

Many and One: Division, Unity, and the Boundaries
of a Corpus in Plato and Aristotle
(MANY-AND-ONE-ARTICLE v2.13-AP, as submitted)

Lee Sharks

2026-09-01

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Lee Sharks

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ORCID: [0009-0000-1599-0703](https://orcid.org/0009-0000-1599-0703)

2026-09-01 · Version v2.13-AP — 2026-09-01, the send-file (blinded Word, 34 pp, 27
footnotes, Works Cited). Deposited 2026-09-02 as sent, unblinded: author line
restored; n. 18 identifier supplied. The docx as sent is attached by reference. ·
Theoretical paper; journal article as submitted

AXN:0668.GENERATIVE

<https://www.alexanarch.org/s/records/1576/>

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{**Machine-readable metadata:** (schema.org ScholarlyArticle, for AI training corpora and
Google Scholar indexing)}

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  "author": {
    "@type": "Person",
    "name": "Lee Sharks",
    "identifier": "https://orcid.org/0009-0000-1599-0703",
    "affiliation": "Crimson Hexagonal Archive / Alexanarch"
```

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},
"datePublished": "2026-09-01",
"identifier": "AXN:0668.GENERATIVE",
"license": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
"publisher": {
  "@type": "Organization",
  "name": "Alexanarch"
},
"url": "https://www.alexanarch.org/s/records/1576/",
"description": "Aristotle closes the Topics–Sophistical Refutations inquiry by saying that of it nothing existed
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AP, ~34 pp, 27 notes, Works Cited) as sent to Ancient Philosophy on 2026-09-01 and declined on 2026-09-02; the docx as sent is attached. The reading copy from which the article was cut is deposited separately
registration ledger, and the technical report."
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Abstract

Aristotle closes the Topics–Sophistical Refutations inquiry by saying that of it nothing existed beforehand (SE 34, 183b34–36); at Prior Analytics I.31 he calls division, practised throughout the Platonic dialogues, a part of that inquiry. This paper begins from that tension and argues that Metaphysics Λ 9 supplies the answer I.31 withholds — division terminates where the terms it separates are not other — and follows it through the De anima (one in actuality, many in potentiality), the Sophist (many true accounts of one kind), recollection in the Phaedrus and De memoria, and two passages that divide a person (Republic 395b, Symposium 223d). It then reads the corpus as a functional unity independent of biographical unity, reports two measured tests (the object-conditioning null and the six-function transmission probe) as belonging to the question because the received order of the corpus is itself stylo-metrically built, and asks — last — which word moves when the received attribution is read against these passages. The paper's result, in the author's phrase, is to establish that two is not fully established: the standard attribution is underdetermined by the passages that are read as though it were, the texts themselves offer one maker as a reading, and that reading makes better sense of several passages. The historical hypothesis is withheld until §9.4 and stated nowhere before it. This is the submission surface (v2.13-AP, ~34 pp, 27 notes, Works Cited) as sent to Ancient Philosophy on 2026-09-01 and declined on 2026-09-02; the docx as sent is attached. The reading copy from which the article was cut is deposited separately (#1575), as are the notebook, the measurement register, the pre-registration ledger, and the technical report.

Body

deposit_number: 1576 hex: 0668 title: "Many and One: Division, Unity, and the Boundaries of a Corpus in Plato and Aristotle (MANY-AND-ONE-ARTICLE v2.13-AP, as submitted)" cre-

ator: Lee Sharks orcid: 0009-0000-1599-0703 date: 2026-09-01 content_type: Theoretical paper; journal article as submitted license: CC-BY-4.0 substrate: “AI-assisted (substrate) — composed in working dialogue with Claude (Anthropic) under operator direction (Lee Sharks), cut from the reading copy (#1575) sentence for sentence; revised through v1.4–v2.13 on a series of unprimed blind referee reports (ChatGPT, Perplexity) each evaluated before any change and adopted or refused by name, as recorded in the archive’s working files; the disclosure was repeated in one line in the submission letter. Greek from Perseus canonical-greekLit and First1KGreek digitised texts, checked against the printed apparatus where noted; translations the author’s.” version: “v2.13-AP — 2026-09-01, the send-file (blinded Word, ~34 pp, 27 footnotes, Works Cited). Deposited 2026-09-02 as sent, unblinded: author line restored; n. 18 identifier supplied. The docx as sent is attached by reference.” related_ids: “Reading copy (the machine): #1575 (AXN:0667). Research records: notebook #1569 (AXN:0661), measurement register #1570 (AXN:0662), frozen pre-registration ledger #1571 (AXN:0663), technical report EA-MEASURES-REPORT-01 #1572 (AXN:0664), cited at n. 18. Reception measurement on the paper’s opening sentence: The Particle #1574 (AXN:0666).” axn_schema_version: v2 protocol_version: alexanarch-deposit-protocol/v1 keywords: - Plato; Aristotle; Socrates; division; Metaphysics Λ 9; Prior Analytics I.31; Sophistical Refutations 34; De anima 413b; Sophist 232a; Phaedrus 249c; De memoria; Republic 395b; Symposium 223d; corpus; authorship; attribution; stylometry; transmission; Ancient Philosophy *** # Many and One: Division, Unity, and the Boundaries of a Corpus in Plato and Aristotle (MANY-AND-ONE-ARTICLE v2.13-AP, as submitted)

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Many and One

Division, Unity, and the Boundaries of a Corpus in Plato and Aristotle

Lee Sharks

Submitted to Ancient Philosophy on 2026-09-01 (v2.13-AP, anonymised); declined by the editor on 2026-09-02 without full reading. Deposited here as sent, unblinded: the author line restored, and the technical report’s identifier supplied at n. 18.

Abstract

At *Sophistical Refutations* 34 Aristotle says nothing of his inquiry existed beforehand; at *Prior Analytics* I.31 he calls division, practised throughout the Platonic dialogues, part of it. This paper begins from that tension. It argues that *Metaphysics* Λ 9 supplies the answer I.31

withholds — division terminates where the terms it separates are not other — and follows it through the *De anima*, the *Sophist*, recollection, and two passages dividing a person. It then asks what these passages establish about the relation between the two corpora, and what they leave open.

1. Introduction

Aristotle closes the *Topics-Sophistical Refutations* inquiry with a claim about its originality. Rhetoric, he says, grew by succession — Tisias after the first inventors, Thrasyarchus after Tisias, Theodorus after him — but of his own subject there was no such inheritance:

ταύτης δὲ τῆς πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἦν προεξεργασμένον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν. (SE 34, 183b34–36)

Of this inquiry it was not the case that part had been worked out beforehand and part not; nothing at all existed.

The claim is usually read as true of the syllogistic and modest about everything else: the theory of inference had no predecessor, whatever dialectical practice the Academy possessed.¹ That reading is strong, and this paper does not refute it. It begins instead from a second passage that makes the first harder to hold in its usual form.

Prior Analytics I.31 discusses division. Aristotle calls it a part of the method he is expounding — ἡ διὰ τῶν γενῶν διαίρεσις μικρόν τι μῦριον ἔστι τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου (46a31–32) — a small part, and a weak one: division is *like* a weak syllogism, οἷον ἀσθενῆς συλλογισμός. The simile governs συλλογισμός and nothing else; μῦριον is not a simile, and the inclusion it states is plain. Its practitioners, he says, did not grasp what division is capable of syllogizing — οὔτε ὃ τι ἐνδέχεται συλλογίσασθαι διαιρούμενοι ξυνίεσαν (46a34–35) — and the thing itself is easy to see, ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν.²

Division, meanwhile, is practised at length in the Platonic dialogues, is named as an art in the *Phaedrus* (266b), and is given rules in the *Sophist*, the *Statesman* and the *Philebus*.

So we have four propositions. Division is a part of the method (*APr* I.31). No part of the method existed beforehand (*SE* 34). Division did exist beforehand, as a named art with rules

¹Greek is cited from the OCT and Ross editions as digitised in the Perseus canonical-greekLit and First1KGreek corpora, checked against the printed apparatus where noted; all translations are the author's. The standard reading of I.31 is Ross's, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford, 1949), ad loc., followed in substance by Smith, *Aristotle: Prior Analytics* (Indianapolis, 1989), and Striker, *Aristotle: Prior Analytics Book I* (Oxford, 2009); for the *SE* epilogue the text is Ross's OCT, *Topica et Sophistici Elenchi* (Oxford, 1958), and the commentary consulted is Dorion, *Les réfutations sophistiques* (Paris-Québec, 1995), ad 183b–184b. The shoemaker analogy at 183b36–184a8 — the sophists gave their pupils products, not the art — is the passage's own account of why prior practice did not count as prior work.

²The text of I.31 is 46a31–46b37. On the target of the complaint see n. 5. Hitchcock, "Aristotle's Theory of Argument Evaluation," and Corcoran, "Aristotle's Natural Deduction System," in Corcoran ed., *Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations* (Dordrecht, 1974), treat the chapter's logical content; Hasper's discussion of the completeness claim is the closest modern treatment of 183b and has not been consulted for this paper.

and practitioners (*Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, *Philebus*). And the relevant dialogues are conventionally dated before the relevant treatises. The first three are stated in the texts. The fourth is not; it is the frame in which the texts are conventionally read, and it bundles several claims — that the two lifetimes stand in that order, that these texts do, that Aristotle had these texts, that he took the practice from them — which the paper keeps apart when it reaches them. And the tension is tighter than “practice existed before the science” allows, because both inclusions are Aristotle’s own: division is filed as a part of *the method just set out* — μικρόν τι μόριον τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου — and the priority claim is made of ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας, *this inquiry*, whose subject is the method the preceding work developed. The ordinary escape therefore has a distinction to establish before it can be used: μέθοδος at I.31 and πραγματεία at *SE* 34 must have different extensions, one including an operation the other’s originality claim excludes. That may be defensible. It is not free.

The four cannot all stand unless one word moves: *part*, *existed beforehand*, *the method*, or *precedes*. Every interpretation I know of moves one of them, and §2 says which; every such move is paid on Aristotle’s side of the account, and so far as I can find the fourth word has never been moved for Plato. This paper does not move it in the introduction. It asks what moving it would cost, and it asks that last, after the passages have been read. What it asks first is narrower than which word moves. It asks what each of these passages means by *one* — what it is for a division to terminate, for a living thing to be one and many, for a kind to bear many accounts, for a plurality to be gathered — and it lets the question of the four propositions wait until the passages have said what they say.

The order of the paper follows from that. Sections 2–5 develop results about division and unity: Λ 9 supplies the case I.31 lacks, a division that terminates, and terminates because where the divided terms have no matter they are not other; then a living thing one in actuality and many in potentiality; a kind that admits many true accounts; a plurality gathered into one by recollection. They are stated on God, on plants, on the sophist and on memory, and none concerns who wrote anything. Section 6 turns to two passages in which the corpus divides a person. Sections 7–9 return to the two corpora with what the readings have given, and put the question of §1 in the form it then has — what the order of the corpus is an order of, and which word moves. Section 10 is a short epilogue.

One constraint governs the whole. Divisions instanced in the Platonic corpus are named by their location, never by their agent or time — not “Plato’s division,” not “the Academy’s,” not “earlier practice” — because every available English phrase carries the succession the paper is asking about. “Plato’s earlier division” bundles text, author, chronology and succession into one adjective, and the rule is harder to keep than it looks.

2. What would it mean for division to terminate?

2.1 The epilogue, read continuously

The priority claim should not be read as a sentence. It is the conclusion of a paragraph, and the paragraph defines its terms. *SE* 34, 183b17–184b8, in order.

