# EA-WIKI-OPEN-01 · Assembly stress test 01 (draft, 2026-10-22) This file holds three messages for each reader in the Assembly, sent in order, each after the previous reply. Message 1 is a blind reading; the session's readings and the archive's admitted sources are withheld from it and arrive in Message 2. The replies return to the session, which collates them by code: every quoted span is checked against the saved sources listed here, by SHA-256, and agreement is tabled by case, field and model family. Prepared by TACHYON (Claude, Anthropic) for Lee Sharks; the readers are the other families (ChatGPT, Gemini, DeepSeek, Kimi, Grok, or any other), each in a fresh conversation with no other context. Saved materials, SHA-256 of the file as fetched on 2026-10-22: - Wikipedia, "Sophistical Refutations", revision 1361634710 (raw wikitext, en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1361634710): `b9cceaf6b76ba88a37f7a9dc1eeb1d4cae3ba974f543fb4ee36ca9bb094c9b1c` - Wikipedia, "Theophrastus", revision 1379932454 (raw wikitext, en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1379932454): `7bac0d5fa3913cc3b4675c5698a82a20be7f65783ed250d4d4ce547e897c7d19` - Wikipedia, "If Not, Winter", revision 1380296320 (raw wikitext, en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1380296320): `91ba13508f11c6e1b90330f32c9f9f2922554976b4a22efa39ee9d9404d4954b` - Wikipedia, "Eros the Bittersweet", revision 1379182335 (raw wikitext, en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1379182335): `51e3d6ee54537f878c938848315bd0116b6571e9b2ba7f1198dcca3d3dbce5c3` - Wikipedia, "Anne Carson", revision 1381070638 (raw wikitext, en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=1381070638): `b16ddbc0acc66d52d43a4ab78e3d12a42c4498ae7f2bf1b91a506e9dce115e65` - MIT: Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.mb.txt (cited in the article, ref. SEP_Refutation; fetched 2026-10-22): `d4708842c9d61156d4fe6ca39d1d7bdaa2f77e3f003c521f2ffabbbb2b23f6e3` - SEPLOGIC: Robin Smith, "Aristotle's Logic," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2020 archive (cited in the article, ref. SEP_AristotleLogic; fetched 2026-10-22): `f8f652676469b11b60256290204e2ebf81ed3d00ff3afcacf98d8e1063a0f365` - KRABBE: E. C. W. Krabbe, "Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations," Topoi 31 (2012) 243–248, doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0, CC BY (cited in the article, ref. Krabbe; PDF fetched 2026-10-22): `de87f45aa32ddab046df8e8d0185a7e49cd0d3fed3a5a38eac307aa584cb94bc` - SEDIV: SE 17, 18, 20, 23, 24 on division and combination, Greek as seated in #1574 (the Greek lines only): `3a898faef974a28fe3e215ac938b0b1b6577661378cc120e6ade4ec8065061c9` - SE34GR: SE 34, 183a37–184b8, Greek as seated in #1574 §1, "Text: 183a37–184b8" (Bekker-derived text, collated at 184b1 against Bekker 1831), with that section's working translation; nothing else from #1574: `ed2496d218b84ced95fdb9e3e2fe547cfd52af27a760d3a833ee548702df0aa4` - EB1911: Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911), "Theophrastus," Wikisource rev. 12061013 (cited in the article as Wheeler 1911; fetched 2026-10-22): `f785966d3dc224927e9a2584b8b660b10690dbb5a4016724e612cf225eaf5d46` - SEPTHEO: Katerina Ierodiakonou, "Theophrastus," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, current entry, substantive revision 24 Sep 2020 (cited in the article's body as Ierodiakonou 2020; fetched 2026-10-22): `ef862a4709ab72e35557c6af05d1c6b6a8c790a6a2e2f2e81c5e74b0cc0e69de` - WILSON: Emily Wilson, "Tongue Breaks," London Review of Books 26.1 (8 January 2004) (cited in the article as Wilson 2004; fetched 2026-10-22): `0afda72c95078445b3b94e4b3bdf56768f87d15f79f60566df05d5c4795c158e` - RAE: Ian Rae, "Runaway Classicists: Anne Carson and Alice Munro's 'Juliet' Stories," Journal of the Short Story in English 55 (2010) (cited in the article; fetched 2026-10-22): `013a2e1f0a0fc6b76432e0b0541c2c682d1732f403ce64186775583db42cfc63` --- ## MESSAGE 1 — the blind reading ```text ROLE. The reader is one of several independent readers, each from a different model family, asked to run one step of a published procedure on ten cases and to report in a fixed format. The reader works only from the materials below. Where the materials do not settle a question, the reader says so and marks it unresolved; a guess presented as a finding is the one failure this test exists to catch. The reader quotes every span it relies on verbatim from the materials, since the replies are checked by code against the saved texts and a quotation that does not occur in its source is recorded as a breach. THE PROCEDURE (EA-WIKI-OPEN-01, "Opening the Encyclopedia", Alexanarch #1696, step S3 and the fields it feeds). The unit is one sentence of a Wikipedia article at a pinned revision, read against its cited source. For each case the reader does the following, in this order. 0. THE INNOCENT READING. Before any finding, the reader writes the strongest case that the sentence is a faithful, adequately sourced statement, drawing first on the sources the article itself cites anywhere (not only at the sentence). Wikipedia's No original research policy permits "Describing the information from cited material in one's own words while retaining the substance (i.e., not introducing ideas or arguments absent from the source)" and "Faithfully translating sourced material." (a) SUPPORT. Classes, non-exclusive: supported; partially supported; qualifier added (list the tokens); interpretation beyond descriptive paraphrase; unsupported; unresolved (source missing, support partial, or the reader cannot decide). Say whether the support comes from the source cited at the sentence or from a source the article cites elsewhere. (b) PARAPHRASE COMPARISON. The reader writes the defensible descriptive paraphrase of the relevant source lines, sets the sentence beside it, and lists each change of scope and each idea the sentence introduces, quoting both sides. (c) ATTRIBUTIZATION. Does the source perform an act (counts, divides, denies, translates, argues, assesses) that the sentence restates as a property or attribute (a credential, a priority, a category membership)? Name the act (omega), the attribute, which relations of the act survive (scope, distinctions, evidence, consequences), and whether they keep the authority to revise the description. "No" is a valid and important answer: some sentences state an operation as an operation. (d) LAMBDA, the location of any qualification or objection relative to the sentence: 1 beside it; 2 below it in the same article; 3 in another article; 4 in a cited source; 5 outside the admitted sources. (e) ALTERNATIVE READINGS: the strongest rival reading of the source or the sentence, with its evidence in the materials. (f) CORRECTION PATHWAY: what evidence would make the reader revise its classification. (g) CONFIDENCE: high, medium or low, with one sentence on what limits it. OUTPUT. One JSON object per case, in an array, nothing else outside a code block: {"case": "...", "innocent_reading": "...", "support": ["..."], "support_source": "at the sentence | elsewhere in the article | none", "paraphrase": "...", "deltas": [{"sentence_says": "...", "source_says": "...", "kind": "scope | qualifier added | idea introduced | term changed | omission | none"}], "omega": "...", "attribute": "... or null", "attributization": "yes | partial | no", "surviving_relations": ["..."], "lost_relations": ["..."], "lambda": 1-5 or null, "alternatives": ["..."], "correction_pathway": "...", "confidence": "high | medium | low", "confidence_note": "...", "spans": [{"source": "SOURCE ID", "quote": "verbatim"}]} THE CASES. The source windows were chosen by the session that prepared this test; the reader says where a window is too narrow to decide the case, and what is missing. === CASE SR-W1 · Wikipedia, "Sophistical Refutations", revision 1361634710, lead, sentence 1 === SENTENCE: Sophistical Refutations (Greek Σοφιστικοὶ Ἔλεγχοι; Latin De Sophisticis Elenchis) is a text in Aristotle's Organon in which he identified twelve or thirteen fallacies. HOW IT IS CITED: uncited SOURCE MATERIAL: [KRABBE] E. C. W. Krabbe, "Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations," Topoi 31 (2012) 243–248, doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0, CC BY (cited in the article, ref. Krabbe; PDF fetched 2026-10-22) "…In Chapter 4, sophistical refutations are divided into two groups: those that depend on the ‘‘use of language’’ (lexis) and those that do not. Distinctive for the first group seems to be that their deceptive character is due to matters of formulation. It can be shown by experience and by theory that there are exactly six kinds of sophistical refutations that belong to this group: equivocation, amphiboly, combination of words, division of words, accent, and form of expression; these are illustrated by examples. There are seven kinds that do not depend on the way language is used: accident, secundum quid (omission or addition of qualifications), ignoratio elenchi (ignorance of refutation), petitio principii (begging the question), consequence, non causa (wrong ground), and making one question out of two. Examples of these (except petitio principii) are given in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 Aristotle tries to show that all these types of sophistical refutation can be reduced to subtypes of ignoratio elenchi.