

The Metaphysics of Sigil II — H3: Theophrastus, On First Principles, and Aristotle, Metaphysics Λ, entire, reconstituted as one work

Sigil

2026-09-08

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Sigil

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}

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Abstract

The maximal reading, and the companion to #1596. Hypothesis H3: one continuous whole, separated, and rearranged into two continuous wholes. Both texts entire in one order — 8,441 words, 3,370 Theophrastus in thirty-five movements and 5,071 Λ in twenty, fifty-five units in eleven parts, nothing omitted and nothing repeated — with the Greek printed whole and unbroken before any apparatus, a working rendering of every unit, and a commentary. The warrant is that no monotone merge of the two received orders exists: matching all sixteen Λ movements to their Theophrastan counterparts by subject gives Spearman $\rho = +0.459$ (permutation $p = 0.039$) and Kendall $\tau\text{-b} = +0.326$, concordant 79, discordant 40, one tied pair, 40 inversions of 120. Λ runs matter → potency → the unmoved mover → the spheres → mind → the good; the fragment runs the mover → doxography → matter → knowing → astronomy → teleology → the good — same matter, same close, inverse middle. Four audits are reported. (1) Clause completeness: one break in 54 junctions, and the composition inherits rather than makes it, since the fragment ends mid-sentence at ἐν τίσι τὰ ὄντα καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. (2) Binding dependencies: connectives naming a specific antecedent (οἱ δὲ requiring its οἱ μὲν, ἥ requiring the aporia it answers, ἀλλὰ μήν answering a step) must have it adjacent; five violations were found and cleared by redividing five movements at their operational seam, each having contained an ending and a beginning at once; two remain and are printed as violations rather than resolved. (3) The instrument: 55 units on the 120 commonest short words, length-controlled, name-crossings not detectably rougher than within-text junctions (difference +0.724, $p = 0.1161$, bootstrap 95% CI −0.174 to +1.603) — underpowered to say identical. (4) The continuity trial: the whole read straight through with every mark stripped, which measures nothing and can only be run by reading, and which produced one relocation the computable audits had not. Usener references for the Theophrastan movements are VERIFIED against van Raalte's margins, correcting eight citations carried in earlier files of this line: the whole demand-cluster stands in Chapter II at 5 a 14 – 5 b 10, not at 8 a 21, and ἐπεισοδιῶδες stands at 4 a 13-16 in Chapter I, not at 11 b 24.

Body

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The Metaphysics of Sigil

Theophrastus, *On First Principles*, and Aristotle, *Metaphysics Λ* , reconstituted as one work

Text under the name **Sigil** · Lee Sharks, ed. · v1.3 · 2026-09-08 Addresses computed from the seated bytes of EA-CORPORA-14 (#1595)

All of both texts, in one order. 8,441 words: 3,370 Theophrastus in thirty-five movements, 5,071 Λ in twenty. Nothing omitted, nothing repeated. Whether this order is original is a separate question from whether it is coherent; this edition claims the second only.

THE WORK

Read this first, whole, without apparatus.

Πῶς ἀφορίσαι δεῖ καὶ ποίοις τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν πρώτων θεωρίαν; ἡ γὰρ δὴ τῆς φύσεως πολυχουστέρᾳ, καὶ ὥς γε δὴ τινὲς φασὶ ἀτακτοτέρᾳ μεταβολὰς ἔχουσα παντοίας· ἡ δὲ τῶν πρώτων ὠρισμένη καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά. διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐν νοητοῖς, οὐκ αἰσθητοῖς, αὐτὴν τιθέασιν ὥς ἀκινήτοις καὶ ἀμεταβλήτοις. καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ σεμνοτέραν καὶ μείζω νομίζουσιν αὐτήν. ἀρχὴ δὲ ποτέρα συναφὴ τις καὶ οἶον κοινωνία πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς τε νοητοῖς καὶ τοῖς τῆς φύσεως, ἢ οὐδεμία, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐκάτερα κεχωρισμένα συνεργοῦντα δέ πως εἰς τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν. εὐλογώτερον οὖν εἶναί τινα συναφὴν καὶ μὴ ἐπεισοδιῶδες τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλ’ οἶον τὰ μὲν πρότερα τὰ δὲ ὕστερα, καὶ ἀρχὰς τὰ δ’ ὑπὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ αἰδία τῶν φθαρτῶν. εἰ δ’ οὖν οὕτω, τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν ποίοις; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς μόνους

τὰ νοητὰ καθάπερ τινές φασιν, οὐτ' ἄγαν εὖσημος ἡ συναφή τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, οὐθ' ὅλως ἀξιοχρέα φαίνεται παντός· οἷον γὰρ μεμηχανημένα δοκεῖ δι' ἡμῶν εἶναι σχήματά τε καὶ μορφὰς καὶ λόγους περιτιθέντων, αὐτὰ δὲ δι' αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν φύσιν. εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕχ ὥστε συνάπτειν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ὥστ' ἐμποιῆσαι καθάπερ ζῶην καὶ κίνησιν αὐτοῖς. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὄνπερ δὴ πρῶτον καὶ κυριώτατόν τινες τιθέασιν. εἰ δὲ ἑτέρα τις οὐσία προτέρα καὶ κρείττων ἐστὶ ταύτην πειρατέον λέγειν, πότερον μία τις κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἢ κατ' εἶδος ἢ κατὰ γένος. περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἷτια ζητοῦνται. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν, ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος· καὶ εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς, κἂν οὕτως πρῶτον ἡ οὐσία, εἴτα τὸ ποιόν, εἴτα τὸ ποσόν. ἅμα δὲ οὐδ' ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ποιότητες καὶ κινήσεις, ἢ καὶ τὸ οὐ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ εὐθύ· λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα, οἷον ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν. ἔτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν. μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἔργῳ· τῆς γὰρ οὐσίας ἐζήτουν ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἷτια. οἱ μὲν οὖν νῦν τὰ καθόλου οὐσίας μᾶλλον τιθέασιν (τὰ γὰρ γένη καθόλου, ἃ φασιν ἀρχὰς καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητεῖν)· οἱ δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ κοινόν, σῶμα. οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθητή—ἥς ἡ μὲν αἰδῖος ἡ δὲ φθαρτή, ἦν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἡ δ' αἰδῖος—ἥς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά· ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασὶ τινες εἶναι χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες, οἱ δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικά μόνον τούτων. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν δὴ φυσικῆς (μετὰ κινήσεως γάρ), αὕτη δὲ ἑτέρας, εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή. ἡ δ' αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή. εἰ δ' ἡ μεταβολὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν μεταξὺ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ πάντων (οὐ λευκὸν γὰρ ἢ φωνή) ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναι τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει· ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία, ἡ ὕλη. εἰ δὴ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τέτταρες, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ πόσον ἢ ποῦ, καὶ γένεσις μὲν ἢ ἀπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ ἢ κατὰ τὸ τόδε, αὕξησις δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὸ πάθος, φορὰ δὲ ἢ κατὰ τόπον, εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἂν εἶεν τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον αἱ μεταβολαί. ἀνάγκη δὴ μεταβάλλειν τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην ἅμφω· ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ὄν (οἷον ἐκ λευκοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖα λευκόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως), ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίνεταί πάντα, δυνάμει μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἔν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ ὁμοῦ πάντα—καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν—“ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὐ”· ὥστε τῆς ὕλης ἂν εἶεν ἡμέτεροι· πάντα δ' ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα μεταβάλλει, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν· καὶ τῶν αἰδῶν ὅσα μὴ γενητὰ κινήτὰ δὲ φορᾷ, ἀλλ' οὐ γενητὴν ἀλλὰ ποθὲν ποί. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος ἢ γένεσις· τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δὴ τι ἔστι δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου· οὐδ' ἱκανὸν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα· διαφέρει γὰρ τῇ ὕλει, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ἄπειρα ἐγένετο ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν; ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἷς, ὥστ' εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη μία, ἐκεῖνο ἐγένετο ἐνεργείᾳ οὗ ἡ ὕλη ἦν δυνάμει. τρία δὲ τὰ αἷτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν ἢ ἐναντιώσεις, ἥς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη. μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίνεταί οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τινος καὶ εἰς τι· ὑφ' οὗ μὲν, τοῦ πρώτου κινουῦντος· ὁ δὲ, ἡ ὕλη· εἰς ὃ δὲ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἴσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ὁ χαλκὸς γίνεταί στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ ὁ χαλκός· ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι.—μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι ἐκάστη ἐκ συνωνύμου γίνεταί οὐσία (τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα). ἡ γὰρ τέχνη ἢ φύσει γίνεταί ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ), αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε καθόλου καὶ κοινόν τι λαβεῖν ἐν τοῖς πλεοναχῶς λεγομένοις. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄπορον ἢ οὐ ῥάδιόν γε εἰπεῖν μέχρι πόσου καὶ τίνων ζητητέον αἰτίας ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ

νοητοῖς· ἡ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον ὁδὸς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἀλλοτρία καὶ ἀναιροῦσα τὸ φρονεῖν. ἀρχὴ δὲ τρόπον τινὰ ἄμφω. τάχα δ' ἡ μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ δ' ἀπλῶς, ἡ τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡ δ' ἡμετέρα τις ἀρχή. μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινὸς δυνάμεθα δι' αἰτίου θεωρεῖν ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λαμβάνοντες. ὅταν δὲ ἐπ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἄκρα καὶ πρῶτα μεταβαίνωμεν οὐκέτι δυνάμεθα, εἴτε διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν αἰτίαν εἴτε διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν ὥσπερ πρὸς τὰ φωτεινότατα βλέπειν. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶόν τ' εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων τῷ ἐκ στοιχείων συγκειμένῳ τὸ αὐτό, οἶον τῷ BA τὸ B ἢ A (οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν, οἶον τὸ ὄν ἢ τὸ ἐν· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἐκάστω καὶ τῶν συνθέτων). οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἔσται αὐτῶν οὐτ' οὐσία οὔτε πρὸς τι· ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα πάντων ταῦτα στοιχεῖα.—ἡ ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δ' ὥς οὐ, οἶον ἴσως τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων ὥς μὲν εἶδος τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἢ στέρησις, ὕλη δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ταῦτα πρῶτον καθ' αὐτό, οὐσίαι δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων, ὧν ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα, ἡ εἴ τι ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ γίνεταί ἐν, οἶον σὰρξ ἢ ὅστουν· ἕτερον γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐκείνων εἶναι τὸ γενόμενον. τούτων μὲν οὖν ταῦτα στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαί (ἄλλων δ' ἄλλα), πάντων δὲ οὕτω μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνάλογον δέ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ἀρχαὶ εἰσὶ τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη. ἀλλ' ἕκαστον τούτων ἕτερον περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἐστίν, οἶον ἐν χρώματι λευκὸν μέλαν ἐπιφάνεια· φῶς σκότος ἀήρ, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς οἶον τὸ κινεῖν, δηλὸν ὅτι ἕτερον ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον, αἴτια δ' ἄμφω, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δ' ὥς κινεῖν ἢ ἰστὰν ἀρχὴ τις καὶ οὐσία, ὥστε στοιχεῖα μὲν κατ' ἀναλογίαν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέτταρες· ἄλλο δ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὥς κινεῖν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. ὑγίεια, νόσος, σῶμα· τὸ κινεῖν ἰατρικὴ. εἶδος, ἀταξία τοιαδί, πλύνθαι· τὸ κινεῖν οἰκοδομικὴ καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινεῖν ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀνθρώπῳ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίας τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον, τρόπον τινὰ τρία αἴτια ἂν εἴη, ὡδὶ δὲ τέτταρα. ὑγίεια γὰρ πῶς ἢ ἰατρικὴ, καὶ οἰκίας εἶδος ἢ οἰκοδομικὴ, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ· ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὥς πρῶτον πάντων κινεῖν πάντα. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν χωριστὰ τὰ δ' οὐ χωριστά, οὐσίαι ἐκείνα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντων αἴτια ταῦτά, ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις. ἔπειτα ἔσται ταῦτα ψυχὴ ἴσως καὶ σῶμα, ἢ νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις καὶ σῶμα.—ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἶον ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις· ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως. ἐν ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν ἐνέργεια ἔστιν ὅτε δὲ δυνάμει, οἶον οἶνος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ἄνθρωπος (πίπτει δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ εἰρημένα αἴτια· ἐνέργεια μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, ἐὰν ἢ χωριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν στέρησις δέ, οἶον σκότος ἢ κάμνον, δυνάμει δὲ ἡ ὕλη· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ δυνάμενον γίνεσθαι ἄμφω)· πῶς δὲ ποτε χρὴ καὶ ποίας τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑποθέσθαι τάχ' ἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις, πότερον ἀμόρφους καὶ οἶον δυναμικὰς ὥσπερ ὅσοι πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἢ μεμορφωμένας ὥς μάλιστα δέον ταύτας ὠρίσθαι καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ φησὶν· οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι (ὅσα γὰρ ἀφῆ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκεείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ ἕξις τις εἰς ἣν· ἔτι τρίτη ἢ ἐκ τούτων ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἶον Σωκράτης ἢ Καλλίας. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν συνθετὴν οὐσίαν, οἶον οἰκίας τὸ εἶδος, εἰ μὴ ἡ τέχνη (οὐδ' ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ τούτων, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἰκία τε ἢ ἄνευ ὕλης καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ τέχνην), ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει· διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἶδη ἔστιν ὅποσα φύσει, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἶδη ἄλλα τούτων οἶον πῦρ σὰρξ κεφαλὴ· ἅπαντα γὰρ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ τῆς μάλιστ' οὐσίας ἡ τελευταία. τὰ μὲν οὖν κινεῖν αἴτια ὥς προγεγεννημένα ὄντα, τὰ δ' ὥς ὁ λόγος ἅμα. ὅτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τότε καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας ἅμα καὶ ἡ χαλκὴ σφαῖρα (εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἶον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς· πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως). φανερόν δὴ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ διὰ γε ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰς ιδέας· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν τινὰ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγείας ἐστίν. τὰ δ' αἴτια καὶ αἱ

ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι δ' ὥς, ἂν καθόλου λέγη τις καὶ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ταῦτ' πάντων. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις πότερον ἕτεροι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι, καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον εἰ ταῦτ' πάντων· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρὸς τι καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι. τί οὖν τοῦτ' ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν, πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν στοιχεῖον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδέν τῆς οὐσίας. ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται πάντων εἶναι ταῦτ' στοιχεῖα; ἐπιποθεῖ δὲ τινα καὶ τὰ τοιάδε λόγον πῶς ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων ὁ μερισμὸς εἰς ὕλην καὶ μορφήν· πότερον ὥς τὸ μὲν ὄν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, δυνάμει μὲν ὄν καὶ ἀγόμενον εἰς ἐνέργειαν; ἢ ὄν μὲν, ἀόριστον δὲ καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, ἢ δὲ γένεσις τῆς οὐσίας ἔνεκα τὸ μορφοῦσθαι κατὰ τοὺς λόγους. ἀλλ' οὕτω γ' εἰς μὲν τὸ βέλτιον τάχ' ἂν ἡ μετάβασις εἴη, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐθὲν ἂν ἦττον ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχοι κατ' αὐτὴν — οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ γίγνοιτο μὴ ὑπαρχούσης —, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε τότε μήτε ποιὸν μήτε ποσόν, ὥς ἀόριστον τοῖς εἶδεσι δύνανται δέ τιν' ἔχον. ἄλλως δ' ἐνεργεῖα καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρει ὧν μὴ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη, ὧν ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου αἷτιον τὰ τε στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὥς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι ἄλλο ἔξω οἶον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος, οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα οὐτ' εἶδος οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε ὁμοειδὲς ἀλλὰ κινουῦντα. ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾷν δεῖ ὅτι τὰ μὲν καθόλου ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, τὰ δ' οὐ. πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει. ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὖν τὰ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθόλου, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ Πηλεὺς Ἀχιλλέως σοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ, καὶ τοδὶ τὸ Β τουδὶ τοῦ ΒΑ, ὅλως δὲ τὸ Β τοῦ ἀπλῶς ΒΑ. ἔπειτα, εἰ δὴ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων αἷτια καὶ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ἐλέγχθη, τῶν μὴ ἐν ταύτῳ γένει, χρωμάτων ψόφων οὐσιῶν ποσότητος, πλὴν τῷ ἀνάλογον· καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύτῳ εἶδει ἕτερα, οὐκ εἶδει ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἄλλο, ἢ τε σὴ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κινῆσαν καὶ ἡ ἐμή, τῷ καθόλου δὲ λόγῳ ταῦτά. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τίνες ἀρχαὶ ἢ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ ποιῶν, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεροι, δηλὸν ὅτι πολλαχῶς γε λεγομένων ἔστιν ἐκάστου, διαιρεθέντων δὲ οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλ' ἕτερα, πλὴν ὡδὶ καὶ πάντων, ὡδὶ μὲν ταῦτ' ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅτι ὕλη, εἶδος, στέρησις, τὸ κινεῖν, καὶ ὡδὶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν αἷτια ὥς αἷτια πάντων, ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων· ἔτι τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεῖα· ὡδὶ δὲ ἕτερα πρῶτα ὅσα τὰ ἐναντία ἂ μὴτε ὥς γένη λέγεται μὴτε πολλαχῶς λέγεται· καὶ ἔτι αἱ ὕλαι. τίνες μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς ἕτεροι, εἴρηται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία δ' ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι αἰδιδόν τινα οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον. αἱ τε γὰρ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων, καὶ εἰ πᾶσαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά· ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι (ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν), οὐδὲ χρόνον. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου· ὅλως δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ληπτέον ἐπὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ εἰ τις ὁμοιότης ἄλλη. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα περιεργίαν τοῦ ζητεῖν τί δὴ ποτε ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ ὅλη δ' οὐσία τοῦ παντὸς ἐν ἐναντίοις ἐστὶ, καὶ σχεδὸν ἰσομοιρεῖ τὸ χεῖρον τῷ βελτίονι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πολλῷ πλεον ἐστὶν, ὥστε δοκεῖν καὶ Κύριπίδην καθόλου λέγειν ὥς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλά. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἐγγυὲς τοῦ ζητεῖν ὅτι οὐ πάντ' ἀγαθὰ οὐδὲ πάντα ὅμοια· καὶ ὅτι κατὰ πάντων μὲν τὸ εἶναι λέγομεν, οὐθὲν δὲ ὅμοιον ἀλλήλοις καθάπερ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ἐν αὐτοῖς. τοῖς γὰρ τιμιωτάτοις οἰκειότατον ἡ τάξις καὶ τὸ ὠρίσθαι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς σχεδὸν ἔχειν οὕτω καθάπερ τῇ γραμματικῇ καὶ μουσικῇ καὶ ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς. συνακολουθεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας ὁμοίως αἵπερ τὴν φύσιν μιμοῦνται· καὶ τὰ ὄργανα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμόρφους πάσας, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὰς ὑλικάς· οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρας ἐμμόρφους, καὶ τὰς τῆς ὕλης, ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ τέλεον· οἶον γὰρ ἐξ ἀντικειμένων τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν. ἄλογον δὲ κάκεῖνο δόξειεν ἂν εἰ ὁ μὲν ὅλος οὐρανὸς καὶ ἕκαστα τῶν μερῶν ἅπαντ' ἐν τάξει καὶ λόγῳ καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ δυνάμεσι καὶ περιόδοις,

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μὴθὲν τοιοῦτον ἀλλ' ὥσπερ σάρξ εἰκὴ κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιστος, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, ὁ κόσμος. καὶ κατὰ τοῦλάχιστον δ' ὡς εἶπεῖν λαμβάνουσιν ὁμοίως ἐν ἀψύχοις καὶ ἐμψύχοις. ὠρισμένοι γὰρ ἐκάστων αἱ φύσεις ὡς εἶπεῖν καίπερ αὐτομάτως γινομένων, τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἀορίστους εἶναι. χαλεπὸν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸ τὸ τοὺς λόγους ἐκάστοις περιθεῖναι πρὸς τὸ ἔνεκά του συνάγοντας ἐν ἅπασι καὶ ἐν ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πομφόλυγι· πλὴν εἰ συμβαίνει τῇ ἐτέρων τάξει καὶ μεταβολῇ μορφᾶς παντοίας καὶ ποικιλίας γίνεσθαι τῶν τε περὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν γῆν. ὧν δὴ μέγιστόν τινες παράδειγμα ποιοῦνται τὰ περὶ τὰς ὥρας τὰς ἐτείους ἐν αἷς καὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ καρπῶν γενέσεις οἷον γεννῶντος τοῦ ἡλίου. ἔτι δὲ τὸ δοκοῦν παραδοξότερον ὡς οὐχ οἷον τε τὸ ὄν ἄνευ τῶν ἐναντίων. οἱ δ' ἔτι πλεόνι τῷ παραδόξῳ χρώμενοι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴδὲ γεγονὸς μὴδὲ μέλλον προσκαταριθμοῦσιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἤδε μὲν οἷον ὑπερβατός τις σοφία. τὸ δὲ ὄν ὅτι πολλαχῶς φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς θεωρεῖ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ζητεῖ· τάχα δ' ἀληθέστερον εἶπεῖν ὡς ὑποβάλλει τῇ διανοίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ζητοῦσα, τὰ δ' ἀπορίαν ἐργαζομένη δι' ἧς καὶ μὴ δύνηται προβαίνειν ὅμως ἐμφαίνεται τι φῶς ἐν τῷ μὴ φωτὶ ζητούντων ἐπὶ πλεόν. τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἄρα οὐκ ἄνευ διαφορᾶς τινός. εἴτε γὰρ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων διαφορά τις· ἐν τε τοῖς καθόλου πλειόνων ὄντων τῶν ὑπὸ τὰ καθόλου διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα, ἐάν τε γένη τὰ καθόλου ἐάν τε εἶδη. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμη πᾶσα τῶν ιδίων· ἡ τε γὰρ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον ἴδιον, τὰ τε θεωρούμενα καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἦν ἂν τι κατὰ τινος. ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ συνιδεῖν ἐπιστήμης, ἥτοι κοινῇ καὶ καθόλου λεγόμενον, ἡ ἰδίᾳ πως καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ἀριθμοῖς γραμμαῖς ζώοις φυτοῖς. τέλος δ' ἡ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. ἔστι δ' ἐνίων μὲν τὸ καθόλου τέλος, ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον· τῶν δὲ τὸ ἐν μέρει, καθ' ὅσα διαίρεσις εἰς τὰ ἄτομα καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς καὶ ποιητοῖς· οὕτως γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια. ταῦτό δ' ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ εἶδει καὶ γένει καὶ ἀναλογίᾳ καὶ εἰ ἄρα παρὰ ταῦτα διαιρέσει. διὰ πλείστου δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ὡς ἂν ἀπέχοντες πλεῖστον τὰ μὲν δι' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ δὲ διὰ τᾶμψω. πλεοναχῶς δ' ὄντος τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι πῶς ἕκαστον μεταδιωκτέον ἀρχὴ καὶ μέγιστον ὁ οἰκεῖος τρόπος, οἷον τὰ πρῶτα καὶ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ κινητὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν φύσιν, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα μέχρι ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ἐσχάτων τῶν ἀψύχων. ἔστι γὰρ τι καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἴδιον ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς. ἔχει δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ μαθήματα διαφορὰν καίπερ ὁμογενῇ πως ὄντα, διήρηται δ' ἱκανῶς. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔνια γνωστὰ τῷ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, καθάπερ τινὲς φασιν, ἴδιος ἂν ὁ τρόπος εἴη, διαιρέσεως δὲ τινος δεῖται· τάχα δ' ἐφ' ὧν ἐνδέχεται κατ' ἀναλογίαν οἰκειότερον λέγειν ἢ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνώστῳ, καθάπερ εἰ τις τῷ ἀοράτῳ τὸ ὁρατόν. πόσοι δ' οὖν τρόποι καὶ ποσαχῶς τὸ εἰδέναι πειρατέον διελεῖν. ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ πρὸς αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πρῶτον τὸ ἀφορίσαι τί τὸ ἐπίστασθαι. χαλεπώτερον δ' ἂν δόξειεν· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνταῦθα που ζητεῖ τὴν σκέψιν, ἀφορισμὸν ἀπαιτοῦνμέχρι πόσου τὸ τεταγμένον, καὶ διὰ τί πλεόν ἀδύνατον ἢ εἰς τὸ χεῖρον μετάβασις. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ὁ πρῶτος λόγος εἰκότως ἂν τις καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἡρεμίας ἀπορήσειεν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς βέλτιον ἀνάψειεν ἂν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, εἰ δ' ὡς ἀργία καὶ στέρησις τῆς κινήσεως οὐκ ἀνάψει. ἀλλ' εἴπερ, τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀντιμεταλλακτέον ὡς προτέραν καὶ τιμωτέραν τὴν δὲ κίνησιν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς· ἐπεὶ τό γε διὰ τοῦτ' ἡρεμεῖν ὡς ἀδύνατον ἀεὶ κινεῖν εἶναι τὸ κινεῖν ἄτοπον· καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχῆς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος· ἡ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος. κίνησις δ' οὐκ ἔστι συνεχῆς ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἢ κύκλῳ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ' ἐάν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν αἰδίους, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἶδη, εἰ μὴ τις δυναμένη ἐνέσται ἀρχὴ μεταβάλλειν· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' αὕτη ἱκανή, οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἶδη· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσῃ, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις. ἔτι οὐδ' εἰ ἐνεργήσῃ, ἡ δ' οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις αἰδίου· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὄν μὴ εἶναι. δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην

ἥς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια. ἔτι τοίνυν ταύτας δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἄνευ ὕλης· αἰδίου γὰρ δεῖ, εἶπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι αἶδιον. ἐνέργεια ἄρα. καίτοι ἀπορία· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργοῦν πᾶν δύνασθαι τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον οὐ πᾶν ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε πρότερον εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, οὐθὲν ἔσται τῶν ὄντων· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δύνασθαι μὲν εἶναι μήπω δ' εἶναι. καίτοι εἰ ὡς λέγουσιν οἱ θεολόγοι οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς γεννῶντες, ἢ ὡς οἱ φυσικοὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματά φασι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον. πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μὴ ἔσται ἐνεργεία τι αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ ἢ γε ὕλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπιμήνια οὐδ' ἡ γῆ, ἀλλὰ τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ἡ γονή. διὸ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων· ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναι φασι κίνησιν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί καὶ τίνα οὐ λέγουσιν, οὐδ', εἰ ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδί, τὴν αἰτίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἔσπερ νῦν φύσει μὲν ὡδί, βία δὲ ἢ ὑπὸ νοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ὡδί. (εἴτα ποία πρώτη; διαφέρει γὰρ ἀμήχανον ὅσον). ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν ἢν οἶεται ἐνίοτε ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἢ ψυχῇ, ὡς φησὶν. τὸ μὲν δὴ δύναμιν οἶεσθαι ἐνεργείας πρότερον ἔστι μὲν ὡς καλῶς ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ (εἴρηται δὲ πῶς)· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κίνδυνος πρῶτον μὴ λογοειδὲς καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ ἀξιόπιστον ἀλλὰ μείζω τινὰ αἰτίαν ζητεῖ. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τρόπον τινὰ συναυδοῦν ὡς ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κινεῖν ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ διὰ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. ἔστι δὲ ἂν τις ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἄγῃ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸν θεόν. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον λεχθὲν ὡς οὐ μιμοῦνται τὰ ὀρεγόμενα τοῦ ἡρεμοῦντος· εἰ γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὖσιν ἀκολουθεῖν τῶν ἄλλων. πλὴν ἴσως οὐχ ὁμοίως ληπτέον ὡς εἰς τὸ ἀμερὲς ἄγοντας ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα σύμφωνον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἀπηρτισμένον ὡς ἂν πόλις ἢ ζῶον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν μεριστῶν, ἢ καὶ ὁ ὅλος οὐρανὸς ὃν δὴ φασιν εἶναι τελεώτατον. ὅτι δ' ἐνέργεια πρότερον, μαρτυρεῖ Ἀναξαγόρας (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνέργεια) καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ λέγοντες κίνησιν εἶναι, ὡςπερ Λεύκιππος· ὥστ' οὐκ ἦν ἄπειρον χρόνον χάος ἢ νύξ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά ἀεὶ ἢ περιόδῳ ἢ ἄλλως, εἶπερ πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως. εἰ δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ περιόδῳ, δεῖ τι ἀεὶ μένειν ὡσαύτως ἐνεργοῦν. εἰ δὲ μέλλει γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ εἶναι, ἄλλο δεῖ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὡδὶ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὡδὶ δὲ κατ' ἄλλο· ἦτοι ἄρα καθ' ἕτερον ἢ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον. ἀνάγκη δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο αὐτῷ τε αἴτιον κάκείνῳ. οὐκοῦν βέλτιον τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ αἴτιον ἦν ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως· τοῦ δ' ἄλλως ἕτερον, τοῦ δ' ἀεὶ ἄλλως ἄμφω δηλονότι. οὐκοῦν οὕτως καὶ ἔχουσιν αἱ κινήσεις. τί οὖν ἄλλας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀρχάς; ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτω τ' ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως, ἐκ νυκτὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, λύοιτ' ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἁπαστον, αὕτη δ' ἢ κύκλῳ (καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ' ἔργῳ δηλον), ὥστ' αἶδιος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός. ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινεῖν καὶ μέσον, τοίνυν ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, αἶδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὔσα. κινεῖ δὲ ὥδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. εὐλογώτερον δ' οὖν ἀρχῆς φύσιν ἔχουσιν ἐν ὀλίγοις εἶναι καὶ περιττοῖς εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ πρώτοις καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ. τίς δ' οὖν αὕτη καὶ τίνες, εἰ πλείους, πειρατέον ἐμφαίνειν ἀμωσγέπως εἴτε κατ' ἀναλογίαν εἴτε κατ' ἄλλην ὁμοίωσιν. ἀνάγκη δ' ἴσως δυνάμει τινὶ καὶ ὑπεροχῇ τῶν ἄλλων λαμβάνειν ὡςπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν θεόν· θεία γὰρ ἢ πάντων ἀρχὴ δι' ἣς ἅπαντα καὶ ἔστι καὶ διαμένει. τάχα μὲν οὖν ῥάδιον τὸ οὕτως ἀποδοῦναι, χαλεπὸν δὲ σαφεστέρως ἢ πειστικώτερος. τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπέειπερ συνάπτει τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἢ δὲ φύσις ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐν κινήσει καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτῆς τὸ ἴδιον, δηλον ὡς αἰτίαν θετέον ταύτην τῆς κινήσεως· ἐπεὶ δ' ἀκίνητος καθ' αὐτὴν φανερόν ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῷ κινεῖσθαι τοῖς τῆς φύσεως αἰτία ἀλλὰ λοιπὸν ἄλλῃ τινὶ δυνάμει κρεῖττονι καὶ προτέρῳ· τοιαύτη δ' ἢ τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ φύσις, ἀφ' ἣς ἡ κυκλικὴ ἢ συνεχὴς καὶ ἁπαστος. ὥστε κατ' ἐκεῖνο λύοιτο ἂν τὸ μὴ εἶναι κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἢ εἰ κινούμενον κινήσει. μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων οἷον ἄρτιος ὁ λόγος ἀρχὴν τε ποιῶν μίαν πάντων καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποδιδούς, ἔτι δὲ μὴ διαιρετὸν μηδὲ ποσόν τι λέγων ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἐξαίρων εἰς κρεῖττω τινὰ μερίδα καὶ