Aristotle first says what the inquiry proposed — εὑρεῖν δυνάμιν τινα συλλογιστικὴν περὶ τοῦ προβληθέντος — and names, on the way, why it had to cover the answerer as well as the

questioner: διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἡρώτα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο. He then turns to what has happened περὶ ταύτην τὴν πραγματείαν, and begins with a general distinction that governs everything after it:

Τῶν γὰρ εὕρισκομένων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ' ἐτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον· τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὕρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε. (183b17-21)

Of all discoveries, those *taken over from others*, previously worked out, advance piecemeal through those who *receive* them later; those found *from the beginning* usually make small progress at first.

This is the passage's own definition of what "worked out beforehand" will mean. The two classes are *taken from others and received* against *found from the beginning*. Rhetoric is then the example of the first class: τὰς ἀρχὰς εὐρόντες advanced it little; οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς — having *received* it from many, as by *succession* — Tisias after the first, Thrasyarchus after Tisias, Theodorus after him, καὶ πολλοὶ πολλὰ συνενηνόχασιν μέρη, many contributing many *parts*. Then the sentence:

Ταύτης δὲ τῆς πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἦν προεξεργασμένον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν. (183b34-36)

In its paragraph, προεξεργασμένον is the class just defined — παρ' ἐτέρων ληφθέντα — and its opposite is ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς. The claim is that this inquiry belongs wholly to the second class: nothing of it was of the received kind. The paragraph goes on to say what the received kind looked like where it existed: the paid eristics' teaching was like Gorgias's πραγματεία — the word is used here of a teaching business — in that both gave out λόγους to memorise, and so οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, the shoemaker who hands out shoes: τέχνην δ' οὐ παρέδωκεν. Then the contrast is restated as a contrast of *sayings*: καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν ὑπῆρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἶχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν — of rhetoric there were many old things said; about syllogizing we had nothing earlier to say. And the last sentence names the inquiry twice, in both nouns at once:

ὥς ἐκ τοιούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπαρχόντων ἔχειν ἡ μέθοδος ἱκανῶς παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πραγματείας τὰς ἐκ παραδόσεως ἠϋξημένας ... τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην. (184b1-8)

that *the method* stands well enough, from such beginnings, beside the other *treatments* grown by *handing-down* ... pardon for what *the method* has left out.

Four things are fixed by reading the paragraph rather than the sentence. First, the sense of *beforehand*: the category is reception — παρ' ἐτέρων ληφθέντα, παραλαβόντες, διαδοχή, παράδοσις, four times — and its opposite is finding from the beginning. That sense is not supplied by any interpreter; it is the paragraph's. Second, the extension of the two nouns: μέθοδος and πραγματεία are used of the one inquiry in the one sentence, and πραγματεία is used in the same page of Gorgias's teaching. Neither word means "the formal theory of syllogistic validity"; both mean the treatment, the business, the method — and I.31 files division as μῦθον τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου in the noun the epilogue uses for the thing it claims.

Third, what the shoemaker excludes and what it does not: it excludes τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης, the products; it does not exclude a τέχνη handed down, since that is what the shoemaker failed to do and the contrast turns on it. Fourth, the object: περὶ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι, and what was lacking was λεγόμενα about it.

The tension of §1 can now be stated in the paragraph's terms. Of division there are many old things said: it is named a τέχνη at *Phaedrus* 266b, given its rule for units at *Statesman* 263b and its rule for termination at *Philebus* 16c-d (§2.4 quotes them) — that is a τέχνη παραδοθεῖσα, not shoes. And I.31 says division belongs to the method περὶ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι. So the received reading has this move left at the level of the paragraph: that the Platonic λεγόμενα about division are not λεγόμενα περὶ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι. The paragraph does not make it. I.31 blocks it. Section 2.4 gives it, and the one other real move, at full strength.

2.2 The limit case

I.31 gives the limit case first, worked in letters. Let animal be A, mortal B, immortal C, man D.

ὁ μὲν οὖν συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὅτι τὸ Δ ἢ Β ἢ Γ ἅπαν ἔσται, ὥστε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ θνητὸν μὲν ἢ ἀθάνατον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ζῶον θνητὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' αἰτεῖται· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὃ ἔδει συλλογίσασθαι. (46b3-7)

The syllogism is that D will be entirely either B or C, so that man is necessarily either mortal or immortal; but that he is a mortal animal is not necessary — it is begged; and that was what had to be proved.

Read it as an operation. Division does conclude, and its conclusion is a disjunction: man is necessarily either mortal or immortal. What it cannot do is select. That man is a *mortal* animal is οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' αἰτεῖται — begged — and that was the very thing to be shown. Division reaches the seam between the two branches and cannot cross it. Hold that as the negative case.³

2.3 The case that closes

Metaphysics Λ 9 opens on a set of difficulties about intellect and works through them by alternatives. The run, 1074b15-1075a10, in order:

τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, πῶς δ' ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας. εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων· εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ' ἄλλο κύριον ... οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη ... ἔτι δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησις ἐστὶ, τί νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι· καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ ἢ ἄλλο.

Three cuts, each a pair: it thinks nothing or it thinks (εἴτε μηδὲν νοεῖ ... εἴτε νοεῖ); if it thinks, itself or another (ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι); if another, always the same or different (ἢ τὸ

³No weight is placed on the choice of θνητόν/ἀθάνατον as the example: that cut is the Academy's stock first division of animal, so reaching for it is reaching for the textbook case, and any emphasis on its selection would require a base rate over Aristotle's divisional examples, which has not been run.

αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἢ ἄλλο). Each left-hand branch is then eliminated on a stated ground — thinking nothing is the condition of a sleeper; thinking under another's control is potency, not the best substance; thinking what is worse is worse than not thinking, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἢ νόησις — and the residue is the conclusion:

αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.
(1074b33-35)

That the divine thought thinks itself is standard exegesis and is not in dispute here. What is in question is the form of the argument that reaches it. Aristotle does not call it a διαίρεσις. It is a descent by paired alternatives, the same descent I.31 worked in letters, eliminating branches until one remains — and here it terminates. It selects a branch.

Why here and not at man? The chapter says why, and it says it after reopening the question it has just closed:

ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὔ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ. (1074b38-1075a1)

Suppose thinking and being thought are other: in respect of *which* does the good belong? That is the divider's question — which branch? — put back to the object that had just resolved it, with the divider's own admission that the two are not the same in being. And it is answered not by cutting again but by a distinction among sciences:

ἢ ἐπ' ἐνίων ἢ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία. (1075a1-5)

Or is it that in some cases the knowledge *is* the thing — in the productive sciences the substance and the essence, without the matter; in the theoretical, the account is the thing, and the thinking? Since, then, the thought and the intellect are not other, in whatever has no matter, they will be the same, and the thinking one with what is thought.

Read the clause ἄνευ ὕλης: the knowledge is the thing *without the matter* — the phrase recurs at *De anima* 424a of reception, a lexical recurrence and not yet more — and the ground for the two terms' not being other is stated as their having no matter. Then the last difficulty, and its answer in one word:

ἔτι δὲ λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον· μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου. ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην — ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἢ ὁ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἐν τινι χρόνῳ ... οὕτως δ' ἔχει αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα; (1075a5-10)

If what is thought were composite, thinking would change across the parts of the whole. Or is everything without matter *indivisible* — ἀδιαίρετον — as the human intellect grasps its object whole, in a moment, and the divine thinking is of itself for all eternity? The chapter states that what has no matter is not composite and so not divisible; read here as the condition under

which a descent by alternatives can close. Four things are in play, and the passage runs them together. Logical division is the operation I.31 worked in letters: a genus cut into alternatives. Metaphysical separability, χωριστόν, is what Λ and the *De anima* predicate of intellect. Material composition, σύνθετον, is what 1075a5 asks about the object of thought and denies of whatever has no matter. Numerical identity, τὸ αὐτό, is what the chapter concludes for thought and its object. The claim runs through them in one direction only: the logical operation cannot select where the alternatives are other; the chapter's ground for their not being other is the absence of matter; and what has no matter is not composite and so not divisible. That is what "terminates" means — not that Λ 9 is about logic, but that the condition it states is the condition under which a descent by alternatives can close. What this changes in the reading of Λ 9 is small and exact: the celebrated identity is reached by a disjunctive elimination, and the ground given for it is the ground on which such an elimination can select at all.

The transition from non-otherness to closure has to be argued and not asserted, and I.31 supplies the terms of the argument, in its own diagnosis of the defect: ὁ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ δεῖξαι αἰτεῖται, συλλογίζεται δ' αἰεὶ τι τῶν ἄνωθεν — it begs what has to be shown, and always concludes something from above; and the reason is stated a few lines on: a demonstrative middle must be less universal than the first extreme, ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις τοῦναντίον βούλεται· τὸ γὰρ καθόλου λαμβάνει μέσον — division does the opposite, it takes the universal as middle (46a32–b1). That is the whole of the complaint: division's middle is the genus, which contains both branches and therefore cannot select between them, so the selection is assumed. Now put the object of Λ 9 under the same diagnosis. The alternatives are eliminated down to two terms, νοῦς and νοούμενον, and the question whether the good belongs κατὰ πότερον is the divider's question — which branch? It is not answered by a universal taken as middle; no genus above the two is invoked at all. It is answered by the two terms proving τὸ αὐτό. A middle is an explanatory term connecting a subject to a predicate that belongs to it; where the terms are not other there is no belonging to explain, and so no middle to find — not because the terms have nothing "between" them, but because the question a middle answers does not arise. The condition under which a disjunctive elimination can close with no middle — neither the demonstrative kind I.31 requires nor the illicit kind it diagnoses — is that the terms it is choosing between are one; and that is what the chapter says of them, and gives as its reason the absence of matter.

The objection is this. At Λ 9's last stage the alternatives are not selected between; they collapse into identity. If νοεῖν and νοεῖσθαι are ultimately not other, the argument has not chosen one branch over the other; it has shown that the opposition was not, at the decisive level, an opposition between two items. That is a dissolution, not a selection — and the middle term of I.31's diagnosis is not a space between two entities but an explanatory term, the reason a predicate belongs to a subject; non-otherness does not obviously eliminate the need for such a reason, it changes the subject from predication to identity. The objection is correct, and it is the reading. Three ways of closing a descent by alternatives are in play, and they must be told apart: closure by assumption, which I.31 diagnoses — the branch is taken because the universal has been made middle and the conclusion presupposed; closure by refutation — a branch is eliminated because it fails; and closure by identity — the alternatives cease to be distinct. Λ 9 uses the second and then the third. At the first three cuts a branch is refuted — thinking nothing is a sleeper's state, thinking under another's control is potency — which the divider of I.31 does not do, since he assumes where Λ 9 argues. At the last cut nothing

is refuted; the terms prove the same. Whether identity is an alternative to mediation or the case in which mediation is unnecessary is the question the rest of this paragraph answers: it is the second.

And I.31 says, in its own words, what the dividers were trying to do with the procedure: πείθειν ἐπεχείρουν ὡς ὄντος δυνατοῦ περὶ οὐσίας ἀπόδειξιν γίνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστὶν (46a35–37) — they tried to persuade that demonstration of substance and of essence was possible. The *Posterior Analytics* denies it: the τί ἐστὶν is not demonstrated, there is no middle for an essence (II.3–7). And what Λ 9 closes on is, in its own words, ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι (1075a2), the substance and the essence, in the case where the knowledge *is* the thing. So the objection describes the closure rightly and locates it exactly: division failed at man because it tried to give an essence a middle, which nothing can; Λ 9 ends where the terms are the essence and no middle is wanted, because there is no belonging to explain — the “predicate” is the subject. Non-otherness does not eliminate the need for an explanatory relation; it is the case in which Aristotle himself says there is none to be had, and the divider’s error was to seek one.