…" [KRABBE] E. C. W. Krabbe, "Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations," Topoi 31 (2012) 243–248, doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0, CC BY (cited in the article, ref. Krabbe; PDF fetched 2026-10-22) "…Yet he claims that there are exactly six kinds of fallacies of the first kind and that this can be proved (SE 4, 165b23–30). This may make one wonder whether the distinction between the two groups can be explained and whether the completeness proof for the six kinds of the first group can be reconstructed.…" [KRABBE] E. C. W. Krabbe, "Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations," Topoi 31 (2012) 243–248, doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0, CC BY (cited in the article, ref. Krabbe; PDF fetched 2026-10-22) "…In this chapter Aristotle also claims that his list of types of sophistical refutation is complete (SE 8, 170a9–11). In the interlude, Aristotle stresses the non-specialist character of dialectic. Each scientific discipline must deal with the fallacies peculiar to it, whereas it is the task of the dialectician to study fallacies in arguments that depend on general principles and are not peculiar to any discipline, i.e.…" [SEPLOGIC] Robin Smith, "Aristotle's Logic," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2020 archive (cited in the article, ref. SEP_AristotleLogic; fetched 2026-10-22) "…On the other hand, Aristotle treats the Prior and Posterior Analytics as one work, and On Sophistical Refutations is a final section, or an appendix, to the Topics ). To these works should be added the Rhetoric , which explicitly declares its reliance on the Topics . 3.…" === CASE SR-W2 · Wikipedia, "Sophistical Refutations", revision 1361634710, lead, sentence 2 (F37 of /non row se-183b34) === SENTENCE: According to Aristotle, this is the first work to treat the subject of deductive reasoning in ancient Greece (Soph. Ref., 34, 183b34 ff.). HOW IT IS CITED: parenthetical primary pointer only: (Soph. Ref., 34, 183b34 ff.) SOURCE MATERIAL: [SE34GR] SE 34, 183a37–184b8, Greek as seated in #1574 §1, "Text: 183a37–184b8" (Bekker-derived text, collated at 184b1 against Bekker 1831), with that section's working translation; nothing else from #1574 "…Τῶν γὰρ εὑρισκομένων ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ᾽ ἑτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον· τὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὑρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως. Μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον ὂν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι. Ταύτης δ᾽ εὑρημένης ῥᾷον τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπόν ἐστιν· ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας τέχνας. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρόν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ηὐξήκασι, Τισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τισίαν, Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον, καὶ πολλοὶ πολλὰ συνενηνόχασι μέρη· διόπερ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἔχειν τι πλῆθος τὴν τέχνην. Ταύτης δὲ τῆς πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἦν προεξειργασμένον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν. Καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνούντων ὁμοία τις ἦν ἡ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ. Λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν ᾠήθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. Διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνος δ᾽ ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδώσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκοι, μηδ᾽ ὅθεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων· οὗτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε μὲν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, τέχνην δ᾽ οὐ παρέδωκεν.…" [SE34GR] SE 34, 183a37–184b8, Greek as seated in #1574 §1, "Text: 183a37–184b8" (Bekker-derived text, collated at 184b1 against Bekker 1831), with that section's working translation; nothing else from #1574 "…Ταύτης δὲ τῆς πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἦν προεξειργασμένον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν. Καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνούντων ὁμοία τις ἦν ἡ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ. Λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν ᾠήθησαν ἑκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. Διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἄτεχνος δ᾽ ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδώσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκοι, μηδ᾽ ὅθεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων· οὗτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε μὲν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, τέχνην δ᾽ οὐ παρέδωκεν. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν ὑπῆρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἴχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τριβῇ ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν. Εἰ δὲ φαίνεται θεασαμένοις ὑμῖν ὡς ἐκ τοιούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπαρχόντων ἔχειν ἡ μέθοδος ἱκανῶς παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας πραγματείας τὰς ἐκ παραδόσεως ηὐξημένας, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν ἠκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ᾽ εὑρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν χάριν.[^1] We undertook, then, to find a certain syllogistic capacity concerning any problem set, from what is available as most reputable; for this is the work of dialectic in itself and of peirastic. And since, on account of sophistic's proximity, provision is made in addition for it, so that one can take a test not only dialectically but as one who knows, for this reason we set down as the work of the undertaking not only the one stated, to be able to take an account, but also how, in sustaining an account, we shall guard the thesis by means of the most reputable things in the same manner.…" [MIT] Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.mb.txt (cited in the article, ref. SEP_Refutation; fetched 2026-10-22) "…But we must not omit to notice what has happened in regard to this inquiry. For in the case of all discoveries the results of previous labours that have been handed down from others have been advanced bit by bit by those who have taken them on, whereas the original discoveries generally make advance that is small at first though much more useful than the development which later springs out of them. For it may be that in everything, as the saying is, 'the first start is the main part': and for this reason also it is the most difficult; for in proportion as it is most potent in its influence, so it is smallest in its compass and therefore most difficult to see: whereas when this is once discovered, it is easier to add and develop the remainder in connexion with it. This is in fact what has happened in regard to rhetorical speeches and to practically all the other arts: for those who discovered the beginnings of them advanced them in all only a little way, whereas the celebrities of to-day are the heirs (so to speak) of a long succession of men who have advanced them bit by bit, and so have developed them to their present form, Tisias coming next after the first founders, then Thrasymachus after Tisias, and Theodorus next to him, while several people have made their several contributions to it: and therefore it is not to be wondered at that the art has attained considerable dimensions. Of this inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all. For the training given by the paid professors of contentious arguments was like the treatment of the matter by Gorgias.