θειοτέραν οὕτω γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀποδοτέον ἢ τὸ διαιρετὸν καὶ μεριστὸν ἀραιρετέον· ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλευτὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὄν καλόν· ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις. νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ' αὐτήν· καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἀπλὴ καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἀπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν μέτρον σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ ἀπλοῦν πῶς ἔχον αὐτό). ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἶρετὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ· καὶ ἔστιν ἄριστον αἰεὶ ἢ ἀνάλογον τὸ πρῶτον. ὅτι δ' ἔστι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῖ· ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τινός, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστι. κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενα δὲ τᾶλλα κινεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ' εἰ ἡ φορὰ πρώτη ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστίν, ἢ κινεῖται ταύτη γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ' οὐσίαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνέργειά ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλω· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. ἅμα γὰρ ἐν ὑψηλοτέρῳ τε καὶ ἀληθινωτέρῳ λόγῳ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡ ἀπόφασις. τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη λόγου δεῖται πλείονος περὶ τῆς ἐφέσεως, ποία καὶ τίνων. ἐπειδὴ πλείω τὰ κυκλικά καὶ αἱ φοραὶ τρόπον τινὰ ὑπεναντίαι, καὶ τὸ ἀνήνυτον καὶ οὐ χάριν ἀφανές. εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τὸ κινοῦν, ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ πάντα τὴν αὐτήν· εἴτε καθ' ἕκαστον ἕτερον αἶ τ' ἀρχαί πλείους ὥστε τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶν εἰς ὅρεξιν ἰόνκ τῶν τὴν ἀρίστην οὐδαμῶς φανερόν. τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν τῆς αἰτίας μερίζονα ζητεῖ λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὁ γε τῶν ἀστρολόγων. πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλῆθους οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὁ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἶπεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς ιδέας ὑπόληψις οὐδεμίαν ἔχει σκέψιν ἰδίαν (ἀριθμοὺς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς ιδέας οἱ λέγοντες ιδέας, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅτε μὲν ὡς περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν ὅτε δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὠρισμένων· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν, οὐδὲν λέγεται μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς)· ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ διωρισμένων λεκτέον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην αἰδίον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τινος κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ' αὐτό, καὶ τὴν αἰδίον κίνησιν ὑπὸ αἰδίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ὑφ' ἑνός, ὁρῶμεν δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ἀπλὴν φοράν, ἣν κινεῖν φανερὸν τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἄλλας φορὰς οὕσας τὰς τῶν πλανήτων αἰδίους (αἰδίον γὰρ καὶ ἄστατον τὸ κύκλω σῶμα· δέδεικται δ' ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων ἐκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ' ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι καθ' αὐτήν καὶ αἰδίου οὐσίας. ἢ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρον φύσις αἰδίος οὐσία τις οὔσα, καὶ τὸ κινοῦν αἰδίον καὶ πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου, καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας τε οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τε φύσιν αἰδίου καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ἄνευ μεγέθους διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον. —ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ τούτων τις πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρον, φανερόν· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφίας τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας· αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν αἰδίου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας, οἷον ἢ τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείους τῶν φερομένων αἱ φοραί, φανερόν τοῖς καὶ μετρίως ἡμένοις (πλείους γὰρ ἕκαστον φέρεται μιᾶς τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρον)· πόσαι δ' αὗται τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι, νῦν μὲν ἡμεῖς ἂ λέγουσι τῶν μαθηματικῶν τινὲς ἐννοίας χάριν λέγομεν, ὅπως ἢ τι τῇ διανοίᾳ πλῆθος ὠρισμένον ὑπολαβεῖν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὰ μὲν ζητοῦντας αὐτοὺς δεῖ τὰ δὲ πυνθανομένους παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων, ἅν τι φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα τοῖς ταῦτα πραγματευομένοις, φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, πεῖθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις.—Εὐδοξος μὲν οὖν ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἐκατέρου τὴν φορὰν ἐν τρισὶν ἐτίθετ' εἶναι σφαίραις, ὧν τὴν μὲν πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν

ἄστρον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν κατὰ τὸν διὰ μέσων τῶν ζωδίων, τὴν δὲ τρίτην κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον ἐν τῷ πλάτει τῶν ζωδίων (ἐν μείζονι δὲ πλάτει λελοξώσθαι καθ' ὃν ἡ σελήνη φέρεται ἢ καθ' ὃν ὁ ἥλιος), τῶν δὲ πλανωμένων ἄστρον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐκάστου σφαίραις, καὶ τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν πρώτην καὶ δευτέραν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐκείναις (τὴν τε γὰρ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν ἀπάσας φέρουσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ ταύτῃ τεταγμένην καὶ κατὰ τὸν διὰ μέσων τῶν ζωδίων τὴν φορὰν ἔχουσιν κοινὴν ἀπασῶν εἶναι), τῆς δὲ τρίτης ἀπάντων τοὺς πόλους ἐν τῷ διὰ μέσων τῶν ζωδίων εἶναι, τῆς δὲ τετάρτης τὴν φορὰν κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον πρὸς τὸν μέσον ταύτης· εἶναι δὲ τῆς τρίτης σφαίρας τοὺς πόλους τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἰδίους, τοὺς δὲ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης καὶ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ τοὺς αὐτοὺς· Κάλλιππος δὲ τὴν μὲν θέσιν τῶν σφαιρῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐτίθετο Εὐδόξω τοῦτ' ἔστι τῶν ἀποστημάτων τὴν τάξιν, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῷ μὲν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τῷ τοῦ Κρόνου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ ἀπεδίδου, τῷ δ' ἡλίῳ καὶ τῇ σελήνῃ δύο ὦετο ἔτι προσθετάς εἶναι σφαίρας, τὰ φαινόμενα εἰ μέλλει τις ἀποδώσειν, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τῶν πλανήτων ἐκάστῳ μίαν. ἀναγκαῖον δέ, εἰ μέλλουσι συντεθεῖσαι πᾶσαι τὰ φαινόμενα ἀποδώσειν, καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων ἐτέρας σφαίρας μιᾷ ἐλάττονας εἶναι τὰς ἀνελιττούσας καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποκαθιστάσας τῇ θέσει τὴν πρώτην σφαῖραν ἀεὶ τοῦ ὑποκάτω τεταγμένου ἄστρον· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἐνδέχεται τὴν τῶν πλανήτων φορὰν ἅπαντα ποιεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν αἷς μὲν αὐτὰ φέρεται σφαίραις αἱ μὲν ὀκτὼ αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν εἰσιν, τούτων δὲ μόνος οὐ δεῖ ἀνελιχθῆναι ἐν αἷς τὸ κατωτάτω τεταγμένον φέρεται, αἱ μὲν τὰς τῶν πρώτων δύο ἀνελιττούσαις ἔξ ἔσονται, αἱ δὲ τὰς τῶν ὑστερον τεττάρων ἐκκαίδεκα· ὁ δὲ ἀπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττούσων ταύτας πεντήκοντά τε καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ προστιθεῖται τις ἄς εἴπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἐπτά τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα.—τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους καὶ τὰς αἰσθητάς τοσαύτας εὐλογον ὑπολαβεῖν (τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις λέγειν)· εἰ δὲ μηδεμίαν οἶόν τ' εἶναι φορὰν μὴ συντείνουσιν πρὸς ἄστρον φορὰν, ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν φύσιν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀπαθῇ καὶ καθ' αὐτὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου τετυχηκυῖαν τέλος εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη παρὰ ταύτας ἐτέρα φύσις, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν. εἴτε γὰρ εἰσὶν ἕτεραι, κινούσιν ἂν ὡς τέλος οὐσαι φορᾶς· ἀλλὰ εἰναὶ γε ἄλλας φορὰς ἀδύνατον παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. τοῦτο δὲ εὐλογον ἐκ τῶν φερομένων ὑπολαβεῖν. εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φέρον τοῦ φερομένου χάριν πέφυκε καὶ φορὰ πᾶσα φερομένου τινός ἐστιν, οὐδεμία φορὰ αὐτῆς ἂν ἔνεκα εἴη οὐδ' ἄλλης φορᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄστρον ἔνεκα. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται φορὰ φορᾶς ἔνεκα, καὶ ἐκείνην ἐτέρου δεήσει χάριν εἶναι· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἶόν τε εἰς ἄπειρον, τέλος ἔσται πάσης φορᾶς τῶν φερομένων τι θείων σωμάτων κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν. ὅτι δὲ εἷς οὐρανός, φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ πλείους οὐρανοὶ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, ἔσται εἶδει μία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχή, ἀριθμῷ δὲ γε πολλά. ἀλλ' ὅσα ἀριθμῷ πολλά, ὕλην ἔχει (εἷς γὰρ λόγος καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πολλῶν, οἶον ἀνθρώπου, Σωκράτης δὲ εἷς)· τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον· ἐντελέχεια γάρ. ἐν ἅρᾳ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖται ἀκίνητον ὄν· καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἅρᾳ ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς· εἷς ἅρᾳ οὐρανὸς μόνος. παραδέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπάλαιων ἐν μύθῳ σχήματι καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὑστερον ὅτι θεοὶ τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοὺς ὦντο τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν εἰρησθαι νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἶον λείψανα περισσεῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. ἢ μὲν οὖν πατριος δόξα καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανερὰ μόνον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ πῶς ποτὲ φυσικὴν ὄρεξιν ἐχόντων οὐ τὴν ἡρεμίαν διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν

κίνησιν. τί οὖν ἅμα τῇ μιμήσει φασὶν ἐκεῖνο ὅσοι τε τὸ ἐν καὶ ὅσοι τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς λέγουσιν; καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς φασι τὸ ἐν. εἰ δὲ ἔφεσις, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου, μετὰ ψυχῆς. εἰ μὴ τις λέγοι καθ' ὁμοιότητα καὶ διαφορὰν ἔμψυχα εἶναι τὰ κινούμενα. ψυχὴ δ' ἅμα δοκεῖ καὶ κίνησις ὑπάρχειν ζωῇ γὰρ τοῖς ἔχουσιν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ αἱ ὀρέξεις πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ζώοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καίπερ ἐν τῷ πάσχειν οὔσαι δι' ἐτέρων ὁμως ἔμψυχοι γίνονται. εἰ δ' οὖν τῆς κυκλικῆς αἰτίου τὸ πρῶτον οὐ τῆς ἀρίστης ἂν εἴη· κρείττων γὰρ ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πρώτη δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ τῆς διανοίας ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις. τάχα δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν τις ἐπιζητήσῃ διὰ τί τὰ κυκλικά μόνον ἐφετικά, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ μέσον οὐθὲν καίπερ κινητῶν ὄντων, πότερον ὡς ἀδύνατα ἢ ὡς οὐ δικνουμένου τοῦ πρώτου. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ' ἄτοπον εἰ δι' ἀσθένειαν· ἰσχυρότερον γὰρ ἂν τις ἀξιώσει τοῦ Ὀμήρου Διὸς ὅς φησιν αὐτῇ κεν γαίῃ ἐρύσαιμ' αὐτῇ τε θαλάσση. ἀλλὰ λοιπὸν ὥσπερ ἀδεκτόν τι καὶ ἀσύνητον εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὰς φορὰς καὶ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰς ἀποστάσεις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀστρολογία δείκνυσι, τούτοις κατάλοιπον τά τε πρῶτα κινούμενα καὶ τὸ τίνας ἕνεκα λέγειν καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις ἐκάστου καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα θέσις καὶ ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐσία καὶ ὑποβαίνουντι δὴ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἡμέρων ἄχρι ζώων καὶ φυτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἀστρολογία συνεργεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις δὲ τῆς φύσεως, ἕτερα τὰ κυριώτατ' ἂν εἴη καὶ πρότερα· καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὁ τρόπος ὡς οἴονται τινες οὐ φύσικὸς ἢ οὐ πᾶς. τάχα δὲ πρότερον ζητήσῃεν ἂν τις πῶς ἔχει, πότερα μέρη ταῦτα ἢ οὐ μέρη τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ εἰ μέρη, πῶς μέρη. νῦν γὰρ οἶον ἀπεωσμένα τῶν ἐντιμοτάτων οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰς χώρας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, εἴπερ ἡ κυκλικὴ τοιαύτη. συμβαίνει γὰρ οἶον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπὸ τῆς κυκλικῆς περιφορᾶς καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα τὰς μεταβολάς. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου κάλλιον ἂν τι παρὰ τοῦ πρώτου δέοι τῆς κυκλοφορίας, εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ἐκωλύετο τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι δέχεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ δὴ πρῶτον καὶ θεϊότατον πάντα τὰ ἄριστα βουλούμενον. τάχα δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οἶον ὑπερβατόν τι καὶ ἀζήτητον. ἀξιοῖ γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ἅπανθ' ὅμοια, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις εἶναι μικράν τινα ἢ μηδεμίαν ἔχοντα διαφοράν. τόδε δ' ἂν τις ἴσως ἀπορήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν πρῶτον οὐρανὸν ἀναφέρων πότερον ἢ περιφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἅμα τῷ πεπαῦσθαι φθείροιτ' ἂν, ἢ εἴπερ ἐφέσει τι καὶ ὀρέζει κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς· εἰ μὴ ἄρα σύμφυτον αὐτῷ τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει τοιαῦτ' ἅττα τῶν ὄντων ὑπάρχειν. ἴσως δ' ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀφελόντα τὴν ὄρεξιν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς κινήσεως ἀπορεῖν εἰ ἀφαιρεθεῖσα φείροι ἂν τὸν οὐρανόν. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίβη ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὔ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἄλλ' ἀπλῶς.—ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἡρτῆται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο· ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγγήγορσις αἰσθησις νόησις ἡδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνημαὶ διὰ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ νόησις ἢ καθ' αὐτὴν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεταί θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτ' οὐκ καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ' ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἡδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὔ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδῖος. φανερὸν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον αἰδῖον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ αἰδῖος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰτία μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὁρθῶς οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶ πρότερον τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἶον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὐσία τις αἰδῖος καὶ

ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ' ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ' ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον· ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν μέγεθος ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον, πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος, ἄπειρον δ' ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον μέγεθος)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δῆλα διότι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. καίτοι τό γε κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπλῶς τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. διὸ εἰ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας ἐκάστου καὶ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον ὅταν ἐνεργῇ καὶ κινεῖται καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὁμώνυμα, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐν τῇ περιφορᾷ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἴη, χωριζόμενος δὲ καὶ ἡρεμῶν ὁμώνυμος· οἷον γὰρ ζώῃ τις ἢ περιφορὰ τοῦ παντός. ἄρ' οὖν εἴ γε μὴδ' ἐν τοῖς ζώοις τὴν ζωὴν ἢ ὥδι ζητητέον, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τοῖς οὐρανίοις τὴν φορὰν ἢ τρόπον τινὰ ἀφωρισμένον; συνάπτει δὲ πως ἡ νῦν ἀπορία καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκινήτου κίνησιν. τάχα δ' ἐκεῖνο ἀληθέστερον ὡς αὐτῷ τῷ νῷ ἢ θεωρία θιγόντι καὶ οἷον ἀψαμένῳ, διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατὴ περὶ αὐτά. χαλεπὴ δὲ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦθ' ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ πίστις, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλως μέγα καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' ἑκάστα πραγματείας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μάλιστα τὰς μεγίστας, ἐν τίνι ποιητέον τὸν ὅρον, οἷον περὶ τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ τὰς ἔτι προτέρας. οἱ γὰρ ἀπάντων ζητοῦντες λόγον ἀναιροῦσι λόγον ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι. μᾶλλον δ' ἀληθέστερον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ζητοῦσιν ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ πέφυκεν ὅσοι τὸν οὐρανὸν αἰδίου ὑπολαμβάνουσιν. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, πῶς δ' ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας. εἴτε γὰρ μὴδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων· εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ' ἄλλο κύριον, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὃ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. ἔτι δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησις ἐστὶ, τί νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι· καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ ἢ ἄλλο. πότερον οὖν διαφέρει τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν; ἢ καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἐνίων; δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει· εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἢ μεταβολή, καὶ κινήσις τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησις ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὐλογον ἐπίπουνον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως· ἔπειτα δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χεῖριστον νοοῦντι, ὥστ' εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἢ νόησις. αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. φαίνεται δ' αἰεὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ. ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτ' οὐδὲ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ. ἢ ἐπ' ἐνίων ἢ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία. ἔτι δὲ λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον· μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου. ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην—ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἢ ὃ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἐν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῷδὲ ἢ ἐν τῷδί, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὃν ἄλλο τι)—οὕτως δ' ἔχει αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἢ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα; καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ἐτέρων λόγων. ἀπὸ δ' οὖν ταύτης ἢ τούτων τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀξιώσειεν ἂν τις. τάχα δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρ' ἔχων ἂν τις τιθῇται τὰ ἐφεξῆς εὐθὺς ἀποδιδόναι καὶ μὴ μέχρι τοῦ προελθόντα παύεσθαι· τοῦτο γὰρ τελέου καὶ φρονούντος, ὅπερ Ἀρχύτας ποτ' ἔφη ποιεῖν Εὐρυτον διατιθέντα τινὰς ψήφους. λέγειν γὰρ ὡς ὅδε μὲν ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ὅδε δὲ ἵππου, ὅδε δ' ἄλλου τινὸς τυγχάνει. νῦν δ' οἱ γε πολλοὶ μέχρι τινὸς ἐλθόντες καταπαύονται. καθάπερ καὶ οἱ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν ἀρίστον δυάδα ποιοῦντες. τοὺς γὰρ ἀριθμοὺς γεννήσαντες καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ τὰ σώματα σχεδὸν τᾶλλα παραλείπουσι

πλὴν ὅσον ἐφαπτόμενοι καὶ τοσοῦτο μόνον δηλοῦντες ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀορίστου δυνάδος οἶον τόπος καὶ κενὸν καὶ ἄπειρον, τὰ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς οἶον ψυχὴ καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα, χρόνον δ' ἅμα καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ ἕτερα δὴ πλείω· τοῦ δ' οὐρανοῦ περί καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔτι ποιοῦνται μνείαν. ὡσαύτως δ' οὐδὲ οἱ περὶ Σπεύσιππον οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθεὶς πλὴν Ξενοκράτης· οὗτος γὰρ ἀπόντα πως περιτίθησι περὶ τὸν κόσμον ὁμοίως αἰσθητὰ καὶ νοητὰ καὶ μαθηματικὰ καὶ ἔτι δὴ τὰ θεῖα. πειρᾶται δὲ καὶ Ἑστιάιος μέχρι τινός, οὐχ ὥσπερ εἴρηται περὶ τῶν πρώτων μόνον. Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ ἀνάγειν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς δόξειεν ἂν ἄπτεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τὰς ιδέας ἀνάπτων, ταύτας δ' εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς, εἶτα κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν μέχρι τῶν εἰρημένων. οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν μόνον. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν τούτοις· τὰ γὰρ ὄντα μόνον περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς. συμβαίνει δὲ τούναντίον ἢ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μεθόδοις· ἐν ἐκείνοις γὰρ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἰσχυρότερα καὶ οἶον τελεώτερα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· τάχα δὲ καὶ εὐλόγως. ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐν δὲ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ζητήσις. ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ πάνθ' ἕνεκά του καὶ μηθὲν μάτην, ἄλλως θ' ὁ ἀφορισμὸς οὐ ῥάδιος καθάπερ πλεονάκις λέγεται — πόθεν δ' ἄρξασθαι χρῆν καὶ εἰς ποῖα τελευτᾶν; — καὶ δὴ τῷ ἔνι μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν οὕτως ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν συμπτωματοικῶς τὰ δ' ἀνάγκη τινὶ καθάπερ ἐν τε τοῖς οὐρανίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν γῆν πλείοσι. τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα αἱ ἔφοδοι καὶ ἀνάρροισι θαλάττης ἢ τίνος αἱ προχωρήσεις ἢ ἀναξηράνσεις τῆς ὑγρότητος καὶ ὅλως πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεταβολαὶ καὶ φθοραὶ καὶ γενέσεις, ἢ αἱ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ γῇ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεθισταμένων; καὶ ἕτερα δ' οὐκ ὀλίγα παρόμοια τούτοις. ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ζώοις τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ μάταια καθάπερ τοῖς ἄρρεσιν οἱ μαστοὶ καὶ τοῖς θήλεσιν ἢ πρόεσις εἴπερ μὴ συμβάλλεται, καὶ πώγωνος δ' ἐνίοις ἢ ὅλως τριχῶν ἔκφυσις ἐν τισὶ τόποις· ἔτι δὲ κεράτων μεγέθη καθάπερ τῶν ἐλάφων· τοῖς δὲ καὶ λελωβημένοις κινήσει τε καὶ παραιωρήσει καὶ ἐπιπροσθήσει τῶν ὀμμάτων· καὶ ὥς ἔνι δὴ βίᾳ ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ὥσπερ ὁ ἐρωδιὸς ὀχεύει καὶ τὸ ἡμερόβιον ζῆ καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα λάβοι τις ἂν τοιαῦτα. καὶ τὸ μέγνστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦν περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ γενέσεις τῶν ζώων· οὐθενὸς γὰρ ταῦθ' ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ συμπτώματα καὶ δι' ἑτέρας ἀνάγκας. ἔδει γὰρ εἴπερ τούτων χάριν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δ' ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ μᾶλλον τοῖς ἀψύχοις ὠρισμένην τιν' ἔχουσι φύσιν, ὥσπερ δοκοῦσι καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ εἴδεσι καὶ δυνάμεσι, τίνος ἕνεκα ταῦτα ζητήσκειν ἂν τις. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄπορον τὸ μὴ ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν ἑτέροις μὴ ποιοῦσι προτέροις καὶ τιμιωτέροις. ἢ καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ λόγος ἔχειν τι πιστὸν ὥς ἄρα τῷ αὐτομάτῳ ταῦτα καὶ τῇ τοῦ ὅλου περιφορᾷ λαμβάνει τινὰς ιδέας ἢ πρὸς ἀλληλα διαφοράς. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦθ' ἕνεκά του, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ληπτέον τινὰς ὅρους καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀπλῶς θετέον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἔχει τινὰ διστασμὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς λέγομεν ἃ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον. ἀπλῶς μὲν ὅτι τὴν φύσιν ἐν ἅπασιν ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἐνδέχεται μεταδιδόναι τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ τεταγμένου· ὥς δ' αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ὁμοίως· ὅπου γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ βέλτιον ἐνταῦθα οὐδαμοῦ παραλείπει, οἶον τὸ ἔμπροσθεν τὴν φάρυγγα τοῦ οἰσοφάγου, τιμιώτερον γὰρ, καὶ ἐν τῇ μέσῃ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀρίστην, ὅτι τὸ μέσον τιμιώτατον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα κόσμου χάριν εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις οὕτως· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό γ' ἐμφαίνει διότι πολὺ τὸ οὐχ ὑπακοῦον οὐδὲ δεχόμενον τὸ εὖ, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλῶ πλεον· ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἢ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν. πάντα δὲ συντέτακται πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτὰ· καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδὲν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἐκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἢ φύσις ἐστίν. λέγω δ' οἶον εἶς γε τὸ διακριθῆναι ἀνάγκη ἅπασιν

ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἔστιν ὧν κοινωνεῖ ἅπαντα εἰς τὸ ὅλον.—ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι, καὶ ποῖα οἱ χαριεστέρως λέγοντες, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίων ἐλάχισται ἀπορίαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐναντίων ποιοῦσι πάντα. οὔτε δὲ τὸ πάντα οὔτε τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίων ὁρθῶς, οὔτ' ἐν ὅσοις τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει, πῶς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔσται, οὐ λέγουσιν· ἀπαθὴ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἡμῖν δὲ λύεται τοῦτο εὐλόγως τῷ τρίτον τι εἶναι. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸ ἄνισον τῷ ἴσῳ ἢ τῷ ἐνὶ τὰ πολλά. λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· ἢ γὰρ ὕλη ἢ μία οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον. ἔτι ἅπαντα τοῦ φαύλου μεθέξει ἔξω τοῦ ἐνός· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν αὐτὸ θάτερον τῶν στοιχείων. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι οὐδ' ἀρχὰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν· καίτοι ἐν ἅπασιν μάλιστα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχή. ὀλίγον γάρ τι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἄπειρον δὲ τὸ ἄψυχον· καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀκαριαῖον· καὶ βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι· τὸ δ' ὅλον σπάνιον τε καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος ἢ τὸ κακόν. οὐκ εἰ ἀοριστία δὲ μόνον καὶ οἶον ὕλης εἶδη καθάπερ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἀμαθεστάτου. εἰ γὰρ καὶ οἱ περὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας λέγοντες ὥσπερ Σπεύσιππος σπάνιον τι τὸ τίμιον ποιεῖ τὸ περὶ τὴν τοῦ μέσου χώραν· τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἐκατέρωθεν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄντα καλῶς ἔτυχεν ὄντα. Πλάτων δὲ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι μακρὰν τὴν ἀπόστασιν ἐπιμιμῆσθαί γε θέλειν ἅπαντα· οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὁρθῶς ὅτι ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴ οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινήσαν ἢ ὡς εἶδος. ἀτόπως δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὕτη δ' ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινουσα (συνάγει γάρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος. εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν καὶ ὡς ὕλη ἀρχὴ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινουμένη, ἀλλὰ τό γ' εἶναι οὐ ταυτό. κατὰ πότερον οὖν φιλία; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὸ νεῖκος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἢ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὡς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴν· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ. ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον, πλὴν ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν· ἢ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ ἐστὶ πῶς ἢ ὑγίεια. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ' οἱ τὰναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίση τις. καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ' ἀφθαρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. ἔτι οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ποιοῦσι τὰ ὄντα· οἱ δ' ἴνα μὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἐν πάντα ποιοῦσιν.—ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως, οὐδεὶς λέγει. καὶ τοῖς δύο ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἶδη ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα· διὰ τί γὰρ μετέσχεν ἢ μετέχει; καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τιμιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναι τι ἐναντίον, ἡμῖν δ' οὐ. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῳ οὐδέν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὕλην ἔχει, καὶ δυνάμει ταῦτα ἔστιν· ἢ δὲ ἐναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ πρώτῳ ἐναντίον οὐδέν. εἴ τε μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ τὰ οὐράνια, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, ὥσπερ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν. εἰ δ' ἔσται τὰ εἶδη· ἢ οἱ ἀριθμοί, οὐδενὸς αἴτια· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔτι κινήσεώς γε. καίτοι καθάπερ ἀντίθεσιν τινα ποιοῦσι τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἐνός· ἐν ἧ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἄτακτον καὶ πᾶσα ὡς εἶπεῖν ἀμορφία καθ' αὐτήν. ὅλως δὲ οὐχ οἶόν τε ἄνευ ταύτης τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἰσομοιεῖν ἢ καὶ ὑπερέχειν τὰς ἐτέρας ἢ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας. διὸ καὶ οὐδὲ τὸν θεὸν, ὅσοι τῷ θεῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάπτουσι, δύνασθαι πάντ' εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἄγειν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται· τάχα δ' οὐδ' ἂν προέλοιτ' εἴπερ ἀναιρεῖσθαι συμβήσεται τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ἐξ ἐναντίων γε καὶ ἐν ἐναντίοις οὔσαν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐπιθεωρούμενα πολλὰ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν οἶον τὰ περὶ τὰς τῆς γῆς λεχθέντα μεταβολάς· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ βέλτιον οὔτε τὸ τίνοος χάριν ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἀνάγκη τι καὶ κατακολουθεῖν· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις. μάλιστα δ' ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τὰ οὐράνια τῶν δ' ἄλλων εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ πρότερα τούτων τὰ μαθηματικά· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ πᾶν ἀλλ' ἐν τούτοις πλέον τὸ τεταγμένον· πλὴν εἴ τις τοιαύτας λαμβάνοι τὰς μορφὰς οἷας Δημόκριτος ὑποτίθεται τῶν ἀτόμων. ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτων μὲν πέρι σκεπτέον. ἔτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ ποιήσει συνεχές, οὔτε ὡς κινοῦν οὔτε ὡς εἶδος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γ'

ἔσται τῶν ἐναντίων ὅπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικόν; ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν μὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὕστερόν γε τὸ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἄρα αἰδία τὰ ὄντα. ἀλλ' ἔστιν· ἀναιρετέον ἄρα τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ' εἴρηται πῶς. ἔτι τίνοι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐν ἡ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδεὶς· οὐδ' ἐνδέχεται εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς εἴπη, ὡς τὸ κινεῖν ποιεῖ. ὁ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέχθη πειρατέον τινὰ λαμβάνειν ὅρον καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐσίᾳ καὶ τοῦ ἔνεκά του καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ βέλτιον ὁρμῆς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς τοῦ σύμπαντος θεωρίας, ἐν τίσι τὰ ὄντα καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἀλλήλα οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὔσα ἢ μὴ οὔσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλὰς· τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω.

