labourers in Germany 'by mid-44'. A further position states that it accepts all of the field's reading as it reports it, and gives its object as the form of the labor relation that the war economy built from conquest and the assembly line; it reports the field as holding that Nazi expansion to the East was a war for land and empire, Adam Tooze calling the war in the East 'the last great land grab in the long and bloody history of European colonialism', that the camps came before the war and served repression first, and, with Ulrich Herbert, that without foreign labor the agricultural and industrial production of Germany would have collapsed in 1942 at the latest; it reports the relation of labor to annihilation as disputed, positions it cites through Wikipedia: Kaienburg and Kárný treat annihilation through labor as a consistent SS goal, Pingel holds that the phrase should not be applied to all prisoners, and Wagner calls it a metaphor of moral indignation. It holds that Germany entered the Nazi period as an advanced industrial power for which labor became a binding wartime constraint, and that Lebensraum, a land program on the American and British imperial model, was turned in practice into a labor supply: Lebensraum answered with land, and what conquest delivered to the factory, from 1940 onward, was people. The East is read as a continental colony, the colonial relation relocated from overseas to the continent: the planners described it in the vocabulary of overseas empire and the American West, Hitler and other Nazi thinkers drawing, in USHMM's words, 'direct comparisons to American expansion in the West'; the German term for the practice, inner colonization, which Robert Nelson describes as an ethnically based settler colonialism, is stated to be older than Nazism, its continuity held to run through an institution and its personnel, Meyer and the RKF, Meyer penning, on Nelson's account, the first iteration of General Plan East, a plan 'calling for the emptying of the eastern space, followed by its filling with German settlers'. Conquest is held to have become labor policy, a chain from military occupation through recruitment and deportation to registration in the Reich, segregated barracks and the plant: by Hachtmann's account the labour force was recruited, above all from 1941 onward, 'as a kind of war booty' from the territories of Europe occupied by the German military and was no longer protected by the usual labour laws, and in August 1944 more than 7,500,000 non-German workers were registered as working in the Reich, the overwhelming majority forced laborers; the colonial seizure of the East and the staffing of German industry are read as interlocking operations of the same conquest regime. War Fordism, Hachtmann's term for the form in which Fordism was established in broad sectors of German industry under Nazi rule, used by him for the years starting in 1933, is read as decomposing work horizontally while the racial state decomposed persons vertically, the two cuts crossing on one line: Herbert names the contradiction between the economic interest in exploiting as many foreigners as possible and the ideological principles of National Socialism, from which a rigidly hierarchical racist system for the treatment of forced laborers developed, Spoerer's ranking puts 'Nordic' peoples at the top and Jews and Sinti and Roma at the bottom and calls the regime for Poles and Ostarbeiter 'apartheid', and, by Hachtmann's account, male German workers who remained in enterprises advanced to become racially privileged foremen and head workmen. Read in the grammar of a first half that followed the laboring body from noun to verb, from the priced person of the plantation ledger to the timed operation of the Ford line, war Fordism is held to have kept the specified verb and made the noun a switch, racial-juridical classification selecting the coercive regime under which the verb was extracted, so that the same general act of reading productive capacity had radically different consequences depending on juridical-racial status; in Hachtmann's account industrial psychological testing of almost 500,000 civilian foreign labourers, and from the autumn of 1943 of camp prisoners irrespective of their national ('racial') affiliation, 'tended to undermine the racist schema' and 'says little about the core issue', and the racial classification is held to have come from the state, which installed it anyway. Campification is defined, at the strength the figures carry, as the attachment of the camp to the plant as an administrative unit, a subcamp in or near the factory supplied with prisoners by a main camp, run by the SS and contracted to a firm, its criteria stated so that they can be applied, as retrospective analysis of the kind the archive's account of temporal sequestration says remains available; it reports Oswald Pohl to Himmler on 30 April 1942 that 'The main emphasis has shifted to the economic side', camp prisoners first used in regular industrial mass production from August 1942 at the Heinkel aircraft plant in Oranienburg, and a network of satellite camps not spreading throughout the war economy until 1944, and it limits the term by Hachtmann's caveat that only a minority of camp prisoners was used in industrial production, from late 1942 to mid-1944, and by the count of about 700,000 camp prisoners against about six million civilians and 2.2 million prisoners of war at the peak. At the sites it examines the economic object is read as a flow, an allocation of persons per day, drawn from a captured population, reduced by death and refilled by transport: from October 1942 companies paid the Treasury 6 Reichsmarks per day for skilled prisoners and 4 for unqualified; incarceration assured the quantity of the labor supply even as the brutality of the camps depleted it, and the SS used gas chambers and other means to 'weed out' prisoners who were no longer able to work; I.G. Farben intervened at the highest SS levels to obtain additional prisoners for building its plant, and about 25,000 people died in connection with the IG Farben plant at Auschwitz-Monowitz, the vast majority Jewish concentration camp inmates; Hachtmann denies the prisoners the status of slaves in the classical sense, slave owners having an interest in maintaining the labour power of the people under their control, and judges exaggerated both Roth's claim that slave labour can be used profitably if incorporated solely into a workforce-pyramid racially organized in degrees of unfreedom and Sofsky's view of prisoner labor as a means of absolute power and terror, finding camp labor, from the