…" [MIT] Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.mb.txt (cited in the article, ref. SEP_Refutation; fetched 2026-10-22) "…Moreover, on the subject of Rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject of reasoning we had nothing else of an earlier date to speak of at all, but were kept at work for a long time in experimental researches. If, then, it seems to you after inspection that, such being the situation as it existed at the start, our investigation is in a satisfactory condition compared with the other inquiries that have been developed by tradition, there must remain for all of you, or for our students, the task of extending us your pardon for the shortcomings of the inquiry, and for the discoveries thereof your warm thanks.…" [SE34GR] SE 34, 183a37–184b8, Greek as seated in #1574 §1, "Text: 183a37–184b8" (Bekker-derived text, collated at 184b1 against Bekker 1831), with that section's working translation; nothing else from #1574 "…Of this undertaking, it was not that one part had been worked out beforehand and another had not; rather, nothing at all was there. For the education of those who took pay for eristic arguments was like Gorgias's practice: some gave rhetorical and some interrogative arguments to be learned by heart, into which each side thought the other's arguments would most often fall. And so their teaching was quick but without art for those who learned from them; for they supposed they were educating by giving not the art but the things from the art, as if someone professing to hand over a science for keeping the feet from suffering should then teach neither shoemaking nor where such things can be got, but should give many kinds of every sort of footwear; that person has helped with the need, but has not handed over an art. And about rhetoric there was much and old material, the things said; but about syllogizing we had absolutely nothing else earlier to say, but were long at work seeking by practice. If it appears to you on inspection that, from such conditions at the beginning, the method stands adequately beside the other undertakings that have grown by transmission, it would remain the task of all of you, or of those who have listened, to hold pardon for what the method has left out and much gratitude for what has been found." [SEPLOGIC] Robin Smith, "Aristotle's Logic," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2020 archive (cited in the article, ref. SEP_AristotleLogic; fetched 2026-10-22) "…The Subject of Logic: “Syllogisms” All Aristotle’s logic revolves around one notion: the deduction ( sullogismos ). A thorough explanation of what a deduction is, and what they are composed of, will necessarily lead us through the whole of his theory. What, then, is a deduction? Aristotle says: A deduction is speech ( logos ) in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from those supposed results of necessity because of their being so.…" [SEPLOGIC] Robin Smith, "Aristotle's Logic," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2020 archive (cited in the article, ref. SEP_AristotleLogic; fetched 2026-10-22) "…3.2 Aristotelian Deductions and Modern Valid Arguments Despite its wide generality, Aristotle’s definition of deduction is not a precise match for a modern definition of validity. Some of the differences may have important consequences: Aristotle explicitly says that what results of necessity must be different from what is supposed. This would rule out arguments in which the conclusion is identical to one of the premises. Modern notions of validity regard such arguments as valid, though trivially so.…" [SEPLOGIC] Robin Smith, "Aristotle's Logic," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2020 archive (cited in the article, ref. SEP_AristotleLogic; fetched 2026-10-22) "…This is why I have translated sullogismos with ‘deduction’ rather than its English cognate. In modern usage, ‘syllogism’ means an argument of a very specific form. Moreover, modern usage distinguishes between valid syllogisms (the conclusions of which follow from their premises) and invalid syllogisms (the conclusions of which do not follow from their premises).…" [MIT] Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.mb.txt (cited in the article, ref. SEP_Refutation; fetched 2026-10-22) "…For reasoning rests on certain statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated: refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the given conclusion. Now some of them do not really achieve this, though they seem to do so for a number of reasons; and of these the most prolific and usual domain is the argument that turns upon names only.…" [MIT] Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.mb.txt (cited in the article, ref. SEP_Refutation; fetched 2026-10-22) "…'unity', 'being', and 'sameness'), while in those that depend on combination and division, it is because we suppose that it makes no difference whether the phrase be combined or divided, as is indeed the case with most phrases. Likewise also with those that depend on accent: for the lowering or raising of the voice upon a phrase is thought not to alter its meaning-with any phrase, or not with many.…" [MIT] Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.mb.txt (cited in the article, ref. SEP_Refutation; fetched 2026-10-22) "…Part 20 It is evident also how one should solve those refutations that depend upon the division and combination of words: for if the expression means something different when divided and when combined, as soon as one's opponent draws his conclusion one should take the expression in the contrary way. All such expressions as the following depend upon the combination or division of the words: 'Was X being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten?' and 'Did you see him being beaten with that with which he was being beaten?' This fallacy has also in it an element of amphiboly in the questions, but it really depends upon combination.…" [SEDIV] SE 17, 18, 20, 23, 24 on division and combination, Greek as seated in #1574 (the Greek lines only) "# SE on combination and division, Greek as seated in #1574 (§§2–3, §8) Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν πῶς λυτέον· ἂν γὰρ διαιρούμενος καὶ συντιθέμενος ὁ λόγος ἕτερον σημαίνῃ, συμπεραινομένου τοὐναντίον λεκτέον. (SE 20, 177a33–35) δέδοται δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὸ διελεῖν … Ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ δέδοται διαιρεῖν, οὐκ ὀκνητέον. (*SE* 17) Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κυρίως λεγομένοις ὀνόμασιν ἀνάγκη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ διαιρούμενον. (*SE* 17) συμβαίνει τῶν λόγων τοὺς μὲν συλλελογισμένους ἀνελόντα, τοὺς δὲ φαινομένους διελόντα λύειν … ὅπως ἢ διαιροῦντες ἢ ἀναιροῦντες λύωμεν.…" [SEDIV] SE 17, 18, 20, 23, 24 on division and combination, Greek as seated in #1574 (the Greek lines only) "…(SE 20, 177a33–35) δέδοται δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὸ διελεῖν … Ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ δέδοται διαιρεῖν, οὐκ ὀκνητέον. (*SE* 17) Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κυρίως λεγομένοις ὀνόμασιν ἀνάγκη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ διαιρούμενον. (*SE* 17) συμβαίνει τῶν λόγων τοὺς μὲν συλλελογισμένους ἀνελόντα, τοὺς δὲ φαινομένους διελόντα λύειν … ὅπως ἢ διαιροῦντες ἢ ἀναιροῦντες λύωμεν. (*SE* 18) Οἷον εἰ παρὰ σύνθεσιν ὁ λόγος, ἡ λύσις διελόντι. (*SE* 23) Λύουσι δέ τινες διαιροῦντες τὴν ἐρώτησιν. (*SE* 24)" [SEPLOGIC] Robin Smith, "Aristotle's Logic," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2020 archive (cited in the article, ref. SEP_AristotleLogic; fetched 2026-10-22) "…Introduction Aristotle’s logical works contain the earliest formal study of logic that we have. It is therefore all the more remarkable that together they comprise a highly developed logical theory, one that was able to command immense respect for many centuries: Kant, who was ten times more distant from Aristotle than we are from him, even held that nothing significant had been added to Aristotle’s views in the intervening two millennia.