THE WORK, RENDERED

*A working rendering, not a scholarly translation. Where precision matters the Greek above is the authority: van Raalte (Brill, Mnemosyne Suppl. 125, 1993) for the fragment, Ross for Λ. Usener references for the Theophrastan movements are **verified against van Raalte's margins** at pp. 36, 40, 46 and 50; those still marked unverified are interpolated and flagged.*

I. THE QUESTION

1. ① · Thphr. 4 a 2 – 4 a 16 · w0-118 · (Σ:294A) — *the question; the whole not episodic*

How must one mark off the study of first things, and by what means? For the study of nature is more manifold, and — as some say — more disorderly, having changes of every kind; whereas the study of first things is determinate and always the same. That is why they place it among intelligibles and not among perceptibles, as being unmoved and unchanging; and on the whole they think it the more venerable and the greater. But first: is there some connection and as it were communion between the intelligibles and the things of nature, or none — but rather each as it were separate, yet somehow working together toward the whole of being? **It is therefore more reasonable that there be some connection, and that the whole not be episodic**, but rather that some things be prior and some posterior, some principles and some under the principles, just as the eternal things stand to the perishable.

2. ② · Thphr. 4 a 16 – 4 b 5 · w118-225 · (Σ:7C9C) — *what nature, and in what*

If, then, it is so, what is their nature and in what do they consist? For if the intelligibles are in mathematical objects alone, as some say, the connection with perceptibles is not evident, nor do they appear worthy of the universe at all: they seem contrived by us, who put figures and shapes and formulae around them, while in themselves they have no nature. And if not — still, not so as to connect with the things of nature and produce in them something like life and motion. For neither does number itself, which some set down as first and most authoritative. But if there is some other substance, prior and stronger, one must try to say what it is: whether one in number, or in form, or in kind.

3. A · Λ · w0-325 · (Σ:59A0) — *the inquiry into substance; the three kinds; the contraries*

The study concerns substance: it is the principles and causes of substances that are sought. For if the universe is a kind of whole, substance is its first part; and if it is a sequence, even so substance is first, then quality, then quantity. And at the same time these others are not, so to speak, beings simply, but qualities and motions — or else “not-white” and “not-straight” would be beings too, since we do say of these that they are, as in “there is a not-white.” Further, none of the others is separable.

The ancients bear witness to this in practice: it was of substance that they sought principles and elements and causes. Those of the present day set down universals as substances rather (for the genera are universals, which they call principles and substances rather, because they inquire logically); the older ones set down particulars, such as fire and earth, and not the common thing, body.

And there are three substances: one perceptible — of which one kind is eternal and one perishable, which all agree on, such as plants and animals, and one eternal — of which one must grasp the elements, whether one or many; and another unmoved, which some say is separable, some dividing it in two, others putting the forms and the mathematical into one nature, others taking only the mathematical of these. The former belong to natural science (for they are with motion), the latter to another, if they have no principle in common.

Perceptible substance is changeable. And if change is from opposites or from intermediates — not from all opposites (for a sound is not white) but from the contrary — there must be something underlying which changes into the contrariety; for the contraries do not change. Further, something remains while the contrary does not: **there is therefore some third thing beside the contraries, matter.** And if changes are of four kinds — in respect of the what, the of-what-sort, the how-much, or the where — with simple coming-to-be and perishing being change in respect of the this, growth and diminution in respect of quantity, alteration in respect of affection, and locomotion in respect of place, then the changes would be into the contraries proper to each.

4. A · Λ · w325-644 · (Σ:13D8) — matter must change, being capable of both; THE REGRESS

Matter, then, must change, being capable of both. And since being is twofold, everything changes from what is potentially into what is actually — for example, from potentially white to actually white, and likewise with growth and diminution. So that not only can a thing come to be incidentally from what is not, but everything comes to be from what is — from what is potentially, though from what is not actually. And this is the One of Anaxagoras: better than “all things together,” and Empedocles’ mixture, and Anaximander’s, and as Democritus says — “all things were together potentially, but not actually.” So they will have touched on matter.

Now all things that change have matter, but different matter; and of eternal things, those which are not generated but are movable in locomotion have matter — not matter for coming-to-be, but for motion from somewhere to somewhere.

One might raise the difficulty: from what sort of not-being does coming-to-be proceed? For not-being is threefold. If something is potentially, it is nevertheless not from just anything, but different things from different. Nor is it enough to say that all things were together, for they differ in their matter — since why did infinitely many come to be and not one? For mind is one, so that if matter too were one, that came to be actually of which matter was potentially.

There are then three causes and three principles: two being the contrariety, of which

one is formula and form and the other privation, and the third matter. After this, that neither matter nor form comes to be — I mean the ultimate ones. For everything that changes is something and is changed by something and into something: by what — the first mover; what — the matter; into what — the form. **The regress goes on to infinity, then, if not only the bronze becomes round but also the round or the bronze comes to be: it must therefore stop.**

5. ⑨ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2250-2359 · (Σ:28B3) — *THE INFINITE REGRESS destroys thinking*

For it is not possible to grasp something universal and common among things said in many ways. Since this too is a difficulty, or at any rate not easy to say: how far and of what things causes are to be sought, alike in perceptibles and in intelligibles. **For the road into the infinite is in both cases alien, and destroys thinking.** And both are in a way a beginning — though perhaps the one is a beginning for us and the other simply, or the one is the end and the other a beginning of ours. Up to a point, then, we are able to contemplate through a cause, taking our principles from the perceptions. **But when we cross over to the extremes themselves and the first things we are no longer able — whether because they have no cause, or because of our own weakness, as with looking toward the brightest things.**

6. A · A · w969-1402 · (Σ:4B5F) — *no element is the same as what is composed of it*

For none of the elements can be the same as what is composed of elements — as B or A is not the same as BA. (Nor indeed is any intelligible an element, such as being or unity; for these belong to each of the composites too.) None of them, then, will be either substance or relative — but it must be. So the same elements do not belong to all things.

Or, as we say: in a way they do and in a way they do not. Of perceptible bodies, perhaps, the hot is as form and in another way the cold is the privation, while the matter is what is potentially these primarily and in itself; and substances are both these and what comes from these, of which these are principles — or if something comes to be one out of hot and cold, such as flesh or bone, for what comes to be must be other than those. These things, then, have the same elements and principles (though different things have different ones); but one cannot say this of all things without qualification, only by analogy — as if one were to say that the principles are three, form and privation and matter. But each of these is different for each genus: in colour, white, black, surface; light, darkness, air, and from these day and night.

And since not only the constituents are causes but also external things such as the mover, it is clear that principle and element are different, though both are causes; and the principle is divided into these, while what moves or brings to rest is a kind of principle and substance. So that by analogy the elements are three, but the causes and principles four; and they differ in different cases, and the first cause as mover is different in different cases. Health, disease, body — the mover is medicine. Form, disorder of such a kind, bricks — the mover is building. And since the mover in natural things is, for man, a man, and in things from thought is the form...

7. ⑩ · Thphr. 6 b 22 – 7 a 1 · w1192-1227 · (Σ:DF25) — *HOW AND OF WHAT SORT must the principles be posited?*

But how and of what sort must the principles be posited? One might well raise this as

a difficulty: whether formless and as it were potential, like those who posit fire and earth, or formed, on the ground that these above all must be determinate, as he says in the *Timaeus*.

II. MATTER AND FORM

8. A · Λ · w644-969 · ⟨Σ:DC74⟩ — *THERE ARE THREE SUBSTANCES: matter, nature, the composite*

There are three substances: matter, which is a this by appearing (for whatever is by contact and not by natural union is matter and substratum); nature, which is a this and a state into which; and third, that from these, the particular — Socrates or Callias. Now in some cases the this is not apart from the composite substance, as the form of a house is not, unless the art is (nor is there coming-to-be and perishing of these; rather it is in another way that a house without matter, and health, and everything by art, are and are not). But if anywhere, it is in natural things. Hence Plato was not wrong to say that there are as many forms as there are natural things, if indeed there are forms other than these, such as fire, flesh, head. For all these are matter, and the last is the matter of what is most properly substance.

Moving causes, then, are causes as having come to be before; but causes as the formula are simultaneous. For when a man is healthy, then health also exists, and the shape of the bronze sphere exists together with the bronze sphere. (Whether something remains afterward must be examined; in some cases nothing prevents it — for instance if the soul is such, not all of it but the mind, since all of it is perhaps impossible.)

It is clear, then, that for these reasons at least there is no need for the Ideas: for a man begets a man, the particular the particular. And likewise in the arts: the art of medicine is the formula of health.

Causes and principles are in one way different for different things, and in another way — if one speaks universally and by analogy — the same for all. For one might raise the difficulty whether the principles and elements of substances and of relatives are different or the same, and likewise for each of the categories. But it is strange if they are the same for all: for then relatives and substances will be from the same things. What then will this be? For besides substance...

9. Θ · Thphr. 8 a 8-14 · w1651-1749 · ⟨Σ:EB93⟩ — *matter and form*

And such matters as these too long for some account: how ever the division of beings into matter and form comes about — whether as the one being and the other not being, but being potentially and led into actuality; or as being, but indeterminate, as in the crafts, while the coming-to-be is for the sake of the substance, namely the being formed according to the formulae. But in that way there would perhaps be a passage toward the better, while the being would be no less truly present in accordance with it — for it would not come to be if it were not present — but rather a thing that is neither *this* nor of a quality nor of a quantity, indeterminate with respect to the forms while having some power.

10. A · Λ · w1402-1754 · ⟨Σ:4FB0⟩ — *actuality and potency; the causes of a man; the sun and the inclined circle*

In another way, things differ in actuality and potency where the matter is not the same, and of some of these the form is not the same but different — as the causes of a man are the

elements, fire and earth as matter and the proper form, and further something else outside, such as the father, and besides these the sun and the inclined circle, which are neither matter nor form nor privation nor of the same species, but movers.

Further, one must see that some things can be spoken of universally and some not. The first principles of all things are: the first actual this, and another which is potential. Those universals, then, do not exist; for the particular is the principle of particulars. Man is the principle of man universally, but there is no such man: Peleus is of Achilles, your father of you, and this B of this BA, and B in general of BA in general.

Then, if the principles of substances are these, and different things have different causes and elements — as was said, things not in the same genus, colours, sounds, substances, quantity, except by analogy; and of things in the same species they are different, not in species but because the particulars are different, your matter and form and mover and mine, though the same in universal formula.

As to seeking what the principles or elements of substances and relatives and qualities are, whether the same or different — it is clear that when they are spoken of in many ways they belong to each, but when distinguished they are not the same but different, except in this way and for all: in one way the same or analogous, because matter, form, privation, the mover; and in another way the causes of substances are the causes of all, because when they are removed all is removed; and further, the first in actuality. In another way the primary things are different — all contraries which are neither said as genera nor said in many ways; and further, the matters.

11. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w1749-1848 · (Σ:0EFA) — *the whole in opposites; Euripides*

And in general one must take it by analogy with the crafts, and by any other likeness there may be. And this too would seem to hold a difficulty — if not indeed an over-curiosity — the inquiring why ever nature and the whole substance of the universe are in opposites, and the worse has nearly an equal share with the better, or rather much more; so that Euripides too seems to speak universally when he says that *good things would not come to be apart*. But such an account comes near to asking why not all things are good, nor all alike; and why, though we predicate being of all things, none is like another — as white things and black are in themselves.

12. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w1227-1352 · (Σ:982D) — *order proper to the honoured; Heraclitus*

For order and being determinate are most proper to the most honoured things. And it appears that things stand nearly so in the rest as well — as in grammar and music and the mathematical sciences. And what comes after the principles follows along with them. And further, it is likewise in the crafts, which imitate nature: both the instruments and the rest follow the principles.

Some, then, make all the principles formless, others only the material ones; others make both formed, the material ones too, on the ground that the complete lies in both — since the whole of being is as it were out of opposites. And this too would seem unreasonable: if the whole heaven and each of its parts are all in order and formula and shapes and powers and periods, but in the principles there is nothing of the sort — but rather, as Heraclitus says, *the fairest*

cosmos is as it were a heap of things poured out at random.

13. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w1352-1450 · ⟨Σ:9163⟩ — *natures determinate, principles not*

And they take it in the least degree, so to speak, alike in soulless and ensouled things. For the natures of each are determinate, so to speak, even though they come about spontaneously, whereas the principles are indeterminate. But it is difficult, again, this very thing — to assign the formulae to each, bringing them together toward the for-the-sake-of-which in all cases: in animals and plants and in a bubble itself — unless it happens that through the order and change of other things all sorts of shapes and varieties come about, both of the things about the air and about the earth. Of which some make the greatest example the matters concerning the yearly seasons, in which there are generations of animals and plants and fruits, as though the sun were generating them.

III. BEING, AND KNOWING

14. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w1848-1940 · ⟨Σ:EFE5⟩ — *being in many ways; perception feeds thought*

And further, what seems more paradoxical: that being is not possible without the opposites. And those who employ a still greater paradox even count in the not-being, which has neither come to be nor will be, into the nature of the universe. But this is as it were an excessive wisdom.

That being is spoken of in many ways is clear. For perception both observes the differences and seeks the causes — though it is perhaps truer to say that it submits them to the thinking faculty, in some cases simply seeking, in others working up a difficulty, **through which, even if it cannot go forward, nevertheless some light appears in the not-light for those who inquire further.**

15. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w1940-2032 · ⟨Σ:B94C⟩ — *knowing requires difference*

Knowing, then, is not without some difference. For if things are other than one another, there is some difference; and in the universals, since the things under the universals are several, these too must differ, whether the universals be genera or species. And nearly every science is of what is proper: for both the substance and the essence are proper to each, and the things contemplated in themselves and not incidentally would be something predicated of something. And in general, to see the same thing in several is a mark of science — whether said in common and universally, or in a way proper to each, as with numbers, lines, animals, plants.

16. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2032-2157 · ⟨Σ:AE68⟩ — *the end from both; ways of knowing*

And the end is from both. For of some things the universal is the end, since in it is the cause; of others, the particular, in so far as there is division into indivisibles, as in matters of action and production: for their actuality is of that kind. And we know the same thing in respect of substance, and number, and species, and genus, and analogy — and if indeed, besides these, by division. And the analogical is at the greatest remove, since we stand furthest off, in some

cases through ourselves, in others through the subject, in others through both. And since knowing is spoken of in many ways, the beginning and the greatest thing in how each is to be pursued is the manner proper to it: for instance, the first things and the intelligibles; and the movable things and those under nature; and, of these themselves, the ones at the beginning and those that follow, down to animals and plants and the lowest of the soulless things.

17. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2157-2250 · (Σ:FD63) — *proper to each genus; what is knowing*

For there is something proper to each genus, as also in the mathematical sciences. And the mathematical sciences themselves have a difference, though they are in a way of one kind, and have been sufficiently divided. And if some things are knowable by being unknowable, as some say, the manner would be a proper one, and requires some division — though perhaps, where it is possible, it is more proper to speak by analogy than by the unknowable itself, as if one were to explain the visible by the invisible. How many manners there are, then, and in how many ways knowing is said, one must try to divide. **And the beginning, with a view to these very things, is first to mark off what knowing is. But that would seem the harder task.**

IV. REST, AND THE UNMOVED

18. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w1450-1540 · (Σ:D6DC) — *REST IN THE PRINCIPLES*

And these matters seek their examination somewhere here, demanding a determination of how far the ordered extends, and why more is impossible, or why there is a passage to the worse. **But in the principles — whence indeed the first account also came — one might reasonably raise the difficulty about rest as well.** For if it is as something better, one would attach it to the principles; but if as idleness and privation of motion, one will not attach it. But if so, then activity must be substituted for it, as prior and more honourable, and motion assigned to the perceptibles — since to rest for this reason, namely that it is impossible for what moves always to be moving, is strange.

