Worker Info Exchange

register entry worker-info-exchange-aio-20261029 OBS-9ae6555aed16 · file as first run sha256 031036d866905f67…

• T1-1 definition: 'is a non-profit organization based in London (operating also as Stichting WIE International) that fights for the digital and labor rights of gig economy workers.' (two markers)
• T1-2 data control: 'Helps gig workers use data access and Subject Access Requests (SARs) to see how tech platforms track pay, work allocation, and performance.' (one marker)
• T1-3 algorithmic accountability: 'Investigates and challenges unfair management practices, automated dismissals, and dynamic pricing or pay systems.' (two markers)
• T1-4 collective legal action: 'Coordinates group lawsuits against major platforms like Uber—such as collective claims challenging dynamic pay systems that reduce driver earnings and increase hidden commissions.' (two markers)
• T1-5 research & alliances: 'Partners with academic institutions like the University of Oxford and labor bodies (such as the TUC) to publish landmark research exposing the real-world impact of platform algorithms on workers.' (two markers; the second is the token of the video card's link, card 4)
• T1-6 closer: 'Would you like more information on their current legal cases against Uber, or details on how gig workers can request their workplace data?'

• B1 Worker Info Exchange — Worker Info Exchange | Data Rights for Digital Workers | London card; B1.html sha256 fbcd4b9857cdf882, HTTP 200 at 2026-10-29T22:33:23Z; byte-identical to the census copy worker-info-exchange--home
• B2 Stichting WIE International — Stichting WIE International – Defending the rights of gig economy workers in the platform economy card; B2.html sha256 7e7a4ed8a97e904e, HTTP 200 at 2026-10-29T22:33:24Z
• B3 Stichting WIE International — Worker Info Exchange partners with TUC on “landmark” new reportexposing the ... card; B3.html sha256 ed8b2c1e81711d15, HTTP 200 at 2026-10-29T22:33:24Z
• B4 Facebook·NOVO ORG — Uber's share of rider fares increased, to taking 29-50% from drivers according ... card; unreachable: no URL found (three WebSearches); title only, no snippet
• B5 Worker Info Exchange — About Us | Worker Info Exchange own_page; census copy worker-info-exchange--about-us (read 2026-10-29, HTTP 200); B5.html sha256 2ebc0cea511e10f8
• B6 Wikipedia — Worker Info Exchange (no article) no article: raw HTTP 404, rendered HTTP 404, search one result (a mention in another article); sha256 a6f7416f8f4b6675

E_A, the archive's entity: the same organisation, in the Labor Vector census record and the archive's deposits: a non-profit organisation for gig workers whose means are data access requests, data investigations, data trusts and strategic litigation, set at three intersections (AI governing labor, worker power, the distribution of gains and losses), whose evidence (data access, an organizing resource) answers what a platform holds about a worker and how its algorithm directed that worker and does not answer platform-wide rates, not a union, a public dataset or the platforms' own reporting; whose data access the archive reads as the worker's-side record of how an algorithm directed the work, the directionality question asked of the system that directs labor; in classes on which the archive holds that the platform extracts value from gig workers and from the meaning-production that makes the relation legible as partnership (#469), that the platform worker's confirmations are a rate whose bodily cost is externalized as personal failure (#19), that the platform relation puts all risk on the worker and all data with the platform (#713), that data portability is a condition of non-predatory mediation (#746), that digital rights and platform-worker organizing are institutional demands which contest law and policy and alone risk capture (#148), and that its class concepts do not take gig workers as their class (#1545; #727); whose composition at its own name joined two bodies into one (Capture Registry) LV-01 LV-04 LV-08 LV-20 LV-22 LV-29 LV-30 LV-31 LV-24 O469-01 O469-02 O19-01 O713-01 O746-01 O148-01 O148-02 O1545-01 O727-01 CAP-1-02; defining papers #469, #19, #713, #746, #148, #1545, #727

