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SANDIA REPORT 


SAND92— 1382 « UC—721 
Unlimited Release 
Printed November 1993 


Expert Judgment on Markers to Deter 
Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 


Kathleen M. Trauth, Stephen C. Hora, Robert V. Guzowski 


Prepared by 

Sandia Nationa! Laboratories 

Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550 
for the United States Department of Energy 

under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000 


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Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States 
Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation. 

NOTICE: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an 
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SAND92-1382 Distribution 
Unlimited Release Category UC-721 
Printed November 1993 


Expert Judgment on Markers to Deter 
Inadvertent Human Intrusion into 
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 


Kathleen M. Trauth, Stephen C. Hora!, and Robert V. Guzowski2 
Sandia National Laboratories 
Albuquerque, NM 87185 


ABSTRACT 


Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) convened an expert panel to develop 
design characteristics for permanent markers and to judge the efficacy of 
the markers in deterring inadvertent human intrusion in the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant (WIPP). The WIPP, located in southeastern New Mexico, is de- 
signed to demonstrate the safe disposal of transuranic (TRU) radioactive 
wastes generated by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) defense 
programs. The DOE must evaluate WIPP compliance with the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) regulation Environmental Standards for the 
Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic 
Radioactive Wastes (40 CFR Part 191, Subpart B); this EPA regulation 
requires: "Disposal sites shall be designated by the most permanent 


‘markers, records, and other passive institutional controls practicable to 
indicate the dangers of the wastes and their location" (Federal Register 
50: 38086c). The period of regulatory concern is 10,000 years. 


The expert panel identified basic principles to guide current and future 
marker development efforts: (1) the site must be marked, (2) message(s) 
must be truthful and informative, (3) multiple components within a marker 
system, (4) multiple means of communication (e.g., Language, pictographs, 
scientific diagrams), (5) multiple levels of complexitiy within individual 
messages on individual marker system elements, (6) use of materials with 
little recycle value, and (7) international effort to maintain knowledge of 
the locations and contents of nuclear waste repositories. The efficacy of 
the markers in deterring inadvertent human intrusion was estimated to 
decrease with time, with the probability function varying with the mode of 
intrusion (who is intruding and for what purpose) and the level of 
technological development of the society. The development of a permanent, 
passive marker system capable of surviving and remaining interpretable for 
10,000 years will require further study prior to implementation. 


1 University of Hawaii at Hilo 8 .@ ‘ 
2 Science Applications International Corporation i no 
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 


The authors wish to thank the individuals who served on the Marker 


Development Panel. 


* Team A. Dieter G. Ast (Cornell University), Michael Brill (Buffalo 
Organization for Social and Technological Innovation, Inc.), Maureen 
F. Kaplan (Eastern Research Group, Inc.), Ward H. Goodenough 
(University of Pennsylvania), Frederick J. Newmeyer (University of 
Washington), and Woodruff T. Sullivan, III (University of Washington). 


* YJTeam B. Victor R. Baker (University of Arizona), Frank D. Drake 
(University of California at Santa Cruz), Ben R. Finney (University of 
Hawaii at Manoa), David B. Givens (American Anthropological 
Association), Jon Lomberg (independent artist, designer, and writer), 
Louis Narens (University of California at Irvine), and Wendell 
Williams (Case Western Reserve University). 


Thanks go to members of the Futures Panel who discussed their team’s efforts 
and recommendations with the Markers panel--Michael Baram (Boston Team), 
Martin Pasqualetti (Southwest Team), Dan Reicher (Washington A Team), and 
Maris Vinovskis (Washington B Team). Thanks also go to the Sandia Staff who 
presented material to the experts--D. Richard Anderson (6342), Marilyn 
Gruebel (Tech Reps, Inc.), Peter Swift (6342), and Wendell Weart (6303). 
Virginia Gilliland and Molly Minahan (Technical Writers), Debbie Marchand and 
Hawaii Olmstead (Illustrations), Susan Gill (Technical Editor), Steve Tullar 
(Production), and Debra Rivard and the Word Processing Department of Tech 
Reps, Inc. provided support in conducting the meetings and documenting the 
results. 


The authors would also like to thank the technical reviewers, Marilyn Gruebel 
(Tech Reps, Inc.) and Erik Webb (6331) for their useful comments. 


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PREFACE 


This’ SAND report was prepared from information presented by a panel of 
experts expressing judgments about the design and efficacy of markers to 
deter inadvertent human intrusion into the Waste [Isolation Pilot Plant 
(WIPP). Appendices F and G were written by the panelists. The authors 
consolidated and utilized these appendices in preparing the body of the 
report. The individual reports are reprinted as received by the project 
coordinator except for (1) correcting typographical errors, (2) editing for 
internal format consistency, (3) renumbering, repositioning, and captioning 
figures, (4) updating the table of contents to be in line with the previous 
changes, and (5) changing the text in accordance with answers to a number of 
questions that were addressed to the individual teams about their reports as 
written. The members of the expert panel reviewed a draft copy of the report 
and the updated versions of Appendices F and G, and responded to the 
questions provided. 


The panel of experts made their judgments based on current (as of November 
1991) information from disciplines pertinent to markers and about the WIPP 
Project itself. A final decision on marker system design and placement will 
be based on all information that is available to the WIPP Project at the time 
the decision is made. 


Fs 
Rs 
= 


3 


4 


CONTENTS 


EN TRODUCTLON MG crave rt evoterexceersrsyar sls totcic in, teeyeretesone ne see srecsr toot yets ceyerereretsustera rete 1-1 
1.1 Regulatory Requirement for MarkersS................ cee eeeeees 1-5 
WP (BAC Ie OU serie sie eh ahaa aoe ale ngs ovis fas eda erarnre Wy snap ere wvorsions, eS oeahe gare 1-8 
1921 Purare-Socleticss aneurin  eae pero 1-8 
l2 2a MarkersDevelopmentinnercr tai ene renee 1-11 

eS ePULDOSESsO Le Chem SCUGY <a nr potenti ened est ratte emer eet acer ee es 1-12 
ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY........... ce cee ec eee eee cee ee eens 2-1 
2.1 Using Expert Judgment......... Ruka cue tara ecucy eis stetorehoneeay sie exe ttacuetexons este 2-1 
20-2 = EXpert-JuUdpment ePane mrccusmeisteystatersvence ees sistsasustoteney st cr eee ace oumicTarateteeie ss 2-2 
2.2.1 Decision to Use an Expert-Judgment Panel........... ax 2-2 
2.2.2 Development of the Issue Statement.................... 2-2 

LN EO CVECELONEOLGEXPELES creer ye teereere eee eee 2-4 
225 oe NOMInatlOnePLoCeSSaa «te arsue ears eeor terns 2-4 

2.2.3.2 Selection Advisory Committee................. 2-5 

Led MOC LECEPONMOL Eb anNe lew. emir ta eta e eee ener ee 2-6 

2.2.4 Panel Deliberations.................. AUS cay este alebseeuaer ocekcerys 2-6 
RECOMMENDED DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS............ 0. cece ee eee cece eees 3-1 
Dales PPEAM Dg a ie cata tent a terereisbake Lia seeps eons re eRe rtmaven gre Wares order ere ann Sees 3-2 
3,1.1 Basic Premises...... Fees eee Oa Nee AINE ROT Ruch aeas ai ote 
Bein le ASSUMP tTONS/ BAS eC Sires erie rere cen TO ere 3-2 
Jelts3) eMessaver Levels sande Med salir. wecye te iers saetusletotoeeiererstereiel eke 3-3 
3.1.4 Marker System Components.............. cece cece eee e ees 3-4 
3.1.5 Other Design Requirements.............. cc cece eee eee 3-5 

SD gee LC AMM B ia ropersyorstexseoe ge tore rotenone Voce tea es orcs ee woke es sEaeNcton hele Senet Ceey Se Tener ates ei 3-6 
Slee DASTCHELECMES OS cyve/tel seca stsroretsl tages yetedapesercecnalay seekers eemoteee eee reer 3-6 
JM2 2 ee ASSUMPELONS/ BASES year er eee eat sted ee earnest eee 3-8 
3.2.3 Message Levels and Media............ 2. cece ee eee eee 3-8 
3.2.4 Marker System Components.............. cece eee ee eee eee 3-9 
PRINGEREESSORAMARKAENG ie recuener steers leyeear emer aloee ne g-a-atwey mobeuren acter weer n cd eee r sneha eke 4-1 
“mile vArchitectural-Desione Principles rss a cr cere esterase) tor een na encore nae ee ote 4-1 


Vv 


Contents 
4.2 Linguistic Principles............ ccc cece ee eee ewer eee ree ceces 
4.3 Material-Properties Principles........... cece eee reece cece eens 
4.4 Message-Level Principles. .......... eee e eee ee cece erence ences 

5 PROBABILITY ELICITATION. .........cccceccsscccvcverccarsccsssereses 
5.1 Persistence of Markers.............. phe leRseheion Movensicverchelicherenekenenerelode 
5.2 Interpretability of MessagesS...... cece cece eee teeter eee eeeee 
5.3 Gonelusions and Implementation, ............-- cece cece cee eeees 

6 REP ERENGES eanpepeterecee tei ctor reno ces ber ele eho t etal orale lonereterelencisuncl she) sis) aretesnetnitster-lele calc 


Appendix A: 


Appendix B: 
Appendix C: 
Appendix D: 
Appendix E: 


Appendix F: 


Appendix G: 


Issue Statement for the Development of Markers to Deter 
Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste Isolation 
ilies Iles 66 Geo coU OU ooo OHO oom OSU Ubu OaGeouEnronddes 
Letter Requesting Nominations............... cece eee erees : 
List of Those to Whom Requests for Nominations Were Sent.. 
Metter, to NOmPNeeS a.cc ces ici see ie ciel oker oes icce eo ceelo ehruol cele eiieronsteiets 


Expert Panel Selection Criteria. ...... 2... ccc ccc cee eee 


Team A Report: Marking the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 
Ggore sHOACl00) sachet ea oo Se me Oe Che Oc eoU Sou oC ee o ooUeeaUnOOS 


Team B Report: The Development of Markers to Deter 
Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste Isolation 
palibeye weleye (AMUN. Gen doco e cba cand onan be psoas eno sthe 


G-1 


1-1 


1-2 


1-3 


2-1 


4-1 


5-1 


5-2 


5-3 


5-4 


5-5 


5-7 


Figures 


WRB RE LOCA CE OF MA pian, tic eres sere ee oe rye see Se eee Ae Tey ee 


Proposed WIPP repository, showing both TRU-waste disposal areas 


and=experamentallearcast nwa tor esge cree tere peter ner caaee ieee a areeode eiere ror iera nents 


Generalized WIPP stratleraphy. «. seie.).c secsrec ee ceca ens vise eee enone = 


Artist's concept of the WIPP disposal system showing 
the controlled area and accessible environment for 40 CFR 191, 


Subpart B, and the repository/shaft system.................0000 ee 


Tables 


Markers Develiopment = Panciyn pss teccteres roe crete meteneree etree re eee eee 
Marker <System) Components 2.015. acre ee aie ere e s eesisisl custo e cieicuctotetas sere 


Probabilities of the Marker System Persisting - Team A........... 


Consensus Probabilities of the Marker System Persisting - 


Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Drilling for 


WatercassMOde Of eINELUS TON erro er yersie aera eee eee te eee ees 


Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Mineral 


Exploration as Mode of Intrusion................ 0c eee eee ee ce eeee 


Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Drilling for 


Disposal Wells as Mode of Intrusion............... 0... cee ee ee eee 


Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Archaeological 


Investigation as Mode of Intrusion............. 0. eee eee eee eee 


Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Scientific 


Investigation as Mode of Intrusion................... 22.0 eee eee 


Contents 


1-2 


1-3 


1-4 


1-7 


5-3 


5-4 


5-5 


5-7 


5-8 


1. INTRODUCTION 


Expert elicitation was used to determine the potential for markers to 


deter inadvertent human intrusion by future generations into the Waste 
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Specific goals were to obtain information 
about marker designs and message formats that will remain in existence and 
interpretable for the required time period of regulatory concern, and to 
estimate the effectiveness of specific marker designs in deterring intrusion 
and communicating a warning to future generations about the location and 
nature of the waste buried at the WIPP. The assumption was made that when 
individuals know what materials are buried in the area and the dangers of 
intruding into the material, they will not do so. This effort was undertaken 
by the Performance Assessment Department at Sandia National Laboratories 
(SNL). 


This effort to communicate a warning to deter inadvertent human intrusion 
into a repository is necessary because of the hazardous materials that are 
planned for disposal in the WIPP facility. The radioactively contaminated 
waste should be isolated from the biosphere until the risks posed by possible 
releases are acceptably small. In order to accomplish this isolation, 
knowledge of the location and the nature of the wastes must be maintained and 
passed on to successive future societies. Markers are physical structures 
(such as earthworks, stone monoliths, and rock cairns) that are capable of 
carrying the intended message for a long period of time. The message is the 
means of communicating with whatever future societies may exist. 


The WIPP was authorized by Public Law 96-164 (1979) as a research and 
development facility "to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes 
resulting from the defense activities and programs of the United States 
exempted from regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission..." 
Physically, the WIPP is a facility located approximately 26 miles (42 km) 
east of Carlsbad, New Mexico (Figure 1-1). The planned repository is 
schematically shown in Figure 1-2. Some of the experimental areas have 
already been mined at 2157 ft (657 m) below the surface, within the bedded- 
salt Salado Formation (Figure 1-3). If the WIPP is approved as a disposal 
facility, it will accept laboratory and production waste contaminated with 
transuranic elements produced by the nuclear-weapons program. Transuranic 
(TRU) waste is defined for regulatory purposes as waste contaminated with 
radionuclides having an atomic number greater than 92, a half-life greater 
than 20 years, and a concentration greater than 100 nCi/g. In addition to 
TRU waste, lead, radium, thorium, uranium, and contaminants with half-lives 
less than 20 years are expected to be disposed of at the WIPP. While the 
WIPP's primary mission is for the disposal of radioactive wastes, the nature 


1-1 


1. Introduction 


New Mexico 


TRI-6342-223-1 


Figure 1-1. WIPP location map (after Bertram-Howery and Hunter, 1989). 


1-2 


1. Introduction 


= SE ee ee == = 
: Sait Storage Area 


: Rustler 
~ | Formation 


(2157 ft) : Culebra Dolomite 


<—S 
pe Exhaust 
1381 m (4532 ft) <— Sf ae Shaft 
Experimental Area oN 366m 
a Be! (1200 ft) 
b Sete 
= ; 


TRU Waste 776 m (2545 ft) 


Disposal Area 


w~* 


TRI-6346-59-10 


Figure 1-2. Proposed WIPP repository, showing both TRU-waste disposal areas and experimental areas 
(after Waste Management Technology Dept., 1987). 


1-3 


1. Introduction 


Dockum 


SaGANG Ground 
Surface 
Bey he LOW Lak Adige ES Feet | Meters 
7, ye Yi ewey Lake /”, 7. 
YL Red Beds Yj Y, K oe 


KR 


Rustler Formation 


Fete Ne, 400 
TID Salado) | sc LT eee 1500 
Formation) }}.___ 2 
Bi mat aie 2000-600 
Gusts 655 m) 
2500 800 


“Z ax 


Bell Canyon Formation 4500 
—DC?CMM 1400 


Figure 1-3. Generalized WIPP stratigraphy (after Rechard, 1989; based on U.S. DOE, 1980). 


1.1 Regulatory Requirements for Markers 


of the waste is such that some hazardous materials may contaminate the 
radioactive waste. 


1.1 Regulatory Requirement for Markers 


The disposal of nuclear waste at the WIPP is governed by the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA's) Environmental Standards for the 
Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic 
Radioactive Wastes (40 CFR Part 191; EPA, 1985), referred to herein as the 
Standard. Subpart A governs the operation of a repository prior to closure 
and will not be discussed further in this report. Subpart B governs the 
operation of a repository after closure and for the entire regulatory period 
of 10,000 years. Subpart B was vacated and remanded to the EPA by the US 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1987. Through the Second 
Modification to the Consultation and Cooperation Agreement (U.S. DOE and 
State of New Mexico, 1981), studies regarding the performance of the WIPP 
will continue under the provisions of the remanded Standard until a new 
Standard is promulgated. 


The Containment Requirements (§191.13) of the Standard set limits for the 
cumulative release of radionuclides to the accessible environment. The 
cumulative release limits are couched in terms of the magnitude of a 
potential release and the probability of its occurrence. Such potential 
releases are to be calculated during the course of a performance assessment. 
The performance assessments for the WIPP are conducted by the Performance 
Assessment Department at SNL. A performance assessment is defined in the 
Standard (§191.12(q)) as a process that: 


(1) Identifies the processes and events that might affect the 
disposal system; (2) examines the effects of these processes and 
events on the performance of the disposal system; and (3) 
estimates the cumulative releases of radionuclides, considering 
the associated uncertainties, caused by all significant processes 
and events. These estimates shall be incorporated into an overall 
probability distribution of cumulative release to the extent 
practicable. 


Releases are evaluated within boundaries determined by several 
definitions. Accessible environment is defined in the Standard (§191.12(k)) 
as: "(1) The atmosphere; (2) land surfaces; (3) surface waters; (4) oceans; 
and (5) all of the lithosphere that is beyond the controlled area." The 
controlled area is defined in the Standard (§191.12(g)) as: 


(1) A surface location, to be identified by passive institutional 
controls, that encompasses no more than 100 square kilometers and 
extends horizontally no more than five kilometers in any direction 


1-5 


SA eter le BNR Pianta 9S eng irae RP EU ee fe oro WER ee nb ESP eS fo. Shae - Siege a eer ees ee Je prt pees 


1. Introduction 


from the outer boundary of the original location of the 
radioactive wastes in a disposal system; and (2) the subsurface 
underlying such a surface location. 


The accessible environment and controlled area are shown in 
Figure 1-4. 


The Assurance Requirements (§191.14) state, in part, that: 


Disposal sites shall be designated by the most permanent markers, 
records, and other passive institutional controls practicable to 
indicate the dangers of the wastes and their location. 


The term “disposal site" (as here quoted from Subpart B of the Standard) is 
interpreted to mean the controlled area. In the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act 
(WIPP LWA) (Public Law 102-579, approved October 30, 1992), Congress withdrew 
16 square miles of land "...from all forms of entry, appropriation, and 
disposal under the public land laws..."; transferred jurisdiction from the 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior to the Secretary of the 
Department of Energy; and stated that "Such lands are reserved for the use of 
the Secretary [of the Department of Energy] for the construction, 
experimentation, operation, repair and maintenance, disposal, shutdown, 
monitoring, decommissioning, and other authorized activities associated with 
the purposes of WIPP..." The land withdrawal boundary is shown in Figure 
1-4. Performance assessment calculations currently use the land withdrawal 
boundary to assess compliance with the 10,000-year release limits. 


The Standard defines passive institutional control in §191.12(e) as: 


(1) Permanent markers placed at a disposal site, (2) public 
records and archives, (3) government ownership and regulations 
regarding land or resource use, and (4) other methods of 
preserving knowledge about the location, design, and contents of a 
disposal system. 


As explained in the Supplementary Information to the Standard, the 
Assurance Requirements are included in order to address the fact that there 
are many uncertainties in the analysis of releases to the accessible 
environment over the 10,000 years of regulatory concern. The requirement for 
additional measures to improve the operation of a repository is a means to 
address these uncertainties. 


The second context for the use of markers follows from the previous 
requirement (§191.14). Given the fact that markers must be used for a 
nuclear waste repository, EPA’s Guidance to the Standard allows credit to be 
taken for the impact of markers in reducing the probability of inadvertent 
human intrusion (although it can never be assumed to be zero): 


1-6 


1.1 Regulatory Requirements for Markers 


Not to Scale 


: Accessible 


Repository/ 
Shaft System 


40 CFR 191 
Accessible Environment 


TRI-6330-7-12 


Figure 1-4. Artist's concept of the WIPP disposal system showing the controlled area and accessible 
environment for 40 CFR 191, Subpart B, and the repository/shaft system. The 
repository/shaft system scale is exaggerated. On the land surface, the land-withdrawal 


boundary is shown at the same scale as the maximum extent of the controlled area 
(modified from Bertram-Howery and Hunter, 1989). 


1-7 


1. Introduction 


The Agency assumes that, as long as such passive institutional 
controls endure and are understood, they: (1) can be effective in 
deterring systematic or persistent exploitation of these disposal 
sites; and (2) can reduce the likelihood of inadvertent, 
intermittent human intrusion to a degree to be determined by the 
implementing agency. However, the Agency believes that passive 
institutional controls can never be assumed to eliminate the 
chance of inadvertent and intermittent human intrusion into these 
disposal sites (EPA, 1985, p. 38088c). 


Wherever human intrusion is mentioned in the Standard and in the 
Supplementary Information to the Standard, the references are to inadvertent 
human intrusion. Statements such as the following suggest that the 
requirement for passive, institutional controls is to protect against 
inadvertent human intrusion: 


The most speculative potential disruptions of a mined geologic 
repository are those associated with inadvertent human intrusion. 
...the Agency believes that the most productive consideration of 
inadvertent human intrusion concerns those realistic possibilities 
that may be usefully mitigated by repository design, site 
selection, or use of passive controls (although passive 
institutional controls should not be assumed to completely rule 
out the possibility of intrusion). Therefore, inadvertent and 
intermittent intrusion by exploratory drilling for resources 
(other than provided by the disposal system itself) can be the 
most severe intrusion scenario assumed by the implementing 
agencies (EPA, 1985, p. 38088c-38089a). 


The following statement suggests that once the warning message has been 
correctly communicated, a potential intruder will cease activity in the area: 


Furthermore, the implementing agencies can assume that passive 
institutional controls or the intruders’ own exploratory 
procedures are adequate for the intruders to soon detect, or be 
warned of, the incompatibility of the area with their activities 
(EPA, 1985, p. 38089a,b). 


1.2 Background 


1.2.1 Future Societies 


The effort undertaken by the Performance Assessment (PA) Department at 
SNL to design markers for the WIPP builds upon the work of an earlier effort 
that identified the range of possible future societies that may occur in the 
vicinity of the WIPP during the next 10,000 years (Hora et al., 1991). The 
possible modes of humans intruding into a repository, specifically, the WIPP, 


1-8 


1.2 Background 


and the probabilities of such intrusions were considered in this earlier 
study. 


Before one can communicate with future societies about the location and 
dangers of the wastes, it is important to consider with whom one is trying to 
communicate. The question of future societies was addressed using a 
multidisciplinary panel of experts in fields deemed pertinent. This group 
was called the Futures Panel, and included individuals with backgrounds in 
history, future studies, economics, law, physics, sociology, geography, 
engineering, political science, risk analysis, agriculture, climatology, 
history, and demographics. 


The panel was organized into four teams, and each team was given the same 
charge in order to facilitate a focused but diverse set of responses. The 
teams were named based on the predominant geographical location of the 
members: Boston Team, Southwest Team, Washington A Team, and Washington B 
Team. In addition to the panel members being given a specific task, they 
were trained in providing judgments in a numerical fashion and provided with 
background information about the WIPP Project (Weart et al., 1991). 


Each team of the Futures Panel analyzed the question of future societies 
differently. The reports describing the analysis of the problem, prepared by 
each team, were reproduced in Hora et al. (1991). Hora et al. (1991) also 
provide a full discussion of the possible future societies, modes of 
intrusions, and probabilities of intrusions elicited from the teams. The 
material in the individual team reports expanded the view of what future 
societies might be like. Not all of the modes of intrusion considered by the 
teams would be inadvertent. The focus of marking the WIPP is to communicate 
what is buried in the repository and the possible consequences of intruding 
into the repository. The applicable regulation (discussed in the previous 
section) states that it is most important to communicate to protect against 
inadvertent human intrusion and states the assumption that once a potential 
intruder realizes the location and dangers of the waste buried in the 
repository, such activity will cease. Some of the modes of intrusion 
postulated by the Futures Panel are beyond what is currently required by the 
applicable regulations for analysis of the future performance of the WIPP. 


The Boston Team developed several underlying factors that were believed 
to impact future societal activities and possible modes and frequencies of 
intrusion. Certain time periods after the end of the expected 100 years of 
active institutional control after closure (100-300 years, 300-3,000 years, 
or 3,000-10,000 years after closure) and possible levels of technology 
(lower, similar to today, or higher) were considered to impact all of the 
possible modes of intrusion. Knowledge of the past, the value of the 
materials, the level of industrial activity, and population density are the 


1-9 


1. Introduction 


other factors that are important in influencing human actions and the extent 
of human intrusion. The possible modes of intrusion developed by the Boston 
Team are resource exploration and extraction, reopening the WIPP for 
additional storage, waste disposal by injection wells, archaeological 
exploration, explosive testing, and water impoundment. After the first 300 
years after closure, the Boston Team did not believe that boreholes would be 
drilled in the WIPP area for resource exploration and extraction because of 
total removal and/or the use of nonpetroleum energy sources. 


The Southwest Team based its outlook on the possible intrusion into the 
WIPP by future societies in political control of the area around the WIPP 
(the United States of America or another political entity) and the 
technological development pattern (steady increase from today’s level, steady 
decline from today’s level, or a fluctuating seesaw pattern). Possible modes 
of intrusion associated with a steady increase in the level of technology are 
deep strip mining and exotic mining techniques that could develop in the 
future. Conventional drilling and excavation activities were associated with 
a steady decline in the level of technology or a seesaw situation. The 
Southwest Team did not make a distinction in their analysis for time periods, 
stating that society could cycle through the three technological development 
patterns throughout the 10,000 years. 


The Washington A Team examined conditions today in terms of technology 
level and both energy and other natural-resource use and developed possible 
futures by extrapolating these factors. The possible futures thus developed 
are continuity (a continuation of current trends), radical increase (large 
growth in the use of resources), discontinuity (fluctuations in levels of 
technology and resource use), and steady state (emphasizing renewable 
resources and compatibility with the earth). Time was another factor with 
both the period of 0-200 years and 200-10,000 years after closure of the WIPP 
being considered. Exploration for and development of resources were 
considered the most likely modes of intrusion. Other modes included 
construction between cities of a deep tunnel that would intersect the WIPP, 
water impoundment, development of well fields, and explosions. 


The Washington B Team based its examination of possible future societies 
and modes of intrusion on the underlying factors of the level of wealth and 
technology, government control (prudent and effective in controlling the area 
of the WIPP, or not), climate (relating to water supply development), and the 
price of resources (more than doubling current levels, or not). The 
Washington B Team considered the two time periods of 0-200 years and 
200-10,000 years after closure of the WIPP, as the near and far futures, 
respectively. The activities future societies might be undertaking that were 
believed to be able to cause intrusion of the repository were resource 
exploration and extraction, development of water wells, scientific 


1-10 


1.2 Background 


investigations, and weather modification. The far future for resource 
exploration and extraction only extends from 200-500 years after closure. 
After that time, all the oil and gas would have been removed and/or society 
would no Longer be on a petroleum-based economy. 


1.2.2 Marker Development 


The Markers Panel was charged with developing design guidelines for 
markers to be placed at the WIPP and with developing preliminary forms of 
messages and formats to communicate the location and dangers of the wastes 
buried there, for the regulatory period of 10,000 years. The charge was to 
consider both individual components and an entire marker system. After a 
marker-system design was developed based on the guidelines, the panelists 
were asked to estimate the probability over time that the marker system would 


continue to exist and that the messages would be interpretable. The 
estimation of probabilities (function of time, technology, and mode of 
intrusion) is discussed in Chapter 5. 


The nature of the design-criteria problem imposed a number of constraints 
on the work of the Markers Panel. The Futures Panel input suggested that 
societies quite different from our own may be controlling and inhabiting the 
area of the WIPP. The markers must be developed to communicate with people 
whose culture may not be directly descended from our own. This possible 
cultural change is in addition to the changes in language that normally occur 
over time, even when societies are in continuous contact. Secondly, the 
period of regulatory concern (10,000 years) requires that the marker 
materials, construction techniques, and placement be able to withstand the 
forces of nature and the tendency of human beings to vandalize structures or 
to remove pieces. Thirdly, the markers must be able to convey complex 
information, not just about wastes hidden from view, but also about the 
hazards of radioactivity as a function of time. 


The Markers Panel addressed the complexities of the task by relying on 
the strengths of a multidisciplinary panel. The individuals on the panel 
represent disciplines pertinent to addressing the materials and 
communications aspects of the marker issue. Thus, geomorphology, materials 
science, and engineering were included to address the issues of markers 
withstanding natural and human-induced degradation and destructive forces. 
Design and architecture addressed the design and placement of structures. 
Archaeology provided information about the materials and structural 
configurations that historically have been successful in remaining intact 
over long periods of time. Through the study of human social and cultural 
development, anthropology brought to the marker effort the understanding of 
how humans process information and communicate. Linguistics was important to 


1-11 


1. Introduction 


the development of the messages in view of how languages and meanings have 
evolved through time and the necessity of using linguistic messages that can 
easily be decoded. Semiotics addressed communication not only with 
languages, but with signs and symbols. Previous efforts to think broadly 
about communication in terms of using radio signals or sending a satellite 
into space to communicate over long time periods with unknown beings led to 
the selection of individuals from the astronomy and communications 
disciplines for the Panel. The broad educational backgrounds and work 
experience of the panelists (related to the various technical aspects of this 
question) meant that there was broad discussion and cooperation (people not 
limited to their own specific field) in the development of the design 
criteria. 


4.3 Purposes of the Study 


This study had two purposes, one qualitative and one quantitative. These 
purposes were instituted in response to the requirements and guidance of the 
Standard. The qualitative purpose was developing design guidelines for 
markers and messages to communicate with future societies about the location 
and danger of the buried wastes at the WIPP. Such information is intended to 
deter inadvertent human intrusion. The results of the Markers Panel will be 
considered in developing the final design and in constructing the markers. 
The quantitative purpose was to estimate the efficacy of the markers in 
surviving the required time period and in communicating the intended 
messages. Other passive institutional controls (such as a records system or 
a protective barrier system) need to be developed and could also be effective 
in deterring inadvertent human intrusion. Consideration of other passive 
controls and their effectiveness in deterring intrusion was beyond the scope 
of this task. 


1-12 


2. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 


2.1 Using Expert Judgment 


The methodology employed in this study to obtain quantitative evaluations 
of the proposed marker systems performance is referred to as expert-judgment 
analysis (Bonano et al., 1990). For some aspects of performance assessment 
for radioactive waste repositories, it is not possible to build models, 
conduct experiments, or make observations to resolve uncertainties. While 
certain aspects of marker design such as material decay and symbol 
recognition can be studied for short periods of time, it is not possible to 
assess the performance of such a system entirely using these traditional data 
sources. When unresolvable uncertainties do exist, expert judgments are 
often used to quantify the uncertainties and to express both the known and 
the unknown. 


The formalization of expert-judgment elicitation for nuclear waste 


repositories is described in Bonano et al. (1990). Expert judgment is 
pervasive in complex analyses. Judgments about the selection of models, 
experimental conditions, and data sources must be made. The choice is not 


whether expert judgment will be used; instead, the choice is whether it will 
be collected and used in a disciplined, explicit manner or utilized 
implicitly where its role in the analysis is not obvious. 


Precursor studies have provided a structure for the collection of expert 
judgment. These studies include, among others, the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI, 1986) study of seismicity in the eastern United States, the 
NUREG-1150 study (U.S. NRC, 1990), and the recently completed study of 
futures of society (Hora et al., 1991). These studies provide models for the 
collection of expert judgments. These models are designed to avoid the 
pitfalls that interfere with the collection process. 


A formal expert-judgment process should consist of several well-defined 
activities. Such activities include creating issue statements for the 
experts to respond to, selecting experts and training them in probability 
assessment, eliciting probabilities and other information, and processing and 
presenting findings. 


While the NUREG-1150 study was most central in the design of this current 
effort, there are substantial differences between them that are important to 
note. The goal of the expert-judgment process in NUREG-1150 was to provide 
uncertainty distributions for parameters and to judge the likelihood of 
specific phenomena. The uncertain quantities were relatively well defined. 
In the present study of marker systems, the issues are less well defined, and 


2-1 


2. Organization and Methodology 


the experts are required to employ substantial creative effort in devising 
marker systems and evaluating their potential performance. 


Several organizational forms for experts in an elicitation process have 
been described (Bonano et al., 1990). One form is the organization of 
experts into teams. A team structure is useful when disparate disciplines 
need to be used on a given problem. An added benefit of using teams is 
enhanced communication among the experts. In contrast, when experts from 
different disciplines work on separate, but connected, parts of the same 
problem, coordination and communication among the experts must be explicitly 
provided. 


Through the work that was done with the Futures Panel and the Markers 
Panel, PA has developed its own procedure for the use of expert judgment. 
This procedure is documented by Rechard et al., 1992. 


2.2 Expert-Judgment Panel 


2.2.1 Decision to Use an Expert-Judgment Panel 


The decision to use the expert judgment process to develop information on 
markers was based both on the importance of the topic and the ‘lack of 
alternate sources of this information. Human intrusion appears to be the 
only credible means by which radionuclides may reach the accessible 
environment (Marietta et al., 1989; Guzowski, 1990). Deterring human 
intrusion through the use of markers could significantly enhance confidence 
in compliance with the Standard. The handling of such a sensitive topic must 
be done in an open and documented format allowing input from individuals 
outside of the WIPP Project. In addition, the design of. markers is 
interdisciplinary and must utilize input from many disciplines. Further, 
estimation of the efficacy of markers in deterring human intrusion cannot be 
done any other way than through expert judgment--experiments cannot provide 
this type of information. 


2.2.2 Development of the Issue Statement 


The development of the issue statement is the first step in the process 
of conducting an expert judgment panel. Development of the issue statement 
is important not only to clearly define the issue to be addressed by the 
panel, but also as a means of identifying the disciplines that need to be 
represented on the panel. 


2-2 


2.2 Expert-Judgment Panel 


The issue statement for the Markers Panel is found in Appendix A. It 
requires judgments for both marker and message design characteristics and 
estimates of performance of the marker system. Performance of the markers 
was to be estimated for both the "physical" longevity of the markers and the 
ability of the markers to convey the correct message to deter inadvertent 
human intrusion. Marker-design characteristics include a general description 
of the marker system, as well as a physical description of each marker 
component within the marker system, including size, location, shape, and 
materials. Also, the teams were asked to describe the messages upon or 
within the markers and the method(s) of conveying the messages. For 
performance of the system of markers, the teams were asked to assess the 
extent to which the marker system they designed would survive, be correctly 
interpreted, and evoke the correct response over the 10,000 year period of 
regulatory concern. The estimates of performance were requested for the 
individual marker components as well as for the entire system. 


The issue statement in Appendix A is the version provided to the Markers 
Panel. This issue statement was changed once the Markers Panel began their 
work. Such modifications are not inappropriate if the experts believe that 
certain questions cannot be answered or the problem should be examined 
another way. As a result of the emphasis on inadvertent human intrusion, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, the panel members did not provide probabilities that 
the correctly interpreted messages would be heeded (i.e., probabilities were 
not provided for question 6). Team A stated that 


The regulatory requirement is to deter inadvertent human intrusion, and 
thus we feel that if the message is understood, our job is completed. 
Any action that takes place after the message is understood is advertent 
and intentional. 


Team B stated that 


We cannot guarantee that any simple or complex message, even when 
recognized and correctly interpreted, will deter a human being from 
inappropriate action.... Nevertheless, carefully designed warnings could 
be expected to reduce the chances of inadvertent intrusion into the WIPP. 
Moreover, an intrusion would not be casual, but would be a planned event. 
As such, there would be a greater likelihood to consider cautionary data. 


A further change was made to the issue statement. Both teams stated that 


they had developed system designs and that it was inappropriate to consider 
the effectiveness of individual marker components. 


2-3 


ae ee ee men at pe ee he ee ee ee gE en gS a we Faas ee ee ee Se 


2. Organization and Methodology 


2.2.3 Selection of Experts 


Marker design depends upon the expertise of many disciplines, so a 
multidisciplinary team approach was needed. The disciplines expected to be 
important included anthropology, archaeology, architecture, astronomy, 
communications, design, engineering, geology/geophysics, modern languages, 
linguistics, materials science, psychology, semiotics, and sociology. In 
addition, parallel teams were to be established to elicit diversity in the 
responses. Because the teams were to be composed of scientists and scholars 
from many disciplines, the pool of candidates needed to be sufficiently 
broad. An established nomination process was employed to achieve this. 


2.2.3.1 NOMINATION PROCESS 


The selection of experts begins with the identification of persons 
believed sufficiently knowledgeable in the disciplines identified by SNL 
staff as being pertinent to the project to nominate experts. The nominators 
were identified through contacts with professional organizations, such as the 
American Institute of Professional Geologists, the Linguistic Society of 
America, and the American Anthropological Association. Governmental 
organizations such as the U.S. Soil Conservation Service and the National 
Climatic Data Center were also contacted, as were public interest 
organizations such as the League of Women Voters. Simultaneously, literature 
searches were performed in the publications of the above listed disciplines. 
From these literature searches, prominent authors were identified and 
contacted. The editors of professional journals were also contacted 
concerning nominations. 


An initial contact was usually made by telephone to explain the project 
to the potential nominator. This contact was used to determine whether the 
potential nominator would be able to provide nominations and to assist in 
obtaining the cooperation of other people in the project. 


The identification of nominators and the initial contacts took place 
between June 13 and July 13, 1990. By July 24, 1990, a formal request for 
nominations (Appendix B) had been sent to all nominators who .had agreed to 


contribute. This letter outlined the tasks to be accomplished by the 
experts, provided a tentative schedule, and included a description of the 
criteria to be used for selection of experts. The letter invited self- 


nomination if the nominator deemed this to be appropriate. 


During the following week, additional letters were sent to those 
nominators who had not responded to the request for nominations. Several 
potential nominators, who were thought to be sufficiently knowledgeable or 


2-4 


1 
t 


2.2 Expert-Judgment Panel 


their responses considered to be highly desirable but could not be contacted 
verbally, were also sent letters. The parties to whom these letters were 
addressed are shown in Appendix C. 


From this effort, a total of 92 nominations were obtained by August 8, 
1990. By August 14, 1990, a letter was sent to each of the nominees 
(Appendix D). This letter outlined the tasks to be accomplished and firm 
dates for the two meetings to be held in Albuquerque. The nominees, if 
interested and able to participate in the project, were asked to send a 
letter describing their interests and any special qualifications relevant to 
the WIPP marker-development study. A curriculum vitae was also requested 
from each nominee. Letters of interest and curriculum vitae were received 


from 57 nominees by noon of August 20, 1990. After that time, no further 
responses were considered. 


2.2.3.2 SELECTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE 


The selection advisory committee assisted the PA Department by evaluating 
the interest letter and the curriculum vitae from all of the nominees in 
light of the selection criteria and by making recommendations for the 
membership of the Markers Panel as well as several alternates. The selection 
advisory committee was composed of three university professors with some 
knowledge of the WIPP Project and the expert judgment process: Dr. G. Ross 
Heath of the University of Washington (oceanography), Dr. Douglas G. Brookins 
of the University of New Mexico (geology), and Dr. Detlof von Winterfeldt of 
the University of Southern California (decision analysis). Dr. Heath is also 
the chair of the WIPP Performance Assessment Peer Review Panel, which gave 
him special insights into- the project-related goals of the WIPP PA Project 
and the regulatory framework of the Project. 


The members of the selection committee were provided with copies of the 
above information several days prior to the meeting during which the final 
recommendations were made. The recommendations of the selection advisory 
committee were followed in establishing the Markers Panel. 


Criteria for the selection of experts were drafted for use by the 
selection advisory committee. These criteria were similar to the criteria 
that were distributed to the nominators and nominees but also included 
criteria related to the balance of disciplines and geographic location of the 
teams. The criteria are included in this report as Appendix E. 


2-5 


2. Organization and Methodology 


2.2.3.3 SELECTION OF PANEL 


The selection advisory committee recommended members for two teams within 
the Markers Panel, and these recommendations were accepted in establishing 
the Markers Panel. The Markers Panel consisted of one team of six members 
and one team of seven members. Two teams with parallel missions provided a 
focused but diverse set of responses. The size of the teams was dictated, in 
part, on the necessity of representing the pertinent disciplines. Table 2-1 
lists the members of the Markers Panel, their affiliations, and their 
discipline(s). 


2.2.4 Panel Deliberations 


The Markers Panel first met as a group November 4-6, 1991, in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. The first meeting included presentations regarding 
the WIPP Project, the Standard, WIPP performance assessment, and the issue 
Statement (the specific questions the teams were asked to address), as well 
as long-term climate variability at the WIPP, and the geologic and hydrologic 
characteristics of the WIPP region as they relate to marker development. At 
this meeting, the panel members also received an introduction to the expert 
judgment process and training in the process of expert judgment elicitation. 
On November 5, the Markers Panel toured the WIPP surface facilities, 
underground facilities, and surrounding area. Originally, the Markers Panel 
was scheduled to convene in October 1990, to coincide with the meeting at 
which the Futures Panel discussed their results. The convening of the 
Markers Panel was postponed for one year because of budgetary constraints. 
In order to make the connection between the work of the Futures and Markers 
Panels, each member of the Markers Panel was provided with the reports 
prepared by the four Futures Panel teams and text of the background 
information provided to the Futures Panel. In addition, one person from each 
of the four Futures Panel teams attended the November meeting to discuss 
their team’s results and to answer questions. 


The Markers Panel was also provided with literature related both to the 
WIPP Project and human intrusion, as well as other efforts to address 
deterring human intrusion into nuclear waste repositories. 


After the first meeting when the members of the two teams began 
developing a strategy for addressing the issue statement, each team met 
separately for working sessions. (Team A met December 5-6, 1991, in Buffalo, 
New York, and Team B met December 14-16, 1991, in Kona, Hawaii.) 


The two Markers Panel teams presented their results and draft reports to 
SNL staff, federal and state agency representatives, Nuclear Energy Agency 


2-6 


2.2 Expert-Judgment Panel 


(NEA) Human Intrusion Working Group observers, and several members of the 


press January 13-14, 1992, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 


Table 2-1. Marker Development Panel 


Team/Names Organization(s) Discipline(s) 
A 
Ast, Dieter Cornell University Materials Science 
Brill, Michael Buffalo Organization for Architecture, 


Goodenough, Ward 


Kaplan, Maureen 


Newmeyer, Frederick 


Sullivan, Woodruff 


B 
Baker, Victor 


Drake, Frank 


Finney, Ben 


Givens, David 


Lomberg, Jon 


Narens, Louis 


Williams, Wendell 


Social and Technological 
Innovation 


University of Pennsylvania 


Eastern Research Group 


University of Washington 


University of Washington 


University of Arizona 


University of California 
at Santa Cruz 


University of Hawaii at 
Manoa 


American Anthropological 
Association 


Consultant 


University of California 
at Irvine 


Case Western Reserve 
University 


Environmental Design 
Anthropology, 
Linguistics 


Archaeology, 
Environmental Engineering 


Linguistics 


Astronomy, 
Communications 


Geomorphology 
Astronomy 
Communications 
Anthropology 


Anthropology 


Scientific Illustration 


Semiotics 


Materials Science 


2-7 


3. RECOMMENDED DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS 


Team A and Team B of the Markers Panel were both given the same issue 
statement (the same set of questions) to address during their deliberations. 
The issue statement contained a number of requirements and constraints within 
which the Panel needed to work. The time frame for the Panel to consider 
must be 10,000 years because of the requirement that performance assessments 


cover a time period of 10,000 years after closure of the disposal facility 
(Containment Requirements). The second requirement was that the markers must 
be developed with a goal of being able to convey information to any future 
society (considering the broad spectrum of possible future societies 
developed by the Futures Panel [Hora et al., 1991]).. The third requirement 
was to communicate the dangers associated with the waste buried at the WIPP. 


A compatison of the two sets of marker design characteristics highlights 
the aspects of marker design where the two teams are in agreement. A 
comparison of the approaches also allows one to see the diversity in the 
responses and highlights those competing approaches to markers that need to 
be investigated further. 


The reader is directed to Appendices F and G for the Team A and Team B 
reports, respectively. The reports are reproduced as received by the project 
coordinator except for (1) correcting typographical errors, (2) editing for 
internal format consistency, (3) renumbering, repositioning, and captioning 
figures, (4) updating the tables of contents to be in line with the previous 
changes, and (5) changing the text in accordance with answers to a number of 
questions that were addressed to the individual teams about their reports as 
written. The members of the Markers Panel reviewed a draft copy of this 
report and the updated versions of Appendices F and G, and responded to the 
questions provided. The Team A report contains a number of marker 
alternatives that were considered and rejected by the team and are included 
in order to show the range of the thought process. The Team A final 
recommendation is for the use of the "Menacing Earthworks" along with the 
other components discussed below and in their report. The Team B report is a 
discussion of their recommended marker system. 


This report uses a number of terms that need to be clarified. A marker 
system is the entire set of physical structures (whatever their form or 
composition) emplaced to communicate to future societies about the wastes 
buried in the repository. If earthen berms and buried message disks are used 
to mark a repository, their combination would constitute a system. The 
earthen berms and the message disks each would be considered components of 
the marker system. Each individual message disk would be a marker element. 


3-1 


3. Recommended Design Characteristics 


3.1 Team A 
3.1.1 Basic Premises 


Team A listed their goal in communication as the simultaneous fulfillment 
of three objectives: (1) to provide a gestalt message (the whole message is 
greater than the sum of the parts/components), (2) to use a systems approach, 
and (3) to incorporate redundancy in the markers. 


For the gestalt message, the purpose is to convey a message not just with 
words and pictures, but through the very vehicles of conveying the messages, 
and the messages themselves. That is, the marker materials, their 
construction, and their arrangement are such that future generations coming 
upon the markers will understand the message that this place is not one where 
people would want to spend a lot of time. With the gestalt message, the 
emphasis is on communicating through the entire marker system. 


The systems approach to designing and constructing markers is that the 
various marker components are linked to each other and supplement the 
information (or fill in any gaps) from other marker components. Messages are 
provided in different levels of complexity, in different formats, and convey 
different aspects of the entire message. 


The redundancy within the marker components provides enough individual 
markers of any one type (material or message or arrangement) so that if some 
are vandalized or degraded over time, there are sufficient numbers remaining 
to communicate the required message. The size and construction of the 
markers can also provide redundancy in that the form of the communication is 
overdone so that it can still communicate after degradation or defacement. 
With earthen berms (discussed later in this. section), the size called for 
would allow the marker to withstand considerable erosion and still remain 


recognizable as a human construction marking an area. 


3.1.2 Assumptions/Bases 


Team A made the following assumptions that impacted their marker designs 
and their recommendations for future studies. While various civilizations 
have developed and declined over time, history has shown that since literacy 
first developed 6000 years ago, it has not ceased to exist (Appendix F, 
Section 1.2). Team A assumed that scholarship capable of translating the 
messages on the markers will continue to exist somewhere in the world during 
the time period being considered. This resulted in a major emphasis on 
written language, and the redundancy of the written languages to aid in 
decipherment. 


3-2 


3.1 Team A 


Team A assumed that, based on past history, political boundaries are 
impermanent, and so included the importance of an international effort that 
would maintain knowledge of the location of all nuclear waste disposal sites. 


The evolution of existing cultures and the creation of new ones over the 
next 10,000 years cannot be known. Thus, a marking system and the messages 
must be cross-cultural to the extent possible. The marking system must be 
rooted in basic human concepts and understanding. 


3.1.3 Message Levels and Media 


Team A recommended the use of five levels of messages in the overall 
marker system. These five levels are a modification of the following four 
levels defined by Givens (1982; also see Appendix F, p. F-34), who is also a 
member of Team B: 


Level I: Rudimentary Information: "Something manmade is here," 


Level II: Cautionary Information: "Something manmade is here and 
it is dangerous," 


Level III: Basic Information: Tells what, why, when, where, who, 
and how (in terms of information relay, not how the site was 
constructed), and 


Level IV: Complex Information: Highly detailed, written records, 
tables, figures, graphs, maps, and diagrams. 


With the gestalt message, the marker system itself would be able to 
communicate both Level I and Level II information. Team A created a new 
Level IV with the level of complexity of information to be between those of 
the Level III and Level IV messages defined by Givens (1982). The most 
complex information, Level V, would be the “complete rulemaking record" and 
would be stored in archives. 


In an effort to achieve the three objectives in Section 3.1.1, the team 
set out to be as unambiguous as possible in how the warning messages were 
conveyed. This led to a greater reliance on communicating through a sense of 
place, through written languages and scientific symbols for the specific 
information, and through the use of the human face with expressions. 


Communicating through a sense of place is based on the concept of human 
archetypes--that all human beings react similarly to particular physical 


3-3 


3. Recommended Design Characteristics 


environments. The team believed that creating an environment that 
communicated to humans today that the area around the markers was not a 
welcoming one, would also communicate the same message to future human 
beings, at least within the time frame required in the Standard. 


Language was seen as an unambiguous means of communicating specific 
information about the repository, as were scientific media such as the 
periodic table of the elements and star charts. The recommended languages 
are those of the United Nations (Arabic, English, Spanish, French, Russian, 
and Chinese) and that of the largest group of Native Americans in the area 
(Navajo). Space should also be left on the markers for a future society to 
add a language to the markers. The periodic table of the elements is 
distinctive in shape and should bé recognizable. Drawing on humans’ 
traditional observation of the stars, a chart could be developed to show the 
positions of the stars when the WIPP was closed and after 10,000 years. 


Human facial expressions were seen as unambiguous because humans use the 
same expressions to convey particular feelings, independent of culture. 
There is less emphasis on what were perceived as potentially ambiguous 
pictographs. Team members thought that while human figures and animals would 
be recognized in the future, the intent of the messages might be lost. For 
example, one can recognize people and animals in ancient cave drawings but 
not know what the artists were trying to communicate about them. 


3.1.4 Marker System Components 


The individual components that comprise the marker system developed by 
Team A vary with regard to size, materials, specific message and audience, 
and location. The system can best be explained by discussing it in the 
sequence of marker components that would be encountered as someone approached 
the outside and moved to the center. Team A has stated that certain specific 
aspects of the design require testing before being finalized. 


The area over the waste panels (and a buffer area to account for 
migration of the radioactive materials) would be outlined by earthen berms 
(Appendix F, Figs. 4.3-8 and 4.3-9). These berms would be jagged in shape 
and would radiate out from, but not cover, a central, generally square area. 
The number of berms is sufficient to delineate a central area or "keep" even 
if some are destroyed. The four corner berms would be higher and provide a 
"vantage point" to see the area as a whole. The jagged nature of the berms 
is meant to convey a sense of foreboding (not honorific or pleasant). The 
exact size, shape, and configuration of the berms would be such that they 
would not quickly be eroded or covered. The earthworks are meant to convey a 
Level I message. 


3-4 


3.1 Team A 


Within the "keep" would be multiple "message kiosks" (Appendix fF, 
Fig. 4.3-18) containing Level II messages in approximately seven languages 
(those of the United Nations plus a local indigenous language), as well as 
Level III messages in several of the languages plus a local indigenous 
language. Space will be left on the kiosk for a future generation to 
inscribe the message in another language. The construction of the kiosk will 
include a concrete "mother" wall that will be built to curve around and 
protect an inner granite wall containing the actual messages. Messages will 
be placed high up on the wall so as not to be buried by blowing sand and to 
make it more difficult for individuals to deface them. 


The Level IV information, the most complex at the site, will be contained 
in concrete rooms (Appendix F, Fig. 4.3-17). One such room will be buried in 
each of the four corner berms, allowing them to be exposed as the berms 
erode, The rooms will be constructed to allow access but to prevent the 
removal of informational materials. The "sliding stone entry plug" will 
protect an opening large enough for a human to enter and leave, but too small 
to allow removal of an intact stone slab containing the information. Level 
IV information will be located on stone slabs on the interior walls. Two 
additional layers of stone slabs with the same messages will be located 
behind the original layer in case the original wall is damaged or destroyed. 
In addition, each Level IV room will contain other types of information such 
a periodic table of the elements to indicate what is buried at depth, and an 
astronomical calendar to indicate at what point in the past the wastes were 
buried. 


~ 


From the top of the earthworks, one would be able to see a world map 
showing other disposal sites (Appendix F, Fig. 4.3-16), as well as part of 
the original buildings left as a message center ("left to decay"). The 
location of the WIPP on the world map will be indicated by a marker that will 
also sit atop a Level IV room beneath the map. 


3.1.5 Other Design Requirements 


Team A made a number of recommendations about the design and construction 
of markers to increase the probability that they will remain recognizable far 
into the future. MIrregularly shaped "blocks" to be used for construction 
(e.g., message rooms) would make recycling of the blocks for the construction 
of other structures more difficult. The individual marker elements (e.g., 
message kiosks) should be large enough to make them difficult to carry off to 
a future museum, Materials for the construction of the marker elements 
(message kiosks, message chambers, world map) should have the lowest 
intrinsic value feasible so that their materials are not worth removing and 
recycling. 


3. Recommended Design Characteristics 


3.2 Team B 
3.2.1 Basic Premises 


Team B developed a list of 10 items that guided their work in developing 
a marker system. These items relate to the rationale and moral aspects, how 
to mark, and future activities. Their design was guided by the need for 
durability of markers and clarity of messages. The team report addresses 
markers by examining possible alternatives in terms of persistence of 
markers, recognition of markers and messages, interpretation of the messages, 
and deterrence of human intrusion. A discussion of each of the 10 items 
follows. 


(1) Two of the four teams that comprised the Futures Panel (Hora et al., 
1991) recommended to the Markers Panel that the site not be marked so as not 
to draw curious visitors to the WIPP. Team B disagreed and stated that 
because of current mining and petroleum production in the area, the site must 
be marked to reduce the probability of inadvertent human intrusion. 


(2) The marker strategy must not rely on one location for message 
carriers, but should use both surface and buried markers. Surface markers 
would be available for interpretation now and in the future. Buried markers 
could become available to communicate in the future through possible erosion 
if the surface markers have been removed, destroyed, or degraded through 
natural processes. Buried markers could also reinforce the message of 
surface markers during possible intrusion attempts. If humans begin to 
intrude upon the site, buried markers (safe from vandals and certain natural 
weathering processes) could communicate the dangers below. The buried 
markers also reinforce the message if the surface markers are misinterpreted 
or ignored. 


(3) The messages must be truthful. All people have the right to know the 
potential impacts of their actions. In addition, if future people discover 
that part of a message is untrue, they may not believe any of the message. 


(4) The outer extent of the marker system should be visible from the 
center. This allows a visitor (if they are in the center of the marker 
system) to cognitively assemble all the markers they are seeing as 
delineating a coherent site or message about this particular location. 


(5) The area to be marked should be that area above the waste panels. 
Part of the reason for this delineation is found in (3). If a large area is 
marked to communicate that one should not dig or drill here because of the 
hazardous material buried below, and if future societies drill within the 
designated area but outside the area of the panels and find nothing unusual, 


3-6 


3.2 Team B 


they may not believe the other messages. The second reason is found in (4). 
It may be difficult to convey a sense of a coherent marker system that is 
attempting to communicate over, for example, what is believed will be the 
controlled area (16 square miles). People may not be able to relate a marker 
at one point to something that is two miles away, because of the limits of 
human perception. 


(6) The highest probability of success in correctly communicating the 
location and nature of the buried wastes is to repeat the message in a number 
of ways so that if one message form is not completely understood, the message 
in another form may fill in the gaps and reinforce it. The linguistic 
material must use simple sentences so that future scholars will be more 
readily able to translate it. The different modes of communication must 
communicate with different societies having knowledge of or access to 
different levels of technology. This duplication is necessary because we 
cannot know what cultures will be like or what levels of technology will be 
in existence at any future time. The team noted that the message from the 
Futures Panel (Hora et al., 1991) was that the Markers Panel should make 
recommendations for a wide variety of cultures and technologies. 


(7) While current plans call for removing the existing buildings, parking 
lots, roads, ete. and returning the area to its previous condition, Team B 
recommended that part of the main building containing the "hot cell" should 
be left in place for the benefit of future archaeologists--to study it and 
understand what took place at the WIPP. 


(8) Detailed information about the WIPP should be stored off-site, but 
the details of what information should be stored and where and how it should 
be stored, should be developed in the future, closer to the time when such a 
record system would be implemented. 


(9) The marking of nuclear-waste repositories should have an 
international aspect in terms of a map at the site showing other disposal 
sites around the world to ensure that all knowledge is not lost. This 
marking may also include either the existing radiation trefoil symbol or a 
symbol still to be developed. 


(10) Testing of markers and messages must be undertaken between now and 
the time of implementation. This will include testing both for durability 
(materials and inscriptions) and cross-cultural understanding of the 
messages. 


3-7 


3. Recommended Design Characteristics 


3.2.2 Assumptions/Bases 


Team B was directed in their actions by the recommendations of the 
Futures Panel. In developing markers, Team B believed that a systems 
approach (many types of markers, messages, and communication modes) would be 
the most useful in communicating under the unknown and varying circumstances 
of what the Washington A Team of the Futures Panel called “radical 
discontinuity." Under radical discontinuity, society would have gone through 
considerable changes--political, social, and technological--that might impact 
existing knowledge bases, languages, and institutional controls and memory. 
Messages would thus need to communicate to everyone regardless of their 
culture, technology, or political structure, that not intruding upon the 
repository was in their own best interest. A second assumption made by the 
team was that political change will take place (i.e., resulting in the United 
States of America not being in control of the area around the repository). 
This assumption led Team B to be concerned with making the marking of 
repositories an international effort. A third assumption made by Team B was 
that vandalism will contiriue to be a tendency of some parts of human society. 
Multiple marker elements of one component (i.e., the placement of many stone 
monoliths in the marker system) will allow for the marker component to remain 
and be able to be interpreted even if some of the individual elements are 
destroyed or removed. ; 


3.2.3 Message Levels and Media 


Team B recommended the presentation of messages in four levels based on 
the work of Givens (1982; also see Appendix G, pp. G-17 and G-36): 


Level I: Rudimentary Information. The site itself and its 
component parts would announce "Something made by humans is here." 
The most important property of a Level-I sign is its own 
existence. "Human made" would be suggested by the patterned 
shape--the unnatural syntax and negative entropy--of the 
earthwork, rock structures and inscriptions. 


Level II: Cautionary Information. Elementary linguistic scripts 
and pictographic narratives would convey: "Warning, dangerous 
materials are buried below." 


Level TIT: Basic Information. Level III messages, including 
longer linguistic narratives, pictographic sequences, maps and 
simple diagrams would explain basic what, why, when, where, who 
and how information about the site. 


3-8 


3.2 Team B 


Level IV: Complex Information. Highly detailed written records, 
scientific data and diagrams would be available at the site in 
inscriptions and buried “time capsules." 


Team B has delineated the ways in which messages about the WIPP should be 
conveyed to future societies. The first message medium is through written 
language. The languages used for these messages would be the main written 
languages in use today (such as English, Spanish, German, Russian, Japanese, 
and Chinese), liturgical languages (such as Latin, Hebrew, and Arabic), and 
the languages of the Native Americans in the area (such as Navajo, Hopi, and 
Mescalero Apache). Language would be expected to communicate both the basic 
and complex information about the WIPP. Scientific diagrams would be used to 
communicate some of the more complex information about the elements buried at 
the WIPP (the periodic table), the elapsed time since the WIPP was closed (a 
diagram showing the 26,000-year precession of the stars in the sky), or the 
stratigraphy of the area (a model that uses samples of materials from the 
formations between the surface and the repository arranged in the proper 
order and scale to indicate what would be encountered during a potential 
intrusion). Pictographs would be used to communicate information about how 
the WIPP was constructed, how far underground the waste is buried, the 
activities that should not be undertaken in the area, and what might happen 
if the waste is disturbed. Some sort of radioactive symbol might be used in 
text and on the marker elements to make the connection between radioactivity 
and what is buried in the repository. 


3.2.4 Marker System Components 


The marker-system components recommended by Team B will be discussed in 
the sequence they would be encountered by a visitor ‘approaching the area. 
Team B believed that by the mere existence of a marker system and by 
observing the effort that went into creating it, a future society would 
realize that this was something important (markers are there for a purpose) 
and worth saving. The largest, outermost component, the berms (earthworks), 
are encountered first (Appendix G, Figs. 1 and 2). The berms define the 
marked area above the waste panels, but do not completely cover the area 
above the waste panels. If an international symbol has been developed by the 
time the marker system is implemented, the berms could be in that shape. To 
last for the 10,000-year period of regulatory concern, the berms must be 
massive (to withstand human and natural forces), on the order of 30-ft-high, 
constructed of local earth and caliche. The berms would be spiked with 
materials with properties anomalous to the naturally occurring ones (e.g., 
"different dielectric, radar reflective, and magnetic properties") for 
detection by aircraft or satellite equipment. Because the berms outline the 
area above the waste panels, the hot cell of the WIPP buildings, which Team B 
recommended be left in place, is located outside the berms. 


3-9 


3. Recommended Design Characteristics 


Within the outline of the berms, granite monoliths (specific number to be- 
a power of two for easier reconstruction) would be erected in a circular 
pattern. They would be large in size to withstand natural erosion and to 
deter the removal by humans. The monoliths themselves would be of two types: 
taller, narrower ones (25-ft-high by 10-ft-wide) designed not to be buried by 
blowing, accumulating sand; and shorter, wider ones (10-ft-high by 20-ft- 
wide) "difficult to topple or decapitate." Even the accumulation of sand 
around monoliths will still mark the area. The monoliths would be inscribed 
on "protected surfaces" (physically protected from erosion by sand and/or 
water) with warning messages in the languages discussed previously. 
Inscribed monoliths also would be buried within the earthworks for future 
discovery, and granite plugs would be placed in one or more of the shafts 
originally leading to the repository level and in off-site archives. The 
importance of placing markers in the shafts is based on the belief that 
future societies would be able to determine where the shafts were located 
because of anomalies in the materials and/or densities of the shaft 
materials. 


Also salted in the earthworks and in the area within the earthworks would 
be "time capsules" (6-in. to 2-ft in diameter) buried deep enough not to be 
discovered initially by souvenir hunters; the capsules would be placed to be 
found by those beginning to intrude upon the site--e.g., by archaeologists 
--or as the earthworks erode. These "time capsules" (clay, ceramics, glass, 
or sintered alumina) would have information inscribed on the outside. 
Samples of wood might be included to allow a future society to date the 
marker activities through carbon-14 dating. 


In the center of the marker system would be a granite structure (20-ft by 
30-ft) containing the most complex information about the time of the 
placement of the waste, location, and dangers of the waste. This information 
(conveyed through the use of language, pictographs [Appendix G, Figs. 5 
through 15], and diagrams) would be inscribed on protected, flat exposed 
surfaces of the structure. Specific examples include a world map of all 
known nuclear waste sites at the time of marker emplacement, the periodic 
table of the elements indicating the radioactive elements contained in the 
repository, and a diagram showing the precessional cycle of the earth in 
relation to the time of burial and the time of the reading (Appendix G, Figs. 
15 and 16), In addition, models containing samples of the various layers of 
materials that would be encountered while drilling through the material 
overlying the waste ‘panels, including the relative location of the shafts and 
waste panels, would be available both at the site and in other locations 
(Appendix G, Fig. 4). 


3-10 


4. PRINCIPLES OF MARKING 


The purposes of marking a nuclear-waste disposal site are to inform 
future generations of the site’s location and to warn of the hazards 
associated with the nuclear waste buried at the location. To achieve these 
purposes, certain principles should be followed in the design of the markers 
and the development of the messages to maximize the time over -which the 
markers will physically survive with the messages intact and to maximize the 
interpretability of the messages in view of the potential variety of cultural 
changes that can occur. The subject areas where these principles need to be 
identified are architecture, linguistics, material properties, and message 
levels, and were drawn from the design characteristics developed by Team A 
and Team B. The goals and principles of each subject area are described in 
this chapter. Table 4-1 is a summary of these design principles. 


4.1 Architectural-Design Principles 


The principles that need to be included in the design of markers depend 
on the goals of the markers. These goals are the definition of an area that 
future generations should avoid disturbing and the definition of this area 
extending for as reasonably far into the future as possible given the 
resource limitations of any disposal program. 


A single monument defines a spot and is therefore not an adequate 
approach to marking a disposal location. In order to define an area that 
future generations should avoid, a single, large marker covering the area of 
concern or a system of individual monuments or elements of a marker in a 
pattern surrounding the area should be used. Either marker size, monument, 
or marker-element pattern can convey to future generations that the structure 
is not a natural feature. When using a system of marker elements, the sense 
of an area can be conveyed by a design of structural continuity (e.g., other 
parts of the marker system or component can be seen from any other location 
or marker element). Continuity of design allows the recognition of patterns 
in the marker component(s) or element(s) even with part of the component or 
element removed, destroyed, or damaged. 