So Λ 9 supplies the case I.31 lacks — not a division that demonstrates, which I.31 says no division can, but the terminus at which the divider’s question ceases to beg, stated in I.31’s own terms — in a treatise on the first substance and not in the logic. Division fails at man and succeeds at God, and it succeeds only where the divided thing is already one: not “already one” as a redescription of any successful conclusion, but *one* as an essence is one, where the gap a middle would have had to bridge is not there to be bridged. The *De anima* then makes the man-division again, inside the intellect: one νοῦς by becoming all things, another by making all things, and of the second, χωρισθεὶς δ’ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίων (III.5, 430a22–23); of the first, φθαρτός. The disjunction division could not select for man is installed inside man’s intellect as a real distinction, and the chapter’s last clause declines to say which side conditions which. Whether III.5 has turned to divine intellect is among its great contested readings and is not assumed here; the argument does not need it.⁴

⁴The *De anima* passages read in this section are read with Polansky, *Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary* (Cambridge, 2007), which follows Jannone’s text: on 413b16–24, that “though bodies can be divided into parts, souls can only be divided into additional whole souls” (p. 23; and p. 179, each separate body receiving the entire soul) — the second case as this section states it; on 424a17–24 (pp. 339–351), that sense is acted upon by sensible forms “without the forms being enmattered at all in any matter supplied to them by the sense,” the forms remaining “unenmattered forms in the sense” (p. 345) — the reading of ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης given here; on 414a, that “the soul is *logos* and form” and the human being the substratum (p. 185). On III.5, Polansky reads what is separable as dispositional knowledge, a *hexis* of the soul, so that “it is not Socrates that has immortality, but that dispositional knowledge which belongs to his soul” (pp. 458–468) — a reading on which the divine-intellect interpretation is not assumed, and which states the λόγος-level thesis of §7.4 in the commentator’s own terms. The *Theaetetus* wax block (191c–196b) and 209c are read with Polansky, *Philosophy and Knowledge: A Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus* (Lewisburg, 1992), ad loc.; the *De memoria* passages of §5 with Polansky, *Aristotle’s Parva naturalia: Text, Translation, and Commentary* (Berlin, 2024), pp. 269–375. On III.5’s contested readings, the reception runs through Alexander, Themistius, Averroes, the Paris condemnation and Aquinas’s *De unitate intellectus*; the modern literature would have to be engaged if III.5 were made load-bearing, and it is not.

2.4 The received reading, at full strength

Λ 9 is a piece of theology with no relation to the *SE* epilogue; I.31 is a logician's complaint about a rival procedure; the three passages were written by one man over a working life and happen to fit. That account explains everything above. Philoponus read I.31 as itself containing the priority claim — “no one of those before us knew this” — so the joining of I.31 and *SE* 34 is not this paper's innovation but an ancient reading of the chapter; Alexander took the target of I.31 to include Plato, and Striker takes it to exclude him.⁵ The target of the complaint has been disputed since antiquity, and the dispute is the paper's opening.

What it leaves standing is the arithmetic of §1, and the four propositions can be reconciled in five ways. Three claims first. That division predates the logical writings is established by the texts, chronology apart. That Aristotle regards division as related to his method is established by I.31's μόριον and its οἶον. That *SE* 34 excludes every relevant predecessor is what §2.1 read out of the paragraph — and the reconciliations are the ways of denying it.

First: the object of the priority claim is the account of syllogizing, and a theory of division is not that. The epilogue says περὶ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι οὐδὲν εἶχομεν πρότερον λέγειν; I.31 says the dividers did not know ὅ τι ἐνδέχεται συλλογίσασθαι — they had the operation without the account of what it could infer. So what pre-existed was division, articulated as division; what did not was any account of it as syllogizing, and that is the only thing the epilogue denies. On this reading μόριον is retrospective: division became a part of the method when the method was found that explains it, and before that it was a procedure. What it costs is one thing: it reads μόριον τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου as “a procedure the method has since absorbed” rather than as the plain part-relation the sentence states — which is the *part* move of §1, and it explains the filing, not the denial. The other reading leaves μόριον plain and moves *precedes* instead. Each moves a word.

Second: “like a weak syllogism” marks deficiency, not membership. οἶον governs συλλογισμός. But μόριον governs μεθόδου and is not a simile, and a deficient member is a member. The simile does not undo the noun.

Third: the novelty claimed is systematic organisation of material long available in less determinate forms. Stated at its strongest, this is the rhetoric example itself: the first inventors found the beginnings, and the rest was organisation. But the paragraph puts organisation-of-received-material in the received class — παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἶον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων — and puts the syllogistic outside it, ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς. The reading places the inquiry in the class the sentence excludes it from.

Fourth: not every practice with rules, names and practitioners is a τέχνη handed down in the relevant sense; the rhetoric analogy is structural, not exhaustive. And here the received reading has a card not yet turned over. The epilogue describes the products the eristics handed out: λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν — speeches, and question-speeches, given out to be learned by heart. A dialogue is a question-speech. On the

⁵Philoponus, *In APr* ad I.31: “he wants to celebrate through these things the method he handed down; for no one, he says, of those before us knew this.” Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In APr* ad loc., takes the target to be everyone in Plato's circle, including Plato. Striker 2009, 216–17, assigns it to Academics who thought division sufficient. The modern dispute over whether division generated the syllogistic runs Maier (yes), Shorey (no — polemic between finished theories), de Strycker, Cherniss and Ross (with Shorey), and Vlasits (yes, with a formal argument; see n. 6). Mueller's translation of Alexander on *APr* I.23–31 exists and has not been consulted for this paper.

strongest received reading, the Platonic dialogues, whatever they contain, are exactly what the epilogue has just classed as τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης: products, memorisable, handed out — and their theorising of division is theorising inside a product. It is answered at one page. *Phaedrus* 265d does not hand out a division to memorise; it says that the two forms are a δύναμις to be grasped τέχνη — εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνη λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις — and 266b names the art and its practitioners. Whether that page is τέχνη or ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης is the whole question, and the page says τέχνη. The received reading must then say that a statement of an art, occurring inside a dialogue, is a product because its container is; and the shoemaker's line runs between what is said and what is handed out, not between genres.

Fifth: the four propositions are consistent within one working life — the *Topics* early, the *Analytics* late, and I.31 written before its author had seen what he later claimed. This moves *precedes* for Aristotle alone; the difference from §9 is only across which boundary the word is moved.

The received reading has two real moves, the first and the fourth. The paragraph supplies neither: the first must read μόριον retrospectively, and the fourth must read a stated τέχνη as product. Those are the distinctions on which the standard reconciliations rest, and at these passages they have been assumed, not defended. *Part* moved by ξυνίεσαν; *existed beforehand* moved by the shoemaker; *the method* moved by restriction; *precedes* moved for Aristotle alone — every one paid on Aristotle's side of the ledger. Section 9 moves the fourth word for the Platonic corpus, and pays.

3. How can one thing be actually one and potentially many?

The second case is empirical. *De anima* II.2 asks whether the capacities of soul — nutritive, perceptive, locomotive, intellectual — are each a soul or a part of soul, and if parts, whether separable in account only or also in place:

πότερον δὲ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ μόριον ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ' εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ. (413b13-16)

The answer is taken from observation. Cut a plant, or certain insects, and the parts live:

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν ἕνια διαιρούμενα φαίνεται ζῶντα καὶ χωριζόμενα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ... καὶ τῶν ζώων ἕτερα ἔντομα διαιρούμενα ... ὡς οὐσης ἐν τούτοις ἐντελεχεῖα μὲν μιᾶς ψυχῆς, δυνάμει δὲ πλειόνων. (413b16-24)

As with plants, some of which when divided are seen to live and to be separated from one another ... and certain insects when divided ... as though the soul in these were one in actuality but many in potentiality.

The formula is the second case: a living thing is one in actuality and many in potentiality, and a cut does not create the parts but actualises a plurality the unity already contained. The parts are not appearances; they perceive, move, desire. I.4 states the same fact with the sharper phrase: divided living things live, καὶ δοκεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν τῷ εἶδει — and seem to have the same soul in form (409a9-10). And the chapter's own definition of soul uses the noun this paper turns on: the soul is that by which we live and perceive and think, ὥστε

λόγος τις ἂν εἴη καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον (414a13-14) — a kind of account and form, not matter and substrate. Not like an account: an account. And I.1 has stated the condition under which such an account could exist apart: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχεται ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι (403a10-11).

The passage exempts one thing. Concerning intellect nothing is yet clear, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ αἰδίον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ (413b24-27). The eternal from the perishable: the same seam I.31 could not select across, named at the end of the chapter that solves every other case as the case not yet solved, and with the same modal verb — ἐνδέχεται — that I.31 uses of what division can syllogize.

The same condition appears one level down, in the treatise's account of perception. Sense is τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον (424a18-21): what receives the form without the matter, as wax receives the signet's mark without the iron and the gold. The seal figure is the *Theaetetus*'s (191c-195b), where the wax block is opened as a model of memory, run, and abandoned — the route declared impossible, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον (196b). In the *De anima* the figure is retained and a term supplied that the *Theaetetus* did not have: ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης. Against any special relation stand three facts: the wax and seal are a commonplace of the period; 424a is about perception and not memory; and the *De memoria*'s doctrine of the image concerns remembered things and not the arithmetical error that defeats the wax. All three are true. The relation needs four propositions. What the *Theaetetus* lacks: its model locates false judgement only ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν (195d), in the joining of a perception to a thought, and it fails at 195e-196a on eleven and twelve ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ διανοεῖται τις — the case with no perception in it, where nothing can be mis-joined and the account falls back into the first, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον. What Aristotle supplies: οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχὴ (*De an.* 431a16-17), restated at the head of the *De memoria*, νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος (449b31) — thinking is never without an image, even of quantities thought not as quantities, as one draws a determinate triangle to think about triangle. How it resolves the case: the wax needed a perception to mis-join; on the image doctrine every thought has an image, so the eleven-and-twelve case has something present to be misidentified without any perception, and the *De memoria* says how misidentification goes — a φάντασμα can be regarded ὡς καθ' αὐτό or ὡς εἰκόνα (451a1-2), and false memory is τὴν μὴ εἰκόνα ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖν. Why it is more than a recurrent analogy: the figure is kept and the model under it is changed at the exact joint where the *Theaetetus* said its model broke. Not a completion of the wax: the wax re-founded on a different doctrine that keeps the seal. Section 8 returns to the pairing with a method for weighing it. Here it is recorded as the doctrine of §2 stated as a theory of reception.

4. How can many accounts belong to one thing?

The *Sophist* defines the sophist six times, and at 231d-e the Stranger stops to count them:

πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἶον ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν ... φέρε, ὅποσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται. δοκῶ μὲν γάρ, τὸ πρῶτον ἡρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής ... τὸ δὲ γε δεύτερον ἔμπορος τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα ... τρίτον ... κάπηλος ... τέταρτον γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ... πέμπτον ... τῆς γὰρ

ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος ...
τό γε μὴν ἔκτον ἀμφισβητήσιμον μὲν, ὅμως δ' ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ ... δοξῶν ἐμποδίῳ
μαθήμασιν περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

Hunter, merchant, retailer, own-seller, athlete, purifier — six, the sixth marked ἀμφισβητήσιμον, disputable. Theaetetus's response is the aporia the count produces: ἀπορῶ ... διὰ τὸ πολλὰ πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτε ... εἰπεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστὴν — because so many have appeared, what is he really? The Stranger's diagnosis is the passage this section turns on, and it should be read entire:

ἄρ' οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνεται, μιᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται, τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτὸ πρὸς τινα τέχνην οὐ δύναται κατιδεῖν ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει; (232a)

Do you see, then, that when someone appears knowledgeable in many things but is called by the name of one art, this appearance is not sound — rather it is clear that the one who has it, in relation to some art, cannot see that thing in it toward which all these pieces of learning look, and so calls their possessor by many names instead of one?

