Digitized by Google Digitized by Google Digitized by Google Digitized by Google /? /ss Digitized by Google 9 PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. Br GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S., AUTHOR OF THE ' HISTORY OF GREECE P.C.L. OXON., AND LL.D. CAMBRIDGE : VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON : MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, AND HON. MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL ACADEMIES OF 8T. PETERSBURG, KnARKOFF, KoNlOSBEKU, MUNICH, AMSTERDAM, BRUSSELS, AND TURIN : HON. SI EMBER OF THE HISTORICAL SOCIETIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, AND OF PHILADELPHIA, U.S. OF AMERICA. KaAAicrTtt yap Sr) tovto kcu Acycrai Kal AcA.c£ctcu, oti to piv uk^cAi/aof koXov , to SI fiXafitpov auTxpov. Plato, Republ. v. 457 B. To /A€V OVV TT€f)LTrbv C^Ol HTL 7TGLVTC9 Ot TOO ^UoKfJUTOlS XoyOl, Kal TO KOfllpOV Kal to Kaivorofjuov, Kal to fyjrrjriKQV' KaXu>s Si Travra iaio<; %aX €7rov. Aristotel. Tolit. ii. 6, 1265 a 10. IN TRpEfi VOLUMES. VOL. L LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1865. The right of TramlcUvm ii rcitrvtd. Digitized by Google LOKDOX : PRINTED ITT W. CLOWM AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, AND CHARIKO CROSS, Digitized by Google PREFACE. The present work is intended as a sequel and supplement to my History of Greece. It describes a portion of Hellenic philosophy: it dwells upon eminent individuals, enquiring, theorising, reasoning, confuting, &c., as contrasted with those collective political and social manifestations which form the matter of history, and which the modem writer gathers from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. Both Sokrates and Plato, indeed, are interesting characters in history as well as in philosophy. Under the former aspect, they were described by me in my former work as copiously as its general purpose would allow. But it is impossible to do justice to either of them — above all, to Plato, with his extreme variet y and abundance — except in a book of which philosophy is the principal subject, and history only the accessory. The names of Plato and Aristotle tower above all others in Grecian philosophy. Many compositions from both have been preserved, though only a small proportion of the total number left by Aristotle. Such preservation must be accounted highly fortunate, when we read in Diogenes Laertius and others, the long list of works on various topics of philosophy, now irrecoverably lost, and known by little except their titles. Respecting a few of them, indeed, we obtain some partial indications from fragmentary extracts and comments of later critics. But none of these once cele- brated philosophers, except Plato and Aristotle, can be fairly appreciated upon evidence furnished by themselves. The a 2 Digitized by Google IV PREFACE. Platonic dialogues, besides the extraordinary genius which they display as compositions, bear thus an increased price (like tho Sibylline books) as the scanty remnants of a lost philosophical literature, once immense and diversified. Under these two points of view, I trust that the copious analysis and commentary bestowed upon them in the present work will not be considered as unnecessarily lengthened. I maintain, full and undiminished, the catalogue of Plato’s works, as it was inherited from antiquity and recognised by all critics Wore the commencement of the present century. Yet since several subsequent critics have contested the canon, and set aside as spurious many of the dialogues contained in it, — I have devoted a chapter to this question, and to the vindication of the views on which I have proceeded. The title of thesis volumes will sufficiently indicate that I intend to describe, as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic philosophy at Athens during the half century immediately following the death of Sokrates in 399 B.c. My first two chapters do indeed furnish a brief sketch of Pre-Sokratic philosophy : but I profess to take my departure from Sokrates himself, and these chapters are inserted mainly in order that the theories by which ho found himself sur- rounded may not be altogether unknown. Both here, and in the sixty-ninth chapter of my History, I have done my best to throw light on the impressive and eccentric personality of Sokrates : a character original and unique, to whose pe- culiar mode of working on other minds I scarcely know a parallel in history. He was the generator, indirectly and through others, of a new and abundant crop of compositions — the “ Sokratic dialogues:” composed by many different authors, among whom Plato stands out as unquestionable coryphicus, yet amidst other names well deserving respectful mention as seconds, companions, or opponents. It is these Sokratic dialogues, and the various compmions of Digitized by GoogI PREFACE. T Sok rates from whom they proceeded, that the present work is intended to exhibit. They form the dramatic manifestation of Hellenic philosophy — as contrasted with the formal and sys- tematising, afterwards prominent in Aristotle. But the dialogue is a process containing commonly a large intermixture, often a preponderance, of the negative vein: which was more abundant and powerful in Sokrates than in any one. In discussing the Platonic dialogues, I have brought this negative vein into the foreground. It reposes upon a view of the function and value of philo- sophy which is less dwelt upon than it ought to be, and for which I hero briefly prepare tho reader. Philosophy is, or aims at becoming, reasoned truth : an aggregate of matters believed or disbelieved after conscious process of examination gone through by the 'mind, and capable of being explained to others : the beliefs being either primary, knowingly assumed as self-evident — or con- clusions resting upon them, after comparison of all relevant reasons favourable and unfavourable. “ Philosopliia ” (in the words of Cicero), “ex rationum collationo consistit.” This is not the form in which beliefs or disbeliefs exist with ordinary minds: there has been no conscious examination — there is no capacity of explaining to others — there is no distinct set- ting out of primary truths assumed — nor have any pains been taken to look out for the relevant reasons on both sides, and weigh them impartially. Yet the beliefs nevertheless exist as established facts, generated by traditional or other au- thority. They are sincere and often earnest, governing men’s declarations and conduct. They represent a cause in which sentence has been pronounced, or a rule made absolute, without having previously heard the pleadings* • Napoleon, qni de temps en temps, au milieu de sa fortune ct do «a puis- sfun'e, songeait a Robespierre et a Kt tristo tin — interrogoait un jour son urclii - chuncclier Cambaecres sur lc neuf Tliermidor. “C’arf un proce$ juge et non plaid?" repondait Cnmba- eores, avec la finesse d*un jurisconsulto courtisan. — (Hippolyte Camot — Notice sur Boriirc, p. 10U ; Paris, 1842.) Digitized by Google VI PREFACE. Now it is the purpose of the philosopher, first to bring this omission of the pleadings into conscious notice — next to discover, evolve, and bring under hearing the matters omitted, as far as they suggest themselves to his individual reason. Ho claims for himself, and he ought to claim for all others alike, the right of calling for proof where others believe without proof — of rejecting the received doctrines, if upon examination the proof given appears to his mind unsound or insufficient — and of enforcing instead of them any others which impress themselves upon his mind as true. But the truth which he tenders for acceptance must of necessity be reasoned truth : supported by proofs, defended by adequate replies against preconsidered objections from others. Only hereby does it properly belong to the history of philosophy : hardly even hereby lia£ any such novelty a chance of being lairly weighed and appreciated. When we thus advert to the vocation of philosophy, we see that (to use the phrase of an acute modem author b) b Professor Ferrier, in Ilia inetnio- tive volume, ‘The Institutes of Meta- physics’ lias Home valuable remarks on the hoojhj and purjtose of Philo- sophy. I transcribe some of them, in abridgment (Sections 1-8; — “A system of phi- losophy is bound by two main re- quisitions: it ought to be true — and it ought to lx- reasoned. Philo- sophy, in its ideal perfection, is a hotly of reasoned truth. Of these obliga- tions, the latter is the more stringeut. It is more prejtor that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true : because, while truth muy perhaps be unattainable by man, to reason is certainly his province and within his jx»wer. ... A system is of the highest value only when it em- | braces both these requisitions — that is, when it is both true, and reasoned. But a system which is reasoned with- | out being true, is always of higher value than a system which is true without being reasoned. The latter , kind of system is of no value: because I philosophy is the attainment of truth ! by the way of reason. That is its de- finition. A system therefore which | reaches the truth but not by the wav j of reason, is not philosophy at all, I and has therefore no scientific worth. ! Again, an unreasoned philosophy, even 1 though true, carries no guarantee of I its truth. It may lx* true, but it can- | not be certain. On the other hand, a system, which is reasoned without being true, bus always some value. It creates reason by exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, though it may fail to reach it.” (Sections 38-41, — “The student will find that the system here sub- mitted to his attention is of a very polemical character. Why ? Because philosophy exists only to correct the inadvertencies of man's ordinary think- ing. She has no other mission to fulfil. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not lx* taught to think aright. If he is already in jiossession of tlio truth, he does not require to be put in possession of it. The occupation of Digitized by Google .PREFACE. vii it is by necessity polemical : the assertion of independent reason by individual reasoners, who dissent from the unrea- soning belief wliich reigns authoritative in the social atmo- sphere around them, and who recognise no correction or refutation except from the counter-reason of others. Wo see besides, that these dissenters from the public will also be, probably, more or less dissenters from each other. The process of philosophy may be differently performed by two enquirers equally free and sincere, even of the same age and country : and it is suro to be differently performed, if they belong to ages and countries widely apart. It is essen- tially relative to the individual reasoning mind, and to the medium by which the reasoner is surrounded. Philosophy herself has every thing to gain by such dissent ; for it is only thereby that the weak and defective points of each point of view are likely to be exposed. If unanimity is not attained, at least each of the dissentients will better under- stand what he rejects as well as what he adopts. Tho number of individual intellects, independent, inqui- sitive, and acute, is always rare everywhere ; but was com- piiratively less rare in these ages of Greece. The first topic, on which such intellects broke loose from the common con- sciousness of the world around them, and struck out new points of view for themselves, was in reference to the Kosmos or philosophy is gone : her office is super- fluous. Therefore philosophy assumes and must assume that man does not naturally think aright , but must be taught to do so : that truth does not come to him Hi>ontaneously, but must be brought to him by his own ex- ertious. If man does not naturally think aright, he must think, we shall not say wrongly (for that implies mal- ice prepense ) but inadvertently : tho native occupant of his mind must be, we shall not say falsehood (for that too implies malice prepense) but error. Tho original dowry then of universal i man is inadvertency and error. This assumption is tho ground and only justification of the existence of philo- sophy. The circumstance that philo- sophy exist a only to put right the oversights of common thinking — ren- ders her polemical not by choice, blit by nocosaity. She is controversial as the very tenure aud condition of her exist- ence : for how can she correct the slipB of common opinion, the oversights of nnturul thinking, except by contro- verting them?” Professor Ferrier deserves high com- mendation for the care taken in this volume to set out clearly Proposition aud Counter-Proposition: the thesis which he impugns, as well as that which he sustains. Digitized by Google ym PREFACE, the Universe. The received belief, of a multitude of unseen divine persons bringing about by volitions all the different phenomena of nature, became unsatisfactory to men like Thales, Anaximander, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Auaxagoras. Each of these volunteers, following his own independent inspirations, struck out a new hypothesis, and endeavoured to commend it to others with more or less of sustaining reason. There appears to have been little of negation or refutation in their procedure. None of them tried to dis- prove the received point of view, or to throw its supporters upon their defence. Each of them unfolded his own hypo- thesis, or his own version of affirmative reasoned truth, for the adoption of those with whom it might find favour. The dialectic age had not yet arrived. When it did arrive, with Sokrates as its principal champion, the topics of philosophy were altered, and its process revolutionised. We have often heard repeated the Ciceronian dictum — that Sokrates brought philosophy down from the heavens to the earth : from the distant, abstruse, and complicated phenomena of the Kosmos — in respect to which he adhered to the vulgar point of view, and even disapproved any enquiries tending to rationalise it — to the familiar business of man, and the common generalities of ethics and politics. But what has been less observed about Sokrates, though not less true, is, that along with this change of topics ho introduced a com- plete revolution in method. He placed the negative in the front of his procedure; giving to it a point, an emphasis, a substantive value, which no one had done before. His peculiar gift was that of cross-examination, or the application of his Elenchus to discriminate pretended from real know- ledge. He found men full of confident beliefs on these ethical and political topics — affirming with words which they had never troubled themselves to define — and persuaded that they required no further teaching: yet at the same time Digitized by GoogI PREFACE. JX unable to give clear or consistent answers to his questions, and shown by this convincing test to be destitute of real knowledge. Declaring this false persuasion of knowledge, or confident unreasoned belief, to be universal, he undertook as the mission of his life to expose it: and he proclaimed that until the mind was disabused thereof and made pain, fully conscious of ignorance, no affirmative reasoned truth could be presented with any chance of success. Such are the peculiar features of the Sokratic dialogue, exemplified in the compositions hero reviewed. I do not mean that Sokrates always talked so ; but that such was tho marked peculiarity which distinguished his talking from that of others. It is philosophy, or reasoned truth, ap- proached in the most polemical manner; operative at first only to discredit the natural, unreasoned intellectual growths of the ordinary mind, and to generate a painful consciousness of ignorance. I say this here, and I shall often say it again throughout these volumes. It is absolutely indispensable to the understanding of the Platonic dialogues ; one half of which must appear unmeaning, unless construed with refer- ence to this separate function and value of negative dialectic. Whether readers may themselves agree in such estimation of negative dialectic, is another question : but they must keep it in mind ns the governing sentiment of Plato during much of his life, and of Sokrates throughout the whole of life: as being moreover one main cause of that antipathy which Sokrates inspired to many respectable Orthodox con- temporaries. I have thought it right to take constant account of this orthodox sentiment among the ordinary public, as the perpetual drag-chain, even when its force is not absolutely repressive, upon free speculation. Proceeding upon this general view, I have interpreted the numerous negative dialogues in Plato as being really nega- tive and nothing beyond. I have not presumed, still less Digitized by Google X PREFACE. tried to divine, an ulterior affirmative beyond what the text reveals — neither arcana cozhstia, like Proklus and Ficinus,0 nor any other arcanum of terrestrial character. While giving such an analysis of each dialogue as my space permitted and as w'ill enable the reader to comprehend its general scope and peculiarities — I have studied each as it stands written, and have rarely ascribed to Plato any purpose exceeding what he himself intimates. Where I find difficulties forcibly dwelt upon without any solution, I imagine, not that he had a good solution kept back in his closet, but that ho had failed in finding one: that he thought it useful, as a portion of the total process necessary for finding and authenticating reasoned truth, both to work out these unsolved difficulties for himself, and to force them impressively upon the attention of otkere.d Moreover, I deal with each dialogue as a separate compo- sition. Each represents the intellectual scope and impulse of a peculiar moment, which may or may not be in harmony with the rest. Pluto would have protested not less earnestly e F. A. Wolf, Vorredo, Pluto, Syin- i pos. p. vi. ** Ficinus suohte, wie er sich in der | Zueignuugsschrift seiner Version a us- ] driickt, ini Platon allcntlialbcu arcana I codertia: und da er sie in scinern Kopfo mitbruchte, so konnte es ihm nient Bauer werden, etwas zu finden, ! was freilich iedem andern verborgeu bleibeu muss. d A striking passage from Bentham illustrates very well both the Sokr&tic und the Platonic point of vit*w. (Prin- ciples of Morula aud Legislation, vol. ii. ch. xvi. p. 57, ed. 1823.) “Gross ignorance descries no diffi- culties. Im|X"rfect knowledge finds i them out and struggles with tliem. It must be perfect knowledge that over- comes them.” Of the three different mental con- ditions here described, the first is that against which Sokrates mude war, i. e. real ignorance, and false persuAaion of knowledge, which therefore descries no difficulties. The second, or imperfect knowledge struggling with difficulties, is repre- sented by the Platonic negative dia- logues. The third — or perfoct knowledge victorious over difficulties — will bo found in the following pages marked by the character rb bwaadai A 6yov tiibbvai Kod You do not pos- sess “perfect knowledge,*’ until you are able to answer, with unfaltering promptitude and consistency, all the questions of a Sokrutic cross-examiner — an XV CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER I. — ami! mud. I’uge Pag* Pnrmenidean phenomenology — relative and variable 23 of the elements— astronomy and meteorology 41 Pnrmenides recognises no truth, Formation of the Earth, of Gods, but more or less of probability, in men, animals, and plants .. .. 43 phenomenal explanations. — Hi9 Physiology of Empedokles — Pro- physical and astronomical con- creation — Respiration — move- lectures 25 ment of the blood 45 Ilerakleitus — his obscure style, im- pressive metaphors, confident and contemptuous dogmatism 27 Doctrine of ilerakleitus — perpet- Doctrine of effluvia and pores — explanation of perceptions — in- tercommunication of the ele- ments with the sentient subject —like uetiug upon like 77 rr 46 destruction — everything flows, Sense of vision 47 nothing stands — transition of the elements into each other back- wards and forwards 28 Variety of metaphors employed by Hcrakleitus, signifying the same Senses of hearing, smell, taste . . *6. Empcdoklcs declared that justice absolutely forbade the killing of anything that had life. His be- lief in the metempsychosis. Suf- (tencral doctrine 29 IVrings of life, are an expiation Nothing permanent except the law for w rong done during an ante- of process and implication of cedent life. Pretensions to contraries — the transmutntive magical power 48 force. Fixity of particulars is Complaint of Emi pedoklea on the an illusion for the most part : so impossibility of 1 finding out truth 49 far as it exists it in a sin ngninst Theory of Anaxagoras— denied gc- the order of Nature 30 Deration and destruction— recog- Illustrations by which Ilerakleitus nises only mixture and severance symbolized his perpetual force. of pre-existing kinds of mntter 50 destroying and generating .. 