{ "field": [ { "id": "B1", "card": "Aristotle; Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge. \"On Sophistical Refutations\". Retrieved 2020-12-19.", "url": "https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.mb.txt", "role": "field B", "sha256": { "text": "d4708842c9d61156d4fe6ca39d1d7bdaa2f77e3f003c521f2ffabbbb2b23f6e3" }, "availability": "fetched", "fetched": "gnosis S2, 2026-10-23 (verbatim save; text extracted by code)" }, { "id": "B2", "card": "Edward N. Zalta, ed. (18 March 2000). \"Aristotle's Logic, < Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy>\". Retrieved 2020-12-19.", "url": "https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/aristotle-logic/", "role": "field B", "sha256": { "text": "4bfff26b053e1b138c73ab3e81bde00f612918e7be45d0de6a623724a620dade" }, "availability": "fetched", "fetched": "gnosis S2, 2026-10-23 (verbatim save; text extracted by code)" }, { "id": "B3", "card": "Aristotle, De sophisticis elenchis (chapter 33)", "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OpenGreekAndLatin/First1KGreek/7881c563436f52fb3550e6daa6df94be1b83b0e3/data/tlg0086/tlg040/tlg0086.tlg040.1st1K-grc1.xml", "role": "field B", "sha256": { "text": "3a5aaa17de513d42b82d0cfc17af70bab8c47926f8c05cc59ea69d171499b9df" }, "availability": "fetched", "fetched": "gnosis S2, 2026-10-23 (verbatim save; text extracted by code)" }, { "id": "B4", "card": "Krabbe, E.C.W. (2012). \"Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations\". Topoi. 31: 243–248. doi:10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0. hdl:11370/9e6b3574-e6b1-4b91-bbe4-78954ac9ea80. S2CID 170350834.", "url": "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-012-9124-0", "role": "field B", "sha256": { "text": "3930213bb30975ed5b9bf440d83a3a160dd698249a8beb71708c1adf0928fdc6" }, "availability": "fetched", "fetched": "gnosis S2, 2026-10-23 (verbatim save; text extracted by code)" } ], "field_claims": { "F1": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 1, opening", "quote": "Let us now discuss sophistic refutations, i.e. what appear to be refutations but are really fallacies instead.", "claim": "The treatise's subject is sophistic refutations, defined as apparent refutations that are really fallacies.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": true, "const": true, "lineage": "subject: sophistic refutations are apparent refutations", "quote_ok": true }, "F2": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 1", "quote": "reasoning rests on certain statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated: refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the given conclusion.", "claim": "Reasoning is defined as statements necessarily entailing something other than what was stated, and refutation as reasoning involving the contradictory of the given conclusion.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": true, "lineage": "definition of reasoning and refutation", "quote_ok": true }, "F3": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 1", "quote": "That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is evident.", "claim": "Some reasonings are genuine while others only seem so, through a likeness between genuine and sham.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "genuine vs apparent reasoning", "quote_ok": true }, "F4": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 1", "quote": "of these the most prolific and usual domain is the argument that turns upon names only.", "claim": "The most prolific domain of apparent refutation is argument turning on names alone.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "names as chief source of apparent refutation", "quote_ok": true }, "F5": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 1", "quote": "For names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae, while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same formulae, and a single name, have a number of meanings.", "claim": "Because names are finite and things infinite, single names and formulae must have multiple meanings, which makes equivocal argument possible.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "finite names vs infinite things explains equivocation", "quote_ok": true }, "F6": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 1", "quote": "the art of the sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the reality", "claim": "The sophist's art is defined as the semblance of wisdom without the reality.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": true, "lineage": "definition of the sophist's art", "quote_ok": true }, "F7": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 2 (end)", "quote": "contentious arguments are those that reason or appear to reason to a conclusion from premisses that appear to be generally accepted but are not so.", "claim": "Contentious arguments are defined as those that reason or appear to reason from premisses that seem generally accepted but are not.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "definition of contentious argument", "quote_ok": true }, "F8": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 2 (end)", "quote": "The subject, then, of demonstrative arguments has been discussed in the Analytics, while that of dialectic arguments and examination-arguments has been discussed elsewhere", "claim": "Demonstrative, dialectical and examination arguments are treated elsewhere, so this work turns to arguments used in competitions and contests.", "modality": "self-description", "kind": "relation", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "scope relative to Analytics and Topics", "quote_ok": true }, "F9": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 3", "quote": "These are five in number, refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and fifthly to reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling", "claim": "Contentious disputants have five aims: refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism and reducing the opponent to babbling.