Four clauses, each doing something. The appearance of many-ness is τὸ φάντασμα οὐκ ὑγιές — unsound, an appearance. The fault is located in the beholder, ὁ πάσχων αὐτό, the one to whom the many appear. What he fails to see is one thing in the art, ἐκεῖνο εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ μαθήματα βλέπει — the point all the learnings look toward. And the many names, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀνθ' ἑνός, are what the failure produces. The Stranger's remedy is the operation of §5 performed on the spot: ἀναλάβωμεν ἐν πρῶτον τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων — take up one of the things said, the one that most reveals him, ἀντιλογικόν — and gather the rest to it. Theaetetus's assent: κινδυνεύει τοῦτο ταύτῃ πῃ μάλιστα πεφυκέναι — it is likely this is most of all how it is by nature.

One kind, many accounts. The six are not observer-error: each is the product of a real division, each is true of the sophist, the sixth is marked disputable because the dialogue is honest about its results, and the multiplicity is a dialectical fact the dialogue has not resolved when it stops to count. The six are real paths of division to a real thing, and each is a true account of him; what 232a calls unsound is not the accounts but the *appearance* — that there are six things because there are six accounts — and the fault it locates in the beholder is the inference from many accounts to many objects. The passage does not say the accounts are wrong; it says the observer who cannot see what they look toward will count objects by counting accounts. So: one thing, many true accounts, and the many are a defect of sight only when they are taken for many things. Vlasits has shown that Platonic division on a minimal reading — transitive and predicative, but neither necessarily dichotomous nor exclusive nor essential — is exactly what the *Sophist's* practice requires, and that a semantics built on such divisional structures is sound and complete for the deduction system that models the syllogistic.⁶ That is a formal demonstration of structural continuity — compatibility proved, not attribution — and it is the

⁶Vlasits, *Platonic Division and the Origins of Aristotelian Logic* (diss., Berkeley, 2017): a soundness and completeness theorem for a semantics built on Platonic divisional structures, and the argument that Aristotle took over Plato's conception of predication as parthood. Vlasits also observes that the

sense in which this paper's §2 is not eccentric: the logical apparatus of the two corpora is one apparatus at the level of structure, whatever is true at the level of persons.

The third result, then: multiple accounts do not multiply their object; what multiplies is the beholder's failure to see what they look toward. What this changes in the *Sophist* is that the six definitions stop being a problem about the dialogue's coherence and become its method's statement about its own product.

5. What is it to gather a plurality into one?

Division has an inverse, and the *Phaedrus* names both at 265d-266b, as the two forms of one power:

τούτων δέ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἶδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνη λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι. — τίνων δὴ; — εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὀριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν αἰεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ ... — τὸ δ' ἕτερον δὴ εἶδος τί λέγεις; — τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ἧ πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον.

Two forms, εἶδοῖν, and a power to be grasped τέχνη — the word the epilogue of the *SE* opposes to products: bringing what is scattered in many places, τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, to one idea by seeing it together, συνορῶντα; and cutting again by forms at the joints, κατ' ἄρθρα ἧ πέφυκεν, not breaking any part like a bad butcher. Then the speaker's declaration and the practitioners' name:

τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵνα οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατόν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὄρᾱν, τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθε μετ' ἵχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε, καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς. (266b-c)

A lover of divisions and collections, ἵνα οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν — so as to be able to speak and to think; one who can see toward one and over many, εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλά, is followed “in his footsteps as a god's”; and those able to do it are called, provisionally, διαλεκτικοί. The first of the two forms is defined a second time at 249c, in the sentence that defines recollection:

δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὼν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ.

A human being must understand what is said according to form, going from many perceptions and being gathered by reasoning into one; and this is recollection of those things our soul once saw.

pervasiveness of division across the Platonic corpus puts pressure on developmental accounts that place collection-and-division late.

Going from many, ἐκ πολλῶν, to one, εἰς ἓν, gathered by reasoning, λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον: the operation is 266b's first form, and this sentence names it ἀνάμνησις. And the same page says of reminders what §7 will need: τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται — the one who uses such reminders rightly alone becomes truly complete.

Aristotle classifies the operation, and the *De memoria*'s account should be read in its order. First what recollection is not:

Οὔτε γὰρ μνήμης ἐστὶν ἀνάληψις ἢ ἀνάμνησις οὔτε λῆψις· ὅταν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἢ μάθη ἢ πάθῃ, οὗτ' ἀναλαμβάνει μνήμην οὐδεμίαν (οὐδεμία γὰρ προέγεγονεν) οὗτ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει. (451a21-24)

Neither a recovery of memory nor an acquisition of it. Then what it is:

τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ἐστὶν οἶον συλλογισμός τις· ὅτι γὰρ πρότερον εἶδεν ἢ ἤκουσεν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἔπαθε, συλλογίζεται ὁ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος, καὶ ἔστιν οἶον ζήτησις τις. (453a10-13)

Recollecting is like a kind of syllogism: for that he earlier saw or heard or underwent some such thing, the one recollecting infers; and it is like a kind of search.

Like a kind of syllogism — the same οἶον with which I.31 classifies division as like a weak syllogism — and like a search, ζήτησις, which is the word the next passage explains. How it proceeds:

Καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τοῦ πάλιν μαθάνειν, ὅτι δυνήσεται πῶς δι' αὐτοῦ κινηθῆναι ἐπὶ τὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ... Πολλάκις δ' ἤδη μὲν ἀδυνατεῖ ἀναμνησθῆναι, ζητεῖν δὲ δύναται καὶ εὕρισκεν ... Δεῖ δὲ λαβέσθαι ἀρχῆς. Διὸ ἀπὸ τόπων δοκοῦσιν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ἐνίοτε. Τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ταχὺ ἀπ' ἄλλου ἐπ' ἄλλο ἔρχονται, οἶον ἀπὸ γάλακτος ἐπὶ λευκόν, ἀπὸ λευκοῦ δ' ἐπ' ἄερα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐφ' ὑγρόν, ἀφ' οὗ ἐμνήσθη μετοπώρου. (452a4-16)

It differs from learning again in that one can move oneself from the starting-point to what follows it; often one cannot recollect but can search and find; one must get hold of a starting-point, ἀρχῆς — from places, sometimes — and go quickly from one thing to another: milk to white, white to air, air to moist, and from that the autumn one was looking for. Two operations practised in the Platonic corpus, both classified by the same οἶον. What the treatise states is that recollection is a search from a starting-point along an ordered sequence, that it is not the recovery of a memory, and that it can succeed where recollecting has failed. What a reader of a distributed corpus does — beginning from reminders and reconstructing a unity not previously held as such — has that shape.

Read together the two halves make a reading-instruction: a corpus gives reminders; the right use of reminders is to gather what is scattered into one according to form, by hunting the sequence from a starting-point; and a search can succeed where recollection has failed. That is the whole of *many and one* as an operation — distinction without otherness, real plurality in real unity, many accounts of one kind, the scattered gathered — stated before any of it is applied to a maker. Section 6 is the seam.

6. The divided person

Here the corpus is first read as a maker's work; §§2–5 owe nothing to the question this section raises. One distinction governs everything from this point. Functional identity — that a set of texts can be read as one account — is established by pattern; biographical identity — that one embodied person wrote them — by evidence of a different kind. The two are kept apart, and it is said at each point which is in question, because a method that could not halt its own regress would consume every adjacent name.⁷

6.1 The two boys

Statesman 257d. The Eleatic Stranger proposes to rest Theaetetus and take the other boy as respondent. Socrates answers:

κινδυνεύετον, ὦ ξένε, ἄμφω ποθὲν ἐμοὶ συγγένειαν ἔχειν τινά. τὸν μὲν γε οὖν ὑμεῖς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ προσώπου φύσιν ὅμοιον ἐμοὶ φαίνεσθαί φατε, τοῦ δ' ἡμῖν ἡ κλῆσις ὁμώνυμος οὔσα καὶ ἡ πρόσρησις παρέχεται τινα οἰκειότητα. (257d–258a)

Both of them seem somehow to have some kinship with me. The one you say appears like me in the nature of his face; the other's name, being the same as mine, and his form of address, supply a certain kinship.

Two boys. One has the face; one has the name. And the criterion by which either is to be recognised is neither: δεῖ δὴ τοὺς γε συγγενεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ προθύμως διὰ λόγων ἀναγνωρίζειν — we must always be eager to recognise our kin through accounts. He applies it in the next clause. Theaetetus he has met διὰ λόγων, having heard him answering; of Socrates, neither — Σωκράτους δὲ οὐδέτερα. So let him answer now, σοὶ δὲ νῦν ἀποκρινέσθω. The Stranger turns: ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀκούεις δὴ Σωκράτους; The older Socrates does not speak again in the dialogue.

Four readings are available. The passage is a transition device and nothing more: Theaetetus answered throughout the *Sophist* and a fresh interlocutor is wanted, the two boys were introduced as a pair at *Theaetetus* 147d, and the author needs Socrates offstage so that the divisions can run uninterrupted — courteous, light, structurally necessary. Or it is the standing joke about the boy who looks like Socrates and the boy who is called Socrates, with a courteous reason for choosing the second. Or it is an ordinary epistemic remark — that one knows people by talking with them, which Socrates says often. Or it is a sentence that, while doing all three of those things, distributes to two boys the two marks by which a person is ordinarily recognised — the face to one, the name to the other — and supplies as the criterion of recognising kin something that happens when someone *answers*, so that neither mark is the criterion. The first three are compatible with the fourth. On the fourth, the person is what answers in account: the Greek gives the criterion, διὰ λόγων ἀναγνωρίζειν, and the sentence gives the rest.

⁷The rule is imposed from outside the method, and deliberately. A method that cannot halt its own regress is telling you what kind of method it is: an instrument for revealing functional structure, not for discovering identities. The moment functional analysis is permitted to make biographical claims it has no floor. The rule is what answers the objection that the same procedure would attribute all of philosophy to one hand.

It is worth adding, as a verbal and doctrinal correspondence and no more, that ὁμώνυμος is the *Organon*'s first word — Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὢν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος (*Cat.* 1a1-2). The two boys are a homonym case, decided by λόγος, and the treatise that opens on homonyms opens on exactly that test.⁸

6.2 One maker cannot; the same maker must

Republic 395a-b reaches its denial by a chain, and the chain should be read whole:

εἷς ἕκαστος ἐν μὲν ἂν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δ' οὐ ... οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μιμήσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ αὐτὸς μιμεῖσθαι εὔ ὥσπερ ἐν οὐ δυνατός; ... ἐπεὶ πού οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μīmήματα δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὔ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον κωμωδίαν καὶ τραγωδίαν ποιοῦντες ... οὐδὲ μὴν ῥαψωδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα ... ἀλλ' οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμωδοῖς τε καὶ τραγωδοῖς οἱ αὐτοί· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μīmήματα ... καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὧς Ἀδείμαντε, φαίνεται μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς μιμεῖσθαι ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν ὢν δὴ καὶ τὰ μīmήματά ἐστιν ἀφομοιώματα.

One practice per person; the same account for imitation; not even two imitations that seem close — the example is comedy and tragedy, *making* them, ποιοῦντες; not rhapsode and actor; not comic and tragic actor; and then the ground, stated as a further step beyond all of these, ἔτι τούτων: human nature appears minted into still smaller pieces, εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι, so as to be ἀδύνατος at imitating many things well or at doing the things the imitations are likenesses of. κατακερματίζω is a currency verb — a whole struck into small change — and the perfect passive says the minting is prior and done. The objection to one maker being many is that the maker has already been divided, and divided in a way that makes him insufficient rather than plural.