To assure longevity, several principles should be used to guide the 
design of the markers and/or monuments. The design should assure structural 
stability and durability. Structural stability refers to the marker 
component or element being able to withstand natural processes and events and 
retain the original orientation and position. Examples of the types of 
potential disruptions are winds associated with intense storms and seismic 
ground motion caused by earthquakes. Stability can be enhanced by designing 
the components and elements to be massive with low centers of gravity or to 


4-1 


4. Principles of Marking 


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Table 4-1. Marker System Components (continued) 


Team A 


Less emphasis on pictographs 


Team B 
Linguistics 


Prominent role for pictographs 


Use human facial expressions (horror and sickness) 


Use several languages 
Greater reliance on sense of place 
Reliance on language 


Accurately convey the risk of intrusion 
(not an attempt to scare) 


Use low-value materials 
« local materials for berms 


« "common" rock for monoliths 
(e.g., granite) 


5 levels of messages 


Levels based on complexity of message 


Use several languages 
Purely functional area; not artistic 
Reliance on language 


Accurately convey the risk of intrusion 
(not an attempt to scare) 


Material Properties 


Use low-value materials 
¢ local materials for berms 


* "common" rocks for monoliths 
(e.g., granite) 


Messaae Levels 


4 levels of messages 


Levels based on complexity of message 


Buppeyy jo sajdiouug “y 


7-7 


Table 4-1. Marker System Components (concluded) 


Team A 


Other Message Media 


Star map and celestial marker to indicate 
time since closure 


Placement near the surface of materials with 
magnetic and electrical conductivity properties 
anomalous to those of the naturally occurring 
materials in the area 


Periodic table of the elements 


Aeolian structures 


Models of the WIPP’s surface facilities, 
stratigraphy, shafts, and waste panels 


International radiation symbol used with 
text and other media 


Other Marking Components 


Public information effort (current) 


International standard for the basic design 
features for long-term marking 


Testing for the longevity of markers and 
the interpretability of messages across 
cultures 


Off-site archives 


Team B 


Star map and celestial marker to indicate 
time since closure 


Placement near the surface of materials with 
magnetic and electrical conductivity properties 
anomalous to those of the naturally 

occurring materials in the area 


Periodic table of the elements and diagrams 
of nuclear reactions 


Models of the WIPP’s surface facilities, 
stratigraphy, shafts, and waste panels 


International biohazard symbol used with 
text and other media 


international standard for the basic design 
features for long-term marking 


Testing for the longevity of markers and 
the intepretability of messages across 
cultures 


Off-site archives (including duplicates of 
markers) 


Buppeyy jo sajdioung “y 


4.3 Material-Properties Principles 


be physically anchored to the ground. Durability generally is dependent on 
the material properties of the markers, although durability can be enhanced 
by design. For example, aerodynamic design can be used to mitigate the 
effects of wind-blown sand abrasion. 


4.2 Linguistic Principles 


The current structure of society undoubtedly will undergo changes over 
time, and these changes may be either gradual or abrupt, continuous or 
discontinuous. Changes in society can include governmental and economic 
structures, cultural values, religion, language, and level of technology. 
The linguistic goal of the marker system is to transmit a warning to future 
societies about the hazards posed by the buried nuclear waste at a particular 
disposal location regardless of these societal changes. Several principles 
should be applied to the development of this warning. 


Because languages evolve over time and can be replaced by "new" 
languages, the warning message should be kept simple for each level of 
societal development being targeted for contact. This simplicity should be 
applied to the message itself (e.g., be direct and not misleading), the 
content of the message (e.g., eliminate extraneous information), and the 
grammatical structure within the message (e.g., avoid complex sentences and 
colloquialisms) . 


Another principle to employ is redundancy. Different cultures may have 
differing capabilities for interpreting messages and the format in which the 
message is presented. To account for such differences in capability, 
redundancy should be incorporated into the message through the use of 
language, symbols, and graphics as deemed appropriate. 


Even without major changes in interpretive abilities, cultural and 
political changes may occur that can be countered through language 
redundancy. For those portions of the message conveyed by language, the use 
of more than one language may increase the likelihood that future societies 
will understand the message. 


4.3 Material-Properties Principles 


The material properties of the markers are of critical importance to the 
goal of marking a disposal location for an extended period of time. This 
time period is a significant portion of the time period of regulatory concern 
limited by the constraint of resource allocation within the overall program 
relative to the hazard posed by the waste being disposed of. Under ideal 


4-5 


we RE a ae yee a a ae Ea ann st tt no : Se ASS — ie) 


4. Principles of Marking 


conditions, the markers should be designed to survive for the entire time 
period of regulatory concern. Material properties play a major role in 
determining the physical survivability of the markers in the natural 
environment. These properties also can affect the type and longevity of the 
messages being transmitted over this time period. 


Principles that determine the suitability of material properties of the 
markers focus on the topics of durability, reactivity, and desirability. 
Durability refers to the ability of a material to withstand both current and 
projected climatic conditions. Weather-related processes include but are not 
limited to wetting and drying, freezing and thawing, and thermal expansion 
and contraction, along with wind-blown sand abrasion. Materials exposed to 
these processes should not suffer significant degradation during extended 
periods of exposure. Material properties also are important in resisting the 
effects of both individual and societal vandalism. 


The materials used for the markers should be nonreactive (inert) for the 
time frame being considered, the environmental conditions expected, and 
geologic setting at the disposal location. Reactivity refers to the chemical 
interaction between two or more materials in contact with one another. The 
reactivity concern is both between materials used to construct marker 
elements and between the markers and the local geologic material upon which 
the marker rests or is embedded or buried. With naturally occurring 
materials, the chemistry may change as climatic conditions change. For 
example, a wetter climate may result in changes in vegetative population, 
which in turn affect the chemistry of soils being developed. Interaction 
between the soils and the marker material could affect the longevity of the 
marker. 


Another factor that will play a major role in the longevity of the 
markers is the desirability of the marker material(s) for use by future 
societies. The material properties of the marker material(s) should be 
selected to minimize the potential resource value for reprocessing or 
recycling. 


4.4 Message-Level Principles 


As was the case for linguistics, future societal changes also are likely 
to affect the type of message that can be interpreted. Scientifically and 
technologically advanced societies may be more inquisitive than substantially 
less developed societies and require more information to satisfy their 
curiosity. For one type of society, a simple warning of danger may be 
sufficient to deter intrusion, whereas another society may require an 
explanation of why the area is dangerous before intrusion is deterred. 


4-6 


4.4 Message-Level Principles 


Because of the possible diversity of future societies and their differing 
abilities to decipher messages and their differing incentives for heeding the 
messages, more than one message level should be used to convey the warning 
about a waste-disposal location. The contents of these messages should be 
based on the principles of redundancy and complexity. 


Redundancy assures that each message level conveys a similar warning 
about the potential hazards of the location. Level of complexity targets 
variously scientifically and technologically developed societies based on 
their estimated ability to decipher a message. Whereas linguistic redundancy 
repeats the same specific message at a particular level of complexity in 
different languages, message-level redundancy repeats the same basic message 
at different degrees of complexity. The number of message levels and the 
degree of message complexity in each level depends on the spectrum of 
development of future societies that are expected to pose an intrusion threat 
to the disposal facility. 


4-7 


5. PROBABILITY ELICITATION 


The elicitation of probabilities of the efficacy of proposed marker 
designs was accomplished in.formal sessions during which the experts were 
assisted in representing their beliefs as probabilities. The sessions took 
place in Albuquerque, New Mexico, January 13 and 14, 1992. The probability 
elicitation sessions were held on the second day of a two day meeting. 
During the first day, the teams made presentations of design characteristics 
and discussed marker systems. This agenda allowed the sharing of information 
and ideas between the expert teams. 


On the second day of the meeting, each team worked with a normative 
specialist, an individual familiar with decision analysis, to encode judgment 
probabilities. Professor Ravinder (University of New Mexico) and Timothy 
Wheeler (SNL, Dept. 6641) were the normative specialists for this study, for 
Team B and Team A respectively, and worked under the direction of Professor 
Stephen Hora (University of Hawaii). In each session, a member of the WIPP 
Performance Assessment staff (Kathleen Trauth [6342] for Team A and Robert 
Guzowski [Science Applications International Corporation] for Team B) was 
present to assist by clarifying issues as required. 


Members of the Nuclear Energy Agency Working Group on Human Intrusion, 
who were meeting simultaneously in Albuquerque, attended both the first day's 
presentations and the elicitation session for Team A. 


The teams were asked to consider two questions: (1) durability of the 
marker system and (2) interpretability of the marker system. The marker 
system used as a basis for making judgments was the marker system presented 
the day before by the respective team. Although the original intent of the 
elicitation session was to obtain probabilistic assessments for each 
component in the marker system, the complexity and interdependency among the 
components of the system thwarted this goal. 


5.1 Persistence of Markers 


Markers Team A members addressed the probabilities of markers continuing 
to exist on an individual basis so that six individual assessments were 
given. Assessments were provided assuming three different levels of societal 
technology--high, medium or current day, and low at five points in time--200, 
500, 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 years after closure. Table 5-1 contains the 
probabilities of the marker system (as defined in the report by Team A) 
continuing to exist at the given epoch, conditional on a dominant state of 
technology. 


5-1 


5. Probability Elicitation 


Table 5-1. Probabilities of the Marker System Persisting - Team A 


Years After Closure 
Dominant 
Expert Technology 200 500 1,000 5,000 10,000 
High .99 98 95 75 50 
Ast Medium -99 .98 .95 75 -60 
Low .99 .98 .95 75 .60 
High .99 .98 .95 .70 50 
Brill Medium .99 .98 95 -70 .50 
Low -99 .98 .95 .85 .80 
High .99 .98 .90 85 .70 
Goodenough Medium .99 .98 95 .90 75 
Low -99 .98 .98 95 .80 
High .95-.99 .95-.99 .90-.95 .80 .70 
Kaplan Medium .95-.99 .95-.99 .90-.95 .80 .70 
Low .95-.99 .95-.99 .90-.95 .90 85 
High 90 85 .70 .65 60 
Newmeyer Medium 95 90 85 80 60 
Low 95 90 85 85 65 
High .90 85 .80 70 50 
Sullivan Medium 95 .90 85 80 .70 


Low 95 90 85 80 70 


During the probability assessments, the members of Team A made the 
following observations: 


At some point in the future, a high technology society may be able to 
remove the entire WIPP or may decide to remove the markers. During the early 
time periods, the distinction between the levels of technology is not as 
great as during later periods simply because the differences have not had 
time to develop. 


In contrast, Team B provided consensus probabilities at three points in 
time--500, 2,000, and 10,000 years after closure. Table 5-2 contains these 
consensus probabilities for the three levels of technology. 


5.2 Interpretability of Messages 
The second question addressed by the teams of experts is whether, given 


that the markers are extant, the message will be interpreted correctly by the 
potential intruders. This question was asked conditionally for several time 


5.2 Interpretability of Messages 


Table 5-2. Consensus Probabilities of the Marker System Persisting - Team B 


Years After Closure 
Dominant 
Technology 500 2,000 10,000 
High 90 85 85 
Medium .90 .80 .60 
Low .90 .70 .40 


periods, for the three levels of technology (higher than current levels, at 
current levels, or lower than current levels), and for six modes of 
intrusion--drilling for water, mineral exploration, drilling to create 
injection wells, archaeological investigation, and other scientific 
investigation. 


Because of the motivations for potential intrusions and the individuals 
expected to be involved, both Team A and Team B tended to group archaeology 
and scientific exploration together, and to group together mineral 
exploration, and drilling wells for water supply or waste disposal. In 
general (across time periods and levels of technology), individuals involved 
in potential intrusions for archaeological and other scientific purposes were 
estimated as having greater likelihoods of correctly interpreting the warning 
information at the WIPP than those individuals involved in mineral 
exploration or drilling wells for water supply or waste disposal. 
Archaeologists and other scientists might be expected to have access to 
local, regional, and international information sources that could provide 
additional information about the WIPP. Within the Team A judgments, 
distinctions were sometimes made among mineral exploration, drilling wells 
for water supply, and drilling wells for waste disposal because of judgments 
about whether the activities were local efforts or represented a large 
societal effort. Individuals involved with those activities believed to 
require a larger, more organized effort were judged to have a higher 
probability of correctly interpreting the messages because of the greater 
access to information. 


The probability that the marker system will deter the potential intruders 
has been assessed as a function of time, the state of technology and the mode 
of intrusion. Tables 5-3 through 5-7 give the probability of correct 
interpretation for each of the five modes of intrusion. The first six lines 
in each table give the correct interpretation probability for the experts of 
Team A while the seventh line is the consensus probability for Team B. 


7-G 


Table 5-3. Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Drilling for Water as Mode of Intrusion 


200 Years 500 Years 1,000 Years 5,000 Years 10,000 Years 
Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = 
Expert Hi! M L H M L H M L H M L H M L 

Ast .99 .98 .98 .98 .95 .60 .95 85 .20 .90 10 .05 .90 .05 01 
Brill .99 .99 95 .95 .95 .90 .95 95 .70 95 95 .60 95 95 50 
Goodenough .99 .99 .99 95 .95 70 .90 .90 50 .65 .60 15 .50 .40 02 
Kaplan .99 .98 95 .98 .90 .70 95 .85 .60 .80 .70 .40 75 -50 01 
Newmeyer .99 .99 .90 .90 .85 .80 .80 70 50 .70 .60 A0 50 30 .20 
Sullivan .95 .95 .80 .90 .90 .60 85 .85 .40 .70 70 .10 -40 .40 01 

500 Years 2000 Years 10,000 Years 
Team B 90 .90 .80 90 85 70 .99 .80 30 


1The levels of technology being more advanced than today (H), similar to today’s level (M), and less advanced than today (L). 


uoneyony Ayiqeqold “S 


Table 5-4. Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Mineral Exploration as Mode of Intrusion 


200 Years 500 Years 1,000 Years 5,000 Years 10,000 Years 
Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = 
Expert H1 M L H M L H M L H M L H M L 

Ast .99 .99 .98 .98 .95 .70 .95 .90 50 .90 .20 .10 90 .20 .05 
Brill .99 .99 .95 .95 .95 -90 .95 95 .70 .95 .95 .60 95 .95 .50 
Goodenough .99 .99 .99 .95 .95 -70 .90 .90 .50 .65 .60 .15 .50 .40 .02 
Kaplan .99 .98 .95 .98 .90 - .70 .97 .85 .65 95 .80 .50 .90 75 .02 
Newmeyer .99 .99 -90 .90 .85 .80 .80 .70 .50 .70 .60 .40 50 .30 .20 
Sullivan .95 95 .80 .90 .90 .60 .85 85 .40 70 .70 .10 .40 .40 01 

500 Years 2000 Years 10,000 Years 
Team B .90 .90 .80 -90 .85 .70 .99 .80 .30 


1The levels of technology being more advanced than today (H), similar to today’s level (M), and less advanced than today (L). 


sabessay jo Ayjiqejesdseyy] z's 


9-S 


Table 5-5. Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Drilling for Disposal Wells as Mode of Intrusion 


200 Years 500 Years 1,000 Years 5,000 Years 10,000 Years 
Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = 
Expert | H1 M L H M L H M L H M L H M L 

Ast .99 .98 .98 .98 95 .60 95 85 .20 .90 10 .05 .90 .05 01 
Brill .99 .99 95 .95 .95 .90 95 .95 .70 .95 .95 .60 .95 95 : 50 
Goodenough .99 99 .99 95 95 .70 .90 90 50 .65 .60 15 50 40 .02 
Kaplan .99 .98 95 .98 .90 .70 97 85 .65 .95 .80 .50 .90 75 .02 
Newmeyer .99 .99 .90 .90 .85 .80 80 .70 50 .70 .60 .40 .50 30 .20 
Sullivan .95 .95 .80 .90 .90 .60 85 85 .40 70 .70 .10 .40 .40 01 

500 Years 2,000 Years 10,000 Years 
Team B .90 .90 80 .90 85 70 99 .80 .30 


1The levels of technology being more advanced than today (H), similar to today’s level (M), and less advanced than today (L). 


uoReHOIEY Aiqeqoly °S 


L-S 


Table 5-6. Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Archaeological Investigation as Mode of Intrusion 


200 Years 500 Years 1,000 Years 5,000 Years 10,000 Years 
Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = 
Expert i= le CHGS Hinman Wh. ete Mente | fhe aii alae 

Ast .9999 .9999 .99 .9999 .9999 98  .999 .98 95 .98 95 50 -90 70 .40 
Brill .999 -999 .99 .999 .99 .95 .99 .97 .87 .99 .96 .75 -99 .95 .60 
Goodenough .99 .99 95 .99 -99 -80 .98 .98 .60 .90 .90 .40 .90 .80 .20 
Kaplan .99 .99 .99 .99 .99 95 .95 95 .70 95 .90 .60 -90 75 10 
Newmeyer .99 .99 .90 .95 -90 75 .85 .85 .40 .70 .60 .20 .60 .20 10 
Sullivan .99 .99 .90 .97 .97 70 -90 .90 .60 .80 80 .20 -60 .60 .03 

500 Years 2,000 Years 10,000 Years 
Team B .99 .99 .90 .99 .95 85 -99 .90 45 


|The levels of technology being more advanced than today (H), similar to today’s level (M), and less advanced than today (L). 


sabessoyy jo Ayyiqeyeidiayuy 7's 


Table 5-7. Probability of Correct Interpretation of Message--Scientific Investigation as Mode of Intrusion 


200 Years 500 Years 1,000 Years 5,000 Years 10,000 Years 
Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = Technology = 
Expert H1 M L H M L H M L H M L H M Ls 

Ast .9999 .9999 99° .9999 .9999 98 .999 .98 95 .98 95 50 -90 .70 .40 
Brill .999 .999 .99 .999 .99 .95 .99 .97 .87 .99 .96 75 .99 .95 .60 
Goodenough  .99 .99 95 .99 .99 .70 .98 .98 .60 .90 .90 30 .90 .80 10 
Kaplan -99 .99 .99 .99 .99 .95 .95 95 70 .90 85 50 75 .50 .05 
Newmeyer .99 .99 .90 .95 .90 PY 43) 85 85 .40 70 .60 .20 .60 .20 10 
Sullivan .99 .99 .90 97 .97 .70 .90 .90 .60 .80 .80 .20 .60 .60 .03 

500 Years 2,000 Years 10,000 Years 
Team B “99 0=—t«C<«“ti(iaHSs—‘i‘t‘O”*~tCtH!!!CCUO!CTTC« 


iThe levels of technology being more advanced than today (H), similar to today’s level (M), and less advanced than today (L). 


voneyorsy Aiqeqoig ‘S 


5.3 Conclusions and Implementation 


5.3 Conclusions and Implementation 


As the teams worked to develop a system of markers for the WIPP, they 
identified a number of fundamental principles that guided their work and that 
should guide future marker panel development efforts. These fundamental 
principles began with the moral imperative to mark the WIPP (in agreement 
with the mandated use of markers at a disposal site in 40 CFR Part 191, 
Subpart B) and to be truthful in the messages rather than attempting to 
frighten or mislead future societies. The teams also identified the need for 
multiple levels of messages (corresponding to the complexity of the 
information) on multiple types of markers, the importance of linking the 
markers to off-site archives, and the necessity of using materials of little 
intrinsic value that would be difficult to recycle. 


The two teams agreed and disagreed in different aspects of marker-system 
design and thus produced the desired diversity in potential designs. - Both 
teams recommended the use of earthen berms, stone markers, small buried 
message markers, message chambers, and markers connected to outside archives 
in their designs. The disagreement between the teams centered on whether to 
attempt to use the principle of human archetypes in communicating through the 
marker system (communicating through the feeling evoked by the markers) or 
whether to develop a marker system that communicates purely through the 
construction and arrangement of the markers and the messages on the markers. 


All the probability sets show a high probability (85% or greater) that 
markers will persist in a recognizable form for 500 years after closure of 
the WIPP, with many of the estimates in the 95-99% range. With time, the 
estimates of marker persistence decrease for all three levels of the dominant 
technology. By 10,000 years, estimates of marker persistence range from 40% 
probability to 85% probability, with most of the estimates in the 60-70% 
range. 


The probability of correct interpretation varies with time and with the 
mode of intrusion, with high probabilities (90-99%) in the earlier (up to 
500) years and for high technology. By 10,000 years, the probabilities of 
correct interpretation have decreased, particularly for a society with a low 
level of technology. 


The high probabilities of both persistence and interpretability in the 
first 500 years after closure of the WIPP would provide the greatest 
protection during the period of continued petroleum exploration and 
extraction, As stated in Chapter 1, the Boston Team and the Washington B 
Team of the Futures Panel believed that resource exploration and extraction 
in the WIPP area would cease within 300-500 years after closure. 


5-9 


5. Probability Elicitation 


The estimates of marker persistence and interpretability from the Markers 
Panel will be used with the estimates of intrusion rates for various modes of 
intrusion from the Futures Panel to provide input on inadvertent human 
intrusion for performance assessments performed by the WIPP PA Department. 


The estimates provided by the panel members show their belief that a 
marker system can be designed and constructed to persist and to communicate 
the location and dangers of the wastes buried in the repository far into the 
10,000 year period of regulatory concern. Further study in some of the areas 
outlined in this report will be necessary prior to the final design and 
construction of the marker system. These topics include (1) physical 
properties--durability of marker materials under current conditions at the 
WIPP, mechanism of attaching or inscribing messages, and the interaction of 
wind/sand/water with marker materials and configurations; (2) interpretation 
of graphic or pictorial messages that are independent of culture; and 
(3) interpretation of written messages that are independent of culture. The 
implementation of the test results and the Panel recommendations in the 
actual design and construction of the marker system will ensure that the 
system is as durable as possible and as effective as possible in 
communicating the appropriate messages. 


5-10 


6. REFERENCES 


Bertram-Howery, S.G., and R.L. Hunter. 1989. Plans for Evaluation of the 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with EPA Standards for Radioactive 
Waste Management and Disposal. SAND88-2871. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia 
National Laboratories. 


Bonano, E.J., S.C. Hora, R.L. Keeney, and D. von Winterfeldt. 1990. 
Elicitation and Use of Expert Judgment in Performance Assessment for High- 


Level Radioactive Waste Repositories. NUREG/CR-5411, SAND89-1821. 
Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. 


EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute). 1986. Seismic Hazard Methodology 
for the Central and Eastern United States. Volume 1, Part 2: Methodology. 
EPRI NP-4726. Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute. 


Givens, D.B. 1982. "From Here to Eternity: Communicating with the Distant 
Future," Et cetera. Vol. 39, no. 2, 159-179, 


Guzowski, R.V. 1990. Preliminary Identification of Scenarios That May 
Affect the Escape and Transport of Radionuclides From the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant, Southeastern New Mexico. SAND89-7149. Albuquerque, NM: 
Sandia National Laboratories. 


Hora, S.C., D. von Winterfeldt, and K.M. Trauth. 1991. Expert Judgment on 
Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. 
SAND90-3063. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. 


Lappin, A.R. 1988. Summary of Site-Characterization Studies Conducted From 
1983 Through 1987 at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site, 
Southeastern New Mexico. SAND88-0157. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National 
Laboratories. 


Marietta, M.G., S.G. Bertram-Howery, D.R. Anderson, K.F. Brinster, R.V. 
Guzowski, H. Iuzgzolino, and R.P. Rechard. 1989. Performance Assessment 
Methodology Demonstration: Methodology Development for Evaluating 
Compliance with EPA 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart B, for the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant. SAND89-2027. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. 


Public Law °96-164. 1979. Department of Energy National Security and 
Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980. 


6-1 


References 


Public Law 102-579. 1992. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act. 


Rechard, R.P. 1989. Review and Discussion of Code Linkage and Data Flow in 
Nuclear Waste Compliance Assessments. SAND87-2833. Albuquerque, NM: 
Sandia National Laboratories. , 


Rechard, R.P., K.M. Trauth, and R.V. Guzowski. 1992. Quality Assurance 
Procedures for Parameter Selection and Use of Expert Judgment Panels 
Supporting Performance Assessments of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. 
SAND91-0429. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. 


U.S. DOE (Department of Energy). 1980. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety 
Analysis Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. Vols. 1-5. 


U.S. DOE (Department of Energy) and the State of New Mexico. 1981, as 
modified. "Agreement for Consultation and Cooperation" on WIPP by the 
State of New Mexico and .U.S. Department of Energy, modified 11/30/84 and 
8/4/87. 


U.S. EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). 1985. "Environmental Standards 
for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and 
Transuranic Radioactive Wastes: Final Rule, 40 CFR Part 191," Federal 
Register. Vol. 50, no. 182, 38066-38089. 


U.S. NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1990. Severe Accident Risks: An 
Assessment of Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants. Final Summary Report. 
NUREG-1150. Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Vol. 1. 


Waste Management Technology Department. 1987. The Scientific Program at the 
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. SAND85-1699. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia 
National Laboratories. 


Weart, W.D., S.G. Bertram-Howery, R.V. Guzowski, K.F. Brinster, P.N. Swift, 
and $.B. Pasztor. 1991. Background Information Presented to the Expert 
Panel on Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. 
Eds. R.V. Guzowski and M.M. Gruebel. SAND91-0928. Albuquerque, NM: 
Sandia National Laboratories. 


6-2 


APPENDIX A: ISSUE STATEMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKERS TO 
DETER INADVERTENT HUMAN INTRUSION INTO THE WASTE 
ISOLATION PILOT PLANT 


APPENDIX A: ISSUE STATEMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKERS TO 
DETER INADVERTENT HUMAN INTRUSION INTO THE WASTE 
ISOLATION PILOT PLANT 


THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKERS TO DETER INADVERTENT HUMAN 
INTRUSION INTO THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT 


ISSUE STATEMENT 


The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) could become an underground disposal 
system for wastes contaminated with transuranic (heavier than uranium) 
radionuclides from defense activities. The WIPP is located in southeastern 
New Mexico, near Carlsbad, in bedded salt 2150 ft. beneath the earth's 
surface. Experts will consider passive markers for deterring inadvertent 
human intrusion, defining characteristics for selecting and manufacturing 
markers to be placed at the WIPP, and judging the performance of these 
markers over a 10,000 year period. A marker is something interpretable by 
the human mind that bears an explicit or implicit message. After 
installation, passive markers should remain operational without further 
human attention. 


The current interpretation of the Standard (40 CFR Part 191) is that the 
characteristics should be designed so that during the ten thousand year 
performance period, the markers and their message(s) will have a high 
probability of warning potential intruders of the dangers associated with 
the transuranic wastes held within the repository, as well as their 
location. A system of several types of markers is an acceptable response 
to this issue statement. 


Once the marker characteristics have been defined, the likely future 
performance of these markers as deterrents to various kinds of intrusions 
will be judged. Such judgments are dependent upon the possible future 
states of society and on the physical changes that the region surrounding 
the WIPP could undergo. The teams of experts who have studied these 
futures as part of this project have identified various plausible futures 
including the possible characteristics of future societies, the potential 
modes of inadvertent intrusion, and the frequencies of these inadvertent 
intrusions. In order to provide deterrence, the markers must be’ 
recognized, their meaning correctly interpreted, and they must elicit the 
desired action from potential intruders. 


The specific questions that the experts are asked to address follow. These 
questions are related to design considerations, performance of individual 
markers, and performance of the entire system. 


Marker Design Characteristics 


Address each of the following, considering the collection of futures 
presented by the group identifying future societies and possible modes of , 
inadvertent human intrusion. 


1. What markers should be used to mark the WIPP disposal system? This 
question asks for a general description of the marker system. The details 
of the markers are asked for in the ensuing questions. Note that the 
system may consist of more than one type of marker. 


Appendix A: Issue Statement for the Development of Markers to Deter 
Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 


Marker Characteristics 


For each of the markers described in the answer to question 1, consider: 


2. The physical description of the markers including size, location, 
shape, and materials. 


3. The messages upon or in the markers and the method of conveying the 
messages. 


Performance of the System of Markers 


The impact of markers in deterring inadvertent intrusion may not be 
independent. Nonetheless, an evaluation of the performance of individual 
markers could be useful to future decision makers in selecting markers if 
the entire system cannot be put in place, and in selecting between the 
markers recommended by the two teams. 


For each of the major modes of intrusion: 


4, Judge the likelihood (as’a function of time) that each marker has 
persisted to the extent that it is recognizable as such and its message is 
apparent. 


5. Given that a marker has survived, what is the likelihood that each 
civilization engaging in each specific potential intrusion will recognize 
the message and correctly interpret that message. 


6. Given that the marker has survived and that the message has been 
correctly interpreted, what is the likelihood that the civilization 
engaging in each specific potential intrusion will take appropriate action 
given the message. 


Finally, for the system of markers: 


7. For the system of markers described above, judge the likelihood that 
the system persists (as in question 4), the message is correctly 
interpreted (as in question 5), and intrusion is deterred (as in question 
6). 


Questions 5, 6, and, in part, 7 require assessments of how future societies 
will comprehend the markers and their messages. Because the 
characteristics of these future societies are very uncertain, you are asked 
to respond to these questions taking into account a wide range of future 
societies. If this task is too difficult, assessments may be made for 
several representative societies. For example, societies that are more 
advanced and less advanced than our society and societies that are similar 
to present day society may be considered. If assessments conditional on 
various societies are made, it will be necessary to provide the likelihoods 
of the various societies. Guidance in assigning the probabilities of the 
various societies can be found in the report from the Future Intrusion 
Panel in the form of the societies and probabilities they developed and 
their rationale. The probabilities cannot be obtained directly from this 
study, however, because each team provided alternative interpretations of 
the various future societies. 


The work of the Futures Intrusion Panel highlighted a number of modes of 
inadvertent human intrusion for which markers at the WIPP may provide 
deterrence. They fall into the two general categories of boreholes and 


A-4 


Appendix A: Issue Statement for the Development of Markers to Deter 
Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 


excavations. In the first category, the boreholes may be drilled for 
hydrocarbon exploration and extraction, water wells, or waste injection. 
In the second category, there may be archaeological excavations or other 
scientific excavations. Within an excavation project, it is conceivable 
that there may also be drilling activities. Depending on the particular 
use of the borehole or excavation, there may be different motivations for 
intruding and perhaps different numbers of intrusions. The Panel is free 
to address deterrence for each type of intrusion separately or for a 
category. 


As the above questions are asked as a function of time, it is convenient to 
divide the entire 10,000 year time period into the near, medium, and far 
futures. Specifically, you are asked to consider 0 to 500 years, 500 to 
2,000 years, and 2,000 to 10,000 years. The near future represents the 
general time period during which society might still be based on 
hydrocarbon usage (as discussed in some of the Future Intrusion Panel team 
reports). The medium future represents a period during which markers might 
be more likely to survive and be interpretable. The far future represents 
a period when there may be a lower probability that markers will survive 


and be interpretable. 


Framework for the Expert Judgments 


The work of the Marker Development Panel is part of a staged process to 
develop markers for the WIPP. It is therefore necessary for the Panel to 
work within the confines of the work done previously and the performance 
assessment requirements. 


Marker Design Characteristics 


The Panel is free to recommend a "no marker" strategy or any other 
marking strategy. 


If a "no marker" strategy is recommended, the Panel must still 
recommend the best system of markers as the current Standard (40 CFR 
Part 191) states that markers will be used. 


Performance of the System of Markers 


The results must be applicable to the modes and probabilities of 
intrusion developed by the Future Intrusion Panel. 


Additional future societies, modes of intrusion, and probabilities of 
intrusion that a team wishes to develop for consideration in the design 
eriteria and effectiveness judgments should be contained in the team 
report. These three items, as well as the effectiveness of the markers 
in deterring these intrusions can be elicited, if necessary, at the 
second meeting of the Marker Development Panel. 


Communication of Findings 


We ask that each team provide responses to the above questions and the 
rationales supporting these responses. The responses should be in the form 
of a draft report that includes a description of the recommended marker 
system, and factors that would impact the effectiveness of various markers 
in deterring various types of intrusions, as well as the assumptions, 
methods, rationales, and other information used to reach these conclusions. 
The draft report should be finalized after the second meeting, after the 


Appendix A: Issue Statement for the Development of Markers to Deter 
Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 


judgments have been elicited, and there has been interaction between the 
two teams. 


The assessment of the probabilities of: 1) existence, 2) interpretation, 
and 3) deterrence, as well as possible modification of the design criteria 
will take place during the second meeting of the teams. Each team of 
experts is expected to make a presentation of their findings to the other 
team and the project staff. Similarly, while the teams are asked to 
develop/identify factors influencing marker effectiveness, the assessment 
of probabilities will be accomplished during the second meeting. This is 
not to say that the expert participants should not give deep and careful 
consideration to the assignment of these probabilities, however. The 
intention here is to preclude the fixing of positions until after an 
exchange of ideas takes place between the two teams. Further, it is 
desired that the actual assessment of probabilities be done in conjunction 
with the decision analysts participating in this project. 


The probability assessments of the experts will be documented and 
processed, and returned to the experts for comment and review. Following 
concurrence by the experts, the results will be summarized and conveyed to 
the DOE and the WIPP performance assessment team for inclusion in the 
performance calculations of the WIPP system. 


A-6 


APPENDIX B: LETTER REQUESTING NOMINATIONS 


fee aren 


APPENDIX B: LETTER REQUESTING NOMINATIONS 


Sandia National Laboratories 


Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 


- July 24, 1990 


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Dear <ti> <In>: 


The safe disposal of nuclear waste is one of the most pressing issues facing 
the United States today. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in 
New Mexico, is to be the first of this nation’s nuclear waste repositories. 
The geologic and hydrologic properties of the site indicate that the WIPP 
system will serve as an effective repository, if left undisturbed. Inadvertent 
human intrusion, however, might result in radioactive releases to the 
biosphere. Preventing such intrusion through the development and 
implementation of a passive marker system that will deter inadvertent 
human intrusion into the repository is essential for assessing the 
performance of the site. We seek your assistance in nominating persons to 
participate in the identification of characteristics for selecting and 
manufacturing markers to be placed at the WIPP site. Participants in this 
study will identify the possible physical as erties of markers (both 
composition and placement), as well as the form and content of the 
messages such markers should carry. If your qualifications are appropriate 
for this study, we encourage you to place your own name in nomination. 


Because the knowledge necessary to develop a marker system that will 
remain operational during the performance period of the site (10,000 years) 
can be found across many of our traditional disciplines of study, we are 
attempting to construct panels that are multidisciplinary in nature-spanning 
the fields of materials science, climatology, communications, and the social 
sciences including archaeology, anthropology, and psychology. 


Attached is a more detailed description of the tasks to be accomplished. 
While the total effort required from the various panel members may vary 
because of their backgrounds and areas of responsibility, we envision a 
commitment of about three weeks effort including two meetings to be held 
in New Mexico on October 10-12, and December 13-14, 1990. Expenses 
and an honorarium in lieu of professional fees will be provided by Sandia 
National Laboratories. 


Appendix B: Letter Requesting Nominations 


Please send your nominations to me by August 3, 1990. We request that, if 
possible, you contact suggested nominees to inform them of your 
nomination and verify their interest in participating. Your inclusion of 
complete addresses and telephone numbers (both voice and FAX if 
available) will be greatly appreciated. We will contact the nominees shortly 
thereafter and request credentials. The selection of participants will be 
based on tangible evidence of expertise, previous work in related areas, 
availability, and freedom from conflicts of interest. 


If you need additional information, please contact Mr. Dan Scott or Ms. 
Suzanne Pasztor at (505) 844-1917. If you wish, you may send your 
nominations by FAX to Mr. Scott or Ms. Pasztor at 505) 844-1723 or you - 
may mail them directly to me. 


Thank you for your assistance with this important issue. 


Sincerely, 


Dy QR Aan ene 


D. Richard Anderson 
Performance Assessment 
Division 6342 

Sandia National Laboratories 
Albuquerque, NM 87185 


Enclosure 


Appendix B: Letter Requesting Nominations 


ACQUISITION OF EXPERT JUDGMENTS FOR PASSIVE MARKERS 
TO DETER HUMAN INTRUSION INTO NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORIES 


The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is an underground storage facility for 
transuranic (heavier than uranium) radioactive wastes from military weapons 
production. The repository is located in southeastern New Mexico, near 
Carlsbad, in bedded salt approximately 2500 ft. beneath the earth’s surface. 
The goal of the expert judgment effort for passive markers to deter human 
intrusion is the creation of characteristics for selecting and manufacturing . 
markers to be placed at the WIPP site. A marker is something detectable by the 
mind that bears an explicit or implicit message. Passive markers remain 
operational without further human attention. 


Design characteristics can be implemented in various ways. For example, the 
design characteristics may specify that the markers shall be placed so that they 
delineate the surface area above the repository. Those markers located to each 
side of any one marker can be seen with the unaided eye from that marker. 
Further, the weight of the marker, or each piece of the marker, shall be great 
enough to discourage removal and the marker’s overall height (above and below 
the ground) shall not only enhance ground and aerial visibility, but ensure 
stability with respect to anticipated erosion and prevent burial due to shifting 
sands and soil. The monuments shall be made of a durable material known to 
withstand the weathering under current conditions at the WIPP site for ten 
thousand years. The material shall not have value as a resource. 


The messages on the monuments would be further described in the 
characteristics. For example, the characteristics may state that the message must 
be provided in the form of a pictograph, and in English, Chinese, and Russian. 
The contents of the message would clearly signal the presence of biohazardous 
waste in the repository. Further, the message will be inscribed to a depth 
sufficient to prevent obliteration by erosion or corrosion. 


The characteristics should be designed so that during the ten thousand year 
performance period, the markers will have a high probability of warning 
inadvertent intruders of the dangers associated with the transuranic wastes held 
within the repository. A system of several types of markers may perform better 
than a single type of marker for several reasons. First, there are events that 
may yield certain types of markers ineffective while not impairing other types 
of markers. For instance, monuments may be covered by sand dunes while 
buried magnetic markers may remain detectable. Second, some types of 
markers may be more effective for specific types of intrusions. Brilliantly 
colored layers of materials laid beneath the surface may provide a warning 
when brought to the surface by conventional drilling, but might go unnoticed 
when drilling is performed by lasers. 


The creation of characteristics for markers, then, requires the assessment of 
specific marker performance for various modes of intrusion under various 
scenarios of natural and manmade processes that may destroy or neutralize the 


Appendix B: Letter Requesting Nominations 


markers. The study of intrusion modes will be completed at an earlier stage in 
the overall project and will be provided as an input to the group working on 
characteristics for markers. The expert group may, however, develop additional 
intrusion modes. 


The expert group will formulate characteristics for passive markers to provide a 
high probability of effective warning at various times in the future. A marker 
can provide an effective warning only if: 


1, It survives. 2. It can be detected. 3. The message is perceived as a warning. 
4. The warning initiates appropriate action. 


The expert group must consider each of these aspects in developing 
characteristics. 


A presentation will be made to the group of experts on the background research 
on markers performed in predecessor studies of radioactive waste disposal. This 
review will take place in New Mexico October 10-12 of this year at a location 
to be determined. The group will be introduced to the techniques and 
procedures of probability elicitation and will undergo training in probability 
assessment. Finally, the group will be taken on a familiarization tour of the 
WIPP site which is located in Carlsbad, New Mexico. 


The experts will then be asked to spend several weeks over the following two 
month period preparing analyses using the tools and knowledge of their own 
disciplines. The group will reassemble December 13-14, 1990 to make 
presentations of their findings. Written documentation in the form of a paper or 
report will be furnished as part of the presentation. Next, the experts will be 
asked to provide probabilistic assessments of the performance of various types 
of markers. These assessments will be collected using the methods of formal 
probability elicitation. 


The probability assessments of the experts will be documented and processed 
and returned to the experts for comment and review. Following concurrence by 
the experts, the results will be summarized and conveyed to the DOE and the 
WIPP performance assessment team for inclusion in the performance calculations 
of the WIPP system. 


Expenses and an honorarium in lieu of professional fees will be paid by the 
project. 


APPENDIXC: LIST OF THOSE TO WHOM REQUESTS FOR NOMINATIONS 
WERE SENT 


APPENDIXC: LIST OF THOSE TO WHOM REQUESTS FOR NOMINATIONS 
WERE SENT 


Arun Agrawal 
Battelle Memorial Institute 
Columbus, OH 


Paul Angelis 

Secretary Treasurer 

American Association for Applied Linguistics 
Department of Linguistics 

Southern Illinois University 

Carbondale, IL 


Leonid V. Azaroff 

Director 

Institute of Materials Science 
University of Connecticut 
Storrs, CT 


John Baglin 
IBM Almaden Research Center 
San Jose, CA 


Eric Barron 
University Park, PA 


Jeffrey Beard 
Manager, Regulatory Affairs 


American Society of Civil Engineers 
Washington, DC 


Eugene Bierly 

Division of Atmospheric Sciences 
National Science Foundation 
Washington, DC 


Michael Brill 

President 

Buffalo Organization for Social and Technological Innovation 
Buffalo, NY 


Richard Brose 
Malcolm Pirnie, Inc. 
Phoenix, AZ 


Cc-3 


Appendix C: List of Those to Whom Requests for Nominations Were Sent 


Austin Chang 
Department of Materials Science and Engineering 
University of Wisconsin 


Madison, WI 


David E. Clement 
Columbia, SG 


John E. Costa 
United States Geological Survey 
Vancouver, WA 98661 


Bob Costello 
Hudson Institute 
Indianapolis, IN 


Donna Kelleher Darden 
Department of Sociology 
Eckerd College 

St. Petersburg, FL 


Leonard David 
Space Data Resources 
Washington, DC 


Frank Drake 

Lick Observatory 
University of California 
Santa Cruz, CA 


Charles Fairhurst 

Department of Civil and Mineral Engineering 
University of Minnesota 

Minneapolis, MN 


Virginia Fairweather 
Editor, Civil Engineering 
New York, NY 


Harry Farrar, IV 


Rockwell International 
Canoga Park, CA 


C-4 


Appendix C: List of Those to Whom Requests for Nominations Were Sent 


Barry Fell 
President 
Epigraphic Society 
San Diego, CA 


Ben Finney 

Department of Anthropology 
University of Hawaii 
Honolulu, HI 


Susan Gass 

English Language Center 
Michigan State University 
East Lansing, MI 


Richard L. Gay 
Rockwell International 
Canoga Park, CA 


Carol Gipp 

Project Coordinator 

National Congress of American Indians 
Washington, DC 


David Givens 
American Anthropological Association 
Washington, DC 


Thomas Greaves 
Executive Director 
Bucknell University 
Lewisburg, PA 


Ken Hadeen 
National Climatic Data Center 
Ashville, NC 


Don Hancock 
Southwest Research and Information Center 
Albuquerque, NM 


nee be as En ee Leen a Zo aces 2 cee ss, 


Appendix C: List of Those to Whom Requests for Nominations Were Sent 


J.N. Hartley 

Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory 
Environmental Management Operations 
Richland, WA 


Richard Henshel 

Department of Sociology 
University of Western Ontario 
London, Canada 


Jack Howell 

Associate Executive Director of Programs 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
New York, NY 


Paul Kay 

Secretary -Treasurer 

Society for Linguistic Anthropology 
Department of Linguistics 
University of California, Berkeley 
Berkeley, CA 


Maureen F. Kaplan 
Eastern Research Group, Inc. 
Lexington, MA 


Max Lagally 

Department of Material Science and Engineering 
University of Wisconsin 

Madison, WI 


T.G. Langdon 

Department of Materials Science 
University of Southern California 
Los Angeles, CA 


Richard Lanigan 

Speech Communications Department 
Southern Illinois University 
Carbondale, IL 


Clifford F. Lewis 
Editor, Materials Engineering 
Cleveland, OH 


Appendix C: List of Those to Whom Requests for Nominations Were Sent 


Christopher D. Lidstone 
Lidstone and Anderson, Inc. 
Fort Collins, CO 


Jon Lomberg 
Honaunau, HI 


Dean MacConnell 

Acting Executive Director 
Semiotic Society of America 
Applied Behavioral Science 
University of California, Davis 
Davis, CA 


Harris Marcus 

Director, Center for Research in Materials Science and Engineering 
University of Texas at Austin 

Austin, TX 


Tom May 

Director 

Environmental Design Research Associates 
Oklahoma City, OK 


Tom McCulloch 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
Washington, DC 


William S. Neubeck 
Feura Bush, NY 


Dennis N. Nielsen 

Dean 

College of Science and Engineering 
Winona State University 

Winona, MN 


S.J. Phillips 
Westinghouse 
Richland, WA 


Ken Pierce 


United States Geological Survey-Denver 
Denver, CO 


C-7 


Appendix C: List of Those to Whom Requests for Nominations Were Sent 


Russell Pinizzotti 
University of North Texas 
Denton, TX 


Jeffrey K. Polum 

Dean of the Graduate School 
University of Santa Cruz 
Santa Cruz, CA 


Robert Quayle 
National Climatic Data Center 
Ashville, NC 


C.C. Reeves 
Department of Geosciences 


Texas Tech University 
Lubbock, TX 


Marilyn Reeves 
League of Women Voters 
Amity, Oregon 


Richard Reisenweber 

Vice President, Environmental Control 
Rockwell International 

El Segundo, CA 


Margaret Reynolds 

Executive Director 

Linguistic Society of America 
Washington, DC 


Thomas E. Rice 
Amherst, MA 


Richard Ricker 

Corrosion Group Leader 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Gaithersburg, MD 


Reed D. Riner 
Flagstaff, AZ 


c-8 


Alex Roland 
Department of History 
Duke University 
Durham, NC 


Della M. Roy 
Materials Research Lab 
Penn State University 
University Park, PA 


Carl Sagan 

Laboratory for Planetary Studies 
Cornell University 

Ithaca, NY 


Thomas Sebeok 


Appendix C: List of Those to Whom Requests for Nominations Were Sent 


Research Center for Language and Semiotics 


Indiana University 
Bloomington, IN 


Russell G. Shepherd 
U.S. Soil Conservation Service 
Des Moines, IA 


Sally Shumaker 


National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute 


Bethesda, MD 


Robert H. Silsbee 
Clark Hall of Science 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, NY 


Joseph J. Snyder 
Executive Secretary and Editor 


American Committee to Advance the Study of Petroglyphs and Pictographs 


Sheperdstown, WV 


Percy H. Tannenbaum 
Director 
Survey Research Center 


University of California at Berkeley 


Berkeley, CA 


c-9 


Appendix C: List of Those to Whom Requests for Nominations Were Sent 


G. Richard Tucker 

President 

Center for Applied Linguistics 
Washington, DC 


William J. Wayne 
Department of Geology 
University of Nebraska 
Lincoln, NE 


Julie P. Weatherington-Rice 
Bennett and Williams, Inc. 
Worthington, OH 


Abraham Weitzberg 
NUS Corporation 
Rockville, MD 


Gerry Wendorf 

Department of Anthropology 
Southern Methodist University 
Dallas, TX 


Larry Whipple 

Managing Director for Professional Affairs 
American Society of Civil Engineers 

New York, NY 


Ray A. Williamson 

Space Policy Institute 
George Washington University 
Washington, DC 


Thomas G. Winner 
Barnet, VT 


APPENDIX D: LETTER TO NOMINEES 


D-2 


APPENDIX D: LETTER TO NOMINEES 


Sandia National Laboratories 


Albuquerque. New Mexico 87185 


July 23, 1990 


Dear 


The safe disposal of nuclear waste is one of the most pressing issues facing the United 
States today. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in New Mexico, is to be the 
first of this nation’s nuclear waste repositories. The geologic and hydrologic properties of 
the site indicate that the WIPP system will serve as an effective repository, if left 
undisturbed. Inadvertent human intrusion, however, might result in radioactive releases to 
the biosphere. Sandia National Laboratories is working on the development and 
implementation of a passive marker system to deter inadvertent human intrusion into the 
repository. 


You have been nominated to participate in a study otis by Sandia National 
Laboratories that will identify what kinds of markers should be placed at the WIPP site and 
will attempt to assess the effectiveness of such a marking system. A brief description of the 

roblem, the criteria for selecting participants from the nominees, and scheduling 
information follow. 


The knowledge necessary to develop a marker system that will remain operational during 
the performance period of the site—10,000 years—can be found across many of our 
traditional disciplines of study. For this reason, we are constructing a panel of eight to ten 
experts that is multidisciplinary in nature—spanning the fields of materials science, 
climatology, communications, and the social sciences including archaeology, anthropology, 
and psychology. Each panel member will answer questions regarding the marker system 
that directly concern his or her expertise. For example, a materials scientist will help 
identify what the markers should be made of, while a linguist will be concerned with what 
kind of inscription should go on the markers. 


Attached is a more detailed description of the tasks to be accomplished. While the total 
effort required from the various team members may vary because of their backgrounds and 
areas of responsibility, we envision a commitment of about three weeks effort including two 
meetings to be held in New Mexico: one during early fall (October 10 through 12) and 
another two months following the first meeting (December 13 and 14). Expenses and an 
honorarium in lieu of professional fees will be provided by Sandia National Laboratories. 


Appendix D: Letter to Nominees 


If you are interested in serving on this ao please send me your resume and a letter 
stating your interest by August 15, 1990. This letter should include a brief description of 
why you feel you are qualified to serve. Citing work you have accomplished that is 
germane to this study would be helpful to our selection committee. You should also show 
that you will be able to attend the required meetings and perform the assigned work 
between the two meetings. The selection of participants will be based on tangible evidence 
of expertise, curriculum vitae, previous work in related areas, availability, and freedom 
from conflicts of interest. 


If you need additional information, please contact Mr. Dan Scott or Ms. Suzanne Pasztor at 
ey) 844-1917. If you wish, you may send your letter peauesHn to serve on the study by 
to Mr. Scott or Ms. Pasztor at (505) 844-1723, or you may mail them directly to me. 


Thank you for your assistance with this important issue. 


Sincerely, 


D. Richard Anderson 
Performance Assessment 
Division 6342 

Sandia National Laboratories 
Albuquerque, NM 87185 


Enclosure 


Appendix D: Letter to Nominees 


ACQUISITION OF EXPERT JUDGMENTS FOR PASSIVE MARKERS 
TO DETER HUMAN INTRUSION INTO NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORIES 


The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is an underground storage facility for transuranic 
(heavier than uranium) radioactive wastes from military weapons production. The 
repository is located in southeastern New Mexico, near Carlsbad, in bedded salt 
approximately 2500 ft. beneath the earth’s surface. The goal of the expert judgment effort 
for passive markers to deter human intrusion is the creation of characteristics for selecting 
and manufacturing markers to be placed at the WIPP site. A marker is something 
detectable by the mind that bears an explicit or implicit message. Passive markers remain 
operational without further human attention. 


Design characteristics can be implemented in various ways. For example, the desi 
characteristics may specify that the markers shall be placed so that they delineate the 
surface area above the repository. Those markers located to each side of any one marker 
can be seer with the unaided ik from that marker. Further, the weight of the marker, or 
each piece of the marker, shall be great enough to discourage removal and the marker’s 
overall height (above and below the ground) shall not only enhance ground and aerial 
visibility, but ensure stability with respect to anticipated erosion and prevent burial due to 
shifting sands and soil. e monuments shall be made of a durable material known to 
withstand the weathering under current conditions at the WIPP site for ten thousand years. 
The material shall not have value as a resource. 


The messages on the monuments would be further described in the characteristics. For 
example, the characteristics may state that the message must be provided in the form of a 
pictograph, and in English, Chinese, and Russian. The contents of the message would 
clearly signal the presence of biohazardous waste in the repository. Further, the message 
will be inscribed to a depth sufficient to prevent obliteration by erosion or corrosion. 


‘The characteristics should be designed so that during the ten thousand year performance 
period, the markers will have a high probability of warning inadvertent intruders of the 
dangers associated with the transuranic wastes held within the Oa aah A system of 
several types of markers may perform better than a single type of marker for several 
reasons. First, there are events that may yield certain types of markers ineffective while not 
impairing other types of markers. For instance, monuments may be covered by sand dunes 
while buried magnetic markers may remain detectable. Second, some types of markers 
may be more effective for specific types of intrusions. eter aa colored layers of materials 
laid beneath the surface may provide a warning when brought to the surface by 
conventional drilling, but might go unnoticed when drilling is performed by lasers. 


The creation of characteristics for markers, then, requires the assessment of specific 
marker performance for various modes of intrusion under various scenarios of natural and 
manmade processes that may destroy or neutralize the markers. The study of intrusion 
modes will be completed at an earlier stage in the overall project and will be provided as 
an input to the group working on characteristics for markers. The expert group may, 
however, consider additional intrusion modes. : 


The expert group will formulate characteristics for passive markers to provide a high 
probability of effective warning at various times in the future. A marker can provide an 


effective warning only if: 


Appendix D: Letter to Nominees 


1. It survives. 

2. It can be detected. 

3. The message is perceived as a warning. 
4. The warning initiates appropriate action. 


The expert group must consider each of these aspects in developing characteristics. 


A presentation will be made to the Group of experts on the background research on 

markers performed in predecessor studies of radioactive waste disposal. This review will 

take place in New Mexico October 10-12 of this year in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The 

group will be introduced to the techniques and procedures of pro ent elicitation and 

will undergo wauning in probability assessment. Finally, the group will be taken on a 
iliarization tour of the P site which is located in Carlsbad, New Mexico. 


The experts will then be asked to spend several weeks over the following two month period 
preparing analyses using the tools and knowledge of their own sar erage The group will 
reassemble December 13-14, 1990 to make presentations of their findings. Written 
documentation in the form of a pepe or report will be furnished as part of the 
presentation. Next, the experts will be asked to provide probabilistic assessments of the 
performance of various types of markers. These assessments will be collected using the 
methods of formal probability elicitation. 


The probability assessments of the experts will be documented and processed and returned 
to the experts for comment and review. Following concurrence by the experts, the results 
will be summarized and conveyed to the DOE and the WIPP performance assessment team 
for inclusion in the performance calculations of the WIPP system. 


Expenses and an honorarium in lieu of professional fees will be paid by the project. 


APPENDIX E: EXPERT PANEL SELECTION CRITERIA 


APPENDIX E: EXPERT PANEL SELECTION CRITERIA 


Each member of the selection committee evaluated the nominees based on the 
following criteria: 


tangible evidence of expertise, 

professional reputation, 

availability and willingness to participate, 

understanding of the general problem area, 

impartiality, 

lack of economic or personal stake in the potential findings, 


balance among team members so that each team has the needed breadth of 
expertise, 


physical proximity to other participants so that teams can work 
effectively, 


balance among all participants so that various constituent groups are 
represented. 


APPENDIX F: TEAM A REPORT: MARKING THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT 
PLANT FOR 10,000 YEARS 


Prepared by Team A: 


Dieter G. Ast 
Michael Brill 
Ward Goodenough 
Maureen Kaplan 
Frederick Newmeyer 
~ Woodruff Sullivan 


April 1992 


F-2 


APPENDIX F: TEAM A REPORT: MARKING THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT 
PLANT FOR 10,000 YEARS 


MARKING THE WASTE 
ISOLATION PILOT PLANT 


FOR 10,000 YEARS 


Prepared by: 


Dieter G. Ast 
Michael Brill 
Ward Goodenough 
Maureen Kaplan 
Frederick Newmeyer 
Woodruff Sullivan 
[““TEAM A’’] 


April 1992 


A Report prepared for the US Department of Energy 


F-3 


Gary 
. 

a 
|| 
. 

i Al 
a 
ae 


\ 
| 
{ 
| 


F-4 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Table of Contents 
SS TEETA GINS seared tears ote lacie Be ies Opts cea So enrag tor NCAT ge COM erm ye gas a vey ena F-10 
BRC ULV ES UMIVEAR Ys cetera sean ty etch ee Ape cP chiara SPE alas IES tne AG F-11 
1. General Considerations 
1.1 Background information on marking the WIPP site .................. F-19 
V2) Charge.to the expert panel we ie oes ces hee ea eres nee oe are le F-20 
£33 -hould.the site-ne-matked? = 25 nes ce a ene ee eee a F-23 
D3 eyo IMIOTIVALIONS: TOR VIAL RANE a ecco e eet ns tern ape Oo eres tence ee eee cae F-23 
1.3.2 General Criteria for any Marking System ................... F-24 
1.4 - International aspects: of marking «2.02 aia. . es te Sin nee oe F-25 
1.5 A system approach...two major themes ......... 0... eee eee eee F-28 
156, cOn-site 4estino Of markers A454, ces wished a) ea eran Gee asa A aes oe F-30 
JOA Pe Eo) (oh be SRR tS Pra eat ate g Perak ate COON uty eta ERRAND, ge Da F-31 
2. The Problem of Message 
Dele MAVIESSADe CERI OM nama eruten tee ee eur rye tecnica Warr eer na re pea ese F-33 
227 Messave: leveleand critetia i. cele dy ats Senn che ees cee, a Oca F-34 
D2 AE MIMICSSARE EV CIS Net ety Leese ram eke, ater eee Caste enone ere eee nes F-34 
far) Aap a Gs GC Nee END ee goe gee SAS ea ae eA es Re A ne Ae a F-35 
2.3 Which message level is necessary to deter intrusion? ...............-. F-36 
2 Sako! “ActivatiossNear thesite: oo eave ts ee tig) ao Bates Oe eae F-36 
2ede2)- AGUVITIES Ab The SILC Pern otis oe ea een eas aioe eae hse Pee ee eer F-37 
DAP RELCTENICES baer ete c an Wat at lees ok Ait ae a i SP eS ee Rae eae ur ten F-37 


3. Components of a Marking System 


3.1 Communications: site and structures ........... 0.00 cc ec eee ences F-39 
3.2 General discussion: for the site as a whole and individual 
SITEESTEUICTULES ore) corset es oe ht ae ara F-39 


SF EA, eee aie Rag be gee Bn eS ER PRE Ne Ae pees spt ras eee ee ee eee ay ae ae ee 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


33 


3.4 


3.5 


4.2 


4.4 


3.2.1 The Concept of Archetypes ........ cree eee Rt cP F-40 
3.2.2 Archetypes Operating as a Natural Language ................. F-40 
3.2.3 The Medium for Expression of Place-Archetypes .............. F-41 
The appropriate use of graphics in marking ................---000- F-42 
SoBe ATHDISU IE Ya Seatac tooo a ei ea athe rat Cd eal ate any ome ya meme Ske haere F-42 
Beco, PROMOV AL aA ticer eeeee tn inran store ae es eee hen See oe eed F-43 
S257 30° > Gllltorall REStriCHOns ten ack ate eee tee BE ce ence MP ree ese F-43 
O. 37h a Universal ExXpressiGiSan. tu. cea i ee erase eee aor eed tin ie reeks F-44 
The languages to be inscribed on markers .........-.-.2.-0-022 0200s F-44 
3.4.1 The Importance of Linguistic Markings ..................-. F-44 
3.4.2. Which Languages Should be Chosen? .................-2-. F-44 
3.4.2.1 Linguistic Demography of the WIPP Site ............ F-44 
Oe he Choice or Lancuages. <0 ee ghee eer woe es F-45 
Public:intormationzat. the WIPP ‘site 1 4 sects eg ses ae ees F-46 
3.5.1 Public Involvement in Marking and Publicizing 
Ai dD td Lite ee Cae eNO Prue a Ce area a eae oP ae amie a ie ee ery e F-46 
Sed. ss Olt-site ATCHIVING: cy, herent he eee et ene) ee F-46 
5:0.) -BlIply Space 1 OL REINSCHIPEONG. cr su ae seein pore age Git aed ein bes F-47 
BR CLCTE INC CS oak a cag treats opine ae mre ae ten ter Sc ee Ne Met reas See Caae Cnt Pareare ee F-47 


Criteria for a Marking System with Examples 


Site design guidelines for a design of the entire site, so it is 


a major component of a system of messages ...............20000- F-49 
DDESION<OPEONSs Fat yatee eerste st eta neny Sete eee Same wey ea ce) a ae ae F-57 
A visual depiction of various design options .............. 00002 ee ee F-60 
Durability of common marker structures .......... 2.00. eee eee eee F-79 
AEA AN SAUITOOUCHONG sea wea cota coy areas oe ee ER peter Sass Pen et oon ke F-79 
474.2 ~-Should-all: Markers be: Durable? 70. 6 6 ee te ee F-79 
AA). se atepories OF Markers: 4). usecase ean een iad Gee ea ee F-80 
4.4.4 Distinction Between Markers and Barriers ..............000- F-80 
4.4.5 Five Principles to Maximize Durability .................... F-80 
44,6. “Environmental Factors: ¢-scnces oe oi ee ieee SA ee ete tactanes F-89 
4.4.7 Feasibility Demonstration that Durable Markers can 

be Constructed... 1fCostus/No-Object: a4 iis eo as a ee F-90 
4.4.7.1 Longevity Principles in the Classical 
PYTANMAOGSION: tiara kes ved ee enn ee nee a F-90 
4.4.7.2 Shortcomings of a Pyramid Design ................ F-92 
4.4.8 Minimizing Marker Removal by Humans ..................-. F-92 
4.4.9 Durability of Some Common Elements of a Marker 
SVS(CHL the tea tye ee eat Pee ke ane COS NE een ck anaes F-97 
4.4.9.1 THtROGUCEI ON cas sua eno shenos ee resco hn Cee reel See F-97 
AAO. ee eatpe barth peritisn eaten heres ae grace tr eeia gee ean F-98 
4.4.9.3. Monoliths Made of Stone. .............2.0220005 F-98 
44,904 Concrete: Moncltlis: 5-5..cs oe ace ee F-100 
4.4.9.5 ‘Composite: "Monoliths” 24. 2.2.-29:.4.5 4 ee hoki eae F-101 


F-6 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.4.9.6 | Markers Generating Noise or Tones .............. F-101 
4.4.9.7 Other Self-Energized Marker Systems ............. F-101 
4.4.9.8 | Above-Ground, Closed Rooms ................. F-102 
4.4.9.9 Partially Buried, Closed Rooms ................. F-102 
4.4.9.10 Below-Ground, Closed Rooms ................. F-105 
4.4.9.11 Small-Scale, Near-Surface Markers ............... F-105 
4.479512) Deeply: BUnEd MarKetss:.< et anc ary a nee ay ae oes F-107 
Ay = <oraphic, deslenSaor markers 20-2 or. ee reers a toes es eels aes cases ence oe F-110 
a ok) ORESION Criteria scene wrt sss ee encase tiene word, es tn ree ee ye F-110 
4.5.2 International Symbol for "Buried Radioactive Waste" ........... F-112 
ASS TA AE ACES He tae EU pee, Tema get ay GE es te ee ROTA ate eye een occa eee nee F-114 
AvSvay SINIADS «ae oy cet mosh ae oe cts eating ee hn ts Oe Roa eta ae aed eae F-114 
4.5.5. «Star Map Showine: Precession: 5.5.4.3 2 isis oe. ee ee es F-118 
4:5.0>. -Peniodicslable of Rlements.c chars ik pat eee eke ees het oe F-120 
4.6 Marker messages, Levels II, II, andIV.................-2.002- F-120 
4.6.1 Message Levels, Languages, and Markers ................. F-120 
4 bee a Ee Messapes..| NMSCLVOS: cer cea, toe ee entrant tine Reet ae F-123 
S621) | sMarker Messace— evel yer en ee eee S 2. F-123 
AG@22- “Marker: Messace, Level Ui. so. ee ee F-123 
4.6.2.3, Marker Message, Level IV (first alternative) ......... F-123 
4.6.2.4 | Marker Message, Level IV (second alternative) ....... F-126 
477, ‘Additional-possible components) 2 2 220s esha oe ee es F-135 
PsA Ee NOME Sg ae ROR ee eae ers OA Pay are ran ay erie eM PA eee UR F-135 
4.72) RCOMAt, SETUCLUFES! ec puge vce es ee et ae ee ree es Pe yin ome ee F-136 
GB PUR CLELONC Sine ao Se teres ate eres ar ara se Ge EO ren ire eas F-136 
5. Appendices 
5.1 Scenario for the marking system (MFK) ..................2--2-8- F-139 
5:27 ‘The enormity of:marking ‘the WIPP sife:(FN) i042) 2.2012 Ge ae F-142 
5.3) Personal thoughts:QWs) ce cock. we ace meee ran we ee eee ee F-143 
5.4 Possible origins of archetypes of place (MB) ..................... F-144 
5.4.1 Landscapes Seen as Having Adaptive Value in Evolution ........ F-144 
5.4.2 Landscapes as Primordial Factor in Development of Mythic 
CONSCIOUSNESS er ee ee eee oa yee eae ee aS F-145 
5.4.3. Archetypes of Built-Form Seen as Originating in Body- 
FEXDERICNCE? co iret ceca cece, Maya oe st or ype a Sin Mens Porter area eet ae F-146 
Sa SRELCTENCES ce nro tees My a eae ae tacn en en, etn ee es a F-147 
5.5 A Proposal for a Visitors’ Center and Memorial at the WIPP 
CLT iD Wieeen ecm tae May Saal orth on rec ea ne eR rah A aligns a Rinne CMD en ange te F-149 
5.6 ‘‘Beauty is conserved, ugliness discarded" (DGA) .................. F-152 
Additional Information from SAND92-1382 Authors ................-+--- F-153 


F-7 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Figures 

World wide distribution of nuclear reactors .............00-0000% F-27 
Bandscape- Of ThOms. - View se con jog ere ean a TES I ase F-61 
Handscape: or THOms Vicw 2 a1 scern aoe ee eh re ae ea F-62 
Spike Dicld-wiwel as eyes rae cutee nee ty ees Sey at keene oe a ete, F-63 
DpikesHicldl viewer toe nese ns eo ere pati a. aang West eae ee F-64 
Spikes Bursting Through Grid, view 1 .............00 2 eee eeee F-65 
Spikes Bursting Through Grid, view2 ............00 0c eee eeee F-66 
heanin os Stone: Spikes. evra) mites A iaesesie Coon as eae cee, ena le ce iret F-67 
Menacing Earthworks “View ol" 225 spcrdee susp teva ne organ See a anes a eh a F-68 
MendCIne AT WOIKS “VICW 29 ca en eke a ner eee hee ease are ney F-69 
IBlaCKSTIOLe eviews bree, betel is areca ears sien uh Ry erence et MAE to. ted F-70 
BIACR HIGIE: Views 2. cnn ae conten rear on ee hare Re gt Ds are Ge gs Lye ah F-71 
Rubble Landscape; view li. oi yca ee - heeree di sired tp aa mine ve, moe neeaae Ss F-72 
Rubole-kandscape yw ViCW 2: caro an coche ene Mae rae sae ie yates Oe a F-73 
Origin & BIOCKS VIEW Lair stn tay oeclia atone oe, ane aue ries tN ee. fate Eanes F-74 
OrpIdd me BIGEKS VIEW 2, hectic ok sacs tt sm oe es sake ta eee Rena alee eras F-75 
Walk-on Map of World’s Radioactive Burial Sties ................ F-76 
Buried Room with Level IV Messages ........... 0000000 e eves F-77 
Readine- Walis/Messare: Kiosk= 90202.) ey tees eusiore 6k os ee F-78 
Camel Skeleton: Initial discovery, cervical vertebra ............... F-82 
Camel: Skeleton: :Pre-excavalionc.% 6 ceun a  eR a eke ae ans ee F-82 
Camel Skeleton: Overburden removed—excavation begins ........... F-83 
Camel Skeleton: Camel being exposed—soft sand ................ F-83 
Great Pyramids at Giza: Mycerinus, Chephren, and Cheops .......... F-85 
PhevGredt:S phim ats Giza. er, ere croissant (ve ae ee a F-86 
MonolithicstomUxe wo nty eh concn crac) emesis age aee maces: F-87 
PASSARC* OEAVE a terse oho unin re toate ec tenn ay en Wa ae ae ee te F-88 
Pyramid of engraved blocks: An example of durable message transmittal .. F-91 
ENE PamtheOn: Sececuc actrees share ean eat red GMCS Oh ee We os Veh coe A F-93 
StONEH ED SS oer ee Wena eae denr guna ce rege ae oo eth allied F-96 
Possible prototypes for facial icons, example 1 ................. F-111 
Possible prototypes for facial icons, example2 ................. F-111 
Proposed sign for buried radioactive waste .............200000% F-113 
Proposed "evel LU MeSSabe: eras ey ar S eee orcs Benker ated F-115 
Example of a map in the Level IV chamber indicating the locations of 

nuclear waste sites around the world. ...............0000008 F-116 
Diagram for Level IV message indicating much more accurate locations 

for the sites Shown an bigure: 54-95 90 a Ss os ee ee es F-117 


A perspective view of the repository for Level III messages, showing waste 

panels, shafts, marker features, and the reader’s present location on the 

SHIGTACE LALEOW oro) nice are Gos na ia A at rind trae ke Sp Rasy ee Re F-119 
Level III diagram that allows the date of burial and the time that has 

passed since burial to be determined if precession of the pole 

tSea KNOWN PHENOMENON. 44,07 ten Mca eee ator eee Scat F-121 
Level IV diagram of the periodic table of elements ............... F-122 


F-8 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.6-1 Detailed perspective view of the repository and site (for the Level IV 

CHAMBER se reacar ere arte octet ea in een nah cate Ts Nasctes F-127 
4.6-2 Details of the shaft sealing (for the Level TV chamber) ............ F-128 
4,6-3 Detailed geologic cross-section of the site (for the Level IV chamber) ... F-131 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


You are not obliged to finish the task, 
Nor are you released from undertaking it. 