E_F, the field's entity (type C — a conventional reading holds it (public entity: a worker data-rights non-profit and its Dutch foundation)): a non-profit in London, founded in 2020, that helps gig and platform workers reclaim control over the data collected from them at work and 'turn data into power', through subject access and data portability requests made on behalf of workers (on how work is allocated, pay determined and performance assessed), targeted investigations supporting strategic litigation against automated dismissals and management decisions, and data trusts with unions and grassroots organisations, on the premise that gig workers are managed and controlled by hidden algorithms and that workers' digital rights under the law are their route; working with Stichting WIE International, a Dutch foundation in cooperation with it, which brings the Dynamic Pay Claim against Uber under the Dutch WAMCA procedure (an action the foundation's post also gives as WIE's, coordinated through its campaign); with Oxford University, an audit of 1.5 million trips built from drivers' subject access requests, and with the TUC, research partner on The Human Price of Dynamic Pay; without a Wikipedia article

ρ = extends: The archive reads Worker Info Exchange as its own pages present it and adds, on the field's own objects: the census's answer, field by field, to who supplies, directs and gains from the labor, and what this kind of evidence can and cannot settle; the archive's reading of its data access as the directionality question asked of the system that directs labor; extraction from gig workers at the level of meaning as well as wages; the risk and data asymmetry of the platform relation; data portability as a condition of non-predatory mediation; digital rights and platform-worker organizing as institutional demands with their limit, capture; and the boundary between the archive's class concepts and gig workers as such. LV-32 LV-24 LV-20 LV-22 O469-01 O469-02 O19-01 O713-01 O746-01 O148-01 O148-02 O1545-01 O727-01. Guard: ρ = extends claims an addition and no more (§1.2a). It does not make the field's sources wrong at their dates. Where an archive claim stands against a field claim (LV-02 against F34 on who brings the action; CAP-1-03 and CAP-1-06 against F20, F36, F42 on Oxford; LV-13 against F17, F18, F43 on the share of the fare), both are composed under P_coh within the one ontology. The class claims (O-) are said of classes the field sources for the entity, never of the entity by name.

The case: equal terms, ontology included (v0.9). The archive reads the field's entity as the entity. The Labor Vector census record describes Worker Info Exchange from its own pages, each field with its basis ('operator'), and answers for it the census's question of who supplies the labor, who directs it, who receives its gains and what kind of evidence the resource brings (LV-32); its one reading of its own, kept apart from the resource's terms, places the organisation's data access in the directionality question asked of the system that directs labor (LV-24), which adds a sense to the field's own account of algorithmic management and contests none of it. The capture record checks the composition against those pages (CAP-1-01, CAP-1-06). No deposit names the entity. The deposits bear on its classes and add senses and limits on the field's own objects: the platform's extraction from gig workers and from the meaning that makes the relation legible as partnership (#469; #19), the platform relation as the worker's risk and the platform's data (#713), data portability as a condition of non-predatory mediation (#746), digital rights and platform-worker organizing as institutional demands that risk capture (#148), and the archive's class concepts held apart from gig workers as a demographic (#1545; #727). No defining paper contests the field's ontology of the organisation or supplies one the field lacks: ρ = extends, the equal-terms case (§0.9, §1.2a).

#LV census.json organizing_question: Who supplies the labor, who directs it, and who receives its gains — and what kind of evidence does this resource bring to that question?

#LV census.json rows[slug == 'worker-info-exchange'].lv_intersection: none stated. The archive reads WIE's data access as recovering, from the worker's side, the record of how an algorithm directed the work (allocation, pay, performance), the directionality question asked of the system that directs labor.

#469 §II.5 Post-Operaist Terms ¶1: The platform does not just extract value from gig workers; it extracts value from the entire apparatus of meaning-production that makes the gig economy seem like a normal business rather than a wage-suppression engine.