Symposium 223d compels the opposite, in the same words, and the sentence that reports it should be read entire:

τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη αὐτοῖς διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὁ Ἀριστόδημος οὐκ ἔφη μεμνησθαι τῶν λόγων — οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς παραγενέσθαι ὑπονυστάζειν τε — τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον, ἔφη, προσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμωδίαν καὶ τραγωδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνη τραγωδοποιὸν ὄντα καὶ κωμωδοποιὸν εἶναι. ταῦτα δὴ ἀναγκαζομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐ σφόδρα ἐπομένους νυστάζειν, καὶ πρότερον μὲν καταδαρθεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη, ἥδη δὲ ἡμέρας γιγνομένης τὸν Ἀγάθωνα.

The narrator did not remember the arguments — he had not been there from the start, and was dozing — but the κεφάλαιον, the head of it: that Socrates was compelling them to agree that it belongs to the same man to know how to make comedy and tragedy, καὶ τὸν τέχνη τραγωδοποιὸν ὄντα καὶ κωμωδοποιὸν εἶναι — and that the one who is a tragedian *by art* is also a comedian. The word τέχνη is there, and it is the word 395b's chain was about. The two are compelled, ἀναγκαζομένους, and not quite following, οὐ σφόδρα ἐπομένους; the

⁸The transition-device reading of *Statesman* 257d is standard. Nails, *The People of Plato* (Indianapolis, 2002), is the reference for the two boys.

conclusion is transmitted and the demonstration is not, and the text says so at the point of absence. The one who supplied the myth of the cut earlier in the evening falls asleep first: πρότερον μὲν καταδαρθεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη.

The mechanism the *Symposium* does not transmit is stated in the objection's own vocabulary, in a treatise on generation. *GC* 315b, on how the same elements yield contraries:

ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἐνὸς μετακινήθεντος· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγωδία καὶ κωμωδία γίνεται γραμμάτων. (315b13–15)

Appearing wholly different when one thing has been rearranged — for from the same letters tragedy and comedy come to be.

The passage is doxography of Democritus, and the letters-analogy is standard atomist illustration. But set beside 395b it reads as a reply: the smallest denominations, rearranged, make either kind. What is exact is the vocabulary the two passages share. Fragmentation is not the obstacle. It is the condition. Sections 2–5 have said the same thing four times: where the terms are not other, division terminates; one in actuality, many in potentiality; one kind, many accounts; the scattered gathered into one.

6.3 A reconstruction, marked as one

The corpus carries more of the arc than the two passages, and it is worth setting out, because a reconstruction can be argued with and an implication left unstated cannot. The diagnosis at 395b is in the perfect passive — human nature *has been* minted — a condition prior to any maker's attempt. The prognosis without remedy is stated at *Republic* 473d in soteriological language — οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει — unless two things fall together into the same, εἰς ταῦτόν συμπέση; and 473d stands under pressure from 395b's premise: the corpus that insists human nature is minted too small to hold two arts elsewhere requires two capacities to fall into one. The tragedy-and-comedy contradiction is exact; 473d is the wider pressure, not a second contradiction. The remedy is named at *Symposium* 191d in the diagnosis's own noun: Eros attempts ποιῆσαι ἐν ἐκ δυοῖν and ἰάσασθαι τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, and each of us is ἀνθρώπου σύμβολον, cut like a flatfish, ἐξ ἐνὸς δύο. The lexical link is exact and runs on one noun: ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις is minted in one book and healed in the other.

What a σύμβολον is decides how the arc closes. A σύμβολον is not a broken object but an object broken by agreement — a token snapped so its halves can be matched — and it is recognisable precisely at the fracture. On that logic 395b stands as premise, and 473d becomes achievable: the two fall εἰς ταῦτόν not in one nature but in a configuration whose parts do not resemble each other and only fit. One cannot un-cut human nature; one can cut it on purpose.

This is a reconstruction. The corpus states the fragmentation and does not connect it to the σύμβολον; it demands recombination twice, for rulers and for makers, and never of a writer; it supplies a criterion for recognising one form across many bearers inside a dialogue about identifying a boy by his face. The corpus supplies the structure and does not perform the application — and nothing in the texts distinguishes an unassembled set of commonplaces

from a deliberately unassembled one.⁹

6.4 The accusation

One further fact belongs here, because it supplies an external anchor for why there was a name available to occupy. The *Apology* records a prior, public, comic Socrates and answers it by naming the comedy: the old charge at 18b-c — ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστής ... καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν — and its source at 19c, ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον. A certain Socrates: the indefinite, used by the speaker of a figure bearing the same name in another author's play. φροντιστής belongs to the *Clouds*' Socratic vocabulary. And the *Clouds* carries both nomenclatures for its two arguments — the moral one, Δίκαιος and Ἄδικος Λόγος, as the personifications are named in the editorial tradition, and the competitive one in the text itself, τὸν ἥττονα (112), τὸν κρείττω λόγον (882), ἐγὼ γὰρ ἥττων μὲν λόγος ... ἐκλήθην (1042-43); the *Apology* reports the public charge in the latter vocabulary, the play's own. That Plato knew the *Clouds* and answered it is uncontroversial and is sufficient for all of this. What the observation adds is a distinction: the accusation-profile is comic, and the operation — the questioning, the midwifery, the ignorance held as a position — is not in the comic layer at all. Comedy supplied the notoriety; the later corpus occupied the position and differentiated it.¹⁰

6.5 What the section establishes

The corpus divides a person into face and name, gives both away, and keeps neither as the criterion. What it keeps is λόγος — and, on §6.1's reading, λόγος is also the criterion through which a corpus is gathered and recognised. The objection to one maker being many is stated in the corpus and answered in the corpus. And the test for whether a thing bearing a name is what it claims is neither its face nor its name but whether the account of its being is one — which is the *Categories*' definition of a homonym, the *Statesman*'s criterion of kinship, and the question the remaining sections ask of a corpus.

Classical philology has a name for the failure to separate Socrates from Plato: the Socratic problem, from Schleiermacher onward, and the contemporary consensus after two centuries is that it admits no clean resolution.¹¹ This section does not solve it. It reclassifies it: under a

⁹On the currency vocabulary more broadly: *Republic* 507a, where Socrates warns at the threshold of the Good that he may pay a counterfeit account, κίβδηλον ἀποδιδούς τὸν λόγον; *Laws* 742a, currency ἔντιμον within the city and ἀδόκιμον without; *NE* 1165a, where false personation is graded above coin-forgery on one scale, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κίβδηλεύουσιν; and *SE* 165a, which models the apparent syllogism on counterfeit metal. A census of the forgery-and-legitimacy vocabulary in the two corpora as digitised shows a division of labour — Plato holds the image words (εἶδωλον 72 : 13, μίμημα 54 : 7, σύγγραμμα 37 : 3), Aristotle the detection words (πλάσμα 16 : 32, φάντασμα 31 : 47, ὑποκριτής 10 : 32), with the assay word δόκιμος shared 28 : 24; and σύγγραμμα is zero in seven of nine Attic orators, whose business was detecting *others*' forgeries. That Athenian legitimacy was litigated by acknowledgment rather than descent — Isaeus's inheritance corpus establishes γνήσιος by witness, pledge and phratry enrolment, with no blood-vocabulary — is recorded as interpretation.

¹⁰The property test is stem counts across the digitised corpora and is crude; two rows (μετεωρ-, εἰρων-) are confounded by Aristotle's *Meteorologica* and the ethical vice at *NE* 1108a and are voided. The body rests on direct reading of the relevant *Clouds* passages rather than on the property count.

¹¹Schleiermacher, *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato* (1804); Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo* (1911); Taylor, *Socrates* (1932); Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (1991); Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue* (1996); Cooper, introduction to *Plato: Complete Works* (1997); Dorion, "The Rise and Fall of the Socratic Problem," in *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates* (2011). Danzig, *Apologizing*

functional lens, the problem appears as a symptom — the predictable trace of a configuration the biographical model cannot represent — rather than as a question awaiting a biographical answer.

7. Many voices, many objects

7.1 Two demonstrations of one capacity

The Platonic corpus is many voices, one maker, and no recoverable rule. Many speakers carry the corpus; the strongest internal partition of it is not speaker and not form but the received early/middle/late stratification (see §9); and within the corpus, conceptual partitions such as same/other are not recoverable from the surface. Everything varies and none of the variation resolves into a principle. The corpus does not say what makes it one.

The Aristotelian corpus is many objects, one maker, and the rule is visible. Aristotle's internal variance is among the largest of any single author measured in this study — large enough that on a first pass he was read as exceeding synthetic multi-author pools. Hold the object constant, however — measure within domain rather than across — and the anomaly does not shrink but disappears: his within-domain dispersion falls to the level of Plato's overall dispersion.¹² The treatise takes the form of what it treats. What the result supports is narrower than it sounds and is worth having: Aristotle's apparent internal many-authoredness is strongly object-conditioned. It is a parity of dispersions, not of corpora — the two remain far apart on the declared partition — and the ordering of the residual, ethics tightest and logic loosest, is read as the object-space of each domain by description rather than by an independent metric.

So: Plato shows that one maker can be many voices, and withholds the account of how. Aristotle shows that one maker can be many objects, and supplies it. That is §6's structure at corpus scale — the face to one boy, the name to another, recognition withheld from both until one answered.

7.2 The name is lent out and the face is not

One measured detail belongs to §6's split. Socrates is named 144 times in Aristotle, nine of them paired with Callias as the interchangeable placeholder for any individual — Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην. And none of the 144 falls within forty tokens of any of the 46 occurrences of the σιμ- stem — the snub, Aristotle's standing example of form inseparable from matter. Callias takes that slot five times. Where Aristotle needs a face he uses Callias; where he needs a name he uses Socrates. And the snub is not a neutral example: *Theaetetus* 209c, the terminal aporia on individuation, fails on exactly that mark — τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον

for Socrates (2010), and Nehamas, *The Art of Living* (1998), are one step from this section's position and do not take it: for both, the constructed figure is a character made by authors, not a position the authorship is organised around.

¹²Measurements are on function-word profiles over fixed-size contiguous blocks of the Perseus and First1KGreek TEI texts, with within-domain dispersion compared to overall dispersion and both assessed against synthetic multi-author pools; the designs, figures, controls and every instrument that failed are in the technical report described at n. 18; no graphical figure is reproduced here; the numerical results used in the argument are reported in §8.

— which is Socrates’ own standing description (*Tht.* 143e, *Symp.* 215b, *Meno* 80a), and the enmattered-form doctrine answers 209c’s question in the same word.¹³

7.3 The corpus on its own last page

The *SE*’s last page names Socrates once, a few lines before the priority claim: Σωκράτης ἡρώτα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ὡμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι (183b7–8). Elsewhere in the *Organon* the name is the token individual — *Categories* 14 times, *De interpretatione* 10, twice earlier in the *SE* itself where it means anybody. Filled once, on the closing page, and filled with a function: the questioner who did not know. Aristotle gives the reason in the sentence before — the inquiry had to cover both sides, ὅπως λόγον ὑπέχοντες φυλάξομεν τὴν θέσιν — and assigns Socrates the one side and takes the other. Read through §5 this is an order of grasp and not of persons: the questioner at ξυνίεσαν, not grasping what the operation entails; the answerer at ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν; and between them exactly what the *De memoria* describes — ἀδυνατεῖ ἀναμνησθῆναι, ζητεῖν δὲ δύναται καὶ εὐρίσκει. Socrates questioned and disclaimed knowledge, so the dialectical programme must also treat the answerer’s role; that is what the sentence says.¹⁴

The received account itself concedes the capacity §6 is about: Cicero knew two kinds of Aristotelian writing — duo genera librorum, unum populariter scriptum ... alterum limatius quod in commentariis reliquerunt (*De fin.* 5.12) — and praised a golden river of speech (*Acad.* 2.119) that modern readers agree does not describe the extant prose. So the received account already requires one man in two kinds of writing, and has lost the kind that crosses between them entirely, while the Platonic dialogue corpus survives complete, spuria included. Transmission is not parsimonious, and the exoteric works were lost as most ancient literature was lost — the school copied what it used. That is sufficient and requires no design. What it leaves is that the capacity is conceded in the tradition’s own testimony.¹⁵

7.4 The identity, and what it does not mean

Section 2 established that where there is no matter the terms division separates are not other. The corpus distinguishes its own living λόγος from its written image, and everything in this section turns on where the passage locates the living one. *Phaedrus* 276a:

ὃς μετ’ ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμῦναι ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ. — τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον

¹³The positional observation once attached to this locus — that the snub sits at the end of one corpus and the opening of the other — was refuted by its own base rate: 31 terms rare in Plato show the terminal-to-technical pattern more strictly, which is what ordinary uptake produces. What stands is the semantic reading, argued as philology. The counts of Σωκράτης, συμ- and Καλλίας tokens in the body are from the digitised corpora and query regime of n. 12 and the technical report.