31 Water— intermediate between Fire (Air) and Earth 32 Sun and Stars — not solid bodies, but meteoric aggregations dissi- pated and renewed — Kclipses— ^KTiypaxm, or destruction of the Kosmos by fire 33 His doctrines respecting the human Horn ceom erics — small particles of diverse kindsof matter, all mixed together ib. First condition of things— all the primordial varieties of matter were huddled together in con- fusion. NoOr or reason distinct from all of them, supervened and acted upon this confused mass. soul and human knowledge. All setting the constituent particles wisdom resided in the Universal in movement 51 Reason — individual Reason is worthless 35 By Universal Reason, he did not mean the Reason of most men as it Is, but ns it ought to be.. .. 37 Ilerakleitus at the opposite pole from Parmenides 38 Empedoklcs— his doctrine of the four elements and two moving or restraining forces 39 Construction of the Kosmos from Movement of rotation in the mass, originated by Nous on a small scale, but gradually extending itself. Like particles congregate together— distinguishable aggre- gates arc formed 52 Nothing (except Noes) can be en- tirely pure or unmixed ; but other things may be compara- tively pure. Flesh, Bone, &c. are purer than Air or Earth .. 53 these elements and forces — Theory of Anaxagoras, compared action and counteraction of love with that of Empedoklcs, .. .. 54 and enmity. The Kosmos alter- nately made and unmade . . . . 40 Suggested partly by the phenomena of animal nutrition 55 F.mpcdoklcan predestined cycle of Chaos common to both Empcdo- things — complete empire ot Love kies and Anaxagoras : moving — Sphoerus— Empire of Enmity — disengagement or separation agency, different in one from the other theory 56 Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME T. XVII * CHAPTER I.— continued. Sous, or mind, postulated by Anaxagoras — how understood by later writers — how intended by Anaxagoras himself .. .. 56 Plato apd Aristotle blame Anax- agoras for deserting his own theory 58 Astronomy and physics of Anaxa- goras 59 His geology, meteorology, physio- logy 60 The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and impious 62 Diogenes of Apollouia recognises one primordial element ib, Air was the primordial, universal element ^ ^ ^ ^ 63 Air possessed numerous and di» verse properties; was eminently modifiable . . u u M Physiology of Diogenes — his de- human body .. .. fiii Kosmology and Meteorology .. fill l.eukippus and Pemokritus — Atomic theory £8 Long life, varied travels, and nu- kriliia. u ~ u ~ iL Relation between the theory of Pemokritus and that of Par- menides ^ 69 Dcmokritean theory — Atoms — Plena and Vacua —Eds and Non* Km 70 Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, position, and arrangement — they had no qua- lities, but their movements and combinations generated qualities 22 Combinations of atoms — generat- ing different qualities in the compound 73 "All atoms essentially separate from each other Z. II “ 1A Page All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, were phe- observer. Sensation could give no knowledge of the real and 21 Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little of it was attainable No separate force required to set the 75 atoms in motion — they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms naturally tend towards like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the Kosmos Tfi zoology and animal generation T8 it with heat or fire, diffused throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental par- ticles intermingled throughout all frame with corporeal par- ib. Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body .. 12 Explanation of different sensations and perceptions. Colours Vision caused by the outflow* of 82 etlluvia or images from objects. Hearing SI Difference of tastes — how explained 82 Thought or intelligence — was pro- duced by influx of atoms from S3 Sensation, obscure knowledge rcla- tive to the sentient : Thought, genuine knowledge— absolute, or object per se SI Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which determined the tone of thoughts, feelings. dreams, divinations, &c S5 Universality of Demokritus — his ethical views ik CHAPTER II GENERAL TtEMARKS ON TH EaRI.IER PHILOSOPHERS — GROWTH OF Dialectic — Zeno and Goroiar. Variety of sects and theories — multiplicity of individual autho- rities is the characteristic of Creek philosophy 82 These early theorists are not known from their own writings, VOL, 1. which have been lost. Import- ance of the Information of Aristotle about them ^ 88 Abundance of speculative genius ami invention — a memorable fact in the Hellenic mind . . . . . 89 b Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. xviii CHAPTER II. — continued. I*»ge Difficulties which a Grecian philo- sopher had to overcome — preva- lent view of Nature, established, impressive, and misleading .. 89 Views of the Ionic philosophers — compared with the more recent Abstractions of Plato and Ari- stotle ^ ^ 90 Parmenides and Pythagoras- more Advantage derived from this va- riety of constructive imagination among the Greeks .. .. .. <6. All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, Zeno, Plato, and the dialecticians. Im- portance of the scrutiny of negative Dialectic 94 The early theorists were studied. in the third and second centuries b.c 96 Negative attribute common to all the early theorists— little or no dialectic. ib. Zeno of Klea — Meliaaua ib. Zeno’s Dialectic— he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, by showing that their assumptions led to contradictions and ab- surdities . ill Consequences of their assumption nf Kntia Plum Diacontinua. Keductiones ad absurdum .. 98 Each thing must exist in its own l*agc place — Grain of millet not so- norous ,, u ^ ^ 99 Zenonian arguments in regard to motion . . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ loo General purpose and result of the Zenonian Dialectic. Nothing is knowablc except the relative .. 102 Mistake of supposing Zeno’s redtto tionrn ad absurdum of an op- ponent’s doctrine, to be contra- dictions of data generalized from experience 103 Zenonian Dialectic— Platonic Par- menides ^ ^ ~ ~ 104 Views of historians of philosophy, respecting Zeno iL Absolute and relative — the first, unknowable 105 Zeno did not deny motion, as a fact, phenomenal and relative .. 106 Gorgias the Leontine — did not admit the Absolute, even as con- ceived by Parmenides .. .. 107 His reasonings against the Abso- lute, either as Eng or F.ntia .. £L Kns, incogi table ami unknowable 108 Kns. even if granted to bo know- ablc, is still incommunicable to others 16. Zeno and Gorgias — contrasted with the earlier Grecian philosophers 199 New character of Grecian philo- sophy-antithesis of affirmative and negative — proof and dis- proof .. .. ik. CHAPTER HI I.IFR OF Pl.ATO. Scanty information about Plato’s life 113 His birth, parentage, and early education 114 Early relations of Plato with So- krates 115 Plato’s youth— service as a citizen nnd sol lier 117 Period of political ambition .. .. 118 He becomes disgusted with politics 1 19 He retires from Athens after the death of Sokrates — his travels 120 His permanent establishment at Athens — 386 b.c 121 He commences his teaching at the Acodemy . . 122 Plato as a teacher— pupils n timer- cities 12.1 J Visit of Plato to the younger titying failure 1 ‘ib Expedition of Dion against Piony- the Academy 127 Success, misconduct, and death of Dion ! Death of Plato, aged 80, 347 B.C. ib. Scholars of IMato— Aristntle !. 128 Little known about Plato’s personal 1 history 130 Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. xix CHATTER IV. Platonic Canon, as recognised by Thrasyllus. I*age Platonic Canon — Ancient and modern discussions 152 Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its favour .. 133 Athens — founded by Plato and transmitted to successors .. H ib. Importance of this foundation. Preservation of Plato’s manu- scripts. School library .. 131 Security provided by the school for distinguishing what were Plato’s genuine writings .. .. 13fi Unfinished fragments and prepara- tory sketches, preserved and published after Plato's death .. ib. Peripatetic school at the Lykeum — its composition and arrange- ment 13? Peripatetic school library, its re- moval from Athens to Sk£psis — its ultimate restitution in a damaged state to Athens, then to Home 138 Inconvenience to the Peripatetic school from the loss of its library 130 Advantage to the Platonic school from having preserved its MSS. 140 Conditions favourable, for preserv- ing the genuine works of Plato 141 Historical facts as to their preser- vation iL Arrangement of them into Tri- logies, by Aristophanes ib. Aristophanes, librarian at the Alexandrine library 1 42 Plato's works in the Alexandrine library, before the time of Ari- stophanes ib. Kailimachus —predecessor of Ari- stophanes — his published Tables of authors whose works were in the library . . .. .. . . 143 Large and rapid accumulation of the Alexandrine Library .. . ■ 144 Plato's works — in the library at the time of Kailimachus .. i*6. First formation of the library- — intended as a copy of the Pla- tonic anti Aristotelian Moi/gtlfl at Athens . . 14G Favour of Ptolemy Soter towards the philosophers at Athens .. 147 Demetrius Phalereus his history and character u 148 He was chief agent in the first establishment of the Alexandrine Library 149 I’age Proceedings of Demetrius in be- ginning to collect the library .. 150 Certainty that the works of Plato and Aristotle were among the earliest acquisitions made by him for the library 131 Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring good MSS Catalogue of Platonic works, pre- 1 j4 . pared by Aristophanes, is trust- worthy .. . the Platonic dialogues, when arranged by Aristophanes Other librariesand literary centres. 155 besides Alexandria, in which spurious Platonic works might get footing ib. Other crit ics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different arrangements of the Platonic dialogues .. 156 Pamctius, the Stoic — considered the Phiedon to be spurious — earliest known example of a Platonic dialogue disallowed up- on internal grounds 157 Classification of Platonic works by the rhetor Thrasyllus— dramatic — ydiilosophical 158 Dramatic principle —Tetralogies . . ib. Philosophical principle Dialogues of Search — Dialogues of Expo- si Lion - ~ ^ 160 Incongruity and repugnance of the two classifications ^ ^ ^ 163 Dramatic principle of classification — was inherited by Thrasyllus from Aristophanes 164 Authority of the Alexundrine li- brary-editions of Plato pub- lishetl. with the Alexandrine critical marks u u u >7'. Thrasyllus followed the Alexan- as to genuine Platonic works .. 