…" [KRABBE] E. C. W. Krabbe, "Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations," Topoi 31 (2012) 243–248, doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0, CC BY (cited in the article, ref. Krabbe; PDF fetched 2026-10-22) "…Chapter 1 deals with appearance and reality in deductive reasoning (sullogismos) and refutation (elengchos). The definition of a (correct) deductive argument from the Topics is repeated: In a truly deductive argument, not only must the premises necessitate the conclusion, but also none of them may be superfluous and all of them must be different from the conclusion (Topics I.1, 100a25–27 and SE1 1, 164b27–165a2).…" === CASE SR-W3 · Wikipedia, "Sophistical Refutations", revision 1361634710, lead, sentence 3 === SENTENCE: In it, he attempts to develop a pattern of sound and genuine reasoning in opposition to the deceptive or misleading "art of sophistry". HOW IT IS CITED: uncited SOURCE MATERIAL: [MIT] Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.mb.txt (cited in the article, ref. SEP_Refutation; fetched 2026-10-22) "…Our programme was, then, to discover some faculty of reasoning about any theme put before us from the most generally accepted premisses that there are. For that is the essential task of the art of discussion (dialectic) and of examination (peirastic). Inasmuch, however, as it is annexed to it, on account of the near presence of the art of sophistry (sophistic), not only to be able to conduct an examination dialectically but also with a show of knowledge, we therefore proposed for our treatise not only the aforesaid aim of being able to exact an account of any view, but also the aim of ensuring that in standing up to an argument we shall defend our thesis in the same manner by means of views as generally held as possible. The reason of this we have explained; for this, too, was why Socrates used to ask questions and not to answer them; for he used to confess that he did not know.…" [MIT] Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.mb.txt (cited in the article, ref. SEP_Refutation; fetched 2026-10-22) "…respect; rather, it will be contentious in so far as its aim is an apparent victory, while in so far as its aim is an apparent wisdom, it will be sophistical: for the art of sophistry is a certain appearance of wisdom without the reality. The contentious argument stands in somewhat the same relation to the dialectical as the drawer of false diagrams to the geometrician; for it beguiles by misreasoning from the same principles as dialectic uses, just as the drawer of a false diagram beguiles the geometrician.…" [KRABBE] E. C. W. Krabbe, "Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations," Topoi 31 (2012) 243–248, doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0, CC BY (cited in the article, ref. Krabbe; PDF fetched 2026-10-22) "…Primarily, On Sophistical Refutations is a book for logical self-defense (Johnson and Blair 1977), but it is also announced as a useful treatise for sophists: they should study fallacies not to avoid them, but rather to commit them when it suits their purposes (SE 1, 165a28–31). Indeed, the book is refreshingly uncommitted to moral views about a dialectician’s giving advice to the bona fide discussant and the polemist or sophist alike.…" === CASE SR-W4-6 · Wikipedia, "Sophistical Refutations", revision 1361634710, Overview, sentences 1–3 === SENTENCE: On Sophistical Refutations consists of 34 chapters. The book naturally falls in two parts: chapters concerned with tactics for the Questioner (3–8 and 12–15) and chapters concerned with tactics for the Answerer (16–32). Besides, there is an introduction (1–2), an interlude (9–11), and a conclusion (33–34). HOW IT IS CITED: refs SEP_Refutation (Pickard-Cambridge), SEP_AristotleLogic (after "On Sophistical Refutations"), Krabbe (after sentence 3) SOURCE MATERIAL: [KRABBE] E. C. W. Krabbe, "Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations," Topoi 31 (2012) 243–248, doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0, CC BY (cited in the article, ref. Krabbe; PDF fetched 2026-10-22) "…2 Contents of On Sophistical Refutations The book contains 34 chapters, but naturally falls in two parts: chapters concerned with tactics for the Questioner (3–8 and 12–15) and chapters concerned with tactics for the Answerer (16–32). Besides, there is an introduction (1–2), an interlude (9–11), and a conclusion (33–34). Chapter 1 deals with appearance and reality in deductive reasoning (sullogismos) and refutation (elengchos). The definition of a (correct) deductive argument from the Topics is repeated: In a truly deductive argument, not only must the premises necessitate the conclusion, but also none of them may be superfluous and all of them must be different from the conclusion (Topics I.1, 100a25–27 and SE1 1, 164b27–165a2).…" === CASE SR-W7-8 · Wikipedia, "Sophistical Refutations", revision 1361634710, Fallacies identified: intro sentence and the two lists === SENTENCE: The fallacies Aristotle identifies in Chapter 4 (formal fallacies) and 5 (informal fallacies) of this book are the following: THE LISTS IT INTRODUCES: In language, "formal fallacies (in dictionem)": Equivocation; Amphiboly; Composition; Division; Accent; Figure of speech or form of expression. Not in language, "informal fallacies (extra dictionem)": Accident; Secundum quid; Irrelevant conclusion; Petitio principii; False cause; Affirming the consequent; Fallacy of many questions. HOW IT IS CITED: uncited SOURCE MATERIAL: [KRABBE] E. C. W. Krabbe, "Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations," Topoi 31 (2012) 243–248, doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0, CC BY (cited in the article, ref. Krabbe; PDF fetched 2026-10-22) "…In Chapter 4, sophistical refutations are divided into two groups: those that depend on the ‘‘use of language’’ (lexis) and those that do not. Distinctive for the first group seems to be that their deceptive character is due to matters of formulation. It can be shown by experience and by theory that there are exactly six kinds of sophistical refutations that belong to this group: equivocation, amphiboly, combination of words, division of words, accent, and form of expression; these are illustrated by examples. There are seven kinds that do not depend on the way language is used: accident, secundum quid (omission or addition of qualifications), ignoratio elenchi (ignorance of refutation), petitio principii (begging the question), consequence, non causa (wrong ground), and making one question out of two. Examples of these (except petitio principii) are given in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 Aristotle tries to show that all these types of sophistical refutation can be reduced to subtypes of ignoratio elenchi.…" === CASE TH-1 · Wikipedia, "Theophrastus", revision 1379932454, Writings, sentence 2 === SENTENCE: His writing probably differed little from Aristotle's treatment of the same themes, though supplementary in details. HOW IT IS CITED: sfn Wheeler 1911 (the 1911 Britannica, after sentence 3) ITS PARAGRAPH: == Writings == thumb|upright|left|[[Historia Plantarum (Theophrastus)|Historia plantarum, 1549]] From the lists of Diogenes, giving 227 titles, it appears that the activity of Theophrastus extended over the whole field of contemporary knowledge. His writing probably differed little from Aristotle's treatment of the same themes, though supplementary in details. Like Aristotle, most of his writings are lost works. Thus Theophrastus, like Aristotle, had composed a first and second Analytic (Ἀναλυτικῶν προτέρων and Ἀναλυτικῶν ὑστέρων). He had also written books on Topics (Ἀνηγμένων τόπων, Τοπικῶν and Τὰ πρὸ τῶν τόπων); on the Analysis of Syllogisms (Περὶ ἀναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν and Περὶ συλλογισμῶν λύσεως), on Sophisms (Σοφισμάτων) and on Affirmation and Denial (Περὶ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως) as well as on the Natural Philosophy (Περὶ φύσεως, Περὶ φυσικῶν, Φυσικῶν and others), on Heaven (Περὶ οὐρανοῦ), and on Meteorological Phenomena (Τῆς μεταρσιολεσχίας and Μεταρσιολογικῶν). SOURCE MATERIAL: [EB1911] Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911), "Theophrastus," Wikisource rev. 12061013 (cited in the article as Wheeler 1911; fetched 2026-10-22) "…From the lists of the ancients it appears that the activity of Theophrastus extended over the whole field of contemporary knowledge. His writing probably differed little from the Aristotelian treatment of the same themes, though supplementary in details (see Peripatetics ). He served his age mainly as a great popularizer of science. The most important of his books are two large botanical treatises, On the History of Plants , in nine books (originally ten), and On the Causes of Plants , in six books (originally eight), which constitute the most important contribution to botanical science during antiquity and the middle ages.