(Ethics of Our Fathers II:21) 
(Pirkei Avot IT:21) 


The land was not willed to you by your ancestors 
- it was loaned to you by your children 


(Kenya saying) 


OZYMANDIAS 
Percy Bysshe Shelley 


I met a traveler from an antique land 

Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone 
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand, 
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown, 
and wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command, 

Tell that its sculptor well those passions read 
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things, 
The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed; 
And on the pedestal these words appear: 

““My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings: 

Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!’’ 
Nothing besides remains. Round the decay 

Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare 

The lone and level sands stretch far away. 


F-10 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 


Sandia National Laboratories charged a panel of outside experts with the task to design a 
10,000-year marking system for the WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) site, and estimate the’ 
efficacy of the system against various types of intrusion. The goal of the marking system is to 
deter inadvertent human interference with the site. The panel of experts was divided into two 
teams. This is the report of the A Team; a multidisciplinary group with an anthropologist (who 
is at home with different, but contemporary, cultures), an astronomer (who searches for 
extra-terrestrial intelligence), an archaeologist (who is at home with cultures that differ in both 
time and space from our own), an environmental designer (who studies how people perceive and 
react to a landscape and the buildings within them), a linguist (who studies how languages 
change with time), and a materials scientist (who knows the options available to us for 
implementing our marking system concepts). The report is a team effort. There is much 
consensus on the design criteria and necessary components of the marking system. 
Understandably, there is some diversity of opinion on some matters, and this is evident in the 
text. 


We developed several criteria for the marking system: 


e The site must be marked. Aside from a legal requirement, the site will be indelibly 
imprinted by the human activity associated with waste disposal. We must complete the 
process by explaining what has been done and why. 


¢ The site must be marked in such a manner that its purpose cannot be mistaken. 


e Other nuclear waste disposal sites must be marked in a similar manner within the U.S. and 
preferably world-wide. 


e A marking system must be utilized. By this we mean that components of the marking 
system relate to one another in such a way that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. 


e Redundancy must play a preeminent role in marking system design. The designs considered 
here have redundancy in terms of message levels, marking system components, materials, 
and modes of communication. 


e Each component of the marking system should be made of material(s) with little intrinsic 
value. The destructive (or recycling) nature of people will pose a serious threat to the 
marking system. 


e¢ The components of the marking system should be tested during the next few decades while 


the WIPP is in operation, not only for the longevity of the materials but for the pan-cultural 
nature of the message. ; 


F-11 


Soe Eee Spann lg Tee ey PE eres Neon a = a a a ceeoe= ee pies 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


In other words, as with the repository design itself, the team was comfortable with the thought 
of designing a marking system that would last 10,000 years if left undisturbed. Our efforts 
focused on making it understandable while providing minimal incentive to disturb it. We also 
consider a public information effort a necessary part of the marking system design. A system 
that is not understood today has no chance of being understood in the far future. 


Figures 4.3-1 through 4.3-18 provide a basic description of our most developed design and other 
design options! (for these figures and more details please see: Section 4.2, Design options, and 
Section 4.3, A visual depiction of various design options). 


The central area of interest is surrounded by earthen berms. For the WIPP site, the area of 
interest is where we do not want drilling or excavation to occur. In the design the central area 
is the area of the underground panels plus either (1) a one-fourth-mile buffer zone, or (2) the 
distance to which the radionuclides may migrate during the 10,000-year period, whichever is 
larger. The forms of the earthworks are jagged and rough, suggestive of energy radiating from 
the central area. 


The berms serve several purposes. First, they define the area of interest. Their size is set so 
that sand dunes are unlikely to cover all of them entirely at the same time. Instead, the wind will 
leave dunes streaming behind the berms and create an even larger marker. Second, their shape 
sets the tone for the entire landscape -- non-natural, ominous, and repulsive. Third, the corner 
berms are higher than the others and provide vantage points for viewing the entire site. Fourth, 
the corner berms also include buried rooms with all the message levels recommended for 
inclusion in this marker system. As the berms erode, these rooms will become uncovered at 
various times. 


The investigator will be guided toward the center of the site by the berms. Prior to entering the 
central area, however, he or she will encounter a ‘‘message kiosk’’ (Figure 4.3-18). Each 
message kiosk is composed of a message wall and a protecting wall. In terms of site Jayout, the 
message kiosks form the only ‘‘nurturing’’ part of the marking system design. The protecting 
wall is of concrete and is meant to protect the message wall from erosion. The message wall 
is of granite or other hard rock and is a vertical, curved form. There are two reasons for a 
curved form: (1) it makes it very difficult to reuse the piece for another purpose, and (2) it is 
not an honorific form such as an obelisk. The vertical aspect minimizes tensile stress on the 
components. 


The message wall will bear what we call Level II and Level II messages (cautionary and basic 
information, respectively). The preliminary texts read: 


! The body of the report reviews several designs that were considered and rejected. We include them because 
we believe it is as important to document the decision-making process as it is to present the conclusion. 
"Menacing Earthworks" is the final recommendation for the overall design option, along with the other marker 
system components discussed in the text. 


F-12 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Level II: 
DANGER. 
POISONOUS RADIOACTIVE WASTE BURIED HERE. 
DO NOT DIG OR DRILL HERE BEFORE A.D. 12,000. 
Level Il: 


These standing stones mark an area used to bury 
radioactive wastes. The area is... by... 
kilometers (or...miles or about...times 

the height of an average full grown male person) 
and the buried waste is...kilometers 

down. This place was chosen to put this 
dangerous material far away from people. The 
rock and water in this area may not look, feel, 
or smell, unusual but may be poisoned by 
radioactive wastes. When radioactive matter 
decays, it gives off invisible energy that can 
destroy or damage people, animals, and 

plants. 


Do.not drill here. Do not dig here. Do not do 


anything that will change the rocks or water in 
the area. 


Do not destroy this marker. This marking 
system has been designed to last 10,000 years. 
If the marker is difficult to read, add new 
markers in longer-lasting materials in 

languages that you speak. For more information 
go to the building further inside. The site 

was known as the WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant) site when it was closed in.... 


[Face on the right reprinted with permission from: 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irandus. Human Ethology. 

(New York: Aldine de Gruyter) Copyright © 

1989 by Irandus Eibl-Eibesfeldt.] 


The Level II message is flanked on either side by a face, one denoting horror and the other 
denoting sickness or nausea. The messages are repeated seven times: the six languages of the 
United Nations (Arabic, English, Spanish, French, Russian, and Chinese), Navajo, and blank. 
The blank area is so the message can be inscribed in another language when these grow too 
ancient to read comfortably. Also included on the message wall is a map of the WIPP site, 
showing both surface and underground features. This would allow the future investigator to 


F-13 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


reconstruct the site at the time of original construction regardless of what has happened to the 
site in the interim. 


Beyond the message walls lies the central area. A major feature of the design is the concept 
of a hollow center, that is, nothing at the center is a focal point of interest. Within the central 
area, but not at the center, lies a ‘‘Level IV’’ room (Figure 4.3-17).2 This room has both 
messages listed above as well as an extended text and additional pictures. 


We have constructed two possible texts for the Level IV message. Straight brackets, [ ], 
enclose comments for this report. The shorter one of the two is: 


This place is a burial place for radioactive 
wastes. We believe this place is not dangerous 
IF IT IS LEFT ALONE! We are going to tell you 
what lies underground, why you should not 
disturb this place, and what may happen if you 
do. By giving you this information, we want 

you to protect yourselves and future 

generations from the dangers of this waste. 


The waste is buried ... kilometers down in a 
salt layer. Salt was chosen because there is 
very little water in it and cracks caused by 
digging the rooms for the waste reseal. There 
is a pocket of pressurized salt water ... 

km below the waste. There is a rock layer ... 
kilometers below the surface that did not have 
drinkable water when we built the site. We 
studied all the things that could go wrong with 
the site. We found out that the worst things 
happen when people disturb the site. For 
example, drilling or digging through the site 
could connect the salt water below the radioactive 
waste with the water above the waste or with the 
surface. The salt water could wash through the 
waste and bring the poisonous and radioactive waste 
to the water near the surface or to the surface 
itself. People who drink the water will drink 
the poison. If the water is used for animals 

or crops, those too will be poisoned and the 
people who eat them will be poisoned. It may 
take many years for the sickness and death to 
show. Radioactivity poisons people because it 


designed to be entered and studied in great detail. 


F-14 


can cause cancer. When radioactive matter 
decays, the energy it releases can damage the 
basic material of life in each cell of the 

human body. The damage can cause uncontrolled 
cell growth, called cancer, that can Kill. 


The waste is buried in 845,000 metal drums in 

a space of about 6,200,000 cubic feet. The waste 
was generated during the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons, also called atomic bombs. It is basically 
laboratory and manufacturing materials that 

are contaminated with radionuclides having 
atomic numbers greater than 92, half-lives 
exceeding 20 years, and concentrations 

exceeding 100 nanocuries per gram. (A gram of 
radium is a curie of radioactivity. There are 
1,000,000, 000 nanocuries per I curie. A nanocurie 
corresponds to the disintegration of 37 atoms in 
one second). The waste includes metal objects (such 
as hand tools, machine tools, and motors), glass 
objects (such as cups and containers), plastic 
objects (such as bags, tubes, and gloves), and 
Paper and rag materials, such as protective 
clothing worn by people when they worked with 
the radioactivity. Many of these materials 

will corrode, decay or otherwise disappear but 
the radioactivity will remain. 


Pictures on the walls of this room help explain the 
message. A map shows the surface marking system, 
its relationship to the underground area used for 
disposal, and the depth of disposal. A map shows 
the rock layers below the site. A periodic table 
identifies those elements that are radioactive and 
those that are buried below here. When the site 
was closed in ..., it contained 


plutonium-239 =... curies 
plutonium-240 =... curies 
americium-241 =... curies 
uranium-233 =... curies 
thorium-229 =... curies. 


Radioactivity declines exponentially with time. 
By 10,000 years, after the waste was buried here, 
the waste will be no more hazardous than the ore 


F-15 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


from which the radioactive material was taken [see 50 FR 38071aj. 
There is a picture showing the four brightest 

Stars that can be seen from the site (Sirius, 

Canopus, Arcturus, and Vega). The position of 

the star-rise changes in time, and lining up 

the angles of the star-rise with the map will 

show how much time has passed since the site 

was closed. The site was closed in 


...AD (anno domini), Gregorian calendar 
...AD, Byzantine calendar 

..-, Jewish calendar 

..-, Lslamic calendar 

..-» Chinese calendar 


The waste also contains hazardous materials, 
whose danger does not lessen with time. These 
include: lead, cadmium, chromium, barium, 
methylene chloride, and toluene. The elements 
also have an arrow in.the box in the periodic 
table. The chemical form for methylene 
chloride and toluene are shown, also. 


If you find unusual sickness in this region, , 
or you find higher than normal levels of 
radioactivity in the area, inspect the area of 
the site. Look for: boreholes that were 

drilled after the site closed, but were never 
sealed; old mine shafts that were never 
sealed; and failed seals from the original 
repository. Reseal these areas, using your 
best technology, to prevent any further leakage 
of radioactivity or toxic materials. 


Do not destroy these markers. If the message 

is difficult to read, rewrite the message in 

your language in the blank area on this wall. 

If the markers are worn or missing, add new 

ones in longer-lasting materials in languages 

that you speak. This site, built in ... by 

the United States of America government, represents 
a first attempt to responsibly dispose of wastes 

for an extended period of time. Other sites exist 
that contain radioactive wastes, and they are marked 
in a similar manner. We have shown these sites on a 
map in this room. Do not disturb any of these Sites. 


F-16 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


These messages will be inscribed onto the walls of the room. Some pictures will be inscribed 
on stones standing on the floor of the room. (Pictures need be done only once since they do not 
need to be translated.) The messages will actually be done on two layers, so as one is removed, 
the message still remains. The configuration of the stones should be such that they can fit 
together without mortar and can only fit together in one way. The backs of the first layer should 
be uneven. This will minimize their ease for reuse. 


The periodic table will include a sample of each element in the respective box. Naturally 
radioactive materials will have the radiation trefoil in the box. Man-made radioactive materials 
occurring in the WIPP will also will have the radiation symbol plus a downward pointing arrow 
proportional to the amount stored in WIPP. This will allow the investigator to reconstruct the 
radioactive contents of the WIPP site. To indicate the non-radioactive content of the WIPP, a 
differently designed, less prominent, downward arrow could be used to indicate the content of 
other elements. A star map will allow the investigator to estimate the amount of time that has 
passed since closure has occurred. 


The interior of the room is not easily accessible, since the size of the openings makes it difficult 
to carry away internal parts of the room. There will be five Level IV rooms at the site - - one 
on the surface and the other four buried within the corner berms. The surface room will be 
under layers of earth and stone to minimize the effects of daily and seasonal fluctuations of 
temperature and moisture. 


Other components considered for the surface area of the site include a world map, showing the 
locations of other radioactive waste disposal sites, reuse of the hot cell as a Level IV room (if 


it can be decontaminated), a visitor’s center/memorial, and aeolian structures. 


We also considered three sets of subsurface markers. The first group come into effect once 
intrusion has begun. Their goal is to stop potential intruders, if only for a short while, and to 
make them reconsider their actions. These include hard crystalline rock at the walls and ceiling 
of the waste rooms, and Thermit to be ignited by the intrusion process itself. 


The second set of subsurface markers provide warnings to potential intruders before damage is 
done to the repository system. These include salting the site with small markers. These would 
be lenticular in shape, about 5 inches in diameter, and bear the Level II message. These would 
be buried throughout the central area, above the caliche level. They are meant to work their 
way to the surface via erosion or surface excavations. It is a way to remind the potential home 
builder or farmer that they really do not want to be there. Materials for these markers include 
fired clay or glass. 


The final set of markers would be emplaced in the shafts. This is the most likely area for 
radionuclide migration. The material would be located about 50 feet down -- i.e., where surface 
activities are unlikely to affect it but above the region for the various repository seals. Again, 
disks dispersed in the backfill with Level II messages are appropriate, as are ones with a 
message saying ‘‘You have reached a shaft - Do not dig here.’’ These would tie the activities 
at the shaft with the warning markers located around the area. 


F-17 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


F-18 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


1. General Considerations 


1.1 Background information on marking the WIPP site 


The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a research and development facility for the disposal 
of defense wastes. Defense wastes are primarily transuranic wastes (TRU). TRU is defined as 
materials contaminated with isotopes with an atomic number greater than 92, a half-life greater 
than 20 years, and a concentration greater than 100 nanocuries per gram. The existence of such 
a site was mandated by Public Law 96-164 (Department of Energy National Security and 
Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980). 


The WIPP site is located in southeastern New Mexico, about 25 miles east of Carlsbad. The 
site currently consists of a 16 square-mile area (the land withdrawal area) and a fenced area that 
is approximately 1.5 miles on a side. Within the secured boundary lie the waste handling 
building and subsidiary offices. The underground waste disposal panels and rooms are designed 
to lie within the secured boundary. These panels and rooms are designed to occupy an area that 
is 2,064 feet by 2,545 feet at a depth of 2,157 feet. There is an overlying aquifer, but the water 
is not potable. The site is located in an arid region (about 12 inches of rainfall per year) that 
supports cattle grazing but not dry farming. The arid landscape is undulating in the southeastern 
part of the site with both stabilized and mobile sand dunes. 


WIPP is regulated by an EPA standard set in 1985 [Ref. 1-1]. 
There are several important features of the Standard: 


¢ Itrequires a marking system at the site; i.e., it states that "Disposal sites shall be designated 


by the most permanent markers, records, and other passive institutional controls practicable 
to indicate the dangers of the wastes and their location" (40 CFR 191.14(c)). 


¢ The performance assessment for the disposal facility must be probabilistically-based. That 
is, not only must the consequences of a given scenario be calculated, the likelihood of that 
scenario must be estimated (40 CFR 191.13). 


e The time period of interest is 10,000 years (40 CFR 191.13 (a)). 


e Active institutional controls are considered effective for no more than 100 years (40 CFR 
191.14(a)). 


In other words, there is a legal requirement to mark the site. It is this requirement that led 
Sandia National Laboratories to convene what are known as the Futures panel and the Markers 
panel. The first group examined the possible "futures" over the next 10,000 years and 
considered a wide range of conceivable cultures, population sizes, and technical developments. 
The role of the Markers panel is to develop design characteristics for marking systems for the 
WIPP site and to judge their effectiveness against the intrusion scenarios developed by the 


F-19 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Futures panel. The charge to the Markers panel will be discussed in more detail in Section 1.2. 


The Sandia work is the second major effort to consider the long-term marking of nuclear waste 
disposal sites. The U.S. Department of Energy convened the Human Interference Task Force 
(HITF) in 1980 [Ref. 1-2]. 

The value of that work lies in establishing the credibility and feasibility of the effort to design 

long-term marking systems for nuclear waste disposal sites. The Sandia approach differs from 

the HITF approach in two important features: 

e The Sandia approach divided the experts into two teams. The reports, then, reflect 
interdisciplinary team efforts rather than the focus of individual specialties. It should not be 
surprising that some designs presented in this report are dramatically different from those 
presented a decade ago. 

e The Sandia approach involves the elicitation of subjective probabilities for the likelihood of 
deterring human interference with the site. This part of the effort is required to evaluate 
whether WIPP meets the probabilistic basis of the EPA regulation. 

1.2 Charge to the expert panel 

The Marking System Teams were given a seven-fold charge: 

e Recommend markers that should be used to mark the WIPP disposal site. 

e Provide physical descriptions of the markers, including size, location, shape, and materials. 


e Provide the message on the markers and the method of conveying the messages. 


For each major mode of intrusion identified by the Futures panel: 


e Estimate the likelihood that each marker has survived (i.e., it is recognizable and the message 
is apparent). 


e Estimate the likelihood that the potential intruder will recognize and correctly interpret the 
message, given that the marker has survived. 


e Estimate the likelihood that a potential intruder will take appropriate action to avoid intrusion 
given that the marker has survived and that the potential intruder has recognized and correctly 
interpreted the message. 

For the system of markers: 

e Re-estimate the likelihood that the system persists, the message is correctly interpreted, and 


intrusion is deterred. 


F-20 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


The focus of this report is the first three items, which will form a basis for probability estimates 
from each individual member of the team. Finally, the Markers panel was instructed not to 
consider cost when developing marking system designs. 


The following working assumptions have governed the panel’s view of the possible scenarios 
relating to its charge: 


Climate will vary from that of a desert or near desert to that of good grassland. At best, 
water will be a scarce resource. Probability of significant change in availability of water 
over the next 10,000 years is very low. 


The region will be sparsely inhabited under the best of-conditions, most likely by keepers 
of livestock, once natural gas has been taken out of the area over the next few hundred 
years. 


A tradition directly descended from one or another of the modern technologically, 
scientifically, and scholarly developed societies will continue through the next 10,000 years, 
barring catastrophic developments on a scale that makes that impossible. 


Continuity of human existence guarantees that whatever languages are spoken over the next 
10,000 years, they will be lineal descendants of one or more languages spoken now, most 
probably those most widely spoken and written now. 


Because literacy has not ceased to exist since it was first developed some 6,000 years ago, 
it will not cease to exist over the next 10,000 years, nor the scientific and scholarly 
traditions based on it, again barring catastrophic developments on a scale that makes that 
impossible. 


In light of these assumptions, the following scenarios have been considered in relation to the 
problem of marking the WIPP site: 


Human existence has been reduced to what can be supported by a metal-using technology 
similar to that of early medieval Europe -- use of iron tools, limited literacy, technology 
capable of deep intrusion at the site if there was extraordinarily high incentive for doing so. 
Local inhabitants of the site area are most likely to be livestock keepers and small-scale 
river-bottom farmers. The probability of an intrusion is relatively low. There is little need 
for a marking system. A marking system that is awesome and scary, as suggested in this 
report, may invite its being used for religious purposes or as a place of assembly among 
groups in the area, but is unlikely to invite deep intrusion, especially considering the effort 
it would require. 


Human existence has continued with regional ups and downs over the world at the present 
level of technological sophistication, at least, if not a higher one. But the area of the WIPP 
site has been a marginal one for human habitation and exploitation because of the cycles of 
climatic changes between desert and grassland. People encountering the site following a 
period of desertification are likely to be relatively unsophisticated themselves, livestock 


F-21 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


keepers or resource prospectors. If the site is marked by a massive, awesome, and rather 
scary marking system, word of it is more likely to be disseminated so that it will come to 
the notice of officials and scholars and scientists of the time. Once they have learned of it, 
its massive scale will draw scholars and scientists to study it, decipher the messages 
inscribed there, and thus become acquainted with the nature of the site and what is buried 
there. In the absence of such study and reacquaintance with what is there, the likelihood 
of inadvertent intrusion is greater. 


e Human existence went through a period of global catastrophe in which it was reduced to 
illiteracy and something bordering on a Stone Age level of technology, and then redeveloped 
new patterns of technological sophistication, new literacy, and new science. The probability 
that people would then be able to decipher and understand the true meaning of the messages 
inscribed there is low, unless the inscriptions provide a key to their interpretation. By 
having the same messages in different languages arranged in a way that shows them to be 
parallel messages, the site design can provide the equivalent of the Rosetta Stone that will 
increase the probability of successful decipherment. 


It is to the last two scenarios above that our team has considered a marking system to be most 
relevant. With these scenarios in mind, we decided on a systems approach to marking with 


e Several components within a given design, 
e¢ Multiple items within each component, and 
¢ Two-way indexing linking different levels of information and system marking components. 


With this approach, we can afford to lose items within a given component without seriously 
compromising the effectiveness of the entire design. (For example, about one-third of the stones 
of Stonehenge are missing, yet the entire design can be reconstructed without major 
controversy.) Under these conditions, it is the probability estimate for the entire system that is 
relevant, not those for individual markers. 


Second, a literal interpretation of the charge leads to the estimation of 54 probabilities for each 
system design (2 modes of intrusion x 3 time periods x 3 degrees of efficacy [the marker 
survives/is understood/and deters] x 3 types of societies [more advanced/similar to our own/less 
advanced]). Given that we have explored 5 designs, a literal interpretation of the charge leads 
to several hundred probability estimates. Extending this effort to individual components of a 
system would further extend the number of needed estimates. Using Occam’s razor to slice 
through this forest of logic branches, the A Team interpreted the work of the Futures panel as 
the need to be ready for anything regarding marking system design for the WIPP site. 


Third, we considered one set of branches to be outside our purview. The regulatory requirement 
is to deter inadvertent intrusion, and thus we feel that if the message is understood, our job is 


F-22 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


completed. Any action that takes place after the message is understood is advertent and 
intentional. If the intruder is aware of what lies below him or her, and of the consequences of 
disturbing the area, and yet does not change his or her intended course of action, it is not 
inadvertent intrusion. 


1.3 Should the site be marked? 

1.3.1 Motivations for Marking 

There are two major motivations for marking the WIPP site: 

e Social responsibility to the future generations that did not create the waste. 
e We have no alternative; the site is already marked. 


We therefore feel that it is essential that the WIPP site be marked in some manner, and cannot 
agree with the conclusions of two of the Futures panel teams and other authors [Ref. 1-3], which 
suggested not marking it. We take it as uncontroversial that all people have an inherent right to 
understand as far as possible the forces that might profoundly affect their well-being. We do 
not accept the reasoning that led to the suggestion not to mark the site. In this view, marking 
might be counterproductive; given the (presumed) small risk of inadvertent exposure, marking 
would lead only to the attraction of ‘‘curiosity seekers,’’ thereby increasing overall risk. But 
we are not sufficiently confident that the risk of inadvertent exposure is low and, even if it is, 
not warning future generations of a potential peril under their feet represents an abdication of 
moral responsibility. 


An analogy seems appropriate here: Inhalation of radionuclides projected to be confined in 
drums in the Salado formation may well present a greater health hazard than a lifetime of 
cigarette smoking, and yet our society places health warnings on every cigarette pack. 


The performance assessments at the WIPP site indicate that the expected behavior of the site 
indicates little danger to humans, except for human interference. Although the regulation is 
probabalistically-based, the team decided to design the site as if it posed the maximum plausible 
danger. We examined two causes for greater potential danger. First, as one of the Futures panel 
teams noted, the site may be used to store the more dangerous high-level waste, despite the 
absence of explicit official plans to use it for this purpose. We can imagine a scenario of a WIPP 
already in operation, political pressure in other states to ship out-of-state all their radioactive 
wastes, and a decision not to build the facility at Yucca Mountain, NV, as the repository for the 
country’s high-level civilian and defense waste.' Thus an atmosphere would arise conducive to 


1 Section 12 of the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (WIPP LWA) (Public Law 102-579), approved October 30, 1992, 
entitled Ban on High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, states: 
The Secretary shall not transport high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel to WIPP or emplace 
or dispose of such waste or fuel at WIPP. 
While Congress has spoken on this issue, Team A found it conceivable that the WIPP LWA would be amended 


F-23 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


concentrating the nation’s high-level radioactive refuse, whatever its ultimate source, at the 
WIPP. There is even some support in the State of New Mexico for this plan: in 1987 the 
governor suggested that the WIPP site should serve as a repository for high-level commercial 
waste. Moreover, the remote handling area of the WIPP building could be used to handle 
high-level wastes without redesign, and the site could be expanded either laterally or at a deeper 
layer to accommodate the additional wastes. 


Second, whatever wastes are ultimately stored at the WIPP, there is a probability significantly 
greater than zero that they are not as secure in the Salado salt beds as might be hoped. The 
Scientists’ Review Panel on WIPP [Ref. 1-4] has warned that brine seepage in the beds will in 
all probability lead to corrosion of the canisters. This contaminated water could find its way into 
the Rustler Aquifer (which feeds the Pecos River and is located only around 1000 feet below 
ground level) through the access shafts filled with disturbed salt or through boreholes created 
by drilling.” 


Even if this is only a very remote possibility (it is, indeed, one which we lack the technical 
expertise to evaluate), the potential danger provides a powerful argument for marking the site. 


In a real sense, there is little point in pressing further the argument that the site should be 
marked for the simple reason that it already is marked (or will be if it is ever operational). So 
much buried metal and radioactive material will leave a ‘‘signature’’ that scientists of the future 
will have no difficulty in detecting. What we need to do, of course, is to ‘‘complete’’ the 
marking by letting them know why it is there. Also, it is projected that after settling of the 
excavated and filled salt deposits, ground levels will be depressed by at least a half foot. Even 
today’s geologists and archaeologists can detect such a depression; those of the future will 
presumably be able to do so even more readily. 


It must be noted that marking the site is incompatible with the recommendation that after the last 
drum is buried the site be restored to a pristine condition. We are sympathetic to 
environmentalist concerns that WIPP leave no permanent trace on the landscape, but we feel that 
in this case health and safety requirements outweigh aesthetic ones. 


1.3.2 General Criteria for any Marking System 


Any system for marking the WIPP site will have to be colossal in scale. Given the many huge 
human-made structures in the world today and the many more that are likely to be built in the 
coming centuries, a marker consisting of a small building or sculpture bearing a standard 
commemorative plaque is unlikely to be effective. Many of these existing structures are in 
cities, but others are in remote areas and thus potentially compete for attention with anything 
marking the WIPP site. In the U.S. alone, there are dozens of National Battlefields, National 
Historical Parks, National Memorials, and so on, most (like the WIPP) away from major 


to allow other types of waste at the WIPP. They thus considered all scenarios, even those with a low probability. 
Marker text will be finalized to reflect the contents at closure. 


? For related information from the SAND92-1382 authors, see p. F-153. 


F-24 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


conurbations and each containing statuary and commemorative markers. In order to avoid the 
risk of the WIPP markers being confused with them and ignored (who in the 72nd century is 
going to bother to have a dedication to some 19th century war hero decoded?), they and their 
connecting structures have to be conceived of on a scale equivalent to that of the pyramid 
complexes of Egypt. 


Put simply, the marking system must be on a sufficiently grand scale to provide future 
generations with the motivation for going to the trouble to translate the message on the markers. 
We have no doubt that, barring a global cataclysm that results in a pre-technological culture, 
there will always be scholars in the world capable of translating the major languages of the 
twentieth century. The question we must ask with respect to the markers is: Why should they 
bother to do so? Inscriptions in ancient languages like Hittite, Lydian, Numidian, and so on are 
readily translated for the simple reason that there are so few of them. But thousands of books 
are now published each year on an acid-free paper that promises to survive the centuries. More 
to the point, the world today is filled with durable structures, of which monuments are only one 
type, most of which are marked with inscriptions of some sort. In short, because it is highly 
likely that much written material from our culture will survive long into the future, no intruder 
into the WIPP site will have the slightest interest in going to the (perhaps considerable) trouble 
of having its markers translated unless he or she can be convinced that the importance of the site 
would make not doing so perilous. 


1.4 International aspects of marking 


This panel is only the second to attempt a coherent design of a marker system for radioactive 
wastes, and it is important that we think on a more encompassing scale than just for the WIPP 
site. , 


The previous panel, called the Human Interference Task Force, was convened for DOE by 
Battelle’s Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation. See their 1984 report: BMI/ONWI-537. Reducing 
the Likelihood of Future Human Activities That Could Affect Geologic High-Level Waste 
Repositories [Ref. 1-2]. 


The disposal of radioactive wastes is an international problem, and although present political 
boundaries shape many aspects of how the problem is being defined and handled today, it is 
clear that these boundaries have absolutely no relevance to the generations of future millennia. 
It is therefore essential that any WIPP markers be designed as part of a global system of marked 
sites. Figure 1.4-1 gives a rough idea of how long-term disposal sites are likely to be scattered 
around the world; by various measures the U.S. represents only one-sixth to one-third of the 
total (for instance, about one-quarter of the world’s nuclear power plants are in the U.S.) 
[Ref. 1-5]. 


We urge that an international standard be developed for the marking of long-term disposal sites. 
A degree of commonality between sites all over the globe provides a redundancy that should 
greatly enhance the likelihood of any given site’s markers working to deter intrusion. Even if 
the markers at a given site become misinterpreted or baffling, their similarity to those at other 
sites where the message is understood will provide a means for the message to be reinstated. 


F-25 


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F-26 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Furthermore, if each site refers in some way to the specific locations of all other sites (as we 
propose in Section 4.5.4), then it will be possible to reinstate the message even if a site’s marker 
system has physically disappeared due to natural catastrophe or deliberate destruction. 


The international standard should not dictate the details of design and construction for the entire 
marker system. It would be both politically unrealistic and foolish from an engineering and 
cultural point of view to try to do so. Instead, the standard must give a few basic design 
features to which all marker systems must conform; each individual system will then 
undoubtedly have many more components. Here is the type of standard that we envision: 


Each site must: 


(1) display its basic warning message 

[what we call Level II in this report, 10-15 words] 
in at least the following languages: 

Chinese, Russian, English, Spanish, French, and 
Arabic [the UN languages] and the local 
language in common use if not otherwise listed; 


(2) prominently display the international 
radiation symbol flanked by horror faces; 


(3) display in a protected chamber a world map of 
all disposal sites, together with a standard 
diagram [Fig. 4.5-6, and Section 4.5.4] that 
geometrically allows their location to an 

accuracy of at least 5 km; and 


(4) include earthen berms to delineate the 
disposal area with heights of at least 10 m. 


This last standard is only an example, the important aspect of it is that there be some common 
aspect to all sites that is large-scale, long-enduring, and not dependent on languages or graphics. 


1.5 A systems approach...two major themes 


This team’s thinking is founded on two major themes. The first theme states that the use of 
communication technology cannot bypass the problem of the certain transformation and 
succession of cultures, but use of fundamental and enduring psychology can. The second theme 
states that the entire site must be experienced as an integrated system of mutually reinforcing 
messages, and designed accordingly. These themes are discussed below. 


F-27 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


A system for bypassing the vagaries of cultural transformation: Most general models of 
communications assume that sender and receiver co-exist in time, are to some extent known to 
each other, and share a culture sufficiently similar to reduce cross-cultural noise. 


In this project we face the unique problem of a sender and receiver living in epochs so 
enormously time-distant from each other that we know little of what the political, economic, 
symbolic, linguistic, social, and technological realms of probable future cultures will be like. 
Further, we assume a succession of many such transformed cultures. As a result, much of the 
past thinking on marking the site has focussed on the problems of cultural phenomena, and on 
the probability of these phenomena enduring and being useful, especially the technology of 
structures and materials, and the technology of communications, language, pictures, and 
symbols. But precisely because they are cultural phenomena, they too will have an historically 
predicted rapid rate and range of transformation, which makes most culture-related 
prognostication uncomfortably speculative. Past assumptions regarding markers posit that this 
discomfort could be reduced through better technologies. We strongly recommend an alternative 
strategy, and have adopted it as a theme in our work. 


This team’s fundamental premise is to cancel the time-borne cultural "distance" between sender 
and receiver by concentrating on fundamental and enduring phenomena shared by all humans, 
things that are species-wide now, probably always have been, and will continue to be, 
phenomena, that is, that bypass culture(s), and have enormous endurance. Only such phenomena 
can render moot the transformation of cultures. Such phenomena are ‘‘archetypal,’’ called so 
because they were already meaningful before the emergence of language and culture in human 
evolution and because they are universal to human existence even with language and cultural 
differences, and therefore, all cultures use them as their common basic material, transforming 
them into each culture’s specific ways, what Joseph Campbell calls "ethnic variations." (Givens 
[Ref. 1-6] cites many of these.) 


The stuff of both our messages and our mode of communication is the fundamental psychic 
structure of humans, their world-wide predilection for symbol formation, and the bonding of 
meaning to form in species-wide archetypes. 


This focus on archetypal forms-bonded-to-meaning assures survivability of content against all 
events and processes that leave our species biologically unchanged. It focuses on meaning and 
feeling content that is already in the mind and body before language, and thus is not dependent 
on it. (In this report, the most extensive explication of what archetypes are, their origins and 
behaviors are in Sections 3.2 and 5.4.) 


The entire site as a system of communication: If archetypal meanings are to be transmitted, and 
because these meanings originated during hundreds of thousands of years of our activity in an 
experientially whole environment, they should be best communicated in and through an 
experientially whole environment. Thus, our medium of communication is the entire 
environment experienced near and at the WIPP site. 


This mode of experientially-whole environment-based communication cannot be achieved by 
standing stone markers on an otherwise unchanged site...in fact, such designs may be easily 


F-28 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


misinterpreted. We choose to focus on the conscious design of the human experience of the 
entire area and all its subelements, which is both the mode and the content of communication, 
where meanings are bonded to and embodied in form. 


We intend that all our physical interventions at the site serve as parts of a communications 
system and that all elements of this system carry archetypal symbolic content...from the layout 
of the entire site down to the location and shape of thermal expansion joints. 


As well, we use the more culture-bound modes of communications such as languages and 
diagrams, but these are used as part of a larger system of communications. This system is to 
be one with great redundancy of messages and modes, so that even with some loss the goals of 


the system are met. 


As well as being conceived as (1) a whole communication experience, (2) having a systemic 
character in which pieces are related in meaningful ways that add meaning, and (3) being 
sufficiently redundant to endure loss of elements, we apply the principle of Gestalt, in which the 
experience of the total communicated message is greater than the sum of its parts (even with 
some parts missing or degraded). 


Detailed guidelines for design of the site and its subelements so that they achieve these goals are 
in Section 4 of this report. 


1.6 On-site testing of markers 


The problem of designing a system that will work for all imaginable societies over a period of 
10,000 years is daunting. The fact that humans have designed and built systems that have 
already survived for 5,000 years, however, allows us to believe that this is a feasible and 
credible task. We also have the advantage that, as planned, the WIPP will not be sealed for at 
least another 30 years. Although it is less than 1% of the design lifetime for the marker system, 
30 years provide an important opportunity for testing. We strongly urge that a long-term 
program for testing materials, structures, messages, and concepts be nla as soon as 
possible. 


The most obvious tests concern the longevity of structures (earthworks, monoliths, rooms), 
materials (concrete, stone) and the longevity of engravings as they would be placed variously 
at the WIPP site in the proposed marker system, e.g., 100 feet above the ground, at the surface 
(with and without various types of protection from the elements) and underground. 


A second class of tests is no less important: how well do our basic messages come through for 
a wide variety of people and cultures? This panel is very unrepresentative of even U.S. citizens. 
We are all white, highly educated, with only one female, one immigrant, two ‘religious 
traditions, and a 30-year age range between the participants. The overall site design and the 
specific messages should be tested for efficacy on a wide variety of persons in the United States 


F-29 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


(various racial and ethnic groups, educational levels, etc.) and in other countries (including 
undeveloped societies). ; 


Another basic test becomes possible because of the long lead time before the final design of the 
WIPP marker system. The final marker-design panel (in AD 2030?) can look back at the present 
panel’s recommendations and gauge how ideas have evolved over 40 years. Stability and 
consistency in the concepts for the major design elements would give them more confidence that 
they have lasting value; disagreements in approach should cause some hard thinking about the 
likely success of the markers. 


1.7 References 


[1-1] (EPA) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1985. "Environmental Standards for the 
Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic 
Radioactive Wastes," Federal Register. Vol. 50, no. 182, 38066-38089. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded Subpart B (which prescribes the 
performance of the disposal facility after closure), but the Department of Energy has 
agreed to abide by the Standard, as promulgated, until a new Standard is finalized, see 
**Second Modification to the July 1, 1981, Agreement for Consultation and Cooperation 
on WIPP by the State of New Mexico and the U.S. Department of Energy.’’ 


[1-2] The main report of the Human Interference Task Force was: Office of Nuclear Waste 
Isolation. 1984. Reducing the Likelihood of Future Human Activities That Could Affect 
Geologic High-Level Waste Repositories. BMI/ONWI-537. Columbus, OH: Office of 
Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle Memorial Institute. More detailed individual reports 
were: Berry, W.E. 1983. Durability of Marker Materials for Nuclear Waste Isolation 
Sites. ONWI-474. Columbus, OH: Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle 
Memorial Institute; Givens, D.B. 1982. "From Here to Eternity: Communicating with 
the Distant Future," Et cetera. Vol. 39, no. 2, 159-179; Kaplan, M.F. 1982. 
Archaeological Data as a Basis for Repository Marker Design. ONWI-354. Columbus, 
OH: Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle Project Management Division; Sebeok, 
T.A. 1984. Communication Measures to Bridge Ten Millennia. BMI/ONWI-532. 
Columbus, OH: Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle Memorial Institute; 
Tannenbaum, P.H. 1984. Communication Across 300 Generations: Deterring Human 
Interference With Waste Deposit Sites. BMI/ONWI-535. Columbus, OH: Office of 
Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle Memorial Institute; Weitzberg, A. 1982, Building on 
Existing Institutions to Perpetuate Knowledge of Waste Repositories. ONWI-379. 
Columbus, OH: Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle Memorial Institute. 


[1-3] Rochlin, G.I. 1977. "Nuclear Waste Disposal -- Two Social Criteria," Science. Vol. 
195, no. 4273, 23-31. 


[1-4] Rosenthal, D. 1990. At the Heart of the Bomb: The Dangerous Allure of Weapons 
Work. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


[1-5] American Nuclear Society. 1988. "World List of Nuclear Power Plants Operable, 
Under Construction, or on Order (30 MWe and Over) as of December 31, 1987," 
Nuclear News. Vol. 31, no. 2, 63-82. 


[1-6] Givens, D.B. 1982. ‘‘From Here to Eternity: Communicating with the Distant Future,’’ 
Et cetera. Vol. 39, no. 2, 159-179. 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


F-32 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


2. The Problem of Message 


2.1 Message definition 


Modern understanding of the communications enterprise shows that there can be little separation 
of the content of a message from its form, and from its transportation vehicle. They affect each 
other, and all of it is message. McLuhan and Fiore [Ref. 2-1] take that even further, arguing 
that "the medium is the message." Given this, rather than our attempting to first articulate 
messages, then to select their form, and then to design their vehicle, we choose to do as much 
of this simultaneously as is reasonable, attempting to accomplish 


@ a Gestalt, in which more is received than sent, 


@ a Systems Approach, where the various elements of the communication system are linked to 
each other, act as indexes to each other, are co-presented and reciprocally reinforcing, and 


e Redundancy, where some elements of the system can be degraded or lost without substantial 
damage to the system’s capacity to communicate. — 


Everything on this site is conceived of as part of the message communication...from the very 
size of the whole site-marking down to the design of protected inscribed reading walls and the 
shapes of materials and their joints. In this report, the various levels of message content are 
described, as is the content of each level, the various modes of message delivery, and the most 


appropriate physical form for each. 


We obviously recommend that a very large investment be made in the overall framework of this 
system, in the marking of the entire site, and in a communication mode that is non-linguistic, 
not rooted in any particular culture, and thus not affected by the expected certain transformation 
of cultures. This mode uses species-wide archetypes...of meanings bonded to form, such that 
the physical form of the site and its constructions are both message content and mode of 
communication. Thus, the most emphatically delivered message is the meaning-bonded-to-form 
in the site itself. (See Section 4 for the message the site is asked to deliver.) 


As part of a system of message communication, we recommend substantial use of verbal texts 
and graphics, but with little emphasis on constructed, non-natural, non-iconic symbols. These 
texts and graphics act as indexes to each other, and act as indexes across message levels. We 
also suggest the site be marked so it is anomalous to its surroundings in its physical properties 
such as electrical conductivity and magnetism. 


F-33 


Appendix F: Team A Report 

2.2 Message levels and criteria 

2.2.1 Message Levels 

Givens [Ref. 2-2] describes four information levels for the messages: 

e Level I: Rudimentary Information: "Something man-made is here" 

e Level II: Cautionary Information: "Something man-made is here and it is dangerous" 


e Level Il: Basic Information: Tells what, why, when, where, who, and how (in terms of 
information relay, not how the site was constructed) 


e Level IV: Complex Information: Highly detailed, written records, tables, figures, graphs, 
maps, and diagrams 


Our discussions led to two expansions of Givens’ work. First, we decided that it was possible 
to convey a sense of danger, foreboding, and dread without the use of language or pictures. 
This would be done within the context of site design. Under these circumstances, what would 
generally be considered as Level I components (e.g., earthworks) would be able to convey both 
Level I and Level It messages. Second, we decided to have a fifth level that lay between 
Givens’ Level II and Level IV. The new Level IV would have more detail than Level III but 
still not be the complete rulemaking record. The latter level is now called Level V. Specific 
examples of the different level messages are given in Section 4.6.2. 


The general approach taken by the team is that the emphasis is on clarity and, where possible, 
brevity. Overly long and complex messages will be too difficult and time-consuming to translate 
to be effective. The message must be straightforward and neither understate nor overstate the 
hazards of the site. The difficulty in formulating the message is that many normal human 
activities, e.g., house building and farming, can occur on the surface without jeopardizing the 
performance of the repository. Problems begin only when deeper drilling and excavation occur. 


We decided against a large radiation symbol prominently displayed on a marker lest the potential 
intruders take a quick reading, find nothing more than background radiation, and ignore the rest 
of the message. We did decide that the incorporation of a radiation symbol was appropriate © 
within the larger context of the message. As a symbol, it could provide a link between textual 
and pictorial information. 


We decided against simple ‘‘Keep Out’’ messages with scary faces. Museums and private 
collections abound with such guardian figures removed from burial sites. These earlier warning 
messages did not work because the intruder knew that the burial goods were valuable. We did 
decide to include faces portraying horror and sickness (see Sections 3.3 and 4.5.1). Such faces 
would relate to the potential intruder wishing to protect himself or herself, rather than to 
protecting a valued resource from thievery. 


F-34 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


We decided against overstatement of the danger. The ‘“Touch one stone and you will die’’ 
approach is unacceptable because it is not credible. Inevitably, someone will investigate the site 
in a non-intrusive manner. Nothing will happen to that person, and the rest of the message will 
therefore be ignored. There was consensus, however, on the need to mark the site and on the 
need to convey the dangers to the potential intruder. 


We consider the key to a successful marking system to be a credible conveyance of the dangers 
of disturbing the repository. We must inform potential intruders what lies below and the 
consequences of disturbing the waste. If they decide that the value of the metal component of 
the waste far outweighs the risks of recovering the metal, the decision is their responsibility, not 
ours. 


The warning information is divided up into multiple message levels and occurs in different 
spatial configurations to prevent information overload. The Level II message is short and 
simple. It is meant to function during the time the language is still readable by the intentional 
intruder. If a sufficient amount of time has passed that the language is difficult to interpret or 
needs to be translated, the Level III and Level IV messages provide larger blocks of text that 
will be easier to translate. 


The general guideline for the message levels is that they are linked or indexed. Any intruder 
that can comprehend a given message level will be able to comprehend lower message levels. 
At least two levels of information appear on or in any given component of the marking system, 
thus allowing a link from lower to higher level messages. If there is not a physical link between 
message levels on a given component, there is a linguistic ‘‘pointer’’ that there is another set 
of information at the site. 


2.2.2 Criteria 


Givens [Ref. 2-2] presents criteria for a warning system for a nuclear waste disposal site. We 
have addressed the criteria in our designs. The designs presented here use a mixture of iconic, 
symbolic, and linguistic signs. 


Iconic signs are used with written languages to convey information for message Levels IL 
through IV. Unlike Givens, the team had difficulty designing an iconic narrative that could 
unambiguously convey complex information, such as contamination of the food chain and its 
effects on human health. As he points out, a picture may be worth a thousand words, but it may 
be difficult to determine which thousand words a set of pictures may evoke. We will be 
interested to learn of B Team’s work in this area. 


We in Team A, however, selected sample icons for use within the marker system. They are 


limited in number, have emotional impact, and are not culturally bound. Section 4.5 gives 
examples of the potential icons to be used within the marking system. 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


Symbols do not play a large role in our marking system. The consensus within the team is that 
symbols are culturally learned. For example, to know that a picture of a beetle means more than 
a beetle when it appears on an ancient Egyptian tomb wall means that the viewer must be aware 
that it was a symbol of rebirth. The dung beetle (scarab) rolls around its seemingly lifeless ball 
of dirt only to have life burst forth from it. This became a metaphor for the beetle rolling the 
ball of the sun (which gives life) across the sky. The sun disappears (dies) every evening and 
is reborn every morning. Yet the significance of the scarab could be reconstructed because of 
its context within language. In a similar manner, the marking system design incorporates the 
radiation symbol, which has already been established as an international symbol for 40 years, 
in multiple contexts to allow future readers to reconstruct its meaning. 


We found that redundancy in many forms was crucial to the functioning of the marking system. 
Both textual and non-textual (landscape architecture) methods are used to convey information 
about the WIPP site. Symbols, icons, and language are used within the textual methods of 
conveying information. Different languages are used as a means of redundancy within the last 
category. Another form of redundancy is standardization of a general marking system design 
and its use at all potentially hazardous radioactive waste disposal sites. This repetition enhances 
the understandability of the message. WIPP should not be unique. An archaeologist prays to 
find that unique site or object that will make her or his reputation. Then, when it is found, she 
or he bemoans the fact that there are no comparisons that can be made to enhance our 
understanding of the find. 


Finally, the site will be marked even if we do not place a marking system there (see Section 
1.3). The visual (e.g., surface depression) and non-visual anomalies (e.g., seismic profile) at 
the site will attract further investigation. Our task is to give the potential intruder sufficient 
credible information to allow him or her to decide whether to leave the site alone. (nformed, 
intentional intrusion is not covered by the regulation.) To this end we use a mixture of durable 
signs and sign vehicles to claim the area boldly as one set aside for a specific and special 


purpose. 


2.3 Which message level is necessary to deter intrusion? 
2.3.1 Activities Near the Site 


At the onset of this task, the Markers panel received an introduction to the WIPP site and 
background information on the research to date. The introduction included a review of scenarios 
developed by the Futures panel teams and the possible modes of intrusion by both near-site and 
on-site activities. Follow-up information included performance assessments for several scenarios 
involving intrusion by exploratory boreholes for hydrocarbons. The team considered subsidiary 
markers at nearby towns to link with the marking system at the WIPP site itself. We decided 
against this approach because (1) it was too easy to misinterpret the subsidiary marker as 
indicating another smaller repository, and (2) it was too difficult to identify all the potential areas 
where such activities would occur during the next 10,000 years. We believe that it is appropri- 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


ate to place written information at nearby towns to inform the local population about the site and 
the danger of activities that could affect its performance. There is a general request, however, 
in the Level III message not to disturb the rocks or water at the site. This is a link between the 
marking system at the site itself and off-site activities, and is consistent with the charge to the 
Markers panel for an emphasis on preventing boreholes at and excavation of the site itself. 


2.3.2 Activities at the Site 


A Level I message without cautionary intent or higher level messages is insufficient to deter 
intrusion. In fact, its presence will simply spur investigation. Therefore an earthwork without 
cautionary content in its form or without associated higher level messages is not acceptable. 


The consensus of the group is that message Levels I through IV should be present at the site 
itself. Each message level will be repeated more than once in the marking system design for 
the sake of redundancy. 


Level V information, by its very nature and volume, is not suited to engraving on stone. It is 
suited to the media of acid-free paper, microform, and electronic form (e.g., CD-ROM). These 
can be reproduced relatively cheaply and dispersed into numerous libraries world-wide. (See 


Weitzberg [Ref. 2-3] for more details on the dissemination of Level V information.) 


2.4 References 


[2-1] McLuhan, M., and Q. Fiore. 1967. The Medium is the Massage (sic), New York, NY: 
Random House, Inc. 


[2-2] Givens, D.B. 1982. "From Here to Eternity: Communicating with the Distant Future," 
Et cetera. Vol. 39, no. 2, 159-179. 


[2-3] Weitzberg, A. 1982. Building on Existing Institutions to Perpetuate Knowledge of Waste 


Repositories. ONWI-379. Columbus, OH: Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle 
Memorial Institute. 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


3. Components of a Marking System 


3.1 Communications: site and structures 


MODES OF COMMUNICATION: 


Section 3 presents the general background to the modes of communication used to convey the 
messages. Detailed examples implementing these thoughts are represented in Section 4. 


3.2 General discussion: for the site as a whole and individual site structures 


A major premise of our work is that the physical form of the entire WIPP and each and all the 
structures on it can itself be a communication...through a universal, ‘‘natural language’’ of 
forms. 


Furthermore, a major component of the site’s communicative capacity is the importance we give 
it. (One measure of importance is the sheer enormity of work done to mark it.) This 
communication of importance cannot be achieved just through markers on the site. (The use of 
vertical stone markers not only will not suffice, it well may introduce substantial message 
ambiguity through their form alone. This is discussed later.) 


The capacity to communicate meaning through physical form is based or an enduring human 
propensity to experience common and stable meanings in the physical forms of things, including 
the design of landscapes and built-places. Such communication operates in a different mode 
from, and independently of, linguistic modes of communication. There is an emerging literature 
on the ‘‘semantics of design’’ in architecture, landscape architecture, and industrial and product 
design, some of it in our citations. 


While some form-carried meanings are certainly based in or modified by cultures, others far 
more basic both predate and thus transcend (or bypass) particular cultures, forming a 
species-wide ‘‘natural language’’ we are all either born knowing or learn from the early life 
experiences that are common to human existence everywhere. These meanings-embodied-in- 
form and communicated through form are archetypal, seem to vary little across cultures or 
epochs, have already endured with us for over several hundred thousand years, and are expected 
to endure unchanged for far longer than this project’s time frame of 10,000 years. 


There are particular places (built-forms and natural and made-landscapes) that elicit powerful 
feelings in almost everybody. These places feel ‘‘charged,’’ almost in an electric sense, and the 
places seem filled with meaning. Most places, of course, are not charged and few are filled 
with meaning. The places that do carry charge and meaning are sometimes beautiful, but at 
least as many are ugly, awesome, or forbidding. Their importance is in their content (the 
message), far more than their form, and the success of their forms is in their expressive 
capacity, not their aesthetics. 


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These meanings and feelings often come to people in places that are not even of their culture or 
time. Obvious examples are the way Stonehenge and the painted caves [Ref. 3-1] of Altamira 
[Ref. 3-2] and Lascaux [Ref. 3-3] evoke profound feelings in modern viewers. This stable and 
common response to certain places thus seems to transcend particular cultures and particular 
times. (Recent cross-cultural research in peoples’ preferences for types of landscapes supports 
this.) It suggests an origin in something much broader than individual experience and older and 
deeper than culture, something that is species-wide, part of what it is to be human. 


3.2.1 The Concept of Archetypes 


Why do the meanings attributed to and feelings evoked by certain types of forms recur so 
frequently across cultures and epochs? A general answer is offered by work in such fields as 
cultural anthropology, philosophy, evolutionary biology, semiotics, psycho-analytic theory, 
mythology, and comparative religion, which suggest that such a phenomenon is explainable by 
the presence of what some call ‘‘archetypes’’ in us. Archetypes result from inherited 
propensities to respond to certain forms, or to experience certain forms, in specific ways 
affectively. Archetypal forms are those that evoke these responsive propensities. Archetypes have 
always played an essential role in human physiological, social and spiritual functioning, evoking 
feelings of anger, aspiration, nurturing, desire, community, order, and death, to name some of 
the phenomena about which we still feel, think, and ponder most profoundly. 


Many argue that the origins of our strong feelings and meanings in these special places come 
from their resonance with something already inside us, like templates in the mind, which have 
been called various names: Archetype; Imprint, Innate Releasing Mechanism, Primary Image; 
Elementary Idea, Inherited Memory, Isomorph, Cosmic Model, Embodied Myth, Shadows, 
Memory Deposit, Engram, and others. An archetype seems to be a naturally occurring creation 
of human experience and human spirit, but not one fully explainable or explorable through 
analytic modes of thought. We need not subscribe to theories of a ‘‘collective unconscious’’ or 
to other explanations for archetypes in order to work effectively with such forms, as artists and 
architects have been doing for centuries. 


3.2.2 Archetypes Operating as a Natural Language 


If the physical forms of places can communicate meanings, then places have a narrative capacity, 
a capacity to tell us a story about ourselves. But like each of the symbolic forms (language, 
dance, sculpture, myth, etc.) engaged in narrative, or re-presentation, form of place tells certain 
stories well and certain ones less well, depending on the ‘‘fit’’ between each symbolic form’s 
fundamental qualities and mechanisms and the stories it tries to tell. The best voice of place, 
its most robust and effortless speaking, is through a natural language of spatial physicality. The 
language is called “‘natural’’ because it is a language we do not have to learn...we seem to 
understand it without learning it. 


This is not a symbolic language that one must learn (through one’s culture), like the meaning 


of the cross, the swastika, the trefoil radiation symbol, or that buildings done in Greek or 
Roman styles today are somehow ‘“‘more important.’’ 


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Meaning is received by all the senses (including the haptic sense of body structure and postures), 
by the mind, and is probably more felt than understood. It does not have precise meanings, but 
rather, flickers of, bundles of, even a mosaic of meanings. No absolutely direct translation into 
language is possible, or even appropriate. Places speak in another way. 


As one example of the meanings inherent in a form, let us examine a particular form of vertical 
stone marker, variously called stele, obelisk, standing-stone, and memorial column. These have 
been historically and commonly used to commemorate honored phenomena. So, when a people 
wish to remember an important relationship, event or personage, a location is dedicated to it and 
often marked with an enduring and aspiring vertical form or sets of them. In natural language, 
a vertical stone means: an aspiring connector between us (on earth) and an ideal (up there); that 
we ‘“‘stand up’’ with pride about this honored phenomenon. The marker is a symbolic 
inhabitation of the place it occupies. Its size and workmanship is a sacrifice of much work and 
resources to a memory. It is a strong suggestion (because we left it to them and it is of durable 
material) that future people also give honor to the memorialized phenomenon. When we use’ this 
particular physical form of the vertical marker, both its historic use as an honorific and its 
meanings in natural language may well send a message that this is an honored place, a place 
about a ‘‘good’’ both in our culture and in the culture of future observers. Such a message 
would be inappropriate for the WIPP site. This discussion is not meant to discard use of 
markers, but to re-examine some underlying assumptions and, perhaps, to place markers in the 
context of a larger set of markings. The team recommends the use of vertical masonry markers, 
if their form feels dangerous, more like jagged teeth and thorns than ideals embodied. 


In any scenario(s) for the future, a natural language, one that is relatively independent of cultural 
conditioning and can survive cultural discontinuity, offers a stable means of communication. 
There are certain future scenarios, where natural language may become a most valuable means 
of communication. It has, however, clear limitations on any message content needing the 
precision of linguistic text. Only markers with durable pictograms and text, and off-site/on-site 
archives can provide this precision. Our site design will function best when complemented with 
more precise/specific modes of communication...but few other modes of communication have 
the durability and power of natural language. 


3.2.3 The Medium for Expression of Place-Archetypes 


The materials best used to manifest the content of place-archetypes must be the very stuff of 
place itself...that which differentiates place from all else. At its core, place is an 
earth-grounded, sky-covered, sheltering and surrounding physical spatiality that we inhabit and 
move through. From this, we can describe the basic elements from which places derive 
meaning. 


In the reaim of landscape and architectonic built-form the elements that constitute all built-form 
and thus their meanings are: landform; location; fixity; markedness; substantiality; orientations 
and direction; order, rhythm, and sequence; acknowledgement of celestial activity; center and 
boundaries; dimensions and shapes; parts and wholes; enclosure and openness; passage and 
penetration; views to and from; light and dark; time and movement; available energy; plant 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


material and its cycles; building materials ordered and worked; surface manipulation; local 
altering of climate; relationship to the near surround; inhabitation by the one and the many; 
maintenance, care, and sacrifice; and use, retirement, and ruin. 


There are messages that place-design can easily communicate. To speak of architecture and 
landscape architecture as a ‘‘natural language’’ helps us to understand its capacity to 
communicate, but does not help us to know how. If we use language as the ‘‘model’’ for a 
place’s capacity to communicate, we misunderstand it. It speaks in a different way. 
Place-design can speak about all the following, and importantly for this project, about their 
opposites as well: the flight from Chaos to Cosmos, and an ordering of intransigent nature; 
transformation and ordering of materiality; locating and sheltering; a locus for inhabitation and 
dwelling; safety and security; stability; an investment of energy; aspiration; nurturance; a focus 
of care and maintenance; a declaring of value and values; and a way we represent ourselves to 
ourselves, and others. 


The ‘‘language’’ is in and of form, and is multivalent, imprecise, and powerful. Yet, it is 
clearly possible to develop design guidelines for places to act as communications of ideas in a 
natural language of form. As an example, Brill [Ref. 3-4] developed design guidelines for 
sacred space that embody and tell myths of the creation of the world, following the research of 
Rapoport [Ref. 3-5] and Eliade [Ref. 3-6]. 


Some of the archetypal feelings and meanings we will explore in design of the markers for the 
WIPP site are those of: danger to the body; darkness; fear of the beast; pattern breaking chaos 
and loss-of-control; dark forces emanating from within; the void or abyss; rejection of 
inhabitation; parched, poisoned and plagued land...and others. In the Design Guidelines in 
Section 4, we describe the meanings we wish our site design and built-form to communicate. 
The possible origins of archetypes are discussed in detail in one of the appendices, Section 5.4. 


3.3 The appropriate use of graphics in marking 

By ‘‘graphics’’ we refer to design elements such as pictures, signs, drawings, pictographs, 
cartoons, icons, and symbols. If language fails, these may provide a powerful means for 
communicating our message. Even if language is understood, moreover, there are forms of 


information that can be more succinctly and successfully transmitted by means of graphics. 


Graphics pose problems, however, that must be carefully considered in their design. 