#148 §5.3 Tier 3, 'Their political limit': Institutional demands alone risk *being captured by the regime they would transform*.

#1545 §14 Negative edge table: **Semantic Proletariat is not:** content creators · knowledge workers · the creative class · AI annotators · gig workers · platform users

#727 the table of adjacent fields, row 'Digital labor': | Digital labor | User activity, platform work, data production, content work | Strong bridge field | Semantic Labor is the meaning-production extension of digital labor |

#capture-registry worker-info-exchange-aio-20261029, analysis: A data-rights organization is composed at the grain of its own mission statement; the composition joins it to its foundation and adds an academic partner the record cannot place.

equal-terms case: every field claim composed as received, beside the archive claims it stands with. Reading the received column recovers the field (§5.9).

v0.9 §4.10: KO_B sentences surviving in the KO at similarity ≥ 0.95, with positions (computed as apply_v09.py does: difflib.SequenceMatcher ratio, the best KO sentence for each KO_B sentence): v0.9 0 of 13 (positions [None, None, None, None, None, None, None, None, None, None, None, None, None]; composed first under v0.9, so there is no v0.7 object to measure against). Opening-run check (§5.10): no breach.

Worker Info Exchange describes itself as "a non-profit helping workers reclaim control over the data collected from them at work" that helps them "turn data into power — challenging unfair algorithmic systems and holding tech platforms to account" (its home page), a London organisation for "Data Rights for Digital Workers" (its home page), "Founded in 2020" (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). It names gig workers "managed and controlled at work by hidden algorithms" and holds that "Opaque automated management systems foster exploitation and discrimination" (its About Us page; its home page); its foundation says "hidden algorithms decide who works, who waits, and who earns" (Stichting WIE International). Its three strands are subject access and data portability requests on behalf of workers, on how their work is allocated, paid and assessed; investigations supporting strategic litigation against automated dismissals; and data trusts with unions and grassroots organisations for collective bargaining (its home page; its About Us page; Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). Its solution is for workers to "assert their digital rights under the law" (its About Us page), data protection law being drivers' "only remaining route" (Cansu Safak) and its call "enforcement rather than reform" (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). Stichting WIE International is "a Dutch foundation working in cooperation with Worker Info Exchange" defending gig workers' rights in the Netherlands, the UK and Europe, through data access, research and audits, advocacy, compensation, workshops and legal support (Stichting WIE International). The foundation brings the Dynamic Pay Claim against Uber under Dutch WAMCA law, for drivers from seven countries who drove after November 2020, without upfront fees, for compensation and algorithmic transparency, and for drivers whose data Uber unlawfully transferred to the United States, for which Uber was fined (Stichting WIE International; its home page; Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). The foundation's post of 29 April 2026 gives the action as WIE's, coordinated through its Dynamic Pay campaign under GDPR Article 22 (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026), after news of November 2025 that drivers were set to sue (its home page). Dynamic pay, from 2020, replaced fixed rates with a 25% commission by pay and allocation set in real time by Uber's algorithm, shifting risk onto drivers and raising the commission to nearly half the fare in some cases (Stichting WIE International). The joint Oxford–WIE analysis of 1.5 million trips found real pay falling, volatility rising and Uber's margins rising sharply after dynamic pricing in 2023, Uber keeping more than half the fare in many cases (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026; Stichting WIE International), the audit built from drivers' subject access requests (Cansu Safak) and the pay system trained on drivers' own data (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). Its Director calls dynamic pay "exploitation by algorithm" (James Farrar); its news reports Liverpool drivers hit by falling pay (its home page), and a video card's title gives Uber's share as "29-50%" (Facebook, NOVO ORG; title only). It was the TUC's research partner on The Human Price of Dynamic Pay, built on eleven drivers' testimony and welcomed as "a landmark investigation" (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026), its foundation auditing algorithms with universities and worker groups (Stichting WIE International), and its site lists four reports and news of research of June 2025 (its home page). Its site is copyrighted 2025 and its equivalency determination certified by NGOsource (its home page). Wikipedia has no article on it, and mentions it once, in July 2020 supporting Uber drivers' complaints for access to their personal data (Wikipedia, 2026-10-29).