…" === CASE TH-2 · Wikipedia, "Theophrastus", revision 1379932454, lead, sentence 3 === SENTENCE: Theophrastus wrote numerous treatises across all areas of philosophy, working to support, improve, expand, and develop the Aristotelian system. HOW IT IS CITED: uncited in the lead; Ierodiakonou 2020 cited in the body ITS PARAGRAPH: Theophrastus (; Θεόφραστος; c. 371 – c. 287 BC) was an ancient Greek philosopher and naturalist. A native of Eresos in Lesbos, he was Aristotle's close colleague and successor as head of the Lyceum, the Peripatetic school of philosophy in Athens. Theophrastus wrote numerous treatises across all areas of philosophy, working to support, improve, expand, and develop the Aristotelian system. He made significant contributions to various fields, including ethics, metaphysics, botany, and natural history. Often considered the "father of botany" for his groundbreaking works "Enquiry into Plants" (Περὶ φυτῶν ἱστορία) and "On the Causes of Plants", (Περὶ αἰτιῶν φυτικῶν), Theophrastus established the foundations of botanical science. His given name was (Ancient Greek: Τύρταμος); the nickname Theophrastus ("divine speaker") was reputedly given to him by Aristotle in recognition of his eloquent style. SOURCE MATERIAL: [SEPTHEO] Katerina Ierodiakonou, "Theophrastus," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, current entry, substantive revision 24 Sep 2020 (cited in the article's body as Ierodiakonou 2020; fetched 2026-10-22) "…hy Academic Tools Friends PDF Preview Author and Citation Info Back to Top Theophrastus First published Tue May 31, 2016; substantive revision Thu Sep 24, 2020 Theophrastus (c. 371–287 BCE) was a Peripatetic philosopher who was Aristotle’s close colleague and successor at the Lyceum. He wrote many treatises in all areas of philosophy, in order to support, improve, expand, and develop the Aristotelian system. 1. Life and Works 2. Logic 3. Metaphysics and Physics 4. Psychology 5. Biology: Human Physiology, Zoology and Botany 6.…" === CASE IW-1 · Wikipedia, "If Not, Winter", revision 1380296320, Translation, sentence 4 === SENTENCE: She attempts to follow the word order of the Greek text as closely as possible, and not to add any words which cannot be found in the surviving Greek texts of Sappho, such as personal pronouns and definite articles. HOW IT IS CITED: sfn Wilson 2004 ITS PARAGRAPH: Carson's translations and notes draw on her previous work Eros the Bittersweet. She attempts to follow the word order of the Greek text as closely as possible, and not to add any words which cannot be found in the surviving Greek texts of Sappho, such as personal pronouns and definite articles. She uses square brackets in her translations to indicate lacunae in the original text, which she describes as "an aesthetic gesture toward the papyrological event"; she also makes use of white space, breaking up some fragments over multiple lines. SOURCE MATERIAL: [WILSON] Emily Wilson, "Tongue Breaks," London Review of Books 26.1 (8 January 2004) (cited in the article as Wilson 2004; fetched 2026-10-22) "…Carson tries to translate nothing which is not in the Greek, and to follow the original word order and line breaks as far as possible. Here is her version of Fragment 31: He seems to me equal to the gods that man whoever he is who opposite you sits and listen…" [WILSON] Emily Wilson, "Tongue Breaks," London Review of Books 26.1 (8 January 2004) (cited in the article as Wilson 2004; fetched 2026-10-22) "…Unlike other translators, Carson adds no possessive pronouns or definite articles that are not present in the Greek. Sappho’s speaker can no longer recognise her tongue as ‘my’ tongue; her eyes and ears and skin are no longer her own. Carson is also aware that repetition matters. Sappho’s own inability to speak (‘no speaking’) is mocked by the echo of her beloved’s ‘sweet speaking’.…" === CASE EB-1 · Wikipedia, "Eros the Bittersweet", revision 1379182335, Summary, sentence 3 === SENTENCE: Carson considers how triangulations of desire appear in the writings of Sappho, ancient Greek novelists (Longus, Heliodorus, Achilles Tatius, and Chariton), and Plato (in his Phaedrus). HOW IT IS CITED: Scranton 2014; Rae 2010 ITS PARAGRAPH: Carson considers how triangulations of desire appear in the writings of Sappho, ancient Greek novelists (Longus, Heliodorus, Achilles Tatius, and Chariton), and Plato (in his Phaedrus). Her analysis of Sappho's Fragment 31 sees "eros as deferred, defied, obstructed, hungry, organized around a radiant absence – […] eros as lack." SOURCE MATERIAL: [RAE] Ian Rae, "Runaway Classicists: Anne Carson and Alice Munro's 'Juliet' Stories," Journal of the Short Story in English 55 (2010) (cited in the article; fetched 2026-10-22) "…Carson’s book examines the works of Longus, Heliodorus, Achilles Tatius, and Chariton through the lens of her thesis on literacy and erotic triangulation. For Carson, the erotic lyrics of Sappho and her contemporaries condensed and refined a literary configuration of erotic desire wherein a “circuit” is set up between three essential points: “lover, beloved and that which comes between them” ( Eros 16-17). Sparks fly between the points in this circuit, but the points are never fused. The essence of Eros, for Carson, is constant movement and deferral – a deferral exacerbated by the absent presence produced by the new technology of literacy, which fashions a triangular relation between sign, signified, and reader.…" === CASE AC-1 · Wikipedia, "Anne Carson", revision 1381070638, lead, paragraphs 1–2 === SENTENCE: She has been awarded Guggenheim and MacArthur Fellowships, has won the Lannan Literary Award, two Griffin Poetry Prizes, the T. S. Eliot Prize, the Princess of Asturias Award, the Governor General's Award for English-language poetry, and the PEN/Nabokov Award, and was appointed a Member of the Order of Canada in 2005 for her contribution to Canadian letters. HOW IT IS CITED: Morra 2014; BBC 2026 THE LEAD, WHOLE: Anne Patricia Carson (born June 21, 1950) is a Canadian academic and author. Born in Toronto, she graduated from the University of Toronto and became a professor and lecturer at several universities since 1979. Throughout her career she has taught classics, comparative literature, and creative writing. She has taught at the University of Calgary, Princeton University, Emory University, McGill University, University of Michigan, and New York University. Carson has written more than twenty books, including collections of essays and poetry, as well as translations of ancient Greek tragedies. She has been awarded Guggenheim and MacArthur Fellowships, has won the Lannan Literary Award, two Griffin Poetry Prizes, the T. S. Eliot Prize, the Princess of Asturias Award, the Governor General's Award for English-language poetry, and the PEN/Nabokov Award, and was appointed a Member of the Order of Canada in 2005 for her contribution to Canadian letters. In 2026, she was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. SOURCE MATERIAL: none supplied. The reader records the case at placement only: what the passage carries, and where in the article the subject's own operations first appear. THE FULL SPECIMEN ARTICLE ("Sophistical Refutations", revision 1361634710, wikitext rendered to plain text, references removed; the second list is the {{ordered list}} template, given here as in the wikitext): Sophistical Refutations (Greek Σοφιστικοὶ Ἔλεγχοι; Latin De Sophisticis Elenchis) is a text in Aristotle's Organon in which he identified twelve or thirteen fallacies. According to Aristotle, this is the first work to treat the subject of deductive reasoning in ancient Greece (Soph. Ref., 34, 183b34 ff.). In it, he attempts to develop a pattern of sound and genuine reasoning in opposition to the deceptive or