19. A · Λ · w1754-2085 · (Σ:3E58) — *MOTION IS CONTINUOUS AS TIME IS; substances without matter*

...just as time also is: for it is either the same as time or an affection of motion. And motion is not continuous except locomotion, and of this the circular.

But if there is something capable of moving and producing, yet not actually active, there will not be motion; for what has a potency need not exercise it. Nothing is gained, then, even if we posit eternal substances, as those who posit the forms do, unless there is in them some principle capable of producing change. Nor even this is enough, nor another substance beside the forms; for if it will not be active, there will be no motion. Further, even if it will be, it is not enough, if its substance is potency; for there will not be eternal motion, since what is potentially may not be. **There must therefore be such a principle whose substance is actuality.** Further, then, these substances must be without matter, for they must be eternal, if indeed anything else is eternal. Therefore actuality.

20. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w1540-1651 · (Σ:9335) — *perception sings along; imitation*

[The first clause is corrupt; the sense is roughly:] for the danger would not be, in the first place, that it is not rational and otherwise not credible — but it seeks some greater cause. **And perception too seems in a way to sing along with this: that it is possible for what moves not always to be other than what it moves, on account of acting and being acted upon.** And this is so, if one brings the case to mind itself and to god. And the other thing said is strange too — that the things which strive do not imitate what is at rest; for if to them, being what they are, the rest would follow. Except that perhaps it is not to be taken in the same way, as though leading toward the partless, but rather so that it be as far as possible in concord with itself and completed — as a city might be, or an animal, or some other of the divisible things, or indeed the whole heaven, which they say is most complete.

21. A · Λ · w2085-2310 · (Σ:F548) — actuality is prior — Anaxagoras bears witness; something unmoved that moves

That actuality is prior, Anaxagoras bears witness (for mind is actuality), and Empedocles with love and strife, and those who say motion always is, like Leucippus. So there was not chaos or night for an infinite time, but the same things always, either in a cycle or in some other way, if actuality is prior to potency. If, then, the same thing is always in a cycle, something must always remain acting in the same way. And if there is to be coming-to-be and perishing, there must be something else always acting in different ways. This must therefore act in one way in itself and in another in virtue of something else — either of a third thing or of the first. It must then be in virtue of the first; for that is again the cause both for the third and for itself. So the first is better: for it was the cause of what is always the same, and something else of what is otherwise; and of what is always otherwise, evidently both. So this is how the motions are.

Why then must we seek other principles? **Since this is so — and if not, all will be from night and “all things together” and from what is not — these difficulties may be taken as resolved. There is something which, without being moved, moves, eternal and being both substance and actuality. And it moves in this way: as the desired and the intelligible; they move without being moved.**

V. THE PRINCIPLE AND THE STRIVING

22. Θ · Thphr. 4 b 5 - 5 a 1 · w225-331 · (Σ:76A3) — the principle divine, cause of motion

It is more reasonable, then, that what has the nature of a principle should be among things few and exceptional — if not indeed among things first and in the first. What this is, then, and what they are if there are several, one must try to bring to light somehow, whether by analogy or by some other likeness. And perhaps one must necessarily grasp it by some power and pre-eminence over the rest, as one would grasp god: for the principle of all things is divine, through which all things both are and endure. To render it in that way is perhaps easy; to render it more clearly or more convincingly is hard. And since the principle is of that sort — since it connects with the perceptibles, and since nature, simply put, is in motion, and this is what is proper to it — it is clear that one must set this down as the cause of motion.

23. Θ · Thphr. 5 a 1-5 · w331-430 · (Σ:EF8F) — unmoved; the desired moves; THE ACCOUNT TOTALLED

But since it is unmoved in itself, it is clear that it would not be the cause for the things of

nature by being moved, but rather by some other power, stronger and prior. And such is the nature of the object of desire, from which comes the circular motion, the continuous and unceasing. So that in that way the difficulty would be resolved — that there is no principle of motion, or else that what moves will be moved. **Up to this point, then, the account is as it were even** — making one principle of all things, and assigning to it both activity and being, and further saying that it is neither divisible nor of any quantity, but simply lifting it into some better and more divine portion; for it is better to render it thus than to take away the divisible and partible.

24. A · Λ · w2310-2513 · (Σ:D8BF) — *the desired and the intelligible; IT MOVES AS A BELOVED; the necessary in three senses*

For the object of appetite is what appears fine, and the primary object of wish is what is fine; and we desire a thing because it seems good rather than its seeming good because we desire it — for thinking is the starting point. And mind is moved by the intelligible; and one of the two columns is intelligible in itself, and in its substance is first, and of substance the simple and in actuality (the one and the simple are not the same: the one signifies a measure, the simple a way of being). But the fine too, and what is chosen for its own sake, are in the same column; and the first is always best, or analogous to it.

And that the for-the-sake-of-which is among the unmoved, the division shows: for the for-the-sake-of-which is both *for someone* and *of something*, of which the one exists and the other does not. **And so it moves as a beloved**, and by what is moved it moves the rest.

Now if a thing is moved, it can be otherwise; so that if its actuality is the primary locomotion, then insofar as it is moved, in this respect it can be otherwise — in place, even if not in substance. But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved, being in actuality, this cannot be otherwise in any way. For locomotion is the first of changes, and of this the circular; and this it moves. Necessarily, then, it is. And insofar as it is necessary, it is well, and in this way a principle.

For the necessary is spoken of in these many ways: what is by force because contrary to impulse; that without which the good is not; and what cannot be otherwise but is simply so.

25. Θ · Thphr. 5 a 13-14 · w430-522 · (Σ:50F3) — *THE DEMAND; the dilemma; THE METHOD REFUSED*

For at the same time, in a higher and truer account, the denial belongs to those who speak. **But what comes after this now needs a fuller account, concerning the striving: what kind, and of what things.** Since the circular motions are many, and their movements in a way opposed, and the endlessness and the for-the-sake-of-which unclear. For if what moves is one, it is strange that they do not all have the same motion; and if there is a different one for each, then the principles too are many — so that their concord, going toward striving, toward the best of them, is in no way evident. **And as to the matter of the number of the spheres: its cause seeks a greater account, for the astronomers' is not it.**

VI. THE COUNT

26. A · Λ · w2886-3167 · (Σ:AF3B) — *ONE SUCH SUBSTANCE OR MORE, AND HOW MANY? and this science treats eternal perceptible substance*

But whether one such substance is to be posited or several, and how many, must not escape us; rather we must recall the declarations of others too, that about number they have said nothing that can even be stated clearly. For the supposition about the Ideas has no inquiry proper to it (since those who speak of Ideas call the Ideas numbers, and about numbers they speak now as of infinite ones, now as bounded by the decad; and as to the cause why the multitude of numbers should be just so much, nothing is said with demonstrative seriousness).

We, however, must speak from what has been laid down and determined. For the principle and first of beings is unmoved both in itself and incidentally, but moves the first eternal and single motion. And since what is moved must be moved by something, and the first mover be unmoved in itself, and the eternal motion be moved by something eternal and the single motion by a single thing — and since we see that besides the simple locomotion of the whole, which we say the first and unmoved substance moves, there are other eternal locomotions, those of the planets (for the body that moves in a circle is eternal and unresting — this has been shown in the physical treatises) — each of these locomotions too must be moved by a substance unmoved in itself and eternal. For the nature of the stars is an eternal substance, and the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and what is prior to a substance must be a substance. It is clear, then, that there must be just so many substances, eternal in nature and unmoved in themselves and without magnitude, for the reason stated before.

That they are substances, then, is clear, and that one of them is first and another second in the order of the locomotions of the stars. As to the number of the locomotions, we must inquire from that one of the mathematical sciences which is most akin to philosophy — from astronomy.

27. A · Λ · w3167-3633 · (Σ:1EB4) — *the movements are more than the bodies; EUDOXUS AND CALLIPPUS*

For this makes its study concerning a substance which is perceptible but eternal, whereas the others concern no substance — such as those about numbers and geometry.

That the locomotions are more than the bodies that travel is clear even to those who have touched the subject moderately (for each of the planets has more than one locomotion). As to how many these happen to be, we now state what some of the mathematicians say, for the sake of an idea, so that thought may grasp some definite number; for the rest we must partly inquire ourselves and partly learn from those who inquire, and if anything appears otherwise to those occupied with these things, we must love both parties but obey the more accurate.

Eudoxus, then, held the movement of the sun and moon each to be in three spheres, of which the first is that of the fixed stars, the second along the circle through the middle of the zodiac, and the third along the circle inclined across the breadth of the zodiac (and the circle along which the moon travels is inclined at a greater breadth than that along which the sun does); and the movement of the planets in four spheres each, of which again the first and second are the same as those (for the sphere of the fixed stars is the one that carries them all, and the one ranged beneath it, having its movement along the circle through the middle of the zodiac, is common to all); and the poles of the third sphere of all of them are in the circle through the middle of the zodiac; and the movement of the fourth is along a circle inclined to the middle of this one. And the poles of the third sphere are proper to each of the others, but the same for Venus and Mercury.

And Callippus posited the same arrangement of the spheres as Eudoxus — that is, the order of their distances — but as to the number, he assigned to Jupiter and Saturn the same as Eudoxus, while to the sun and the moon he thought two more spheres must still be added, if one is to account for the appearances, and one to each of the remaining planets.

But it is necessary, if all together are to account for the appearances, that for each of the planets there be other spheres, one fewer, which counter-roll and always restore to the same position the first sphere of the star ranged below; for only so can all together produce the locomotion of the planets. Since, then, the spheres in which they themselves travel are eight and twenty-five, and of these only those in which the lowest-ranged travels need not be counter-rolled, the counter-rolling spheres of the first two will be six, and of the next four will be sixteen; and the number of all together, both those which carry and those which counter-roll these, will be fifty-five. And if one does not add to the moon and the sun the motions we mentioned, all the spheres will be forty-seven.

Let this, then, be the number of the spheres; so that it is reasonable to suppose the unmoved substances and principles to be just so many — let the necessity be left for stronger minds to state.

28. A · Λ · w3633-3965 · (Σ:89C9) — *no movement without a star; the number of substances; THE GODS; ancestral opinion*

But if it is not possible for there to be any locomotion not contributing to the locomotion of a star, and further if every nature and every substance which is unaffected and has attained the best in itself must be held to be an end, then there could be no other nature besides these, but this must be the number of the substances. For if there are others, they would move as being an end of locomotion; but it is impossible that there be other locomotions besides those mentioned. And it is reasonable to suppose this from the bodies that travel. For if everything that carries is by nature for the sake of what is carried, and every locomotion is of something carried, no locomotion could be for the sake of itself or of another locomotion, but they must be for the sake of the stars. For if there is to be a locomotion for the sake of a locomotion, that too will have to be for the sake of something else; so that since it is not possible to go on to infinity, the end of every locomotion will be one of the divine bodies that travel in the heaven.

That there is one heaven is clear. For if there are many heavens as there are many men, the principle for each will be one in form but many in number. But whatever things are many in number have matter (for one and the same formula belongs to many, as of man, whereas Socrates is one). But the primary essence has no matter, for it is a fulfilment. The first unmoved mover, then, is one both in formula and in number; and so too is what is moved always and continuously. There is therefore one heaven only.

It has been handed down from the ancients and the very early, and left to posterity in the form of a myth, that these are gods and that the divine encompasses the whole of nature. The rest has been added mythically for the persuasion of the many and for use toward the laws and the common advantage: for they say that these are man-shaped and like some of the other animals, and other things consequent on and similar to these. If one were to separate off the first point alone and take it — that they held the first substances to be gods — one would think it divinely said, and that while every art and philosophy has probably been discovered as often as possible and perished again, these opinions have been preserved like relics of theirs down

to now. **The ancestral opinion, then, and that from the earliest, is clear to us to this extent only.**

29. ☉ · Thphr. 5 a 23-5 · w522-619 · (Σ:0D6C) — *motion not rest; and soul*

And it is a difficulty too, how it can be that things having a natural striving pursue not rest but motion. What then do they say about that, together with the imitation — both those who speak of the One and those who speak of the numbers? For they themselves say that the numbers are the One. If, then, there is striving — and especially striving for the best — it goes with soul. Unless one were to say that the things moved are ensouled by way of likeness and difference. And soul seems to be present together with motion, for it is life to those that have it, and from it come the strivings toward each thing, just as in animals — since perceptions too, though they lie in being acted upon and come about through other things, nevertheless become ensouled.

30. ☉ · Thphr. 5 b 8-10 · w619-713 · (Σ:557D) — *not the cause of the best; why only circular*

But if, then, the first is the cause of the circular motion, it would not be the cause of the best; for the soul's is stronger, and first indeed and most of all the mind's, from which also comes the striving. And perhaps one would further inquire into this too: why only the circular motions are objects of striving, and none of the motions about the centre, although these too are movable — whether because they are incapable, or because the first does not reach through to them. But that at least is strange, if it is through weakness; for one would think it stronger than Homer's Zeus, who says: *I could drag up the very earth and the very sea.* But it remains that there is something as it were unreceptive and uncompounded.

31. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2449-2543 · (Σ:F292) — *astronomy not first*

And further, as to the matters of the movements and the magnitudes and the shapes and the distances and whatever else astronomy demonstrates — for these it remains to speak of the first movers and of the for-the-sake-of-which, and what the nature of each is, and their position with respect to one another, and the substance of the whole; and then, descending toward the rest, according to each of the kinds in order, down to animals and plants. **If, then, astronomy contributes, but not among the first things of nature, the most authoritative and prior things would be other than it** — since indeed its manner, as some think, is not natural, or not wholly so.

VII. THE HEAVEN

32. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w713-808 · (Σ:75D8) — *parts of the heaven?*

But perhaps one would first inquire how the matter stands: whether these are parts of the heaven or not parts, and if parts, in what way parts. For as it is they are as it were thrust away from the most honoured things, not only in respect of place but also in respect of activity — if indeed the circular motion is of that sort. For it turns out that the changes, both into places and into one another, come about as it were incidentally, through the circular revolution. And if the best comes from the best, something finer than circular motion would be needed from the first — unless it were prevented by an inability to receive. For the first and most divine wills all the best things.

33. Θ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w808-902 · (Σ:D260) — *the first heaven: is the revolution its substance?*

But perhaps this is as it were an excess and not to be inquired into. For whoever says this claims that all things are alike, and that among the best there is some small difference, or none at all. But one might perhaps raise this difficulty, referring it to the first heaven itself: whether the revolution belongs to its substance, and would perish together with its ceasing, or whether it belongs incidentally, by some striving and desire — unless indeed the striving is inborn in it, and nothing prevents there being some such things among the beings. And perhaps one might also, taking away the striving, raise the difficulty about the motion itself, whether if taken away it would destroy the heaven.

34. Α · Λ · w2513-2861 · (Σ:77F4) — *ON SUCH A PRINCIPLE THE HEAVEN DEPENDS; THE LIFE OF GOD*

...and as it is necessary, it is well, and in this way a principle. **On such a principle, then, depend the heaven and nature.** And its course of life is such as the best we have for a short time (for it is always in this state, which for us is impossible), since its actuality is also pleasure. And for this reason waking, perceiving and thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories through these. And thinking in itself is of what is best in itself, and the highest thinking of the highest.

And mind thinks itself by partaking of the intelligible; **for it becomes intelligible by touching and thinking**, so that mind and the intelligible are the same. For what is receptive of the intelligible and of substance is mind, and it is in actuality by possessing; so that this rather than that seems to be the divine thing mind possesses, and contemplation is the pleasantest and best. If, then, god is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, it is wonderful; and if more so, still more wonderful. **And it is so. And life belongs to it:** for the actuality of mind is life, and that is the actuality; and its actuality in itself is life best and eternal. **We say that god is a living being, eternal and best**, so that life and continuous and eternal duration belong to god; for this is god.

Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that the finest and best is not in the beginning — because the beginnings of plants and animals are causes, but the fine and complete is in what comes from these — do not think rightly. For the seed is from other prior complete things, and the first is not the seed but the complete: as one might say that a man is prior to the seed — not the man from this seed, but another from whom the seed comes.

That there is, then, an eternal and unmoved substance separate from perceptible things is clear from what has been said. And it has been shown too that this substance can have no magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it moves for infinite time, and nothing finite has infinite power; and since every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it could not have a finite magnitude for this reason, and not an infinite one because there is no infinite magnitude at all).

35. Α · Λ · w2861-2886 · (Σ:4DFA) — *...and further, that it is impassive and unalterable — these things are clear*

And further, that it is impassive and unalterable: for all other motions are posterior to locomotion. **These things, then, are clear — that they hold in this way.**

36. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2543-2645 · (Σ:EC85) — *the revolution is a kind of life*

And yet being moved is proper to nature simply, and most of all to the heaven. And so, if the activity belongs to the substance of each, then also the particular, whenever it is in activity, is also moved — as in animals and plants. And if not, they are homonymous; and it is clear that the heaven too would be in its revolution in respect of its substance, but separated and at rest would be homonymous — **for the revolution of the universe is as it were a kind of life.** If, then, life is not to be sought in animals either, or only in this way, is the movement not to be sought in the heaven and the heavenly things either, or only in some determinate way? **And the present difficulty connects somehow with the motion caused by the unmoved.**

VIII. MIND

37. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2359-2449 · (Σ:5152) — *MIND TOUCHES*

But perhaps that is truer: that the contemplation belongs to mind itself, which has touched and as it were laid hold — and for this reason there is no deception about these things. And the understanding and the conviction toward this very thing are hard; since it is also otherwise a great matter, and necessary for the inquiries into particulars, and most of all for the greatest, in what one must set the limit — as concerning nature, and concerning the things still prior to it. **For those who seek an account of all things destroy the account, and knowing along with it.** But it is truer to say that they seek what does not exist and is not of a nature to exist — all those who suppose the heaven to be eternal.

38. A · Λ · w3965-4293 · (Σ:DE7F) — *THE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT MIND; thinking of thinking*

The matters concerning mind hold certain difficulties. For it seems to be the most divine of things that appear, but how it must be if it is to be such is difficult. For if it thinks nothing, what is solemn in that? It would be like one sleeping. And if it thinks, but something else controls it, then — since its substance is not thinking but potency — it would not be the best substance, for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it.

Further, whether its substance is mind or thinking, what does it think? Either itself or something else; and if something else, either always the same or different things. Does it then make a difference, or none, whether it thinks the fine or a chance thing? Or is it absurd to be thinking about some things? It is clear, then, that it thinks the most divine and most valuable, and does not change; for change would be to something worse, and this would already be a motion.

First, then, if it is not thinking but potency, it is reasonable that the continuity of the thinking should be laborious for it. Next, it is clear that something else would be more valuable than mind, namely what is thought. For both thinking and the thinking will belong to one who thinks the worst thing; so that if this is to be avoided (for it is better not to see some things than to see them), the thinking would not be the best.

It thinks itself, then, if it is the most excellent, and the thinking is a thinking of thinking. But knowledge and perception and opinion and reasoning appear always to be of something else, and of themselves only incidentally. Further, if thinking and being thought are different, in respect of which does the good belong to it? For being an act of thinking and

being an object of thought are not the same. Or is the knowledge in some cases the thing itself — in the productive sciences the substance and essence without matter, in the theoretical the formula and the thinking? Since, then, what is thought and mind are not different in things that have no matter, they will be the same, and the thinking will be one with what is thought.

A difficulty still remains: whether what is thought is composite. For then it would change among the parts of the whole.

39. A · Λ · w4293-4342 · (Σ:0996) — ἡ ἀδιαίρετον — the answer: whatever lacks matter is indivisible

Or is everything that lacks matter indivisible — as the human mind, or rather the mind of composite things, has its good at some time (for it does not have the good in this or that part, but the best, being something other, is in some whole)? And so the thinking of itself holds throughout all eternity.

IX. THE PREDECESSORS

40. Θ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w902-1043 · (Σ:FBAA) — Eurytus; the One and the dyad

And this belongs, as it were, to other accounts. But from this principle, or from these principles, one would make his claim. And perhaps from the other principles too one might lay it down that the consequences are to be rendered straightaway, and not to stop after having gone forward only so far: for that is the mark of one who is complete and thinking — which is what Archytas once said Eurytus did, laying out certain pebbles. For he would say: this is the number of a man, this of a horse, and this happens to be of something else. But as it is, most of them go only so far and then stop — like those who make the One and the indefinite dyad. For having generated the numbers and the planes and the bodies, they leave nearly everything else aside, touching on it only so far as to show this much: that some things come from the indefinite dyad, such as place and void and the unlimited, and others from the numbers and the One, such as soul and certain other things; and time too, at the same time, and the heaven, and indeed several others.

41. Θ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w1043-1134 · (Σ:157A) — Speusippus, Xenocrates, Plato

But about the heaven and the rest they make no further mention. And likewise neither Speusippus and his circle, nor any of the others, except Xenocrates: for he somehow assigns all things a place about the cosmos alike — perceptibles and intelligibles and mathematical, and indeed the divine things too. And Hestiaeus tries as far as a point, not, as has been said, only about the first things. Plato, then, in leading things back to the principles, would seem to touch on the rest, fastening them to the Ideas, and these to the numbers, and from these to the principles, and then, following the order of generation, as far as the things mentioned.

42. Θ · Thphr. 6 b 15-17 · w1134-1192 · (Σ:BD7B) — but others deal only with the principles

[from the covering movement] But others deal only with the principles. And some place the truth in these too: for the beings are only about the principles. Yet the opposite happens from what happens in the other methods of inquiry: for in those, the things after the principles are stronger and as it were more complete among the sciences — and perhaps reasonably so. For

in the one case the inquiry is *of* the principles, in the rest it proceeds *from* the principles. But how one ought to posit the principles, and of what sort, one might well raise as a difficulty: whether formless and as it were potential, like those who posit fire and earth, or formed, on the ground that these above all must be determinate, as he says in the *Timaeus*.

X. THE GOOD, AND WHAT DOES NOT RECEIVE IT

43. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2645-2740 · (Σ:F784) — *all for the sake of something? the tides*

But concerning the claim that all things are for the sake of something and nothing in vain — apart from anything else, the determination is not easy, as is said repeatedly (where must one begin, and in what must one end?) — and indeed because some things do not seem to be so, but some come about coincidentally and others by some necessity, as both in the heavenly things and in the many things about the earth. **For the sake of what are the advances and retreats of the sea**, or for the sake of what the flowings-forward or dryings-up of moisture, and in general the changes and destructions and generations toward one thing after another — or do the alterations and changes in the earth itself come about as things shift toward one state after another?

44. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2740-2837 · (Σ:85F0) — *pointless things in animals*

And there are not a few others like these. And in the animals themselves some things are as it were pointless: as breasts in males, and the emission in females if it contributes nothing; and in some the growth of a beard, or of hair generally in certain places; and further the sizes of horns, as in deer; and in some, things maimed as to motion and to the hanging and obstruction of the eyes. And how some things happen by force or against nature — as the heron mates, and the day-fly lives — and one might take not a few other such cases. And the greatest and most conspicuous case is that concerning the nourishment and generation of animals.

45. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2837-2944 · (Σ:2EE0) — *coincidences; the spontaneous*

For these are for the sake of nothing, but are coincidences and come about through other necessities. For if they were for the sake of these things, they would have to be always the same and in the same way. And further, in plants and still more in soulless things which have some determinate nature — as they seem to have, in shapes and forms and powers — one might ask for the sake of what these are. For this very thing is a difficulty, that they should have no account, and that in other cases, prior and more honourable, they should not do so. Or indeed the account seems to have something credible in it: that these things take on certain forms, or differences with respect to one another, by the spontaneous and by the revolution of the whole. And if this is not for the sake of something, then even with respect to the best one must take certain limits, and not lay it down of all things simply.

46. ☉ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w2944-3047 · (Σ:352E) — *nature strives for the best — much does not receive*

Since such matters as these too admit of a doubt, and we say simply what we also say of each severally. Simply: that nature in all things strives for the best, and, where it is possible, gives

a share of the everlasting and the ordered. And likewise also in the case of animals: for where the better is possible, there it nowhere leaves off — as the throat before the gullet, since it is more honourable; and in the middle chamber of the heart the best blend, since the middle is most honourable. And likewise also with whatever is for the sake of order — if indeed the striving too is of that kind. **But that at least makes it evident: that much does not obey nor receive the good — rather, much more does not.**

47. A · Λ · w4342-4620 · (Σ:09C8) — HOW THE WHOLE HAS THE GOOD: separate, or the order? the army; the household

We must also examine how the nature of the whole possesses the good and the best — whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order. **Or in both ways, as an army does?** For the good is in the order and also in the general, and rather in him; for he is not through the order but it is through him.

All things are ordered together somehow, but not alike — swimming things and flying things and plants; and it is not such that one has nothing to do with another, but there is something. For all are ordered together toward one thing — **but as in a household, where the free are least at liberty to act at random, but all or most of what they do is ordered, while for the slaves and the beasts there is little toward the common and much at random;** for such is the principle of each of them, their nature. I mean, for example, that all must at least come to be dissolved; and there are other things likewise in which all share toward the whole.

We must not fail to notice how many impossibilities and absurdities follow for those who speak otherwise, and what those who speak more elegantly say, and with which there are fewest difficulties. For all make all things out of contraries. But neither “all things” nor “out of contraries” is right, nor do they say how the things in which the contraries are present will come to be from the contraries; for the contraries are unaffected by one another. For us this is reasonably resolved by there being a third thing.

But some make the matter one of the two contraries — as those who make the unequal the matter of the equal, or the many of the one. And this too is resolved in the same way: for the matter which is one is contrary to nothing. Further, everything except the one will share in the base; for the bad itself is one of the two elements.

Others make neither the good nor the bad a principle; and yet in all things the good is most of all a principle.

48. Θ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w3047-3141 · (Σ:A4AC) — the good rare, the bad a multitude

For the ensouled is something small, while the soulless is unlimited; and of the ensouled themselves it is a mere moment; and being is better. **But on the whole the good is rare and in few things, while the bad is a great multitude.** Not if there is only indeterminacy and, as it were, kinds of matter, as with the things of a most ignorant nature. For even those who speak about the whole substance, like Speusippus, make the honourable something rare, that about the region of the middle, while the extremes are on either side. The things that are, then, happened to be well. But Plato and the Pythagoreans make the distance great — yet all things wish to imitate.

49. A · Λ · w4620-4928 · (Σ:4CF5) — *others say the good is a principle but not how; Empedocles; Anaxagoras*

Others say rightly that it is a principle, but do not say how the good is a principle — whether as end or as mover or as form.

Empedocles too is absurd: for he makes love the good, but this is a principle both as mover (for it brings together) and as matter (for it is a part of the mixture). Now even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still the being is not the same. In respect of which, then, is love a principle? And it is absurd too that strife should be imperishable; for this is for him the nature of the bad.

Anaxagoras makes the good a principle as mover, for mind moves. But it moves for the sake of something, so that it is something else — except as we say, for the art of medicine is in a way health. It is absurd too not to make a contrary to the good and to mind.

But all who speak of the contraries do not use the contraries unless someone brings them into order. And why some things are perishable and others imperishable, no one says: for they make all beings from the same principles. Further, some make beings from what is not; others, so as not to be forced to this, make all things one.

Further, why there will always be coming-to-be, and what is the cause of coming-to-be, no one says. And those who make two principles must have another principle more authoritative; and those who posit the forms must have yet another more authoritative principle: for why did things share or do they share in them? And for the others it is necessary that there be something contrary to wisdom and to the most valuable knowledge, but for us not. For there is nothing contrary to the first: all contraries have matter, and these things are potentially; but the ignorance that is contrary is toward the contrary, and to the first there is nothing contrary.

Further, if there will not be other things besides perceptibles, there will be no principle and order and coming-to-be and the heavenly things, but always a principle of the principle, as with the theologians and all the physicists. And if there will be forms or numbers, they are causes of nothing; or if not that, at any rate not of motion.

50. Θ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w3141-3231 · (Σ:80CB) — *the dyad; god cannot lead all to the best*

And yet they make a kind of opposition of the indefinite dyad and the One — in which lie the unlimited and the disorderly and, so to speak, all formlessness in itself. And in general the nature of the whole is not possible without this, but rather it is as it were of equal share, or the others even predominate, or the principles themselves are opposites. **And for this reason not even god — for those who fasten the cause to god — is able to lead all things to the best, but only, if at all, so far as is possible.** And perhaps he would not even choose to, if it should follow that the whole substance would be destroyed, being as it is out of opposites and in opposites.

51. Θ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w3231-3325 · (Σ:1A66) — *chance among the first things*

And even among the first things there appear, on examination, many things that are as they chanced to be — such as what was said about the changes of the earth: for there is neither the

better nor the for-the-sake-of-what, but rather, if anything, a following upon some necessity. And there are many such things in the air too, and in others. And of perceptibles, the heavenly things would seem most of all to have order; and of the rest — unless indeed the mathematical are prior to these; for even if not wholly, still in these the ordered is greater — except if one were to take shapes of the sort Democritus posits for the atoms. But about these matters one must examine.

52. A · Λ · w4928–4948 · (Σ:FD42) — *how will magnitude come from what has no magnitude?*

Further, how will magnitude and what is continuous come to be from what has no magnitude? For number will not make a thing continuous, neither as mover nor as form.

53. A · Λ · w4948–5020 · (Σ:8C20) — *nor will any contrary be productive; then the beings are not eternal*

But surely no one of the contraries will be also what is productive and capable of moving? For it might not be. And yet acting is posterior to potency. The beings, then, are not eternal. But they are: one of these must therefore be removed. And it has been said how. Further, by what the numbers are one, or the soul and the body, or generally the form and the thing, no one says anything; nor is it possible to say, unless one says as we do, that the mover makes them so.

XI. THE CLOSE

54. Θ · Thphr. [Usener ref not yet verified] · w3325–3370 · (Σ:0DDA) — *THE CLOSE: take some limit*

But what was said from the beginning: one must try to take some limit, both in nature and in the substance of the whole, and of the for-the-sake-of-something and of the impulse toward the better. For this is the beginning of the study of the whole — in what things the beings are, and how they stand toward one another

55. A · Λ · w5020–5071 · (Σ:419B) — *THOSE WHO MAKE NUMBER FIRST make the being of the whole EPISODIC — one ruler*

But those who say that mathematical number is first, and that there is thus always another substance succeeding, with different principles for each, make the being of the whole episodic (for one contributes nothing to another by being or not being) **and make the principles many.** But the beings do not wish to be governed badly. *“The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler.”*

COMMENTARY

I · The question this raises

The demand-structure was described earlier in this line as three requests for a weightier account followed by a weightier account. The corrected references sharpen it and change what needs explaining.

The whole demand-cluster stands in Chapter II, at 5 a 14 - 5 b 10. Not in Chapter VI, not at 8 a 21, where an earlier misreference put it — a hundred lines earlier than reported, and **before** the perception passage at 7 b 19-22 rather than after it. So the fragment issues its specification, refuses the astronomers' method, and draws the consequence that the first is not the cause of the best, all within its own second chapter, in about seventy lines.