perspective of the companies using it, also quite functional economically, at least from 1942–1943 onward. Extermination is held not to be reducible to optimization: the regime destroyed labor it needed, the more than two million Soviet prisoners of war permitted to die in the autumn and winter of 1941–42 having been destroyed before the decision to deploy Soviet prisoners as workers; for the Jews labor is read as deferring death and setting no limit to it, Browning finding the ideological goal 'never superseded, just temporarily deferred' and the destruction of Warsaw beginning in July 1942 regardless of productivity; Peter Hayes, after Michael Allen, reports that the mutually negating desires to extract value from foreigners and to keep them separate and unequal never really troubled the SS, 'dedicated to destruction as its overriding priority', though it did trouble the private industrial enterprises, and, after Rolf Keller, that in many cases forced labor did not even pay for itself, while calling these not necessarily representative cases; racial extermination and industrial exploitation are read as sometimes reinforcing each other and sometimes destroying each other's objects. The Holocaust, the murder of six million European Jews, is stated to remain larger than this labor history, which describes an industrial form that the killing passed through at certain sites and does not explain why the killing was done; the field, as the position reports it, finds the Holocaust's causes in Nazi anti-Jewish policy and gives it no colonial or economic cause, and the position does not claim that the Holocaust has an economic or colonial cause, nor that the camps were founded as labor institutions, that camp labor was a large share of the war economy's workforce, that forced labor was generally profitable, or that the Nazi camps descend from the colonial camps of 1900. On colonial continuity the positions it reports are carried as contested: Zimmerer, as Adhikari reports, points 'especially to continuities with the horrors perpetrated by the Nazi regime four decades later', while Alan Kramer finds it problematic to see the colonial camps as antecedents in a genealogical line at the end of which stand the Nazi death camps, and Adhikari holds that an explanation of Nazi violence cannot simply be reduced to colonial influences; taking Kramer's word, the position places the repertoire of concentration, forced labor by captives, racial classification and settler clearance in a common archive from about 1900, claims no line of descent from Windhoek to the Nazi camps, and states that the joining of the camp to the assembly line belongs to 1942–44 and to German industry, reading the colony as entering the factory and conquest as metabolized at the industrial core, under a continental imperialism that 'truly begins at home', a frame Arendt did not carry into the labor relation, having judged the camps economically irrelevant, a judgment the position cites through Wikipedia.

T against L(B) (representational): T read the address two ways at once, the causes of the war and the causes of Germany's defeat, glossing 'roke' as defeat; the field the layer surfaced carries both readings (causes: B1–B3, B5, B6, B10, B11; defeat: B4, B7–B9), so the double reading is composed from the field's own division. On the outbreak T composes Versailles (F3, F4, F22, F35), the Depression (F8, F16), Nazi ideology and Lebensraum (F6, F24, F36), appeasement (F12, F18, F41) and the invasion of Poland (F1, F37). T's 'hyperinflation' caused by the Great Depression of 1929 differs from the field, which places the runaway inflation in 1923 and ties it to the reparations (F5). On defeat T composes supply lines (F29), the two-front war (F28), Allied production and Lend-Lease (F33, F45, F47, F61), Stalingrad (F39, F51) and bombing (F53, F62); its Kursk, warm clothing and Ruhr Pocket are not in the field ledger's quotes (Kursk and the troops 'poorly clad' before Moscow are in B8's text, not ledgered). Available in the field and not composed: Germany's war of conquest as the entity's frame and the support of the officer class and millions of citizens (F1, F2); Germany's aggressive foreign policy as 'a large contributing factor' and the embassies' statements of responsibility (F14, F17, F63, F64); rearmament against Versailles and the Hossbach planning (F11, F15, F26); the Nazi-Soviet pact (F19, F25, F37); the war of annihilation, the General Plan for the East and the American West (F7, F42, F54, F56); the Holocaust in its relation to the war (F20, F38, F40, F43, F55), which T does not mention; fuel (F49) and the war economy's late peak (F30, F31); conquest that failed to pay and forced labour replacing German workers drafted to the front (F48, F50, F52, F58, F59, F60).

L(B) against L(B ∪ A) (the intervention): Admission adds one deposit's line on what conquest became for the war economy, the object the field names in passing (forced labourers replacing German workers sent to the front, F52, F60; requisitioned labour, F48, F59; forced labor and murder at the camps, F43) and does not compose. It adds labor as a binding wartime constraint for an advanced industrial power and Lebensraum read as turned in practice into a labor supply (#1669 §§1, 12); the East as a continental colony through inner colonization older than Nazism, Meyer and the RKF (§2), which meets the field's 'European version of the American West' (F54); conquest as labor policy (§3); Hachtmann's war Fordism, the racial labor hierarchy and the two cuts, work and persons (§§4–5); the noun as switch, with the aptitude tests that crossed the racial grade (§§5, 8); campification defined and limited to its scale, a minority of camp prisoners from late 1942 to mid-1944 (§6); the allocated day as a flow reduced by death and refilled by transport (§7); and extermination held irreducible to optimization (§9). It carries the field's disputes as #1669 reports them (annihilation through labor; colonial continuity; Roth and Sofsky) and its own non-claims: no economic or colonial cause of the Holocaust, which is stated larger than the labor history; no descent from the colonial camps; camp labor no large share; forced labor not generally profitable. The archive adds nothing on Versailles, the Depression, appeasement or the pact, which it accepts, or on the military course of the war, Stalingrad or the bombing. Within the archive, #1669 states itself as retrospective analysis of the kind #923's temporal sequestration says remains available. The field's causes and defeat are kept whole and first; with the archive they gain the war economy's labor relation.