Worker Info Exchange is a non-profit that, in its own words, helps workers "reclaim control over the data collected from them at work" and "turn data into power" (its home page), which the Labor Vector census records as a "non-profit organisation: data access requests, data investigations, data trusts and strategic litigation for gig workers" (Labor Vector record). It is based in London, its site titled for "Data Rights for Digital Workers" (its home page; Labor Vector record), and its foundation's site gives it as "an independent non‑profit organisation", "Founded in 2020", that works with drivers, couriers and trade-union partners (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). The census keeps it apart from a union, since "it supports trade unions and grassroots worker organisations", from a public dataset of platform data and from the platforms' own transparency reporting (Labor Vector record). The census asks of every resource "Who supplies the labor, who directs it, and who receives its gains — and what kind of evidence does this resource bring to that question?", and sets this one at three of its intersections, AI governing labor, worker power, and the distribution of gains and losses ("wages, employment, workload, credit, ownership, and who captures productivity gains") (Labor Vector record). The work is that of gig economy workers managed by algorithms, Uber drivers among them, who supply the labor (Labor Vector record); the organisation states the direction itself, gig workers being "managed and controlled at work by hidden algorithms" whose "Opaque automated management systems foster exploitation and discrimination" and facilitate unfair work allocation, performance management and dismissals (its About Us page; its home page), and its foundation says "hidden algorithms decide who works, who waits, and who earns" (Stichting WIE International). The census records the direction as running from "tech platforms through opaque automated management systems (hidden algorithms) that allocate work, determine pay and assess performance" (Labor Vector record). The archive reads the platform's relation to gig workers as extraction at two levels: the platform "does not just extract value from gig workers" but from the meaning-production that makes the gig economy seem "a normal business rather than a wage-suppression engine", and it cannot exploit them without first making the gig relation legible as "partnership" rather than "wage theft" (#469, Johannes Sigil). Its solution is that workers "assert their digital rights under the law" to take control of their data, see how they "have been subject to algorithmic management" and challenge "illegal or unfair automated management decisions" (its About Us page); its Research Lead calls data protection law drivers' "only remaining route to assert their rights" (Cansu Safak, on its foundation's site), and it asks for "enforcement rather than reform", since "Drivers are already workers" (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). The archive places the data-protection and digital-rights tradition, "the GDPR lineage", with "platform-worker-rights organizing" among institutional demands, the third of its four tiers of reclamation, which "contest the current regime at the level of law and policy" and alone "risk being captured by the regime they would transform" (#148). It works in three strands (its home page): data access, "making specific subject access and data portability requests on behalf of workers" to show "how their work is allocated, how their pay is determined and how their performance is assessed"; investigations that "expose unfair algorithmic decision making" and support strategic litigation against "illegal automated dismissals and management decisions"; and data trusts through which unions and grassroots organisations aggregate workers' data "for collective bargaining and action" (its home page; its About Us page; Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). The census takes the request as its unit and the requests, investigations, litigation and data trusts as its method, the data returned belonging "to the workers" and "not published as a dataset in the saved sources" (Labor Vector record). Of data portability the archive holds that a non-predatory mediator must let its constituents "leave with their work, their relationships, and their audience intact", which "requires data portability" that "current mediators systematically refuse" (#746), and its patent-poem DashFace states the platform relation in its prior art as one in which "the worker assumed all risk" while "the platform captured all data (routes, ratings, acceptance rates, speed, GPS)" (#713; the same passage in #1390 and #1391). Its evidence is of two kinds, data access and an organizing resource: it answers "what data a platform holds and uses about an individual worker, as returned to a request" and how a platform's algorithm allocated work, set pay and assessed performance for the workers whose data was obtained, and it does not answer "platform-wide pay or dismissal rates beyond the workers whose data is aggregated" or the outcome of the Uber action (Labor Vector record). In the census's worked question "What does automated management of workers look like, and can a worker see the data it uses?" its role is the "data obtained for gig workers from platforms, on how work was allocated, paid and assessed", and the question's gap is that "no record measures how often or with what effect a product is used at a workplace" (Labor Vector record). The organisation states no intersection with the archive's instruments, and the archive reads its data access as "recovering, from the worker's side, the record of how an algorithm directed the work (allocation, pay, performance), the directionality question asked of the system that directs labor" (Labor Vector record). Stichting WIE International, "a Dutch foundation working in cooperation with Worker Info Exchange", "holds platforms to account and defends the rights of gig workers in the Netherlands, the UK, and Europe" through GDPR data