3.3.1. Ambiguity 


Graphics are likely to be ambiguous. Even for people who share a culture, they can, in the 
absence of accompanying clarifying language, be subject to varying interpretations. Indeed, the 
Thematic Apperception Test, used in clinical psychology, exploits precisely this kind of 
ambiguity in a series of drawings of people in various situations, asking the person being tested 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


to tell a story about what each picture seems to represent. The ‘‘biohazardous waste symbol’’ 
proposed by the Human Interference Task Force [Ref. 1-2] is an example of unintended 
ambiguity. Some people to whom we showed it said it seemed to suggest that one should dig 
in the direction of the downward pointing arrow. The symbol suggested digging claws to them. 


3.3.2. Removal 


Graphics are liable to be perceived as ‘‘art’’ and to be removed. Such perception becomes 
increasingly likely in the course of time as they become seen as relics of the art of a past 
civilization to be displayed in museums or sold to art collectors. Witness what happened to the 
stelae of the Maya. 


3.3.3. Cultural Restrictions 


Graphics are likely to be culturally restricted in meaning. There are no conventional signs, such 
as the skull and crossbones,' for example, that convey the same meaning across cultures. A bar 
across a picture of someone digging may suggest prohibition of digging to people now, but one 
cannot be sure that it will not be seen as suggesting something positive about digging 3,000 
years from now. Representations of human faces and human and animal figures tend to be 
recognized for what they are, however, across cultural boundaries and millennia. For example, 
we have no trouble recognizing such figures in the paleolithic cave paintings of Europe and in 
prehistoric rock carvings and rock shelter paintings in Africa, Australia, and the Americas. We 
can even recognize many of the activities in which the human figures in these paintings seem 
to be engaged. But why these representations were put there and what the beholders should infer 
from them are obscure and the subject of conflicting interpretations. Cross-cultural ambiguity 
of this kind is especially likely with the use of cartoons. 


3.3.4. Universal Expressions 


Representations of human facial expressions of emotion and feeling, such as pain, anger, disgust, 
and fear communicate in the same way universally, regardless of cultural differences. They 
recommend themselves, therefore, for appropriate use in the design of the marker system. 


1 Yn Mexico, the bones are the repository of the life force, and thus the skull and crossbones would have a very 
different meaning. 


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3.4 The languages to be inscribed on markers 
3.4.1 The Importance of Linguistic Markings 


While it is possible that the content of pictures, icons, symbols, and so on that are devised today 
might be recognizable to the average person 10,000 years from now, this is surely inconceivable 
for written language. Languages are in a continuous state of change; linguists have no ability 
to predict the course of this change and it is unlikely that they ever will. Certain changes in 
pronunciation and grammar are more likely to occur than others, but languages are such complex 
systems that any tendency to “‘simplify’’ one part of the system is likely to trigger complicating 
effects in another. As a result, there is no general directionality to language change. Also, many 
changes are effects of historical factors that no one can foresee. The primary reason that English 
differs so profoundly from its closest Germanic relative Frisian (spoken in the northern part of 
the Netherlands) is that speakers of the former, but not the latter, were conquered by 
French-speaking Normans. 


As a consequence, only ‘‘experts’’ will be able to read written messages on the markers after 
a number of centuries. Even so, linguistic markings are more important than iconographic ones 
because the former are inherently less ambiguous. Again, barring some drastic cultural 
discontinuity, there will always be scholars capable of reading the major languages of the 
twentieth century. The existence of literally millions of texts (and accompanying grammar books, 
dictionaries, and so on) will ensure that. However, it is not so obvious that the symbols that 
seem obviously iconic to us today will be interpretable in centuries to come. For example, 
considerably more effort must be expended in finding out the meanings of the alchemical, 
zodiacal, and occult symbols that were in common use 500 years ago than of the words that they 
represent. We suspect that 500 years from now, it will be correspondingly easier to uncover the 
meanings of the English words ‘‘radioactivity’’ and ‘‘hazardous waste’’ than of the symbols now 
used to denote them. 


In conclusion, there must be written warnings as well as pictorial-symbolic ones. 

3.4.2 Which Languages Should be Chosen? 

Any decision about the languages of the markers must be based on a combination of factors, the 
most important being the languages spoken at or near the WIPP site itself and the desirability 
of having all waste-disposal sites around the world marked in the same languages. 

3.4.2.1 Linguistic Demography of the WIPP Site 

The language in daily use by the majority of the residents of Eddy County (in which both WIPP 


and the city of Carlsbad are located) is English. The county has a sizeable Hispanic population 
(although not as large as in other parts of New Mexico) with Spanish spoken by a minority of 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


residents, most of whom are bilingual in English. The Mexican border, however, is only 150 
miles away, and parts of west Texas and New Mexico in which Spanish predominates are even 


closer. All projections agree that the percentage of Spanish speakers in this area will increase 
steadily in the foreseeable future. 


Eddy County is less than 1% Indian and does not contain a community of speakers of an Indian 
language. There is a Mescalero Apache reservation about 120 miles to the northwest, with about 
1,800 speakers out of a population of 2,000. There is no actively used written language, 
however, and even the spoken language is severely threatened, as children are not learning it 
or are learning it imperfectly. The huge Navajo reservation occupies the opposite corner of the 
state from the WIPP site and extends into northeast Arizona. The Navajo language has 130,000 
speakers out of a population of 170,000, many of whom live in Albuquerque and other towns 
outside the reservation. The written language is in the healthiest condition of any indigenous to 
North America; newspapers and books are published in it. Given current trends, Navajo should 
last well into the next century; as only about a third of the children are becoming fluent 
speakers, however, it too must be considered threatened. 


3.4.2.2 The Choice of Languages 


Which languages should the messages be in? English and Spanish are obvious choices, by virtue 
of their being spoken in the area of WIPP and also being two of the most widely spoken 
languages in the world. Our feeling is that if the scholars of future millennia cannot read current 
English or Spanish, they won’t be able to read any language of today. However, because there 
are good reasons to mark every radioactive waste site in the world identically, more languages 
should be represented. Those of the United Nations are obvious choices: Arabic, Chinese, 
French, and Russian, in addition to English and Spanish. 


Markers in countries where none of the above is the local language (say, Japan) will also have 
to be marked in that language. This means that (assuming that at least some markers will have 
all languages represented) there will have to be space on the markers for a seventh language. 
We suggest that the seventh language on the WIPP site markers be Navajo. While the immediate 
area contains few if any Navajo speakers, marking in Navajo grants recognition to the fact that 
Native American peoples predominated in the area for many thousands of years. Also, 
Mescalero Apache, which is spoken relatively close to WIPP, is very closely related to Navajo. 


It will be important to consult with the Navajos themselves to ensure that they feel that including 
a message in their language is appropriate. After all, they may see it as a patronizing attempt 
to appease them as one more desecration of what was once Indian land is carried out. That 
Native peoples might not have an automatic revulsion at the idea of marking the WIPP site in 
an indigenous language, however, is suggested by the fact that the President of the Mescalero 
Apache Tribal Council, Wendell Chino, has recently received a Department of Energy grant to 
investigate the possibility of storing radioactive waste on their reservation. 


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There exists today a number of artificially constructed ‘‘international’’ languages, the most 
notable of which is Esperanto. Millions of people in dozens of countries have had some 
connection with this language, but the number of effective speakers is under 50,000. Study and 
use of Esperanto has had its ups and downs. It peaked between the two world wars, and was 
especially popular in the smaller European countries. Its effective death knell was sounded when 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union joined forces to prevent it from becoming a working language of 
the United Nations. We see no prospect of a widespread adoption of Esperanto, and do not 
recommend it as a language of the markers. 


3.5 Public information at the WIPP site 


A marking system whose message is intelligible to the current community has a higher 
probability of long-term understandability than a marking system whose message is unknown or 
unintelligible to its present-day audience. In this section, we present several options for 
enhancing the present-day level of knowledge in order to plant the seeds for future 
understanding. - 


There is a specific purpose for including such efforts to inform the public as part of the marking 
system. The Futures panel identified pressure to drill for oil and gas to be intense over the next 
two centuries. (Beyond that, the sources will have been exhausted and other energy supplies 
must be found.) The period of active institutional control for which credit can be taken is 100 
years. Therefore, there is a 100-year window when there may be intense pressure to drill at the 
WIPP site. This 100-year window comes at the beginning, when the wastes are most dangerous 
(particularly if high-level waste is ever included at WIPP). 


No funding for these public information efforts is assumed beyond the 100-year period of active 
institutional control. A high level of awareness at the beginning of the 100-year window will 
help protect the site during this period. In many cases, what is proposed below would have 
already been considered as part of the Department of Energy plans for public information and 
involvement for WIPP. 


~~ 


3.5.1 Public Involvement in Marking and Publicizing WIPP 


Before a final decision is made on how to mark the WIPP site, a diverse sampling of local 
perception of proposed markers should be gathered. The sample should include a cross section 
of whites, blacks, and Indians; ‘‘Anglos’’ and Hispanics; men and women; and people from a 
wide range of social classes and occupations. Publicity about the site must be aimed effectively 
at the public generally, in all its diversity. 


‘3.5.2 Off-site Archiving 


Any mining or other venture which might tap the buried radioactive waste is likely to be initiated 
from a city at some distance from the WIPP site. All pertinent facts regarding WIPP should thus 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


be filed with any governmental agency, mining company, and so on that we can imagine having 
an interest in exploiting the site. Given the prospect of increasing multi-national ventures, these 


bodies are as likely to lie outside the United States as inside. There is no way, of course, of 
guaranteeing that the relevant information will be passed on to successor bodies over the 
centuries; the best we can do is hope that it will be. 


3.5.3 Empty Space for Reinscription 


Blank spaces should be left on all structures capable of taking inscriptions to allow for 
reinscribing the message in the contemporary local languages or copying from other message 
bearing stones at the site in case of defacement (see Section 4.4.9.3 and Figure 4.3-18). 


3.6 References 


[3-1] Raphael, M. 1945. Prehistoric Cave Paintings. Translated by N. Guterman. The 
Bollinger Series IV. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 


[3-2] Garcia Guinea, M.A. 1975. Altamira y el Arte Prehistorico de las Cuevas de Santander. 
Santander: Patronato de Cuevas Prehistéricas de Santander. 


[3-3] Bataille, G. 1955. Lascaux, or the Birth of Art: Prehistoric Painting. Translated by A. 
Wainhouse. The Great Centuries of Painting. Lausanne, Switzerland: Skira. 


[3-4] [Brill, M.] 1985. ‘‘Using the Place-Creation Myth to Develop Design Guidelines for 
Sacred Space, an address given to the annual Council of Educators in Landscape 
Architecture (CELA) Conference. University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, September 20, 1985. 
(Copy on file in the Nuclear Waste Management Library, Sandia National Laboratories, 


Albuquerque, NM.) 


[3-5] Rapoport, A. 1982. ‘‘Sacred Places, Sacred Occasions and Sacred Environments,’’ 
Architectural Design. Vol. 52, no. 9/10, 75-82. 


[3-6] Eliade, M. 1954. The Myth of the Eternal Return. Bollingen Series 46. New York, NY: 
Pantheon Books. 


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4. Criteria for a Marking System with Examples 


4.1 Site design guidelines for a design of the entire site, so it is a major component of 
a system of messages 


The Design Guidelines herein will be largely performance-based, that is, they describe how the 
design must perform, rather than what it must look like or be made of. These guidelines can, 
in turn, be used as criteria to evaluate designs. Because performance-based design guidelines do 
not describe the design, but rather what the design must do, several alternative designs can be 
developed in response to the guidelines. We have developed designs using the design guidelines, 
both as a test of the utility of the guidelines and as an expression of the team’s preferred 
solutions. Because all the designs cover the entire interment, and then some, we refer to them 
as ‘‘site designs.’’ These designs are presented in Section 4.2.' 


The various site design issues may be listed as follows: 
e The site must be marked. 


e §=6All levels of message complexity should be located on-site. Thus, communication vehicles 
for information at Levels I, II, Il, and IV should be on the WIPP site and available to 
humans. As well, this team has developed specific message content for each level, 
presented later in Section 4.6. 


e The design of the whole site itself is to be a major source of meaning, acting as a 
framework for other levels of information, reinforcing and being reinforced by those other 
levels in a system of communication. The message that we believe can be communicated 
non-linguistically (through the design of the whole site), using physical form as a ‘‘natural 
language,’’ encompasses Level I and portions (faces showing horror and sickness) of Level 
II. Put into words, it would communicate something like the following: 


This place is a message...and part of a 
system of messages...pay attention to it! 


Sending this message was important to us. 
We considered ourselves to be a powerful culture. 


This place is not a place of honor...no 
highly esteemed deed is commemorated here 
...nNothing valued is here. 


1 In this discussion and then later in the descriptions of the designs that test these design guidelines we will use 
the expression "the Keep" to define an area whose size and shape is the "footprint" or the vertical projection 
on the site’s surface of the final interment area. Our team’s analysis suggests that the final footprint may be 
larger than currently shown because of both migration of radionuclides in the salt and future expansion. 


F-49 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


What is here was dangerous and repulsive to us. 
This message is a warning about danger. 


The danger is in a particular location... 
it increases towards a center...the 
center of danger is here...of a 
particular size and shape, and below us. 


The danger is still present, in your time, as 
it was in ours. 


The danger is to the body, and it can Kill. 


The form of the danger is an emanation 
of energy. 


The danger is unleashed only if you 
substantially disturb this place physically. 
This place is best shunned and left uninhabited. 


e All physical site interventions and markings must be understood as communicating a message. 
It is not enough to know that this is a place of importance and danger...you must know that 
the place itself is a message, that it contains messages, and is part of a system of messages, 
and is a system with redundance. 


e Redundancy of message communication is important to message survivability. Redundancy 
should be achieved through: (a) a high frequency of message locations, permitting some to 
be lost; (b) making direct and physical links among message levels, that is, ‘“co-presentation’’ 
of messages; and (c) multiple and mutually reinforcing modes of communication. 


It is expected that the number of presentations of messages will decrease as the message 
complexity (or Level) increases. Thus, there will be many more presentations of Level II 
linguistic messages than of Level IV. 


While the system of marking should strongly embody the principles of redundancy, at the 
same time the methods of achieving redundancy should be carefully designed to maintain 
message clarity. Redundancy should not be achieved at the expense of clarity. 


e The method of site-marking must be very powerful to distinguish this place from all other 
types of places, so that the future must pay attention to this site. The place’s physical 
structure should strongly suggest enhanced attention to itself and to its subelements. To 
achieve this, the volume of human effort used to make and mark this place must be 
understood as massive, emphasizing its importance to us. The site’s constructions must be 


F-50 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


seen as an effort at the scale of a grand and committed culture, far beyond what a group or 
sect or organization could do. 


About scale: ‘‘Scale’’ refers to the perceived size relationship between a human and something 
else (like a house or a chair or a site). When the size of a thing gets far larger than a person, 
changes in scale are not easily perceived or are experienced as irrelevant. Thus, there is little 
difference to a person at ground level whether an earthwork is 1 mile or 2 miles long. These 
distances are experienced as much the same. What we propose as a marking for this site is 
already at a scale where it could be somewhat smaller or larger with no loss of meaning. And 
further, if the design were to be replicated elsewhere, it could be (somewhat) scaled up or 
down with no loss of meaning. 


¢ Vertical masonry markers alone are simply not enough to accomplish our purposes. They are 
not large enough, nor frequent enough, nor sufficiently distinguishing from other sites already 
so marked; and their use elsewhere may well make their use here somewhat trivial and 
certainly ambiguous. If only markers are used here, they will be seen as much like markers 
on other sites, which are generally sites of far less import, and also tend to be marked because 
they are honorific or commemorative, the opposite of the message we seek to send. 


© Use a system of markings that utilizes the whole site as an enormous mark, and that includes: 
smaller markers; high points to climb to from which to view the entire site; walls and places 
to be in that co-locate viewers with messages...an organized environment. Consider the 
possible retention of a currently existing structure for symbolic purposes only, as a decaying 
massiveness. 


As for use of existing-site structures, if we assume no active institutional control, the 
only current above-ground site structure that might endure for a substantial portion of the 
10,000 years would be the thick-walled concrete “‘hot’’ cell. The other buildings will 
decay, or more probably be stripped of their valuable building materials for re-use. 


The ‘‘hot’’ cell may be put to symbolic use by incorporating it into the site’s design, as 
a mute artifact suggesting something ‘‘strong’’ that needed to be contained, although 
from its large door size, a thing that had to be easily accessible and thus was (probably) 
not treasure. And, because the ‘‘hot’’ cell’s openings are randomly placed, rather than 
symmetrical, it would tend not to be mistaken for an honorific or privileged structure. 
If the ‘‘hot’’ cell is kept, it should not be located in the geometric center of any open 
space, which would symbolically elevate its importance. 


¢ While this system of markings should represent an enormous effort and investment of 


resources on our part, the construction itself should be of materials of little value, and the 
workmanship should not bestow any value through elegance of craft or artistry. Doing 


F-51 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


substantial work on materials of little value suggests that the place is not commemorative of 
phenomena highly valued by the culture that made it, but as marking something important yet 
quite unvalued...not a treasure, but its opposite...a location of highly devalued material 
(‘dangerous garbage’’ or an ‘‘un-treasure’’), 


The place should not suggest shelter, protection or nurture...it should suggest that it is not a 
place for dwelling, nor for farming or husbandry. This would be most strongly communicated 
if the place obviously tries to deny inhabitation and utilization. It might best be designed as 
a place difficult to be in, and to work in...both actually and symbolically. Given this, the 
center of the place should reject rather than embrace. Any attractive focus on/near the center 
would suggest welcome, and by extension, occupancy and utilization. 


We believe there is no physical barrier we can devise that (some) future technology cannot 
breach, and any attempt to bar entry physically to the Keep can and will be breached (by 
cutting through it, going under it, or coming down from above). Thus, any ‘‘barrier’’ placed 
around the Keep can only be purely symbolic, and should be used to enclose it only in a 
spatial sense rather than to attempt a fortification or a security barrier. 


As to the meaning of ‘‘center’’: physically to mark the WIPP site in any way makes it a 
different place from the surrounding desert, and creates a ‘‘figure’’ against a ‘‘ground.’’ It 
makes a center in the desert. 


For human beginnings, making a center (‘‘here we are’’) is the first act of marking order 
(Cosmos) out of undifferentiation (Chaos). All further meanings of ‘‘center’’ derive from this 
original positive valence. The meanings of ‘‘center’’ have always been as a highly valued 
place or a gathering place...the holy of holies; the statue centered within the temple, itself 
centered within the settlement; the dancing ground; the sacred place as the physical and 
spiritual center of a people, etc. In this project, we want to invert this symbolic meaning, to 
suggest that the center is not a place of privilege, or honor, or value, but its opposite. In 
symbolic terms, we suggest that the largest portion of the Keep, its center, be left open, and 
few (if any) structures placed there, so that symbolically it is: uninhabited, shunned, a void, 
a hole, a non-place. 


As for the geometric center, placement of anything at dead-center of the Keep would suggest 
that it is of the utmost importance, occupying the place of greatest privilege. We do not 
believe there is any one thing that can or should play that role on this site. (For example, 
someone might suggest that the highest Level IV of information might be placed at the center. 
But because a Level IV message may be gibberish to some intruders, while a Level II message 
would be well understood, no level of message is more important than any other, and no 
particular message or level is important enough to occupy the most privileged location.) 


F-52 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Design of the entire site and its subelements should avoid those forms that humans regularly 
tend to use to represent the ‘‘ideal,’’ ‘‘perfection,’’ or ‘‘aspiration.’’ Aspiring forms are 
sky-reaching verticals, the obelisk, for example. Ideal and perfect ones are the perfect forms 
of symmetrical geometry (spheres, pyramids, hexagons) and of regular crystalline structures 
or polyhedrons. If such forms are used, we suggest their perfection be undermined through 
substantial and obviously meant ‘‘irregularity,’’ as if its builders knew about the ideal and 
perfection, but asserted that this place is not about them. More appropriate types of forms 
to use are amorphic or jagged and horizontal, a deliberate shunning of the values of 
‘‘perfection’’ or ‘‘aspiration.”’ 


A major site-delivered message is that this place is ominous, not to be disturbed. This Level 
II message can be delivered both through site design and through ‘‘reading walls,’’ discussed 
later. Message levels will probably be delivered in a sequence, but no level of message is 
more valuable than another. The design should incorporate this parity of levels. While Level 
IV information is certainly the most complete and detailed of all our communications at the 
site, there are certainly plausible future scenarios under which it will be of less value than a 
Level II message, or even of no value at all, even if seen. Thus, Level IV is more complex, 
but not a more valuable message to us (or future people), and its location should symbolically 
bestow no more value or privilege on it than on other message levels. 


The design should provide a general sense of the magnitude, shape, and location of the 
original danger. Because there is no apparent danger at the site’s surface, the design makes 
it clear that the danger is below and threatens to escape. The site design should also articulate 
that the dangerous material is bounded, has a substantial footprint that is of a certain shape. 
Going out from this on-surface imprint might be concentric bands designed to signify 
diminishing danger. It is not necessary to mark the Land Withdrawal boundary; it is a legal 
boundary that will be meaningless in a few centuries. 


The enormity of this site’s undertaking and its shape should be visible and comprehendible 
in its entirety, as a panorama. A panorama, the “‘seeing-all’’ from an altitude, is an ancient 
human metaphor for knowing, and seeking it is natural. Thus, provide elevated points for site 
viewing (mound, ziggurat, tower...all of which can be climbed for viewing). 


The site-marking system should also function as a locator for multiple concepts of location and 
should: 


locate the site in relation to local centers of pop- 


ulation of our time (which may contain archives 
as part of the information system); 


F-53 


ane oe ein we enn wale ante = Seana 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


locate this site in relationship to other disposal 
Sites in the world; 


locate the viewer (‘“you are here’’) on all three 
spatial axes in relationship to the entire site and 
its subelements, and to the hazard; 


locate the construction of this site in time; locate 
all on-site positions of Level III and IV messages. 


e The place should be understood as both special and ominous from the air and from a distance. 
This implies a scale of construction whose heights are substantially greater than dunes, and 
whose overall pattern strongly differentiates it from desert. 


¢ Maintain an approach and access to the place; permit and welcome access while suggesting 
the possibility of danger. Approached from ground level, information about the danger of the 
place should be available before you enter the Keep. From any point in the Withdrawn Area, 
a person must perceive that there is a direction of more or less danger, a gradient. Because 
it is probable that you cannot ‘“‘see’’ the whole place from the ground, each part you 
encounter must point to a beneficial direction towards which to move. 


As for details of the place and markers, we note the following: 


e Inscribed messages need to be protected from future tourists taking pieces home as souvenirs. 
While messages need to be visually accessible, they should not be physically reachable. Thus, 
consider messages engraved high on hard-to-climb markers; message walls separated from 
viewing positions by a greater-than-jumping-distance chasm, etc. 


e Because today’s languages are not expected to be comprehensible to people other than future 
language scholars, part of the linguistic message should be an urgent request to update 
linguistic messages, to re-inscribe the messages as languages change. The physical design of 
message places should suggest and welcome such reinscription, perhaps by providing a 
sequence of “‘empty’’ markers near the original ones, or empty spaces’ on markers. 


e Wherever, possible, use design principles in which the intended performance of something is 
not diminished as. it degrades or fails. So the design of the place, and its construction, 
materials and configurations should gain, rather than lose, communicative capacity as parts 
erode over time, or as pieces are removed. Erosion or dismantling should expose new 
messages or reinforce them. (For example, in a wall built of stones, also inscribe messages 
on the surfaces not exposed, adjacent to the faces of other stones, so if the stone is removed, 


F-54 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


fresh messages appear. Because they are the same messages, curiosity should be reduced 
about what the next stone says.) 


e The shape of built-structures (markers, walls, sculptural forms...) should enhance their 
durability. For example, we might use curved and bowed forms to: 


“‘dish’’ wind-driven sand, which otherwise acts as 
an eroder; 


have no sharp corners or arises, which are the 
first parts of faceted forms to spall and erode; 


use materials whose geometry makes them poorly 
suited for reuse as a building material elsewhere 
...(shapes on which too much work would need 
to be done to make them geometrically suitable 
for re-use construction); 


protect other forms whose durability is more im- 
portant. 


© Inscriptions of the simplest linguistic and pictorial messages (Level Il) should occur with more 
frequency than Levels II and IV inscriptions, and many of them should be fully accessible 
to message-viewers, implying their placement at external locations. These frequently 
occurring inscription locations should be reasonably protected from direct attack by.eroding 
forces. As an example, for an inscription on a wall, consider locating a second wall, higher 
and wider than the inscribed one, in a position that protects the inscribed wall and yet permits 
comfortable viewing by a few people. This second wall is ‘‘sacrificed’’; it will erode to save 
the other. 


e As for location(s) of Level IV information: While there certainly should/will be off-site 
archives for Level IV messages, and their locations described on-site, there must be Level IV 
message(s) available at the site to guarantee its availability. Continued retention and 
maintenance of archives elsewhere imply a highly improbable level of institutional control. 
Thus, at the site, there should be several locations for Level IV messages. 


© Design of Level IV message places must recognize that a Level TV message, in any one 
language, takes up far more space than all others (about 10 times more than of Level T]) and 
also involves non-text graphics such as diagrams and tables, further increasing space needs. 
We expect fewer Level IV messages at the site and a lower level of redundancy for this most 
complex level of message. Thus, Level TV message must have a high probability of enduring 


F-55 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


at the site. Only things unexposed to climatic cycles of change can endure. Thus, we 
recommend that each location of Level IV information be contained in an enclosed room 
whose exterior surfaces are protected from wind erosion and change cycles. So, provide for 
concrete or stone rooms underground, or embedded in earth/rubble above ground. (See the 
design drawing of Level IV room, Section 4.3, Fig. 4.3-17.) Consider as well some Level 
IV rooms at successive depths, revealed over time through site activities at the site. 


In these rooms, we recommend the following: 
© Messages be engraved in stone, primarily on vertical surfaces. 


e Periodic table of the elements and astronomical drawings be inscribed on tilted stones at table 
height, the tilt clarifying which is top and which is the bottom of drawings. 


© Messages be of a type size and at a height readable by a standing or seated individual (an area 
of inscription between 3- and 8-feet high would be optimum for a standing person to read). 


¢ Relationship between type size and viewing distance affects both legibility and the amount of 
wall space needed for messages. 


e The principle of redundancy suggests that several layers of message-on-stone be available in 
case a future people removes a set for study. 


e The message-on-stone layers should be of identical stone materials and shaped to reduce their 
desirability as a building material (perhaps with odd shaped edges and bumpy backs). 


e Several entries to each room be provided, each of them a removable stone or concrete plug 
that can slide into/out of an opening about 2 1/2 feet square, large enough for human entry 
but too small to remove stone message panels intact. These entries should be marked so that 
excavators can find them easily. 


© Room size should be dependent only on type size and viewing distance, message length, and 
number of languages. The room’s purpose is to be seen as entirely pragmatic, a ‘‘message 
center’’ rather than symbolic or sacred. 


© Overall comprehension can be reinforced by prominent sculptural models of the site showing 
on-surface and sub-surface elements of the site and the original location of the waste. The 
models should have scale, in relationship to themselves, to a person, or to the site. 


Following this presentation of overall Design Guidelines is a set of designs that act as examples 


of these guidelines in physical form; as tests of the efficacy of the guidelines; and as a 
presentation of this team’s preferences in design. There are several major families of design, 


F-56 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


demonstrating the range of responses possible and, also, that the guidelines are capable of 
multiple interpretations. 


As well, there are design drawings of a Level 4 underground room, above-ground message 
walls, and ways to make durable symbolic structures. 


These Design Guidelines are further enriched by a more detailed analysis (in Section 4.4) of the 
endurance and behavior of materials and structures, both above ground and below ground. 


4.2 Design options 


Presented on p. F-60 are several alternative designs for the entire site, followed by designs for 
some particular spaces on it. These designs are based on the Design Guidelines just presented 
and thus act as tests of the efficacy of the guidelines. Of the many designs developed and 
reviewed, these are also the design solutions most preferred by the team. The designs utilize 
archetypal images whose physical forms embody and communicate meaning. We have given 
them names, both for identification and as verbal images for each. They are: 


Landscape of Thorns (Figs. 4.3-1, 4.3-2) 

Spike Field (Figs. 4.3-3, 4.3-4) 

Spikes Bursting Through Grid (Figs. 4.3.-5, 4.3-6) 
Leaning Stone Spikes (Fig. 4.3-7) 

Menacing Earthworks (Figs. 4.3-8, 4.3-9) 

Black Hole (Figs. 4.3-10, 4.3-11) 

Rubble Landscape (Figs. 4.3-12, 4.3-13) 
Forbidding Blocks (Figs. 4.3-14, 4.3-15). 


Some designs use images of dangerous emanations and wounding of the body. Some are images 
of shunned land...land that is poisoned, destroyed, parched, uninhabitable, unusable. Some 
combine these images. All designs entirely cover or define at least the interment area, called 
here the Keep. 


Shapes that hurt the body and shapes that communicate danger: Danger seems to emanate 
from below, and out of the Keep in the form of stone spikes (in Spike Field and Spikes Bursting 
Through Grid--Figs. 4.3-3 to 4.3-6 and Leaning Stone Spikes--Fig. 4.3-7), concrete thorns (in 
Landscape of Thorns--Figs. 4.3-1, 4.3-2), and zig-zag earthworks emanating from the Keep (in 
Menacing Earthworks--Figs. 4.3-8, 4.3-9). The shapes suggest danger to the body... wounding 
forms, like thorns and spikes, even lightning. They seem active, in motion out and up, moving 
in various directions. They are irregular or non-repetitive in their shape, location and direction. 
They seem not controlled, somewhat chaotic. 


F-57 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


In the three designs that use ‘‘fields’’ of spikes or thorns, these spikes or thorns come out of, 
and define the Keep, so the whole area that is dangerous to drill down into is so marked. 


*“Menacing Earthworks’’ (Figs. 4.3-8, 4.3-9): Immense lightning-shaped earthworks radiating 
out of an open-centered Keep. It is very powerful when seen both from the air and from the 
vantage points on the tops of the four highest earthworks, the ones just off the corners of the 
square Keep. Walking through it, at ground level, the massive earthworks crowd in on you, 


‘dwarfing you, cutting off your sight to the horizon, a loss of connection to any sense of place. 


The large expanse of center is left open, with only two elements in it: the WIPP’s existing 
thick-walled concrete hot cell, left to ruin; a walk-on world map showing locations of all the 
repositories of radioactive waste on earth and a 50-foot wide map of New Mexico (Fig. 4.3-16), 
with the WIPP site in the geometric center of the Keep. The entire map is domed in order to 
shed sand blown by the wind. Underneath the slightly domed map a Level 4 room is buried 
(Fig. 4.3-17). Four other rooms are located under the four tallest earthworks. Reading walls 
(Fig. 4.3-18) are strewn between the earthworks, encountered before the Keep is entered. 


Shunned land...poisoned, destroyed, unusable: 


‘‘Black Hole’? (Figs. 4.3-10, 4.3-11): A masonry slab, either of black Basalt rock, or 
black-dyed concrete, is an image of an enormous black hole; an immense nothing; a void; land 
removed from use with nothing left behind; a useless place. It both looks uninhabitable and 
unfarmable, and it is, for it is exceedingly hot part of the year. Its blackness absorbs the | 
desert’s high sun-heat load and radiates it back. It is a massive effort to make a place that is 
fearful, ugly, and uncomfortable. 


The heat of this black slab will generate substantial thermal movement. It should have thick 
expansion joints in a pattern that is irregular, like a crazy-quilt, like the cracks in parched land. 
And the surface of the slab should undulate, so as to shed sand in patterns in the direction of the 
wind. 


‘*Rubble Landscape’’ (Figs. 4.3-12, 4.3-13): A square outer rim of the caliche layer of stone 
is dynamited and bulldozed into a crude square pile over the entire Keep. This makes a 
rubble-stone landscape at a level above the surrounding desert, an anomaly both topographic and 
in roughness of material. The outer rim from which rubble was pushed inwards fills with sand, 
becoming a soft moat, probably with an anomalous pattern of vegetation. This all makes for an 
enormous landscape of large-stone rubble, one that is very inhospitable, being hard to walk on 
and difficult to bring machinery onto. It is a place that feels destroyed, rather than one that has 
been made. 


‘*Forbidding Blocks’’ (Figs. 4.3-14, 4.3-15): Stone from the outer rim of an enormous square 


is dynamited and then cast into large concrete/stone blocks, dyed black, and each about 25 feet 
on a side. They are deliberately irregular and distorted cubes. The cubic blocks are set in a 


F-58 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


grid, defining a square, with 5-foot wide ‘‘streets’’ running both ways. You can get ‘‘in’’ it, 
but the streets lead nowhere, and they are too narrow to live in, farm in, or even meet in. It 
is a massive effort to deny use. At certain seasons it is very, very hot inside because of the 
black masonry’s absorption of the desert’s high sun-heat load. It is an ordered place, but crude 
in form, forbidding, and uncomfortable. 


Some blocks can be of granite, or faced with it, and carry inscriptions. Their closeness to other 
blocks reduces their exposure and increases their durability. 


Note our use of irregular geometries and the denial of craftsmanship. None of our designs use 
any of the regular or ‘‘ideal’’ geometric forms, and only crude craftsmanship is sought, except 
for the precision of engraved messages. Why? The geometry of ideal forms, like squares and 
cubes, circles and spheres, triangles and pyramids is a fundamental human invention, a seeking 
of perfection in an imperfect world. Historically, people have used these ideal forms in places 
that embody their aspirations and ideals. In our designs, there is much irregularity both of 
forms and in their locations and directions, yet done by people with obvious knowledge of pure 
geometry. This shows an understanding of the ideal, but at the same time a deliberate shunning 
of it...suggesting we do not value this place, that it is not one that embodies our ideals. 


The same is true of craft and workmanship. Historically, people use good workmanship to 
bestow value on things they value. In most of our schemes, the structures that cover or define 
the Keep’s ‘‘cover’’ are made crudely, or of materials that prohibit workmanship (such as 
rubble, or earthworks, or a large slab). At the same time, we make an enormous investment 
of labor in these rude materials. It speaks of a massive investment, but one not tinged with 
pride or honored with value-through-workmanship. 


About durability: All the designs, except one, have a high probability of lasting 10,000 years. 
This is because of their conformity with the guidelines for materials durability in Section 4.4. 


The concrete structures of the Landscape of Thorns have projecting, cantilevered elements that 
will have tension on their upper surfaces, causing minute cracks. These cracks will accelerate 
local decay. Until new materials are available, or new methods for tensioning concrete 
members, we cannot ‘‘guarantee’’ the durability of this design. However, we present it here 
because of its strong emotive character. 


F-59 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.3 A visual depiction of various design options 


Pages F-61 to F-78 show various designs described in Section 4.2. These designs are: 


Figure 4.3-1 
Figure 4.3-2 
Figure 4.3-3 
Figure 4.3-4 
Figure 4.3-5 
Figure 4.3-6 
Figure 4.3-7 
Figure 4.3-8 
Figure 4.3-9 
Figure 4.3-10 
Figure 4.3-11 


Figure 4.3-12 


Figure 4.3-13: 


Figure 4.3-14 
Figure 4.3-15 
Figure 4.3-16 
Figure 4.3-17 


Figure 4.3-18 


Eandseape-of Thoms, views). N. hane ee ee F-61 
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poy af LH Bbc) Fe ssh (2 Ie eave er pepe re ne ars tr toga eee ree arama ee . F-63 
SDIKC Miele Viewed gee aac hse tn rans, hegre sige is aera eae wie . F-64 
Spikes Bursting Through Grid, view 1 ............... . F-65 
Spikes Bursting Through Grid, view2 ............... . F-66 
Leaning Stone Spikes ...... POR I Pe rere Canes aren Sar Petry ae . F-67 
Menacing Earthworks, view1 ............000e eee . F-68 
Menacing Earthworks, view2 ........... ; Saati ee F-69 
BIACKMTOISSoVICW SU ian Nectar tee sia atin or ceed meee eeatas . F-70 
BlaCKSH Ole AVIEWE2 i. st ots acts eae mae he oe atten wren aie . F-71 
Rubble Landscape, view yal) yas votes ews a nether Rise . F-72 
Rubble Landscape View 2.27 sc ee en as ee . F-73 
Forbidding Blooes, view 1)... 0/0s5 0 ss es E74 
Forbiddine Blocks, view 2°.) 4... ee ce es | F-75 
Walk-on Map of World’s Radioactive Burial Sites ......... F-76 
Buried Room with Level IV Messages ................ F-77 
Reading Walls/Message Kiosk ............-.2 0000 eee F-78 


F-60 


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F-63 


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F.64 


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aiet woe I Usipd ym icep. 
iind Jo ued Neo! D\qepereyaiUM 

: Stouwo’ Bouma’ DIU WRIA - 
sea UNS wor} joy hiq'ponu : 
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——-FIOH VE 


a 


F-70 


Ted 


or 
EF renee" PY warn, 
rt fare’ 

: mS 
pi 


Figure 4.3-11. Black Hole, view 2 (concept by Michael Brill and art by Safdar Abidi). 


“(Mg TeeqorAl Aq ye pue ydoou0s) [ Mata ‘adeospuey s[qqny “ZI-¢"7 sNsLy 


Guug souo yan af (aay “DYaetsoud A 


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os Poko png fue ‘poyureu 
a ‘ : ee DUS DUDITED Jo WIL ID\nO 
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ae tg Ny <: 


. a 


F-72 


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a 


7 


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*, 


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14 <@, e 
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F-74 


ry 4 < 
f) J Ye Wee, 


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F-75 


ne 


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ithe. 


ne 


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Figure 4.3-15. Forbidding Blocks, view 2 (concept by Michael Brill and art by Safdar Abidi). 


“(I TeeqorA, Aq 1k) sayg yeLNg aaTovorpey s,ppIoM Jo dey uo-WeM “OT-¢'p aNsTY 


lard 40qR2ny fo Foeunsse 


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TW 40 dYW NOAM 


F-76 


for Level 4 messages 


BURIED ROOM: 


yet tht LP 
hy the 


F-77 


Figure 4.3-17. Buried Room with Level IV Messages (art by Michael Brill). 


“(tg jeeqoIAL Aq 17e) Ysory oSessopysyem Sutpesy “gT-Ey HNshy 


wo Rar aves. eRURe 
AOSD YAP IOOW,, TROUT) 


Autq pure lems Ul ¢ [DCT | bor ne| tL W FRAAM 7 OK] JA0 


ASOIA AOVSEAWN 


F-78 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.4 Durability of common marker structures 
4.4.1 Introduction 


This section discusses the durability of various proposed above-ground and below-ground marker 
structures, 


The charge to the panel is to make recommendations to mark the site with ‘‘durable’’ markers. 
In what follows we take the position that ‘‘durable’’ in addition to meaning ‘‘resistant to decay 
by forces of nature’’ shall mean ‘‘resistant against removal by man.’’ 


A marker system designed to be ‘‘durable’’ against attempts of individuals to remove or deface 
markers (vandalism, recycling) can also be designed to offer very different degrees of resistance 
against removal by future societies. 


Various scenarios can be envisaged under which future governments would want to remove the 
marking system, either in order to increase the economic value? of the site or to deter advertent 
intrusion into the WIPP.* 


On balance, the team recommends a marker system designed to be as difficult as possible to 
remove by future societies. 


4.4.2 Should all Markers be Durable? 


Clearly, some markers at the site must endure for 10,000 years. However, this does not imply 
that all markers must endure for such time. For example, if we accept the prediction of the 
Futures panel that drilling for oil and gas will cease within the next 200 years, then it would 


make sense to design a sub-set of markers with a design life of 300 years, containing specific 
warnings--in English and Spanish only--against drilling for hydrocarbons at the Site. 


Furthermore, such markers could be designed to shield for some time the more elaborate, 
complex and durable markers required to warn societies in the more distant future. Thus, the 
wooden structures bearing warnings not to drill at the site might contain monolithic cores of 
granite inscribed with the full set of Level I and II messages. 


2 Value of land increases when knowledge that toxic material is buried there becomes lost. This results in a 
tendency by local government bodies to lose, destroy, or forget such information, see [Ref. 4-1]. 

3 Imagine, for example, a border conflict in which a temporarily victorious party controlling the WIPP site decides 
to contaminate the area before retreating by drilling into and through the waste panels. The degree of 
contamination, of course, would depend very much on the amount of high pressure brine, if any, released by 
the drilling. This scenario, although not considered by the Futures panel, is plausible (see, e.g., Iraqi behavior 
in Kuwait) and appears repeatedly in military history as the "scorched earth" tactic. A "removable" marker 
system could have been dismantled by the society owning the site, making it more difficult to locate the WIPP 
Site. 


F-79 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.4.3 Categories of Markers 


We shall use the term marker both for structures that are messages in themselves (‘‘something 
man-made is here’’) and for structures that provide space for graphic and written messages. In 
addition, buried structures designed to introduce anomalies in the gravimetric, seismic, electrical 
conductivity, and magnetic profiles of the site are considered to be markers, because they will 
help to locate the site even if all surface structures were to be obliterated by unforeseen events. 


4.4.4 Distinction Between Markers and Barriers 


Consideration of barriers is not included in the charge to the panel. The distinction between 
“‘markers’’ and ‘‘barriers,’’ however, becomes blurred in cases where message bearing markers 
cannot be read without taking physical action. 


For example, to read a subsurface marker requires digging or plowing at the site, and to read 
markers buried at the depth of the waste panels requires excavation or drilling. Plowed up 
markers can be read easily, but fragments flushed up during drilling are so small that inscribed 
messages are likely to go unnoticed.* 


Therefore, a marker system on the level of the waste panels should include a component that 
forces the driller closely to inspect the material being drilled into. Encounter of ultrahard 
material fragments, or even Thermit® ignited by a mechanism set off by drilling through the 
enclosing titanium container would achieve this objective. 


These ‘‘attention getters’? have been treated as part of the marker system, as their purpose is 
not to prevent physical intrusion but to force attention to the markers. 


4.4.5 Five Principles to Maximize Durability 
Longevity of the marker system can be improved by adhering to five basic principles: 
(1) Setting up a benign environment: 


How long a material lasts is frequently determined more by the environment than by the 
material’s inherent properties. In a benign (i.e., a dry and low humidity) environment even 
organic materials can survive for long times (papyrus, mummies). On the other hand, even 
highly corrosion resistant materials are likely to disappear in a wet, ‘‘aggressive’’ 
environment, as, for example, a hot brine solution. 


Therefore, a general principle to ensure marker survival should be to set up a “‘local’’ 
environment beneficial to the marker’s survival. 


Unless the marker is specifically designed for even fragments to attract attention - e.g., through the use of 
brilliant color. 

Thermit: a mixture of aluminum powder and iron oxide that when ignited generates a great amount of heat and 
is used for welding. 


F-80 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Examples would be locations shielded by berms or sacrificial walls against wind driven erosion 
and by overhangs against precipitation. For buried markers, archaeological finds in New Mexico 
can provide guidelines for setting up beneficial environments. 


For example, the New Mexico Museum of Natural History in Albuquerque contains a stunningly 
well preserved skeleton of a young camel that roamed in the Albuquerque area 10,000 to 20,000 
years® ago when the climate was wetter than today (see Figs. 4.4-1 to 4.4-4).” This skeleton 
was found in a bed of sand and gravel in a commercial gravel pit just outside Albuquerque. The 
skeleton, down to the smallest vertebrae at the tip of the tail, is perfectly conserved. Thus even 
a material of medium durability® can survive for very long times without losing small features 
when embedded in a suitable environment (sand and gravel). To duplicate these conditions for 
buried markers, one of us (DGA) has acquired some data on the Albuquerque site. The site 
consisted of a mixture of alluvial sand and gravel (one to a few inches thick). The recommended 
strategy, therefore, is to bury important markers, particularly those in the access shafts (see 
Section 4.4.9.12) in an appropriate mix of well-drained sand and gravel. 


Similarly, guidelines for setting up conditions maximizing the survival of inscriptions on markers 
can be extracted from Indian rock carvings, even though the age of the oldest of these is about 
one tenth of the design life of WIPP marker system. 


(2) Avoid mixing materials in a single structure. 


Bringing different materials into contact opens the possibility for chemical reactions.” In 
a non-sliding contact, temperature changes will create thermal stresses unless the thermal 
expansion coefficients are matched. Thus, it is best not to mix different materials in the 
construction of a marker (e.g., use engravings, not inlays for inscription). 


If contact of different material cannot be avoided, as for example at the interface between 


a concrete foundation and the ground, it is important to minimize the possibility for 
chemical reactions (e.g., by inserting an impervious clay layer between concrete and soil 
containing sulfates). 


(3) Working with large size components. 


For illustrative purposes, let us as assume that a marker weathers at the rate of 1 mm/year. 
Although a small value, it will amount to more than 30 feet over the design life of 10,000 
years. A structure a few feet in size will disappear but a structure many feet in size will lose 


6 The age is in dispute. According to Mike O’Neil, District Paleontologist, U.S. Bureau of Land Management 
in Santa Fe, NM, the skeleton might be as old as 80,000 years. 

7 One of us (DGA) is indebted to Mike O’Neil, District Paleontologist, U.S. Bureau of Land Management in Santa 
Fe, NM, for the loan of the original slides of this site. 

8 Bone is quite durable in an alkaline environment but will not Jast in an acidic environment. 

9 Although it is possible to test for such reactions, extrapolation from laboratory tests, typically carried out at 
elevated temperatures, to 10,000 years is inherently uncertain. Thus, it is best to minimize the potential for 
reactions through a ‘‘same material’’ strategy. 


F-81 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Figure 4.4-1. Camel Skeleton: Initial discovery, cervical vertebra (photo courtesy of Mike 
O’Neil, Bureau of Land Management). 


Figure 4.4-2. Camel Skeleton: Pre-excavation (photo courtesy of Mike O’Neil, Bureau of Land 
Management). 


F-82 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Figure 4.4-3. Camel Skeleton: Overburden removed—excavation begins (photo courtesy of 
Mike O’Neil, Bureau of Land Management). 


Figure 4.4-4. Camel Skeleton: Camel being exposed—soft sand (photo courtesy of Mike 
O’Neil, Bureau of Land Management). 


F-83 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


but a small fraction of its volume. Thus size is an important factor in durability. It is no 
accident that structures that have survived in their original shape (pyramids, Fig. 4.4-5; 
sphinx, Fig. 4.4-6; monolithic tombs, Figs. 4.4-7, 4.4-8) for long periods of time are very 
large. (Note, for example, the scale of modern buildings in the background of Fig. 4.4-6 to 
the sphinx.) Thus, it is important in above-ground structures to work with marker structures 
of large size. 


Because erosion tends to progress linearly in time,’ it makes little sense to use a logarithmic 
time scale in judging a marker system. That is, the probabilistic division into near future 
(order 100 years) medium future (order 1,000) years and far future (order 10,000 years) has 
no physical base even though it pleases human perception. 


Interestingly, the principle that size promotes durability extends all the way to everyday 
constructions. Bicz6k [Ref. 4-2] states that large (on the scale of meters) concrete structures, 
all other things being equal, are much more resistant to erosion than small ones. Empirical 
observations over several decades show that the actual corrosion of concrete structures (which 
for concrete is usually moisture related) is much smaller than expected from laboratory 
experiments on small specimens (Bicz6k [Ref. 4-2] cites the example of a mortar sample that 
had survived in excellent condition in seawater for 17 years, but when enclosed in a barrel 
filled with the very same seawater completely corroded in 16 days). 


(4) Redundancy 


Fourth, because it is difficult to foresee all possible scenarios detrimental to survival of 
the markers, redundancy must be applied to every physical aspect of the marker system, 
i.e., to location (above, semi-buried, and below-ground structures), structural design 
elements (berms, monoliths, rooms), and materials selection. 


Monoliths of stone should be made from rocks of granite, basalt, and sandstone; concrete 
structures from portland-, aluminous-, or ferro-cements; scattered markers from fired 
alumina, beryllium oxide, earthenware, porcelain, single crystal sapphire (e.g., aluminum 
oxide discs), different glasses (pyrex, borate), and maybe even metals (titanium, stainless 
steel). 


To preserve a readily perceived pattern, the placement of materials, where possible, 
should alternate in a sequence (i.e., one monolith of basalt, followed by one of Sandia 
granite, followed by one of Vermont granite, followed by one of sandstone, etc). 
Scattered markers made from different materials should be arranged in concentric rings 
or radial rows. 


© As long as the amount removed is a small fraction of the original volume and the surface composition and 
morphology does not change. 


F-84 


S8-d 


Egypt 

Perhaps the most famous 
architectural monuments 
in the world, the pyramids 
were built of stone with a 
rubble core as enlarged and 
elaborated versions of the 
humble mudbrick mastaba. 
The masses of masonry 
were partly symbolic, partly 
protective, and seemingly 
disproportionate for the 
sepulchral chambers they 
covered. They were worthy 
memorials but hardly 
inviolate. A remarkable 
ability in surveying, 
immediately obvious from 
their sheer bulk and proved 
by the accuracy of layout 
and orientation was 
necessary for their construc- 
tion. The great pyramid of 
Cheops differed from the 
others in its greater bulk 
and internal layout. It had 
three separate chambers 
while the Chephren Mycerinus 
pyramid had one chamber 
with two approaches. 
Mycerinus’ tomb had one 
chamber and one entrance. 


.Chephren Cheops 


Sections through Giza pyramids showing tombs 


Figure 4.4-5. The Great Pyramids at Giza: Mycerinus, Chephren, Cheops. The structures are between 4,000 and 5,000 years old. 
Copyright (c) 1976 by Jacquetta Hawkes. From The Atlas of Early Man. Reprinted through special arrangement with 
St. Martin’s Press, Inc., New York, NY. 


98-4 


The Great Sphinx at Giza 


Figure 4.4-6. The Great Sphinx at Giza. The nose was shot off by troops of Napoleon (vandalism). Its disappearance was not 
caused by natural forces. Copyright (c) 1976 by Jacquetta Hawkes. From The Atlas of Early Man. Reprinted through 
special arrangement with St. Martin’s Press, Inc., New York, NY. 


re rte ee Fe apr eran tere | Ren tire SENIOR) OLS RR ET a Ra a ie ee Be 


Figure 4.4-7. 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Continental Europe 

The immense megalithic 
chamber tombs required 
great community effort for 
manipulating blocks of 
stone weighing up to 100 
torfs into position. Some of 
these chambers contained 
kerbstones decorated with 
abstract designs. The West 
Kennet tomb was built of 
large boulders and had 
drystone walls. It was 
covered by a 350 ft (106 m) 
long mound. 


West Kennet long barrow, 
Wiltshire, England 


Monolithic tomb. The one depicted here is in West Kennet, Ireland. Stones 
up to 100 tons in weight were used in its construction. The grave is between 
4,000 and 5,000 years old. Copyright (c) 1976 by Jacquetta Hawks. From 
The Atlas of Early Man. Reprinted through special arrangement with St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., New York, NY. 


F-87 


88-4 


Figure 4.4-8, 


Elaborate spiral decoration is found on an entrance stone to the passage grave at New Grange, County Meath, Ireland. 


Passage grave 


The one depicted here is New Grange, County Meath, Ireland 


Note that the spiral engraving on 


the entrance stone is well preserved after 5,000 to 5,500 years. Copyright (c) 1976 by Jacquetta Hawkes. From 


The Atlas of Early Man. Reprinted through special arrangement with St. Martin’s Press, Inc 


.. New York, NY. 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


(5) Using on-site testing data in the design 


On-site testing of marker materials will allow a better informed choice of materials. This 
is particularly important for concrete, a material with highly variable properties, see below. 


The anticipated operation time for WIPP, 30 to 40 years, is sufficiently long to acquire 
meaningful upper limits on the erosion rates of materials planned to be used in the marker 
system. 


One of the panel members (DGA) examined the 30-year-old concrete Gnome marker, marking 
an underground nuclear test explosion located a few miles from the WIPP site. Based on its 
appearance (but excluding the already visibly eroded water retaining depression on the top) the 
amount of concrete eroded over that time period appears to be, at most, 1 mm. 


If we take this value as an upper limit and extrapolate it to 10,000 years, we obtain 36 cm. As 
this exceeds the width of the marker, it may disappear. 


The above estimate can be criticized from many aspects (e.g., corrosion rates may speed up as 
the surface becomes less smooth; failure might be of some other mechanism, or from lighting, 
tornadoes, nuclear explosions, etc.), but it illustrates two important points: 


e Data useful to predict erosion of marker structures can be acquired over 30 years, that is, 
before WIPP is scheduled to close. 


e These test data provide guidelines for the minimum feature size of such structures. 


The Portland Cement Association, PCA, (Chicago) started in 1940 the long-term testing of 
concrete at 13 U.S. sites [Ref. 4-3]. Progress Reports are published every 10 years. The test 
set-up at the WIPP site should use the PCA test set up so that results obtained can be linked to 
a data base going back to 1940. 


- 


4.4.6 Environmental Factors 


Site factors influencing survival of markers at the site are climate (temperature cycles and 
precipitation), wind (tornadoes), wind-blown sand, soil chemistry, surface and ground water, 
and natural calamities (lightning, earthquakes). 


The present climate at the WIPP site is semi-arid. Even if rainfall were to double (which is the 
worst case prediction for next 10,000 years [Ref. 4-4]), the evaporation rate would still exceed 
the precipitation rate and the climate would remain favorable to the survival of materials. 


A site-specific study of wind and tornado probabilities at the WIPP site has been prepared by 
Fujita [Ref. 4-5]. This study predicts a 10“/year probability for 119 mph straight line gusts and 


F-89 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


80 mph tornadoes. The most severe credible tornado that could be expected to occur at the 
WIPP site, with a probability of 1% over the next 10,000 years, would have a maximum wind 
speed of 183 mph and a pressure drop of 0.69 psi. To ensure longevity, above-ground markers 
must be designed to withstand the latter conditions. 


Dunes are present at the site and are likely to move, and therefore may bury structures and 
supply sand for wind-driven erosion [Ref. 4-6]. To ensure continued visibility, above-ground 
structures must therefore exceed a height of 30 feet. 


The panel had no data on the probabilities of earthquakes. An earthquake occurred during the 
time of this study Jan. 92). The quake was centered in western Texas/eastern New Mexico and 
registered 4.6 on the Richter scale [Ref. 4-7]. 


Because the durability of concrete depends to a very large degree on soil pH, presence or 
absence of sulfates and chlorides, and contact with the ground water table [Ref. 4-8], on-site 
data for these parameters must be acquired, should the marker design make use of this material. 


4.4.7 Feasibility Demonstration that Durable Markers can be Constructed...if Cost is No Object 
4.4.7.1 Longevity Principles in the Classical Pyramid Design 

Although guaranteeing survival of structures or markers for 10,000 years appears to be a 
formidable task, it is straightforward, in the absence of other constraints (e.g., costs, 
psychological effectiveness), to design a marker system that will be able to transmit engraved 
and other physically carried messages for ten millennia, provided humans do not disturb the site. 
An example would be a 300 x 300 feet pyramid, constructed of 9 x 9 x 9 feet (or larger) square 
blocks of granite. No mortar would be used, and all six sides of each block would be engraved 
with the full set of Level II and II messages. Thus, should engraving on the exterior surfaces 
erode with time, future generations would only have to lift one block to uncover a fresh 
inscription of the same information. 

As over 90% of the Cheops pyramid is still extant after 4,600 years (see Fig. 4.4-5), there is 
no doubt that such a construction, if left undisturbed, would preserve inscribed messages for 


10,000 years. 


The pyramid design (Fig. 4.4-9), put forward as an illustration only, incorporates the following 
design principles: 


© Use of all available surfaces to carry messages. 
e Redundancy--the message is repeated many times. 


e Time evolving messages--as one surface erodes, other, new ones, emerge. 


F-90 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


¢ Both ‘“‘exterior’’ and ‘‘interior’’ storage of messages (the core of the pyramid could be 
considered as a cave filled with message carrying blocks). 


e Easy and obvious access to interior messages. 


e All components are made of the same material, eliminating problems that can arise when 
materials with different thermal expansion and chemical potential are in a non-sliding contact. 


The structure is tapered with a slope less steep than the talus slope.’ Even when shaken by 
a large earthquake, the structure, therefore, would largely retain its original shape. 


The load bearing stress is compressive (i.e., tends to close any crack that might form). 


e No tensile surface stresses exist (which would promote crack opening if a crack were to 
form). 


Figure 4.4-9. Pyramid of engraved blocks: An example of durable message transmittal. 


The above example also illustrates that a design guaranteed to survive 10,000 years will be 
expensive. Assume that 9 x 9 x 9 feet granite blocks are to be used and that a single block, 
including engraving, could be fabricated for $5,000. The cost of the material alone, then, would 
amount to $62 million. This would be about 6% of the to-date cost of WIPP but less than 1% 
of the projected cost of WIPP over its operating lifetime. 


1 The talus slope is the steepest slope a pile of ‘‘granular’’ material will take. 


F-91 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


The high cost of the design is not accidental. Any realistic consideration of proposed marker 
systems will show that a tradeoff exists between longevity and cost. Any above ground marker 
system secure against the forces of nature is, by necessity, a large system made out of durable 
materials, as only such a system can afford the loss of material over time without losing its 
function. 


Therefore, a meaningful probabilistic estimate of the survival of the marker system can only be 
made if the cost that can be spent on the system is known. 


4.4.7.2 Shortcomings of a Pyramid Design 
In addition to high cost, a ‘‘classical’’ pyramid design has the following shortcomings: 
e The structure is somewhat difficult to see from an altitude of 30,000 feet (aspect ratio 1:100), 


e Ifsmaller blocks are used, it is easily climbed, rendering all exterior message bearing surfaces 
accessible to vandalism, 


e The use of quadratic blocks encourages alternative use of the components by future 
generations (‘‘quarry’’), the form of the structure is one often used to mark honored 
phenomena and may embody an inappropriate message in its form. 


Good visibility from the air is highly desirable, as mankind is likely to continue the use of air 
transportation. Thus, a large population (conceivably even people off-site who make decisions 
about drilling) can be made aware of the existence of the site by choosing a large design that 
could easily and unambiguously be identified from the air as a nuclear waste site. This would 
require a standard large scale design for all nuclear disposal sites. (One solution, which hinges 
on the continued use of the radiation sign for the next 400 generations, would be earth berms 
formed into the radiation trefoil sign with a ring of monoliths forming a central circle. Such a 
design is discussed by Team B. However, the continued use of any cultural icon over 400 
generations is uncertain, see Section 3.3.) 


4.4.8 Minimizing Marker Removal by Humans 


Without doubt, the major threat to the survival of markers is human activity, not nature. Metals 
in historic sites have nearly always disappeared,’” and buildings have been used as quarries 
(note in Fig. 4.4-5 the removal of the more valuable cladding layer’). 


® An exception appears to be the bronze doors of the Pantheon, still there after 1,800 years. 
3 Again, the Pantheon (Fig. 4.4-10) appears to be an exception, possibly because the use of concrete in some of 
its construction. 


F-92 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


THE PANTHEON The dome 
of the Pantheon, intact after 
eighteen centuries, has an 
internal diameter of 142 ft. 
(43 m). Its construction was 
made possible by a highly 
skilled use of concrete. 


Figure 4.4-10. The Pantheon. This building, which uses, in part, concrete still stands after 
1,800 years. Copyright (c) 1976 by Jacquetta Hawkes. From The Atlas of 
Early Man. Reprinted through special arrangement with St. Martins Press, 
Inc., New York, NY. 


F-93 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Vandalism of monuments has been a problem, even when the site commemorates a revered 
personality, as in the Washington Monument [Ref. 4-9]. 


For this reason we recommend the construction of closed Level IV rooms. 


Finally, as discussed before, an organized, large scale activity by future societies to remove the 
marker system is conceivable. 


General guidelines to minimize removal of above-ground marker structures are: 


_ 
ivy 


Use of inexpensive materials. Examples are materials found at the site (e.g., caliche) and to 
a degree concrete. 


Use of otherwise not easily usable materials and building blocks. Examples are brittle 
materials prone to break when reshaped and large blocks shaped in odd forms. By odd forms 
we mean specifically forms that can not readily be assembled to fill space (like rectangular 
block). For example, equal sized blocks of five fold symmetry cannot fill space 
continuously .' 


Further to discourage alternative use of irregular shaped components, each component should 
be shaped such that it cannot rest without rocking or falling over on a flat surface. 


Using interlocking structures involving irregularly shaped blocks that can be assembled into 
one form only. A computer code to arrive at such a design should take into account: 


* Generation of flat surfaces of minimum area to hold desired messages (this would apply 
only to structures designed to hold time released messages). 


* Design of components that cannot rest stably on a flat surface (to discourage alternative use 
as a weight). 


* Self-locking assembly into final form. 


* Stability against ground motions caused by large earthquakes. 


After a construction that spanned half a century, the Washington Monument was opened to the public in 1886. 
Vandalism immediately became a serious problem threatening ‘‘if not curbed, the existence of the monument 
itself’ (Casey, the last of the builders, in 1886)...Guards were hired, and Congress, in 1887 passed legislation 
forbidding people ‘‘dots to chip off fragments or pieces from any of the stone, iron, or other parts of the 
completed structure....’’ Violations would be punished by a fine of at least $5, imprisonment of 15 days or both. 
If damage exceeded $100, the offender would be remanded for trial and, if found guilty, imprisoned for 6 months 
to five years. In spite of this legislation, vandalism continued and eventually forced the closing of the interior 
stairwell of the monument, see [Ref. 4-9] for further details. 

Twofold object of two different sizes, however, as Penrose showed, can fill space continuously. Such a ‘‘Penrose 
tiling’’ might be useful in the design of marker structures. 


F-94 


_ 
an 


18 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


* Drainage of any water that may enter outside surfaces. 
Use of obnoxious materials 


Obnoxious materials are not likely to be removed. However, materials obnoxious in the sense 
of ‘‘bad smell’’ cannot be durable since they continuously evaporate the small fragments 
reaching us. Thus, they must disappear with time. However, it might be possible to enclose 
such materials into long-lasting glass capsules that break when stressed. The glass of choice 
would be lanthiumborate.'* 


Another long-lasting obnoxious material is a material with a low level of radioactivity. Thus, 
one could consider the display of small amounts of clearly marked quantities of low-level 
radioactive materials with long lifetimes (e.g., low-grade uranium containing ores).'” 


Maximizing the labor component, minimizing material value. An example would be the 
construction of a very large earth dam from material at the site. 


Maximizing the ratio of work required to remove the structure to that required to make the 
structure. 


This principle strongly favors the use of reinforced concrete, as structures made of such 
material, when large, are very difficult to remove, while the work for construction is 
relatively modest. This is very different from a design made out of shaped blocks of stone that 
requires much more work to make than to disassemble. 


The concrete bunkers of the Maginot and Siegfried lines, therefore, have not been removed, 
in spite of intense political pressure from the local communities, whereas much of the building 
stones of the colosseum in Rome have been recycled. 


Using above-ground components that are large and heavy (say with minimum dimensions of 
6 x 6 x 6 feet, or a minimum weight of 18 tons). Such weights are difficult to remove with 
farm equipment!® but easily handled by today’s cranes. 


The builders of Stonehenge (1500 BC) used blocks of up to 54 tons in weight (Fig. 4.4-11). 
The builders of the West Kennet tomb (3000 - 2000 BC) used blocks of stones weighing up 
to 100 tons (Fig. 4.4-7) [Ref. 4-10]. 


One of us (DGA) would like to thank Dr. Morse, of Corning Glass Laboratory, for several valuable discussions. 
Contrary to public perception low-level, radioactive materials are used widely in specialized applications. For 
example, many thousands of armor piercing rounds made from depleted uranium were used by U.S. forces in 
the war following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It was the low-level radioactivity imparted on the hit target that 
permitted the unambiguous identification of friendly fire. 

It is unlikely that farm equipment changes much in terms of load capacity. 