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "five aims of contentious disputants", "quote_ok": true }, "F10": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 3", "quote": "For they choose if possible plainly to refute the other party, or as the second best to show that he is committing some fallacy, or as a third best to lead him into paradox", "claim": "The five aims are ranked, with refutation preferred first and repetition a last resort.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "interpretation", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "ranking of sophistic aims", "quote_ok": true }, "F11": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 4", "quote": "There are two styles of refutation: for some depend on the language used, while some are independent of language.", "claim": "Refutations divide into those depending on language and those independent of it.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": true, "const": true, "lineage": "two-fold division of fallacies", "quote_ok": true }, "F12": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 4", "quote": "they are ambiguity, amphiboly, combination, division of words, accent, form of expression.", "claim": "There are six language-dependent fallacies, a number assured by induction and by syllogistic proof.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": true, "const": true, "lineage": "six language-dependent fallacies", "quote_ok": true }, "F13": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 4", "quote": "Of fallacies, on the other hand, that are independent of language there are seven kinds:", "claim": "There are seven kinds of fallacy independent of language: accident, qualified/absolute, ignorance of refutation, consequent, begging the question, false cause, many questions as one.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": true, "lineage": "seven non-linguistic fallacies", "quote_ok": true }, "F14": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 4", "quote": "'Those learn who know: for it is those who know their letters who learn the letters dictated to them'. For to 'learn' is ambiguous", "claim": "The argument 'those learn who know' exemplifies ambiguity, since 'learn' means both to understand and to acquire knowledge.", "modality": "documented", "kind": "text", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "example of ambiguity: learning", "quote_ok": true }, "F15": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 5", "quote": "Fallacies, then, that depend on Accident occur whenever any attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its accident.", "claim": "Fallacies of accident occur when an attribute is claimed to belong alike to a thing and to its accident.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "definition of fallacy of accident", "quote_ok": true }, "F16": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 5", "quote": "'If Coriscus be different from \"man\", he is different from himself: for he is a man'", "claim": "The Coriscus argument exemplifies the fallacy of accident.", "modality": "documented", "kind": "text", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "example of accident: Coriscus", "quote_ok": true }, "F17": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 7", "quote": "deception comes about because we cannot distinguish the sameness and otherness of terms, i.e. their unity and multiplicity", "claim": "Accident fallacies deceive because we cannot distinguish sameness and otherness of terms, i.e. unity and multiplicity.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "cause of deception in accident fallacies", "quote_ok": true }, "F18": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 7", "quote": "the deception consists in the smallness of the difference involved", "claim": "Qualified/absolute, begging-the-question, false-cause and many-questions fallacies deceive because the difference is small.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "smallness of difference as cause of deception", "quote_ok": true }, "F19": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 7", "quote": "for the consequent is a branch of Accident.", "claim": "The fallacy of the consequent is treated as a branch of the fallacy of accident.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "relation", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "consequent as branch of accident", "quote_ok": true }, "F20": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 8", "quote": "By a sophistical refutation and syllogism I mean not only a syllogism or refutation which appears to be valid but is not, but also one which, though it is valid, only appears to be appropriate to the thing in question.", "claim": "Sophistical refutation is defined to include both apparently valid invalid arguments and valid arguments that only appear appropriate to the subject.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": true, "const": true, "lineage": "extended definition of sophistical refutation", "quote_ok": true }, "F21": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 8", "quote": "Now the art of examining is a branch of dialectic: and this may prove a false conclusion because of the ignorance of the answerer.", "claim": "The art of examination is a branch of dialectic and may reach a false conclusion through the answerer's ignorance.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "relation", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "examination as branch of dialectic", "quote_ok": true }, "F22": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1, Part 8", "quote": "Sophistic refutations on the other hand, even though they prove the contradictory of his thesis, do not make clear whether he is ignorant", "claim": "Sophistic refutations, even when they prove the contradictory of the thesis, do not show whether the answerer is ignorant.