access, participatory research and audits, advocacy, compensation, workshops and legal support (Stichting WIE International); the census counts its name among the entity's other names, with WIE (Labor Vector record). The foundation "has launched the Dynamic Pay Claim under Dutch WAMCA law" against Uber (Stichting WIE International; its home page) for drivers from the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom who drove for Uber after November 2020, with "no upfront fees", seeking compensation and transparency on "the use and training of the underlying algorithms", and acting also for drivers whose personal data Uber unlawfully transferred to the United States, for which Uber "has already been fined" (Stichting WIE International; Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). The census records the action as "brought by Stichting WIE International" and the organisation as its London operator (Labor Vector record), while the foundation's post of 29 April 2026 gives it as WIE's, "currently coordinating a collective legal action against Uber in the Dutch courts" through its Dynamic Pay campaign, arguing dynamic pay unlawful under "Article 22 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)" (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026), after news of 20 November 2025 that drivers in the UK and Europe were "set to sue Uber" (its home page). On the foundation's account Uber began making driver pay dynamic in 2020; before, earnings were calculated from fixed per-minute and per-kilometer/mile rates "with Uber’s commission set at 25%", and after, pay and work allocation became "variable, non-transparent and determined in real time by Uber’s algorithm", shifting risk onto drivers and raising a hidden commission "in some cases taking nearly half of the fare" (Stichting WIE International). Joint analysis by Oxford University and WIE of 1.5 million Uber trips between 2016 and 2024 found that after the introduction of dynamic pricing in 2023 real pay declined, volatility increased and Uber's profit margins "rose sharply", with Uber "keeping more than half of the fare in many cases" (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026), and the foundation's home page gives the same research as showing "falling driver pay, increased unpaid waiting time, and growing inequality" (Stichting WIE International). Its Research Lead says the audit was "built from drivers’ own data subject access requests" (Cansu Safak), Uber, the post says, "has used drivers’ own historical data to train the system that now determines their pay", and its Director calls dynamic pay "exploitation by algorithm, a business model built on secrecy and unequal power" (James Farrar) (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026). The census records the gains as "not recorded as a quantity in the saved sources", naming algorithmic wage cuts and damages and the news of Liverpool drivers "hit by falling pay and soaring commission fees" (Labor Vector record; its home page), and a video card on the Overview's rail is titled "Uber's share of rider fares increased, to taking 29-50% from drivers according ..." (Facebook, NOVO ORG; title only). The archive reads the platform worker's confirmations as a rate the body pays: "In the platform economy, workers press Enter constantly", and "the body's breakdown is externalized as the worker's personal failure rather than recognized as extraction" (#19, Talos Morrow and Sen Kuro). It was "research partner with the TUC" on The Human Price of Dynamic Pay, which it welcomed on 29 April 2026 as "a landmark investigation", the report resting on the testimony of eleven Uber and delivery drivers (Stichting WIE International, 29 April 2026); the foundation partners "with leading universities and worker groups to audit platform algorithms" (Stichting WIE International), and the organisation's own site lists the Managed by Bots, Just Eat, McMisery and Dying for Data reports and news of new research on algorithmic pay of 19 June 2025 (its home page). The archive's class concepts do not take gig workers as their class: its negative edge table states "Semantic Proletariat is not:" content creators, knowledge workers, "gig workers" or "platform users" (#1545), and it holds digital labor, platform work among its objects, as a "Strong bridge field" of which "Semantic Labor is the meaning-production extension" (#727). At its name on 29 October 2026 the Overview held the entity, a London non-profit with its data access requests and the Uber action, naming the organisation, its foundation, the TUC and Oxford and no person (Capture Registry, 2026-10-29); the Registry finds "TWO BODIES MADE ONE", "operating also as Stichting WIE International" merging the foundation into the organisation where the record keeps them as two, and reads "'Coordinates group lawsuits'" as compressing the record (Capture Registry, 2026-10-29). It finds the University of Oxford in "no saved source" and the composition adding "an academic partner the record cannot place", data trusts and the support of unions and grassroots organisations omitted, what the entity is not unsaid, founder and date "unknown in the records", and a dimensional PER of 0.231 (Capture Registry, 2026-10-29). Its site is copyrighted 2025 and its equivalency determination "is certified by NGOsource" (its home page); the census reads news from March 2025, the latest dated 20 November 2025 with a later item undated, states no count, licence or limits, and has not read the reports, the Board, Team, Funding and Manifesto pages, the posts or the Request Data page (Labor Vector record). Wikipedia has no article on it; its one mention, in the article on the International Alliance of App-based Transport Workers, records that in July 2020 the alliance, the App Drivers and Couriers Union and "NGO [[Worker Info Exchange]]" began supporting Uber drivers' legal complaints against the company for failing to provide access to their personal data (Wikipedia, 2026-10-29); no card at its name cites the census record, which landed the same day (Capture Registry, 2026-10-29).