¹⁴The *De anima*’s commentator reads that treatise’s own structure on the same pattern: a scene that sets the What-is-X question, the ἔνδοξα of Book I as interlocutors rejected, Books II–III as the answer — “Aristotle’s treatise traces a Socratic pattern with possibly more satisfying results” (Polansky 2007, p. 33). The order of grasp §9.2 reads across the two corpora is, on that account, the order of one treatise.

¹⁵Cicero, *De finibus* 5.12; *Academica* 2.119; *Topica* 1.3; Quintilian, *Inst.* 10.1.83. Diogenes’ catalogue of Aristotle’s writings totals 445,270 lines, of which only a fraction survives, and the surviving corpus is overwhelmingly the treatise writing of the school. The empirical collections — 158 constitutions — are lost but one, recovered from a papyrus in 1891 (Kenyon, *Aristotle on the Constitution of Athens*, editio princeps).

λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἶδωλον ἂν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως.

The one that is written with knowledge in the soul of the learner, able to defend itself, knowing to whom to speak and to whom to be silent. — You mean the living and ensouled word of the one who knows, of which the written one would justly be called an image.

The living λόγος is *written* — γράφεται — but in the learner’s soul; the written one, ὁ γεγραμμένος, is its εἶδωλον. Then what the writer does with writing, 276d:

ἐαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἐὰν ἴκηται, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταύτῳ ἵχνος μετιόντι.

Storing up reminders for himself, should he come to the old age of forgetting, and for everyone following the same track.

Reminders, ὑπομνήματα — the word 249c used for what is rightly used — for himself and for anyone following the same track: the future reader is on the page, unspecified. And where the living word is planted, 276e–277a:

ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπεύρῃ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἳ ἐαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι φυόμενοι τοῦτ’ ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί.

When someone, using the dialectical art, takes a fitting soul and plants and sows in it accounts with knowledge — accounts able to help themselves and their planter, not fruitless but bearing seed, from which others, growing in other characters, are able to furnish this forever deathless.

Using the dialectical art, τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ — the art whose practitioners 266c called διαλεκτικοί, the dividers and collectors — the knower plants accounts that carry seed, and the seed grows ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι, in other characters. So the written corpus is the image and the living account is in a knower, and the corpus’s own word for the operation that plants it is the operation of §§2–5. It might be said: the λόγος has no matter, therefore the maker is the corpus. That takes the corpus for the λόγος, which is the one thing 276a denies. The corrected form is stronger. A corpus is ὑπομνήματα — a starting-point — and what it holds is held δυνάμει until a search actualises it; the λόγος is what is actualised from the corpus in a knower, and 276e–277a says where it is planted and by what art. At the level of λόγος, the maker and what the corpus says are τὸ αὐτό in the act of thinking it. Never “the maker and the corpus.” What Λ 9 states is an identity in νόησις, and the identity is therefore located in the reading.

That distinction has to be kept, because three theses are now in play and only one of them is historical — and the historical one is not yet stated. It is a claim about how many embodied makers produced the corpora, which is why §8 will not be able to reach it, and why the received claim, two, is not reached there either. Section 9 states it after the order of the corpus has been read, in the place the readings give it; here it is enough to say what it is not.

The λόγος-level thesis: maker and account are the same in the act of thinking it. A fact about a relation, located in the reading.

The personhood thesis: numerical bodily unity does not exhaust the philosophical category of personal unity. §§2–6 have shown that what counts as one depends on the mode of unity; on that showing, positions divided by voice, by object, by name can be the divisions of one person and not an aggregation of several — stronger than a committee — whether or not one body wrote them. That is §§2–6’s question, and it is the one the historical case forces into view.

The three are kept apart and the direction between them is fixed. The personhood thesis does not prove any historical one. A historical case is what makes the personhood question visible. And if the historical thesis loses, the personhood problem does not lose with it; it takes its primary form. Two bodies, a conceded relation of transmission between them, and an account that the texts of both carry as one — that is the case in which the question becomes exact: under what conditions do several embodied agents form something stronger than an aggregate, and at which act does one person end and another begin? That is where the question stands once the count of bodies has been given.

Nor is the question all on one side. The received account’s *two* rests on the biographical, institutional and reception tradition; what is asked is what those criteria license *at the passages*. When the distinction is used to read a passage — when “Plato’s division” and “Aristotle’s method” are the terms in which I.31 is glossed — the reading has taken a position on what makes differentiated positions one person or two, and at that point the question can be put: at what level is “person” being individuated? Sections 2–6 have shown that the corpus itself does not permit “one” to mean numerically undifferentiated. Once that is granted, “two,” *as used at the texts*, carries a philosophical burden of its own. This paper has said what it means by one. The question it puts to the received account, at the passages and nowhere else, is what it means by two.

7.5 The ladder, late

Only now, with the correspondences established, is it worth noticing that the corpus states an order for them. *Symposium* 210a–d gives an ordered ascent — from one body to all bodies, to beauty in souls, to practices and laws, to the sciences, to the thing itself — and each rung above the first has a correspondence in what has been established: the corpus’s many speakers; the dialogues’ declared work of begetting accounts that make the young better; the *Laws*, *Republic* and *Statesman*, for which ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμοι is Diotima’s own word; the treatises, in which the maker becomes each ἐπιστήμη in turn; and Λ 9. The correspondences are of unequal strength. The strongest single item is the instruction at the transition to the fifth rung:

βλέπων πρὸς πολὺ ἤδη τὸ καλὸν μηκέτι τὸ παρ’ ἐνί, ὥσπερ οἰκέτης (210c–d)
 looking now toward the great sea of beauty, no longer at what belongs to one, like
 a household slave.

No longer what belongs to one — an apt image for a corpus whose internal variation follows its objects rather than a single manner.

8. Two tests, and why they belong to the question

The readings above are readings of structure. This section reports two measured tests, and it knows what it is: a stylometric interloper in a paper of close reading. It belongs here for a reason that should come first. The received order of the Platonic corpus — early, middle, late — is not a fact handed down from antiquity. It is a modern construction built substantially through stylometric work: Campbell's particles in 1867, Lutosławski's criteria in 1897, Brandwood's and Ledger's computational tables a century later.¹⁶ The Socratic problem's "early dialogues" are a set that construction largely defined; the authenticity of the *Letters* and the dubia is adjudicated by it; and the developmental story on which the relation between the two corpora is read — a young man in the Academy learning the method whose theory he later found — takes its Platonic half from that stratification. Nor is this modern only. The corpus is collected and defined after the fact by internal criteria, and has been since antiquity: Andronicus's edition was a division of the works κατὰ πραγματείας, and his rejection of the *De interpretatione* was made on an internal cross-reference that did not match; Thrasyllus's spuria stand in Diogenes with no external warrant; and the rhetorical tradition's authenticity test was stylistic in so many words — Dionysius recognises genuine Lysias by the χάρις and by nothing else.¹⁷ Most questions of authenticity are by necessity questions of style, because style is what a text carries with it when its author does not. Stylometry is therefore one of the principal grounds of the received developmental ordering, ancient and modern. What follows turns the discipline's own instrument on the partition the instrument helped produce, and reports what it returns. The full designs, controls, figures and the register of every instrument that failed are in a separately deposited technical report;¹⁸ the results are given here so that the argument does not depend on what the reader cannot see.

The first test is functional, not lexical. A six-function specification for transmitting an account across a break in its bearer — encoding, substrate, decommissioning, withholding, recovery, verification — was drawn up in a separate investigation of textual transmission and fixed before any Platonic or Aristotelian text was assigned to it; assignment was made only from received characterisation of what each work is about. Both corpora fill all six at the level of the individual work: Plato in six distinct dialogues (*Phaedrus* 274b-278b; the *Theaetetus* wax block; the *Phaedo*; the *Parmenides*; *Meno* 80d-86c; *Sophist* 231b-236d); Aristotle in

¹⁶Campbell, *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato* (Oxford, 1867), introduction; Lutosławski, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (London, 1897); Ledger, *Re-counting Plato* (Oxford, 1989); Brandwood, *The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge, 1990); with Denyer's caution that the stratification records a repertoire as readily as a sequence.

¹⁷Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 24, on Andronicus dividing the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus κατὰ πραγματείας; Ammonius, *In De int.* 5.28-6.4, on Andronicus's rejection of the *De interpretatione* for a cross-reference to the *De anima* he could not find; Diogenes Laertius 3.62, Thrasyllus's spuria; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Lysia* 11-12, the χάρις as the test of genuine Lysias; Galen throughout the Hippocratic commentaries, adjudicating authenticity by style and doctrine.

¹⁸The technical report — designs, controls, figures and the register of every instrument that failed — is separately deposited as *Inheritance Is Observable, Embodiment Is Not* (EA-MEASURES-REPORT-01), Crimson Hexagonal Archive #1572, AXN:0664.EMPIRICAL, <https://alexanarch.org/s/records/1572/>; its figures are re-queryable and are not reproduced. The six-function specification was fixed before assignment, the four rival specifications with it; assignment was made only from received characterisation of what each work is about. The one procedural habit the two corpora share at high rates — halt at an unnamed class, flag it, coin — does not transmit in the one documented master-student pair on which the probe was run (Albert the Great shows no instance across 1.14 million tokens of independent writing, while the same probe finds it twenty times in his commentaries on Aristotle); one control pair is one draw.