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "sophistic refutation fails to expose ignorance", "quote_ok": true }, "F23": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 1 (end), on didactic and dialectical argument", "quote": "while he who argues didactically should not ask questions but make things clear himself, the other should merely ask questions.", "claim": "Didactic argument explains rather than asks questions, while dialectical argument only asks them.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "didactic vs dialectical argument", "quote_ok": true }, "F24": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 2, Part 11", "quote": "to claim a 'Yes' or 'No' answer is the business not of a man who is showing something, but of one who is holding an examination.", "claim": "Demanding a yes/no answer belongs to the examiner, not to one who is demonstrating.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "yes/no questioning belongs to examination", "quote_ok": true }, "F25": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 2, Part 11", "quote": "He, then, is a dialectician who regards the common principles with their application to the particular matter in hand, while he who only appears to do this is a sophist.", "claim": "The dialectician is defined as one who applies common principles to the matter in hand, the sophist as one who only appears to.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": true, "lineage": "dialectician vs sophist", "quote_ok": true }, "F26": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 2, Part 11", "quote": "But Bryson's method of squaring the circle, even if the circle is thereby squared, is still sophistical because it does not conform to the subject in hand.", "claim": "Bryson's squaring of the circle is sophistical because it does not conform to the subject, even if it succeeds; false geometrical diagrams such as Hippocrates' are not contentious.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "attribution", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "Bryson's squaring of the circle is sophistical", "quote_ok": true }, "F27": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 2, Part 11", "quote": "any reasoning that merely appears to conform to the subject in hand, even though it be genuine reasoning, is a contentious argument", "claim": "Any reasoning merely appearing to conform to the subject, even if genuine, is contentious.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "contentious argument includes valid but inappropriate reasoning", "quote_ok": true }, "F28": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 2, Part 11", "quote": "the contentious reasoner will not be given to misreasoning from any definite class of principles, but will deal with every class.", "claim": "The contentious reasoner misreasons from every class of principles, unlike the drawer of a false diagram, who is confined to one subject.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "contentious reasoner unrestricted by subject", "quote_ok": true }, "F29": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 2, Part 11", "quote": "it is possible from these general principles to hold an examination on everything, and that there should be a definite art of so doing, and, moreover, an art which is not of the same kind as those which demonstrate.", "claim": "General principles allow examination on any subject and so permit a definite art of examination distinct from demonstrative arts.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "general principles ground the art of examination", "quote_ok": true }, "F30": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 2, Part 11 (end)", "quote": "that it belongs to the dialectician to study these, and to be able to effect them, is not difficult to see: for the investigation of premisses comprises the whole of this study.", "claim": "The dialectician is the one to study and be able to produce sophistical refutations, since investigating premisses comprises the whole of the study.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "dialectician studies sophistical refutations", "quote_ok": true }, "F31": { "source": "B1", "locus": "Section 2, Part 12", "quote": "people are more inclined to make mistakes when they talk at large, and they talk at large when they have no defini", "claim": "Questioning without reference to a definite subject best induces fallacy and paradox, since people err more when they talk at large.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "indefinite questioning induces error", "quote_ok": true }, "F32": { "source": "B2", "locus": "Opening paragraph", "quote": "Aristotle’s logic, especially his theory of the syllogism, has had an unparalleled influence on the history of Western thought.", "claim": "Aristotle's logic, especially the syllogism theory, has had unparalleled influence on Western thought.", "modality": "self-description", "kind": "finding", "kernel": true, "const": false, "lineage": "Aristotle's logic's unparalleled influence", "quote_ok": true }, "F33": { "source": "B2", "locus": "Opening paragraph", "quote": "This article is written from the latter perspective. As such, it is about Aristotle’s logic, which is not always the same thing as what has been called “Aristotelian” logic.", "claim": "The article adopts the modern formal-techniques perspective and distinguishes Aristotle's logic from what has been called 'Aristotelian' logic.