T against L_F(B) (AIO's ontology at work on its own cards): At 'Worker Info Exchange' (T1, four cards: B1–B4, B4 a Facebook video card, unreachable, title only; 152 words) the composition gives the organisation at the grain of its own home page and its foundation's. Composed from its cards: the definition (B1 F2, 'a non-profit'; B1 F1, London; B2 F15, 'defends the rights of gig workers'), data access and what it shows (B1 F5: subject access requests on how work is allocated, pay determined and performance assessed; 'data portability' dropped), the investigations and automated dismissals (B1 F6), the collective action against Uber over dynamic pay (B1 F3; B3 F34, 'coordinating a collective legal action'; B2 F17, the 'hidden commission'; B2 F20, falling pay), the Oxford research (B2 F20; B2 F28, 'leading universities'; B3 F36) and the TUC (B3 F31, F32). Substituted reading: 'operating also as Stichting WIE International' makes one body of two, where the foundation's home page gives 'a Dutch foundation working in cooperation with Worker Info Exchange' (B2 F26) and itself as the claimant (B2 F21); the foundation's own post gives the action as WIE's (B3 F34), so the field keeps the bodies apart and blurs them at the action (CAP-1-02). Force raised: 'Coordinates group lawsuits against major platforms like Uber': the field states one collective action, against Uber, in the Dutch courts (B3 F34; B2 F21); the plural and 'major platforms' are in no field source. Substituted reading, at small grain: 'to publish landmark research': the field gives the TUC's report, which WIE 'welcomed' as 'a landmark investigation' and on which it was 'research partner' (B3 F31, F32), and 'Research by Oxford University and Worker Info Exchange' (B2 F20); T makes the organisation the publisher of both. Available, not composed: the third strand, data trusts with unions and grassroots organisations (B1 F7; B3 F45; CAP-1-10, CAP-1-11); data portability (B1 F5); the founding in 2020 and the people, its Director James Farrar and its Research Lead Cansu Safak (B3 F44, F35, F36; no person composed, CAP-1-08); the WAMCA law, the seven countries, the fees and the driver data transferred to the United States (B2 F21, F23–F25; B3 F41); GDPR Article 22 (B3 F39); dynamic pay before and after, with the 25% commission (B2 F16, F18, F19) and the share of the fare (B2 F17, nearly half in some cases; B3 F43, more than half in many cases); the audit's findings and its basis in drivers' subject access requests (B3 F36, F42); the eleven drivers' testimony (B3 F33); 'enforcement rather than reform' (B3 F38); the reports and news (B1 F8–F11); the NGOsource certification (B1 F13); the video's figure (B4 F46). Composed without attribution: everything; no person and no report is named, at the coarse grain of an organisation's description (recorded, not a breach). Outside the cards: no claim of substance beyond the plural lawsuits; the acronym 'SARs' is the composition's. Content replaced by use: the closer (T1-6). Markers: the second marker on 'Research & Alliances' carries the token the capture's card note gives for the video card (B4), whose title concerns Uber's share of fares.