163 Ten spurious dialogues, rejected by all other critics as well ns by Thrasyllus — evidence that these critics followed the common authority of the Alexandrine library 166 Thrasyllus did not follow an in- ternal sentiment of his own in rejecting dialogues as spurious 167 Results as to the trustworthinesTof the Thrasyllenn Canon .. . . Ifi8 l> 2 Digitized by Google XX CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER V. I'l.ATnvif Caxox as Appreciated and Modified by Modern Unifies. Taco The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally acknowledged, by the Nco-Platonists, as well as by Eicinus and the succeeding criticsaftcr the revival of learning 170 Serranus — his six Syzygics — left the aggregate Canon unchanged. Tennemann — importance as- signed to the Phredrus .. 171 Schleiermachcr -new theory about the purposes of Plato. One phi- losophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the beginning — es- sential order and interdepend- ence of the dialogues, as contri- buting to the full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not constituent items in the scries, but lying alongside of it. Order of arrangement .. .. 172 Theory of Ast — he denies the reality of any preconceived scheme— considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas 173 His order of arrangement. He admit? only fourteen dialogues as genuine, rejecting all the rest 175 Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme — his ar- rangement of the dialogues, dif- fering from both Ast and Schleiermachcr — he rejects as spurious Parmenides, Sophist es, Politilcus, Kritias, with many others * ib. Schleicrmacher and Ast both con- sider Phsedrus and Protagoras os early compositions — Socher puts Protagoras into the second period, Phnedrus into the third 176 K. F. Hermann — Stallbaum— both of them consider the Phtedrug as a late dialogue — both of them deny preconceived order and system — their arrangements of the dialogues — they admit new and varying philosophical points of view ib. They reject several dialogues . . 179 Steinhart — agrees in rejecting Sdilcicrmacher’a fundamental postulate — his arrangement of the dialogues — considers the Phasdrus ns late in order— re- jects several .. .. .. .. ft. Susemihl — coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hcrmnnn — his order of arrangement . . 180 Edward Munk— adopts a differ- ent principle of arrangement, founded upon the different pe- riod which each dialogue exhi- bits of the life, philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates — his arrangement, founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of com- position from the place allotted to each dialogue in the syste- matic plan 181 Views of Ueberweg — attempt to reconcile Schleiermachcr and Hermann — ndmits the precon- ceived purpose for the later dialogues, composed after the foundation of the school, but not fpr the curlier ,, ■■ ~77 182 His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the dialogues. He rejects Hippias Major, Krastae, Theages, Kleitophon, Parmenides : he is inclined to reject Euthyphron and Mcnex- enus 184 Other Platonic critics — great dis- sensions about scheme and order of the dialogues 185 Contrast of different points of view instructive— but no solution has been obtained 186 The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of the theory propounded by Schleiermachcr — slenderness of his proofs .. .. ib. Schleiernmchcr’s hypothesis in- cludes a preconceived scheme, and a peremptory order of in- terdependence among the dia- logues .. .. .. 187 Assumptions of Schleiermachcr re- suming the Phoedrus inadmis- sible IKS Neither Schleiermachcr, nor an}’ other critic, has as yet produced nal theory of the Platonic dia- logues .... . . . . . . ~ 180 Muiik’s theory is the most ambi- tious, and the most gratuitous, »ext to tklileiermachor’s .. .. 1110 Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. xxi CHAPTER V. — continued . P*KC The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a circumstance of little moment 190 No intentional sequence or inter- dependence of the dialogues can be made out .. 191 T>y7I ermann i9 reasonable suc- cessive changes in Plato's point of view : but we cannot explain either the order or the cauacaS these changes 192 Hermann’s view more tenable than Scbleiermacher's 193 Small number of certainties, or even reasonable presumptions, as to date or order of the dialogues 194 Trilogies indicated by Plato him- flelf .. 195 Positive dates of all the dialogues — unknown .. 196 When did Plato begin to compose ? Not till after the death of Sokrates . ib. Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition — does not consist with youth of the author 197 Reasons founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his relations with Plato .. “ Ti ~ TT 199 Reasons, founded on the early ftge life, character, and position of 200 Plato’s early life— active by neces* sity, and to some extent ambi- tiOLLS „ „ „ „ „ 21il Plato did not retire from political life until after the restoration of the democracy, nor devote him- self to philosophy until after the death of Sokrates 204 All Plato's dialogues were com- posed during the fifty-one years after the death of Sokrates .. 205 The Thrasyllean Canon is more worthy of trust than the modern critical theories by which it has been condemned 206 Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed ib. Opinions of Schleiermacher, tend- ing to show this 207 Any true theory of Plato must rccogniso all his varieties, and must be based upon all the w’orks in the Canon, not upon some to the exclusion of the reBt 210 CHAPTER VI. Platonic Compositions generally. Variety and abundance visible in Plato’s writings 212 Plato both sceptical and dog- matical ib. Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in all .. 213 Form of dialogue — universal to this extent, that Plato never speaks in his own name .. .. 214 No one common characteristic per- vading all Plato’s works .. .. ib. The real Plato was not merely a writer of dialogues, but also lec- turer and president of a school. In this last important function he is scarcely at all known to us. Notes of his lectures taken by Aristotle 216 Plato’s lectures De Bono ob- scure and transcendental. F.ffect which they produced on the auditors 218 They were delivered U> miscellane- ous auditors. They coincide mainly with what Aristotle states about the Platonic Ideas 218 The lectures Dc Bono may perhaps have been more transcendental than Plato’s other lectures .. 219 I Plato’s F.pistles — in them only he speaks in his own person .. .. 220 Intentional obscurity of his F.pistles in reference to philoso- phical doctrine 221 Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. llis anxiety to confine philosophy to discus- sion among select and prepared minds 222 He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative exposition of his own philosophical doctrine .. 223 He illustrates his doctrine by the successive stages of geometrical Digitized by Google XXII CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER VI. — continued . teaching. Difficulty to avoid the creeping in of error at each of these 9tages 224 No written exposition can keep clear of those chances of error 226 Relations of I*lato with Dionysius II. nud the friends of the deceased Dion. Pretensions of Diony- sius to understand and expound Plato's doctrines ib. ten exposition assumed by Plato ; the assumption intellU gible in his day . . .. . ■ ■■ 222 Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the expository process. — Power of sustaining a Sokratic cross-examination ^ ^ 2211 Plato never published any of the ki-tiirefl which lie delivered at the Academy . . . . . . . . 230 Plato would never publish his phi- losophical opinions in his own name ; but he may have pub- lished them in the dialogues under the names of others .. ib. Croups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown .. .. 232 Distribution made by Thrnsyllus defective, but still useful— Dia- logues of Search, Dialogues of Exposition ib. Dialogues of Exposition— present affirmative result. Dialogues of Search are wanting in that attri- butc .. », 233 The distribution, coincides mainly with that of Aristotle —Dialec- tic, Demonstrative ib. Classification of Thrasyllus in its details. lie applies his own principles erroneously .. . ■ 234 The classification as it would stand, if his principles were ap- plied correctly 236 Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over the expository and dogmatical .. ib. Dialogues of Search — sub-clusses among them recognised by Thra- syllus—Gymnastic and Agonis- tic, &c 16. Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative teaching, positive results, direct proofs .. 237 The Platonic Dialogues of Senrch disclaim authority uud teaching — ussunic truth to be unknown Page to all alike — follow a process devious as well as fruitless .. 237 The questioner has no predeter- mined course, hut follows the lead given by the respondent in his answers 238 Relation of teacher and learner. Appeal to authority is sup- pressed 233 In the modern world the search for truth is put out of sight. Every writer or talker processes to have already found it, and to proclaim it to others .. .. .. 240 The search for truth by various interlocutors was a recognised process in the Sokratie ageT Acute negative Dialectic of Sokrates 241 Negative procedure supposed to be represented by the Sophists and the Megarici ; discouraged and censured by historians of philosophy . . .. 242 ! Vocation of imkrates and Plato for ! the negative procedure: absolute necessity of it as a condition of reasoned truth, Parmcnidfo of Plato 243 Sokrates considered the negative procedure to be valuable by it- self, and separately. II is theory of the natural state of the human mind ; not ignorance, but false persuasion of knowledge .. . . 244 Declaration of frokratea m the Apology ; liis constant mission to make Mar against the false persuasion of knowledge .. ♦ . 245 I Opposition of feeling between So- krates and the Dikasts .. .. 246 The Dialogues of Search present an end in themselves. Mistake of supposing that Plato had in his wind on ulterior afflrmativo end, not declared ib. False persuasion of knowledge — had reference to topics social, political, ethical To those topics, on which each 247 community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs, senti- ments, consecrated and tradi- tional, peculiar to itself. The local creed, which is never for- mally proclaimed or taught, but is culorced unconsciously by every one upon every one else. Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME 1. win CHAPTER VI. — continued. I’age Omnipotence of King Nomos .. 248 Small minority of exceptional indi- to the established orthodoxy, but insist on exorcising their own judgment .. .. .. . ■ .. 253 Early appearance of a few free- judging individuals, or free* thinkers in Greece 255 Rise of Dialectic — Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery .. . . 256 Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social topics by Solera teg ^ !=_= ^ ^ the right of satisfaction for his own individual reason 25? Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure of Sokrates. Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure be- longs peculiarly to the Sophists and the Megarici .. .. 2&8 The same charges w hich the histo^ rians of philosophy bring against the Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates. They represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual with an orthodox public.. 259 Aversion towards Sokrates aggra- vated by his extreme publicity of speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of know^ ledge is universal ; must be understood as a basis in appre- ciating Plato’s Dialogues of Search 264 Result called KnoicU'due% which Plato aspires to. Power of go- ing through a Sokratic cross- examination ; not attainable cx- cept through the Platonic process and method 2G7 Platonic process adapted to Pla- tonic topics — man and society 269 Plato docs not provide solutions for the difficulties which he has raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him com- pletely distinct. His dogmas arc enunciations h priori of some impressive sentiment Hypothesis — that Plato had solved all his own difficulties for him- self; but that he communicated the solution only to a few select auditors in oral lectures— U nten- able Characteristic of the oral lectures — That they were delivered in Plato’s own name. in what other respects they departed from the dialogues, we cannot say Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the process of search and debate per se. Pro- tracted enquiry is a valuable privilege, not a tiresome obliga- tion Plato has done more than any one else to make the process of en- quiry interesting to others, os it was to himself Process of generalisation always kept in view and illustrated throughout the Platonic Dia- logues of Search— general terms and propositions made subjects of conscious analysis The Dialogues must be reviewed as Distinct compositions by the same author, illustrating each other, but without assignable inter-dependence Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under sepurate review. Apology will come first ; Titnxus, Kritias, Leges, Epinomis, last Kriton ami Kuthyphron come im- mediately after Apology. The intermediate dialogues present no convincing grounds for any determiuate order 1‘age 270 272 273 274 276 277 278 279 »6. CHAPTER YIL Apology ok The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates before the Dikaats, reported by Plato, with- Quiiutentional transformation.. 281 Sokrates. Even if it be Plato’s own composi- tion, it comes naturally first in the review of his dialogues . • 282 General character of the Apo- Digitized by Google XXIV CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER VII. — continued. I 'age logy — Sentiments entertained towards Sokratcs at Athens .. 283 Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom of Sokratcs, interpreted bv him as a mission to croga-csaniinc the citizens generally— The oracle is proved to be true 284 False persuasion of wisdom is uni- versal— the God alone is wise .. 285 Emphatic assertion by Sokratcs of the cross-examining mission im- posed upon him by the God .. 286 lie had devoted his life to the exe- cution of this mission, and he intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger .. •• .. 287 He disclaims the function of a teacher — he cannot teach, for he is not wiser than others. He differs from others by being con- scious of his own ignorance .. 288 He does not know where competent teachers can be found. He is perpetually seeking for them, but in vain ib. Impression made by the Platonic Apology on Zeno the Stoic .. 289 Extent of efficacious influence claimed by Sokratcs for himself — exemplified by Plato through- out the Dialogues of Search — Xenophon and Plato enlarge it . . 290 Assumption by modern critics, that Sokratcs is a positive | teacher, employing indirect i methods for the inculcation o? theories of his own ^ ^ 291 Incorrectness of such assumption , — the Sokratic Elenchus does not furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the respond- ent, stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own 292 Value and importance of this process — stimulating active in- dividual minds to theorise each for itself 293 View taken by Sokratcs about death. Other men profess to kuow what it is, and think it a great misfortune : he does not know ib. ! Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether agrec- . ing or disagreeing with others . . 295 Formidable efficacy of established public beliefs, generated without any ostensible author .. .. ib. Kiiiton General purpose of the Kriton . . 297 by the Laws of Athens to So- Subject of the dialogue — inter- krates, demanding from him locutors . . . . . . .. ~ W. implicit obedience 300 Answer of Sokrates to the appeal mode by Kriton 298 He declares that the judgment of Purpose of Plato in this pleading — to present the dispositions of Sokrates in a light different from the general public is not worthy that which the Apology had pre- of trust: he appeals to thejudg- sented — unqualified submission mont of the one Expert, who is instead of defiance 301 wise on the matter in debate .. 298 Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the question with Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust ? Never in any case to act unjustly 299 Sokrates admits that few will agree Harangue of Sokrates, delivered in the name of the Laws, W’ould have been applauded by all the democratical patriots of Athens 302 The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with other citizens, overlooking the spe- with him, and that most persons cialties of his character .. .. 303 hold the opposite opinion : but Still Sokrates is represented as he affirms that the poiut is car- adopting the resolution to obev. dinal 77 77 . . . . 77 77 W. Pleading supposed to be addressed from his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. xxv CHAPTER VIII. — continued. Page but which would not weigh with others .. ^ !_s j t 3M Tbe harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, but represents feelings common among Athenian citizens .. .. ib. Emphatic declaration of the au- thority of individual reason and conscience, for the individual hirpgelf ^ ^ ~ ^ ib. The Kriton is rhetorical, not di&- bictkaL Difference betwecu Rhetoric and Dialectic . . . . 305 The Kriton makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but overlooks the ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be solved . , 30G Incompetence of the general public or ibiunai — appeal to the profes- sional Expert 307 Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been declared — hfi-dac.s not name who the trust- worthy Expert is .♦ .. .. 308 Sokrates acts as the Expert him- self: he finds authority in his q» o reftsoa and conacknct? . . ib. CHAPTER IX. Eutiiyphrok. Situation supposed in the dialogue — interlocutors 310 Indictment by Melfttus against Sp- it rates — Antipathy of the Athe- nians towards those who spread heretical opinions »6. Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment for murder against his own father^ Displeasure of his friends at the proceeding 311 Euthyphron expresses full confi- deuce that this step of his is both required anti warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks him — what is Holiness? .. .. 312 Euthyphron alludes to the puni9h- ment of Uranus by his sou Kronus, and of Kronus by his son Zeus 313 Sokrates intimates his own hesita- tion in believing these stories of discord among the Gods. Eu- thyphron declares his full belief in them, as well as in many si- milar narratives, not in so much circulation .,313 Bearing of this dialogue on the re- lative positions of Sokrates and the Athenian public . . . . . ■ 314 Dramatic moral set forth by ArT- stophanes against Sokrates and the freethinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox champion . . .. Sequel of the dialogue — Euthy- phron gives n particular example as the reply to a general question 311 Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion 317 First general answer given by Eu- thyphron— that which is pleas- ing to the Gods is Holy. Com- ments of Sokrates thereon .. 318 To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the Holy — they love it because it is holy. In what then does its essence gopgisL? Perplexity of Euthyphron .. 3 H) Sokrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or va- riety of the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministra- tion by men to the Gods . . . . 320 Ministration to the Gods ? How ? To what purpose ? . . . . . . ib. Hglinesg — rectitude in sacrifice and prayer — right traffic between men and the Gods 321 This will not stand — the Gods gain nothing — they receive from men marks of honour and gratitude — they are pleased therewith — the Holy therefore must be that which is pleasing to the Gods .. 77 77 77 ^77 77 322 This is the 9ame explanation which was before declared insufficient. A fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He breaks off the dialogue ib. Sokratic spirit of the dialogue — confessed ignorance applying the Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge ib. Digitized by Google XXVI CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER IX. — continued. Page The questions always difficult, often impossible to answer. Sokrates is unable to answer them, though he exposes the ba*l answers of others .. .. 322 Objections of Theopompus to the Platonic procedure .324 Objective view of Ethics, distin- guished by Sokrates from the subjective ih. Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent 325 Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental condi- tion by gokrates — position of Sokrates and Plato in regard ^ 326 The Holy — it has an essential cha- racteristic—hat is this ? — not the foct that it is loved by the Gods— this is true, but is not its constituent essence 327 Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the Holy different from those of the Platonic So- krntes—he disallows any common absolute genera) type of the Holy —he recognises an indefinite variety of types, discordant and relative 328 The Holy a branch of the Just — not tenable os a definition, but useful as bringing to view the subordination of logical terms 329 The Euthyphron represents Plato’s way of replying to the charge of impiety, preferred by Melctus against Sokrates — comparisoli with Xenophon’s way of reply- ing ib. CHAPTER X, AUUlilAPF.S I. AND II. Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons — Sokrates and Alki- biadcs — 331 Exorbitant hopes and political am- bition of Alkibiades 332 Questions put by Sokrates, in re- ference to Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of tlic Athenians, Whftt Up eg hg intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he know ^ ib. Alkibiadt‘8 intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace. Questions of So- krates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better to fight— to what standard does better refer ? To just and un- just .. . . . . 333 How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and l'njust? lie never learnt it from any one ; lie always knew it, even as a boy., 334 Answer amended. Alkiliindea learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek. —The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. Al- kibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself u u ^ 335 Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally dc- bate about just or unjust— which they consider plain to every one — but about expedient and inex- pedient, which are not coinei- dent with just and unjust. But neither docs Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks So- krates to explain. Sokrates de- clines: he can do nothing but question 336 Sokratic method — the respond- ent makes the discoveries for himself., u ^ ~ ~ ^ 337 Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable, expedient : and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, and procures for him- self happiness thereby. Equi- vocal reasoning of Sokrates . . ih. Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally ignorant. But the real op- onents, against whom Alki- iadcs is to measure himself, arts Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. xxvu CHAPTER X.— continued. l*a«‘ the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them. Alki- biades must make himself as good as possible 338 But good — for what end, and under what cirCUmiitMiceg? Abundant illustrative examples 339 Alkibiades, puzzled and humi- liated, confesses his ignorance. Encouragement given by So- krat cs. It is an advantage to make such discovery in youth .. 34Q Platonic Dialectic — its actual effect — its anticipated effect — applic- able to the season of youth .. ib. Know Thyself— Delphian maxim — its urgent importance — What is myself? My mind is myself ib, I cannot know myself, except by looking into another mind. Self- know [edge is temperance. Tem- >erance and Justice ore the con- S it ions both of happiness and of fmedturL 342 Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares that he will never quit Sok rates .. .. ib. Second Alkibiades— situotion sup- posed . . 343 Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which may provo mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word : madmen, a par- ticular variety under it .. .. i'6. Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms compre- hended under it, was not then familiar ^ ^ ^ _ 344 Frequent cases, in which men pray tor supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows w~hat~is beneficial : mischiefs of ignor- an.ee u u t'6. Mistake in predications about ig- norance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of wi>al ( Ignorance of good,~i8^ always mischievous : ignorance of oth er things, not always . . 345 Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but because I*age they know, besides, upon what occasions, and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used 345 Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are oftencr hurtful than beneficial . . ^ ^ 346 It is unsafe for Alkibiades to pro- cecd with his sacrifice, until ho has learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates . , 347 Different critical opinions respect- ing these two dialogues .. . . 348 Grounds for disallowing them — less strong against the Second than agAinst the First . . . . ib. The supposed grounds for disal- lowance are in reality only marks of inferiority ; .. 349 The two dialogues may probably be among Plato’s earlier compo- sitions 350 Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia — Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men . . .. 351 FitH£&&_i>f the name and character of Alkibiades for idealising this feature in Sokrates .. . . 352 Plato’s manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conver- sation of Sokrates 354 The purpose proclaimed by So- k rates in the Apology is followed out in AlkibiadOs 1. Warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge .. . . 355 Difficulties multiplied for the pur- pose of bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance 356 Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue — but these are acknowledged Incognita 357 Prolixity of Alkibiadds I. — Ex- treme multiplication of illustra- tive examples — How explained ib. Alkibiades II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined . . . . 358 Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for favours undefined — his views about the Digitized by Google xx vm CONTENTS OK VOLUME I. CHARTER X.— continued. . Page semi - regular, semi - irregular agency of the Gods — he prays to them for premonitory warnings 359 Comparison of Alkibiades 11. with Good itself is indispensable; without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial Page 360 the Xenophontic Memorabilia, Know ledge of Good — appears pos- especially the conversation of tainted and divined, in many of Sokrates with Euthydemus. So- k rates not always consistent with the riatonic dialogues, under different titles 362 Himself.. 77 77 77 77 7“ nfin Remarkable doctrine of Alkihindes 11. — that knowledge is not al- Plato leaves this undetermined ways Good. The knowledge of CHAPTER XT Hippias Major — Him ah Minor. Hippias Major — situation supposed — character of tin; dialogue. Sarcasm aiul mockery against Hippias .. .. . ~ . . 364 lteal debate between the historical Sokrat os and 1 1 Ippins J in the Xenophontic Memorabilia — sub- ject of that debate 365 Opening of the Hippias Minor — Hippias describes the successful circuit which he hail matin through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures > f « » , , , . I T ailil Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions — their law’ forbids ib. Question, What is law? The law- makers always aim at the Profit- able, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they fnil to attain law’. The lawful is the Profitable . the Unprofitable is also unlawful 3G7 Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates . . 368 The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives — and to this he does not always adhere 369 Lectures of Hippias at Sparta— not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but upon the question — What pursuits arc beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth ? 370 Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the back- ground, who has just been puzzling him with it— What is the Beautiful ? 371 Hippias thinks the question easy to answer ib. Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is Beauty, or the Beautiful? .. ib. Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by indi- cating one particularly beautiful object 372 Cross-questioning by Sokrates — Other things also are beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under some particular circumstances — it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful ih. Second answer of Hippias — Gold, is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful — scrutiny applied to the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies 373 Third answer of Hippias — ques- tions upon it — proof given that it fails of universal application 374 Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself — 1. The Suit- able or Becoming — objections thereunto— it is rejected .. .. ib. 2. The useful or profitable — ob- jections—it will not hold .. . . 375 3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable — that w’hich is received through the eye and the ear 376 Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER XI.— continued. Objections to this last — What pro- prrty is there common to both sight and hearing, which conferi upon the pleasures of those two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful ? 376 Answer— There is, belonging to each ami to both in common, the property of being innocuous ami profitable pleasures— upon this ground they arc called beautiful 378 This will not hohl— the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from flood — to say that the beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good — but this has been already declared inad- missible ib. Remarks upon the Dialogue — the explanations ascribed to llippias are special conspicuous ex- amples; those ascribed to So- k rates are attempts to assign some general concept ib. Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by the X-cnophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia • . 380 Concluding thrust exchanged be- tween llippias anti Sokrates 7. 382 Rhetoric against Dialectic TT .. 384 Aten who dealt with real life, con- trasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers .. .. ib. Concrete Aggregates — abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialec-ticiun 385 Antitheses of Absolute and Rela- tive, here brought into debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty .. . . 