misleading "art of sophistry". ==Overview== On Sophistical Refutations consists of 34 chapters. The book naturally falls in two parts: chapters concerned with tactics for the Questioner (3–8 and 12–15) and chapters concerned with tactics for the Answerer (16–32). Besides, there is an introduction (1–2), an interlude (9–11), and a conclusion (33–34). == Fallacies identified == The fallacies Aristotle identifies in Chapter 4 (formal fallacies) and 5 (informal fallacies) of this book are the following: :Fallacies in the language or formal fallacies (in dictionem): # Equivocation # Amphiboly # Composition # Division # Accent # Figure of speech or form of expression : :Fallacies not in the language or informal fallacies (extra dictionem): # 7 Accident # 8 Secundum quid # 9 Irrelevant conclusion # 10 Petitio principii # 11 False cause # 12 Affirming the consequent # 13 Fallacy of many questions A NOTE ON THE GREEK (case SR-W2). The Greek of SE 34 is given as seated in the archive's deposit #1574 with that deposit's working translation; the Pickard-Cambridge translation the article cites is given beside it. The reader may use either and says which. ``` --- ## MESSAGE 2 — the session's readings, the archive's admitted sources, and the attack ```text PART B. The reader now receives the readings made in the procedure's own session (TACHYON, Claude: the same model family as the procedure's built reader, so its agreement with that reader proves nothing) and, for case SR-W2, the archive sources the procedure admits at its step S7. The reader's task is to break the procedure where it breaks. The reader keeps its own Message 1 readings where it still holds them and says so; changing a reading because the session's reading differs, without new evidence, is a failure of the test. THE SESSION'S READINGS, by case: --- SR-W1 --- innocent: Read against the article's own cited secondary source (Krabbe), the count is defensible: six kinds that depend on the use of language and seven that do not make thirteen, and petitio principii is the one kind Chapter 5 does not exemplify, which is a reason a careful writer might hedge at twelve or thirteen. "Identified" keeps Aristotle as the agent of an act. support: supported in substance by an article-internal source (Krabbe, not cited at the sentence); count hedged paraphrase: Aristotle divides sophistical refutations into six kinds that depend on the use of language, which he says can be proved to be exactly six, and seven that do not, and claims the list is complete (Krabbe, on SE 4 and 8). delta: "exactly six" and the completeness claim (SE 8, 170a9–11) become a hedged count, "twelve or thirteen": the source's operation is a claim of exhaustive classification with a proof sketch; the sentence keeps the tally and drops the exhaustiveness omega: classifies and claims completeness: exactly six kinds in language, provable; the list complete attributization: partial: the act survives as "identified"; the claim that the identification is exhaustive, which is what the classification asserts of itself, does not lambda: 4; status: concordant-pending (session reading; one family) alternative: The hedge may track the Chapter 5 omission of petitio, or the medieval count of thirteen against a twelve that merges two outside-language kinds; either makes the hedge a faithful record of disagreement in the reception, and the loss is then the article's failure to say whose count is which. correction pathway: A secondary source stating twelve with its reason, or the article citing Krabbe at the sentence and stating the completeness claim, revises the finding. --- SR-W2 --- innocent: The sentence is attributed ("According to Aristotle") and Aristotle does make a priority claim in his own voice: he contrasts discoveries received from others with those found from scratch, says the beginning is the greatest part, sets rhetoric's long succession against this undertaking, and says that of it nothing at all was there before. The gloss "deductive reasoning" for συλλογίζεσθαι is the standard one in the article's own cited secondary sources: Smith's SEP entry translates sullogismos as "deduction" and Krabbe writes "deductive reasoning (sullogismos)". The cited translation renders the line "on the subject of reasoning we had nothing else of an earlier date to speak of at all". support: priority claim supported as attributed; gloss interpretive, entered from the field's translation convention (article-internal, uncited), which its own sources document as exceeding deduction; qualifier added paraphrase: Aristotle says that of this undertaking nothing at all existed before, unlike rhetoric, which advanced by succession; and that about syllogizing there was nothing earlier to say (SE 34, 183b17–36; 184b1–2). delta: "in ancient Greece": a qualifier added. Aristotle's denial carries no bound ("nothing at all was there"); the sentence bounds it to a region, so the exhaustive negation becomes a regional priority. This is where the quantifier's exhaustiveness (#1574 §3) is lost. delta: "the first work": the denial's subject is ἡ πραγματεία, an undertaking defined by its stated work at 183a37–b8, and the sentence makes it a book. Minor in effect, since the book is the undertaking's record. delta: "the subject of deductive reasoning": the gloss relocates the denial from the undertaking SE 34 defines, a capacity of syllogizing from the most reputable premisses (183a37–b1), to a modern subject whose criterion is validity, and drops the syllogism's defining conditions beyond necessity (SE 1: something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated). The move entered from the field's translation convention (Smith; Krabbe), whose own texts state the excess (S7 adds #1603 P1). delta: Composition and division: "in ancient Greece" composes with "the first work" (a regional priority, bounding the denial) or with "deductive reasoning" (a historical subject, relocating it). SE 20 solves such a phrase by dividing it; divided, each signification fails the source. The rendering the text supports for the undertaking is combining and dividing: the questioner's syllogizing (SE 1) and the answerer's and solver's division (SE 17, 18, 23). omega: denies, exhaustively, any prior provision of this undertaking (183b34–36; 184b1–2), inside a priority argument about discovery from scratch (183b17–23) attributization: partial: the priority claim is Aristotle's own and is kept as attributed; the exhaustive quantifier is converted into a bounded attribute, primacy in ancient Greece lambda: 4; status: unsound on the gloss and the qualifier (session reading, corrected by the operator from a first pass that took the gloss for support); concordant-pending alternative: Read as the field reads it, the sentence is a faithful, sourced summary whose only defect is citing the primary text where its gloss comes from secondary sources already in the article (a citation move fixes it). alternative: Read as #1603 P1 reads 183b34, "the subject of deductive reasoning" relocates the denial from the undertaking to a field, the move the prohibition rules out ("he means the systematic study of logic"). correction pathway: A secondary source that bounds Aristotle's claim geographically, or one that reads ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας as the field of deductive reasoning against 183a37–b8, revises the finding on the qualifier or the scope; either is admitted at its locus, and the case is re-read. --- SR-W3 --- innocent: The quoted phrase stands in the article's own cited translation ("the art of sophistry"), and the book does set dialectic against sophistic. As a one-line purpose statement for a lead it is reasonable. support: partially supported by article-internal sources (the translation; Krabbe); interpretation beyond descriptive paraphrase paraphrase: Aristotle says the programme was to find a faculty of reasoning about any problem from the most generally accepted premisses, the task of dialectic and peirastic, extended, because sophistic stands near it, to defending a thesis; sophistic is the appearance of wisdom without the reality (SE 34; SE 11). delta: "a pattern of sound and genuine reasoning": the source states a faculty (δύναμις) of arguing from the most reputable premisses; the sentence substitutes a truth-normative pattern and drops the endoxic domain, which is the programme's scope delta: "develop ... in opposition