F-95 


96-4 


Continental Europe around 4 tons weight. 
Stonehenge is outstanding These were imported with 
among the henge monu- immense labour from 
ments in Britain - circular Prescelly, 132 miles 
structures of stone or (220 km) away in Wales. 
wooden uprights. Blocksof The site appearsto 

stone up to 54 tons were represent the corporate 
transported tothis site from achievement of a wealthy 
24 miles (40 km] off, society, whose leading 
dressed to shape and members lay in the barrows 


erected. Others were raised 
to serve as lintels. The 
shaping included subtle 
architectural tricks like the 
swelling of uprights, the 
tapering of lintels, and the 
curvature of the circle of 
lintels over the outer ring, 
all intended to improve the 
visual, aesthetic appear- 
ance of the building. 
Within the main structure 
were subsidiary stones of 


~ as 


which cluster around. (The 
burial illustrated is of a 
similar but less architectur- 
ally inclined group in 
Germany.} Two major 
controversies have raged 
over this monument. The 
building’s function has 
been strongly debated and 
questionable contact with 
Mycenaean Greece has 
been inferred from the 
architectural niceties. 


we 


Stonehenge c. 1500 BC, Salisbury Plain, England 


Stonehenge today 


Figure 4.4-11. Stonehenge. Blocks up to 54 tons in weight were transported 24 miles away to construct this monument, much of 
which stands after 3,500 years in spite of relative shallow embedding of the monoliths. Copyright (c) 1976 by 
Jacquetta Hawkes. From The Atlas of Early Man. Reprinted through special arrangement with St. Martin’s Press, 
Inc., New York, NY. 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


For subsurface and scattered markers, the following factors minimize the probability of removal 
of markers: 


© Distribution over a wide area and a variety of depths. 
© Use of materials that are not easily retrievable, i.e., materials with physical characteristics 


(density, dielectric and magnetic constants) similar to that in which they are embedded. This 
will make it difficult to use automated retrieval. 


© Use of inexpensive materials. 

Examples incorporating these guidelines can be found in Section 4.3. 

4.4.9 Durability of Some Common Elements of a Marker System 

4.4.9.1 Introduction 

In this section, we discuss the durability of structures considered in this report. These structures 
are examples only, and are not meant to indicate the design of the site, which is an architectural 
decision. 

The durability of these structures depends on their environment, their design, and the materials 
used. Because these factors are interrelated, materials are discussed as they would be used in 
generic marker elements. 

Above-ground elements include the following: 

e Earth berms, 

® Monoliths, 

e Structures generating tones or noises when blown on by wind, and 

e Enclosed rooms housing Level IV messages. 


Below-ground structures comprise the following: 


e Subterranean markers (scattered surface markers, markers denoting shafts, markers at the 
depth levels of waste panels), and 


e Buried magnets, electric, and seismic resonant structures. 


These elements will be discussed in the above order. 


F-97 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.4.9.2 Large Earth Berms 


Earth berms have been used as barriers (e.g., in fortifications) and to define areas (e.g., in 
formal gardens). Based on the historic record (prehistoric mounds, Roman lines,'® Hadrian’s 
wall) the probability that large earth dams survive for 10,000 years is very high. 


They should be made out of material found at the WIPP site to minimize their material value 
and should be designed such that their removal requires much work. 


The earth berms should be covered with caliche (white) that will (at least temporarily) increase 
contrast with the environment (light brown). This contrast will increase visibility of the site from 
the air. Consideration should be given to the size and orientation of shadows thrown by the 
berms so as to maximize visibility (and, possibly, to generate forms of artistic interest). 


To avoid the possibility that significant sections get buried by migrating dunes (estimated to 
reach heights of 30 feet), the minimum height of these earth berms should be 50 feet. This 
requirement together with the talus slope, determines the minimum lateral extension. Except for 
this constraint, the longitudinal extensions are matters of design. 


The area outlined should coincide with the lateral extension of radionuclides at the storage level. 
That is, with the waste panels plus the upper limit calculated for the lateral movement of 
radionuclides by appropriate transport mechanisms (diffusion, percolation, and convection). 


Earthworks do not provide surfaces suitable to carry message bearing inscriptions, but their 
construction should be combined with the following: 


e Interment of scattered markers whenever possible. 
e Interment of conductors to mark the site by man-made changes in soil conductivity. 
e Interment of magnetic markers, to mark site by magnetic anomalies. 


e Construction of sealed and buried rooms containing Level IV information (see Sections 
4.4.9.9 and 4.4.9.10 for details). 


4.4.9.3 Monoliths Made of Stone 


Monoliths made out of natural stone have survived for 3,500 years at Stonehenge, quite a wet 
climate. At the WIPP site, monoliths are very likely to survive at the site for 10,000 years if 
bedded properly and left undisturbed. 


Monoliths (and walls formed of monoliths) are suitable carriers for Level II and Ii information. 
To minimize the probability that the inscribed information will be destroyed by acts of 
vandalism, a monolith must have a height such that at least one set of these messages is not 


19 The fortification line between the Roman Empire and the Teutonic tribes, stretching from the Danube to the 
Rhine. Even though the climate is rather wet, resulting in the loss of all wooden fortifications, the earth berm 
itself survives. 


F-98 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


accessible to a standing person, or a person on horseback or standing on top of common farm 
equipment (wagons, pickup trucks, tractors). One of the areas left for future re-inscription, as 
well, should be outside the reach of such persons. 


Level II and IM messages should be inscribed several times over the length of the monolith 
including inscriptions below ground. The topography of the engraved messages must make it 
clear that messages continue below ground (deeply engraved spiral band with alternating 
inscriptions and empty spaces for re-inscription?). Thus, if the inscriptions above ground should 
weather away, digging would unearth a fresh set of inscriptions. 


These monoliths should 


¢ Where feasible, be protected from wind-driven sand that can cause erosion by other design 
elements, e.g., on the lee side of berms or by encircling ‘‘sacrificial’’ walls. Their heights 
could vary but should not be less than 4 feet. Openings in the wall should be narrow and on 
the lee side of the prevailing wind. 


These walls could be constructed of concrete, or of irregular, tightly interlocking stones and, 
if suitable, may carry Level II messages on its inside. 


To ensure a sound foundation, the buried part of a monolith should be equal to or greater than 
its exposed part or it should be imbedded in the rock strata below. Monoliths should be 
placed upright, or nearly upright to avoid the formation of tensile stresses at the surface. 


The construction material of monoliths should be natural stone with a minimum compressive 
strength of 25,000 psi. Suitable materials are granite (average strength 26,000 psi) and basalt 
(29,000 psi). The principle of redundancy favors use of a variety of materials. 


Some rocks, for example felsite (47,000 psi) are notably stronger, but we found no 
information on their availability. Granite can be found in the Sandia mountain range. 


The erosion of rocks by sand as measured by the abrasion test used for concrete (aggregate 
particles between 1/2 and 3/8 inch in diameter subjected to 500 abrasions with Leighton 
Buzzard sand, see Neville [Ref. 4-8]) is similar and ranges from 16.5 for limestone to 19.2 
for flint (the higher numbers being worse). Thus, in regard to erosion by wind-driven sand, 
there is no compelling reason to prefer one natural rock material over another. 


Removing the constraint of uprightness from monoliths, e.g., using diagonally inclined 
monoliths, considerably increases design options to mark the WIPP site (for examples of such 
designs, see Figs. 4.3-1, 4.3-3, and 4.3-7). 


However, such structures will develop tensile stresses at their surface that increase with their 
deviation from the vertical. Tensile stresses, in a brittle material, can lead to catastrophic failure 
once a crack, however slowly growing, reaches a critical length. 


In structures designed to last, tensile stresses therefore are undesirable. It is recommended that 
only a subset of monoliths be positioned in such a way and that their inclination be limited to 


F-99 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


angles that keep the magnitude of the tensile stress at the surface below 0.6 of the compressive 
strength of the material used. This recommendation, incorporating a safety factor of 10, is based 
on the observation that the strength of stone (or non-reinforced concrete) in static tension is 
about one-eighth of the strength in compression and that the fatigue strength is about half of the 
static strength. 


The foundation of inclined monoliths must be such that the center of gravity coincides with the 
center of the foundation footprint. 


4.4.9.4 Concrete Monoliths 


The probability of survival of monoliths made out of concrete has been looked into by the team 
in considerable detail, because concrete has several advantages, notably a low price and 
‘‘in-situ’’ staying power, the work to remove or recycle heavily reinforced concrete being 
exceptionally large. More details on concrete can be found later in the various discussions of 
rooms. 


If used as a construction material, only a subset of monoliths should be fabricated with concrete, 
and the overall design should take into account that this subset may disappear after 2,000 to 
5,000 years (see below). 


To ensure survival for that (and possibly even a longer) time period, the following practices 
must be adhered to: 


e High quality, 20,000 psi, concrete is to be used. 


© Sacrificial walls are to be installed at the base of the concrete monoliths to provide protection 
against wind-driven erosion. 


e The monolith is to be sized and designed to remain stable and upright even if eroded (possibly 
unsymmetrically resulting in an unbalance) to such an extent that the loss of material may 
reach the order of tens of centimeters, with the exact value to be determined by the outcome 
of test results at the site. 


e Soil at the foundation is to be checked for sulfates and chlorides, and, if necessary, an 
intermediate bed of clay or other impervious material is to be inserted to separate the concrete 
footing from the soil. 


e The footing is to be in a well-drained stratum. 


The protection of steel reinforced concrete monoliths against lightning is a subject of further 
research. 


F-100 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.4.9.5 Composite ‘‘Monoliths’’ 


Structures similar to monoliths, but consisting of a concrete core and a rock cladding are cheaper 
than stone monoliths. They are conceivably durable if they are designed with care, especially 
against the intrusion of water, and constructed without mortar bonding to allow movement of 
the core relative to the cladding. 


The thermal expansion coefficient of rocks and concrete is similar. Thus, provided both 
materials are at the same temperature, thermal expansion differences between core and cladding 
are small. For example, in a 30-foot-long ‘‘monolith’’ subjected to an 80°F temperature swing, 
the difference in thermal expansion between core (concrete) and skin (rock) would be below 
1 mm. If this difference would be accommodated by homogeneous elastic deformation, the 
corresponding stress would be a few psi. 


The above result is based on the assumption that the core and cladding, at any point in time, 
have the same temperature; but that is not likely because in the morning sunlight first heats the 
surface and then the interior. 


Assume, for example, that the surface cladding has reached a temperature of 55°F, but the core 
remains at 30°F . Such a temperature profile could occur when a cold night is followed by a 
sunny day. In such a case, the difference in strain would increase to 1.5 x 10% and the thermal 
stress, tensile in nature, on the core would increase to roughly 1000 psi. This is 1/20 of the yield 
stress in compression of good concrete and high enough to cause concern as the fracture stress 
in tension is about one order of magnitude lower. Thus, a design should be chosen that permits 
the cladding to move respective to the core, if the latter is fabricated from non-reinforced 
concrete. 


4.4.9.6 Markers Generating Noise or Tones 


Audible markers can be fabricated with structures that contain ‘‘tuned’’ air masses that vibrate 
when set in oscillation by wind. 


Both dissonant and consonant sets of harmonies could be generated. Because the only moving 
component is air, a 10,000-year survival of properly designed structures appears feasible. 


4.4.9.7 Other Self-Energized Marker Systems 


A team member (DGA) has considered the use of other active markers. However, none of them 
is likely to survive for more than a few hundred years. Of those, the most durable appears to 
be thermo-electric power based on the temperature difference between surface and 100 feet 
below. Such a power source could drive low-power active electromagnetic warning systems. We 
note that electronic components with exceptional reliability have been developed for use in 
undersea cables. Devices constructed with such technologies could conceivably survive several 
hundred years or even mote. 


F-101 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.4.9.8 Above-Ground, Closed Rooms 


The team recommends closed rooms for the Level IV message. To ensure the long-term 
preservation of the message, it should be inscribed on both the (visible) front of the wall panels 
fabricated from hard rock as well as on their backs. Removal of these panels (stripping the wall) 
should expose a second set of identical panels and removal of those the building’s walls of stone. 
(The blocks making up this wall, again, may contain Level IV information, if necessary in a 
condensed version. As a further backup, removal of a block could make visible further engraved 
blocks.) 


The periodic table of the elements should be made of stone also. It should be large and contain 
samples of the elements where feasible. Inexpensive materials should be inserted as plugs. 
Expensive but durable materials, such as gold, should be applied as very thin layers (rub-on or 
sputtering) to minimize the incentive for removal. 


If the periodic table is mounted on the wall, the down arrows towards the radioactive elements 
stored below should be engraved. If the table is horizontal, down pointing arrows made of stone 
should be inserted into the table. In each case, the arrow length should give some indication of 
the total amount of the element stored below. : 


An above-ground storage site must deal with daily temperature fluctuations that may reach 80°F. 
The thermal stresses and movements induced by thermal expansion are detrimental to the long- 
term survival of the structure and the messages contained therein. 


Any above-ground structure for a Level IV message should, therefore, be designed to allow for 
thermal expansion and to be sufficiently massive to dampen the daily temperature variations. 
An approximately constant temperature at the actual site at which the information is stored is 
desirable. For the same reason, direct sunlight on the inscription should be avoided. 


To ensure longevity, the building material for any above-ground Level IV storage site should 
be natural stone. The uncertainty of the durability of concrete rules out its use for crucial 
above-ground structures. 


Based on the historical record, a building constructed with irregular, interlocking natural stones 
weighing tens of tons should survive for 10,000 years at the site. (Note that megalithic chamber 


tombs, surviving intact to date (see Figs. 4.4-7 and 4.4-8) were constructed with blocks up to 
100 tons in weight.) 


4.4.9.9 Partially Buried, Closed Rooms 


A partially buried structure is exposed to much smaller daily temperature oscillations. It is 
therefore much more suitable for concrete construction, which, if properly sized, is reasonably 


F-102 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


likely to survive for 10,000 years, provided the foundations remain above the water table for the 
design period. 


Thus, buried Level [TV rooms may be constructed of concrete, if the structures are covered with 
earth and if the minimum dimension anywhere in the structure is several feet. We note that a 
design incorporating similar principles has been proposed for the long-term storage of 
transuranic waste [Ref. 4-11]. : 


Because this is the first time at which the team recommends the use of concrete for the 
construction of a component with a design life of 10,000 years, a more detailed discussion of 
the durability of concrete is in order. 


Mankind has experimented with stone for over 35,000 years, and 5,000-year old tombs are still 
in fine condition (see Fig. 4.4-8 taken from [Ref. 4-10]). Mankind’s experience with concrete 
is limited to 2,000 years. Although some 2,000-year-old concrete structures have endured to this 
date, e.g., Fig. 4.4-10 (not to mention Roman bridges—e.g., 6 of the 8 built by the Romans 
across the Tiber are still in service), this is an insufficient base to predict survival for 10,000 
years. Furthermore, contrary to expectation, it is conceivable that Roman concrete was better 
than today’s concrete (see below). 


A fundamental problem is that concrete is a man-made material, with properties critically 
dependent on the care taken in its preparation. Thus, the compressive strength of commercial 
concrete can vary from about 1,000 psi to 20,000 psi, depending primarily on the cement to 
water ratio used. A low cement to water ratio makes for good concrete, but also for a very stiff 
mix that is difficult and expensive to work with. The Romans used slave labor to ram stiff 
concrete into place—today’s contractors like to pump a sloppy concrete through pipes. 


If concrete is considered as construction material at the WIPP site, data on sulfate and chloride 
content of the soil are needed as well as an estimate of where the ground water table might be 
in the future. Our impression is that the ground water level, even if precipitation were to double, 
would be well below any foundation, but this must be checked with a geology expert. (If a 


concrete foundation should reach the ground water level, its survival for 10,0000 years would 
be very questionable because contact with water accelerates the erosion of concrete.) 


If concrete is to be used, its preparation and testing should follow the recommendations for the 
preparation of concrete used in critical applications. 


These applications are 
¢ Construction of containment vessels at nuclear plants 


© Construction of large offshore structures 


F-103 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


The concretes used in the. latter applications are specifically designed to function in a wet, 
chloride-containing environment. Thus, these concretes should work well at the WIPP site even 
if salt (left over from the mining operation or blowing about as dust) or brine would generate 
a chloride-containing environment. 


The rules below are excerpts from an article by Gerwick presented at the 1973 American 
Concrete Institute Conference on the Durability of Concrete [Ref. 4-3]. These rules are 
presented here as an example for the details that will have to be specified if concrete is used at 
the WIPP site. Some features, such as a water ratio below .45, a high cement content, cement 
with a low C,A and alkali content, and chloride-free water for mixing and curing are common 
recommendations for all high quality concrete. 

The following are Gerwick’s recommendations for durable offshore construction [Ref. 4-3]: ° 


© Cement -- Portland Cement, ASTM type II or equivalent. Moderate C,A (5-6%). Low Alkali 
(0.65% K,O + Na,O max) 


© Cement factor -- A minimum of 7 sacks per cubic yard and preferentially 8 sacks. 


e Aggregates -- To meet ASTM C33. Sound under sodium sulfate test. Satisfactory past 
seawater durability and freeze-thaw durability. 


e Free from chlorides -- No more than 0.02% of chloride by weight. 

© Non alkali reactive. 

e Testing of both fine and coarse aggregate. 

e Water used -- Chloride content less than 500 ppm. Sulfate content less than 1000 ppm. 
Water-cement ratio less than 0.45 and preferentially 0.40. (The importance of working at a 
ratio below 0.45 to reduce chemical attack is also stressed by Biczok [Ref. 4-2]). 


e Admixtures -- Water reducing admixtures are desirable. Air-entrainment 6%. 


e Mixing and consolidation -- Concrete must be properly mixed and thoroughly consolidated to 
eliminate all honeycomb, rock pockets, and ‘“bug holes.’’ 


e Forms -- Forms should be tight, especially at corners to prevent mortar leakage. Corners 
should be rounded wherever possible. 


© Cover -- 2 1/2 inches of concrete over prestressing tendons and main reinforcements. 


e Surface finish -- smooth. 


F-104 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


© Curing -- water curing should use water of same quality as mixing water. If steam curing is 
used, ensure that chloride content of mix is below limits set. 


These are sophisticated specifications likely to baffle a local contractor. If concrete is used in 
the marker construction, a contractor familiar with large offshore concrete constructions or 


fabrication of nuclear containment vessels is therefore more likely to produce long-lasting 
concrete. 


4.4.9.10 Below-Ground, Closed Rooms 


The team recommends the use of sealed or nearly sealed (total openings below 1 square foot) 
rooms, buried into earth berms, man-made mounts or underground. These sealed rooms would 
contain Level IV information engraved on a double set of granite panels. 


Below-ground structures are sheltered from temperature oscillation but may react with the soil. 
They are likely to last for 10,000 years if high quality concrete is used in their construction (see - 
Section 4.4.9.9). If the soil at the site contains sulfate and chlorides, it is recommended that any 
concrete structure be isolated from the ground by protective layers (e.g., sand, clay). 


The four sealed (or semi-sealed) units recommended by the team should be buried using sand 
as an intermediate layer to separate the concrete from caliche. The thickness of their caliche 
covering should vary such that natural erosion sequentially reveals the top of a chamber every 
2,500 years. The proper design of the caliche thickness requires data on the erosion of caliche 
measured at the site over the next 30 to 40 years. Very small portholes (either sealed with 


sapphire windows, or consisting of small openings) could permit inspection of the chamber and 
reading of the inscriptions but must be designed to prevent physical access to the chamber. 


4.4,9,11 Small-Scale, Near-Surface Markers 


Small markers are proposed to be buried in the sand layer present at the site or into the caliche 
layer, if the sand layer is thin. The depth should be greater than the maximum depth that can 
be reached by plowing. 


During the construction of the earth berms, scattered markers should be buried throughout, such 
that any effort to level those berms exposes these markers. 


These scattered markers should be made from a variety of materials, such as 
e Fired ceramics, 

e Lanthium-borate glass, 

e Plastic, 


e Titanium, and 


F-105 


FS Soe = — — ence Ln nN =. peer, Ses ee 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


e Magnetic markers 


to ensure that even if one material fails, another subset of markers survives. If this strategy is 
followed, it is virtually certain that scattered markers will survive for 10,000 years at the WIPP 
Site. : 


The attractive feature of “‘classical’’ ceramics, such as silica and alumina, is that they are 
already oxides and therefore guaranteed resistant against further oxidation. This sets these 
materials apart from metals (except the noble metals) and modern ceramics such as carbides, 
nitrides, and borates. A ceramic that occurs in nature as a mineral (e.g., silicon dioxide, quartz 
and aluminum oxide, sapphire) is more likely to survive for long periods than one that does not 
(e.g., silicon nitride). 


The durability of fired ceramics improves with the firing temperature. Sumerian cuneiforms 
prove that fired clay is durable, but modern ceramics should also be considered. Technical 
porcelain (as used in high voltage insulators) has an excellent service record under demanding 
conditions and therefore should be considered for scattered markers. Other candidates are 
beryllium oxide and aluminum oxide. Single crystal aluminum oxide (sapphire) is extremely 
tough and corrosion resistant (which explains its survival as a gem stone in the ground). Suitable 
sapphire disks are made in large numbers commercially by Corning and Union Carbide (sapphire 
wafers are used in the electronic industry to make radiation hard circuits). 


Of the modern ceramics, silicon nitride and zirconium stabilized yttrium oxide (a material with 
a relative high fracture toughness) would be candidates for scattered markers. 


Glass is an amorphous oxide, and, in a dry environment, is likely to survive 10,000 years. Low 
melting soda-lime glass from Egyptian times has survived (with erosion) to date. In a wet 
environment, soda-lime glass is fairly resistant to acids and moderately resistant against alkali. 
According to Dr. Leroy Morse of Corning Glass Laboratories, Corning glass has an 
experimental glass, lanthiumborate, developed in the program to vitrify nuclear waste that is 
“‘much’’ more resistant to corrosion than regular glass or even.Corning laboratory glassware 
(Pyrex). He estimated the cost for lanthiumborate glass to be a ‘‘few’’ dollars per pound. 
Markers made of this glass could contain colored cores shaped as icons. 


Plastics, i.e., organic polymeric materials, are not usually associated with durability. However, 
some ‘“plastic’’? materials such as heavy tar have survived in the ground for millenia (which 
explains why tar pitch has an excellent service record as a protective covering in the pipeline 
industry). Plastic is cheap, and plastic markers can be fabricated in great numbers and with 
various colors. 


Unfortunately, not much literature exists on the survival of modern plastics in the ground except 
for studies of the problem of disposal of plastics in landfills and what plastics to use to line 
landfills against seepage. For this purpose polyethylene is used. It has a very good service record 
but, of course, the experience with buried polyethylene is too short to extrapolate with 
confidence to 10,000 years. However, as a saturated hydrocarbon compound, chemically similar 
to oil, polyethylene may well survive for 10,000 years in the ground. (This is especially likely 


F-106 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


for polyethylene buried in salt.) Thus, it is recommended that a subset of the markers may be 
made out of polyethylene. Polyethylene and any other plastic is not recommended for above- 
ground duty as it will deteriorate in sunlight. 


Metals are materials that are easily reusable (e.g., by melting) and therefore unlikely to survive 
at the site except, perhaps, as subsurface markers. If a metal were to be used, the clear choice 


is titanium [Refs. 4-12, 4-13, 4-14]. Only a small subset of markers should be made out of this 
metal to make mining an uneconomical prospect. 


Titanium owes its high corrosion resistance to its pronounced tendency to oxidize. Therefore 
titanium is always covered with a layer of titanium oxide. It is this self-healing ceramic coating 
that accounts for the high corrosion resistivity. 


Thus, unalloyed titanium is highly resistant against the corrosion normally associated with many 
natural environments, including seawater, body fluids, and fruit and vegetable juices. Wet 
chlorine, molten sulfur, many organic compounds, and most oxidizing acids have essentially no 
effect on this metal. Titanium also resists hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide gases at 
temperatures up to 500°F [Ref. 4-14]. 


Magnetic markers are proposed to be buried in berms only. The markers should be buried 
centrally, at the base of the berms (i.e., 50 feet below the top surface) to make retrieval 
difficult. The magnets should be sized such that their magnetic field at the surface of the berm 
exceeds the earth’s magnetic field by a factor of 10. Consideration should be given to the 
direction of the magnetic field that is induced. These fields could point toward a buried 
Level IV storage site, or simply be oriented such that they locally reverse the direction of the 
earth’s magnetic field. 


Magnetic markers are likely to survive for 10,000 years if protected against corrosion. 
Therefore, the permanent magnetic material (e.g., Alnico) used in the construction should be 
encased with polyethylene and a hermetically sealed titanium housing to protect the markers 
from corrosion. 


4,.4.9,12 Deeply Buried Markers 


Such markers are proposed to be located in the shafts and the waste panels. 


The repository itself may be detectable by several methods commonly used today in geological 
explorations. Induced polarization techniques can detect the metals deposited (containers, tubing, 
etc.). Magneto and telluric field techniques as well as electrical resistivity can detect the 
presence of a conducting medium (especially if a brine slurry should form). Gravimetric (static), 
magnetic, seismic, self-potential, and radioactivity methods appear less promising. Even when 
detected, however, the repository’s detailed shape is unlikely to be discernible, only its rough 
location and size. We have therefore not proposed shaping the waste panels into any special 


F-107 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


form.”” The access shafts are the most likely paths for migration of radionuclides by natural 
processes. For this reason, the access shafts should be specifically marked. 


The shafts should be marked by filling the top 50 feet with alternating layers of sand (10 feet) 
and gravel. The sand layers should contain fired clay, glass, and titanium markers containing 
pictorial and verbal information showing that this is a backfilled access shaft. 


The message on these markers could deviate from the general message in pointing out that these 
shafts are the most likely site for the up-migration, if any, of radioactive material. Because the 
sealing techniques and migration rates have not yet been established, the specific wording of this 
message remain for future panels to decide. 


In addition to markers, the sand layers might contain ‘‘monitoring’’ materials to offer future 
generations the possibility of tracing the migration of alpha-emitting materials. An example is 
the plastic found in radon monitors (decaying radon introduces nuclear tracks that can be 
selectively etched and thus counted). The design of these monitors requires further study. Slant 
drilling (and even drilling from below) has been considered by the Futures panel. Horizontal 
drilling (within the reach of today’s technology) can only be cautioned against by locating 
markers at the depth level of the waste panels. 


Slant drilling could be warned against from the surface, but to warn against shallow angle 
drilling would require marking a very large surface area. (To take an extreme example, surface 
warning against drillers using a 15-degree angle from the horizontal would have to cover almost 
2 miles beyond the footprint of the waste panels.) This could be done, but would dramatically 
increase the marked area of the site. 


The panel has therefore considered markers at the depth level of the waste panels. 


Small scattered markers of the type recommended to salt the surface are likely to be ineffective 
in warning against unintentional drilling into the waste panels, as they most likely would be not 
noticed by the drilling crew. 


To ensure attention to the presence of markers, a marker system must be used that forces the 
driller to inspect the properties of the layers they are drilling into. 


Any material that will survive for 10,000 years in salt and that exhibits very different drilling 
properties from salt will do (whatever the drilling technology will be in 10,000 years, it will be 
maximized to make progress in salt). A material should be selected that is physically hard and 
has a high heat of evaporation (to take care of the laser drilling schemes considered by the 
Futures panel). 


20 We thank Bob Guzowski for this information. 


F-108 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Thus, large chunks of rock, or slabs made from concrete resistant to seawater appear suitable. 


Disruption of the drilling process will likely lead to an inspection of the material causing the 
disruption. Therefore, once we have the attention of the driller, we need to have additional 
markers that can easily be retrieved (or are retrieved automatically by the drilling fluid or the 
bit). This consideration restricts the size of these markers to the size of fragments generated by 
the drilling process itself. 


Thus, these large blocks should be interspersed with small markers of clay, plastic (which in this 
dark and constant temperature environment may well survive), glass and (if affordable) titanium 
clad magnets containing Level II warnings. The magnetic marker should be designed to optimize 
adherence to drill bits (a test is recommended as well as the exploration of other schemes that 
would adhere markers to drill bits such as the use of cold welding). 


If the marker surface is too small to contain the entire Level IT message, the message should be 
spread over two or three markers, together with an obvious symbol on how to paste the markers 
together. 

The location of these markers is dictated by two considerations: 

e Slant, and even horizontal, drilling was considered by the Futures panel. 

e An early warning is desirable. 

To meet the first requirement, the outer end-walls of the waste panels should be backfilled with 
the above mixture, and they could not be used to store remotely handled waste. Also unusable 


would be those sections of the sidewalls that can be hit by horizontal drilling in directions other 
than those within say 15 degrees of the orientation of the long axis of the waste panel. 


The remainder of the sidewalls could be used because rooms shield each other. 

The second requirement would be best met by excavating a (thin) layer of salt above the waste 
panels, to be backfilled with the above mixture. However, excavation of a layer for the 
deposition of markers violates the principle of disturbing the layering (and hence the long-term 


stability) of the site as little as possible. The tradeoff is unclear and deserves future study. 


If a separate layer cannot be excavated, the top of the waste rooms should be backfilled with the 
above mixture. 


F-109 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.5 Graphic designs for markers 


4.5.1 Design Criteria 


In keeping with the considerations presented in Section 3.2, we recommend the following design 
criteria for the use of graphics. 


They must have emotional impact. Given that people coming on the site may be unable to read 
any verbal message, they must be impressed by the site itself as a symbol evoking awe and 
apprehension. Visual symbols and the icons must be evocative in the same way, reinforcing 
the impression given by the arrangement of the site’s structures. Evocative symbols and icons 
must be located so that they are among the first things people encounter at the site. 


Whatever graphics are used, their nature and location should be such as to make them an 
integral part of the site as a whole, every part and feature of which must reinforce every other 
part with cumulative emotional and informative impact. 


Graphics must be unambiguous and universally meaningful cross-culturally. In this regard, 
icons most suitable for evoking wariness and apprehension are representations of human faces 
exhibiting the expressions people universally associate with such states as horror, revulsion, 
fear, pain, and anguish. 


Human faces or other graphics may be used by themselves, but are better used in conjunction 
with language. For instance, if human faces are used to frame the shortest word messages, such 
as “‘DANGER, poisonous radioactive waste buried here,’’ they will indicate that the message 
is a warning and invite its decipherment as a precaution to any intrusion on the site. The 
representations (Figures 4.5-1 and 4.5-2) on the following page are suggested as possible 
examples for appropriate artistic adoption [Ref. 4-15, 4-16]. — 


Symbols and words should be used together in ways that allow each to aid in the interpretation 
of the other. Their ability to communicate will be enhanced if they are mutually reinforcing. 
Thus the word ‘‘danger’’ and iconic signs that suggest danger will be more likely to 
communicate if exhibited together than if exhibited separately, particularly in messages of 
Level II. Similarly, telling people not to dig is for some an invitation to dig, arousing 
curiosity as to why they are being told not to. A warning against doing something must be 
accompanied by symbols that evoke a sense of danger or fear and also by an explanation for 
the warning. 


F-110 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Mournful, almost = Physically hurt, Frightened Panicstricken, Nauseated Bitter, woeful 
in tears tormented anguished 


Figure 4.5-1. Possible prototypes for facial icons, example 1. See text for details. 
Reprinted with permission from: Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Iranéus. Human Ethology. 
(New York: Aldine de Gruyter) Copyright © 1989 by Irandus Eibl- 
Eibesfeldt. 


Figure 4.5-2. Possible prototypes for facial icons, example 2. See text for details. The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, Carnarvon Collection, Gift of Edward S. 
Harkness, 1926. (26.7.1020, .1021). All rights reserved, The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art. 


F-111 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


© Messages of greater length than those of Level II should be introduced in each case by the 
short ‘‘DANGER’’ message framed with the facial icons—the Level II message first 
encountered on entering the site—in order to indicate that the longer messages are fuller 
explanations of the danger warning in Level I. 


e Conventional symbols, if used, should be the ones, such as mathematical and scientific 
symbols, that have wide international recognition and use, regardless of other differences in 
language and culture. There is more likelihood that such symbols will persist in use or, at 
least, be understandable to historians in the distant future. 


e Symbols and words must be clearly legible. Human figures and faces are clearer in base 
relief than when incised. Words are clearer when incised. Their size and shape must be 
adapted to the needs of the viewer under the conditions in which they are to be seen and read. 
Engravings and text must have an incised depth sufficient to survive 10,000 years of erosion. 
Level III messages should be further protected from erosion by the use of shielding walls, and 
Level IV messages will be best protected by being in enclosed rooms. 


¢ Visual representations of the site’s stratigraphy and the location of the buried waste therein 
may usefully accompany the fuller explanatory statements to be inscribed in the Level IV © 
message chambers. 


e Conventional symbols relating to scientific matters are best confined to the full explanatory 
statement (Level IV) and used in association with the appropriate words in the text. For 
example, the trefoil design may continue through time as an international symbol of 
radioactivity and could be appropriately used in conjunction with mention of radioactivity in 
the explanatory inscriptions, but only there in textual context. Similarly, the periodic table of 
elements and the conventional signs representing them are likely to be known at least to 
historians of science, if not to scientists, thousands of years hence. Their use in conjunction 
with the full explanatory statement is therefore appropriate. 


The sections to follow give details of the various graphics that we recommend. We have not 
included any pictographs, but have no objections to them if they can be kept simple in design 
and yet reasonably unambiguous. 


4.5.2 International Symbol for ‘‘Buried Radioactive Waste’’ 


A difficult question is whether or not to include the familiar radiation hazard trefoil as a part of 
our design. It is indeed an internationally recognized symbol with a 40-year history, but its 
long-term intelligibility when applied to all cultures over a period of 10,000 years is dubious at 
best. Furthermore, one of its standard uses means ‘‘do not go into this space unless properly 


F-112 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


protected,’’ whereas we are not trying to keep people away from the surface above the WIPP 
repository. So even if the symbol were understood in the future, once no radioactivity was 
measured on the surface, we might lose our credibility in the eyes of future investigators. We 
have compromised by not only making the trefoil a vital part of our design (such as by arranging 
monoliths or berms in the form of the trefoil), but also by not ignoring it altogether. We propose 
to insert the trefoil in all texts of all levels after each occurrence of the word ‘‘radioactive’’ and 
also for the appropriate elements in the periodic table (see Section 4.5.6). In this way, we define 
its meaning for those who can understand the language or the periodic table, and we give some 
warning to those who know the symbol but not the language. In order to avoid the ambiguity 
mentioned above, we propose always to incorporate the trefoil with a downward arrow, meaning 
‘“‘the radiation is not here, it is below’’ (Figure 4.5-3). 


Perhaps, a better overall symbol to incorporate into the marker system in a major way would 
be a (new) international symbol specifically for ‘‘long-term radioactive waste buried here.’’ 
This symbol would be used at all disposal sites as well as appear on all reports dealing with 
radioactive waste. In this way, its meaning would become well-established and its recognition 
at a site would immediately convey our basic message. The design of such a symbol would again 


700 m 


Figure 4.5-3. Proposed sign for buried radioactive waste. 


F-113 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


be the task of an international commission; the symbol would then become part of the 
international standard for marking disposal sites. 


The 1984 Human Interference Task Force recommended creation of a specific symbol for 
“‘biohazardous waste buried here’’; because such a symbol encompasses a miuch broader class 
of wastes, it would indeed be ubiquitous. On the other hand, the special and very long-term 
dangers of radionuclides are distinctive enough that we recommend a symbol confined to 
radioactive waste burial. 


4.5.3 Faces 


As discussed earlier, we strongly recommend the inclusion of drawings of faces expressing 
emotion as a major part of the marking system. These are most appropriate for Level I, which 
is the simplest explicit message and will be engraved on just about every available surface all 
over the site. Fig. 4.5-4 shows one realization of the Level II message as flanked by two faces. 
The left face (and associated hands) conveys abject horror and terror (not unlike Edvard 
Munch’s famous painting ‘“The Scream’’); the right face conveys disgust, as for something 
nauseating or poisonous. In our example given here in Fig. 4.5-4, the second face is a bit more 
detailed than desirable, and the first (without the services of an artist) perhaps not detailed 
enough. 


4.5.4 Maps 


There are two classes of maps that we recommend: (1) sites around the world and (2) the WIPP 
site. In Section 4.3, Fig. 4.3-16, we show the option of a very-large-scale map that would be 
a major element of the overall site design. Whether or not this is adopted, we recommend that 
the Level IV room should include a world map (Fig. 4.5-5) showing all radioactive waste 
disposal sites, each indicated by the (new) international symbol discussed earlier. The WIPP site 
should be located at the center of the map and therefore serve as a point of reference for locating 
other sites whose marker systems may have failed for cultural or physical reasons. The map 
itself might be about 1-m across on the wall, and thus an engraving accuracy of 1-mm would 
only locate each site to an accuracy of about 40 km. (By the way, continental drift fortunately 
will amount to only a few hundred meters over 10,000 years.) In order to improve this 
locational accuracy by an order of magnitude, we suggest that an adjacent diagram indicate the 
latitudes and longitudes of all sites relative to that of the WIPP site. The WIPP site is the 
obvious reference frame for (0,0), because the future reader will know it, and not need any 
historical knowledge about Greenwich, England, 10,000 years before. This diagram (Fig. 4.5-6) 
consists of a partial circle that indicates relative latitude within a full circle indicating relative 
longitude. The numbers associated with each dot correspond to a site that is similarly numbered 


F-114 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


\ DANGER 
y, POISONOUS RADIOACTIVE‘ WASTE BURIED HERE | 
DO NOT DIG OR DRILL HERE BEFORE 12,000 A.D. 


Figure 4.5-4. Proposed Level II message. The face to the right is reprinted with permission 
from Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Iranius. Human Ethology. (New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter) Copyright © 1989 by Irandus Eibl-Eibesfeldt. 


F-115 


OTT-A 


Figure 4.5-5. 


@ New international symbol for ; 

“radioactive waste buried here’ 
or standard trefoil for radio- 
activity. 


Example of a map in the Level IV chamber indicating the locations of nuclear waste sites around the world. 


Signo s =e = 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Figure 4.5-6. Diagram for Level IV message indicating much more accurate locations for 
the sites shown in Fig. 4.5-5. If the circle has a diameter of about 3 m and 
the dots on its circumference are drawn with a positional accuracy of 1 mm, 
sites can be located to about 4 km accuracy. The text explains how the outer 
circle indicates the longitudes and the inner semicircle the latitudes of all sites. 


F-117 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


on the map. Ambiguity between longitude and latitude is averted because the latter has a limited 
range in its values (for WIPP at lat. 32 degree, the range is -122 degree to +58 degree), 
whereas longitude extends over a full-360 degrees. The circles have a diameter of 3-m, meaning 
that a 1-mm engraving accuracy allows a 4-km locational accuracy (about 2-arcmin of angle). 
A 3-m circle takes up a lot of wall space, but in fact most of its interior will be empty and can 
be used for text. The map and circles should also be part of an international standard, thus 
interlocking all site locations with each other. 


The second type of map is of the WIPP site itself. We recommend that a perspective view 
accompany each Level III message. This view (Fig. 4.5-7) shows ‘‘to scale’’ surface features 
of the marking system, the reader’s present location on the surface, shaft locations, and the 
layout of the waste storage panels. Combined with the faces on the Level II message, this Level 
III graphic conveys--even to someone who does not understand the language--the idea of horrific 
stuff buried at a specific depth. 


Level IV will contain a more detailed version of Fig. 4.5-7 as well as plan views of the marker 
system and the repository. It will also have a side view showing the geological strata and the 
location of the repository. These diagrams are not problematic or novel and so are not shown 
here. The Level IV room should also contain a three-dimensional carved block of granite that 
indicates both the site’s topography and the location and shape of the repository (same scale in 
all three dimensions). This model will cover the situation in which conventions of perspective 
on a two-dimensional graphic are not understood. 


4.5.5 Star Map Showing Precession 


The astronomical phenomenon of precession allows us to indicate the date of the site, as well 
as time intervals. The projection of the earth’s north pole, now fortuitously pointed very nearly 
toward the star Polaris, actually moves and describes a circle on the sky of radius 23.5 degrees 
and period 26,000 years. Any culture (even low-tech) that watches the stars will know where 
the pole for their own epoch lies, although it takes more astuteness (in the case of Western 
culture, Hipparchus) to notice, say over a period of a few centuries, that the pole’s location has 
changed. The shapes and relative locations of the constellations, however, do not significantly 
change (for our purposes) on a 5,000- or 10,000-year scale. Thus, a simple diagram of the 
northern sky showing three major constellations and (prominently) the position of the pole, 
nicely indicates the epoch AD 2000 (easily to 100 years accuracy). In addition, a time interval 
(such as the half-lives of the main constituents of the waste) can be indicated by such a diagram 
having a trace over a portion of the full circle, e.g., one fourth the way around indicates 6,500 
years. 


F-118 


F-119 


A perspective view of the repository for Level III messages showing waste panels, shafts, marker features, and the 


reader’s present location on the surface (arrow). 


Figure 4.5-7. 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


We propose to use a precession diagram with the Level III message (Fig. 4.5-8). To those not 
able to understand any languages, this diagram will indicate both the epoch of burial and the 
period of danger. The diagram shows a progression from a disgusted to a neutral face to a more 
content face as the epoch changes from AD 2000 to AD 12,000 to the millennium beyond. Also 
along this arc of the full precession circle is a sequence of the (new) international symbol (for 
buried radioactive waste) steadily decreasing in size, symbolizing less danger as time passes. 
The Level III message will thus be accompanied by two diagrams that, independent of the 
language, characterize the nature of the waste and its location in space and time. Level IV will 
also utilize the precession diagram, but to indicate the half-lives of radionuclides (next section). 


4.5.6 Periodic Table of Elements 


The Level IV message will contain a diagram showing the periodic table in its usual form 
(Fig. 4.5-9). Where possible, the box for each element will contain a small plug of the actual 
element itself. Those elements that are naturally radioactive will have a radiation trefoil in their 
boxes. Those elements that have radionuclides in significant quantity in the WIPP repository will 
also have the (new) international symbol for ‘‘radioactive waste buried here,’’ along with arrows 
or a connecting line linking each of them to the repository portion of the diagram showing the 
WIPP perspective view (Fig. 4.5-7). Furthermore, each of these WIPP radionuclides will have 
its half-life indicated by a precession diagram with the appropriate fraction of the 26,000-year 
circumference circle marked out. 


4.6 Marker messages, Levels II, III, and IV 
4.6.1 Message Levels, Languages, and Markers 


The Level If and Level II messages should be short enough so that they can be inscribed in the 
six languages of the United Nations plus a possible local language such as Navajo. It does not 
seem feasible to inscribe the longer Level III message on each marker in each language. Each 
marker should have its Level III message in the (20th century) local language (i.e., English at 
the WIPP site) and the others, with a rotation system ensuring that all the non-local languages 
be equally represented. As far as the Level IV message is concerned, practicality might dictate 
that it be given only in one language. If so, it should be in English. If there is room for it to be 
given twice at the WIPP site, the second language should be Spanish. 


F-120 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


} 


oO 


@ New international symbol for 
"radioactive waste buried here," 
or standard radiation trefoil. 


Figure 4.5-8. Level III diagram that allows the date of burial and the time that has passed 
since burial to be determined if precision of the pole is a known phenomenon. 
As the position of the pole moves from the right (near the star Polaris and the 
unpleasant face), the size of the symbol for "radioactive waste buried here" 
(here shown as a filled square) steadily shrinks. The face becomes a neutral 
one after 10,000 years and a more content one later. Faces based on figures 
from Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Iranidus. Human Ethology. (New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter) Copyright © 1989 by Iranaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt. 


F-121 


tcl 


Lithtum |B 
6.94 


to depository map 


1 
H 
Hydrogen 
1,008 


Manganese 
54.938 


Platinum 
195.09 


Carbon 
12.011 


14 
Si 
Silicon 
28,09 


Nitrogen 
14,007 


Chlorine 
35.453 


126.904 


At 
Polonium | Astatine 
(209) (210) 


36 
Kr 
Krypton 
83.80 


71 
Lu 
Lutetium 
174.967 


Figure 4.5-9. Level IV diagram of the periodic table of elements. Radioactive elements are indicated with the radiation trefoil 
and those with major amounts in the repository are further labeled with the symbol (here shown as a filled square) 
for "radioactive waste buried here," as well as a connecting line to a map of the repository. Non-radioactive toxic 
elements present in the repository are circled. 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.6.2 The Messages Themselves 
4.6.2.1 Marker Message, Level II 


We suggest the following Level II message: 


DANGER 
4) POISONOUS RADIOACTIVE’ WASTE BURIED HERE 
DO NOT DIG OR DRILL HERE BEFORE 12,000 A.D. 


Face on the right reprinted with permission from: Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Iranaus. Human Ethology. 
(New York: Aldine de Gruyter) Copyright © 1989 by Irandus Eibl-Eibesfeldt. 


4.6.2.2 Marker Message, Level III 
We suggest the following Level III message: 


These structures mark an area used to bury radioactive wastes. The 
area is...by...kilometers and the waste is buried...kilometers 

down. This place was chosen to put this dangerous material far. 
away from people. The rock and water in this area may not look, 
feel, or smell unusual, but may be poisoned by radioactive wastes. 
When radioactive matter decays, it gives off invisible energy that 
can destroy or damage people, animals, and plants. 


Do not drill here. Do not dig here. Do not do anything with the 
rocks or water in the area. 


Do not destroy this marker. This marking system has been de- 
signed to last 10,000 years. If the marker is difficult to read, add 
new markers in longer-lasting materials and copy this message in 
your language onto them. 


For more information, go to the building further inside this marked 
area. The site was known as the WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) 
site when it was closed in.... 


4,6,2.3 Marker Message, Level IV (first alternative) 


We have developed two sample Level IV messages. Straight brackets, [], enclose comments for 
this report. The shorter of the two reads are follows: 


This place is a burial place for radioactive wastes. We believe this 
3 place is not dangerous 


F-123 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


IF IT IS LEFT ALONE! 


We are going to tell you what lies underground, why you should 
not disturb this place, and what may happen if you do. By giving 
you this information, we want you to protect yourselves and future 
generations from the dangers of this waste. 


The waste is buried...kilometers down in a salt layer. Salt was 
chosen because there is very little water in it and cracks caused by 
digging the rooms for the waste reseal. There is a pocket of pres- 
surized salt water...kilometers below the waste. There is a rock 
layer...Kilometers below the surface that did not have drinkable 
water when we built the site. We studied all the things that could 
go wrong with the site. We found out that the worst things hap- 
pen when people disturb the site. For example, drilling or digging 
through the site could connect the salt water below the radioactive 
waste with the water above the waste or with the surface. The salt 
water could wash through the waste and bring the poisonous and 
radioactive waste to the water near the surface or to the surface it- 
self. People who drink the water will drink the poison. If the water 
is used for animals or crops, those too will be poisoned and the peo- 
ple who eat them will be poisoned. It may take many years for the 
sickness and death to show. Radioactivity poisons people because 

it can cause cancer. When radioactive matter decays, the energy it 
releases can damage the basic material of life in each cell of the hu- 
man body. The damage can cause uncontrolled cell growth, called 
cancer, that can Kill. 


The waste is buried in 845,000 metal drums in a space of about 
6,200,000 cubic feet. The waste was generated during the manu- 
facture of nuclear weapons, also called atomic bombs. The waste 
is basically laboratory and manufacturing materials that are con- 
taminated with radionuclides having atomic numbers greater than 
92, half-lives exceeding 20 years, and concentrations exceeding 100 
nanocuries per gram. (A gram of radium is a curie of radioactivity. 
There are 1,000,000,000 nanocuries per I curie.) The waste includes 
metal objects (such as hand tools, machine tools, and motors), glass 
objects (such as cups and containers), plastic objects (such as bags, 
tubes, and gloves). Paper and rag materials, such as protective 
clothing worn by people when they worked with the radioactivity, 
will decay after burial, but the radioactivity will remain. 


Pictures on the walls of this room help explain the message. A map 
shows the surface marking system, its relationship to the under- 
ground area used for disposal, and the depth of the waste disposal. 


F-124 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


There are four other rooms like this one at the site. A map shows 
the rock layers below the site. A periodic table of elements identifies 
those elements that are radioactive and those that are buried below 
here. When the site was closed in..., it contained: 


plutonium-239 = ...curies 
plutonium-240 = ...curies 
americium-241 = ...curies 
uranium-233 = ...curies 
thorium-229 =...curies. 


Radioactivity declines exponentially with time. By 10,000 years af- 

ter the waste was buried here, the waste will be no more hazardous 
than the ore from which the radioactive material was taken [see 50 FR 
3807laj. There is a picture with the four brightest stars that can 

be seen from the site (Sirius, Canopus, Arcturus, and Vega). The 
position of the star-rise changes in time, and lining up the angles of 

the star-rise with the map will show how much time has passed since the 
site was closed. The site was closed in ...AD (anno domini), Gregorian 
calendar...AD, Byzantine calendar..., Jewish calendar..., Islamic 
calendar..., Chinese calendar... 


The waste also contains hazardous materials, whose danger does not 
lessen with time. These materials include: lead, cadmium, chromium, 
barium, methylene chloride, and toluene. The elements also have 

an arrow in the box in the periodic table. The chemical form for 
methylene chloride and toluene are shown, also. 


Tf you find unusual sickness in this region, or you find higher than 
normal levels of radioactivity in the area, inspect the area of the 
site. Look for: boreholes that were drilled after the site closed, but 
were never sealed, old mine shafis that were never sealed, and failed 
seals from the original repository. Reseal these areas, using your 
best technology, to prevent any further leakage of radioactivity or 
toxic materials. 


Do not destroy these markers. If the message is difficult to read, 
rewrite the message in your language in the blank area on this wall. 
If the markers are worn or missing, add new markers in longer- 
lasting materials in languages that you speak. This site, built in 
...by the United States of America government, represents a first 
attempt to responsibly dispose of wastes for an extended period of 
time. Other sites exist that contain radioactive wastes, and they are 


F-125 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


marked in a similar manner. We have shown these sites on a map in 
this room. Do not disturb any of these sites. 


4.6.2.4 Marker message, Level IV (second alternative) 


Our second sample Level IV message is longer and more informative than is absolutely 
necessary for the basic tasks of the marker system; it consists of about 2500 words and 7 
illustrations. If this message is deemed too long either for practical or policy reasons, then 
suggested cuts (mostly of historical information) have been indicated by printing these sections 
in smaller type. Straight brackets, [], enclose comments for this report. As it stands now, many 
of the stated ‘‘facts’’ in this version are tentative and need checking. 


This version of a Level IV message is written as if the current date is AD 2020 and the WIPP 
is being sealed. It is written from the point of view of the builders and operators of WIPP, who 
are speaking to any future persons who might come upon the Level IV chamber, giving them 
information they need or would like to know. These persons would primarily include engineers 
and scientists who are trying to understand the physical waste storage area, as well as historians 
and archaeologists who wish to study 20th-21st century culture. Explained in detail are the 
rationale for the repository and marker system, as well as all diagrams appearing in this message 
and in the Level II and Level III messages. 


This place is a repository where radioactive waste has been buried. 
It was designed to isolate dangerous radionuclides from humans and 
other life forms for a period of at least 10,000 years. The repository 
is at a depth of 650 meters below this room [a line of one meter 
length (1 m) is shown under this text]. DO NOT DRILL OR DIG 
AT THIS SITE, OR DO ANYTHING ELSE THAT MIGHT DIS- 
TURB THE WATER OR ROCKS IN THIS AREA. If you do, there 

is danger that the poisonous radioactivity may come to the surface 
in the ground water. If this water is used directly by humans or for 
growing food or feeding animals that produce food, humans could 
suffer from the disease cancer. Cancer is the uncontrolled growth 
of cells in the human body and can result from the damage to cells 
caused by the energy from decaying radioactive materials. It some- 
times takes many years for the sickness and death due to cancer to 
become evident. If you suspect that radioactivity may have reached 
the surface, check this site for (1) failed seals in the shafts of the 
original repository, Diagrams 1 and 2 [shown in Figs. 4.6-1 and 
4.6-2 respectively], and (2) drillholes or mine shafts that may have 
provided a means for escape of the radioactivity. 


This repository was constructed during the period AD 1985 to 1995, 


was filled with waste from 1995 to 2020, and has been sealed in 
2020. This is the first major effort by humans to attempt a long- 


F-126 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


= een ee cer gree 


Salt Storage Area 


Rustler 
Formation 


657m 
(2157 ft) 


1381 m (4532 ft) SS! 
Experimenta! Area SS 


=n - 3 629 m (2064 ft) 


TRU Waste 
Disposal Area 


776 m (2545 ft) 


Figure 4.6-1. Detailed perspective view of the repository and site (for the Level IV chamber). 


F-127 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


Contact Elevations 
are Referenced 
to Borehole ERDA-9 


Elevation (m) 


USGS Ref. Elev. 
1039.06 m 


me and Near Surface Plug 


1023.3 ; 
| ee 
Dewey Lake 
Red Beds 
Shaft 
874.0 aoe Cement 
856.7 Magenta { Plug 
849.1 | Member ; Water Bearing 
200 
823.4 Culebra ea ‘ eer Zone Seal System 
816.4 Member + === == ormation ——7 
Upper Shaft 
779.7 Seal System 
400 Eee Vaca Triste MB 
Lower Shaft 
McNutt Seal System 
Member 
Salado 
Formation Pegend 
511.6 MB 126 Height of 
Complete = Mudstone and Siltstone 
Consolidation EE 
Halite 
FA Dolomite 
L 
ais 396.4 Member 74 Anhydrite 
; MB 138 x ; 
378.0 MB 139 safes Repository [| HMscollaneots 
378.1 Level 
Concrete 
ee ais Clay 
Eesg4q Crushed WIPP Salt 
TRI-6342-311-2 
Figure 4.6-2. Details of the shaft sealing (for the Level IV chamber). 


F-128 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


term solution to the problem of radioactive waste disposal, for we 

believe that we have an obligation to protect future generations 

jrom the hazards that we have created. This repository is known 

as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and has been built and oper- 

ated by the government of the United States of America at a cost 

of $xx, which corresponds to the average annual family income of yy 

households. At the time of its construction the United States had 

accumulated over a 50-year period a great amount of hazardous radioactive 

wastes with long half-lives. Until now these wastes have been inadequately 

stored above the ground or in shallow burial sites. These wastes are generated 

by atomic energy defense activities (i.e., nuclear weapons). [Under the 

present WIPP LWA, these wastes are generated by atomic energy defense activities. 

If the use of WIPP changes, the previous statement must be modified to reflect 

the wastes being accepted.] The specific wastes buried at this site are primarily 

from the laboratories and factories involved in the construction of nuclear weapons 

since 1970. The long-term radioactive wastes buried here consist of 
radionuclides with atomic numbers greater than 92, half-lives exceeding 
20 years, and concentrations exceeding 3700 nuclear disintegrations per 
gram per second (a gram is the mass of one millionth cubic meter of water, 
and there are 3,160,000 seconds in a year, the orbital period of the earth). 


The information in this room is the most detailed on the site. Other 
rooms identical to this one are located [exact locations given], but 
we urge you to keep the rooms intact and buried as they are, so 
that they may be preserved for future generations. If the languages 
and diagrams in this room are difficult for you to understand, we 
urge you to add new translations of our texts for the benefit of fu- 
ture generations. This should be done for texts in this room and 
throughout the site; also add new markers and other structures if 
necessary to maintain the marking system in good, effective condi- 
tion. However, do not deface or remove the original texts, diagrams, 
or markers, for they will remain valuable to future persons trying to 
understand your own translations and additions. If you want more 
information than is available in this room, search in historical and 
archaeological libraries, museums, and archives appropriate to our 


time. At the time of closure of this site we are sending detailed information 
about this site and its contents to many major archives around the world. 


The site for this repository was selected and approved in a technical and poli- 
tical process that involved a search for suitable sites and extensive testing. Deep 
burial in salt beds is considered at this time to be the most economical safe dis- 
posal method for long-term radioactive waste. Other methods that have been 
considered include deep-well injections, placement under the seabed or inside 
glaciers, sending into outer space, and transmutation of the radionuclides into 
stable elements. The salt bed at this site at a depth of 650 m is about 
220 million years old and is considered very stable on a time-scale 


of 10,000 years against geological events such as earthquakes and 


F-129 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


volcanism. Diagram 3 [see Fig. 4.6-3] shows the geological strata 
at this site and the location of the depository. Salt is considered 

a good medium for the permanent storage of these wastes because 
its presence indicates a lack of circulating groundwater, it is easy 

to mine, and it is mobile in the sense that it relatively quickly seals 
any fractures or voids, such as those of a waste repository. The site 
is also considered acceptable in that few resources attractive for ex- 
traction are known in the vicinity (at least at the present time or 

in the foreseeable future). The main such resources known in this 
region are potash and some natural gas. The site also is not associ- 
ated with any potable aquifer (the nearest river is about 30,000 m 

= 30 km away) and has a very dry climate (0.3 m of rain per year), 
moreover, we expect the climate to remain dry over the next 10,000 
years. The region including the site is sparsely populated and is expected to 
remain so (the nearest city is Carlsbad 40 km to the west, with a population 

of 25,000). The only significant uses of the region’s land presently are potash 
mining (for fertilizers) and cattle grazing (for meat). 


The repository as constructed consisted of a series of rooms carved 
out of the salt, each about 10-m wide by 4-m high by 110-m long. 
The rooms covered a total area of almost 600 m by 800 m and were 
accessed by a waste shaft of dimensions xx m by yy m, Diagram I 
[shown in Fig. 4.6-1]. Other shafts were for removal of salt, and for 
air intake and exhaust. The radioactive wastes were brought to this site 
Jrom about 15 places around the United States, some as far as 2500 km away. 


They were transported by trucks carrying specially designed containers able 
to withstand extreme collision and fire in the event of accidents. These con- 


tainers held the waste in many steel barrels. Altogether 845,000 barrels, 
each of volume 0.2 cubic meters, were brought to this site in about 
20,000 truck shipments. The average mass of a barrel is xx grams. 
The barrels contain mostly ordinary items that became radioactive 

at some stage in the developing, testing, constructing, and renew- 
ing of nuclear weapons. Buried items include rags, clothing, bags, 
and containers, these are made of fabrics, plastic, glass, and metal. 
There are also complex machines such as motors, hand tools, and 
machine tools. About 60 percent of the radioactive waste also con- 
tains hazardous chemical wastes such as lead, cadmium, chromium, 
barium, methylene chloride (CH,C12), and toluene (C,H;CH;). Most 
of the radioactive waste has minimal emissions of gamma rays, but 
about 3 percent has enough gamma-ray emission that it had to be 
remotely handled at all stages, with humans well removed from the 
barrels. The estimated amount at the time of burial of the major 
radionuclides buried here is: neptunium-237 (yy grams, each with 
xx nuclear disintegrations per second, half-life of 2,100,000 years), 
plutonium-238 ([same kind of information...]), plutonium-239 (...), 
plutonium-240, americium-241, americium-243, curium-244, uranium-233, 
and thorium-229 [list needs checking]. We estimate that after 10,000 
years the total number of disintegrations in the buried waste here 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


Generalized Geologic Cross Section 


Elevation (m) 


SW NE 
Ground Suface 
Gatuna Formation Surficial Deposits 
Dockum 
____.Group 
1000 Dewey Lake 
Red Beds 
LALLLLL 
LET Rustler 
LL ee Formation 
SE Gu ES op Re gs te a eg eee 
‘Culebra Magenta 
BB ai gortae ot oe Rustler-Salado Contact 
Terres McNutt 5... 5 ~------.__ 
Pie Potash Zone ances 
B00 ee ae Salado: 
—— Repository Level BOENeUeD 
250 
7 Cage Wf YY 
Sea Lippy Yj 
Level LLL, 


LLL, 
“LiL iter, Castile Formation 


~250 


Bell Canyon 
Formation 


Sand and Sandstone Anhydrite 
[“——] Siltstone and Sandstone [__] Halite 
Mudstone and Siltstone Eeod) Limestone 


730-0 


Figure 4.6-3. Detailed geologic cross-section .of the site (for the Level IV chamber). 


F-131 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


will be reduced to xx per second, which means that someone standing 
next to this waste would encounter a level of radioactivity corres- 
ponding to yy percent of the natural background at the surface, or 

about the amount corresponding to typical uranium ore [see 50 FR 38071aj]. 
Diagram 4 [shown in Fig. 4.5-9] is a periodic table of the elements, 
with the radioactive elements indicated by the international ‘‘radio- 
activity hazard’’ symbol [actual symbol goes here in the text] that 

has been used in our time since 1950. Elements with a large amount of 
radionuclides buried here are also marked with a second international 
symbol [a filled square in the present figure, actual symbol goes here 

in the text] that means ‘‘radioactive waste buried here’’; these symbols 
are then connected by lines to the repository, see Diagram I [shown in 
Fig. 4.6-1]. These two symbols have also been used widely elsewhere in 
our marking system. Non-radioactive, chemically toxic elements buried 
here are indicated with a downward-pointing circle. 


After each room was filled with barrels of waste, the remaining 
space was then completely filled with salt. Groups of seven rooms 
were each sealed with a 20-m thick series of layers of cement, salt, 
and bentonite. Upon complete filling of the repository in AD 2020 
each of the four shafts to the surface was sealed with an elaborate 
series of materials, Diagram 2 [shown in Fig. 4.6-2], topped by a 
concrete cap xx m thick [give more details here of sealing, useful 

to the future engineer trying to fix or improve the seal]. The waste 
rooms are expected to collapse from the weight of rock above them 
within 100 years and the steel barrels will break. But the salt is ex- 
pected, based on our tests, to prevent the radionuclides from escap- 
ing to the surface; the expected outward diffusion into the salt is 
only yy meters per year. We believe that the greatest possibility for 
radionuclides to make their way to the surface is through human in- 
trusion, and hence we have designed and built this elaborate mark- 
ing system to warn you of the dangers. DO NOT DRILL OR DIG 
AT THIS SITE, DO NOT DO ANYTHING ELSE THAT MIGHT 
DISTURB THE WATER OR ROCKS IN THIS AREA. We believe 
that the most likely type of accidental intrusion is drilling a hole 
that penetrates both the site and the salty water found at some ley- 
els above and below the repository. This water may then become 
contaminated and reach the surface through the drillhole [give spe- 
cific data here]. 


We have found it extremely difficult to imagine all the forms of human society 
and available technology that over the next 10,000 years might give people the 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


desire and ability to intrude into the repository level and thus potentially bring 
great harm to themselves. Nevertheless, we have done the best we can in the 
design of a marker system that will survive over this period, that will be under- 
stood by those who encounter it, and that will be effective in countering their 
natural curiosity to dig at such a uniquely marked and fascinating place. We 
have considered the options of not marking the site at all, of trying to pass on 
through social institutions the vital information about this site, and of build- 

ing a barrier that would physically prevent intrusion by future generations. All 
of these have been found wanting in important ethical or practical ways, and 

so we have built this passive marker system. We have designed the overall ap- 
pearance of the site to deliver the desired message at a psychological level, for 
we believe that our distant descendants will probably share with us far more 
psychology than technology. This desired message is ‘extreme danger to your 
health if you drill or dig here; this message is valid for a very, very long time; 
there is nothing valuable buried here, only dangerous material.”’ A detailed 
map of the marker system is given in Diagram 5 [not shown - deter- 
mined by final design of marker system]. [When final design is cho- 
sen add here appropriate sentences describing the physical layout, 
including subsurface markers.] The alignments shown on the map 
toward the azimuth angles of 110 degrees, 160 degrees, 66 degrees, 
and 42 degrees correspond to the locations where the four bright- 
est stars now visible from this site rise: Sirius, Canopus, Arcturus, 
and Vega. Because of precession of the poles, these star-rise loca- 
tions constantly change and thus a measurement of these alignments 
allows an accurate dating of this site. 