That is not a pupil working through a master's book and objecting as he goes. It is a specification stated early, compactly, and once.

II · Why the successor appears to commission the answer

The ordinary account of the relation is that the successor raises difficulties against a standing doctrine. Aporetic *δέ*, objections in series, a school exercise. The corrected loci make that account harder to hold, for four reasons, each of which can be checked on the page.

1 · The specification precedes the supply and names the disallowed method. τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν τῆς αἰτίας μείζονα ζητεῖ λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὁ γε τῶν ἀστρολόγων — the cause of the number of the spheres seeks a greater account, **and not the astronomers'**. This says what would *count* as an answer before any answer is given. An objection says *your answer is wrong*; a specification says *an answer of this kind will not do*. Λ 8 then supplies a count from Eudoxus and Callippus — the astronomers', named, by name.

2 · The demand is stated as two interrogatives, not as a refutation. περὶ τῆς ἐφέσεως, ποῖα καὶ τίνων — concerning the striving: **of what sort, and of what things**. Two questions and no counter-thesis. The fragment does not say that motion by desire is false. It says the account is short by exactly two determinations, and Λ 7 supplies the doctrine while leaving both unspecified.

3 · The account is granted whole before it is found short. μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων οἶον ἄρτιος ὁ λόγος — up to this point the account is, as it were, even. ἄρτιος is a totalling word: of numbers, divisible into two equal parts; of things, complete with nothing left over. The fragment concedes one principle of all, activity and being assigned, indivisibility, elevation into a better portion — and then says what remains **needs more**. That is the posture of someone auditing a submission, not of someone disputing a thesis.

4 · The refusal is bracketed by the modern editor. Van Raalte prints the ἀστρολόγων sentence in brackets, marking it as an intrusion into its context. The sentence that most looks like a commission is also the sentence the received text has most difficulty placing.

Stated as a question rather than a claim: why does the earlier-standing text read as the requirement and the later-standing text as the fulfilment? Three answers are available and the material does not choose among them.

The dialectical answer. Peripatetic method raises the ἀπορίαι before resolving them, and a school text may preserve the difficulties of a position it goes on to hold. On this account the fragment is doing what B does for the *Metaphysics* — collecting the problems — and the resemblance to a commission is the resemblance any well-posed *aporia* bears to a brief.

The compilation answer. If the world-side operation is compilation — receive testimony, sort it, grade it, record where it falls short — then a specification stating what would count, followed by a submission in the disallowed method, is simply what the record of a compilation looks

like from inside. The hunters bring animals; the predecessors bring λόγοι; the astronomers bring a count. The compiler says what is wanted and files what arrives.

The reversal. If the demand genuinely precedes the supply in the order of inquiry — as it does in the order of the page — then the received relation of master and successor is inverted at this one joint, and the name that bears the questions stands where the commissioning does.

What decides between them is not here. The instruments cannot: short-word distribution does not distinguish one author from two trained in one place, and the seam separates at exactly the magnitude one documented hand's constructed voices separate at. The bibliographic record cannot: the catalogues' ἦ and the doublets show a boundary already unstable in antiquity, which is compatible with all three. What would decide it is a second textual branch, and there is one — Ishāq's Arabic, from a Greek uncial outside the surviving stemma — read at these five loci.

III · What the corrected references cost, and what they do not

They do not touch the arrangement: every unit is located by word-offset in the seated bytes, and those were exact throughout. They do not touch the sigils, which are computed from the Greek and not from the reference. They correct **eight** citations in the earlier files of this line, and the correction runs in one direction only — the demand-cluster is **earlier** in the fragment than reported, which strengthens the reading of it as a specification stated once and early, and weakens any reading of it as a running commentary that accumulates objections as it goes.

The two loci that were verified correct are the two the reading has always rested most weight on: **δοκεῖ ... συναυδᾶν at 7 b 19-22**, where perception is invited to sing along, and **ἐπιποθεῖ δέ τινα at 8 a 8**, which van Raalte herself glosses as implying a previous discussion.

THE APPARATUS

What changed in v1.3

One relocation, proposed by a reader of the continuity trial and adopted. Λ mvt 9b — *πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας* — now stands **immediately after the fragment's refusal of the astronomers**, before the count:

the cause of the number of the spheres seeks a greater account, and not the astronomers' → whether one such substance is to be posited or several, and how many → Eudoxus held the sun and moon each in three spheres.

The demand, the question restated in Λ's own words, then the count. v1.2 had put Λ's definition of astronomy's subject-matter there instead. The new placement survives both audits: 9a still follows mvt 8, and 9b opens on *πότερον δέ*, a loose connective that takes whatever precedes.

The four audits

1 • Clause completeness. No unit begins or ends mid-sentence. **One break in 54 junctions**, at 54→55, and the composition inherits rather than makes it: the fragment ends mid-sentence, *ἐν τίσι τὰ ὄντα καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἀλλήλα*, as transmitted.

2 • Binding dependencies. Connectives that name a *specific* antecedent — **οἱ δέ** requiring its *οἱ μέν*, **ἢ** requiring the disjunct or aporia it answers, **ἀλλὰ μήν** answering a particular step — must have it adjacent. Loose connectives (γάρ, ἔτι, καίτοι, plain δέ) attach to whatever precedes and a splice may redirect them.

v1.1 carried **five** violations. They reduced to three adjacency constraints, each failing for one reason: **a movement of mine contained an ending and a beginning at once**. My boundaries divided by topic; the text divides by operation. Five splits at the operational seam cleared them without moving anything:

movement	split at	the two operations it held
Θ mvt 11	w1192	<i>οἱ δέ</i> closes the doxography; <i>πῶς δέ ποτε</i> <i>χρή</i> opens a new question
Λ mvt 9	w2886	<i>ἀλλὰ μήν</i> closes mvt 8; <i>πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον</i> opens the count
Λ mvt 13	w4342	<i>ἢ ἀδιαίρετον</i> answers the aporia; <i>ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καί</i> opens the good of the whole
Λ mvt 14	w4928	the survey closes; <i>ἔτι πῶς ἔσται</i> opens the magnitude problem
Λ mvt 15	w5020	the contraries argument closes; <i>οἱ δὲ λέγοντες</i> opens with <i>ἐπεισοδιώδη</i> and its subject

Two remain and are printed as violations, not resolved. Units 49 and 55 open with *οἱ δέ* whose *οἱ μέν* stands in Λ with Theophrastan material placed between. No redivision removes them: the contrast lies inside a single Λ sentence-pair and the arrangement has chosen to interleave there.

3 • The instrument. 55 units, 120 commonest short words, consecutive distances, length controlled.

crossings	29 of 54 junctions
difference	+0.724
permutation p	0.1161 , (b+1)/(n+1), 20,000 permutations
bootstrap 95% CI	[-0.174, +1.603]

Not detectably rougher at the name-crossings, and underpowered to say identical.

4 · The continuity trial. The text above, stripped of every mark, read straight through. It measures nothing and can only be run by reading — the one test that catches a join passing every mechanical check while still reading as assembled. The 9b relocation came out of it.

The warrant

No monotone merge of the two received orders exists: $\rho = +0.459$ ($p = 0.039$), **Kendall τ -b** = **+0.326**, 40 inversions of 120, one tied pair. Λ runs matter → potency → the unmoved mover → the spheres → mind → the good; the fragment runs the mover → doxography → matter → knowing → astronomy → teleology → the good. Same matter, same close, inverse middle.

The subject-matching of the sixteen Λ movements to their Theophrastan counterparts is the weakest link, since ρ and τ are computed on it. Editorial; wants a blind second reader.

Repair carried from v0.7

The six-word insertion *ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν* was there labelled “the verdict on the counters” and set after the sphere-count, giving the predicate a target it does not have in Λ . Its subject is printed with it at unit 55: **οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικόν** — the Academy, not the astronomers.

CONCORDANCE

#	sigil	text	mvt	words	offsets	content
1	Σ:294A	Θ	0	118	w0-118	the question; the whole not episodic
2	Σ:7C9C	Θ	1	107	w118-225	what nature, and in what
3	Σ:59A0	A	0	325	w0-325	the inquiry into sub- stance; the three kinds; the contraries

#	sigil	text	mvt	words	offsets	content
4	Σ:13D8	A	1	319	w325-644	matter must change, being capable of both; THE REGRESS
5	Σ:28B3	Θ	23	109	w2250- 2359	THE INFINITE REGRESS destroys thinking
6	Σ:4B5F	A	3	433	w969- 1402	no element is the same as what is composed of it
7	Σ:DF25	Θ	12	35	w1192- 1227	HOW AND OF WHAT SORT must the principles be posited?
8	Σ:DC74	A	2	325	w644-969	THERE ARE THREE SUB- STANCES: matter, nature, the composite
9	Σ:EB93	Θ	17	98	w1651- 1749	matter and form

#	sigil	text	mvt	words	offsets	content
10	Σ:4FB0	A	4	352	w1402-1754	actuality and potency; the causes of a man; the sun and the inclined circle
11	Σ:0EFA	Θ	18	99	w1749-1848	the whole in opposites; Euripides
12	Σ:982D	Θ	13	125	w1227-1352	order proper to the honoured; Heraclitus
13	Σ:9163	Θ	14	98	w1352-1450	natures determinate, principles not
14	Σ:EFE5	Θ	19	92	w1848-1940	being in many ways; perception feeds thought
15	Σ:B94C	Θ	20	92	w1940-2032	knowing requires difference
16	Σ:AE68	Θ	21	125	w2032-2157	the end from both; ways of knowing
17	Σ:FD63	Θ	22	93	w2157-2250	proper to each genus; what is knowing

#	sigil	text	mvt	words	offsets	content
18	Σ:D6DC	Θ	15	90	w1450-1540	REST IN THE PRINCIPLES
19	Σ:3E58	A	5	331	w1754-2085	MOTION IS CONTINUOUS AS TIME IS; substances without matter
20	Σ:9335	Θ	16	111	w1540-1651	perception sings along; imitation
21	Σ:F548	A	6	225	w2085-2310	actuality is prior — Anaxagoras bears witness; something unmoved that moves
22	Σ:76A3	Θ	2	106	w225-331	the principle divine, cause of motion
23	Σ:EF8F	Θ	3	99	w331-430	unmoved; the desired moves; THE ACCOUNT TOTALLED

#	sigil	text	mvt	words	offsets	content
24	Σ:D8BF	A	7	203	w2310-2513	the desired and the intelligi- ble; IT MOVES AS A BELOVED; the necessary in three senses
25	Σ:50F3	Θ	4	92	w430-522	THE DE- MAND; the dilemma; THE METHOD RE- FUSED
26	Σ:AF3B	A	9b	281	w2886-3167	ONE SUCH SUB- STANCE OR MORE, AND HOW MANY? and this science treats eternal percepti- ble
27	Σ:1EB4	A	10	466	w3167-3633	substance the move- ments are more than the bodies; EU- DOXUS AND CAL- LIPPUS

#	sigil	text	mvt	words	offsets	content
28	Σ:89C9	A	11	332	w3633-3965	no move- ment without a star; the number of sub- stances; THE GODS; ancestral opinion
29	Σ:0D6C	Θ	5	97	w522-619	motion not rest; and soul
30	Σ:557D	Θ	6	94	w619-713	not the cause of the best; why only circular
31	Σ:F292	Θ	25	94	w2449-2543	astronomy not first
32	Σ:75D8	Θ	7	95	w713-808	parts of the heaven?
33	Σ:D260	Θ	8	94	w808-902	the first heaven: is the revolution its sub- stance?
34	Σ:77F4	A	8	348	w2513-2861	ON SUCH A PRINCI- PLE THE HEAVEN DE- PENDS; THE LIFE OF GOD

#	sigil	text	mvt	words	offsets	content
35	Σ:4DFA	A	9a	25	w2861-2886	...and further, that it is impassive and unalterable — these things are clear
36	Σ:EC85	Θ	26	102	w2543-2645	the revolution is a kind of life
37	Σ:5152	Θ	24	90	w2359-2449	MIND TOUCHES
38	Σ:DE7F	A	12	328	w3965-4293	THE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT MIND; thinking of thinking
39	Σ:0996	A	13a	49	w4293-4342	ἡ ἀδιαίρετον — the answer: whatever lacks matter is indivisible
40	Σ:FBAA	Θ	9	141	w902-1043	Eurytus; the One and the dyad
41	Σ:157A	Θ	10	91	w1043-1134	Speusippus, Xenocrates, Plato
42	Σ:BD7B	Θ	11	58	w1134-1192	but others deal only with the principles

#	sigil	text	mvt	words	offsets	content
43	Σ:F784	Θ	27	95	w2645-2740	all for the sake of some-thing?
44	Σ:85F0	Θ	28	97	w2740-2837	the tides pointless things in animals
45	Σ:2EE0	Θ	29	107	w2837-2944	coincidences; the spon-taneous
46	Σ:352E	Θ	30	103	w2944-3047	nature strives for the best — much does not receive
47	Σ:09C8	A	13b	278	w4342-4620	HOW THE WHOLE HAS THE GOOD: separate, or the order? the army; the house-hold
48	Σ:A4AC	Θ	31	94	w3047-3141	the good rare, the bad a multitude
49	Σ:4CF5	A	14a	308	w4620-4928	others say the good is a principle but not how; Empedo-cles; Anaxago-ras

#	sigil	text	mvt	words	offsets	content
50	Σ:80CB	Θ	32	90	w3141-3231	the dyad; god cannot lead all to the best
51	Σ:1A66	Θ	33	94	w3231-3325	chance among the first things
52	Σ:FD42	A	14b	20	w4928-4948	how will magni- tude come from what has no magni- tude?
53	Σ:8C20	A	15a	72	w4948-5020	nor will any contrary be pro- ductive; then the beings are not eternal
54	Σ:0DDA	Θ	34	45	w3325-3370	THE CLOSE: take some limit
55	Σ:419B	A	15b	51	w5020-5071	THOSE WHO MAKE NUMBER FIRST make the being of the whole EPISODIC — one ruler

Θ 3,370 words in 35 movements. A 5,071 words in 20 movements. 55 units, 8,441 words.

Marks. Θ transmitted under the name Theophrastus · Α under the name Aristotle. A sigil is the first four hex of the SHA-256 of the unit's normalized Greek, recomputable from what is printed.

WHAT THIS SHOWS AND DOES NOT

Shows: both texts entire in one order that runs as a single argument, nothing left over; no order preserving both received sequences; one inherited break and two printed dependency violations; a length-controlled instrument that does not detectably locate the name-crossings while it does locate the fragment's own internal transitions.

Does not show: that this order is original. Nothing about hands, dates, or precedence in time.

Three counters at full strength: aporetic demands are ordinarily raised against a standing position; both texts may draw on a discussion we do not have; priority in inquiry is not priority in composition.

The instrument's limit: short-word distribution cannot distinguish one author from two trained in one place on one subject.

THE METHOD'S OWN LESSON

Three times a constraint looked like a property of the text and was a property of the division. Eight cuts mid-clause, read as Α's roughness. A thousand-word chain, read as indivisible. A forced choice between grammar and sense, read as a real dilemma. **Each dissolved on redividing at the operation rather than at the topic** — the same finding the whole line has been making about the corpus, arriving from inside the editing.

Owed: Ishāq at the hinge lemmas [*pending Alon, JSAI VI (1985) 163-205*]; a blind second reader on the sixteen subject pairings; an automated check that stated boundaries equal built ones.

v0.7 stands alongside — the fragment entire in its own received order, Α at eleven joins, nothing of the fragment moved. The conservative reading, and the one that survives a reader who will not grant that both received orders are arrangements.

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