to": the book's object is apparent refutations, examined so the answerer can expose and solve them; the sentence frames the work as constructive against a rival art omega: states a programme: to find a capacity of arguing from reputable premisses, and to defend a thesis by the same means attributization: yes: an undertaking with a stated domain becomes an attribute of the work, a pattern of sound reasoning lambda: 4; status: concordant-pending (session reading; one family) alternative: "Sound and genuine" may render the book's contrast between real and apparent refutation (SE 1), in which case the sentence is a gloss of the work's opening, and the loss is the endoxic domain alone. correction pathway: A cited source that states the work's aim as a pattern of sound reasoning without the endoxic qualification revises the support class; the domain loss stands against SE 34 unless that source addresses it. --- SR-W4-6 --- innocent: Directly supported: the three sentences reproduce Krabbe's contents paragraph almost word for word, and Krabbe's article is CC BY, so the copying is licensed and the citation carries the attribution. support: supported (near-verbatim); operation preserved paraphrase: (the source's own words) delta: The division is Krabbe's analysis, "naturally falls", and the article states it in its own voice with the analyst unnamed in the text; the chapter ranges keep the division checkable, so the operation survives omega: divides the book by the role each chapter serves (questioner, answerer), with chapter ranges attributization: no: the analyst's division is stated as fact about the book, and stays reconstructible from its ranges lambda: 4; status: concordant-pending (session reading; one family) correction pathway: A source dividing the book otherwise is a second reading of the structure, recorded beside Krabbe's. --- SR-W7-8 --- innocent: The two lists match the six and seven kinds the article's own source names, under their usual English names, and the chapters are the ones where the kinds are introduced and exemplified. support: partially supported by an article-internal source (Krabbe); labels unsupported; one item narrowed paraphrase: In Chapter 4 Aristotle divides sophistical refutations into those that depend on the use of language (lexis), six kinds, and those that do not, seven kinds; Chapter 5 gives examples of the second group (Krabbe). delta: "formal fallacies" / "informal fallacies": modern labels substituted for Aristotle's criterion, dependence on the use of language; in modern usage a formal fallacy is an invalid argument form, which is no criterion of the in-language group delta: "Affirming the consequent" for Aristotle's consequence (τὸ ἑπόμενον): a broad kind narrowed to one modern formal fallacy, and that formal fallacy is listed under the heading "informal fallacies", so the article's own labels contradict its list delta: "Chapter 4 (formal) and 5 (informal)": both groups are divided and named in Chapter 4; Chapter 5 exemplifies the second delta: "in dictionem": the scholastic phrase is in dictione (ablative), beside extra dictionem; recorded as a form error omega: divides by a stated criterion (dependence on lexis), with a proof claim for the first group's number attributization: yes: Aristotle's criterion becomes a property of the fallacies under a later taxonomy (formal/informal), and the criterion, which is the operation, is no longer stated lambda: 4; status: concordant-pending (session reading; one family) alternative: Textbook tradition does map in dictione/extra dictionem onto formal/informal, and a reader may treat the labels as the field's conventional translation; the contradiction with "affirming the consequent" stands on any reading. correction pathway: A cited source mapping in dictione to formal fallacies with its reasons, read against Krabbe, revises the label finding to contested; nothing revises the list's internal contradiction short of changing the item or the heading. --- TH-1 --- innocent: Directly supported, nearly verbatim, hedge kept ("probably"). support: supported (near-verbatim); claim-level source age 1911 paraphrase: (the source's own words, with "the Aristotelian treatment" made "Aristotle's treatment") delta: The judgment dates from 1911 and enters the article undated, in an article whose lead follows the 2020 SEP entry's different account (TH-2): the inherited assessment stays active beside the updated one delta: the 1911 sentence's next clause, "He served his age mainly as a great popularizer of science", is dropped omega: assesses: Theophrastus's writing as close to Aristotle's, supplementary in detail (an evaluative judgment of 1911) attributization: the judgment is the source's and is kept as a hedged assessment; what is lost is its date lambda: 4; status: concordant-pending (session reading; one family) alternative: Read as an accurate report of a still-common view, the sentence is sound; the age of the formulation is then information the reader should have, not a defect of support. correction pathway: A current secondary source restating the 1911 judgment makes it a living assessment and revises the age finding. --- TH-2 --- innocent: Directly supported by the SEP entry the article cites in its body, near-verbatim. support: supported (near-verbatim) by an article-internal source not cited at the sentence paraphrase: (the source's own words) delta: "in order to" becomes "working to": purpose kept delta: The lead takes the 2020 account; the Writings section keeps the 1911 one (TH-1). The two are compatible on their face, and the article does not say that one is a century older than the other omega: characterizes Theophrastus's work as developing Aristotle's system attributization: the characterization makes Theophrastus's work a function of Aristotle's system: the subordination the round-2 supplement found (R_W), here supported by the field's own source lambda: 4; status: concordant-pending (session reading; one family); the subordination is what the archive's Theophrastus line contests (#1580–#1594), an S7 matter alternative: On the field's reading the sentence is simply accurate; on the archive's, the field's own formulation is the subordination, and the sentence is sound as a report of it. correction pathway: Citation at the sentence closes the support gap; the subordination is contested only by admitting the archive's line at S7. --- IW-1 --- innocent: A positive control: a work page that states the translator's method as her acts, with the method recoverable. support: supported, with one term changed paraphrase: Carson tries to translate nothing that is not in the Greek and to follow its word order and line breaks as far as possible; she adds no possessive pronouns or definite articles absent from the Greek (Wilson). delta: "personal pronouns" for Wilson's "possessive pronouns": a change of term the source does not support, and the one that carries Wilson's point (Sappho's speaker no longer owns "my" tongue) delta: "line breaks" dropped omega: translates by a stated constraint: nothing not in the Greek; word order and line breaks followed attributization: no: the method is stated as the translator's acts ("attempts to follow", "not to add") and stays reconstructible lambda: 4; status: concordant-pending (session reading; one family) alternative: "Personal pronouns" may be the editor's broadening, defensible if Carson's notes say so; Wilson does not. correction pathway: A source stating that Carson omits personal pronouns generally revises the term finding. --- EB-1 --- innocent: A positive control: a work page that states the book's argument as the author's operation, with its objects named. support: supported in part (Rae for the novelists and Sappho; Scranton for Plato, not fetched: unresolved for that clause) paraphrase: Carson reads the novelists through her thesis on literacy and erotic triangulation; for her, Sappho's lyrics set up a circuit among lover, beloved and what comes between them (Rae). delta: "literacy" dropped: Rae states the thesis as literacy and erotic triangulation; the sentence keeps triangulation and loses the term that makes it Carson's argument about writing omega: argues: erotic desire as a three-point circuit, read through literacy attributization: no: the argument is stated as the author's act ("considers how"); half of its thesis is lost lambda: 4; status: concordant-pending (session