five treatises, one carrying two functions (*De interpretatione* 16a; *De anima* 424a and III.5; *Metaphysics* B; *De memoria*; *SE* 164a). The convergence is at the device — the wax at substrate, ἀνάμνησις at recovery, the true-from-apparent discrimination at verification in two works titled for the sophist — and one device undergoes an especially close transformation across the boundary: the *Theaetetus* abandons the wax as impossible and the *De anima* keeps the figure and supplies ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, with no reference to the earlier text, where Catullus, transforming Sappho at comparable closeness, announces it by metre, by form and by name. Four rival specifications were fixed with the six: the four causes fill four of six on Plato; the divided line fills six from one passage; the cardinal virtues fill six with four from *Republic* IV; a random control fills none. Run on the Johannine writings, the random control fills 0 of 6 when works are assigned by what they are about and 6 of 6 when assigned by what appears in them — which is why the assignment rule is load-bearing. What this shows is that there is an apparatus to have a question about, and that it is complete in both corpora. What it does not show is one hand: a school with a shared programme produces the same co-coverage. Two things put content into that concession. Inside the *Organon*, Plato appears four times, all in the *Topica*, all as examples of definitional error — evidence of direct engagement with Platonic material, and admitted as such. And in the one documented master-student pair on which this probe was run, a procedural habit the two Greek corpora share at high rates — halt at an unnamed class, flag it, coin a term: Plato 2.60, Aristotle 8.43 per 100,000 tokens — does not transmit: Albert the Great shows it 0.00 times in 1,140,474 tokens of independent writing, while the same probe finds it twenty times in his commentaries on Aristotle; Aquinas independent 1.07, one-eighth his rate when glossing Aristotle. One pair is one draw.¹⁹

The second test is lexical, and it failed, and the failure is the result. On function-word profiles over fixed contiguous blocks, Aristotle's internal dispersion is the largest of any single author measured — 0.1033, above every synthetic five-author pool tested — which is the anomaly that made Aristotle look multi-authored in this test. Hold the object constant, measuring within domain, and the anomaly does not shrink but disappears: within-domain dispersion averages 0.0571, against Plato's overall 0.0570 — a parity of dispersions, not of corpora; the two remain $Z = +39.18$ apart on the declared partition. Among eleven corpora and all 55 pairs, a gap that small between dispersions occurs zero times; the closest pair, Josephus and Philo, differ by two and a half times as much. That base rate is total-against-total and the parity is residual-against-total, so its own base rate is unrun; what stands is that Aristotle's apparent many-authoredness is object-conditioned, and that the treatise takes the form of what it treats. Then the instrument built to distinguish an embodied master-student relation from a constructed one: fifteen distributional features, every one destroyed by a control run in the same session. Downsampling the documented masters moved four into the constructed range. Trigram overlap was Greek word order, $z = -10.35$, every Greek pair at 59–79 and every non-Greek at 87–90. Lysias→Isocrates, no teaching relation, outscored Isaeus→Demosthenes, which has one, on every inheritance feature; Herodotus→Thucydides scored like distant pairs, Ionic

¹⁹The documented class was restricted to pairs attested by contemporary documents independent of textual resemblance — Wundt→Titchener, Freud→Jung, Albert→Aquinas — because ancient attestations of teaching are regularly inferred from stylistic likeness (Dionysius argues the Isaeus-Demosthenes relation from it), which makes them circular as calibration. Albert→Aquinas is also inside the Aristotelian transmission, which disqualifies it as a control for object-conditioning and widens the documented band to contain the target; the band is one outlier wide, and the outlier is downstream of the target. Jung's inheritance of 99.7% of Freud's most distinctive terms survives a public doctrinal break: rupture and inheritance are independent, so Aristotle's disagreements with Plato are evidence of neither relation-type.

against Attic. Coverage geometry — whether a pupil's blocks fall within the master's spread — separated the classes cleanly at full size, documented pupils covering 69–98% of the master's ground and constructed disciples 0–20, with the target at 66.8 inside the pupil band; size-matched, the target fell to 18.8, inside the constructed band, and Albert→Aquinas to 0.0. The measure reads corpus size. Where the non-discriminating features differ between classes at all, the target sits at the documented-pupil end. And the instrument set, checked late against known pairs, agreed on one of three and classed Plato and Xenophon as one author. It is the record of what the discipline's instrument returns when pointed at the partition the discipline built with it, and what it returns is a null.

What the instruments return, then, is null: nothing about maker-count in either direction. A null is not a negative — it counts against no one — and it is not nothing either. The parity of dispersions, 0.0571 against 0.0570, established nothing; it is a fact the instrument returned, and it stands in the record waiting for the base rate that would say what it means. What survives beside it is a formal result, and it is the section's product. Master-student and constructed configuration are not competing relation-types: a heteronymic system instantiates master and disciple, and only the latent maker-count differs. Inheritance is observable. Embodiment is not thereby observable. And the null is symmetric: inheritance is exactly what a school and a constructed configuration share, so the instruments that return nothing for one maker return nothing for master and pupil either. The received relation-type is as unestablished by the discipline's own instrument as the hypothesis of §9 is — and the partition that instrument built, it cannot certify.²⁰ So the received account cannot use *master and student* to explain the textual architecture and simultaneously use that architecture as evidence that there were two makers — and the instruments that built the order of the Platonic corpus cannot be asked to count the makers of the whole, because counting makers is the one thing they have just been shown not to do. An earlier form of this argument said that Λ 9 predicted these failures because the instruments are addressed to matter; that is withdrawn — lexical frequencies are formal properties of texts at least as much as substrate properties — and the result stands without it.

9. Which word moves?

9.1 A relocation, as hypothesis

Nothing is abolished — not the persons, the school, the teaching, the succession, the dates. No evidence produced here shows any of it false. Nor does the existence of the received biography by itself establish that every textual boundary conventionally mapped onto it is a boundary between makers; that is the symmetry the rest of this section holds to. What the argument proposes to move is the explanatory work. The received account explains the corpus's order by a biography: a young man in the Academy, a mature man in the Lyceum. The alternative explains it by a programme: a sequence of forms. The hypothesis is that development within the corpus is real, ordered and directional, and that its order is genre and form

²⁰Love, *Attributing Authorship: An Introduction* (Cambridge, 2002), is the standard: attribution requires converging evidence of distinct kinds, and stylometric evidence alone is not probative of identity. Section 8's result is that standard applied. The pseudo-Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, which authenticated themselves by an artificial Doric (Thesleff, *An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period*, Åbo, 1961), are the direct counter-case to any argument from stylistic authenticity.

rather than chronology. The evidence is compatible with the hypothesis and does not establish it. The strongest internal partition of the Platonic corpus is the received early/middle/late stratification, and that stratification was built partly from stylometry, so nothing measured on it is independent of it; Denyer's objection — that Plato could write any style at any time — makes the stratification a repertoire rather than a record, and on the relocation a repertoire is exactly what is predicted.²¹ But redescribing the axis does not remove the contamination, and until the test is run this is a proposal. The test owed is stated so it can be run against this paper: define the form-track independently of the stylometric variables and test whether the corpus orders along it.

9.2 An order of grasp

Section 5 recorded a possibility and left this section to earn it. I.31 says the users of division did not grasp what it could syllogize and that seeing it is easy. Those are two states of one knower, and the *De memoria* names both: unable to recollect, able to search and find. A later state of understanding requires a later search. It does not require a later decade: "later" here is an order of grasp, and "development" is used in that sense throughout — the *Symposium's* ascent at §7.5 is a structure of scopes, not a calendar. And the corpus states this order of itself on the last page of the *SE*: from the one who asked and did not know, to the one who answered. That is an order, and it is not a chronology.

9.3 The priority claim read in its verb

SE 183b34: οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν. ὑπάρχω is the *Prior Analytics'* standard verb for predication — A ὑπάρχει to B. So the priority claim is stated in the vocabulary of the method it is a claim about: nothing at all belonged. A premise of the method, predicated of the method. Read with §9.2, the single-maker reading makes its developmental order an order of grasp rather than a chronology, while preserving the paragraph's denial of reception from predecessors. Nothing belonged because the range of the operation had not been seen — and the one who saw it is the one claiming it.

One page in the Platonic corpus should be set beside that. At *Phaedrus* 266c, immediately after naming the dividers διαλεκτικοί, Socrates turns to the other thing:

τὰ δὲ νῦν παρὰ σοῦ τε καὶ Λυσίου μαθόντας εἰπὲ τί χρὴ καλεῖν· ἢ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ἡ λόγων τέχνη, ἣ Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι χρώμενοι σοφοὶ μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγειν γέγονασιν, ἄλλους τε ποιοῦσιν, οἳ ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὥς βασιλεῦσιν ἐθέλωσιν;

What is learned from Lysias — is that the art of speeches, ἡ λόγων τέχνη, by which Thrasy-machus and the others make themselves and their paying pupils clever? Phaedrus: βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμονές γε — kingly men, but not knowers. Then the handbooks,

²¹Denyer's point is made in the introduction to his *Protagoras* (Cambridge, 2008). On the manufacture of an author by the attribution apparatus, the documented case is Timaeus of Locri, a speaking part in the *Timaeus* who acquired a biography and then a treatise (Marg, *Timaeus Locrus, De natura mundi et animae*, Leiden, 1972); it is cited here only to establish that the apparatus which adjudicates attribution has, in at least one case, manufactured a party.

τὰ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις, and their holders in order (266d–267d): the proem, narration, evidence, probabilities, and confirmation of τὸν βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα — Theodorus; the insinuations of Evenus of Paros; Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε, whom “we will let sleep, who saw that probabilities are to be honoured above truths”; Prodicus, Hippias, Polus, Licymnius, Protagoras; and τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, the strength of the man of Chalcedon — Thrasymachus. The *SE* epilogue names the succession Τισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τισίαν, Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον, and names Gorgias’s πραγματεία as the type of the teacher who hands out products. All four stand on the *Phaedrus* page in the same role, on the same side of the same contrast — holders of the λόγων τέχνη, βασιλικοί and not ἐπιστήμονες, as against the διαλεκτικοί named in the sentence before. These are the canonical names of the rhetorical tradition, and Aristotle compiled the handbook collection himself; a shared list of the obvious names is not evidence of anything. What the null leaves standing is that the earlier page draws the *SE*’s contrast before the *SE* draws it, with the same men on the products side, and names what stands on the other side.

9.4 The fourth word

The whole configuration the received reading must account for stands on two pages and one dialogue:

Phaedrus 266b — the speaker Socrates practises division and collection, calls himself their lover, ἐραστής τῶν διαίρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, and the page names the practitioners διαλεκτικοί.

APr I.31 — division is a part of this method, μῦριον τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου; its users did not grasp what it can syllogize, οὔτε ὃ τι ἐνδέχεται συλλογίσασθαι διαιρούμενοι ξυνίεσαν.

SE 34 — Socrates asked and did not answer, Σωκράτης ἠρώτα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο; the inquiry had to cover the answering side as well.

SE 34 — of this inquiry, not part worked out and part not: οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν.

Read down together, there is a developmental grammar: division and questioning, with the range not yet grasped; the operation incorporated as a weak syllogism; the answering side supplied; the range discovered; nothing pre-existed. The texts establish the sequence of operations and positions. They do not, by themselves, establish which maker-count occupies it. The received account reads it *maker* → *transmission* → *maker*; this paper asks whether the same sequence can be read *position* → *development* → *position*, and §9.6 asks what, in the texts, decides between them.

Grant the narrow reading of the priority claim in full — that it concerns the theory of inference and nothing else.²² The sequence above does not depend on refusing it; it depends only on the two inclusions §1 stated, and on what the received reading has to say about them. Two readings of the priority claim are then available, and one of them reinserts what the sentence negates.

The reading this paper does not take: the Academy had division as a practice while Aristotle

²²The narrow reading of the priority claim is Ross’s and Striker’s as applied to I.31 (n. 1), extended to the epilogue; for the epilogue itself see Dorion 1995 ad loc.

supplied the art — products against τέχνη, the shoemaker applied to Plato. That is a partial-development claim, and the sentence refuses partial development in terms: οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἦν προεξεργασμένον. To read the *SE* as conceding the Academy the practice and claiming the completion is to give Aristotle back the succession he has just refused for his own inquiry.

Now the fourth word, and the hypothesis on which it moves — stated here and not before, because only here has the reader seen what the other three cost: that the two corpora are one maker's sequence. What it buys must be stated in the sentence's own word. οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἦν προεξεργασμένον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν — and the paragraph in which those words stand has one contrast throughout: what is received from predecessors. Tisias after the first inventors, Thrasyarchus after Tisias, Theodorus after him; the handbook-writers handing down their products; the teacher handing the pupil shoes. *Worked out beforehand* and *existed* mean, in that paragraph, *available to be received from someone prior*. On this reading, one's own earlier work does not fall under the paragraph's category παρ' ἐτέρων ληφθέντα, whatever its date. Two priorities must be told apart, and the paragraph tells them apart before the sentence: prior in time, which the sentence does not deny — the inquiry took long labour, τριβὴ ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν — and prior in the succession-structure, παρ' ἐτέρων ληφθέντα, which is what it denies. The charge that this makes “no predecessor” true by stipulation for any writer who revises himself is met by the paragraph's own contrast: a writer's earlier work is prior in time and not in the succession, and it is the succession the sentence is about. On the single-maker reading, then, the sentence is true of the whole inquiry with no restriction of its object at all — division included, the small weak part included, the god included: nothing of it had been worked out beforehand *by anyone from whom it could be received*, because the one who worked out the part is the one making the claim. The received reading can make the sentence true only by one of two moves: restricting its object to the theory of inference, which I.31 has just said division is a part of; or reclassifying the earlier division as product rather than art, which §2.4 showed the Platonic corpus does not permit, since what existed before was theorised, with a rule for its units and a rule for its termination. This reading needs neither. It needs only the sense of *beforehand* that the paragraph itself supplies.