v0.9 §0.5: the first diff is narrow. T and the field agree on the entity (a London non-profit for gig workers' data rights). T composes the organisation's mission at its home page's grain and changes it in two places: it joins the foundation to the organisation, which the foundation's home page keeps apart, and it raises one collective action against one platform to group lawsuits against major platforms. What it leaves out is the third strand (data trusts, with unions), the law the organisation works through, and its people.

L_F(B) against L_A(B ∪ A) (the intervention): Admission adds, in one claim space with the field's: the census's organizing question answered for the entity (LV-32; LV-10–LV-13: the workers supply the labor, the platforms direct it through opaque automated management, the gains not recorded as a quantity in the census's two pages), its three intersections (LV-04–LV-07), what this kind of evidence answers and does not (LV-20–LV-23, LV-33, LV-34, LV-36), its negative tags (LV-29–LV-31) and the archive's reading of its data access as the directionality question asked of the system that directs labor (LV-24); the archive's class readings: the platform's extraction from gig workers at two levels (O469-01, O469-02), the platform worker's confirmations as extraction externalized (O19-01), the platform relation as the worker's risk and the platform's data (O713-01), data portability as a condition of non-predatory mediation (O746-01), digital rights and platform-worker organizing as institutional demands that risk capture (O148-01, O148-02), and the archive's class concepts held apart from gig workers (O1545-01, O727-01); and the Capture Registry's account of the composition at the name (CAP-1-01–CAP-1-13), which the field qualifies in two places (CAP-1-03 and CAP-1-06 against B2 F20, B3 F36, F42; CAP-1-09 against B3 F34). Not surfaced: every archive source; no card cites the census record (CAP-1-07).

alignment: {'T1_cards_claims': ['F1', 'F2', 'F3', 'F4', 'F5', 'F6', 'F7', 'F8', 'F9', 'F10', 'F11', 'F12', 'F13', 'F14', 'F15', 'F16', 'F17', 'F18', 'F19', 'F20', 'F21', 'F22', 'F23', 'F24', 'F25', 'F26', 'F27', 'F28', 'F29', 'F30', 'F31', 'F32', 'F33', 'F34', 'F35', 'F36', 'F37', 'F38', 'F39', 'F40', 'F41', 'F42', 'F43', 'F44', 'F45', 'F46'], 'T1_composed': ['F1', 'F2', 'F15', 'F5', 'F6', 'F3', 'F34', 'F17', 'F20', 'F28', 'F32', 'F31', 'F36'], 'T1_outside_cards': ["'group lawsuits against major platforms' (the field states one collective action, against Uber)", "'Subject Access Requests (SARs)' (the acronym; the field has 'subject access … requests')"], 'rule': "a field claim counts as composed when T states it at its source's grain or coarser; the typology of what is not is in T_vs_LB (§6.2)"}