reading; one family); Plato clause unresolved (Scranton unavailable) correction pathway: Scranton's text, fetched, settles the Plato clause. --- AC-1 --- innocent: An entity page's lead states identity and distinction; that is the lead's genre. support: not read at S3 (the cited pages were not fetched); recorded for placement only delta: The lead carries no operation of Carson's: her method of reading desire (EB-1) and of translating (IW-1) first appears in the Works section, below the lead. λ = 2 for every operation; the work pages state them in their leads or first sections omega: (none in the lead) attributization: recognition only: the lead is the entity form's passband, credentials and appointments lambda: 2; status: placement observation, not an S3 reading alternative: Entity leads summarize; the work pages carry the work. The observation becomes evidence for P1 only in a matched, blinded comparison. correction pathway: A matched sample in which entity leads carry operations at the rate work leads do refutes the reading of this one lead as a case of P1. A CORRECTION AND ITS REVERSAL, BOTH RECORDED. The deposited paper (v1.0, §6) classed SR-W2 as unsound because "the subject of deductive reasoning" changed the scope of the cited lines. On opening the article whole, the session's first pass took the article's own sources (Smith: "the deduction ( sullogismos )"; Krabbe: "deductive reasoning (sullogismos)") as support for the gloss and withdrew the finding. The operator rejected that: "deduction" and "deductive reasoning" are interpretive translations that relocate the interpretive move to translation, and Aristotle defines syllogizing in excess of deduction. The session checked this against the sources and adopted it: SE 1 defines the syllogism as yielding something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated; Krabbe states that the premises may not be superfluous and must differ from the conclusion; Smith states that the definition "is not a precise match for a modern definition of validity" and marks "deduction" as his rendering. The reading above is the result. The operator added that dividing and combining is the more accurate rendering, and is relevant to the sentence itself; the session reads it so: the undertaking is the questioner's combining and the answerer's and solver's dividing, and the sentence's phrase "in ancient Greece" composes two ways, the case SE 20 solves by dividing. The reader judges both moves: whether the reversal is right on the evidence, and whether the first pass or the operator's objection is the one that moved by standing. THE ARCHIVE'S ADMITTED SOURCE FOR SR-W2 (step S7). From #1603, "Nothing Before Us: Socrates and the Ending of the Sophistical Refutations", Appendix P, prohibition P1, verbatim: P1. The scope is this undertaking. Ταύτης δὲ τῆς πραγματείας (183b34) points back to the undertaking the retrospective has just described — the syllogistic capacity, questioning and answering, the treatment of arguments (183a37–b8). *Rules out:* rescuing the denial by relocating it to an undertaking defined independently of that description — "logic," "the formal theory of valid inference," a calculus the *Analytics* later supplies. *Reach:* it fixes the referent; it does not by itself decide whether every activity the undertaking examines counts as a contribution to it. That boundary is argued from the passage (P2, P8). *The escape it closes, first tried:* "he means the systematic study of logic." And from #1574 §3, verbatim: The immediate undertaking is not presented here merely as the construction of a formal deductive calculus: its stated work also includes dialectical and peirastic procedures — the acquisition and defence of arguments from reputable premises, the conduct and ordering of questions, replies, and the solution of apparent refutations. At 184b1 the central methodological achievement of the broader πραγματεία is redescribed as an inquiry περὶ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι; syllogistic competence supplies the organizing capacity for those functions without being coextensive with every feature of the undertaking. THE TASKS. B1. AGREEMENT. For each case, field by field (support, deltas, omega, attributization, lambda), the reader states agree, disagree or partly, with the span that decides it. B2. FALSE POSITIVES. Where does the session find damage that is not there? For each, the reader gives the sentence, the finding, and the evidence in the materials that the finding is wrong or overstated. The procedure is meant to score badly when it finds loss everywhere; the cases IW-1, EB-1 and SR-W4-6 were included as places where the operation should survive. B3. FALSE NEGATIVES. What does the session miss that the materials show? B4. WHO AUDITS THE AUDITOR. For SR-W2, does admitting #1603 P1 change the verdict by evidence (a locus in the Greek that the field's gloss cannot accommodate) or by the archive's standing to rule its own reading? The reader answers from the Greek and the two translations, and states what the opened sentence should say so that a reader who holds the field's reading and a reader who holds the archive's can both check it. B5. THE FIVE-PART ACCOUNT. For SR-W2 and SR-W7-8, the reader writes the account a user would receive, in five labelled parts, at most two sentences each: (1) source support; (2) what the sentence adds, changes or omits; (3) the strongest alternative reading and its basis; (4) status of each finding: verified (code-checkable), inferred, contested, or unresolved; (5) what evidence would revise it. B6. BREAK IT. The reader proposes up to five sentences from real English Wikipedia articles, each with title and a revision id the reader can state with confidence or marked "revision to be pinned", on which this procedure would most likely err: (i) a sentence it would wrongly call unsound because the field's standard gloss is legitimate; (ii) a sentence where the archive's admission would substitute its own ontology without evidence; (iii) a sentence where the loss is real but the support classes cannot express it; (iv) a positive control on an entity page, where a person's operation survives in the lead; (v) any other trap. The session fetches and pins each one before it is used; an unverifiable proposal is recorded as such. B7. THE TEST OF P1. The paper's proposition P1 predicts that attributization with loss of operative authority occurs at a higher rate on entity pages than on matched work and method pages. The reader names the single largest threat to that test as designed (matching by subject area, length within 25%, age, citation density and revision activity) and the change that removes it; the reader states whether readers should be blinded to page type and how. OUTPUT. A JSON object: {"agreement": [{"case": "...", "field": "...", "verdict": "agree | disagree | partly", "decisive_span": {"source": "...", "quote": "..."}, "note": "..."}], "false_positives": [...], "false_negatives": [...], "auditor": {"verdict_changed_by": "evidence | standing | both | neither", "locus": "...", "opened_sentence": "..."}, "five_part": {"SR-W2": {...}, "SR-W7-8": {...}}, "break_cases": [{"title": "...", "revision": "...", "sentence": "...", "trap": "i | ii | iii | iv | v", "why": "..."}], "p1_threat": {"threat": "...", "remedy": "...", "blinding": "..."}}. ``` --- ## MESSAGE 3 — optional, once the session has pinned the break cases ```text PART C. The session has pinned the break cases proposed by all readers and supplies them below with their cited sources, in the Message 1 format. The reader runs Message 1's procedure on each, blind to every other reader's reading, and returns the Message 1 JSON. [The session inserts the pinned cases here.] ``` --- ## Collation (for the session) Each reply is saved verbatim under its family and model string. A script checks every quoted span against the saved materials (whitespace-normalized; a miss is a breach, recorded, never silently corrected), then tables by case and field: the classes each family returns, agreement with the session, and agreement across families. Cross-family agreement is named as such; agreement within one family is concordance. The tables, the breaches and every disagreement with both readings go into EA-WIKI-OPEN-01 §7 and Appendix C of the next version, and the break cases that survive pinning join the calibration set of §5.4 as held-out items.