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": true, "const": false, "lineage": "article scope: Aristotle's logic vs Aristotelian logic", "quote_ok": true }, "F34": { "source": "B2", "locus": "Opening paragraph", "quote": "More recent scholarship has often applied the very techniques of mathematical logic to Aristotle’s theories, revealing (in the opinion of many) a number of similarities of approach and interest between Aristotle and modern logicians.", "claim": "Applying mathematical logic to Aristotle's theories has, in many scholars' opinion, revealed similarities with modern logicians.", "modality": "attributed", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "similarity of Aristotle and modern logic", "quote_ok": true }, "F35": { "source": "B2", "locus": "Opening paragraph", "quote": "Kant thought that Aristotle had discovered everything there was to know about logic", "claim": "Kant held that Aristotle had discovered everything there was to know about logic.", "modality": "attributed", "kind": "attribution", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "Kant on Aristotle's completeness", "quote_ok": true }, "F36": { "source": "B2", "locus": "2. Aristotle’s Logical Works: The Organon", "quote": "The ancient commentators grouped together several of Aristotle’s treatises under the title Organon (“Instrument”) and regarded them as comprising his logical works:", "claim": "Ancient commentators grouped certain treatises, including On Sophistical Refutations, as the Organon, his logical works.", "modality": "attributed", "kind": "genealogy", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "Organon grouping includes Sophistical Refutations", "quote_ok": true }, "F37": { "source": "B2", "locus": "2. Aristotle’s Logical Works: The Organon", "quote": "Aristotle himself never uses this term, nor does he give much indication that these particular treatises form some kind of group", "claim": "Aristotle never uses the term Organon and gives little sign that the treatises form a group.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "fact", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "Organon title not Aristotle's", "quote_ok": true }, "F38": { "source": "B2", "locus": "2. Aristotle’s Logical Works: The Organon", "quote": "On Sophistical Refutations is a final section, or an appendix, to the Topics", "claim": "On Sophistical Refutations is a final section or appendix to the Topics.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "relation", "kernel": true, "const": false, "lineage": "Sophistical Refutations as appendix to Topics", "quote_ok": true }, "F39": { "source": "B2", "locus": "8.3.1 Gymnastic Dialectic", "quote": "In these exchanges, one participant took the role of answerer, the other the role of questioner.", "claim": "Academy dialectical exchanges, the practice the Topics (and so its appendix) presupposes, had questioner and answerer roles.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "fact", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "Academic dialectical exchange structure", "quote_ok": true }, "F40": { "source": "B2", "locus": "8.3.1 Gymnastic Dialectic", "quote": "to refute ( elenchein ) the answerer’s position", "claim": "The questioner's aim was to refute the answerer's thesis by deriving a contradiction from concessions.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "dialectical refutation aim", "quote_ok": true }, "F41": { "source": "B2", "locus": "Table of contents", "quote": "10. Sophistical Arguments", "claim": "The article has a dedicated section on sophistical arguments, listed after dialectic and rhetoric.", "modality": "documented", "kind": "relation", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "SEP section on sophistical arguments", "quote_ok": true }, "F42": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing recapitulation of the original purpose", "quote": "Προειλόμεθα μὲν οὖν εὑρεῖν δύναμίν τινα συλλογιστικὴν περὶ τοῦ προβληθέντος ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὡς ἐνδοξοτάτων", "claim": "The treatise's stated aim was to find a capacity for reasoning (syllogistic) on any proposed problem from the most reputable available premises.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": true, "const": true, "lineage": "aim: syllogistic capacity from endoxa", "quote_ok": true }, "F43": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing recapitulation of the original purpose", "quote": "τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καθ᾿ αὑτὴν καὶ τῆς πειραστικῆς", "claim": "Finding such a capacity is the proper work of dialectic in itself and of examination (peirastic).", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "function of dialectic and peirastic", "quote_ok": true }, "F44": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing recapitulation of the original purpose", "quote": "Ἐπεὶ δὲ προσκατασκευάζεται πρὸς αὐτὴν διὰ τὴν τῆς σοφιστικῆς γειτνίασιν, ὡς οὐ μόνον πεῖραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς εἰδώς", "claim": "Because of sophistic's proximity, the discipline is fitted out so as to be able to test dialectically and also to proceed as one who knows.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "relation", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "sophistic's proximity shapes the discipline", "quote_ok": true }, "F45": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing recapitulation of the original purpose", "quote": "ὅπως λόγον ὑπέχοντες φυλάξομεν τὴν θέσιν ὡς δι᾿ ἐνδοξοτάτων ὁμοτρόπως", "claim": "A further aim is how, when giving an account, to guard one's thesis through the most reputable premises in the same manner.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "aim: defending a thesis", "quote_ok": true }, "F46": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing recapitulation of the original purpose", "quote": "ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἠρώτα, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ὡμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι.", "claim": "Socrates asked questions and did not answer because he admitted he did not know.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "genealogy", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "Socrates asked and did not answer", "quote_ok": true }, "F47": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, opening", "quote": "Τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ λόγον δεῖ καλεῖν τὸν παρὰ ταὐτὸ γινόμενον", "claim": "An argument arising from the same source of fallacy must be called the same argument.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "identity of arguments by source of fallacy", "quote_ok": true }, "F48": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, opening", "quote": "ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῖς δὲ παρ᾿ ἕτερον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι διὰ τὸ μεταφερόμενον ἕκαστον μὴ ὁμοίως εἶναι δῆλον.", "claim": "The same argument may seem to different people to fall under language, accident or another source, because it is not equally clear when transferred.