In order to increase the chances of successful transmission, the de- 
tails of the message have been given many different, redundant forms, 
in materials, locations, languages, graphics, and amount of detail. 
Most common is the approximately 15-word basic message flanked 
by two human faces [shown in Fig. 4.5-4], which we believe will carry 
for distant future generations the same effect as for us. The one on 
the left is of horror and terror [actual face goes here in the text], 
and on the right is one of disgust [other face goes here]. [Level II 
and Level III messages will also be found in the Level IV chamber and 
thus do not need to be repeated here.] In this message the international 
“radioactivity hazard’’ symbol [actual symbol goes here in the text] is 
also introduced by placing it next to the word ‘‘radioactive’’ with 
an arrow below it pointing downwards, to indicate that the radioac- 
tivity is below the ground, not on the surface. This and all other 
messages are given in the following six languages, which are the of- 
ficial languages of the United Nations organization and are the native 
tongue for about 40 percent of the world’s population of 5,100,000,000 persons 
[1988 figure]: Chinese, Russian, English, Spanish, Arabic, French. We 
also give these messages in Navajo, that is the native American language 


with the most widespread literature, and corresponds to an indigenous people 
who live about 700 km to the northwest of this site. 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


The next type of message [Level III] is engraved less frequently 

on the site and is more detailed than the basic message described 
above, but still does not assume any scientific knowledge about ra- 
dioactivity. It is flanked by two diagrams. The one on the left is 

a perspective, scale view of the repository in relation to the sur- 

Jace and its marking system; this is a simpler version of Diagram 1 
[shown in Fig. 4.6-1]. It also shows with an arrow where the reader 
is located. The right diagram [similar to Fig. 4.5-8] shows the path 
of the north celestial pole through the sky due to the precession of 


the earth’s axis of rotation. Bright stars are indicated by circles 

(the brightest star, on the left, is Vega) and portions of our constel- 
lations Ursa Minor, Draco, and Cygnus are shown by dashed lines 
connecting stars. The illustrated section of arc corresponds to the 
period from AD 2020, when the pole was close to the star Polaris 

and the repository was sealed, to AD 12,000, when the pole will be 

in Cygnus. The faces at the two epochs express differing emotions 
about the safety of intruding into the repository, and the sequence 

of ‘‘radioactive waste buried here’’ symbols [actual symbol goes here 

in the text] of diminishing size expresses the diminishing amount of 
radioactivity present in the repository as 10,000 years pass. The level 
of radioactivity in the waste decreases over time, but it will not all be 
gone after 10,000 years. If you have accurately observed the changing 
position of the pole in your own time, this diagram shows you how to 
determine the date of the sealing of this repository reasonably accurately 
even if you do not understand the “‘AD’’ (Anno Domini) notation used for 
Gregorian calendar dates in this message. In other calendars of our time, 
the end of the year AD 2020 occurs during the following years: 7529 in 
the Byzantine calendar, 5781 in the Jewish calendar, 1441 in the Is- 
lamic calendar, and 4718 in the Chinese calendar. It also occurs on 
Julian Date 2459275. 


This radioactive waste repository and marker system is in fact only 
one of many constructed all over the earth; Diagram 6 [Fig. 4.5-5] 
shows a map of the world (in a two-dimensional projection of the 
globe that preserves the correct relative sizes of all areas) with the 
waste sites indicated by the ‘‘radioactive waste buried here’’ sym- 
bol [actual symbol goes here in text]. In order to locate these sites 
more accurately, each symbol on the map has been labeled with a 
number that can also be found labeling two dots found in Diagram 7 
[shown in Fig. 4.5-6] (whose most noticeable feature is a 3-m di- 
ameter circle). Each dot on the circumference of the outer circle 
gives the longitude of another waste site relative to the longitude of 
this site; this relative longitude is equal to the arc traversed from 
the dot labeled 0 at the top (which corresponds to this site). Dots 
to the right represent sites to the east. In a similar manner, the in- 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


ner partial circle gives the relative latitude of a site, which is equal 
to the arc traversed from the dot labeled 0. Dots on the upper side 
are sites to the north. The fabrication of these panels [accuracy of 
I mm] has been such that we believe that you can determine the lo- 
cation of all other radioactive waste sites from our time to an accu- 
racy of about 4 km. We urge you to check these locations around 
the world and make certain that the marking systems for these 

sites are still intact. You will also find that certain features of these 
other marking systems are identical to those here. The international 
standard for these marking systems can be summarized thus [the 
standard given here is only an example]: 


“Each site must (1) display its basic warning messages in at least 

the following languages: Chinese, Russian, English, Spanish, French, 
and Arabic; (2) prominently display the symbol for international 
radioactive waste burial [symbol goes here]; (3) display in a protected 
chamber a world map of all disposal sites, together with a standard 
diagram that geometrically allows their location to an accuracy of 

at least 5 km; and (4) include earthen berms to delineate the disposal 
area with heights of least 10 m.’’ 


4.7 Additional possible components 


4.7.1 Art 


Art is one of the basic ways that humans express themselves and is therefore a candidate for 
inclusion in any message system designed to span ten millenia. In this section; we refer to the 
incorporation in the site design of a specific work of art by an artist who is commissioned to 
create a piece that will pass on the basic message of ‘‘Danger - do not dig here.”’ 


Examples of artists whose work may be relevant include James Turrell (Roden Crater near 
Flagstaff, AZ), Charles Ross (Star Axis near Las Vegas, NM), and James Acord (‘‘Monstrance 
for a Grey Horse’’ in Richland, WA). The first two artists have specialized in sculptural pieces 
using light, and now are involved with large earthwork projects with astronomical connections. 
The third is a sculptor who uses in part radioactive materials and who is now closely working 
with engineers and scientists at Hanford. 


We see a prominent site-specific work of art as a potentially valuable component of a marker 
system. But to reduce ambiguous interpretation, it should be only one design element of the 
overall, redundant marker system. Furthermore, any work of art should be an integral, 
permanent part of its milieu, thus lessening the desire (or even ability) of future museums to haul 
it away. 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


4.7.2 Aeolian Structures - 


Communication of the basic Level I message could also take place through sound. Although 
probably not lasting for the full 10,000 years, structures designed to resonate in the wind could 
be placed around the site. The effect of the various sounds generated should be consonant with 
the overall site design, namely a place of great foreboding. Indeed, sounds that can readily be 
generated by long-lasting aeolian structures turn out often to be dissonant and mournful, and so 
would readily serve our purposes. Noise levels would need to be controlled so as not to disturb 
people residing in the general vicinity of the site. 


We have not been able to research this idea further, but it deserves attention; for if it is feasible, 
it would be of great utility for at least the first few hundred years. 


4.8 References 


f 
In addition to electronic data bases (NSPEC, COMPENDEX, and RAPRA), the following 
references were consulted in the preparation of Section 4.4: 


[4-1] Levine, A.G. 1982. Love Canal: Science, Politics, and People. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company. 


[4-2] Bicz6k, I. 1968. Betonkorrosion-Betonschutz. 6th ed. Wiesbaden: Bauverlag GmbH. 


[4-3] American Concrete Institute. 1975. Durability of Concrete. ACI Publication SP-47. 
Detroit, MI: American Concrete Institute. 


[4-4] Swift, P.N. 1993. ‘‘Long-Term Climate Variability at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, 
: Southeastern New Mexico, USA,’’ Environmental Management. SAND91-7055. Vol. 
17, no. 1, 83-97. 


[4-5] Fujita, T.T. 1978. A Site-Specific Study of Wind and Tornado Probabilities at the WIPP 
Site in Southeast New Mexico. Satellite and Mesometeorology Research Project (SMRP) 
Research Paper No. 155. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago. 


[4-6] Bagnold, R.A. 1941. The Physics of Blown Sand and Desert Dunes. New York, NY: 
William Morrow & Company. 


[4-7] “‘Light Earthquake Sends Tremor Through Texas and New Mexico,”’ New York Times. 
January 3, 1992, Section A, p. 14, col. 2. 


[4-8] Neville, A.M. 1963. Properties of Concrete. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


[4-9] Torres, L. 1985. ‘‘To the Immortal Name and Memory of George Washington’’: The 
United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Construction of the Washington 
Monument. EP 870-1-21. Washington, DC: Historical Division, Office of 
Administrative Services, Office of the Chief of Engineers. 


[4-10] Hawkes, J. 1976. The Atlas of Early Man. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 

[4-11] U.S. Department of Energy. 1979. Environmental and Other Evaluations of Alternatives 
for Long-Term Management of Stored INEL Transuranic Waste. DOE/ET-0081. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Energy 
Technology, Office of Nuclear Waste Management. 


[4-12] Craig, B.D. 1989. Handbook of Corrosion Data. Metals Park, OH: ASM 
International. 


[4-13] Baboian, R., and S.W. Dean, eds. 1990. Corrosion Testing and Evaluation: Silver 
Anniversary Volume. STP 100. Philadelphia, PA: ASTM. 


[4-14] Baloun, C.H., ed. 1990. Corrosion in Natural Waters. STP 1086. Philadelphia, PA: 
ASTM. 


In Section 4.5, we refer to the following references: 
[4-15] Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. 1989. Human Ethology. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter. 


[4-16] Metropolitan Museum of Art. Photograph Library. Accession nos. 26.7.1020,.1021. 
New York, NY. 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


5. Appendices 


5.1 Scenario for the marking system (MFK) 


Jo and Steve bumped along comfortably as Jo steered the drilling rig over the undulating desert 
terrain. The sun was just up over the horizon, but the day had not yet grown hot. The sky was 
a clear, dark blue with no clouds, and the color contrasted sharply with the tans and reds of the 
desert. There were sand dunes, some free-form and mobil, others quietly building up against 
the mesquite trees. Steve checked the computer screen. ‘‘We ought to be in sight by now,”’ 
he said. 


There were no tracks, so Jo just followed the terrain and the navigation system on the computer. 
She wrestled the vehicle up over a small dune. ‘‘There she is!’’ cried Jo. ‘‘Looks just like the 
aerial shot. The funny thing is, the aerial shot looks more like a drawing than a rock formation. 


This is going to be a strange place.’’ She turned the drilling rig slightly and headed directly 
toward the strange shape to the north. 


The shape turned out to be a series of jagged-shaped earthworks slowly growing higher as they 
moved toward a center. But they didn’t meet in the center. From a distance, the top looked 
flat, but little bits of blue told them that there were passageways through the hills. 


‘*Let’s take another look at that aerial,’’ said Jo. Steve brought it up on the screen. Jo stopped 
to give it a good look. From the air, the place looked like a series of lightning bolts streaking 
away from an empty center. The center was also where Remote said they got a very strong, but 
unrecognizable, signal on their recent survey. ‘“Strange,’’ commented Steve. ‘‘It sure doesn’t 
look natural.’’ 


“‘T don’t care if the Martians built it,’’ replied Jo. ‘‘I’m just a tool pusher and I’m due to go 
home next week. Let’s go.’’ 


They drew closer, and Jo swung the rig so it followed the winding path between two hills. She 
hit the brakes hard, and the two of them snapped against the belts. Blocking their way was a 
rock, It was right in the middle of the path and the rig couldn’t fit around it. 


Steve hopped out and looked around. ‘‘Well, Pll be,’’ he said, ‘‘It’s not rock! It’s some kind 
of concrete!’’ He followed the shape around and disappeared for a few minutes. His head 
poked out from behind the shape. ‘‘Jo,’’ he hollered, ‘‘Come and look at this!”’ 


Jo climbed down and walked over, the sand squeaking beneath her boots. She followed Steve’s 
head around the shape, only to find another shape behind it. The sand had shifted in between 
the two, but the writing was still clear. She stood next to Steve and looked. There were faces, 
two of them. And there was writing, in many different forms. ‘‘Hey, I think that’s Chinese 
-- I saw something like it in my ancient history class,’’ said Steve as he knelt to get a closer 
look. 


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Appendix F: Team A Report 


**So send a picture to Cindy in Remote -- you know she likes that old stuff,’’ shrugged Jo. 
“What did they want around here? Those faces aren’t scary. That one looks scared and that 
one looks sick. I’m not impressed.’’ She stepped out between the pillars and looked around. 
They had stopped just before the center. There was nothing there but sand and scrub. She 
squinted and saw that every passage way was blocked by these little shapes sticking up in the 
middle. She sighed. All this stuff for... nothing? That wasn’t her problem; her problem was 
how to get the rig in there and get the core. The sooner she was done, the happier she’d be. 
She had begun to dislike this place. 


Jo turned to go back to the rig and think. If she blasted the shapes, it wasn’t clear the path 
would be passable. The walls would stop the rubble from traveling very ‘far. Should she pull 
them or go with a directional hole? She stopped to stare at the shapes. No telling how far down 
they may go. The rig was designed for drilling. It could pull 10,000 rangs of pipe, so it could 
probably handle the shapes. There was no sense risking damage though; the directional hole was 
probably the safest route to take. 


Steve was already back at the rig. He really had sent a shot of the place to Cindy. Jo shook 
her head. ‘“When you’re done playing, I need to reprogram the rig.’’ Steve moved aside. ‘‘So 
we are going to start here?’’ ‘“Yup,’’ was the reply. 


Steve went to the other set of controls. He set out the bracing legs to stabilize the rig. He 
activated the roustabout robots that would join the lengths of pipe as the drilling proceeded. He 
prepared the casings to store and transport the geological cores back for analysis. He checked 
the air system. Air was the fluid of choice for drilling systems now, no need to locate a water 
source near the drill site. 


Jo was checking in with Headquarters. ‘‘Yeah, rather than a straight hole, just a 5-sec deviation 
will still bring me right where you want it at 2,100 rangs. The system has been reprogrammed 
and no difficulties are indicated. All we are going through is some shale and salt, till we get 
to the interesting stuff. Any problem?’’ Jo waited until clearance came through. 


She swiveled around, put on her hearing protectors, and began. Steven had everything ready. 
She spudded the hole and watched as the cuttings blew to the discharge pile. The drill bit 
cleanly through the beginning layers. She fine-tuned the bit for the salt she expected to hit. 


When things were underway, they put both systems on automatic and ate dinner. ‘‘Looks ok, 
so far,’’ said Steve. ‘‘Yeah,’’ replied Jo, munching ona biscuit. ‘‘With luck, we’ll be at 2,100 


rangs by tomorrow morning.’’ Steve took the first watch while Jo curled up for some sleep. 


Steve nudged her. ‘‘Your turn. Things are going so well; it is boring. Can’t imagine what’s 
causing the signal the Remote is so interested in.’’ Jo got up, grabbed some coffee and looked 


F-140 


Appendix F: Team A Report 


over the controls. The depth was 1,800 rangs. She gently increased the air pressure to keep 
the hole open at that depth. 


Steven had just fallen asleep when the alarms blew. ‘‘What the?’’ he cried. ‘‘We lost the bit!’’ 
shouted Jo, trying to regain control. She swore. ‘‘We’ve got a stuck pipe and I’m afraid it may 
have snapped. We may have to go fishing.’’ 


Steven got out and checked the last core as it was coming up. There were rangs and rangs of 
salt. What could have happened, he wondered. The last section was just coming into view. 
After the robots had laid it down on the rack, he shut them down too. He looked over, and gave 
a low whistle. He walked back over to Jo who was still bent over the screen. ‘‘Nothing makes 
sense,’’ she was mumbling. 


‘“What happens if you run a salt bit into hard rock at 100 rangs per hour?’’ Steve asked sweetly. 
‘*That’d be a stupid thing to....’’ Jo picked up her head, ‘“Huh?’’ ‘‘Well, that’s what’s out 
there.’’ Steven held out his hand. In his palm lay a chuck of red granite. 


Jo didn’t have time to reply. The communicator squawked and, rubbing her eyes, Jo punched 
it to answer. ‘‘Rig 3 here.’’ The face of her boss showed on the screen. ‘“‘Stop work 
immediately. That’s an order!’’ stated the dark face on the screen. ‘‘You’re too late, we’ve 
already stopped,’’ replied Jo. Her boss stiffened in her chair. ‘‘Since when do you read ancient 
Chinese?’’ asked Linda. ‘‘I don’t,’’ replied Jo. ‘‘I’ve just lost a bit. What’s all this about?’’ 


Linda looked worried. ‘‘What broke the bit? What level are you at?’’ she queried. ‘‘I hit hard 
crystalline rock at 2,100 rangs. God knows, that alone won’t give the signal Remote found, but 
I’m going to have to fish everything out, and put on the spare before I find out.’’ Jo didn’t like 
explaining she lost the bit. 


Linda looked relieved. ‘‘Good. You didn’t go any deeper.’’ It was Jo’s turn to stiffen. ““What 
is going on here? If I don’t complete the job, I don’t get paid.’’ 


Linda smiled. ‘“‘Don’t worry. You'll be paid in full. This is an official job change. The data 
Steve sent to Cindy were most interesting. We know what the signal is now, so you won’t have 
to drill. It’s an old waste disposal site like the one they hit 10 years ago im the north 
mountains.’’ 


Jo shuddered. She had heard about that site. Another crew went exploring. In that case, the 
stuff was much closer to the surface and they lost a couple of people before they figured things 
out. She liked her job and it paid well, but it did have its risks. ‘‘So just close up shop and go 
home?’’ she asked. ‘‘That’s right,’’ said Linda as she signed off. 


Steve and Jo reloaded all the equipment and got ready to back out of the passageway. But 
before she left, Jo walked over to the shapes again -- the ones that blocked their way to the dead 
zone. She looked again at the faces. They were right, she thought. As she climbed into the 
cab, she told Steve ‘‘Let’s get out of here. I knew I didn’t like this place.”’ 


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5.2 The enormity of marking the WIPP site (FN) 


If the WIPP is ever operational, the site may pose a greater hazard than is officially 
acknowledged. Yet the problems involved in marking the site to deter inadvertent intrusion for 
the next 10,000 years are enormous. Even if knowledge exists that would allow translation of 


the message on the markers, there might be little motivation to solicit such knowledge. Pictorial 
messages, however, are unreliable and may even convey the opposite of what is intended. 


This panel member therefore recommends that the markers and the structures associated with 
them be conceived along truly gargantuan lines. To put their size into perspective, a simple 
berm, say 35-m wide and 15-m high, surrounding the proposed land-withdrawal boundary, 
would involve the excavation, transport, and placement of around 12 million m> of earth. What 
is proposed, of course, is on a much grander scale than that. By contrast, in the construction of 
the Panama Canal, 72.6 million m* were excavated and the Great Pyramid occupies 2.4 million 
m’. In short, to ensure probability of success, the WIPP marker undertaking will have to be one 
of the greatest public works ventures in history. 


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5.3 Personal thoughts (WS) 


Working on this panel, always fascinating and usually enlightening too, has led to the following 
personal thoughts: 


(a) We have all become very marker-prone, but shouldn’t we nevertheless admit that, in the end, 
despite all we try to do, the most effective ‘‘marker’’ for any intruders will be a relatively 
limited amount of sickness or death caused by the radioactive waste? In other words, it is largely 
a self-correcting process if anyone intrudes without appropriate precautions, and it seems 
unlikely that intrusion on such buried waste would lead to large-scale disasters. An analysis of 
the likely number of death over 10,000 years due to inadvertent intrusion should be conducted. 
This cost should be weighted against that of the marker system. 


(b) The design and testing of markers and messages must involve a broad spectrum of societies 
and people within those societies. So-called "experts" can of course make important 
contributions, but they must listen carefully to all other people who represent those who might 
encounter the markers. In the course of working on this project, I received excellent ideas from 
a wide range of undergraduates, colleagues, friends, and relatives. 


(c) The very exercise of designing, building, and viewing markers creates powerful testimony 
addressed to today’s society about the full environmental, social, and economic costs of using 
nuclear materials. We can never know if we indeed have successfully communicated with our 
descendants 400 generations removed, but we can, in any case, perhaps convey an important 
message to ourselves. 


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5.4 Possible origins of archetypes of place (MB) 


Several explanations are offered for the phenomenon of archetypes of place. All receive some 
external validation in various literatures and all (or some) may be operating simultaneously. 


5.4.1 Landscapes Seen as Having Adaptive Value in Evolution 


Much current theory about our strong and stable preferences for particular forms of landscape 
and habitat sees them as adaptive behavior. It sees the common feelings, meanings, and 
preferences people have in regards to types of places as a product of our bio-evolutionary history 
of successful adaptation in certain habitats. 


Landscape archetypes may be so powerful because they were ‘‘imprinted’’ over an incredibly 
long period of time (clearly far longer than we have had cultures and built-form); imprinted 
during the period of the mind’s greatest openness to landscapes, during the development of 
consciousness; imprinted at a time of our fullest sensory integration, and in a situation of our 
most profound participation in nature seen as a life-unity. Some theories suggest that landscape 
archetypes originate in the physiologically nurturing habitat of our evolutionary ‘‘cradle,’’ the 
African savannah, which provided ample food, water, breeding grounds, and cover/refuge, all 
requirements for survival. Humans who prospered were those who preferred the savannah as 
habitat, while those who preferred other and less salutary habitats did not survive. These 
adaptive preferences either were or became ‘‘hard-wired’’ and genetically transmitted, so that 
these landscape preferences remain with us today, even though there is no lingering survival 
value ([Ref. 5-1], [Ref 5-2], [Ref. 5-3], [Ref. 5-4], [Ref. 5-5], and [Ref. 5-6]). 


Another research supported theory is about the survival value of an enhanced ability to read and 
know environments so we may more wisely bend them to our purposes. Appleton [Ref. 5-1] 
posits three types of cues in the landscape (hazards, prospects and refuges) with which wise 
cue-readers would be rewarded with enhanced chances of survival. Hazard cues, when 
perceived, arouse anxiety that is resolved when some successful action is taken, leading to 
relaxation and even pleasure. Because some or all parts of this “‘hard-wired’’ sequence have 
had adaptive value, we still display strong preference for environments that provide a good 
balance of prospect and refuge, even though it is no longer adaptive. 


The theory of understanding and exploration of landscapes of S. Kaplan ([Ref. 5-7], [Ref. 5-8], 
and [Ref. 5-9]) is broader, and emphasizes the evolved ability to read, understand and explore 
the landscape. The corollary is that we still prefer landscapes that are recognizable, invite some 
exploration, and are comprehensible and interpretable. 


Orians and Heerwagen [Ref. 5-6] link several landscape and habitat preference theories in their 
concept of a three stage interaction process, much of which is run ‘‘on automatic,’’ on evolved 
and imprinted responses. The stages are (1) a rapid emotional response to physical qualities of 
an environment; (2) information-gathering, engaged by features that entice exploration, aid it, 


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and support wayfinding, especially ‘‘the way back’’...all helped by an automatic risk-assessment; 
and (3) the decision to inhabit (or not) based on the presence of ‘‘patches’’ of things needed for 
survival and available with reasonable energy expenditures. 


Some researchers also argue that our archetypes for built-form are based on those for landscapes 
(Hildebrand [Ref. 5-10]).. 


5.4.2 Landscapes as Primordial Factor in Development of Mythic Consciousness 


In his analyses (done in the twenties and published 1955 and 1973) of the development of human 
symbol formation ({Ref. 5-11] and [Ref. 5-12]), Cassirer locates its origins in our mythic 
consciousness, where the mythologies of peoples are not the products of consciousness, but are 
the imprinted evolutionary ‘‘record’’ of the history of the development of consciousness 
itself...the idea that myths really took place in consciousness during its long development. 
Archetypes (of place and all else) reside in the unconscious, made from primordial material over 
an enormous time. McCully [Ref. 5-13] suggests that the primordial materials in the 
unconscious are ‘‘prototypical experiences of food gathering, elimination, fertility, father, 
mother, authority; self, femininity, goddess, eternity, childhood, circle, square, devil (evil), god 
(good), maleness and sleep.’’ To these Cassirer would certainly add ‘‘space, time, and number’”’ 
and I would add ‘‘communion; community; body-danger; pain and death.’’ These may be 
considered the substratum, the basic materials of human experience and meaning, and humans 
explore and represent these primordial materials in all our symbolic forms: myth, language, 
religion, and art. 


As an example, there seems to be a world-wide set of common myths, ones that have 
near-identical basic structure and that only differ in details. While we only see local or what 
Joseph Campbell [Ref. 5-14] calls ‘‘ethnic variations,’’ and never see the archetypal myth at the 
center, the remarkable structural commonalities attest to that archetypal center and meaning. 
Some species-wide mythic themes are: the creation of the world from a chaos of nothing; the 
fire-theft; the great mother; virgin birth; the plenitude of Eden and the beauty of paradise; the 
chaos-again of the flood or deluge; the land of the dead; the dying and resurrected god or hero; 
the questing journey or pilgrimage; and redemption through sacrifice and suffering. 


The fundamental human experiences carried as archetypes are ones that, when experienced “‘in 
the beginning,’’ already had a mythically significant ‘‘tone.’’ In fact, our predisposition to even 
notice certain things and not others is because they have some meaning...they first ‘‘appear’’ 
to us as significant, against a background of all else, which at that moment, seems irrelevant. 
This experience, Eliade [Ref. 5-15] argues, is the origin for the fundamental articulation of the 
Sacred and the Profane. 


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While it is, of course, our projection of meaning onto a world, it seemed and still seems like 
a perception of meaning in the world. As Cassirer [Ref. 5-12], the philosopher of symbolic 
form, said in Language and Myth, in 1923: 


“*The mythical form of conception is not something super-added to certain definite elements of 
empirical existence; instead, the primary experience itself is steeped in the imagery of myth and 
saturated with its atmosphere.”’ 


It is this experiencing-as-significant, this irruption of meaning, which forms the basis for the 
development of, first, concepts, and then the early symbolic forms of myth and language. And 
it is these significant meanings that are also embedded in the unconscious in yet another 
symbolic form, that of archetypes. 


5.4.3 Archetypes of Built-Form Seen as Originating in Body-Experience 


Some theories about our feelings and preferences for built-forms suggests primary origins in the 
body. 


Harries ([Ref. 5-16], [Ref. 5-17], and [Ref. 5-18]) uses the term ‘‘natural language’’ to describe 
how the body senses itself in a place and makes sense of a place, while moving through it and 
using it. This ‘‘language’’ is derived and transmitted through millennia of these common 
experiences. He posits fundamental dialectics as ‘‘natural symbols’’ in human experience: our 
bodies’ six axial directions and its center, and the polarities of phenomena related to vision, 
hearing, touch, gravity, and location (dark-light, loud-soft, rough-smooth/hard-soft/cold-hot, 
heaviness-lightness, here-there/inside-outside). His work shows that in all spatial experience, 
the body feels and responds to these, and there is meaning. Much current research in the 
phenomenological meanings of places supports this. 


Walter [Ref. 5-19] and others posit ‘‘haptic perception’’ in which the body feels the articulations 
ou Sears and surfaces in the world by means of its own inner articulations, and (almost literally) 
““srasps’’ meaning from form. 


Thiis-Evensen [Ref. 5-20] in a work called Archetypes in Architecture links body-feeling more 
directly to the primary physical elements used in making buildings. From a fundamental 
dialectic of the balance of the forces of inside and outside come the archetypal physical elements 
that delimit spatiality: the wall, floor, and roof (and further, the door, window, and stair), and 
their activity in mediating between inside and outside. It is our body that senses the meanings 
through our relationship to three aspects of each element: motion (its dynamic nature...felt as 
expanding, contracting or balanced); weight (its relation with gravity); and substance (the 
character of material...hard/soft; warm/cold). 


There are many others who have studied how we comprehend the meanings of place through our 


bodies’ posture, orientation, feel, and movement, such as Yi Fu Tuan in Space and Place, The 
Perspective of Experience [Ref. 5-21]; Kent Bloomer and Charles Moore in Body, Memory, and 


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Architecture [Ref. 5-22]; Joseph Grange’s "Place, Body and Situation" in Dwelling, Place and 
Environment [Ref. 5-23]. 


There are other possibilities. I will not describe them here, but important ones are: Bachelard 
[Ref. 5-24], Condon [Ref. 5-25], Lobell [Ref. 5-26], and Munro [Ref. 5-27]. 


5.4.4 References 


[5-1] Appleton, J. 1975. The Experience of Landscape. New York, NY: John Wiley & 
Sons. 


[5-2] Dubos, R. 1965. Man Adapting. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
[5-3] Dubos, R. 1968. So Human an Animal. New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 
[5-4] Dubos, R. 1980. The Wooing of Earth, New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 


[S-5] Orians, G.H., 1986. ‘‘An Ecological and Evolutionary Approach to Landscape 
Aesthetics,’’ Landscape Meanings and Values. Eds. E.C. Penning-Rowsell and D. 
Lowenthal. London, England: Allen and Unwin. 3-25. 


[5-6] Orians G.H., and J.H. Heerwagen. 1992. ‘‘Evolved Responses to Landscapes,’’ The 
Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Eds. J.H. 
Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 555- 
579. 


[5-7] Kaplan, S. 1975. ‘‘An Informal Model for the Prediction of Preference,’’ Landscape 
Assessment: Values, Perceptions, and Resources. Eds. E.H. Zube, R.O. Brush, and 
J.G. Fabos. Stroudsburg, PA: Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, Inc. 92-101. 


[5-8] Kaplan, S. 1979. ‘‘Perception and Landscape: Conceptions and Misconceptions,’’ Our 
National Landscape: A Conference on Applied Techniques for Analysis and Management 
of the Visual Resource, Incline Village, NV, September 1979. Berkeley, CA: Pacific 
Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station. 241-248. 


[5-9] Kaplan, S. 1987. ‘‘Aesthetics, Affect, and Cognition: Environmental Preference from 
. an Evolutionary Perspective,’’ Environment and Behavior. Vol. 19, no. 1, 3-32. 


[5-10] Hildebrand, G. 1991. The Wright Space: Pattern and Meaning in Frank Lloyd Wright’s 
Houses. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press. 


[5-11] Cassirer, E. 1955. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume 2: Mythical Thought. 
Translated by R. Manheim. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 


[5-12] Cassirer, E. 1946. Language and Myth. Translated by S.K. Langer. [New York, 
NY]: Dover Publications, Inc. 


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[5-13] McCully, R.S. 1987. Jung and Rorschach: A Study in the Archetype of Perception. 
Dallas, TX: Spring Publications. 


[5-14] Campbell, J. 1959. The Masks of God. New York, NY: Viking Press. Vols. 1-4. 


[5-15] Eliade, M. 1959. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. New York, 
NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 


[5-16] Harries, K. 1982. "Building and the Terror of Time," Perspecta. Vol. 19, 58-69. 


[5-17] Harries, K. 1988. ‘‘Representation and Re-presentation in Architecture,’’ Via. 1988, 
no. 9, [12]-25. 


[5-18] Harries, K. 1988. "The Voices of Space," Center: A Journal for Architecture in 
America. Vol. 4, 34-49. 


[5-19] Walter, E.V. 1988. Placeways, A Theory of the Human Environment. Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Carolina Press. 


[5-20] Thiis-Evensen, T. 1987. Archetypes in Architecture. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 


[5-21] Tuan, Y-F. 1977. Space and Place, The Perspective of Experience. Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press. 


[5-22] Bloomer, K.C., and C.W. Moore. 1977. Body, Memory, and Architecture. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 


[5-23] Grange, J. 1985. ‘‘Place, Body and Situation,’’ Dwelling, Place and Environment: 
Towards a Phenomenology of Person and World. Eds. D. Seamon aud R. Mugerauer. 
Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 71-84. 


[5-24] [Bachelard, G.] 1969. The Poetics of Space. Translated from the French by Maria 
Jolas. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 


[5-25] Condon, P.M. 1988. A Designed Landscape Space Typology: A Series Design Tool: 
A Report to the National Endowment for the Arts. Minneapolis, MN: School of 
Architecture and Landscape Architecture, University of Minnesota. (Copy on file at the 
Architecture Library, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.) 

[5-26] Lobell, M. 1983. "Spatial Archetypes," Revision. Vol. 6, no. 2, 69-82. 


[5-27] Munro, E.C. 1987. On Glory Roads: A Pilgrim’s Book about Pilgrimage. New York, 
NY: Thames and Hudson. 


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5.5 A Proposal for a Visitors’ Center and Memorial at the WIPP Site (FN) 


I wish to suggest that the structures proposed in Section 4 above be complemented with 
constructions of a very different sort, which should be located at or close to the most likely 
public approach to the message-bearing structures. They would include a visitors’ center whose 
role would be in part to fulfill the standard function of such centers; in this case, explaining the 
history and design of WIPP and the marking system. However, the visitors’ center and 
associated structures should also convey a serious message, one which will endow the entire site 
with the significance of a solemn memorial, or even a shrine. In brief, the message conveyed 
should be the destructive power of nuclear energy. Therefore, accompanying the visitors’ center 
itself there might be symbols recognizable as denoting mourning, reflection, and remembrance. 
Symbolic gravesites, small shrines, and the like could serve this purpose. 


The following paragraphs outline briefly the observations, assumptions, and predictions that have 
led me to put forward this idea. 


1. If the collective proposals of Team A are carried out, the WIPP site will quickly become 
known as one of the major architectural and artistic marvels of the modern world. Quite simply, 
there will be no keeping people away. We owe it to these people to explain to them why WIPP 
was built and its overall significance. To do so adequately would require a dedicated information 
center; the structures themselves are not designed for this purpose. 


2. An appropriate message for the public area leading to the markers is the insanity of nuclear 
war and the dangers inherent in the preparations for one. The principal exhibits could feature 
the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the now acknowledged Soviet disaster at an 
atomic weapons complex in the Urals in 1957 that forced the evacuation of 10,000 people. Other 
exhibits could document and thereby help atone for the lack of forthrightness on the part of the 
government in informing the affected public about the dangers they have faced as a consequence 
of nuclear weapons production and testing. (A good example is the plight of the Hanford 
"downwinders," who now suffer disproportionate incidences of thyroid and other cancers 
because no one told them about the 530,000 curies of radioactive iodine isotopes that were 
released from the reactors between 1944 and 1956.) 


Other exhibits could serve as constant reminders of the human and financial cost of nuclear 
power, focusing on the events at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and the like. I take it for 
granted that increasingly nuclear power will come to be looked upon as a mid-to-late 20th 
century folly. There is considerable reason to believe that it will be abandoned as an energy 
source before long. In the United States, there are many fewer power plants in operation or 
pending construction now than a decade ago. Many of the former are expected to be shut down 
and most of the latter will never be built. At the end of 1990, there were only 83 plants under 
construction in the world, half in Eastern Europe and not likely ever to be completed. A tragedy 
on the scale of Chernobyl, which is inevitable in the next decade, will end dreams of nuclear 


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power as an energy source forever. Because (as we note in Section 1.3.1) it is highly likely that 
WIPP will be used to store civilian, as well as military, wastes, it is appropriate that the 
memorial at WIPP serve as a reminder of the tragic cost of nuclear power as used for "peaceful" 
as well as intentionally destructive purposes. 


Indeed, the very existence of WIPP with its price tag of well over a billion dollars is a 


’ monument to the folly of the nuclear enterprise. We owe it to the public to explain in detail the 
circumstances surrounding the birth and death of this enterprise. 


3. The primary task of the Marker panel teams is to devise ways to ensure that the WIPP site 
not be tampered with over the centuries. It seems to me that an ideal way to accomplish this 
would be to associate with it a memorial with solemn significance such as is described above. 
Obviously, no building or plot of ground is destruction-proof, but those known to bear religious, 
memorial, or emotional significance tend to fare better than most. By way of example, consider 
how difficult it is in societies around the world to expropriate cemetery land for any other 
purpose. There are several square miles in the borough of Queens in New York City that contain 
some of the (potentially) most valuable real estate in the world. Yet it is safe to say that, barring 
some massive cultural discontinuity, the cemeteries on this land will remain undisturbed 
indefinitely. In many Asian and European cities, the only standing structures more than a century 
or two old are temples and churches. This is due in part to the fact that they were constructed 
to last in a way that secular buildings were not, but also to a reluctance to destroy them. Even 
where the forces of history lead to one culture and its religion being displaced by another, the 
sacred sites of the former are often expropriated for the same purpose by the latter. The 
Parthenon has been successively a temple dedicated to Athena, a Byzantine church, a mosque, 
and (in effect) a monument to the grandeur of the ancient peoples who built it.” 


It is true, of course, that the conquest of one people by another is often accompanied by cultural 
genocide and with it the conscious elimination of the sacred symbols of the conquered. Witness 
the destruction of the Temple of Solomon by the Romans in AD 70 and the systematic 
annihilation or removal by Christian colonizers of virtually all structures and cultural artifacts 
bearing religious significance among the conquered peoples in the Americas, Africa, and 
Oceania.' One might have the uneasy feeling, then, that the replacement of the currently 
dominant "Anglo" culture by another in the New Mexico area (an event that is surely inevitable 
over 10,000 years) might lead to destruction of any memorial at the WIPP site. I can think of 
two diametrically opposed scenarios for the future involving such a replacement, an optimistic 
one and a pessimistic one. Neither, however, cuts at the heart of the recommendation to 
construct a solemn memorial at the site. In the first, optimistically speaking, there appears to 
be arising an historically unprecedented sensitivity to the cultural rights of the vanquished and 


1 Yet the Israelis dare not rebuild the Temple because the site now bears holy significance to Islam and some 
religious structures in Mexico, Peru, Easter Island and elsewhere were too large for even the Western 
conquerors to destroy or remove. 


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dispossessed. For the first time in 500 years, there is serious discussion in the dominant culture 
of the negative effects of Columbus’ legacy. More specifically, Native American Indians have 
been challenging the right of anthropologists, developers, and others to continue pillaging their 
burial sites and removing objects of sacred value and, to a certain degree, they have been 
winning. For example, some states have enacted strict legislation prohibiting any kind of 
excavation in such sites without prior consent of the relevant Indian tribe. Thus, one has reason 
to hope that future political shifts in the area will leave any memorial (and the message it 
conveys) intact. 


On the other hand, in the pessimistic scenario, any successful invader that would think nothing 
of destroying objects of sacred significance would also indifferently destroy simple markers, 
buildings, and any other objects or symbols valued by the defeated or displaced people. In such 
an event, any marker system would be imperiled. Therefore, there is nothing to lose by 
constructing a solemn memorial at the site. 


4, While I am a linguist, not a physicist or a geologist, careful reading of the literature critical 
of WIPP? has convinced me that it poses hazards greater than those that are officially 
acknowledged. I therefore feel that the site should be monitored well past the 100-year point at 
which active institutional control is projected to cease. The presence of a staffed visitors’ center 
will encourage monitoring to continue. At the same time, there would be no hazards to visitors, 
because the natural geological activity leading to potential public danger will be slow enough to 
allow more than enough time for evacuation and (hopefully) amelioration. An occupied structure 
near the site will also help to discourage drilling and other activity that could lead to a sudden 
hazardous situation. 


5. Finally, let me point out that this is a particularly auspicious time to propose the kind of 
memorial described above. The commitment of all the major powers to nuclear disarmament 
should facilitate the acceptance of this idea. The Japanese, as the only country to feel the full 
fury of nuclear weapons, should be eager to have their experiences commemorated; the 
inheritors of the Soviet Union are in a period of willingly exposing their past nuclear disasters 
and looking for ways of defusing the arms race further; the Europeans might be expected as a 
matter of course to support anything symbolic of the scaling down of the arms race; and we 
Americans should be proud to reinforce to the world the recognition of the evil of nuclear 
weapons and atomic war. 


2 See, for example, Don Hancock. 1989. "Getting Rid of the Nuclear Waste Problem: the WIPP Stalemate," 
The Workbook. Vol. 14, no. 4, 134-144; Michele Merola. 1991. "State of the WIPP Address," The 
Radioactive Rag. Vol. 3, no. 2, 1-2; Nicholas Lenssen. 1991. "WIPP-Lash: Nuclear Burial Plan Assailed," 
World Watch. Vol. 4, no. 6, 5-7; Debra Rosenthal. 1990. At the Heart of the Bomb: The Dangerous Allure 
of Weapons Work. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 195-202. 


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5.6 ‘Beauty is conserved, ugliness discarded’? (DGA) 


To design a marker system that, left alone, will survive for 10,000 years is not a difficult 
engineering task. 


It is quite an other matter to design a marker system that will for the next 400 generations resist 
attempts by individuals, organized groups, and societies to destroy or remove the markers. 
While this report discusses some strategies to discourage vandalism and recycling of materials, 
we Cannot anticipate what people, groups, and societies may do with the markers many millennia 
from now. 


A marker system should be chosen that instills awe, pride, and admiration, as it is these feelings 
that motivate people to maintain ancient markers, monuments, and buildings. 


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Additional Information 
From SAND92-1382 Authors 
(see p. F-24) 


Unlike the containers for spent fuel, the metal containers for the WIPP waste were not designed 
to contribute to the isolation of the waste--they are expected to be crushed when the salt begins 
to creep closed and to corrode over time, producing gas. Current research is intended to answer 
questions about the physical couplings among room creep, gas generation, gas 
movement/dissipation, and brine inflow/outflow. 


The closest point between the Pecos River and the WIPP is at Malaga Bend, approximately 
19 kilometers (approximately 12 miles) from the edge of the WIPP land withdrawal boundary. 
The Final Supplement Environmental Impact Statement (January 1990) shows results from 
modeling the potential movement of radionuclides for a number of variations for both the 
undisturbed (possible migration of radionuclides from the repository to the Rustler through 
repository shafts) and the disturbed (possible migration of radionuclides from the repository to 
the Rustler through a borehole that intersects a pressurized brine reservoir below) cases. 
Undisturbed travel times for radionuclides from the repository to a stock well located only 3 
miles south of the center of the WIPP (1 mile south of the WIPP land withdrawal boundary) 
ranged from 220,000 to >4,800,000 years. Total radionuclide concentrations in the Culebra 
aquifer (the formation with the greatest transmissivities within the Rustler Formation) at the 
same stock well only 3 miles south of the center of the WIPP at 10,000 years for disturbed cases 
ranged from 107° kg/kg to 10* kg/kg of brine depending on the assumptions that were made. 
The total concentration for one of the cases peaked at 1500 years at a value of 10” kg/kg brine. 
These concentrations resulted in doses to an individual eating beef from cattle watered by the 
stock well that were well within the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
guidelines of 100 mrem per year. Cattle might be expected to drink the water, but not humans 
because the water is almost unpalatable due to the high concentration of dissolved solids. 


U.S. DOE (Department of Energy). 1990. Final Supplement Environmental Impact Statement, 


Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. DOE/EIS-0026-FS. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Energy, Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management. 


F-153 


APPENDIX G: TEAMB REPORT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKERS TO DETER 
INADVERTENT HUMAN INTRUSION INTO THE WASTE ISOLATION 
PILOT PLANT (WIPP) 


Prepared by Team B: 


Victor R. Baker (University of Arizona) 
Frank D. Drake (Lick Observatory) 
Ben R. Finney (University of Hawaii) 

David B. Givens (American Anthropological Association) 
Jon Lomberg (Scientific Illustration, Honaunau, Hawaii) 
Louis E. Narens (University of California-Irvine) 
Wendell S. Williams (Case Western Reserve University) 


David B. Givens, B-Team Editor 


22 April 1992 


APPENDIX G: TEAM B REPORT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKERS TO DETER 
INADVERTENT HUMAN INTRUSION INTO THE WASTE ISOLATION 
PILOT PLANT (WIPP) 


- 


FINAL REPORT FOR SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES 


-On- 


THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKERS TO DETER INADVERTENT HUMAN INTRUSION 
INTO THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (WIPP) 


B-Team Report 


By 


Victor R. Baker (University of Arizona) 
Frank D. Drake (Lick Observatory) 
Ben R. Finney (University of Hawaii) 

David B. Givens (American Anthropological Association) 
Jon Lomberg (Scientific Illustration, Honaunau, Hawaii) 
Louis E. Narens (University of California-Irvine) 
Wendell S. Williams (Case Western Reserve University) 


David B. Givens, B-Team Editor 


22 April 1992 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


CONTENTS 

PE SES COu sci e shay cio eee ee ays omelets eee. are Peter age ie mater aia, she etiete ake Orel aatie eee aso 
Marker, Desi Characters ta Cease ten sialets o le ters ols teie we tetete sr erst euries G-11 
Aye “AGicoplenasiily Ipfeyetot ahh oi ehilrora Ma aranerpry ceca ay patna) foe et Cece te Cuma RRS ci G-11 
2. Physical Description ....... cece eee eeceeeeces Se ear eaaecere ieee Git 
ON)  Iseaaelaonle 6p Hoy db oon SSUSH OOPS UOUU OOO OSES CUO S CUOU UU G-11 

(Bje Aone bathe. 6 oisctem pce ete aie a ree aan 2 ae De ae Ay ate ew eae bh are ay G-14 

(Eye Cetera te Ge IC te etnias i atonens citcieme scape ana mips nane wie gene torenene > ts G-14 

(D)) > Stiall, “Bunred: Time: Capsules cic os.c edicts ois eee noes wie we G-14 

Re SS SACS ecg oie ote te re otat ahe aie vo fete ear enece tal ahaa ah cle at ede (rtanete) sieqmcev ese aNae © G=17 
(As PMES Sacre iiss voce cates sea evar evagan aceite ale tone age wie leaieve rate ce G-17 

BY MbOUS acters ce eee Necene tere oie re tere ol ore en meena le siaiccdn ence ceda = G-17 
PAGE OG EAD OSs ivcciis tiene tie Gn leon othrarer er piere. writer] fous veretesl ars sayels acer G-17 

(B) Message Content ..... eee ee ee eee ee eee eee renee nec e ene Gay 
Level I: Rudimentary Information ...........-e2eeee G-17 

hevel til Cautionary IMbOrmaAtclon -.< 1s<-5 cisco c ais ery ewes G-36 

Level III: Basic Information ..... cee ccc eesaaseces G-36 

Level IV: Complex Information ........-2 eee esse cece G-36 
Colestial Reference Points 22. os ce ee ese ee ess We ono G 
Individual Marker Performance ........ cc erccccccrccrenaereses G-36 


Aiea DOT SU CEOTICR Hey tects BOAT et ae rT RIC Le ererer NTE ee OO 


ON) Issbaelaiiicha << ch agaobnodoon Goud uo obo C oon UU GH O OG oUeaOO€ G-37 
(A0t AOR SOD Year Sure cess a as acura es Sys ete era e apes bee cles ohere nt G-37 

Gop SO\sein lop Nesrenets} AGA Soon as boone GU DODO BO OCe nMOS G-37 

Ce), 225 000= 10", 000s Meer alien tac acs sac ate mare br oneness Hat CREAR G-37 

G2Ry AW ferateplsNedats! oa au Ginis Greate oU OO tn OO Gn Ho Ott Go OLS Oot G-37 
(a) pe OS 0 OV eGars Siew rarelstencu cl uorcucue eciever steko tenetskemnienstererevsnegeus G-37 

(b) 500-2,000 Years .........-. PEER O ORO CS O CORO I OEEO G-38 

A Representative Granite Monolith............- G-38 

PG Parte: Ee liiuvsts tore a ns ener onal er aratietane ter tater tic eretanetane G-38 

(apy PIA oovor sao exele) Waskohatsh Bo an GomnAooUU OUD OOo OS UDUDUGu.E G-38 
GAMA Oceana tees nee cheery cece Nene epensackenstemscs shake ccpenseeserehe G-38 

Salier Weate Mer LG rereaccas ose taateie) sahara tetate eter etalenrtevere atts G-40 

SbuLiAbbenlel 7Nehicly Asoo obda oa e Ooo Doe Ooo pobdeO oF G-40 

(fe ale ley pyiy GG ee Py Cocos Ono ERE OUTS OC CHUTE OL APPR CAO Sar OI Duc Oe ONC G-41 

(GC) mGentrallleS Eruiciuise metre tee cner eect eel on onan seceerch Pr ouokoacWenceoneeet cree G-41 
Cann O50 ON Vicar Succcriereeisen cheucheretewen ene oceuchanelenacchenensberetcvenens G-41 

Goph GOO Pe (ole nese 5 Goo ood Gace o eo ooo bo oeOroE Ueno G-41 

(oy 22s, 000-10, 0009 i ea 8 ans Sia en acts haioua's e pror an ste) a one ienetace G-41 


(D) 


(E) 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Inscriptions (Symbols, Iconic Pictographs, 
Linguistic Scripts, Narrative Arrangements 
and Complex Selentiiic Diagrams) 22... va..01s+6.<ss os 
(Ayre EO SO OBN GAR Sec’ serra autre kee eee a tener gene ae 
(Be S00 KR 2 OCU VC ARS fei ohe ere wa tet ga eu nee ser rae 
(oy (2S COUR I OOOR Yeats 20.0 one aki mune cure eee ey cee 


Busvedh TEMG CaO SUN ee tin. etyeacse tier srt ns ora ee aneaaiar chne te eee 
Kaya S00sY Gare ccsaatac sen eu ey Auoeerhers «temaee tee tur eens 


US) ES OU OOO Um ary ce oh eater re or ee mies wenger oh tas 
(C)PRE2 OOOO ROO 0B Years mene ter re eee ee ee 


RECOGNI LONG cs ctr cit oe nese oth re tenn Daiele atten er enenamanecy tlw we: ea tore 


(A) 


(B) 


(C) 


(D) 


(BE) 


(F) 


[Dye trates ehifop al ey uaeeuey Surat cs eyes Oy CCTM ENCES Ole BRT SER ee Oe 
(a) 0-5 0 ORY GarcGrscuctsewetse vey teenie eer ree reno rene eaten: 
(b) 50.0 2370 CORN CaireSiersiiie seta cenn soon ancu ene reer ruse een ae eee 
(c) PRO OO SAN ONO) SAaehasy ss a oon no Oooo eo BU Hoe 
Marking with High Dielectric Materials ............. 


Wlorekoy Lath r)at stats rate oem ry Cte ara erat CL ata emo s Ge oe yheay Pane a 
CASO R5 OOMVEC arse ctek. tha cice steer che creat Sete e eer ener ora ene 
(oy 5 O00S2 FOO 0s Vears ut waicetr ir Peet ne me aun ae eed 
Coco, OOO =10 000 eV Gare swe cee ne tacPenccs a tesan Ca kr uate sete 
ANS ED iehel. IBEW enol Daou oo an oe ne oes Gu ou es Cone Se oa 


Centrale Struc brewers tere erence ara tear ere erone tees oe rea 
UN ueNe la Wes Ai SU ReRe Me he ee Aer Acs or ae cha Aenea eect 
Central Pla GCeMente cases creo ree Soon enehe tre ee rier oan eet bereesee 


SV MSO LS Marca veut a teraiiem one tote ee ey oe erase ed oe er aea ger ea eee aU age tee aoe 
tnternational, Biohazard-Symbol onsale s.yie's oeve eee eee 
Fel) eas OOS cr re tat ate ae eee wag owt my duc teaee rere r ass is 
MBI NES O02 00 ON cara i rarcie ears eo cig a Ate pen oe sees ane hes 
CE) ED POCO VOM UOOe Vea a eccorse tke Geer ecaeamineramre re eae eee 


PCOULEG PO EU OC PAM trey iia eer te aye aoa Say sae veen ce ner an ead 
(ED SOS O GA Nestea) Ms Wis Gk eG BLOPLO Om OO Oo OA a Gee 
(ope S002 00.0 Vears po eid ears Gee ue eyes Stit ae even eeeetaLe 
COV? ODOR 105 O00 Year ou uc.ctit ecteraieeer irae Peratomicet ies 


DMG be Ses pte, cna nhesctle a kavenc anc crm Sauer ate reel er a 
((as) 2 EOS S10: O AVS ars Sui rrr eee cteste to erro tee mc tae uae ones Be ree ea eure 
Oop Es 1019 ayers 0) Of 0 eed Soc taro een inna, ene aaa ener OE aN Nea ant Ct gah eon 
(CE 20 OORT OF 00 ORV AIS ater terete eet eer nee teen rears 


G-42 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


(G) Complex Scientific Diagrams Pera Rath Ren Ne tete oD G-50 
Van WO SOC Ver roc sire eel oe ureter a Gk eee G-50 

(b) SOO (OG) Nase hatas als eee oe SO Od 6 GH 6-6 Ge Geet Bee G-50 

CO E20 O08 0 0 C0l Vere rata Aiea ttaverer te ee eer ne Oe ee en G-50 

{H) Astronomical References «6 .<66 s% een ves ap be sib ae bo SRS G-51 
AOMillenniad Marking “System <2... <6. iis «ere sie ees 2 ie 6 6re G-51 

G21) Pilea O52) 810 fas r-rel RS Ns ae ge BEE Cee eed aoe G-51 

(CB) S002 0 OO ears 04 rok costee amen tn reece ir ea eh oes 1 G-51 

KC) 2.0001 0000 My Caren. wo teie is iake hard ei ciore Neng eee G-58 

Gin. PERE CEDLOCE ACL OM ioc. avsee iste oes. coches Shale ae tenereereiaats weisee sia. rote a enaerote G-58 
CR) Sree CNW OK Gerretse ny cer tae Suse Mee saree ce Be ae Oe an aie G-58 
(al) e015 0 OMY Cares aires cone ee eee ee ee ew Ce err Ere G-58 

(b) Sie o oor Ke eo lee kaye wal} te Alas Gasp Ee Dro eo GO ols Gee OOo G-58 

Ley 2000 LO ROUO Coane at snare ncttg Bec eiee ee eay G-59 

(B)  Monolaths and.Central Structure .. 25.65 fee We eae eee G-59 
CODES O LS cete ee ere urencn a ttary te  aRea Sone Nt aiiaste Pave Pe eee a G-59 
et m0 SiO a ne any ak ed rt Ca Ae eRe a ..- G-59 

(b) SOO 270 OOMV Cari are rerecctorsescereherercrcuore rel orn one teen ere ieee G-59 

(Cc) 2 O00 =O OOOMYSaTrSasrae crest iet sie ne eee eee ee G-59 

(D)> Aeonie4Pictogranns wen. Bee ued ates eaceer ane hei aie reese G-60 
(a5 710 =D SY Cae var cena Gad aso amare cerenlens eben Gctne es aie ty ea a eta ats G-60 

th) S00 LO R000 Vearcrcne scarce ircis See ce ete ences G-60 
NConsequentia ll SEAtCeMENt 12 .ct%slniecese a wie waste view et ae G-60 
HIStOrUGaly Sequencer qin Gist detirein cere © heres eke ieee anes G-60 

CREE AMOUPS ERG SCT DEG ccyespiatetets taka wie ae eee stare Fela ne vae rel aueme ere lenePate G-60 
(Es CoOmplex (SclentEE te DLagramsn . 4. ven stars: ure we aocere le oie wte ees G-62 
Col) = S00 Veter canta eter stale cis cues eho sie heme p Nera a ase eee G-62 

Coys OO = 200 OF Ve ar cing eecatn aterevetatsl fioea en eae rey ele ini ies G-62 

LOyr 2 OO 0= 105 OO Os rear ay cee e ere ch hec eve nine ieee eae G-62 

Tie DMD oli aa ah VOL = Nin tater erie ch Pe CeO eS Des NEC Ee EL ON ey Ee Onn Ee G-62 
RG) oP TAWO EIS ailing coe n Sag cets lana Rov aranncaem evans eo a4 kha ahetume re ug GIR MELTS Te G-62 
Ca ESO S50 Os FOAL Give atane genta saci pr die cei rere we Nes wede neat G-62 

CO) SOO TOn O00! ¥ Gara os auton nels ace ey fegha crotonan se ea reese k ea G-63 

(B) Monolichs and: Central -StrmicGurescccs15 5 ce hocletea eee G-63 
eT AO Ot VG eee dthaa ss we nan a cer civehr eae cnenica signees amen kta ace G-63 

Cas AO LO OO Oney Sar en a tacr cues aa nye? catia Oe tet ame rule ga a ae G-63 

COPE SV MD OL Sire ase eae ere cna turans een ge cote wt eer id ote eee aaa G-63 
Marker Systems Per formance svn wens Wane ae kon es era ears ee eye eta G-64 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


By “Recognition Of Marker  Syetemr et skwus cece See ae Se G-65 
More Advanced, As Advanced, and Less Advanced Societies .G-65 
gle ahah oa Wor eg ©) god go (meer et ee OEP Er ar eG Re SOR he Se co Ean a Mi nePe tore G-65 
Mescalero: Apache Symbol Sitti ss «clone encase eae es G-66 
WaWiclaS in a sacar sontel ocean dey et poeta St taaue euce Sekeis ore snere telat s eles -. G-66 
Radical Increase in Consumption of World Resources ...... G-69 
RACH CU ADt SCONE UU EY «ic; erro a oteneie ore tere eoueo eee Set ae a ee G-69 
RELErERCSS (Cx CEC a ate secre ccetart oie slate weewcere chaos) a Lotat ay aha ge ian er ob ene ter at oe G-70 


Appendix A: Testing Marker Systems for Understandability ...6G-73 


Appendix B: Supplemental Material on the WIPP Marker....... G-76 
Figures 

1. Radiation Trefoil Used for Earthworks, at Closure and 

gs ao ae OG 18 Rie iota a= eer ee BP aM Oem BUT AED A inca eee RARE cere ehe IPR San G-12 
2. Skull and Crossbones Used for Earthworks, at Closure 

BUVASAT ESR SOOO CAC rcntnnrat es Seats es att wera siata beget ta aiacionte overs G-13 
a.) stall Granite MonGlithe with PnscreipetOne. assess sesso ee G-15 
4, Cross-Sectional Model of the WIPP and the Underground ...G~-16 
5. Pictographic Definition of Symbols—Circle with Slash....G-18 
6. Pictographic Definition of Symbols—Skull and 

GLORBSDOS Sena sores cara tores Grice bi chic ai at og cane ommenelgi attic ese eth eaes one e stele cree oe G-19 
7. Pictographic Definition of Symbols—Radiation Trefoil....G-20 
8. Defining the Equality of Symbols, Version 1 ............. G-21 
9. Defining the Equality of Symbols, Version 2 ............. G-22 
10. Defining the Equality of Symbols and Message Languages, 

VSS LOM) ware asset aaa ehece rev euss eke tat karan ge eens etal aia aunt mt ie ce te aes Cate G-23 
11. Defining the Equality of Symbols, Version 4 ............. G-24 
12. Defining the Equality of Symbols, Version 5 .............- G-25 
13. Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP..... G-26 
al Gove’ Le pig amet: ballet subi g ion ars nag dais «Wal OM verdant geet Pam yee ye aioe tr ana apt t Oera cay yee aera G-49 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


ty. 


16. 


17. 


18. 


abe 


20. 


2k 


The Duhrva-Darshak Yantra, or Pole-Star Instrument...... G-52 
Millennial Marking SyStem .222.. 6. 622s eee ee eee ee eee G-53 
The Changing Shape of the Big Dipper Over 100,000 

Verba! ian ooaaodo ood oOo oe Oooo Oo oto Dd OD oUOU OO CUO roo oO OOo G-61 
The Quartered Circle: Visual Representations of the 
Mescalero Apache "Base Metaphor" ........ 2 eae Saves a giees Pe cat) 
Transformations of the Mescalero Apache Quartered 

Circle into a Four-Pointed Star, then Mountains ......... G-68 
Transparent Canister of Sample WIPP Waste .........-+..+--- G-83 
View of a 30' Monolith from the WIPP Buildings .......... G-87 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Preface 


After an informal discussion as the nascent "B-Team," on the 
last day of the Marker Panels meeting hosted by Sandia National 
Laboratories from November 4-6, 1991 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
five members of the group (Drake, Finney, Givens, Lomberg and 
Narens) met formally on the weekend of December 14-15, 1991 in 
Kona, Hawaii. Three (Givens, Lomberg and Narens) met on December 


16, 1991 to discuss testing the markers. Before the Kona 
meeting, B-Team members had been asked by Jon Lomberg (Chair) to 
respond to questions designed to assess overall 


agreement/disagreement on the issues. 


The five team members who met in Hawaii found themselves in 
general agreement on most of the issues. Wendell Williams' 
comments, faxed to Hawaii, seemed in accord. Victor Baker's 
input, unfortunately, was not available for comment. 


There was unanimous agreement on the following points: 


(1) The site should be marked, on the assumption that leaving 
it unmarked would pose greater risks to the future. Current 
mining activities in the area, alone, would make the choice 
of not marking extremely risky for present-day (i.e., living) 
humans, and cumulatively more dangerous for those living 
between now and 12,000 A.D. At present the WIPP is in an 
area of active oil production, gas production and potash 
mining (Pasztor, 1991, IX-27). 


(2) Surface and buried markers should be used in tandem to 
enhance message redundancy. 


(3) All message components should be truthful, consistent and 
noncontradictory. 


(4) Only the land directly above the waste panels themselves 
—about a 1/2 square-kilometer area—should be marked. (A) 
This would put the marker system on a cognitive scale better 
geared to human perception than one spread thinly over 16 
square miles. (B) Additionally, it would reduce confusion 
that could arise from boring beneath a marker system beyond 
the panels and uncovering nothing unusual. 


(S) The entire perimeter of the marker system should be 
visible from the center of the site. 


(6) An assortment of symbolic, pictographic, linguistic, 
narrative, diagrammatic, scientific and astronomic messages 
should be used to ensure that people from any conceivable 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


culture or future society would be able to undérstand that 
hazardous materials are buried in the immediate area and that 
they should not intrude. 


(7) Part of the WIPP building itself should be left as 
evidence for future archeologists. 


(8) Information about the WIPP should be archived off-site, 
but details should be left to more knowledgeable archivists 
and library-science specialists 50 years from now. 


(9) Marking for nuclear waste sites should be standardized 
worldwide. Each site should include as part of its marking 
system a map of all other nuclear waste sites in the world. 


(10) Regarding the markers and their messages, whatever can 
be tested, should be tested. 


David B. Givens 
B-Team Editor 
Washington, DC 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Marker Design Characteristics 


We recommend that the proposed marker system consist of the 
following components: 


(A) Berms or earthworks to help define the perimeter of the 
surface area directly above the waste repository. The earthwork 
might be arranged in the shape of a symbol, yet to be determined. 


(B) A wring of granite monoliths, around or within the 
perimeter of the marked area, bearing a variety of symbolic, 
pictographic and linguistic inscriptions. 


(C) A central granite structure to house more detailed 
textual, narrative, diagrammatic and scientific information. 


(D) A large number of small, durable markers inscribed with 
basic warning information, seeded at various depths within the 
marked area and in the surrounding earthworks. 


(E) Buried duplicates of the granite monoliths placed in key 
locations at various depths, such as in the plugs of sealed 
airshafts. 


(F) A layer of contrasting dielectric materials at the 
surface to permit remote detection by radar (perhaps arranged in 
the shape of the designated marking symbol). 


(G) Duplicates of markers placed in Carlsbad Caverns and in 
off-site archives. 


Die hysical D ription 


(A) Barthwork. A 30! high earthwork, built of local 
sedimentary materials and caliche, could be constructed in a 
geometric shape, perhaps in the shape of a designated warning 
symbol . The earthwork would surround the 1/2 square-kilometer 
area above the waste panels, and could enclose an inner ring of 
monoliths. By imbedding a thin layer of non-local sediments with 
different dielectric, radar reflective and magnetic properties, 
the earthwork could be remotely sensed by aircraft and orbital 
satellites. (Figures 1 and 2 exemplify how the marking system 
might appear. The top image in each figure shows the site soon 
after completion, and the bottom image depicts the site after 
Many centuries of degradation; the actual choice of symbols needs 
further study. [The structure just outside the ring of monoliths 
in each figure is the existing WIPP facility.]) 


e 2) fees ~ eee, SSeS ae. aS st ome of So ee = 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


ie’ 

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Ms 

“ng j 
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ae 


ah oa 


Ge 


4 
ew Mae 
gb ol ew oda 


nai Pie els ios hamid iat: 


Figure 1. Radiation Trefoil Used for Earthworks, at Closure and 
After 5000 Years (art by Jon Lomberg). 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


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at aS BRS gare > oy AES, =F 
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whey ashy oe ASA eee Nye SSS FN AR ER ARR S Sa 
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Figure 2. Skull and Crossbones Used for Earthworks, at Closure 
and After 5000 Years (art by Jon Lomberg). 


G-13 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


(B) Monoliths. Free-standing, massive, one-piece granite 
monoliths could be placed in a circular arrangement within the 
earthwork. Visible, tall monoliths (25' high X 10' wide) and 
stable, short, rounded stones (10' high X 20' wide) would 
alternate in the arrangement. The tall monoliths would be 
designed to be visible despite the encroachment of sand. The 
squat monoliths would be designed to be difficult to topple or 
decapitate. Both types of monoliths (as well as additional, 
buried monoliths and a large, granitic plug in the main mineshaft 
off-site) would be worked and ‘shaped to convey they were 
manufactured by humans. Each monolith would carry a variety of 
inscriptions. The inscriptions would be placed on protected 
surfaces of the monoliths, such as within recessed niches and 
overhangs (see Figure 3 for a sample design of a tall monolith). 
The number of monoliths would be a power of two, preferably 16 or 
32, to help future investigators infer the original configuration 
of the ring, should some elements be missing. 


(C) Central Structure. A granite "rock shelter" (20' high X 
30' base) could be constructed inside the monolithic ring. 
Extensive planar stone surfaces within the structure (protected 
from weathering) would carry linguistic, diagrammatic and 
pictographic inscriptions. It should be designed to discourage 
habitation and vandalism. The kind of information that would be 
inscribed in the central structure would include a map of all 
nuclear waste sites worldwide; detailed schematics of | the 
repository and its contents; a diagram of the periodic table of 
the elements with radioactive elements highlighted; and an 
explanation of how the Earth's processional cycle is to be used 
in dating the age of the repository. 