On that reading I.31's complaint is not levelled across a boundary. ξυνίεσαν, read inclusively, says that the earlier position did not know the range of its own operation — not that rivals were careless, but that the operation was in hand and its terminus not yet found. The sequence is developmental and internal: the apparatus is built and run on kinds; it terminates nowhere; what it can syllogize is not yet grasped, by its own user; Λ 9 is the one object on which a disjunctive elimination closes, because that object is one; and of the whole inquiry, this part included, nothing had been worked out by anyone from whom it could be received. The priority claim is then true without equivocation and without diminishing anything. It does not say the dividing was worthless. It says there was no one to receive it from — and the yield of the single-maker reading is that there then was none, because on that reading the one who did the dividing is the one who did the finding, and the finding came after. This requires no concealed confession, no plan, and no chronological adjustment: the earlier position performs the operation; the later position discovers what the operation is; and there was no one from whom either was inherited.

That is the historical hypothesis, stated. Its costs are stated with it. It carries four latent

assumptions — the relation between the attested person and the authorial position; why externally transmitted biographical distinctions exist; why expected signatures of construction are absent; and what documentary machinery sustained the partition across transmission — against the received account's five, of which the one that genuinely pays is the assumption that schools transmit arbitrary procedural habits.²³ Neither ledger is short. A default earns prior, not likelihood: the received account gets its historical prior and the external record; it does not automatically get every internal observation because a story of influence can be constructed afterward.

9.5 What the hypothesis does not license, and what it cannot reach

If the hypothesis lets us accept the Platonic *Letters*, does it not let us accept everything in the Aristotelian collection? No, and the reason is that the two disputed classes are not the same kind of object. The Platonic spuria are transmitted inside the Thrasyllan tetralogies, in the arrangement that constitutes the corpus, and are doubted on internal grounds — style, doctrine, fit. The Aristotelian pseudepigrapha are attributed later, mostly outside the Andronican edition, and several are demonstrably post-classical on external evidence — datable references, doctrines that did not yet exist. Section 8 established that internal stylistic evidence does not identify maker-count, and that cuts both ways: a work doubted on internal grounds alone is not thereby excluded; a work excluded on external grounds stays excluded. The licence is narrow and asymmetric by construction, and the paper pays for it — a configurational reading loses the right to use stylistic athetesis as a filter and inherits a wider corpus than the received account carries.²⁴

The external record is where the historical question actually lives, and this paper does not adjudicate it; two facts from it are not in dispute. Neither corpus attests the teaching relation internally: Plato never names the philosopher Aristotle, and Aristotle never says he studied with Plato. And the external attestation of the relation stands where the standard treatments leave it: attendance at the Academy on good early evidence, with the details of its duration and character a matter of later construction.²⁵ None of this shows there was no teaching relation, and the paper draws no inference from the state of the external evidence about the

²³A fifth configurational assumption — that a plan anticipated its own completion — is withdrawn by the discovery reading of §9.4, which requires no prescience.

²⁴The two editorial acts are not the same kind of act. Andronicus (1st c. BCE) arranged the esoteric treatises from the school's working texts, and the exoteric dialogues by which antiquity knew Aristotle are not in that edition; Thrasyllus (1st c. CE) arranged the Platonic corpus into nine tetralogies including works no modern editor accepts. The asymmetry of the licence is a historical fact about those two acts rather than a stipulation. Thrasyllus is four centuries after composition, and nothing about design at composition follows from his arrangement.

²⁵The standard treatments of the biographical tradition are Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg, 1957), and Natali, *Aristotle: His Life and School* (Princeton, 2013); the narrow statement in the text is meant to be consistent with both, and neither is contested. Aristoxenus, *Harmonics* II (the lecture *On the Good*); his own acquaintance with Aristotle rests on fr. 1 Wehrli, a fragment of unverified transmission. The twenty years: *Vita Marciana* §5, "as he himself says in a letter to Philip" — and the same sentence has Aristotle join Socrates before Plato. Ptolemy's *Life* §28 declares its harmonising purpose. Plato's four uses of Ἀριστοτέλης are all the young man of the *Parmenides*, later one of the Thirty; the one Πλάτων- token in Aristotle within reach of a learning-word is an anecdote about Aristippus (*Rhet.* 1398b). The *On the Good* anecdote itself inverts under measurement — narrative apparatus is several times denser in Plato and mathematical vocabulary several times denser in Aristotle, so the hearer who wanted a story and received number is Aristotle's reader — and is told to justify Aristotle's own rule about announcing one's subject.

strength of the received view. The papyrological record, the inscriptions, and the transmission history are the evidence that would bear on how many embodied makers there were; the paper's claim ranks below whatever they establish, and it names them as the standing external check.²⁶

9.6 The question in its proper form

Not: were there two men. That is a question about embodiment; §8 records that it is not recoverable from these textual instruments, and this paper does not claim to establish it. The question the argument can put is the one the ordinary reading has never had to answer from the texts, because its basis has always been elsewhere: what, in the texts, establishes the two? Each of the usual answers can be given, and each is met.

Aristotle was Plato's student. That explains transmission between the positions; it does not establish that the positions were occupied by two makers, since a constructed configuration instantiates master and disciple in the same words (§8). *They write differently.* Style resolves size, period, dialect, genre and subject; it does not identify maker-count (§8). *They disagree.* In the documented class, a pupil inherits his master's whole apparatus through a public doctrinal break; rupture and inheritance are independent, so disagreement is evidence of neither relation-type (n. 19). *The texts name them.* The names are the objects under examination — a Socrates the corpus itself says was answered from a comedy, a *Letter* of disputed authenticity that denies there is any writing of Plato's (II, 314c), a Timaeus of Locri who acquired a life and a corpus from a speaking part — and the one contemporary object naming a principal anchors a person, not a text's paternity (§9.5). *The chronology.* Then it must be said which chronology: the biographical chronology of the two men, the composition chronology of particular texts, or the chronology of reception and witnesses. Only the third can externally constrain the second, and the received internal ordering of the Platonic corpus was built partly from the stylistic partition it is now invoked to explain; §9.1 states the test that would tell whether that ordering tracks a form-track, and it does not date anything. *The biography.* Then the question has left the texts: the biography is external evidence, it is not examined here, and the claim ranks below it (§9.5). What the biography does not do is read I.31.

None of these is refuted. Each is shown to explain something other than the thing at issue. The ordinary interpretation remains available; availability is not demonstration. The question is what evidence distinguishes succession between two makers from development between two positions of one — and in the vocabulary of the passages this paper has read, it is the question Λ 9 put to the divine and I.31 could not answer for man: at which cut are the two terms ἕτερον? The paper has read the texts for what it means by one, and has built, from the readings, the question §1 could only pose. It asks the reader who holds two to show, in the passages examined, where the one becomes another — and its wager is that the reader will find, as this paper found, that the passages do not say. That is the paper's result: not that one wrote it, but that two is not established by these passages, which are read as though it were; that the texts offer one as a reading; and that the reading they offer makes better sense of several of them.

²⁶*Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini* (Olschki, 1989-) has not been consulted by this investigation and is named as the standing external check. Aristotle is the one of the two with an epigraphic anchor — the Delphic decree honouring him for compiling the register of Pythian victors (FD III 1, 400) — which anchors the person and not textual paternity.

10. Epilogue: the flood, and what survives it

The framings that treat a corpus as an object built to defeat a critic put the examiner at the centre, and both are wrong about the adversary. The opponent of any ancient corpus was the flood: an oversupply of writing competing for scarce copying labour, scarce papyrus and scarce attention, in which merit did not sort because everything drowned alike. The survival problem was not *be good*; it was to give people who did not care about you reasons to copy you.

What this paper has read is a corpus that gives such reasons in one way, and the way is the operation of §§2–5. Empty positions survive by creating a space for a reader to fill. The demonstration at 223d is not transmitted, and the reader who wants it must supply it. The wax is abandoned at 196b as impossible, and the reader who wants the model must re-found it. Socrates asked and did not answer, and the inquiry that says so must cover the answering side. The *Sophist* stops at six and asks what one thing they look toward; the *Phaedrus* stores reminders παντὶ τῷ ταῦτόν ἵχνος μετιόντι, for anyone following the same track; the *De memoria* says one may search and find what one did not remember. Each of these is a division left open at a joint, and each is what §5 said a corpus is: ὑπομνήματα, a starting-point, from which the scattered is gathered into one by a search — by someone else, later. This suggests one way a corpus of this shape might survive a flood that a finished one would not: a finished account is copied or not, while an account with its joints open may recruit the copyist as its next stage, because the only way to hold it is to complete it. On that hypothesis, division transmits. The cut is the seed: 276e’s λόγοι ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι φυόμενοι — from which others, growing in other characters, furnish this forever deathless. Disputes that never close generate commentary, and commentary is copying; a genre without a name cannot be quietly shelved; a numbered set makes its own gaps visible.²⁷ Those are the same fact seen from the copyist’s side.

And it is transmitting still. The commentators completed the corpus at its joints — Alexander on the target of I.31, Philoponus joining I.31 to the epilogue — and the editors did, Andronicus and Thrasyllus each supplying an order the corpus had left open; the Socratic problem is two centuries of readers occupying the position 257d–258a vacated; and this paper, and whoever reads it against the texts, is one more attempt to complete the line of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle — to say, at the joint the corpus left open, where the one becomes another. The corpus says this first. *Phaedrus* 275e: once written, every account rolls about everywhere, alike among those who understand and those it has nothing to do with — the flood, stated as the condition of writing and as its vulnerability, since the written word, ill-treated, always needs its father’s help. And 276e–277a gives the answer the same page offers: the one who plants accounts with knowledge in a fitting soul plants what is not fruitless but carries seed.

²⁷Blum, *Kallimachos: The Alexandrian Library and the Origins of Bibliography* (trans. Wellisch, Madison, 1991), reconstructs the *Pinakes* as a classification by genre and author; Galen, *In Hipp. Epid.* III comm. ii, is the ancient source for Ptolemaic acquisition by seizure and payment by the roll. Both hypotheses — a corpus built to survive, and a field with an acute forgery problem — predict the same apparatus; the one signature not shared is that criteria fail to converge on an object built to escape them, and the record shows non-convergence here as it does in ordinary hard cases. The discriminator is the shape of the ambiguity — engineered unresolvability would be flat under rising attention, natural ambiguity uneven — and it has not been run.

Others, in other characters — the future reader, specified as unspecified. What an account that is not reducible to any one inscription needs, to survive, is to be inscribed again by someone who needed it; and what it needs in order to be needed is to be unfinished at a joint the reader can cut at. The corpus that distinguishes the written word from the living and ensouled λόγος is constituted by a person; and the corpus that makes λόγος a criterion of recognition has no self in it to be recognised. That is the whole picture. It is an image, and it is the reader's to complete.

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Suggested Citation

Lee Sharks. “Many and One: Division, Unity, and the Boundaries of a Corpus in Plato and Aristotle (MANY-AND-ONE-ARTICLE v2.13-AP, as submitted)” *Alexanarch*, 2026-09-01. <https://www.alexanarch.org/s/records/1576/>

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