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "one argument classified differently by different people", "quote_ok": true }, "F49": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, opening", "quote": "Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατανοεῖν ὅτι πάντων τῶν λόγων οἱ μέν εἰσι ῥᾴους κατιδεῖν οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι, παρὰ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι παραλογίζονται τὸν ἀκούοντα", "claim": "Some arguments are easier, others harder, to see through, as to what they deceive the hearer by and in.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "arguments differ in difficulty of detection", "quote_ok": true }, "F50": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on homonymy", "quote": "ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τρόπος εὐηθέστατος εἶναι τῶν παραλογισμῶν", "claim": "Fallacies from homonymy are held to be the silliest mode of fallacy.", "modality": "attributed", "kind": "attribution", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "homonymy as silliest fallacy mode", "quote_ok": false }, "F51": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on homonymy", "quote": "καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι σχεδὸν οἱ γελοῖοι πάντες εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν", "claim": "Almost all jocular arguments depend on language.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "jokes depend on language", "quote_ok": true }, "F52": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on homonymy", "quote": "Τὰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐμπειροτάτους φαίνεται λανθάνειν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτων ὅτι μάχονται πολλάκις περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων", "claim": "Some homonymy-based fallacies escape even the most experienced, as shown by their frequent disputes about names.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "homonymy escapes the experienced", "quote_ok": true }, "F53": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on homonymy", "quote": "οἱ δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι διὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς φάναι τὸ ἓν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὄν.", "claim": "Some solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by saying that 'one' and 'being' are said in many ways.", "modality": "attributed", "kind": "attribution", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "Zeno/Parmenides solved by multiple senses of one and being", "quote_ok": true }, "F54": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on difficulty of classification", "quote": "καὶ λαβεῖν ἐν τίνι γένει, καὶ πότερον ἔλεγχος ἢ οὐκ ἔλεγχος, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὁμοίως περὶ πάντων.", "claim": "Determining the kind of fallacy and whether an argument is a refutation or not is not equally easy in all cases.", "modality": "self-description", "kind": "limit", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "classification not equally easy", "quote_ok": true }, "F55": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on the 'pungent' argument", "quote": "Ἔστι δὲ δριμὺς λόγος ὅστις ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ μάλιστα· δάκνει γὰρ οὗτος μάλιστα.", "claim": "A pungent argument is one that most produces perplexity; it bites most.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "definition of the pungent argument", "quote_ok": true }, "F56": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on the 'pungent' argument", "quote": "Ἀπορία δ᾿ ἐστὶ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλελογισμένοις, ὅ τι ἀνέλῃ τις τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἡ δ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, πῶς εἴπῃ τις τὸ προταθέν.", "claim": "Perplexity is twofold: in valid arguments, which question to remove; in eristic ones, how to state the proposition.", "modality": "stipulation", "kind": "definition", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "two kinds of aporia", "quote_ok": true }, "F57": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on the 'pungent' argument", "quote": "Ἔστι δὲ συλλογιστικὸς μὲν λόγος δριμύτατος, ἂν ἐξ ὅτι μάλιστα δοκούντων ὅτι μάλιστα ἔνδοξον ἀναιρῇ.", "claim": "The most pungent valid argument is one that overturns a maximally reputable view from maximally reputable premises.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "most pungent valid argument", "quote_ok": true }, "F58": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on eristic arguments", "quote": "Τῶν δ᾿ ἐριστικῶν δριμύτατος μὲν ὁ πρῶτον εὐθὺς ἄδηλος πότερον συλλελόγισται ἢ οὔ", "claim": "The most pungent eristic argument is one where it is at first unclear whether it is a valid deduction and whether the solution lies in falsity or division.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "most pungent eristic argument", "quote_ok": true }, "F59": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on non-deductive arguments", "quote": "ἐνίοτε δ᾿ οὐκ ἄξιος καταφρονεῖσθαι.", "claim": "An argument that is not a valid deduction is sometimes not to be despised.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "non-deductive argument not always despicable", "quote_ok": true }, "F60": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on non-deductive arguments", "quote": "ἀλλ᾿ ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐπιεικής, ὁ δ᾿ ἐρωτῶν ἠρώτηκεν οὐ καλῶς.", "claim": "Where the missing element is external, the argument is decent but the questioner has questioned badly.