(D) Small, Buried Time Capsules. A variety of smaller "time 
capsules" could be buried (beneath the souvenir-hunter's casual 
digging zone) to deter serious excavators. Candidate materials 
for the small markers might include baked clay or other ceramics, 
tektite-like glass or sintered alumina. Durable tablets carrying 
Simpler messages could likely be decoded by less developed 
societies in the future, and decoded and chronologically dated by 
as-advanced and more-advanced societies having such analytic 
tools as thermoluminescence. Buried samples of wood could be 
dated by carbon-14 analysis. Cross-sectional models using 
samples of sand, siltstone, gypsum and rock salt to show a cut- 
away view of the geological strata, mine shaft and waste panels 
(Figure 4) could be emplaced on and off the WIPP site. 


*(BazequotT uop Aq 3z7e) suOTIdTAOsUL YITM YUATTOUOWM eqATUeTD TTeL ‘*¢€ eanbtg 


nnd ie e 
=) Ww MOOR FS BAL I ee 


nya law ‘ning 


psy SALA — INU H AIO “win 'AehMY? OIYHD nl 
ynowwsdnS BY so Hd¥YDALIIA wuld Aa ADldsnl 
YAAYW wos waisad 1g7VO) 


9T-D 


Figure 4. 


CROSS-SECTIONAL MODEL OF WIPP SITE 


Cross-Sectional Model of the WIPP and the Underground. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


3. Messages 


(A) Message Units. In semiotics, the most generic and 
fundamental message component is known as a sign. Signs marking 
the WIPP site would consist of (1) the arranged pattern of the 
monument itself, its geometric earthwork and configuration of 
surface and subsurface stones; (2) conventional symbolic shapes, 
such as the trefoil; (3) iconic pictographs (signs that picture, 
e.g., the circular arrangement of monoliths or the human face and 
body); (4) linguistic scripts (of the world's major written 
languages, including English, Spanish, German, Russian, Japanese 
and Chinese; major liturgical languages, such as Latin, Hebrew 
and Arabic; and languages of the region's indigenous people, 
including Navajo, Hopi and Mescalero Apache); (5) narrative 
arrangements (sequences of signs that tell a story or explain a 
consequence of actions); and (6) complex scientific diagrams and 
notation systems, such as the periodic table of the elements. 


Symbols. We recommend that a symbol or a variety of symbols be 
used. Symbols may have more emotional connotations than other 
signs. Indeed, symbols such as the U.S. flag, Star of David, 
Christian cross and Nazi swastika can be highly charged to 
humans. In our discussions, the choice of a nuclear warning 
symbol itself became somewhat emotional. In particular, some 
team members felt that the trefoil should be included in the 
report as an example of a nuclear symbol. Others felt that using 
the trefoil as an example would prejudice readers, and that the 
final choice of a designated warning symbol (or symbols) should 
be left to future researchers. Any symbols used should be 
defined pictographically so they could be understood by people 
who had no previous knowledge of the symbols. (See Figures 5-12) 


The human being, drawn as a stylized stick figure, 
ought to be easily recognized by any other human. The existence 
of a worldwide, pancultural tradition of stick-figure iconography 
was outlined by one of the team members in a previous report 
(Givens, 1982). A series of drawings showing stick figures 
engaged in various activities can, through iconographic 
principles of narration, show the history of the WIPP as well as 
the consequences of intrusion. Other drawings can define symbols 
and show how the markers are to be decoded. (See Figure 13, 
Parts (a) through (j)) 


(B) Message Content. The proposed marker system would 
encode four successive levels of meaning (Givens, 1982), from 


rudimentary (information low) to complex (information high) : 


Level I: Rudimentary Information. The site itself 


and its component parts would announce "something 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Figure 5. Pictograph Definition ‘of Symbols—Circle with Slash 
(art by Jon Lomberg). 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Figure 6. Pictograph Definition of Symbols—Skull and. Crossbones 
(art by Jon Lomberg) . 


GS-19 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Figure 7. Pictographic Definition of Symbols—Radiation Trefoil 
(art by Jon Lomberg) . 


G-20 


*(Bzequoyt uor Aq 4zre) T uoTszeq ‘sToquds jo Aqttenbsm oy3 Hututyeq °g eznbtg 


SJNNUIN AG SUlvd NI Gatioossy STeawkS 


PARIS oaeiShhe Nositod Na LeIaUy 


RHDneLYVYD = 9BWAS 


G-21 


cC-D 


Figure 9. 


Apoitovac = PAIR 
PRovines Preooi* 
pT pAéies ARE 
Z synbors wins 
Same MEANING 


Defining the Equality of Symbols, Version 2 (art by Jon Lomberg) . 


oe ee er 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


WARNING: RADIORenvE WASTE BURIED HERE. Deen 
No DRILLING, NO MINING, NO ExPLosives | 

Lyn nS Wap IVEVPR IT pbws : TKN 
— Sb oN, Ssrb «UN 


; mips VN 


sp RADIOACTIVD SUBTERPANEA AQUI. Poison ! 


NO TRABAJO , NO EXPLosivos | 


USE OF CARTOUCHE wiTt LAHGUVAEES 
Gives A clue PMT ALC LAPGUASES 
CAkey THe SAME MESSAGE: 


Figure 10. 


Defining the Equality of Symbols and Message 
Languages, Version 3 (art by Jon Lomberg) . 


G-23 


*(6zequoy uop Aq 4z7e) Spow uoTJeQUeserzd etqtssod 


e se SOUTTINO se UMeIP sToquds 


‘py uotszeq ‘sToquds jo Aqattenby eyq Hututyzed “TT eznbTt A 


& 


i 


G-24 


SZ-D 


Figure 12. Defining the Equality of Symbols, Version 5. Symbols drawn as filled figures 
as a possible presentation mode (art by Jon Lomberg) . 


9S-D 


Figure 13. 


(a) 


Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (3) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 
surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure continued on next page.) 


Lé-D 


Figure 13. 


1989 ao. 


(b) 


Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (j) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 
surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure continued on next page.) 


VST ap, 


8c-D 


Figure 13. 


1990 4.0. 


(c) 


Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (j) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 
surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure continued on next page.) 


62-D 


Figure 13. 


1990 AD 


(da) 


Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (3) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 


surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure continued on next page.) 


0f-D 


: 2150 
IDV an. LOLS a, ZO2S A. 
eeeee 


(e) 


Figure 13. Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (3) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 
surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure continued on next page). 


TE-p 


Figure 13. 


1994 ar. 


2025 A-D. 
(£) 


Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (3) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 
surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure continued on next page). 


CE-D 


o' 
e y 
2180" . = , wv 
1994 Ap. 2028 A.p 
08080000 


(g) 


Figure 13. Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (3) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 
surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure continued on next page). 


ce-D 


2030 A-D. 


YY YYYYY 5 | (hh) 


Figure 13. 


Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (3) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 
surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure continued on next page). 


VE-D 


14,000 ap. 14,000 a.r. 


080800000 (4) 
Figure 13. Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (j) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 


surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure continued on next page). 


SE-D 


i a OER | 
Z6P00 AP. 


© 0006880060 (3) 


Figure 13. Pictographs Showing the Passage of Time at the WIPP. Parts (a) through (3) 
relate the passage of time with the number of dots, and present a closeup 
surface picture by a long-range surface and underground picture (art by John 
Lomberg). (Figure concluded) . 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


made by humans is here." The most important property of 
a level-I sign is its own existence. "Human made" would 
be suggested by the patterned shape—the unnatural 
syntax and negative entropy—of the earthwork, rock 
structures and inscriptions. 


Level II: Cautionary Information. Elementary linguistic 


scripts and pictographic narratives would convey: 
"Warning, dangerous materials are buried below." 


Level IIT: Basic Information. Level-III messages, 
including longer linguistic narratives, pictographic 
sequences, maps and simple diagrams would explain basic 
what, why, when, where, who and how information about 
the site. 


Level IV: Complex Information. Highly detailed written 


records, scientific data and diagrams would be available 
at the site in inscriptions and buried "time capsules." 


Celestial reference points would be included as  level-IV 
information (1) to provide a chronological reference and (2) to 
give the site an astronomical dimension. The specific reference 
to Earth's movement through space and time (relative to the 
northern hemisphere's invariant constellations) would add an 
imaginative, celestial character that could help the site remain 
in society's memory. Precession (westward motion) of the 
equinoxes (the 26,000 year cycle) and the shape of the Big Dipper 
could give the site a chronology. From prehistory onward, humans 
have displayed an intellectual and emotional curiosity about 
their place in the cosmos. 


As the noted astronomer, Edwin Krupp, stated: "For most of the 
history of humankind, going back to stone age times, the sky has 
served as a tool. Just as the hands of the first people grasped 
the flints they crafted, so their brains grasped the sky. The 
regularity of the motions of celestial objects enabled them to 
orient themselves in time and space" (Krupp, 1983, p. 1). 


Individual Marker Performance 


This report is structured in response to Sandia National 
Laboratories' request that we consider the probability of a 
marker system surviving and being understood within three time 
periods: 0-500, 500-2,000 and 2,000-10,000 years. Our design, 
however, evolved from more general discussions of the problem 
without reference to the specific time periods. We consider the 
following estimates to be reasonable yet subjective guesses. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Indeed, the consensus of our team is that the probability- 
consensus elicitation required by Sandia was the least certain 
part of our effort. We urge readers to evaluate our proposal on 
the merits of the design itself rather than on the accuracy of 
our probability estimates. Physical survival of the markers and 
clarity of the messages were our primary design criteria. We 
urge that the proposed physical materials and messages go through 
an adequate process of testing and refinement to insure the 
highest possible performance. 


4. Persistence. 
(A) Earthwork. 


(a) 0-500 Years. A 0.8-kilometer diameter, 30' high 
earthwork of patterned shape would be likely to survive 
as a recognizable land feature for 500 years. The 


earthwork should be composed of "useless" material that 
would have a low probability of being mined in the 
future. 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. Rectangular, earthen mounds and 
plazas built around 950 A.D. (Krupp, 1983) at Cahokia, a 


Mississippian Indian metropolis near St. Louis, have 
survived for 1,000 years. An earthwork on the WIPP site 
would be likely to survive for 2,000 years with its 
shape intact. 


(2) 2,000-10,000 Years. Simple mounded earthworks 
(e.g., the chambered passage grave at Newgrange built by 
neolithic farmers in Ireland, ca. 3300 B.C.; ([Krupp, 
1983]), have survived longer than 5,000 years. The 


banks of the 350' circular ditch surrounding Stonehenge, 
built around 3,000 B.C. (Stover and Kraig, 1978), though 
considerably eroded (the inner bank, originally 6' high 
by 20' wide, is now one foot high [Hawkins, 1973]), is 
still visible after 5,000 years. Hundreds of earthen 
mounds built in the U.S. during the Burial Mound period 
(1000 B.C. to 700 A.D.; Le Mouel, 1991) are easily 
visible 1,300-3,000 years later. There is reason to 
assume an earthwork purposely designed to last 10,000 
years would survive at the WIPP site. 


(B) Monoliths. 


(a) 0-500 Years. Large, granite surface markers would 
have a high probability of survival over the near 
future. The granite itself would be highly durable ina 
relatively arid environment. The size of the monoliths 
would make their removal difficult. The problem of 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


mining the granite would be reduced if future societies 
considered the monolithic arrangement a human monument 
worth preserving (like, e.g., Stonehenge). 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. Granite monoliths would likely 
survive with their shapes intact for 2,000 years. 


A representative granite monolith could be stored off- 
site in nearby Carlsbad Caverns as an indexical sign 
that would refer back to the WIPP marker system. The 
richly inscribed, off-site monolith would be available 
for interpretation as long as humans could visit 
Carlsbad Caverns. Persistence of such a sign would be 
likely over the 500-2,000-year span. 


For redundancy, a second stone marker, similarly 
inscribed, could be emplaced as a granitic plug off- 
site, 10-15' underground in the main shaft of the WIPP. 
The stone seal would be inscribed with a sample of 
messages from the marker system, and with messages 
showing the system's existence relative to the seal as a 
datum point. The likelihood of a buried plug's 
persistence over 500-2,000 years—even if uncovered— 
would be great. 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. 


Granite. Granite is composed principally of quartz, 


mica and feldspar. Minor minerals include fluorospar, 
tourmaline, garnet, topaz and ferrous minerals (Evans, 
1972). Quartz is a crystalline form of silicon dioxide 
(Si02), commonly found as_ sand. Feldspar is a 


potassium, sodium, calcium or barium alumino-silicate 
(e.g., KAI1Si30g, known as orthoclase; Deeson, 1973). An 
example of mica is biotite, a hydrous magnesium iron 
aluminum-potassium silicate (Deeson, 1973). 


Water is the most important single agent in causing the 
natural disintegration (weathering) of granite (Twidale, 
Poe2 Because of its dense crystalline structure, 
intact granite is characterized by extremely low 
permeability, reducing the movement of water into the 
rock to such an extent that granite monuments have great 
durability when exposed to the surface atmosphere and 
drained of surface water. 


The action of water on granite is greatly enhanced by 
prolonged exposure to soil or ground water. Weathering 
tends to concentrate in fracture zones, which are much 
greater in permeability than the intact rock (Twidale, 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


iteteea The principal chemical weathering process for 
most natural granite is hydrolysis, mainly of biotite 
and feldspar. Biotite in particular is easily hydrated 
when in contact with water. The resulting hydrobiotite 
exerts a physical expansion to which some investigators 
attribute the major role in granite weathering 


(Isherwood and Street, 1976). Feldspar alters by 
hydrolysis to clay minerals, silica and metal cations in 
solution. The clay minerals can exert physical 


expansion in a similar manner to the hydrobiotite. 
Small point stresses between crystal grains will, over 
time, disrupt intact granite to grus, an accumulation of 
disaggregated mineral grains of nearly identical 
composition to the parent rock. 


Grussification is extremely slow on exposed, well- 
drained granite surfaces. On time scales of concern to 
marker persistence, the process will only be important 
if water is in continuous contact with the rock. This 
would occur in the following circumstances: (1) surface 
water is allowed to pond or otherwise be retained on the 
exposed granite; (2) regolith or other unconsolidated 
material buries the granite and holds moisture in 
contact with it. Both circumstances would be 
exacerbated by climatic conditions that would increase 
available moisture. 


The most rapid long-term grussification occurs in rock 
basins that enlarge to depths of a few tens of 
centimeters and widths of several meters over a few 
thousand years (Twidale, 1982). On the time scale of 
10,000 years it is extremely unlikely that these 
processes would appreciably modify the basic structure 
of granite columns measuring 10-25 feet in height and 
10-20 feet in diameter. However, surface inscriptions 
could be compromised. 


When exposed to rainwater containing dissolved carbon 
dioxide (to yield carbonic acid), feldspar is weathered 
to form the clay mineral kaolin. When the feldspar is 
dissolved, the adjacent grains of quartz, mica and other 
materials are loosened and eventually washed away. This 
effect is seen in Cornwall, England, where the clay pits 
containing kaolin also feature granite "pyramids" still 
in the process of being weathered (Evans, 1972). This 
illustrates the point that primary rocks from the 
earth's. crust which are formed by igneous processes 
underground are not stable in the earth's atmosphere 
(Sten woot): However, the process of weathering is 
evident only on a geological time scale orders of 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


magnitude longer than the 10,000 year period of 
regulatory concern for the WIPP. 


Salt weathering. The most potent combination of 
weathering agents for construction stone is moisture and 
salt (Winkler, 1975). If water containing salt 


solutions can enter the rock, subsequent evaporation of 
the water will lead to crystallization. Crystallization 
pressure, thermal discontinuities, hydration pressure, 
and other processes may then disaggregate rock 
containing the salt impurity. 


The WIPP lies in an area of high salt concentration. 
Wind from mine spoil piles transports dust with high 
salt content. Leached into the soil, this salt can be 
dissolved in soil and ground water. Burial of granite 
in salt-rich sediment introduces a potential for salt 
weathering of rock surfaces. 


Sulfuric acid. Another potential weathering process is 
attack by sulfuric acid, which decomposes mica to leave 
silica in fine scales (Deeson, 1973). Such attack is 
not likely now, as acid rain from industrial pollution 
is not a current problem. A more likely source of acid 
rain might be from large power plants burning coal, as 
in the Four Corners plant at the junction of Arizona, 
New Mexico, Colorado and Utah. A six-year study by the 
University of Illinois indicated threat by sulfuric acid 
would not be significant at today's level of sulphur 
output. 


In- exposed granite outcroppings, the main observable 
effect of weathering is to smooth the angles and 
accentuate the joints that form naturally during cooling 
of the molten mass from deep in the earth that becomes 
granite on solidifying (Evans, 1972). 


In summary, concerning stability of granite markers at 
the WIPP site over 10,000 years, the amount of acid 
erosion would be negligible if the area remains dry and 


unpopulated, and minor if rainfall increases 
significantly and Le human habitation and 
industrialization overtake the area. Some protection 


against wind-blown sand and rain containing higher than 
normal levels of carbonic acid and/or sulfuric acid 
could be afforded by incising the information deeper 
than the one centimeter observed on some monuments, and 
by providing a ridge of unpolished material around the 
edge of the inscribed area. 


(C) 


(D) 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Sand. Wind-blown sand has the potential to accumulate 
at the marker site. The dryness of climate, lack of 
vegetation and source of sand-sized particles are all 
important in facilitating sand mobilization by wind 
(Costa and Baker, 1981). Prominent coppice dune fields 
immediately southeast of the WIPP attest to the local 
importance of this process. The low relief of earthwork 
should facilitate continued sand transport through the 
Site without accumulation. The monoliths might act as 
obstacles in the wind field, leading to the accumulation 
of shadow dunes on their leeward sides. Because of wide 
spacing, however, it is unlikely that such dunes would 
coalesce. They would remain as relatively low forms 
extending downward from the monoliths. Their 
distinctive pattern could contribute an additional 
marking attribute of the site, making its appearance 
unique in the region. 


Eighteen of the original 30 shaped, 50-ton, 13.5' high 
sandstone monoliths of the Sarsen Circle of Stonehenge 
have been standing for 3,500-4,000 years (Hawkins, 
1973). [Sarsen stone = 7 on Mohs' scale of hardness; 
steel = 6.7 (Stover and Kraig, 1978).] There is reason 
to assume that large, granitic stones—which are harder 
and more durable than sandstone—purposely shaped and 
positioned to remain upright for 10,000 years, would 
last longer than Stonehenge. The likelihood of survival 
of each large stone marker, including the two located 
off-site, would be great. 


n 2a, re. 


(a) 0-500 Years. A granite structure with inscriptions 
on planar surfaces of the inner walls could be the most 
durable feature of the marking system. 


(b) -2 x4 P The inscribed, granitic surfaces 
within the central "rock shelter" would weather less 


than the structure's outer, exposed surfaces. 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. A stable stone structure built 
of intersecting walls of solid granite would have a good 


chance of surviving the 10,000 year time period. 
ription 1 Iconic Pi raph Lin 
i Narrative Arrangemen n mplex ien 


(a) 0-500 Years. There is little scientific evidence 
on the long-term durability of incisions cut in stone. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


(E) 


Most studies have been done on marble tombstones less 
than 500 years old. Research is needed to determine the 
most durable incision for the granite markers. 


(ob) 500-2,000 Years. The monumental Behistun carving 
(520 B.C.) summarizing the biography of Persian King 
Darius I has lasted longer than 2,000 years. While 
inscriptions on buried monoliths would be highly likely 
to survive for at least 2,000 years, inscriptions 
exposed to weathering on surface monoliths would be 
expected to show signs of erosion from blown sand, 
carbonic acid in rain and perhaps sulfuric acid if coal- 
fired power plants are built in the area. (Coal might 
not be used as an energy source during the 500-10,000 
year time period.) 


‘ 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. Though faint, a carving of a 
square-hilted dagger on the inner surface of sarsen 
stone number 53 at Stonehenge has survived in an open 
field for 3,500-4,000 years (Stover and Kraig, 1978). 
It is likely that stone incisions designed to endure for 
10,000 years would last longer than the carved dagger at 
Stonehenge. 


Buried Time Capsules. 

(a) 0-500 Years. Most materials endure longer if 
buried in dry sediments than if left to weather on the 
surface. Time capsules fabricated of materials 


expressly chosen for their durability underground would 
have a very high probability of surviving for 500 years. 
Molded and fired plates of aluminum oxide would be one 
possible choice. 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. Dry-sand burials of human bodies 
in ancient Egypt preserved bone, tissue and organs more 
efficiently than later mummification and embalming 
techniques. The dry, desert environment of the Delaware 
Basin in southeastern New Mexico would not be expected 
to threaten materials buried in sandstone or mudstone 
formations. Alumina is a natural constituent of 
geological formations. 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. Stone projectile points, bone 
needles and bison teeth have survived for 10,000 years 
underground in damp sands and clay at the Lind Coulee 
Paleoindian site in eastern Washington State. Camel 
teeth and bones have been found in ancient spring 
deposits not far from the WIPP itself (R.V. Guzowski, 
personal communication, Science Applications 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


International Corporation, November 4-6, 1991, 
Albuquerque, NM). Artifacts designed to endure in dry 
deposits would be likely to have a greater chance than 
bone needles’ of surviving 10,000 years. 


Buried time capsules ranging in size from six inches to 
two feet in diameter, seeded beneath the surface of the 
earthwork, would most likely be found after thousands of 
years as the earthwork itself eroded, exposing those 
plates closest to the surface in a slowly-timed release. 
Future archeologists would be likely to find the 
artifacts in excavations or to sense their existence 


electronically. Buried time capsules and inscribed 
plates would be unlikely to be found by future drilling 
operations. ; 

Recognition 


(A) Earthwork. 


(a) 0-500 Years. The earthwork's geometric shape would 
be recognizable as long as enough remained for curious 
humans to imaginatively reconstruct. Archeologists have 
reconstructed ancient, seemingly obliterated hearths, 
post holes, building foundations and inscribed geometric 
shapes from the barest traces of material remains. 


(b) 0-2,000 rs. Human curiosity regarding ancient 
earthworks, and creative thoughts about what their 
patterns signify, will likely persist for 2,000 years. 
The large, unnatural geometric shape at the WIPP ‘site 
would with a high degree of probability convey at least 
a level-I message (i.e., rudimentary information) that 
"Something made by humans—if only the earthwork itself 
—is here." 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. The symbolic shape of the 
earthwork would be more recognizable if its design were 
repeated throughout the marker system in linguistic, 
pictographic and diagrammatic inscriptions, and in the 
buried time capsules. The chance of recognizing the 
earthwork's geometric shape 10,000 years from now would 
be greater than the likelihood of recognizing the 
pattern as a meaningful symbol. 


Marking with High Dielectric Materials. Recognition of the 


earthwork could be enhanced through dielectric materials. 
Radar (an acronym for Radio Detection and Ranging) is widely 
used in modern remote sensing from aircraft and spacecraft 
(Henderson, 1985; Sabins, 1978). Side-looking, synthetic- 


G-43 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


aperture radars (SAR) have received extensive recent 
application in the U.S. Space Shuttle and Seasat Programs to 
study Earth (Ford et al., 1989) and the Magellan Mission to 
Venus (Pettengill et al., 1991). Operating in the microwave 
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, radar systems are of 
great interest because of their ability to penetrate the 
atmosphere in nearly all weather conditions except heavy 
rain. Radar's active sensing can be used at night, making it 
useful for military reconnaissance. It is very likely that 
radar will continue to be used by advanced civilizations in 
the future to monitor the surface of Earth. 


The strength of the return radar signal from the terrain 
surface to the radar antenna depends on characteristics of 
(1) the radar signal itself and (2) the terrain. Radar 
Signal properties are easily measured in terms of (a) 
wavelength, (b) polarization and (c) incidence angle (which 
also depends on terrain slope). The key terrain properties 
are (a) surface roughness and (b) the dielectric constant of 
the surface. 


Sandy, arid terrains have relatively smooth surfaces that do 
not provide noticeable anomalies or bright radar response. 
Moreover, flat landscapes, like that at the WIPP, will 
further enhance the uniformity of signal response. In such 
areas dielectric properties may become important. Dry rocks 
and soils tend to have very uniform, low dielectric constants 
of about 3 to 8, while water can be as high as 80 (MacDonald 
and Waite, 1973). The dryness of the WIPP site ensures low 
values. 


Materials with unusually high dielectric constants include 
metal sulfides (such as iron’ pyrite) and ferrimagnetic 


minerals (such as magnetite and pyrite). These are fairly 
common products of mining operations and are readily 
available in sand-sized form. Thus, it is feasible to mix 


such high dielectric materials with the surface soils of the 
WIPP to comprise a marker that would be highly visible to 
radar remote sensing. 


(B) Monoliths. 


(a) 0-500 Years. The rudimentary level-I message 
("Something made by humans is here") would be evident in 
the circular arrangement of standing, worked monoliths. 
Moreover, the monumental configuration of large, shaped 
stones would connote, "Something important is here." 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. Inscriptions on the monoliths 
would reinforce the stones! level-I message. 


G-44 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Furthermore, with age the monoliths could become 
recognized as a preservable, historical resource. 
Should individual monoliths topple or be removed, the 
geometric consistency and numbering (as a power of two 
with, e.g., 32 monoliths in the circle) would be a 
likely indication of what was missing, and from where. 
(The number two is used because the dyad is 
mathematically basic and symmetrical; its use as an 
ordering device could be inferred even if a majority of 
monoliths were gone from the arrangement.) 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. The ring of monoliths would be 
recognizable even if the majority of component stones 
were to break or be toppled. Should individual 


monoliths become unrecognizable, it is still likely that 
the patterned shape of the circular arrangement would 
persist for 10,000 years. 


To establish a human dimension, the diameter of the ring of 
monoliths would approximate the length of a soccer, rugby or 
football field. Visitors within the ring would see all the 
monoliths, feel psychologically enclosed in the circle, 
become "involved" with the stone monuments, and be drawn 
around the circumference to examine pictographs and messages 
inscribed on the granite. The ring of monoliths could be 
designed to engage future humans as active interpreters and 
as guests. 


(C) Central Structure. 


Probability is high that the granite structure emplaced at 
the center of the monolithic ring would be recognized as an 
intentionally constructed human artifact. Should the shelter 
itself collapse, observers from the future would still be 


able to infer that a fabricated structure once stood. The 
richly inscribed inner walls would be decipherable over the 
10,000-year period, whether standing or collapsed. The 


presence of inscriptions, even if unintelligible, would 
convey the level-I message that "Something made by humans is 
here." 


Central placement of the rock shelter would draw future 
visitors through the encircling earthwork and ring of 
monoliths to the center of the marker, where inscriptions 
inside would carry pictographic, linguistic, diagrammatic and 


scientific information. The designed shape itself would 
attract people to the structure, which they could easily 
enter to view the inscriptions overhead. Inside, they would 


also find information about—and directions for sighting—key 
constellations of the northern sky from within the shelter. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


The shape and orientation of the rock shelter will have to 
provide easy access to visitors while minimizing potential 
burial by wind-blown sand. Aerodynamics is a concern here. 
Although sand mainly occurs as thin sheets in this region, 
accumulation around vegetation (coppice dunes) can reach 
depths of six meters. Mobilization of this sand by reduction 
of vegetation (through climate change or human action) could 
lead to redistribution of sand at the marker site. 


An aerodynamically streamlined shape allows sand to bypass a 
potential obstruction without accumulating (Greeley and 


Iversen, 1985). Any aerodynamical streamlining of the rock 
shelter should be carefully oriented relative to the 
prevailing wind direction. Another strategy might be to 


place the entrance behind a streamlined baffle on the upwind 
side of the granite structure. Then any sand accumulation in 
the lee of the structure will not obstruct the entrance. 


The granite shelter would be the most interesting and complex 
marker within the system of markers .at the WIPP. Purposely 
designed to be the world's longest-lasting human artifact, 
the likelihood of its recognition at least as a level-I 
message would be high across the 10,000-year span. 


(D) Symbols. 


Team B agreed that the WIPP marker system should include a 
symbol or symbol set. 


According to Givens (1982, p. 176), "An_international graphic 


symbol or emblem for biohazards should be put into general 
use. The emblem can provide a tangible focus for a simple 


oral transmission of information about hazardous substances, 
such as radioactive waste. The meaning of the symbol may be 
transferred across generations by including it as a component 
in iconic narrative material (i.e., the pictorial material 
would 'teach' the -symbol's significance). A worldwide symbol 
could function as a unifying theme for the entire repository 
communication system." 


(a) 0-500 Years. A symbol is a sign whose physical 
shape and significance (meaning or reference) is purely 
traditional. Without understanding the tradition and 
its cultural history, a symbol is virtually 
indecipherable. An example is the U.S. (or any 
national) flag. The probability of symbol recognition 
over time is, therefore, low. If used, the trefoil 
could easily lose its reference to nuclear radiation 
within 500 years. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


However, symbols are among the most powerful of human 
signs. Along with flags, other potent symbols include 


the Star of David and the Christian cross. Using the 
trefoil or a yet-designed geometric shape in a 
monumental earthwork, and repeating the design 


throughout the inscriptions and in the buried time 
capsules would help the chosen symbol become a 
recognizable "trademark" for the site. On-site 
linguistic, pictographic and diagrammatic inscriptions 
could be used to teach the symbol's meaning. Worldwide 
use in waste repositories would give the symbol a higher 
probability of being recognized as a sign marking buried 
nuclear waste and its danger. 


(b) 00-2 QO. Years. If indexed strategically 
throughout the marker system's sign modalities, a symbol 
would be more recognizable to future humans than if it 
appeared solely as the shape of an earthwork. 


(c) 2 -1 0 F There would be a fair 
probability that the symbol encoded in the surface 
earthwork could serve ultimately as a shorthand label 
for the WIPP site, just as the pyramid has become a 


symbol representing Egypt. Should this happen, the 
probability of recognition across 10,000 years would 
increase. 


(E) Iconic Pictographs. 


(a) Q-500 Years. An iconic pictograph is a sign whose 
physical shape and significance (meaning or reference) 
bears a direct, intuitive relationship to the physical 
shape of what it stands for. Decipherment is aided by 
an iconic sign's visible resemblance to its referent. 
Examples include the crescent moon, the smile face and 


the human stick figure. When a  crescent-moon 
pictograph, for instance, is used to signify the 
crescent moon, the sign is highly iconic. Iconicity is 


lost, however, as the crescent shape takes on less 
obvious meanings, such as in marking an outhouse door. 


When signs are designed explicitly to preserve the 
visual reference, their meanings across time are liable 
to be more recognizable. Airport pictographs of men, 
women, baggage, food and cocktails are examples of signs 
whose iconicity has been explicitly preserved for 
contemporary viewers. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Team B agreed that there is a greater than 90 percent 
chance that simple pictographs could convey accurate 
information about consequences of intrusion into the 
repository. Specific pictographs and narrative 
sequences should be designed by international graphic 
symbol specialists and tested by behavioral scientists 
on people of diverse educational and cultural 
backgrounds. 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. The iconic principle used in the 
WIPP markers is likely to aid sign recognition 2,000 
years from now. Egyptian funerary art, for example, has 
conveyed complex information in graphic, pictographic 


form for 3,000 years (Figure 14). It is likely that 
explicitly designed pictographic signs, strategically 
targeting future humans, could achieve better 


recognition than ancient Egyptian pictographs. 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. The imagined narrative scenes 
would show both what happened during construction of the 
WIPP and what would happen if intrusion were to occur. 
Information-rich pictographs have survived longer than 
10,000 years. Spanish Levantine rock art, for example, 
dating back 12,000 years, still speaks to those willing 
and imaginative enough to reconstruct depicted narrative 
scenes of human hunting parties pursuing prey animals. 
Thus, there is a better than even chance that message 
designers consciously working to preserve iconicity and 
to enhance the narrative significance of pictographic 
messages could send recognizable meanings across the 
10,000-year span. 


(F) Linguistic Scripts. 


(a) 0-500 Years. Recognition of written messages and 


warnings would be likely to persist for 500 years. For 
comparison, Modern English itself is about 500 years 
old. 

(b) 500-2,000 Years. Easy recognition of written 


scripts in the middle future would be less likely 
because today's languages could by then have changed 
dramatically. Middle (c. 1100-1500 A.D.) and Old 
English (c. 400-1100 A.D.) are virtually unreadable to 
most humans today. It is likely, however, that future 
scholars would have little trouble deciphering 20th- 
century linguistic scripts 2,000 years from now. 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. Using a rate of retention per 
1,000 years for "basic" vocabulary terms of 81 percent 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Pons 
a * RON OCOCOO ONO IOS 


set Ne ter, 
iat at Ne No tne IOI nen 
nel No Not ar arene wets 


“Mh 


Sore 


en i lad 


Figure 14. Egyptian Funerary Art (photo by M. McNaugher, The 
Carnegie Museum of Natural History) 


G-49 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


(a figure determined in tJlexicostatistics studies 
[Swadesh, 1952]), by 12,000 A.D. English will have 
retained as few as 12% of its current basic words, and 
still less of its more complex vocabulary items. 
Scholars may have a hard time translating very ancient 
scripts. But the likelihood of recognition could be 
increased by utilizing many scripts in the manner of the 
Rosetta Stone. There is high probability that future 
classicists and linguists would, with scholarly effort, 
recognize and decode the writings. 


The likelihood of decoding could be improved if written 
messages were designed using simple declarative 
sentences and a "basic" (Ogden, 1934), "monolexemic" 
(Swadesh, 1952) vocabulary that would be more likely to 
resist linguistic change over time. 


(G) Complex Scientific Diagrams. 


(a) 0-500 rs. Recognition of scientific diagrams 
such as the periodic table of the elements and nuclear 
reactions that produced the waste would be likely as 
long as major scientific paradigms remained similar to 
those that inspired the diagrams. Should radical shifts 
in scientific thought take place within 500 years, 
science historians and other academic specialists would 
still be likely to understand the periodic table. 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. The periodic table would be more 
likely recognized by societies as advanced or more 
advanced than our own. Less advanced cultures would 
have trouble understanding the table and its scientific 
Significance. To those who did recognize the periodic 
table (with the radioactive elements marked), its 
message would be: Danger, radioactive elements possible 
nearby. The graphic sign marking the radioactive 
elements would also appear, where appropriate, in 
iconic, linguistic, symbolic and other diagrammatic 
messages on site at the WIPP. Future readers would 
infer the sign's meaning from its occurrence within 
multiple contexts and message levels. 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. Detailed maps and scientific 
diagrams, with their iconic references, would be more 
likely to be recognized by future societies, no matter 
how technologically advanced or simple they might be. A 
precise diagram of the surface markers could be used to 
communicate the exact scale (of their dimensions, 
distances and angles) proportionally to the materials 
buried below. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


(H) Astronomical References. 
A Millennial Marking System. To ensure that generations far 


into the future, no matter how many disruptions in 
civilization and science might occur, could readily grasp 
when the WIPP was built and sealed, an astronomical way of 
dating the site should be built into the marker system. A 
Pole Star instrument or "millennial marker" could be 
constructed from a single monolith of granite. Based on an 
astronomical regularity known as the precession of the 
equinoxes, people from the future could date the site by 
sighting along the instrument and noting changes in positions 
of the "invariant" stars in the northern sky. Ten thousand 
years from now the earth's axis will be pointing away from 
the North Star, Polaris, toward a position almost midway 
between the bright stars Deneb and Vega. 


The Earth, like a top, wobbles as it spins. Slowly its polar 
axis traces a huge circle among the stars, a task requiring 
some 26,000 years to complete (Kyselka and Lanterman, 1976). 
To track the northern stars' positions over such vast periods 
of time, the millennial marker would be aligned to true north 
and its sighting ramp (Figures 15 and 16) inclined to the 
same angle as WIPP's 32 degree 23' north  Ilatitude. 
Precession of the equinoxes and the westward drift of the 
vernal (spring) equinox through the zodiac could be depicted 
in language-free stone engravings and applied with a simple 
monolith serving as the sighting instrument. 


(a) 0-500 Years. In 1727 the Maharaja Jawai Jai Singh 
directed his craftsmen to construct a Pole Star 
instrument, a long, narrow slab of red sandstone that 
still can be seen standing in the famous’ stone 
observatory of Jaipur, India (Singh, 1978; 1986). The 
craftsmen beveled the top of this narrow slab of 
sandstone so that it sloped upward at 27 degrees. 
Jaipur is located at 26 degrees 55' north latitude. 
Because the angular height of Polaris above the horizon 
is approximately the same as the observer's latitude, 
one need only peer up the slope to see the North Star. 
Because Polaris is likely to persist as an important 
reference point for navigators for 500 years (at least), 
the proposed millennial marker has a very good chance of 
being recognized in the near future. 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. In 2,000 years the North Star 
would be sufficiently out of alignment with the 
millennial marker for future archeologists and 
astronomers to infer the passage of time. The chance of 
the divergence being recognized would be high; 


cS-D 


THE DUHRVA-DARSHAK YANTRA, OR POLE-STAR INSTRUMENT 


BUILT IN 1727 BY THE MAHARAJA JAWAI JAI SINGH AT HIS STONE OBSERVATORY IN JAIPUR, INDIZ. THE 
INSTRUMENT POINTS TO TRU NORTH, AND THE TOP SLOPES UPWARD AT 27° (THE LATITUDE OF JAIPUR) SO 
THAT IT SIGHTS DIRECTLY TOWARD POLARIS (FROM PRAHLAD SINGH, 1986 JANTAR-MANTARS OF INDIA: 
STONE OBSERVATORIES: JAIPUR, DELHI, UJJAIN, VARANASI, MATHURA. JAIPUR, INDIA: HOLIDAY 
PUBLICATIONS. 40. 


Figure 15. The Duhrva-Darshak Yantra, or Pole-Star Instrument 


€S-) 


MILLENNIAL MARKING SYSTEM: 2,000 A.D. (0 Post Closure) 


BY SIGHTING OVER THE TOP OF A LONG, NARROW STRUCTURE, WHICH IS ALIGNED ON TRUE 
NORTH AND INCLINED AT THE SAME ANGLE AS THE LATITUDE OF WIPP, THE OBSERVER OF 
2,000 A.D. (GIVE OR TAKE SEVERAL CENTURIES) WILL BE LOOKING DIRECTLY AT POLARIS, OUR 
CURRENT "NORTH STAR." 


(a) 
Figure 16. Millennial Marking System. Parts (a) through (e) show the different locations 


of the stars as sighted by a pole-star located at the WIPP over 10,000 years 
(art by Ben Finney). (Figure continued on next page.) 


7s-) 


MILLENNIAL MARKING SYSTEM: 12,000 A.D. (10,000 P.C.) 


THE WOBBLING OF THE EARTH AS IT SPINS CAUSES AN EXTENSION OF ITS AXIS TO TRACE A 
CIRCLE COUNTER-CLOCKWISE AMONG THE STARS OVER THE NORTHERN POLAR REGIONS. IN 
10,000 YEARS (12,000 A.D.) AN OBSERVER SIGHTING TRUE NORTH OVER THE TOP OF THE 
STRUCTURE WILL BE LOOKING AT A POINT ROUGHLY MIDWAY BETWEEN THE BRIGHT STARS 
DENEB AND VEGA. 


(b) 
Figure 16. Millennial Marking System. Parts (a) through (e) show the different locations 


of the stars as sighted by a pole-star located at the WIPP over 10,000 years 
(art by Ben Finney). (Figure continued on next page.) 


SS-)D 


MILLENNIAL MARKING SYSTEM: 14,000 A.D. (12,000 P.C.) 


AT 14,000 A.D. AN OBSERVER SIGHTING TRUE NORTH OVER THE STRUCTURE WILL BE LOOKING 
AT A POINT NEAR VEGA. 


(c) 
Figure 16. Millennial Marking System. Parts (a) through (e) show the different locations 


of the stars as sighted by a pole-star located at the WIPP over 10,000 years 
(art by Ben Finney) . (Figure continued on next page.) 


9S-D 


MILLENNIAL MARKING SYSTEM: 22,000 A.D. (20,000 P.C.) 


AT 22,000 A.D. AN OBSERVER SIGHTING TRUE NORTH OVER THE STRUCTURE WILL BE LOOKING 
AT A POINT BETWEEN THE BIG AND LITTLE DIPPERS. 


(d) 
Figure 16. Millennial Marking System. Parts (a) through (e) show the different locations 


of the stars as sighted by a pole-star located at the WIPP over 10,000 years 
(art by Ben Finney). (Figure continued on next page.) 


LG-D 


MILLENNIAL MARKING SYSTEM: 28,000 A.D. (26,000 P.C.) 


AT 28,000 A.D., ONE 26,000 YEAR CYCLE OF THE PRECESSION WILL HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, 
AND AN OBSERVER SIGHTING TRUE NORTH OVER THE STRUCTURE WILL BE LOOKING TOWARD 
POLARIS, WHICH ONCE AGAIN WILL BE EARTH'S "NORTH STAR." 


NOTE: THE SKEWING OF THE CONSTELLATIONS AND ASTERISMS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENT 
PROPER MOTIONS OF THEIR CONSTITUENT STARS IS NOT SHOWN HERE. BY SHOWING THIS IT 
WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO EXTEND THE CALENDAR BEYOND 28,000 A.D. AS THE POSITION OF 

THE STARS WOULD CHANGE SIGNIFICANTLY FROM ONE PRECESSIONAL CYCLE TO THE NEXT. 


(e) 
Figure 16. Millennial Marking System. Parts (a) through (e) show the different locations 


of the stars as sighted by a pole-star located at the WIPP over 10,000 years 
(art by Ben Finney). (Figure concluded.) 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


precession of the equinoxes has been noted by many 
cultures worldwide for thousands of years. 


(co) 2,000-10,000 Years. In 10,000 years the Earth's 
axis will be pointing away from the North Star to a 
position midway between the bright stars Deneb and Vega. 
Should major discontinuities in knowledge of the current 
BaGe/ AED. system occur in the remote future, it is 
reasonable to assume that the millennial marker, in 
tandem with explanatory diagrams and pictographs, could 
be used to recognize the WIPP's date of closure and to 
determine when it is "safe." Great care would need to 
be taken to make this marker stable. 


Many peoples through the ages have used the nightly 
rotation of circumpolar stars and constellations to tell 
time. The Mescalero Apache, for example, still time the 
commencement and duration of pre-dawn rituals by such a 
star clock (Farrer, 1991). Although we do not know of 
cultures that have employed the precession of the 
equinoxes to keep track of the millennia, there are 
indications in ancient myths and religions that this 
slow shifting of stars was not only recognized by 
cultures reaching back perhaps as far as Paleolithic 
times, but also was the cause of great wonder 
(DeSantillana and von Dechend, 1977; Ulansey, 1989; 
Worthen, 1991). It would seem likely, therefore, that 
even if major breaks occurred in civilization and- 
science, people in future cultures across the next 
10,000 years would still be able to recognize, interpret 
and understand the proposed millennial marking system. 


6. Interpretation 
(A) Earthwork. 


(a) 0-500 Years. Given that the earthwork is 
recognizable, the likelihood of correct interpretation 
as a level-I message ("Something made by humans is 
here") over 500 years would be great. Recognition of 
the earthwork's geometric shape as a symbol—and 
recognition of its 20th-21lst-century meaning—would be 
less likely. 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. At 2,000 years the earthwork 
would suggest construction by humans "long ago." The 
"human- made" message would be likely to persist with a 
high level of probability. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


a) -10 Q. Years. By 10,000 years’ the 
interpretation would be that the feature was constructed 
by "ancient" humans. There is nothing to suggest that 


future generations would attribute the earthwork's 
patterned shape to natural forces, geomorphological 
processes, animals or extraterrestrials. By itself, the 
21st-century's symbolism would be unlikely to survive 
without cross-referenced clues to meaning elsewhere in 
the marker system's iconography, texts and scientific 
diagrams. 


(B) Monoliths and Central Structure. 


The worked stones and their arrangement, along with the 
placement of a rock shelter at the exact center of the 
circle, would reinforce the earthwork's level-I message 
("Something made by humans is here"). The probability that 
level-I messages would be correctly interpreted should be 
high across the 10,000-year span. 


(C) Symbols. 
(a) 0-500 Years. A designated warning symbol ideally 
would serve as the marker's "trademark." Successful 


indexing and cross-referencing with other on-site 
messages would help convey the symbol's contemporary 
connotations of "danger" and "warning." The warning 
symbol's late 20th-century meaning as a sign for nuclear 
radioactivity would be a difficult message for near- 
future viewers to interpret correctly. Still, in 500 
years a fair probability exists that the symbol could 
become a popular logo for the site. 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. The likelihood of the symbol's 
correct interpretation as a shorthand trademark or logo 
for the WIPP site, including connotations of danger and 
warning, could be enhanced if the trefoil (or a yet 
designed symbol) were used in many nuclear-waste 
repositories throughout the world. 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. The symbol would be likely to 


increase in potency the longer it resided in society's 
memory. Assuming recognition is not a problem, its 
correct interpretation as a trademark for the marker 
system would be probable across the 10,000-year period. 
The planned association and cross-referencing of the 
symbol with other on-site messages could increase the 
likelihood of its correct interpretation as a level-II 
(cautionary) sign. 


aes eee he ee ee eee ee eye z marine pees Bel wae pr Oe Ae yee eee Ao Eh SiS Sa ee 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


(D) Iconic Pictographs. 


(a) 0-500 Years. Pictographic messages designed 
according to principles of isotype (Neurath, 1936) and 
scientific illustration (Hogben, 1949) for remote-future 
addressees would have a high probability of correct 
interpretation in 500 years. 


(b) 500-10,000 Years. Pictographic reference to 
environmental objects likely to be seen in the future, 
such as the human hand, face and body; the Sun, crescent 
moon and constellations; and the marker's earthwork and 
arranged monoliths themselves would be clearly 
meaningful in the middle and far futures. Pictographic 
narratives based on such signs would have a high 
probability of being correctly interpreted across 10,000 
years. 


A pictographic narrative could be used, for example, to 
depict the gradually changing shape of the Big Dipper 
(Figure 17), which would provide a chronological 
framework for the WIPP site. 


Two narrative sequences, a simple "consequential" 
statement and a more detailed, historical depiction 
could be used. The former would be a three scene panel 
depicting (a) a human figure standing upright, then (b) 
ingesting a substance (perhaps small capsules marked 
with the designated warning symbol), and finally (c) 
lying down with rips and skull exposed. The message is, 
"This substance (whatever it may be) kills." The fact 
that humans cannot actually see what the nuclear sign 
represents will be less of a problem for future 
scientific societies that can decipher the periodic 
table of elements that it will be for less advanced 
societies. Still, humans need not actually see a deadly 
virus, "germ" or "spirit" in order to avoid the disease- 
causing agent. 


The historical sequence would show’ the site's 
construction through a longer series of pictographic 
panels, in narrative order from top-to-bottom (Figure 
ale) Properly drawn, there is good reason to predict 
that the messages would be correctly interpreted. 


(E) Linguistic Scripts. 
As stated above, though unreadable to most people 2,000- 


10,000 years from now, there is high probability that future 
classicists and linguists could, with scholarly effort, 


T9-D 


THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE BIG DIPPER OVER 100,000 YEARS 
(FROM ROBERT JASTROW, ASTRONOMY: FUNDAMENTALS AND FRONTIERS. WILEY, NEW YORK, 


1977, P. 1-35) 
ey \ 
THE BIG DIPPER \ aN 
TODAY . P 
Woy 
THE BIG DIPPER ° 
50,000 YEARS AGO os 
~~ 
i 
os 
~ 
THE BIG DIPPER \ 
50,000 YEARS HENCE \ 


Figure 17. The Changing Shape of the Big Dipper Over 100,000 years (Jastrow and Thompson, 


LOT). 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


recognize and decode the inscribed, written texts. Given the 
precision of writing as a form of communication, there is 
good reason to assume that written messages would be 
interpreted correctly 10,000 years from now. 


(F) Complex Scientific Diagrams. 


(a) 0-500 Years. Because of their precision and high 
information content, scientific diagrams recognized as 
such would have a very good chance of correct 
interpretation in the future. 


(b) 500-2,000 Years. Their significance would be most 
meaningful to future scientists and/or science 
historians from societies as advanced, or more advanced, 
than our own. 


(c) 2,000-10,000 Years. Assuming that human society 
continues to ascend the ladder of science and 
technology, as it has for the past 10,000 years since 
the domestication of plants and animals, there is a high 
probability that complex scientific diagrams would be 
correctly interpreted. 


Tha AD) rren 


We cannot guarantee that any simple or complex message, even 
when recognized and correctly interpreted, will deter a human 
being from inappropriate action. The caution on tobacco products 
sold in the U.S. demonstrates how frequently people ignore 


explicit health warnings. Ironically, some messages (such as 
"Danger—750 Volts," painted on Washington, D.C.'s Metrorail 
tracks) lure the reckless and suicidal. Nevertheless, carefully 
designed warnings could be expected to reduce the chances of 
inadvertent intrusion into the WIPP. Moreover, an intrusion 
would not be casual, but would be a planned event. As such, 


there would be a greater likelihood to consider cautionary data. 


(A) Earthwork. 


(a) 0-500 Years. With respect to materials buried 
2,100' below the surface, an earthwork would offer two 
modes of deterrence: (1) as a monumental sign of long- 
ago or ancient human activity, and (2) as a symbol for 
dangerous materials: Regarding the former, presence of 
a large, geometric "mound" would not deter mining 
exploration, unless the mound had become a site of 
historic interest (a possibility, at least). The 
earthwork would be massive enough that even several 
exploratory efforts to "find something" in it would do 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


little harm. Regarding a symbolic message—given that 
it had been recognized and correctly interpreted— 
deterrence and appropriate action would be likely across 
the near, middle and far future time periods. 


An intentional goal of building a large, patterned 
earthwork would be to lock the site in society's memory. 
The earthwork's monumental size would be likely to help 
reduce the chance of forgetting its existence. 


(b) 500-10,000 Years. There is significant probability 
that an earthwork of great size and patterned shape 
would become better known with the passage of time, just 
as the world's ancient monuments have become 
increasingly known and recognized through the millennia. 
In the middle and far futures, therefore, an earthwork's 
potential to deter inadvertent intrusion actually could 
be enhanced. 


(B) Monoliths and ntral Str 


(a) Q-500 Years. As a monument commemorating the 21st 
century's concern for the safety of future generations, 
the ring of monoliths, the central rock shelter and the 
accompanying inscriptions would be interesting enough to 
remain securely in societal memory for at least 500 
years. 


(b) 500-10,000 Years. Deterrence as a monumental sign 
and warning symbol from 500-10,000 years in the future 
would be similar to that of the proposed earthwork 
(discussed above). 


(C) Symbols. 


A correctly interpreted symbol could provide high 
probabilities of deterrence. The symbol, in and of itself, 
would not provide needed when, what, where, how and why 
information to back up the warning. 


But as a psychic trademark for the nuclear-waste repository, 
the symbol would increase the likelihood of deterrence and 
appropriate action. Should the symbol be used 
internationally, deterrence would be higher. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Marker System's Performance 


The probabilities and performance characteristics proposed 
above for the individual markers would be greatly enhanced by 
their inclusion within a larger, well-integrated marking system. 


Message redundancy would be increased, of course. But the 
additional cross-referencing and multiple linkages of markers, 
signs, symbols, text and diagrams also would help reduce the 
likelihood of inadvertent intrusion. Furthermore, use of 
teaching principles throughout the message system (i.e., defining 
the meaning of a given symbol or iconic sign by placement within 
appropriate linguistic and diagrammatic messages) would augment 
performance of the entire marker. 


A central assumption is that future human beings from more, 
less and as advanced societies will be curious about the marker, 
and that some members will work actively to decode the monument's 


holistic design. Despite intelligent efforts, however, a 
monument designed by 20th-2ist-century humans will present 
something of a mystery to future generations. . We assume our 


descendants will respond to the challenge as eagerly as 20th- 
century men and women have responded to questions and enigmas 
posed by ancient monuments. 


The fact that people living in the 21st century made an 
effort to transmit a warning message to future generations would 
itself become a message, whether or not the marker system worked 
as efficiently as its designers had hoped. The effort itself, in 
other words, as clumsy as the design might be or seem to future 
generations, could still achieve the desired effect: a lowered 
probability of inadvertent human intrusion into the WIPP. 


Part of the message to future societies, clearly, would be 
the 21st century's perceived level of effort in marking the site. 
A monumental, intellectually stimulating system would enhance 
performance with higher probability than would a less energetic 
design based on minimal investment, thought and creativity. 


An oral tradition tethered to the marker system could 
emphasize (1) that it was designed to be the world's longest 


lasting human artifact, (2) that it was intended as a gift to 
guard the health of future generations, and (3) that it is the 
world's largest celestial "clock" marking the millennia. 


Hyperbole and altruism are strong themes in the world's folk 
tales, songs and myths. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


8. Recognition of Marker System 


Recognition of the proposed marker system would not be 
expected to depend on the technological level of hypothesized 
future civilizations. 


More advanced, as advanced and less advanced societies would 
encounter signs expressly designed for ease of interpretation in 
any culture. Extensive indexing, cross-referencing and teaching 
principles utilized on-site in the marking system would enable 
intelligent Homo sapiens from any future society to understand 
the message. 


More advanced societies would have the least difficulty 
decoding the proposed marker system. Twentieth-century 
scientists have done an admirable job recognizing and 
interpreting ancient pictographs, symbols and archaic texts. 
Future, more advanced scientists would have fewer problems 
interpreting pictographs, symbols and scripts purposely designed 
for transparency of interpretation. 


As advanced societies would be likely to share 21st-century 
assumptions and world view. A high probability exists that 
shared understandings would aid in future efforts to explain the 
markers. 


Less advanced societies would not grasp subtleties encoded in 
the periodic table of the elements, perhaps, but would likely 
understand pictographic narratives and linguistic scripts. 
Future cultures unable to read any of the inscribed, written 
messages would be unlikely candidates for intrusion because of a 
lack of technical capabilities to do so. 


The proposed marker system, therefore, would be designed to 
work for future societies in which technological knowledge 
increases, stabilizes or decreases. 


Political Change. Regarding altered political control of the 
WIPP site, the above principles apply. Societal memory loss 
from a radical change in political control would be less 
likely to deter inadvertent intrusion than would conscious 
decisions by a new government to destroy all traces 
(especially monuments) of the old regime. Because material 
representations of culture reflect basic assumptions and 
foreign world-views, challengers might yield to destructive 
impulses. Use of multicultural (as opposed to parochial or 
nationalistic) messages, could, along with employment of 
culturally diverse symbols, languages and scripts, mitigate 
effects of altered political control across the 10,000 year 
span. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Mescalero Apache Symbolism. To further enhance the 


transmission of the warning message, consideration should be 
given to including at least one Native American language 
among those chosen for the inscriptions, as well as the use 
of Native American symbolism on the markers. Only during the 
last three centuries have Spanish and English-speaking 
peoples been dominant in the plains east of the Pecos River, 
where the WIPP site is located. 


For thousands of years Native American hunters and gatherers 
ranged across these plains. Apache people entered New Mexico 
from the north around 1400 A.D. and then worked their way 
south to the eastern plains (Opler, 1983; Pasztor, 1991). 
The group now known as the Mescalero Apache lived in the 
plains east of the Pecos from at least the 17th until the 
mid-19th century, when they were placed on a reservation just 
west of the Pecos. 


The historic association of this Native American tribe with 
the region where the WIPP is located could be recognized by 
including Mescalero language and the symbolism drawn from 
their rich tradition of ethnoastronomy. Mescalero Apache 
itself is part of a widespread Indian language family, known 
as Athabascan, which includes other Apache languages of New 
Mexico and Arizona, along with Navajo languages spoken as far 
north as Canada and Alaska. A written message could be 
inscribed using the Roman alphabet's standard orthography, 
special Apachean characters and diacritical marks for tone 
agreed upon in 1975 by the Mescalero Apache Language 
Commission (Farrer, 1991, p. 262). 


Like many Native American cultures, the Mescalero Apache 
"lived in the sky." That is to say, they responded with 
cultural sensitivity to motions of celestial bodies (Farrer, 
1991; Williamson, 1984, pp. 289-319). Their "cosmovision, " 
represented by the quartered circle (Figures 18 and 19), 
which still symbolizes the cardinal points, the course of the 
sun and life's circularity (Farrer, 1991; Farrer and Second, 
1981), could be used in the symbolism of the WIPP markers. 


According to Farrer (1991, p. 143): "The Creator gave the 
Mescalero Apache people serious responsibility for the 
maintenance of balance and harmony in the universe. Despite 


incursions of every imaginable sort by the larger mainstream 
Anglo culture, Apaches have persisted and maintained their 


responsibilities." 
Vandals. The greatest threat to any unpoliced marker system 
would be vandalism. Destruction of markers by juvenile 


members of Homo (or soldiers, religious fanatics or political 


L9-D) 


THE QUARTERED CIRCLE: VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MESCALERO APACHE "BASE 
METAPHOR" (FROM CLAIRE FARRER, LIVING LIFE'S CIRCLE: MESCALERO APACHE COSMOVISION. 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO PRESS, ALBUQUERQUE, 1991:96) 


Figure 18. The Quartered Circle: Visual Representations of the Mescalero Apache "Base 
Metaphor" (Farrer, 1991). 


*(T66L ‘TerITeA) suTeQUNOW UeyQ ‘zeIS 
pequtog-aznog e OUT eTOATD pezeqzend syoedy ozeTeoseW ey Jo suoT jeuroFsuezL *6T eaznbTt 4 


G-68 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


true-believers) could present the greatest challenge to 
efforts detailed in the present report. Redundancy would 
make total annihilation of the site by vandals impossible; 
yet the cumulative damage inflicted over 10,000 years by 
vandals from more advanced, as advanced and less advanced 
societies could greatly reduce the expected level of 
deterrence. 


One defense would be to design a site that future generations 
considered valuable enough to preserve for their future 
generations. The better the monument, the more likely it 


would be protected—possibly even repaired—across 10,000 
years. 


Radical Increase in Consumption of World Resources. 


Continued population growth and a significant increase in 
resource consumption presents a scenario in which societies 
2,000-10,000 years from now increasingly would be tempted to 
make advertent intrusions into the WIPP. Efficacy of the 
proposed warning system would not be expected to vary with 
population, extractive activity or resource demand. However, 
such demands would likely stimulate decisions to test the 
limits of the WIPP's warning message. But strictly speaking, 
intrusions based on knowledge would be advertent. 


inuity. A major war or societal catastrophe 
would result in conditions similar to those detailed above 
for political change. Again, the proposed warning system 
would be targeted to more advanced, less advanced and as 
advanced literate societies. Its message would be designed 
for accurate interpretation across 10,000 years for people of 
all technological levels. Resource prices, economic 
disruptions and population growth would be unlikely to 
influence readability, but might be expected to inspire 
deliberate, advertent intrusions by excavation, tunneling and 
drilling, or by additional nuclear-waste storage efforts at 
the WIPP. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


References Cited 


Costa, J.E., and V.R. Baker. 1981. Surficial Geology: Building 
with the Earth. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons. 


DeSantillana, G., and H. Von Dechend. 1977. Hamlet's Mill: An 
Essay on Myth and the Frame of Time. Boston, , MA: David R. 
Godine Pub., Inc. 


Deeson, A.F.L., ed. 1973. The Collector's Encyclopedia of Rocks 
and Minerals. New York, NY: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc. 


Evans, 1.0. 1972. Rocks, Minerals and Gemstones. London, 
England: Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd. 


Farrer, C.R. 1991. Living Life's Circle: Mescalero Apache 
Cosmovision. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press. 


Farrer, C.R., and B. Second. 1981. "Living the Sky: Aspects of 
Mescalero Apache Ethnoastronomy," Archaeoastronomy in the 
Americas. Ed. R.A. Williamson. Balliena Press Anthropological 


Papers 22. Los Altos, CA: Ballena Press. 137-150. 


Ford, J.P., R.G. Blom, J.A. Crisp, C. Elachi, T.G. Farr, R.S. 


Saunders, E.E. Theilig, S.D. Wall, and S.B. Yewell. 1989. 
Spaceborne Radar Observations: A Guide for Magellan Radar-Image 
Analysis. JPL-Publ-89-41. Pasadena, CA: Jet Propulsion 


Laboratory, California Institute of Technology. 


Givens, D.B. 1982. "From Here to Eternity: Communicating with 
the Distant Future," Et Cetera. Vol. 39, no. 2, 159-179. 


Greeley, R., and J.D. Iversen. 1985. Wind as a Geological 
Process: On Earth, Mars, Venus, and Titan. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 


Hawkins, G.S. 1973. Beyond Stonehenge. New York, NY: Harper & 
Row. 


Henderson, F.M. 1985. "Active Microwave Imaging Systems," The 


Surveillant Science: Remote Sensing of the Environment. Ed. 
R.K. Holz. 2nd ed. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. [234]-247. 


Hogben, L.T. 1949. From Cave Painting to Comic Strip: A 
Kaleidoscope of Human Communication. New York, NY: Chanticleer 
Press. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Isherwood, IDS A and A. Street. 1976. "Biotite-Induced 
Grussification of the Boulder Creek Granodiorite, Boulder County, 
Colorado," Geological Society of America Bulletin. Vol. 87, no. 
3, 366-370. 


Jastrow, R., and M.H. Thompson. 1977. Astronomy: Fundamentals 
and Frontiers. 3rd ed. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons. 


Krupp, E.C. 1983. Echoes of the Ancient Skies: The Astronomy of 
Lost Civilizations. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 


Kyselka, W., and R.E. Lanterman. 1976. North Star to Southern 
Cross. Honolulu, HI: University Press of Hawaii. 


Le Mouel, J-F. 1991. "Prehistory of North America," 
Prehistory: The World of Early Man. Ed. J. Guilaine. New York, 
NY: Facts on File. 109-122. 


MacDonald, H.C., and W.P. Waite. 1973. "Imaging Radars Provide 
Terrain Texture and Roughness Parameters in Semi-Arid 
Environments," Modern Geology. Vol. 4, no. 2, 145-158. 


Neurath, O. 1936. International Picture Language: The First 
Rules of Isotype. London, England: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 
& Co. 


Ogden, C.K. 1934. The System of Basic English. New York, NY: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co. 
Opler, M.E. 1983. "Mescalero Apache," Handbook of North 
American Indians. Volume 10: Southwest. BEd. A. Ortiz. 
Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution. 419-439. . 


Pasztor, S.B. 1991. "IX. A Historical Perspective of Cultural 
Development in Southeastern New Mexico," Background Information 
Presented to the Expert Panel on Inadvertent Human Intrusion into 
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Eds. R.V. Guzowski and M.M. 
Gruebel. SAND91-0928. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National 
Laboratories. IX-1 through IX-38. 


Pettengill, G.H., P.G. Ford, W.T.K. Johnson, R.K. Raney, and L.A. 


Soderblom. 1991. "Magellan: Radar Performance and Data 
Products," Science. Vol. 252, no. 5003, 260-265. 
Sabins, F.F., dr. 1978. Remote Sensing: Principles and 


Interpretation. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Singh, P. 178. Stone Observatories in India, Erected by 
Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur, 1686-1743 A.D., at Delhi, 
Jaipur, Ujjain, Varanasi, Mathura. lst ed. Varanasi: Bharata 
Manisha. 

Singh, P. 1986. Jantar-Mantars of India: Store Observatories: 
Jaipur, Delhi, Ujjain, Varanasi, Mathura. Jaipur, India: 


Holiday Publications. 


Smith, D.G., ed. 1981. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Earth 
Sciences. New York, NY: Crown Publishers, Inc. and the Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. 


Stover, L.E., and B. Kraig. 1978. Stonehenge: The Indo-European 
Heritage. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall. 


Swadesh, M. 1952. "Lexico-Statistic ‘Dating of Prehistoric 
Ethnic Contacts," Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society. Vol. 96, no. 4, 452-463. 


Twidale, C.R. 1982. Granite Landforms. New York, NY: Elsevier 
Scientific Publishing Company. 


Ulansey, D. 1989. The Origins of the Mithraic Mysteries: 
Cosmology and Salvation in the Ancient World. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 


Williamson, R.A. 1984. Living in the Sky: The Cosmos of the 
American Indian. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 


Winkler, E.M. Eo 7on Stone: Properties, Durability in Man's 
Environment. 2nd rev. ed. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. 


Worthen, T.D. 1991. The Myth of Replacement: Stars, Gods, and 
Order in the Universe. Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona 
Press. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


APPENDIX A 
TESTING MARKER SYSTEMS FOR UNDERSTANDABILITY 
by Louis Narens 


The ideas for candidate marker systems should be thoroughly 
tested for understandability by various target populations before 
a selection of the final system is made. It is very likely that 
due to the novelty and nature of the project, much testing and 
refining candidate marker systems will be required. Some aspects 
of the testing can be successfully achieved in a modular way 
(i.e., various messages or pieces of messages can be tested 
independently of others), while other aspects may need to test a 
mockup of the entire system to succeed. 


This Appendix presents some testing concerns about marker 
systems similar to the kind of system that Team B has proposed. 


In Team B's system, there are three different kinds of 
explicit messages and a number of implicit ones. Each kind of 
explicit message makes different assumptions about the knowledge 
and capabilities of the reader and the kind of society to which 
he or she belongs. The rationale for testing of these kinds of 
messages will be based in part on these assumptions. 


The SCIENTIFIC MESSAGE assumes a reader with scientific 
sophistication—particularly an understanding of physical 
chemistry. In the present world all potential readers of such a 
message have essentially the same cultural understanding of 
physical chemistry (e.g., their coursework and textbooks, 
although possibly of different traditions and languages, share 
the same concepts, experimental and mathematical methods, facts, 
and roughly the same kind of quality judgments of what is 


important and what is good work). O£ course, we do not assume 
that future physical chemists will necessarily have cultural 
understandings similar to the current one. Thus, given this 


limitation of culturally diverse populations for testing, the 
best we can expect of testing for this case is to verify that the 
scientific message is easily understandable to members of the 
scientific community with knowledge of physical chemistry, and 
establish the level of expertise and intelligence needed for 
correctly interpreting the message. 


The WRITTEN MESSAGE assumes a reader who is familiar with a 
portion of a variant of at least one of the languages the message 
is in. (For the purpose of exposition we will assume that the 
message is written in English) The written messages should be 
tested for understanding on people with a limited understanding 
of English, e.g., people who have English as second or third 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


language, people who speak an English form of Pidgin. It is 
especially important to test the written message on people who 
are from cultures very different from our own, including 
nontechnological ones. 


The (NONSCIENTIFIC) PICTOGRAPHIC MESSAGE assumes moderately 
intelligent reader or group of readers who is willing to put in 
the time and effort to "decode" it. This message should be 
tested in even a wider variety of cultures than the previous 
messages, especially ones that have very limited understanding of 
our culture and technology. 


We assume that the nonscientific pictographic message will 
require much prior testing and redesigning. Much of this testing 
can be modular and can be somewhat generic in the sense that many 
of the results will be applicable to forms of the message. For 
example, variants of a symbol (or subset of symbols) can be 
tested to see which is most understandable; or various schemes 
for "teaching" a meaning of a symbol can be tested, etc. Both 
the resulting good symbols and good teaching methods can be then 
used as a basis for a variety of pictographic messages. 


The creators of various candidate marker systems will have 
ideas about how the overall design of the markers, the graphic 
forms of the messages, as well as the messages themselves will 
likely inform potential readers about the designers of the 
messages, the nature of the society they came from, and possible 
reasons for the marker system, etc. Since it is very likely that 
potential readers will use ideas (perhaps preconceived ones) 
about the designers of the markers, their society, and reasons 
for the markers) as an initial basis for deciding how to go about 
interpreting the messages, it is important that the designers’ 
ideas about such issues be made explicit and be tested. Also 
because of this, it is imperative that the messages themselves 
also be tested in ways that simulate contexts in which readers 
might encounter them. This may mean building a mockup of the 
Markers Project in some nontechnological culture and having 
people of that culture explain what it is about, or sending 
drawings and information about the site to various types of 
specialists of various cultural backgrounds for their opinions, 
etc. 


In view of the above suggestions for testing marker systems, 
the following four considerations should be stressed: 


ilies The results of testing should feed back into the 
designing process. - 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Consideration of culture plays an important role in the 
testing, and thus anthropologists should be strongly 
involved in the entire testing process. 


A variety of kinds of individuals and cultures should be’ 
used in the testing process; and in particular, 
nontechnological cultures who have limited contact with 
our culture should be included. 


The designers of the messages should make explicit the 
means they think various possible readers of the message 
will use to decode the appropriate message, and it 
should be tested whether or not various target 
populations use these means or others in reaching their 
conclusions. 


The proper testing of a candidate marker system, while 
not very expensive in terms of the actual construction 
of the marker system, may take several years to 


complete. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


APPENDIX B 


SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL ON THE WIPP MARKER 


by Jon Lomberg 


P.O. Box 207 
Honaunau, Hawaii, 96726 
die Use of Symbols in the WIPP Marker .......... Sor pee pestere yard 
ire CO eCeWre PrP lee ographearcsevcmusrstsnsionchensnensieteteuonsnetere cetererstorsieret eyes G-80 
III. Marking by Direct Means: Using a sample of waste 

as part of the Marker System ..........ccereseccesr cree G-82 
IV. Notes on Marker Aesthetics and Design ..........---+226- G-84 
REEETENCSS acca creieie ci eleher ere enerersharelchenetonerercistale) curt sValchere <Reloheelseensiners. svelte G-90 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


I. USE OF SYMBOLS IN THE WIPP MARKERS 


There are three basic messages that symbols associated with 
the WIPP marker might be used to convey: 


POISON 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 
DON'T INTRUDE 


Most cultures use visual symbols, but they all use different 
symbols. Our team was unable to discover any "universal" visual 
symbols that are guaranteed to be understood by any human being 
in conveying any of these three messages. 


Some existing symbols were suggested by various members of 
our team. These included: 


1) RADIATION TREFOIL 
2) SKULL AND CROSSBONES 


3) MR. YUK (a recently adopted international poison warning 
symbol for children) 


4) DO NOT (circle with slash) 
5) DIAGONAL SLASH 

6) X (something crossed out) 

7) STYLIZED URANIUM ATOM 


We have used the radiation trefoil in our sample pictographs 
and other drawings submitted with this report, but we want to 
emphasize that this was only done as a matter of graphic 
convenience. Given limited time, the simple trefoil was more 
convenient to sketch quickly than the more complicated skull and 
crossbones or some group of many symbols (as is proposed below). 


The radiation trefoil was the subject of some vigorous 
debate. Some argued that the trefoil had already been adopted 
internationally and might well survive for many centuries with 
its meaning more or less intact. Others were concerned that the 
trefoil is not iconographic, that is there is nothing about it 
that directly relates to the concept it symbolizes. One team 
member quipped, upon seeing the trefoil used to signify waste in 
our sample pictograph, "Why are they burying all those submarine 
propellers?" 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


The skull and crossbones also received a good deal of 
consideration, including some external advice from Carl Sagan, 
who had written a letter to the project on the subject (see 
letter from Carl Sagan at the end of this Appendix B). The 
lineage of the skull and crossbones as a graphic symbol (as 
opposed to the use of real bones in totems and "cannibal 
lintels") leads back to medieval alchemists, for whom the skull 
represented Adam's skull and the crossed bones the cross that 
promised resurrection. It is almost certainly a Western cultural 
artifact, yet it too has spread worldwide as a symbol for poison 
—and also for pirates. Henry Dreyfuss, a great scholar of 
symbols, once performed an experiment where 3-year old children 
were shown a skull and crossbones and immediately shouted 
"Pirates". If they were shown the skull and _ crossbones 
positioned on a bottle, they shouted "Poison". Et is for this 
reason that the skull and crossbones that appear in the drawings 
are sometimes shown set upon a bottle. 


Some general principles were agreed upon: 


1) No symbol is certain to stay in use for the 10,000 year 
period. Future societies will probably create many of their own 
symbols, and symbols from our time may have their meanings 
changed or distorted with the passage of time. Compare how the 
meaning of the swastika has changed in our own century, going 
from positive religious symbol of India to a hated emblem of the 
Nazis. 


2) Symbols used in the WIPP Marker should be defined by 
Pictographs as part of the marker. Some examples of how this 
might be done follow. 


Figure 5 shows how the "Do Not" symbol might be defined. 
Figure 6 shows how the skull and crossbones could be shown to 
mean "poison" (though there should probably be an additional 
frame that shows the sick person as a skeleton). Figure 7 shows 
how difficult it is to define a radiation hazard symbol without 
requiring that the reader have a knowledge of chemistry or 
physics. The problem is that the effects of exposure to 
radiation can take many years to appear. In Figure 7 one 
possible solution to this is presented: A child encounters the 
waste (symbolized by the trefoil), and the symbol is transferred 
onto his chest. In the background are some young trees. Then 
the child is seen as an adult, identified with the child by the 
symbol on his chest. The tree is several decades older, but 
still recognizable by the pattern of its branches. Flowers at 
the base of the’ young and old tree provide a measure of scale. 
An additional frame might be added to this sequence showing the 
adult clearly dead. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


We do not suggest that any of these sequences are developed 
enough to use, but they perhaps point the direction in which 
other definitional pictographs could be developed. 


3) Geometrically simple and symmetrical symbols (such as the 
trefoil or the "X") can withstand more degradation and later be 
reconstructed than can more complex symbols like the skull and 
crossbones. Two drawings show how a system of berms might be 
used to form a symbol visible from above (Figures 1 and 2).* 
Remote marking using materials of different dialectric, thermal, 
or magnetic properties could also be shaped in this way. The 
trefoil can be severely degraded by wind or water erosion, or by 
excavation, and still be recognized. As soon as the skull and 
crossbones begins to lose its definition, there will perhaps be 
those future observers who argue that we are merely projecting a 
face onto a random arrangement of material, as is almost 
certainly the case with the so-called Face On Mars. 


4) Multiple symbols might be easier to read than single symbols. 
While experimenting with various symbols, this artist noticed 
that the symbols were sorting themselves into pairs as follows: 


TREFOIL & STYLIZED ATOM 


CROSSBONES & MR. YUK 
SLASHED CIRCLE & X 


If these symbols are grouped together as pairs, the sum of 
two half-understood symbols might be two fully understood 
symbols. For example, the trefoil itself might seem to some 
future readers like an old radiation sign, while others argued 
that it looked floral (a French ruin?) or like a Japanese mon (a 
clan crest). The stylized atom, if seen alone, might be mistaken 
for a solar system. But together, the two symbols help confirm 
the correct hypothesis and disprove the incorrect hypothesis. 
Boxing the symbols together is one way to enforce the sense of 
their connection. Figure 8 shows how groups of symbols might be 
designed to convey the three basic warning messages. 


A detail that requires more thought is what to put behind the 
slashed circle or the X. A drilling tower such as the one shown 
may not be recognized for what it is. But a stylized stick 
figure of a person digging doesn't convey the danger correctly, 
since it is not dangerous to dig a few feet down; perhaps the 
more detailed information on the pictographic sequence showing 
the history of the WIPP will clarify that possible confusion. 


*The drawings give a generalized view of how our Markers might appear: a ring 
of monoliths circumscribing the area directly over the waste, with a central 
structure that contains the most detailed information. The WIPP building, or 
some remaining portion of it, is due north of the central structure. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


A fourth pair of symbols might be added to help explain that 
the two symbols in each box are equivalent symbols of the same 
concept (see Figure 9). 


5) Symbols could be used in association with the linguistic 
messages. Use of an identical symbol or group of symbols before 
each language could help suggest that each language is saying the 
same thing (see Figure 10). 


6) Symbols can and should be tested to determine which symbols 
work best and how their presentation affects their ability to be 
understood: for example, does it make any difference if symbols 
are drawn as outlines or filled figures? (see Figures 11 and 12). 


II) THE WIPP PICTOGRAPH 


A sketch of the kind of pictorial narrative that might be 
used on the WIPP Marker. 


BACKGROUND 

Not all human cultures have painting, drawing, or other 
graphic arts. In those that do, the human figure is a common 
subject. People and animals are the most easily recognized 


elements in the pictures of another culture. Symbolic elements, 
emblems of natural forces, decorative motifs, and scripts can be 
difficult to interpret in prehistoric cave murals, Egyptian 
frescoes, Chinese scrolls, Persian miniatures, or Plains Indians 
hide paintings. But the human figure is usually clear. 
Universal human actions—running, digging, paddling a _ boat, 
hunting—are also usually easy to recognize. 


Often sequences of images are used to depict events in time 
in a linear fashion, to tell a story or record a historical 
event; there are many examples of linear, pictorial narratives in 


existence. Three independently evolved examples—the Bayeaux 
Tapestry (France, 12th Century); the Japanese scroll "The Mongol 
Invasions" (Japan, 13th Century); and the Lakota Sioux picture 


story of the Battle of the Little Big Horn (United States, 19th 
Century)—indicate how widespread the use of pictures to create 
narrative is. Drawing and reading comic strips is one the most 
ancient and widespread of human pastimes. 


The human figure is the object likeliest to be recognized by 
those people of the future who find the WIPP Markers. The human 
figure provides a natural scale for determining the size of 
objects in the pictures, and helping recipients interpret and 
calibrate the numbers and measurements used. A linear narrative 
contained in panels, read from top to bottom, seems a good way of 
conveying the history of the site. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


TECHNIQUES 


One difficulty facing an artist who wants to show human 
figures at the WIPP site is that the depth of the repository is 
such that to show the underground chambers scaled correctly, more 
than 2200' have to be contained in the frame. The human figure 
is far too small in any reasonably sized frame. 


The size of the frame is constrained by the number of frames 
required to tell the story and the height of the marker. Top to 
bottom reading is done in all cultures. Horizontal readings 
provide more ambiguity, no matter how they are marked. The 
clearest way to present the narrative is in a single stack of 
frames, avoiding the confusion possible if readers have to go 
from the bottom of one column of frames to the top of another. 
Therefore the size of the frame can be determined by dividing the 
height of the easily readable area of the marker by the number of 


frames. Museum exhibit designers generally try to contain all 
text and diagrams between 3 feet and 6 feet from the floor. The 
sequence of drawings for Figure 13 has 10 frames. To. (fat 20 


frames in 3 feet, each frame can be no higher than 3.6 inches. 
Actually, since frames require a little spacing, the actual 
height would be less than that. 


But large frames can be seen even higher than 6 feet. A more 
generous estimate of the maximum reading area might be between 
10' and 2'. Now the height of each panel is over 9 inches. If 
the WIPP building and the repository are shown to scale in a 
frame of this size, then a 6' person is less than one fortieth of 
an inch high. Just a featureless dot on the horizon. 


The conventional solution used in Western style comic strips 
is to cut to scenes at different scales, much as a movie director 
will cut from a long shot to a closeup. But this is not a 
convention that has been used universally, and it provides many 
ambiguities. 


THE STORY OF WIPP 


The solution I propose is to have two parallel stories 
presented in a stack of paired frames. One shows the WIPP site 
at large scale, the other at human scale. Deliberate efforts 
have been made to associate each frame in the pair by date, size 
scale, and stars in the sky. The hope is that future decoders 
will be able to figure out that they are seeing the entire site 
and a closeup and various moments in time. Tally dots beneath 
each frame reinforce the sequencing—and perhaps the sense of 
time passing—implied by the sequence of frames. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


The long shot frames show the desert as it was before WIPP, 
oriented by the North Star, the appearance of WIPP, the sinking 
of the shafts and the excavation of the chambers, the 
transportation of waste material to the site, down the shaft, and 
into the chambers, the sealing of the shaft, the erection of the 
markers, the change in the Polar constellations due to the 
Earth's precessional cycle, and the decay and disappearance of 
the buried hazard. 


The close-up frames cut from surface activities at the site 
to activities beneath the surface. The absence of stars in the 
sky and the indicated depth should be a clue as to the 
difference. Even if recipients cannot actually read the depths, 
they should be able to recognize that the "2150" is associated 
with some of the close-ups and that 0' is associated with others. 
Comparing these two numbers with their positions in the long shot 
will help decode the location of the scenes. 


NOTE: The Trefoil has been used as a symbol for the waste matter 
purely as a matter of the artist's convenience: it was fast for 
me to draw in. The actual symbol or group of symbols that should 
be used on the marker is a matter requiring a great deal of 
further study and testing. 


III) MARKING BY DIRECT MEANS: Using a sample of waste as part 
of the Marker System. 


No symbolic representation of the radioactive material could 
be as unambiguous as the material itself. A properly sealed, 
transparent canister (Figure 20) containing a representative 
sample of the gloves, glassware, and sludge buried at WIPP would 
be harmless, indeed unobserved, by the casual visitor. Sealed 
containers containing small amounts of waste could be buried at 
strategic spots in the Marker area e.g. under the central 
structure, beneath the shaft seals, or with the other buried 
monoliths. Perhaps the "remote" marker in Carlsbad Caverns would 
be another possible site for a waste sample. 


A sample of waste might be the most effective way of 
deterring—or at least slowing down—the potential intruder who 
was serious enough to have begun excavation. The sample could be 
marked with the symbols representing the buried material, and 
thus provide the best possible proof of the meaning of the 
symbols used elsewhere on the site. The discovery of the waste 
sample might help steer intruders away from any hypothesis that 
nuclear weapons, weapons grade materials, or extractable ores 
were contained in the repository. The contents of WIPP are so 
uninspiring and worthless that a sample might be the best means 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


DOSIMETER WIM NEEDLE" IN THe Rep" 


SAMPLE WASTE 


C4 ky-2) “TRANSPARENT” RADIPTION 


Swap Csorw tvent 2») 


SYMBOL CARTOUCHE 


I 3 i 

EIFS 

CORD 
Se as 


ACCESSIBLE BURIED SAMPLE in PRoTECTIVE CONTAINER 


Figure 20. Transparent Canister of Sample WIPP Waste (art by Jon 
Lomberg) . 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


of deterring intruders from undertaking the difficult and costly 
task of re-opening the chambers. 


IV) NOTES ON MARKER AESTHETICS AND DESIGN 


Various members of the Marker Panel have expressed the view 
that the Marker should be designed so as to achieve maximum 
aesthetic impact, so as to be seen as a "gift from our century to 
the future" (Givens), involving contemporary artists working on 
large scale environmental sculpture (Sullivan), or using Jungian 
archetypal forms to create a mood of dread and danger (Brill). 


As a professional artist, I wish to register a dissenting 
view. I believe that the Marker should be designed purely on 
functional grounds, and that any attempts to make the Marker some 
kind of artistic statement are bound to confuse the clarity of 
the basic message we are trying to convey. There are several 
reasons for this belief: 


1. ART IS AMBIGUOUS. 


Art is sometimes described as a universal language. Some 
aspects of art can help bridge gaps when there is no common 
verbal language, and that is the basis of the idea of using a 
pictographic sequence to convey some aspects of the nature of the 
WIPP site. But art can as often be the most ambiguous form of 
human communication, especially when we are trying to understand 
the intent of the artist. For example, the depictions of the 
animals in cave paintings are easily understood, but it is much 
harder to determine why the paintings were created. 
Representational art is much more easily understood than symbolic 
art, and the direction that most artists take in large scale 


sculpture is symbolic or abstract. I believe that most of the 
designs that would be suggested by sculptors or "Earth Artists" 
would be more abstract than representational. Contemporary 


audiences often voice puzzlement over the intent of abstract 
painters and sculptors. Any inclusion of abstract, geometrical, 
or symbolic forms in the Marker is more likely to confuse than to 
enhance the meaning of the Marker. 


2. ART IS AN END IN ITSELF. 


Even if we could commission some monument great enough to 
become a wonder of the world whose fame would be carried down 300 
generations, the very fact that the Marker was so impressive 
could lead to the belief that the purpose of the marker is 
artistic rather than communicative. A large and powerful 
sculpture sitting in the middle of the desert could easily he 
seen as the product of some individual artist—similar to Mt. 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Rushmore or current endeavors like Charles Ross' "Star Axis" 
(also under construction in New Mexico) rather than as an 
organized attempt at communication. Some of these large-scale 
artworks may also survive millennia. The WIPP Marker shouldn't 


be mistaken for another example—however well designed—of a 20th 
Century school of outdoor sculpture. 


Art usually has no function, it exists only to be 
experienced. If people of the future view the WIPP Marker as a 
piece of art, they are less likely to try to interpret it as 
conveying a particular message rather than as some elaborate 
"artistic statement". 


These comments apply equally well to art which intentionally 
tries to be ugly or convey a mood of dread or danger, as in some 
of Mike Brill's (A Team) imaginative designs. Not all great art 
is meant to be beautiful. Consider Picasso's painting "Guernica" 
in this context. Sculptural forms which convey a negative 
emotion or mood may also be seen as "merely" works of art, with 
no explicit marking function. 


3. ART DRAWS PEOPLE TO IT. 


We want people to stay away from this site, not travel from 
distant places to see it. A great and famous work of art 
encourages visits from other artists, historians, and tourists. 
If enough people want to come to see a remote wonder, somebody 
will put up a hotel to accommodate them. Maybe the hotel decides 
to drill for water...By creating a great monument we may be 
causing the developments at the site that we most want to avoid. 


4. GREAT ART IS HARD TO COMMISSION. 


For every successful commissioned monument there are a 
hundred’ failures, e.g., the Prince Albert memorial in London (an 
architectural laughingstock) or the WWII Airman's Memorial in 
Toronto (known locally as "Gumby Goes to Heaven"). If a decision 
is made to have a competition for a sculpture, a momentum is 
established whereby one piece has to be selected, whether or not 
somebody has come up with the right design. 


I am also very concerned about who would decide which design 
would be used. Let me remind the Panel that the thinking that 
now dominates the art world in places like New York is anti- 
scientific, anti-representational, and seems to favor more 
detached and (to me) nihilistic statements of artists. I do not 
think that the art community as it exists would be well qualified 
to create or select a design that would be scientifically 
informed about the many intricacies of this problem (encroachment 
by sand dunes, durability of materials, future scenarios, etc.) 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Yet if an announcement were made that there was going to be a 
grand competition for a Marker to last 10,000 years, it would be 
hard not to involve the art community in the decision making 
process. If you do, be warned: they are likely to end up picking 
a giant inflatable hamburger to mark the site. 


I say let artists submit designs if they wish, but don't 
decide a_ priori that any design will in fact be used. 


Sr AN ARTISTIC MARKER MAKES INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION OF 
MARKERS LESS LIKELY. 


We all seem to agree that having similar markers appear 
worldwide at other nuclear waste repositories is a good idea. A 
purely functional marker, if well conceived and not too site 


specific has a chance of being adopted internationally. But as 
soon as you make it an artistic competition, you invite 
nationalistic competitiveness. I cannot believe, for example, 
that France would want a sculpture selected by an American 
committee to grace a French repository. And if each country 
wants an artistic statement that reflects their own 


(contemporary) artistic beliefs and styles, the Markers will very 
quickly diverge, making it harder for people of the future to 
realize that all these sites have some common link. 


For all of the above reasons, I urge that the Marker be 
designed purely on the criterion of message clarity. 


An example of a marker designed purely for function is shown 
in Figure 3. The design was inspired by the placement of an 
Indian pictograph painted in the year 1054 A.D. which recorded 
the appearance of a supernova in the sky. The painting was done 
on the underside of an overhang, perhaps the best location to 
minimize the effects of rain and windblown dust. Different kinds 
of information could be placed on different faces of the marker. 
For example the symbols and languages could be placed on the side 
facing outward, information about the site's relation to the 
Earth's precessional cycle could be placed on the side facing 
inward. Variations on this design might have niches or other 
recesses carved into each monolith in which the most important 
information could be engraved. 


According to the present dimensions stipulated as those of 
the actual waste storage area, it is possible to calculate how 
large a 30 foot monolith on the perimeter of a ring shown in 
Figure 2 would appear from the center Figure 21. 


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Q1D, OVER THE WASTE REPOSITORY, A 30' 
ete ? MARKER ON THE PERIMETER WOULD 
| uh. yy APPEAR THIS SIZE FROM THE CENTER 
rn Ape OF THE AREA. 
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“igure 21. View of a 30' Monolith from the WIPP Buildings. 


Ba Ye, I ie a Seas Ee enee eas, eneo 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
Center for Radiophysics and Space Research AUG 17 8% 


SPACE SCIENCES BUILDING 
Ithaca, New York 14853-6801 


Telephone (607) 255-4971 Laboratory for Planetary Studies 
Fax (607) 255-9888 


8 August 1990 


Dr. D. Richard Anderson 
Performance Assessment 
Division 6342 

Sandia National Laboratories 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 


Dear Dr. Anderson: 


Many thanks for your kind invitation to participate in the 
panel charged with making recommendations on signing to the 
far future about the presence of dangerous long-lived 
radioactive waste repositories (assuming the waste hasn't all 
leached out by then). It is an interesting and important 
problem, and I'm sorry that my schedule will not permit me to 
participate. But I can, in a few sentences, tell you my views 
on the matter; perhaps you would be kind enough to pass them 
on to the members of the panel: 


Several half-lives of the longest-lived radioisotopes in 
question constitute a time period longer than recorded human 
history. No one knows what changes that span of time will 
bring. Social institutions, artistic conventions, written and 
spoken language, scientific knowledge and even the dedication 
to reason and truth might, for all we know, change 
drastically. What we need is a symbol invariant to all those 
possible changes. Moreover, we want a symbol that will be 
understandable not just to the most educated and 
scientifically literate members of the population, but to 
‘anyone who might come upon this repository. There is one such 
symbol. It is tried and true. It has been used 
transculturally for thousands of years, with unmistakable 
meaning. It is the symbol used on the lintels of cannibal 
dwellings, the flags of pirates, the insignia of SS divisions 
and motorcycle gangs, the labels of bottles of poisons -- the 
skull and crossbones. Human skeletal anatomy, we can be 
reasonably sure, will not unrecognizably change in the next 
few tens of thousands of years. You might very well wish also 
to include warnings in major human languages (being careful 
not to exclude Chinese and Arabic), and to attach a 
specification of the radioisotopes in question -- perhaps by 
circling entries in a periodic table with the appropriate 


‘G-88 


Appendix G: Team B Report 


Dr. D. Richard Anderson 
8 August 1990 
page 2 


isotopic atomic numbers emphasized. It might be useful to 
include on the signs their own radioactive markers so that the 
epoch of radioactive waste burial can be calculated (or maybe 
a sequence of drawings of the Big Dipper moving around the 
Pole Star each year so that, through the precession of the 
equinoxes, the epoch of burial, modulo 26,000 years, could be 
specified). But all this presumes much about future 
generations. The key is the skull and crossbones. 


Unless a more powerful and more direct symbol can be 
devised, I think the only reason for not using the skull and 
crossbones is that we believe the current political cost of 
speaking plainly about deadly radioactive waste is worth more 
than the well-being of future generations. 

With best wishes, 

Cordially, 
i <e 


Carl Sagan 


cc: Jon Lomberg 
Ann Druyan 


Appendix G: Team B Report 
REFERENCES 


Brodrick, A.H. 1948. Prehistoric Painting. London, England: 
Avalon Press Ltd. 


Dreyfuss, H. 1972. Symbol Sourcebook: An Authoritative Guide 
to International Graphic Symbols. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 


The Herder Symbol Dictionary. 1986. Wilmette, IL: Chiron 
Publications. 


Johnson, F.C., L.A. Johnson, and G. Dykstra. 1971. Stick Figure 
Drawing For Language Teachers. London, England: Ginn. 


Kidder, J.E. 1981. The Art of Japan. New York, NY: Park Lane. 


Lehner, E. 1950. Symbols, Signs, and Signets. Cleveland, OH: 
World Publishing Co. 


Sagan, C., F.D. Drake, J. Lomberg, L.S. Sagan, A. Druyan, and T. 
Ferris. 19787. Murmurs of Earth: The Voyager Interstellar 
Record. New York, NY: Random House. 


Soisson, P., and J. Soisson. 1978. Life of the Aztecs in 
Ancient Mexico. Barcelona, Spain: Productions Liber. 


G-30 


DISTRIBUTION 
(Send Distribution list changes to M.M. Gruebel, Dept. 6342, Sandia 
National Laboratories, PO Box 5800, Albuquerque, NM 87185-1328) 


Federal Agencies 


US Department of Energy (6) 
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management 
Attn: Deputy Director, RW-2 
Associate Director, RW-10/50 
Office of Program and 
Resources Management 
Office of Contract Business 
Management 
Director, RW-22, Analysis and 
Verification Division 
Associate Director, RW-30 
Office of Systems and 
Compliance 
Associate Director, RW-40 
Office of Storage and 
Transportation 
Director, RW-4/5 
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and International Programs 
Office of External Relations 
Forrestal Building 
Washington, DC 20585 


US Department of Energy 

Albuquerque Operations Office 

Attn: National Atomic Museum Library 
PO Box 5400 

Albuquerque, NM 87185 


US Department of Energy (2) 
Office of Environmental Restoration 
and Waste Management 
Attn: Director, EM-1 
C, Frank, EM-50 
Washington, DC 20585 


US Department of Energy (3) 

Office of Environmental Restoration 
and Waste Management 

Attn: M. Frei, EM-34 / Trevion II 

Director, Waste Management Projects 

Washington, DC 20585-0002 


US Department of Energy 

Office of Environmental Restoration 
and Waste Management 

Attn: J. Lytle, EM-30 / Trevion II 

Washington, DC 20585-0002 


US Department of Energy 
Office of Environmental Restoration 
and Waste Management 
Attn: S. Schneider, EM-342 
Trevion II 
Washington, DC 20585-0002 


US Department of Energy (3) 
WIPP Task Force 
Attn: G.H. Daly 
S. Fucigna 
B. Bower 
12800 Middlebrook Rd., Suite 400 
Germantown, MD 20874 


US Department of Energy (4) 
Office of Environment, Safety and 
Health 

Attn: R.P. Berube, EH-20 

C. Borgstrum, EH-25 

R. Pelletier, EH-231 

K. Taimi, EH-232 
Washington, DC 20585 


US Department of Energy (6) 
WIPP Project Integration Office 
Attn: S. Alcorn 

W.J. Arthur III 

J. Coffey 

L.W. Gage 

P.J. Higgins 

D.A. Olona 
PO Box 5400 
Albuquerque, NM 87115-5400 


US Department of Energy (2) 
WIPP Project Integration Satellite 
Office 
Attn: R. Batra 

R. Becker 
PO Box 3090, Mail Stop 525 
Carlsbad, NM 88221-3090 


US Department of Energy (10) 
WIPP Project Site Office (Carlsbad) 
Attn: A. Hunt (4) 
V. Daub (4) 
J. Lippis 
K. Hunter 
PO Box 3090 
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Attn: Director 

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Attn: Associate Director, RW-20 
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D. Livingston 

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Attn: R. Grandfield 

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Agency (2) 

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ANR-460 

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Attn: C. Byrum, 6T-ET 

1445 Ross Ave. 

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Mail Stop 4-H-3 

Washington, DC 20555 


US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (4) 
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Attn: D. Moeller 

M.J. Steindler 

P.W. Pomeroy 

W.J. Hinze 
7920 Norfolk Ave. 
Bethesda, MD 20814 


Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
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Attn: D. Winters 

625 Indiana Ave. NW 

Suite 700 

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Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board 
Attn: Library (2) 

1100 Wilson Blvd. 

Suite 910 

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State Agencies 


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and Mineral Resources 
Socorro, NM 87801 


New Mexico Energy, Minerals and 
Natural Resources Department 
Attn: Librarian 

2040 South Pacheco 

Santa Fe, NM 87505 


New Mexico Energy, Minerals and 
Natural Resources Department 
New Mexico Radioactive Task Force (2) 
(Governor's WIPP Task Force) 
Attn: A. Lockwood, Chairman 
C. Wentz, Policy Analyst 
2040 South Pacheco 
Santa Fe, NM 87505 


Bob Forrest 

Mayor, City of Carlsbad 
PO Box 1569 

Carlsbad, NM 88221 


Carlsbad Department of Development 
Executive Director 

Attn: C. Bernard 

PO Box 1090 

Carlsbad, NM 88221 


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PO Box 968 

1190 St. Francis Drive 

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New Mexico Environment Department 
Attn: P. McCasland 

WIPP Project Site Office 

PO Box 3090 

Carlsbad, NM 88221-3090 


New Mexico State Engineer's Office 
Attn: M. Chudnoff 

PO Box 25102 

Santa Fe, NM 87504-5102 


Environmental Evaluation Group (5) 
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James E. Martin 
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WIPP Committee, National Research Council’s 
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National Research Council (2) 
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I.B. Alterman 
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Howard Adler 

Oxyrase, Inc. 

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US Geological Survey (M/S 439) 
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University of New Mexico 


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University of Minnesota 

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PLG, Incorporated 

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Leonard F. Konikow 
US Geological Survey 
431 National Center 
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Jeremiah O'Driscoll 
Jody, Incorporated 
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ICF Kaiser Engineers 

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Thomas A. Zordan 
Zordan Associates, Inc. 
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Performance Assessment Peer Review Panel 


G. Ross Heath 

College of Ocean & Fishery Sciences 
University of Washington 

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Seattle, WA 98195 


Thomas H. Pigford 

Department of Nuclear Engineering 
4159 Etcheverry Hall 

University of California 
Berkeley, CA 94720 


Thomas A. Cotton 

JK Research Associates, Inc. 
4429 Butterworth Place NW 
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Robert J. Budnitz 
President, Future Resources 
Associates, Inc. 

2000 Center Street 

Suite 418 

Berkeley, CA 94704 


G. John Mann 

Department of Geology 
245 Natural History Bldg. 
1301 West Green Street 
University of Illinois 
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Frank W. Schwartz 

Department of Geology and Mineralogy 
The Ohio State University 

Scott Hall 

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Columbus, OH 43210 


National Laboratories 


Argonne National Laboratory (2) 
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D. Tomasko 
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MSIN P8-44 
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Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
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PO Box 2008 

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Pacific Northwest Laboratory 
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PO Box 999 

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M.J. Plodinec — 
G.G. Wicks 
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Corporations/Members of the Public 


Battelle Memorial Institute 
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J. Kircher 
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Benchmark Environmental Corp. 


Attn: C. Frederickson 


4501 Indian School NE, Suite 105 


Albuquerque, NM 87110 


Beta Corporation Int. 
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6613 Esther NE 
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City of Albuquerque 
Public Works Department 
Utility Planning Division 
Attn: W.K. Summers 

PO Box 1293 

Albuquerque, NM 87103 


Devel and Associates, Inc. 
Attn: R.W. Prindle 

7208 Jefferson NE 
Albuquerque, NM 87109 


Disposal Safety, Inc. 
Attn: B. Ross 


1660 L Street NW, Suite 314 


Washington, DC 20036 


Ecodynamics (2) 
Attn: P. Roache 

R. Blaine 
PO Box 9229 


Albuquerque, NM 87119-9229 


EG & G Idaho (3) 
1955 Fremont Street 
Attn: CG. Atwood 

C. Hertzler 

T.I. Clements 
Idaho Falls, ID 83415 


Geomatrix 

Attn: K. Coppersmith 

100 Pine St., Suite 1000 
San Francisco, CA 94111 


Golder Associates, Inc. 
Attn: R. Kossik 

4104 148th Avenue NE 
Redmond, WA 98052 


John Hart and Associates, P.A. 


Attn: J.S. Hart 
2815 Candelaria Road NW 
Albuquerque, NM 87107 


Dist-5 


John Hart and Associates, P.A. 
Attn: K. Lickliter 

400-C 8th St. NW 

Tacoma, WA 98439 


INTERA, Inc. 

Attn: A.M. LaVenue 

1650 University Blvd. NE, Suite 300 
Albuquerque, NM 87102 


INTERA, Inc. 

Attn: J.F. Pickens 

6850 Austin Genter Blvd., Suite 300 
Austin, TX 78731 


INTERA, Inc. 

Attn: W. Stensrud 
PO Box 2123 
Carlsbad, NM 88221 


INTERA, Inc. 

Attn: W. Nelson 

101 Convention Center Dr. 
Suite 540 

Las Vegas, NV 89109 


IT Corporation (2) 
Attn: R.F. McKinney 

J. Myers 
Regional Office, Suite 700 
5301 Central Avenue NE 
Albuquerque, NM 87108 


Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 
Attn: J. Long 

Building 50 E 

Berkeley, CA 94720 


MAC Technical Services Co. 
Attn: D.K. Duncan 

8418 Zuni Road SE, Suite 200 
Albuquerque, NM 87108 


Newman and Holtzinger 

Attn: C. Mallon 

1615 L Street NW, Suite 1000 
Washington, DG 20036 


RE/SPEC, Inc. 
Attn: W. Coons 
4775 Indian School NE, Suite 300 
Albuquerque, NM 87110 


(2) 


Dist-6 


RE/SPEC, Inc. 

Attn: J.L. Ratigan 
PO Box 725 

Rapid City, SD 57709 


Reynolds Electric and Engineering 
Company, Inc. ; 
Attn: E.W. Kendall 

Building 790 

Warehouse Row 

PO Box 98521 

Las Vegas, NV 89193-8521 


SAIC 

Attn: H.R. Pratt 

10260 Campus Point Drive 
San Diego, CA 92121 


SAIG 

Attn: C.G. Pflum 

101 Convention Center Dr. 
Las Vegas, NV 89109 


SAIC (3) 
Attn: M. 
R. 


Davis 
Guzowski 

J. Tollison 
2109 Air Park Road SE 
Albuquerque, NM 87106 


SAIC (2) 
Attn: J. Young 
D. Lester 
18706 North Greek Parkway, Suite 110 
Bothell, WA 98011 


Southwest Research Institute 

Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analysis (2) 
Attn: P.K. Nair 

6220 Culebra Road 

San Antonio, TX 78228-0510 


Systems, Science, and Software (2) 
Attn: E. Peterson 
P. Lagus 
Box 1620 : 
La Jolla, CA 92038 


TASC 

Attn: &.G. Oston 

55 Walkers Brook Drive 
Reading, MA 01867 


Tech Reps, Inc. (8) 
Attn: J. Chapman 
Crawford 
Marchand 

. Peterson 
Stikar 

Scott 
Minahan 

. Gilliland 
5000 Marble NE, Suite 222 
Albuquerque, NM 87110 


amRmoanva 


Tolan, Beeson & Associates 
Attn: T.L. Tolan 

2320 W. 15th Avenue 
Kennewick, WA 99337 


TRW Environmental Safety Systems (2) 


Attn: I. Sacks, Suite 800 


L. Wildman, Suite 1300 


2650 Park Tower Drive 
Vienna, VA 22180-7306 


Sanford Cohen and Associates 


Attn: J. Channell 
7101 Carriage Rd NE 
Albuquerque, NM 87109 


Westinghouse Electric Corporation (5) 


Attn: Library 

C. Cox 

L. Fitch 

B.A. Howard 

R.F. Kehrman 
PO Box 2078 
Carlsbad, NM 88221 


Westinghouse Hanford Company 
Attn: D.E. Wood, MSIN HO-32 


PO Box 1970 
Richland, WA 99352 


Western Water Consultants 
Attn: P.A. Rechard 

PO Box 4128 

Laramie, WY 82071 


Western Water Consultants 
Attn: D. Fritz 

1949 Sugarland Drive #134 
Sheridan, WY 82801-5720 


P. Drez 
8816 Cherry Hills Road NE 
Albuquerque, NM 87111 


David Lechel 
9600 Allende Rd. NE 
Albuquerque, NM 87109 


C.A. Marchese 
PO Box 21790 
Albuquerque, NM 87154 


Arend Meijer 
3821 Anderson SE 
Albuquerque, NM 87108 


D.W. Powers 
Star Route Box 87 
Anthony, TX 79821 


Shirley Thieda 
PO Box 2109, RR1 
Bernalillo, NM 87004 


Jack Urich 

c/o CARD 

144 Harvard SE 
Albuquerque, NM 87106 


Universities 


University of California 
Mechanical, Aerospace, and 
Nuclear Engineering Department (2) 
Attn: W. Kastenberg 

D. Browne 
5532 Boelter Hall 
Los Angeles, CA 90024 


University of California 
Engineering and Applied Science 
Attn: D. Okrent 

48-121A Engineering IV 

Los Angeles, CA 90024-1597 


University of California 
Mine Engineering Department 
Rock Mechanics Engineering 
Attn: N. Cook 


Berkeley, CA 94720 


Dist-7 


University of Hawaii at Hilo 
Business Administration 
*Attn: S. Hora 

Hilo, HI 96720-4091 


University of Illinois 
Department of Geology 
Attn: C. Bethke 

1301 W. Green St. 
Urbana, IL 61801 


University of New Mexico 
Geology Department 

Attn: Library 
Albuquerque, NM 87131 


University of New Mexico 
Research Administration 
Attn: H. Schreyer 

102 Scholes Hall 
Albuquerque, NM 87131 


University of Wyoming 
Department of Civil Engineering 
Attn: V.R. Hasfurther 

Laramie, WY 82071 


University of Wyoming 
Department of Geology 
Attn: J.I. Drever 
Laramie, WY 82071 


University of Wyoming 
Department of Mathematics 
Attn: R.E. Ewing 

Laramie, WY 82071 


Libraries 


Thomas Brannigan Library 
Attn: D. Dresp 

106 W. Hadley St. 

Las Cruces, NM 88001 


New Mexico State Library 
Attn: N. McCallan 

325 Don Gaspar 

Santa Fe, NM 87503 


New Mexico Tech 

Martin Speere Memorial Library 
Campus Street 

Socorro, NM 87810 


EES ee ee Ree eens 


BC) a RS ee es 


Dist-8 


New Mexico Junior College 
Pannell Library 

Attn: R. Hill 

Lovington Highway 

Hobbs, NM 88240 


Carlsbad Municipal Library 
WIPP Public Reading Room 
Attn: L. Hubbard 

101 S. Halagueno St. 
Carlsbad, NM 88220 


University of New Mexico 

Zimmerman Library 

Government Publications Department 
Albuquerque, NM 87131 


NEA/Performance Assessment Advisory 
Group (PAAG) 


P. Duerden 

ANSTO 

Lucas Heights Research Laboratories 
Private Mail Bag No. 1 

Menai, NSW 2234 

AUSTRALIA 


Gordon S. Linsley 

Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and 
Waste Management 

International Atomic Energy Agency 
PO Box 100 

A-1400 Vienna, AUSTRIA . 


Nicolo Cadelli 

Commission of European Communities 
200, Rue de la Loi 

B-1049 Brussels, BELGIUM 


R. Heremans 

Organisme Nationale des Déchets 
Radioactifs et des Matiéres Fissiles 
(ONDRAF) 

Place Madou 1, Boitec 24/25 

B-1030 Brussels, BELGIUM 


J. Marivoet 

Centre d’Etudes de 1’Energie 
Nucléaire (CEN/SCK) 
Boeretang 200 

B-2400 Mol, BELGIUM 


P. Conlon 

Waste Management Division 

Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) 
PO Box 1046 

Ottawa, Ontario KIP 559, CANADA 


A.G, Wikjord 

Manager, Environmental and Safety 
Assessment Branch 

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited 
Whiteshell Research Establishment 
Pinawa, Manitoba ROE 1L0, CANADA 


Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) (2) 
Attn: Timo Aikds 
Jukka-Pekka Salo 
Annankatu 42 C 
SF-00100 Helsinki Suomi, FINLAND 


Timo Vieno 
Technical Research Centre of Finland 


(VIT) 
Nuclear Energy Laboratory 
PO Box 208 


SF-02151 Espoo, FINLAND 


Division de la Sécurité et de la 
Protection de 1'Environment (DSPE) 
Commissariat 4 1’Energie Atomique 
Agence Nationale pour la Gestion des 
Déchets Radioactifs (ANDRA) (2) 
Attn: Gérald Ouzounian 

M. Claude Ringeard 
Route du Panorama Robert Schuman 
B. P. No. 38 
F-92266 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex 
FRANCE 


Claudio Pescatore 

Division of Radiation Protection and 
Waste Management 

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 

38, Boulevard Suchet 

F-75016 Paris 

FRANCE 


M. Dominique Greneche 
Commissariat 4 1’Energie Atomique 
IPSN/DAS /SASICC/SAED 

B.P. No. 6 

F-92265 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex 
FRANCE , 


Dist-9 


Robert Fabriol 

Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et 
Miniéres (BRGM) 

B.P. 6009 

45060 Orléans Cedex 2 

FRANCE 


P. Bogorinski 

Gesellschaft fir Reaktorsicherheit 
(GRS) MBH 

Schwertnergasse 1 

D-5000 Kéin 1, GERMANY 


R. Storck 

GSF - Institut fur Tieflagerung 
Theodor-Heuss-Strabe 4 

D-3300 Braunschweig, GERMANY 


Ferrucio Gera 

ISMES S.p.A 

Via del Crociferi 44 
I-00187 Rome, ITALY 


Hiroyuki Umeki 

Isolation System Research Program 
Radioactive Waste Management Project 
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel 
Development Corporation (PNC) 
1-9-13, Akasaka, Minato-ku 

Tokyo 107 

JAPAN 


Ténis Papp 

Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Co. 

Box 5864 

S 102 48 Stockholm 

SWEDEN : 


Conny Hagg 

Swedish Radiation Protection 
Institute (SSI) 

Box 60204 

$-104 01 Stockholm, SWEDEN 


J. Hadermann 

Paul Scherrer Institute 
Waste Management Programme 
CH-5232 Villigen PSI 
SWITZERLAND 


J. Vigfusson 

HSK-Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate 
Federal Office of Energy 

CH-5232 Villigen-HSK 

SWITZERLAND 


D.E. Billington 

Departmental Manager—Assessment 
Studies 

Radwaste Disposal R&D Division 
AEA Decommissioning & Radwaste 
Harwell Laboratory, B60 

Didcot Oxfordshire OX11 ORA 
UNITED KINGDOM 


P. Grimwood 

Waste Management Unit 
BNFL 

Sellafield 

Seascale, Cumbria CA20 1PG 
UNITED KINGDOM 


Alan J. Hooper 

UK Nirex Ltd 

Curie Avenue 

Harwell, Didcot 
Oxfordshire, OX11 ORH 
UNITED KINGDOM 


Jerry M. Boak 

Yucca Mountain Project Office 
US Department of Energy 

PO Box 98608 

Las Vegas, NV 89193 


Seth M. Coplan (Chairman) 

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Division of High-Level Waste 
Management 

Mail Stop 4-H-3 

Washington, DC 20555 


A.E. Van Luik 

INTERA/M&O 

The Valley Bank Center 
101 Convention Center Dr. 


Las Vegas, NV 89109 


NEA/Probabilistic System Assessment 
Group (PSAG) 


Shaheed Hossain 

Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and 
Waste Management 

International Atomic Energy Agency 
Wagramerstrasse 5 

PO Box 100 

A-1400 Vienna, AUSTRIA 


Alexander Nies (PSAC Chairman) 
Gesellschaft ftir Strahlen- und 
Institut flr Tieflagerung 
Abteilung fiir Endlagersicherheit 
Theodor-Heuss-Strasse 4 

D-3300 Braunschweig 

GERMANY 


Eduard Hofer 

Gesellschaft flir Reaktorsicherheit 
(GRS) MBH 

Forschungsgelande 

D-8046 Garching, GERMANY 


Andrea Saltelli 

Commission of the European 
Communities 

Joint Resarch Gentre of Ispra 
I-21020 Ispra (Varese) 

ITALY 


Alejandro Alonso 

Catedra de Tecnologia Nuclear 
E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales 
José Gutiérrez Abascal, 2 

E-28006 Madrid, SPAIN 


ENRESA (2). 
Attn: M. A. Cufiado 

F. J. Elorza 
Calle Emilio Vargas, 7 
E-28043 Madrid, SPAIN 


Pedro Prado 
CIEMAT 
Instituto de Tecnologia Nuclear 


Avenida Complutense, 22 
E-28040 Madrid, SPAIN 


Dist-10 


Nils A. Kjellbert 

Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Company (SKB) 

Box 5864 

§-102 48 Stockholm, SWEDEN 


Bjérn Gronhjort 

Royal Institute of Technology 
Automatic Control 

S-100 44 Stockholm, SWEDEN 


Richard A. Klos 
Paul-Scherrer Institute (PSI) 
CH-5232 Villingen PSI, SWITZERLAND 


Nationale Genossenschaft ftir die 
Lagerung Radioaktiver Abfalle (2) 
Attn: C. McCombie 

F, Van Dorp 
Hardstrasse 73 
CH-5430 Wettingen, SWITZERLAND 


N. A. Chapman 

Intera Information Technologies 
Park View House 

14B Burton Street 

Melton Mowbray 

Leicestershire LE13 1AE 

UNITED KINGDOM 


Daniel A. Galson 
Galson Sciences Ltd. 
35, Market Place 


Oakham 
Leicestershire LE15 6DT 
UNITED KINGDOM 


David P. Hodgkinson 

Intera Information Technologies 
45 Station Road, Chiltern House 
Henley-on-Thames 

Oxfordshire RG9 1AT 

UNITED KINGDOM 


Brian G.J. Thompson 
Department of the Environment: Her 


Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution 


Room A5.33, Romney House 
43 Marsham Street 
London SWIP 2PY, UNITED KINGDOM 


Intera Information Technologies 
Attn: M.J.Apted 

3609 South Wadsworth Blvd. 
Denver, CO 80235 


US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2) 
Attn: R. Codell 
N. Eisenberg 
Mail Stop 4-H-3 
Washington, DC 20555 


Battelle Pacific Northwest 
Laboratories 

Attn: P.W. Eslinger 

MS K2-32 

PO Box 999 

Richland, WA 99352 


Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory 
Analysis (CNWRA) 

Southwest Research Institute 

Attn: B. Sagar 

PO Drawer 28510 

6220 Culebra Road 

San Antonio, TX 78284 


Geostatistics Expert Working Group (GXG) 


Rafael L. Bras 

R.L. Bras Consulting Engineers 
44 Percy Road 

Lexington, MA 02173 


Jesus Carrera 

Universidad Politécnica de Catalufa 
E.T.S.I. Caminos 

Jordi, Girona 31 

E-08034 Barcelona, SPAIN 


Gedeon Dagan 

Department of Fluid Mechanics and 
Heat Transfer 

Tel Aviv University 

PO Box 39040 

Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978 

ISRAEL 


Dist-11 


Ghislain de Marsily (GXG Chairman) 
University Pierre et Marie Curie 
Laboratorie de Geologie Applique 
4, Place Jussieu 

T.26 - 5© etage 

75252 Paris Cedex 05 

FRANCE 


Alain Galli 

Centre de Geostatistique 
Ecole des Mines de Paris 

35 Rue St. Honore 

77035 Fontainebleau, FRANCE 


Christian Ravenne 

Geology and Geochemistry Division 
Institut Francais du Pétrole 
1&4, Av. de Bois-Préau B.P. 311 
92506 Rueil Malmaison Cedex 
FRANCE 


Peter Grindrod 

INTERA Information Technologies Ltd. 
Chiltern House 

45 Station Road 

Henley-on-Thames 

Oxfordshire, RG9 1AT, UNITED KINGDOM 


Alan Gutjahr 

Department of Mathematics 

New Mexico Institute of Mining and 
Technology 

Socorro, NM 87801 


C. Peter Jackson 

Harwell Laboratory 

Theoretical Studies Department 
Radwaste Disposal Division 

Bldg. 424.4 

Oxfordshire Didcot Oxon OX11 ORA 
UNITED KINDGOM 


Rae Mackay 

Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne 
Newcastle Upon Tyne NEl 7RU 
UNITED KINGDOM 


Steve Gorelick 

Department of Applied Earth Sciences 
Stanford University 

Stanford, CA 94305-2225 


Peter Kitanidis 5 
60 Peter Coutts Circle 
Stanford, CA 94305 


Dennis McLaughlin 

Parsons Laboratory 

Room 48-209 

Department of Civil Engineering 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Cambridge, MA 02139 


Shlomo P. Neuman 

College of Engineering and Mines 
Hydrology and Water Resources Dept. 
University of Arizona 

Tucson, AZ 85721 


Yoram Rubin 

Department of Civil Engineering 
University of California 
Berkeley, CA 94720 


Future Societies Expert Panel 


Michael Baram 
Bracken and Baram 
33 Mount Vernon St. 
Bolton, MA 02108 


Wendell Bell 

Department of Sociology 
Yale University 

1965 Yale Station 

New Haven, CIT 06520 


Gregory Benford 

University of California, Irvine 
Department of Physics 

Irvine, CA 92717 


Duane Chapman 

210 Warren Hall 

Department of Agricultural Economics 
Cornell University 

Ithaca, NY 14853-7801 


Bernard L. Cohen 
Department of Physics 
University of Pittsburgh 
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 


Dist-12 


Victor Ferkiss 
23 Sage Brush Circle 
Corrales, NM 87048 


Theodore S. Glickman 
Resources for the Future 
1616 P St., NW 
Washington, DC 20036 


Ted Gordon 

The Futures Group 

80 Glastonbury Blvd. 
Glastonbury, CT 06033 


Craig Kirkwood 


College of Business Administration 


Arizona State University 
Tempe, AZ 85287 


Harry Otway 


Health, Safety, and Envir. Div. 


Mail Stop K-491 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Los Alamos, NM 87545 


Martin J. Pasqualetti 
Department of Geography 
Arizona State University 
Tempe, AZ 85287-3806 


Dan Reicher 

US Department of Energy 
S-1 

1000 Independence Ave, SW 
Washington, DC 20585 


Norman Rosenberg 
Resources for the Future 
1616 P St., NW 
Washington, DC 20036 


Max Singer 

the Potomac Organization, Inc. 
5400 Greystone St. 

Chevy Chase, MD 20815 


Theodore Taylor 

P.O. Box 39 

3383 Weatherby Rd. 

West Clarksville, NY 14786 


Maris Vinovskis 

Institute for Social Research 
Room 4086 

University of Michigan 

426 Thompson St. 

Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045 


Marker Development 
Expert Panel 


Dieter G. Ast 

Department of Materials Science 
Bard Hall 

Cornell University 

Ithaca, NY 14853-1501 


Victor R. Baker 

Department of Geosciences 

Building #77, Gould-Simpson Building 
University of Arizona 

Tucson, AZ 85721 


Michael Brill 
President 

BOSTI 

1479 Hertel Ave. 
Buffalo, NY 14216 


Frank D. Drake 

Board of Studies in Astronomy and 
Astrophysics 

Lick Observatory 

University of California, Santa Cruz 


Santa Cruz, CA 95064 


Ben R. Finney 

University of Hawaii at Manoa 
Department of Anthropology 
Porteus Hall 346, 2424 Maile Way 
Honolulu, HI 96822 


David B. Givens 

American Anthropological Association 
4350 N. Fairfax Drive, Suite 640 
Arlington, VA 22203 


Ward H. Goodenough 
Department of Anthropology 
University of Pennsylvania 
325 University Museum 

33rd and Spruce Streets 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6398 


Dist-13 


Maureen F. Kaplan 

Eastern Research Group, Inc. 
100 Hartwell Avenue 
Lexington, MA 02173 


Jon Lomberg 
P.O. Box 207 
Honaunau, HI 967626 


Louis E. Narens 

Department of Cognitive Sciences 
School of Social Sciences 
University of California, Irvine 
Irvine, CA 92717 


Frederick J. Newmeyer 
Department of Linguistics 
GN-40 

University of Washington 
Seattle, WA 98195 


Woodruff T. Sullivan, III 
Department of Astronomy 
FM-20 

University of Washington 
Seattle, WA 98195 


Wendell S. Williams 

Materials Science and Engineering 
White Building 

Case Western Reserve University 
Cleveland, OH 44106 


Individuals 


Jill Bartel 
6129C Shanda Drive 
Raleigh, NC 27609 


Michael A. Bauser 
Neuman & Holtzinger 
1615 L St, NW 

Suite 1000 
Washington, DCG 20036 


Paul Carroll 
U.S. Congress 
Office of Technology Assessment 


Ocean and Environment Program 
Washington, DC 20510-8025 


Richard Clegg 

British Nuclear Fuels, ple 
Building B433 

Sellafield Seascale Cumbria 
CA20 1PG 

UNITED KINGDOM 


Matthew Coolidge 
499 Embarcadero 
Oakland, CA 94606 


Jeff Davis 

Mother Jones Magazine 
1663 Mission Street 

San Francisco, CA 94103 


Thomas W. Fogwell 

International Technology Corporation 
4585 Pacheco Boulevard 

Martinez, CA 94553 


Don Hancock 

Southwest Research and Information 
Center 

P.O. Box 4524 

Albuquerque, NM 87106 


Randy Hanson 
3620 15th Avenue South 
Minneapolis, MN 55407 


W.C. Kirwin 

Department of Fine Arts 
University of Guelph 
Guelph 

Province of Ontario 
CANADA N1iG 2W1 


Joe Knap 

TRICAN 

347 Greenwich St. 
Brantford, Ontario 
N3P 5T3 

CANADA 


Donald Lipski 


1061 Manhattan Ave. 
Brooklyn, NY 11222 


Dist-14 


Timothy Margulies 
USEPA 

Mid Code 66023 

401 M St., NW 
Washington, D.C. 20460 


Steven R. Mattson 

Science Applications International 
Corporation 

Valley Bank Center 

101 Convention Center Drive 

Las Vegas, NV 89109 


Elizabeth R. Mertz 

The Carnegie Museum of Natural 
History 

Publications 

4400 Forbes Avenue 

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-4080 


Ardyce Milton 

Clark County Nuclear Waste Division 
301 E. Glark Avenue, Suite 570 

Las Vegas, NV 89101 


Homi Minwalla 

Roy T. Weston, Inc. 

955 L’ Enfant Plaza, SW 
Eighth Floor 
Washington, D.C. 20024 


Jim Morris 

Design Department 

SUNY College at Buffalo 
1300 Elmwood Ave. 
Buffalo, NY 14222 


Mike O'Neil 

U.S. Bureau of Land Management 
New Mexico State Office 

1474 Rodeo Road 

Santa Fe, NM 87502 


David Okrent 
439 Veteran Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90024 


Ken Peterson 

Westinghouse Hanford Company 
P.O. Box 1970, H4-14 
Richland, WA 99352 


Catherine Rich 

University of California 
at Los Angeles 

Department of Geography 

405 Hilgard Avenue 

Los Angeles, CA 90024-1524 


Kyle Rogers 

USEPA 

Office of Radiation Programs 
Mail Code ANR-460 

401 M Street, SW 

Washington, DG 20460 


Tim Rohrer 
1350 West Hualapai 
Tucson, AZ 85745 


Patricia Rosati (2) 

St. Martin's Press, Inc. 
Permissions 

175 Fifty Avenue 

New York, NY 10010-7848 


Carl Sagan 

Space Sciences Building 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, NY 14850 


Al Schenker 

Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc. 
2400 Louisiana Blvd., NE 

Building 1, Suite 400 

Albuquerque, NM 87110 


Steve Schwartz 

Military Production Network 
218 D Street, SE 

2nd Floor 

Washington, DC 20003 


Terry Simmons 
403 Flint Street 
Reno, NV 89501 


Rolf $jéblom 

Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate 
Sehlstedtsgatan 11 

Box 27106 

$-102 52 Stockholm 

SWEDEN 


Dist-15 


Gar Smith 
Earth Island Journal 


300 Broadway, Suite 28 
San Francisco, CA 94133-3312 


Chris Solloway 

U.S. EPA 

PM-223 

402 M Street, SW 
Washington, DC 20460 


George Stromeyer 

Ascot Square 1603 

3850 Woodhaven Road 
Philadelphia, PA 19154 


David R. Turner 

Southwest Research Institute 
6220 Culebra Road 

San Antonio, TX 78238-5166 


Joel Weishaus 
2812 Garfield, SE #E 
Albuquerque, NM 87106 


Simon J. Wisbey 

AEA Technology 

B60, Harwell Laboratory 
Didcot 

Oxfordshire OX11 ORA 
UNITED KINGDOM 


Jya-Syin Wu 

38-137 ENG-IV 

University of California at 
Los Angeles 

Los Angeles, CA 90024 


Foreign Addresses 


Studiecentrum Voor Kernenergie 
Centre D’Energie Nucleaire 
Attn: A. Bonne 

SCK/CEN 

Boeretang 200 

B-2400 Mol, BELGIUM 


Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (3) 
Whiteshell Research Establishment 
Attn: M.E. Stevens 

B.W. Goodwin 

D. Wushke 
Pinewa, Manitoba ROE 1LLO, CANADA 


Juhani Vira 

Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) 
Annankatu 42 C 

SF-00100 Helsinki Suomi 
FINLAND 


Jean-Pierre Olivier 

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (2) 
38, Boulevard Suchet 

F-75016 Paris, FRANCE 


D. Alexandre, Deputy Director 
ANDRA 

31 Rue de la Federation 

75015 Paris, FRANCE 


Claude Sombret 
Centre D'Etudes Nucleaires 
De La Vallee Rhone 
CEN/VALRHO 
S.D.H.A. B.P. 171 
30205 Bagnols-Sur-Ceze, FRANCE 


Bundesministerium fur Forschung und 
Technologie 

Postfach 200 706 

5300 Bonn 2, GERMANY 


Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften 
und Rohstoffe 

Attn: M. Langer 

Postfach 510 153 

3000 Hanover 51, GERMANY 


Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit 


(GRS) (2) 
Attn: B. Baltes 
W. Muller 


Schwertnergasse 1 
D-5000 Cologne, GERMANY 


Institut fur Tieflagerung (2) 
Attn: K. Kuhn 
Theodor-Heuss-Strasse 4 
D-3300 Braunschweig, GERMANY 


Physikalisch-Technische 
Bundesanstalt 

Attn: P. Brenneke 

Postfach 33 45 

D-3300 Braunschweig, GERMANY 


Dist-16 


Shingo Tashiro 

Japan Atomic Energy Research 
Institute 

Tokai-Mura, Ibaraki-Ken 
319-11, JAPAN 


Netherlands Energy Research 
Foundation (ECN) 

Attn: L.H. Vons 

3 Westerduinweg 

PO Box 1 

1755 ZG Petten 

THE NETHERLANDS 


Johan Andersson 

Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate 
Statens Karnkraftinspektion (SKI) 
Box 27106 

§-102 52 Stockholm 

SWEDEN 


Fred Karlsson 

Svensk Karnbransleforsorjning AB 
Project KBS 

Box 5864 

$-102 48 Stockholm 

SWEDEN 


Nationale Genossenschaft ftir die 
Lagerung Radioaktiver Abfalle (2) 
Attn: S. Vomvoris 

P. Zuidema 
Hardstrasse 73 
CH-5430 Wettingen 
SWITZERLAND 


AEA Technology 

Attn: J.E. Tinson 

B4244 Harwell Laboratory 
Didcot, Oxfordshire OX11 ORA 
UNITED KINGDOM 


AEA Technology 

Attn: J.H. Rees 

D5W/29 Culham Laboratory 
Abington . 

Oxfordshire OX14 3DB 
UNITED KINGDOM 


AEA Technology 

Attn: W.R. Rodwell 

044/A31 Winfrith Technical Centre 
Dorchester 

Dorset DT2 8DH, UNITED KINGDOM 


# U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1993—573-110/80283 


D.R. Knowles 

British Nuclear Fuels, ple 
Risley, Warrington 
Cheshire WA3 6AS, 1002607 
UNITED KINGDOM 


MS 
0101 


0827 
0827 
0127 
0724 
1324 
1324 
0750 
1320 
1320 
1322 
1322 
1337 
1335 
1335 
1335 
1335 
1335 
1341 
1326 
1326 
1345 


1328 
1328 
1328 
1328 
1341 
1341 
1341 
1341 
1341 
1343 
1330 
0736 
0746 
0746 
0746 
0727 
0718 
0899 
0619 
1119 


Dist-17 


Internal 
Org. 
1 A. Narath 
20 O.E. Jones 
1502 P.J. Homme 
1511 'D.K. Gartling 
4511 D.P. Garber 
6000 D.L. Hartley 
6115 P.B. Davies 
6115 R.L. Beauheim 
6118 H.R. Westrich 
6119 E.D. Gorham 
6119 Staff (14) 
6121 J.R. Tillerson 
6121 Staff (7) 
6300 D.E. Ellis 
6302 L.E. Shephard 
6303 S.Y. Pickering 
6303 W.D. Weart 
6305 S.A. Goldstein 
6305 A.R. Lappin 
6306 A.L. Stevens 
6312 F.W. Bingham 
6313 L.S. Costin 
6331 P.A. Davis 
6341 Sandia WIPP Central Files 

(150) 


6342 D.R. Anderson 

6342 Staff (30) 

6343 V. Harper-Slaboszewicz 

6343 Staff (3) 

6345 R.C. Lincoln 

6345 Staff (9) 

6347 D.R. Schafer 

6348 J.T. Holmes 

6348 Staff (4) 

6351 R.E. Thompson 

6352 S.E. Sharpton 

6400 N.R. Ortiz 

6613 R.M. Cranwell 

6613 R.L. Iman 

6613 CG 

6622 M.S.Y. Chu 

6641 R.E. Luna, Acting 

7141 Technical Library (5) 

7151 Technical Publications 

7613-2 Document Processing for 
DOE/OSTI (10) 

8523-2 Central Technical Files