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "fault in questioner vs argument", "quote_ok": true }, "F61": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, on modes of solution", "quote": "ὥσπερ λύειν ὁτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων", "claim": "A solution may be directed at the argument, at the questioner and question, or at neither; likewise questioning may be directed at the thesis, the answerer or the time.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "solutions directed at argument, questioner or neither", "quote_ok": true }, "F62": { "source": "B3", "locus": "chapter 33, summary of topics treated", "quote": "Ἐκ πόσων μὲν οὖν καὶ ποίων γίνονται τοῖς διαλεγομένοις οἱ παραλογισμοί, καὶ πῶς δείξομέν τε ψευδόμενον", "claim": "The author summarises what has been covered: sources of fallacies, refuting and leading to paradox, premises, ordering of questions, uses, answering, and solving arguments.", "modality": "self-description", "kind": "function", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "summary of topics treated", "quote_ok": true }, "F63": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing recapitulation", "quote": "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τέλος ἱκανῶς ἃ προειλόμεθα, φανερόν", "claim": "It is clear that what was undertaken has been adequately completed.", "modality": "self-description", "kind": "finding", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "claim of adequate completion", "quote_ok": true }, "F64": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing, on lack of predecessors", "quote": "Ταύτης δὲ τῆς πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἦν τὸ δ᾿ οὐκ ἦν προεξειργασμένον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν.", "claim": "For this inquiry nothing at all had been worked out previously.", "modality": "self-description", "kind": "genealogy", "kernel": true, "const": false, "lineage": "no predecessors for the theory of syllogism and refutation", "quote_ok": true }, "F65": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing, on lack of predecessors", "quote": "περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἴχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ τριβῇ ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν.", "claim": "On reasoning there was nothing previously to cite; the author laboured long by trial and inquiry.", "modality": "self-description", "kind": "genealogy", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "no predecessors for the theory of syllogism and refutation", "quote_ok": true }, "F66": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing, on beginnings", "quote": "Μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον", "claim": "A beginning is perhaps the greatest part of everything, and hence the hardest; discoveries made from scratch grow little at first but are far more useful than later growth.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "interpretation", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "value and difficulty of beginnings", "quote_ok": true }, "F67": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing, on rhetoric's development", "quote": "Τισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τισίαν, Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον", "claim": "Rhetoric grew by succession: Tisias after the first, Thrasymachus after Tisias, Theodorus after him.", "modality": "documented", "kind": "genealogy", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "succession in rhetoric", "quote_ok": true }, "F68": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing, on paid teachers of eristic", "quote": "Καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνούντων ὁμοία τις ἦν ἡ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ.", "claim": "The paid teachers of eristic arguments used an education similar to Gorgias' practice, handing over arguments to memorise.", "modality": "attributed", "kind": "attribution", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "paid teachers taught by memorised arguments", "quote_ok": true }, "F69": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing, on paid teachers of eristic", "quote": "οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον", "claim": "Their teaching was quick but artless: they gave the products of an art, not the art, and thought they were educating.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "interpretation", "kernel": true, "const": false, "lineage": "teaching products of the art rather than the art", "quote_ok": true }, "F70": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing, shoemaker analogy", "quote": "ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδώσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκοι", "claim": "Like someone promising to spare the feet pain who gives many kinds of shoes but does not teach shoemaking: he met the need but passed on no art.", "modality": "interpretation", "kind": "interpretation", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "shoemaker analogy", "quote_ok": true }, "F71": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing, on the treatise's position", "quote": "δεῖ δ᾿ ἡμᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς περὶ ταύτην τὴν πραγματείαν.", "claim": "We must keep in mind the condition attending this inquiry, namely that it began from nothing.", "modality": "self-description", "kind": "limit", "kernel": false, "const": false, "lineage": "limit: pioneering status of the work", "quote_ok": true }, "F72": { "source": "B3", "locus": "closing, final appeal", "quote": "λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν ἠκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ᾿ εὑρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν χάριν.", "claim": "If the method seems adequate given its starting point, it remains for the audience to forgive its omissions and be warmly grateful for what has been discovered.", "modality": "self-description", "kind": "limit", "kernel": true, "const": false, "lineage": "limit: pioneering status of the work", "quote_ok": true } }, "note": "Saved source texts are held by the service, by hash; third-party texts are not redistributed." }