386 llippias Minor — characters and situation supposed 387 llippias has just delivered a lec- tu re. in which he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus — the veracious and straightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty 388 • This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and .ihs mmiila- cions roan arc one find the »»roc — the only man who can answer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses, i. e. the knowing man — the ignorant man cannot make of doing either the one or Pago sure the other JJS2 Analogy of special arts — it is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arith- metic when he chooses ib. View of Sokrates respecting Achilles jn thy Iliad, He thinG that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. llippias maintains that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent purpoi the like with fraudulent purpose 390 Issue here taken — Sokrates con- tends that those who hurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, arc better . than those who do the like unwillingly — he entreats 11 ippias to enlighten him and answer his questions ib. Questions of Sokrates— multiplied analogies of the special arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well when he chooses, but enu also sing badly when he chooses .. .. 391 It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he in- tomU to hit 392 Dissent and repugnance of II ippias ib. Conclusion — That none but the good man can do evil wilfully : the bod man does evil un- willingly. llippias cannot resist the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion — Sokrates confesses his perplexity .. .. 393 Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been Inverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of tKe sophistry and corruption of the Sophists .. .. .. .. 394 Polemical purpose of the dialogue >sc, whereas Odysseus does -H ippias krates purpose as hum lumilinted by So- 395 Philosophical purpose of the dia- loguc — theory of the Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by Plato ,, ,, •• ,, •• •• ib. Digitized by Google XXX CONTENTS OF VOLUME L CHAPTER XI. — continued. Page The Hippias is an exemplification Page intellectual conditions of human of this theory — Sokrates sets conduct 400 forth a case of confusion, and They rely too much on the analog)' avows his inability to clear it up. of the special arts— they take no Confusion — shown up in the note of the tacit assumptions Lesser Hippias — Error in the underlying the epithets of praise The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia .. 398 Aristotle combats the thesis. Ar- Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be suggestive, and that it shall bring before us dif- ferent aspects of the question under review 402 guments against it 399 Antithesis between Rhetoric and Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively on the CHAPT. HiiPAKcm Hipparchus — Question — What is Dialectic ill. ER XII. ’8 — Minos. acquisition made shall be greater the definition of Lover of Gain Y not merely in quantity, but also lie is one who thinks it right to in value, than the outlay. The gain from things worth nothing. valuable is the profitable — the Sokrates cross-examines upon profitable is the good. Conclu- this explanation. No man ex- sion comes back, That Gain is pects to gain from things which Good .. 407 he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man is a lover of gain 403 Gain is good. Every man loves good : therefore all men are lovers of gain .. . . .. .. 404 Apparent contradiction. Sokrates Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that there is no evil gain — all men are lovers of gain — no man ought to be reproached for being so — the companion is com- pelled to admit this, though he accuses the companion of trying declares that he is not per- to deceive him— accusation is suaded . . .. . . . . . . .. 408 retorted upon Sokrates .. .. 405 Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid — never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates .. ib. Sokrates allows the companion to Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion, What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, quatmus law : what is the common constituent attribute ? ift. Answer — Law is. 1. The conse- retract some of his answers. The crated and binding customs. 2. companion affirms that some The decree of the city. 3. So- gain is good, other gain is evil 406 cial or civic opinion 409 Questions by Sokrates — bad gain is gain , as much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called (Jain? Every acquisi- tion, made with no outlay, or with a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections— the acquisition may be evil — embarrassment con- fessed .. 407 It is essential to gain, that the Cross-examination by Sokrates — just and lawfully-behaving men nre so through law : unjust and lawless men arc so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful : lawless- ness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city — or bad social opinion — cannot bo law .. ib, , Suggestion by Sokrates — Law is the good opinion of the city — Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXXI CHAPTER XII. — continued. but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of reality, though it does not always suc- ceed in doing so 410 Objection taken by the Companion — That there is great discordance of laws in different places — he specifies several cases of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or answer .. ib. Farther questions by Sokrates — Things heavy and light, just and unjust, honourable and dis- honourable, &cM are so, and arc accounted so everywhere. Heal things are always accounted real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful 411 There arc laws of health and of cure, composed by the few phy- sicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared by the few’ wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the law's of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who know how to rule . . . . »6. That which is right is the regal law, the only true and real law — that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant .. .. 412 Minos, King of Krete — his laws were divine and excellent, and have remained unchanged from time immemorial ib. Question about the character of Minos— llomer and Hesiod de- clare him to hnve been admir- able, the Attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant, because he was the enemy of Athens 413 That Minos was really admirable — and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city - we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered ib. The question is made more deter- minate— What is it that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind, ns the physician mea- sures out food and exercise for the body ? Sokrates cannot tell. Close , , u u ^ ill The Hipparchus and Minos arc analogous to each other, and I both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished . ■ .. itu I Hipparchus — double meaning of . No answer given. What is the best conjecture ? Answer of tho literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher — as much as will enable him to talk like an Intel- ligent critic, though not to practise 444 The philosopher Is one who is second'-best-jm several different arts— a Pentathlus — who talks Philosophy cannot consist in mul- tiplication of learned acquire- ments .. ^ . . 445 Sokrates changes his course of examination — questions put to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of ad- ministering and discriminating the bad from the good .. .. 446 In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best, compe- tent to talk — but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, com- petent to act 447 Close of the dialogue — humiliation of the literary Erastes . . . . ib. Remarks— animated manner of the dialogue Hl. Definition of philosophy — here sought for the first time — Pla- tonic conception of measure — referee not discovered ■■ 448 View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner 449 well upon each 445 On what occasions can such second- Plato’s view — that the philosopher has a province special to himself, best men be useful ? There are distinct from other specialties — * always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the dimly indicated— regal or politi- cal art 450 second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner . . ib. Philosopher — the supreme artist, controlling other artists .. .. 451 CHAPTER XV. Tn\~ Ion, Persons of the dialogue. Plato disregards and disapproves Difference of opinion among the poetic or emotional working 456 modem critics as to its genuine- ness 454 Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at the festivals. Ion has been tr:um- Ion devoted himself to Homer ex- clusively. Questions of Sokrates to him — How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets ? The poetic art is pliant ib. Functions of the Rhapsodes. Re- one 457 Explanation given by Sokrates — citation — exposition of the poets — arbitrary exposition of tho poets was then frequent .. .. 455 The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation — powerful effect which they produced .. 456 Ion both reciter and expositor — Homer was considered more as both the Rhapsode and the Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration — fine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from 9ome God ib. Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron rings. The Gods an instructor than as a poet .. ib. first inspire Homer, then act VOL. T. a Digitized by Google XXXIV CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER X V. — continued. through him and through Ion upon the auditors 4.r>9 This comparison forms the control point of the dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment de- livered by Sokrates in the Apology .. ib. Platonic antithesis : systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic : which latter was either blind routine, or madness inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad .. .. ib. Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in Grecian life — privileged communications from the Pods to Sokrates — his firm belief in them 461 Condition of the inspired person— his reason is for the time with- drawn , , „ .. 4£2 Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind .. ih* Homer talks upon all subjects — Is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon nil of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its pro* * vince ? . . ^ u u .. The Rhapsode does not know spe- cial matters, such as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, fee. but be knows the business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having learnt it from Homer .. . . .. Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of what he says, but by divine inspira- tiOli Z !_! ^ « The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional expe- rience— Homer and the poets were talked of ns the great teachers— Plato’s view of the poet, as pretending to know everything, but really knowing nothing .. .. .. .. .7 Knowledge, opposed to divine in* spiration without knowledge .. Illustration of Plato’s opinion re- specting the uselessness of writ- ten geometrical treatises . . CHAPTER XVI. Laches. Laches. Subject and persons of the dialogue — whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms. Nikios and Lach6s differ in opinion 468 Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion — he replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge 469 Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their compe- tence to judge — Sokrates avows his own incompetence 470 Nikias and Laches submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates .. 471 Both of them give opinions off- hand, according to their feelings on the special case — Sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education Z Z ib. Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wi 466 467 472 473 474 ib. Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXXV CHAPTER XVI. — continued. or present, which are terrible: but intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelli- gence of past or present .. .. 475 Courage therefore must be intelli- gence of good and evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared that courage was only a port thereof — it will not hold therefore as a definition lof courage 476 Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals de- liver opinions confidently about courage without knowing what Rig ..Z^T 471 No solution given by Plato— ap- parent tendency of his mind, in I looking for a solution. Intelli- gence—cannot_bc_nnderstoo^ without reference to some object or end .. 478 Object— is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence — of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence Is not pos- sessed by professional artists .. ib. Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by — correlates with the undisco- vered Science of Ends 479 Perfect condition of the intelli- gence — is the one sufficient con- 480 Dramatic contrast between Laches and Sokrates, as cross-examiners ib. CHAPTER XVII ClIABMUDES. Scene and personages of the dia- logue. Crowded palastra. Emo- tions of Sokrat ea - 482 Question, What is Temperance ? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate Charmidcs. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness 483 But Temperance is a fine or ho- nourable thing, and slowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary. Temperance cannot be slowness ib. Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates ib. Third answer. Temperance con- sists in doing one’s own busi- ness. Defended by Kritias. So- krates pronounces it a riddle, and refutes it Distinction be- tween making and doing .. .. 484 Fourth answer, by Kritias. Tem- perance consists in self-know- ledge ib. | Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does self-knowledge procure for us ? What is the object known, in this cose ? An- swer : There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge Itself Ti Ti TT 4£5 Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a given cognition as its object Analogies to prove that knowledge of know- ledge is impossible ih. All knowledge must be relative to some object 486 All properties are relative — every thing in nature has its charac- teristic property with reference to something else .. , . ib. Even if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of non-cogni- tion would bo impossible. A man may know what he knows, hut . he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the fact t/iat he knows : but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he does not know 77 487 Temperance therefore as thus de- fined, would be of little or no value .. 488 But even granting the possibility of that which has just been de- nied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that all separate work were well per- c 2 Digitized by Google XXXV CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER XVII. — continued. Page formed, by special practitioners, we should not attain our end — Happiness 489 Which of the varieties of know- Page and dramatising this part of tho mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of con- scious ignorance 494 ledge contributes most to well- Familiar words — constantly used, doing or happiness? That by with much earnest feeling, but which wo know good and evil . . 490 never understood nor defined — Without the science of good and ordinary phenomenon in human evil, the other special science society 495 will be of little or no service. Different ethical points of view in Temperance is not the science different Platonic dialogues T7 496 of good and evil, and is of little Self-knowledge is here declared to Bcrvice ib. be impossible 497 Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have been made which cannot be justified 491 Temperance is and must be a good In other dialogues, Sokrates de- clares self-knowledge to be essen- tial and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have presented to him dissentient points of view t'6. Courage and Temperance are shown thing : but Charmides cannot tell to have no distinct meaning, ex- whether he is temperate or not ; cept as founded on the general since what temperance is remains cognizance of good and evil .. 498 unknown .. 492 Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and devo- tion to Sokrates, at the closo of the dialogue. Dramatic orna- ment throughout ib. The Charmides is an excellent spe- Distinction made between the spe- cial sciences and the science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are of no use .. .. .. .. .. ». ib. Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate or di- cimen of Dialogues of Search. vination of a Science of Tele- Abundance of guesses and tenta- ology 499 tives, all ultimately disallowed . . T5] Trial and Error, the natural pro- Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by Aristotle. cess of the human mind. Plato Comparison between the two . . 500 stands alone in bringing to view CHAPTER XVI II, Lysis. Analogy between Lysis and Char- mides. Richness of dramatic incident in both. Youthful beauty 502 Scenery and personages of the Lysis 16. Origin of the conversation. So- krates promises to give an ex- ample of the proper way of talk- ing to a youth, for his benefit .. 503 Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis ib. Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothales 507 j Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in j the like strain to Menexcnus .. 507 i Value of the first conversation be- tween Sokrates and Lysis, as an illustration of the Platonico- Sokratic manner 508 Sokrates begins to examine Me- nexeuus respecting friendship. Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue ib. i Questions addressed to Lysis. Ap- peal to the maxims of the poets. Like is the friend of like. Can- vassed and rejected 509 Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXXVll CHAPTER XVIII. -continued. Page Other poets declare that likeness rage Subject of friendship, handled both is a cause of aversion ; unlike- by the Xenophontic Sokrates, ness, of friendship. Reasons pro and by Aristotle 518 and con. Rejected 510 Confusion of Sokrates. He sug- gests, That the Indifferent (nei- ther good nor evil) is friend to the Good *6. Suggestion canvassed. If the In- different is friend to the Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from which it is anxious to escape .. 511 Principle illustrated by the philo- Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real. Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, ques- tionable, such as the real So- krates would have found reason for challenging 519 Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates. Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial tinge of evil, and desiring good to escape sopher. His intermediate con- from it 520 dition — not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance .. .. ib, Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates This general theory illustrated by the cose of the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful con- a new suggestion. The Primum sciousness of ignorance the attri- Amabile, or Object originally bute of the philosopher. Value dear to us, per sc: by relation or set by Sokrates and Plato upon jects become dear 512 The cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin to us — or our own 513 Good is of a nature akin to every Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or original and primary object of Love. Par- ticular objects are loved through association with this. The object one, evil is alien to every one. is, Good 522 Inconsistency w ith what has been previously laid down .. .. 514 Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue ib. Remarks. No positive result. So- kratic purpose in analysing the familiar words — to expose the false persuasion of knowledge.. 515 Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dia- Statement by Plato of the general Inw of mental association .. .. ib. Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic communion of Aristotle, distin- guished by him from the feebler analogical communion .. .. 523 logue of Search. Manner of So- Primum Amabile of Plato, com- krates, multiplying defective ex- pared with the Prima Amicitia planations, and showing reasons of Aristotle. Each of them is why each is defective .. .. 516 head of an analogical aggre- The process of trial and error is better illustrated by a search without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue for self-working minds ib. gate, not member of a generic family 525 The Good and Beautiful, consi- dered as objects of attachment . . 526 CHAFTER XIX. Eutiiydkmub. Dramatic and comic exuberance of the F.uthyddmus. Judgments of various critics 527 Scenery and personages 16. The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus : manner in which they are here presented .. .. 528 Conversation carried on with Kloi- nias, first by Sokrates, next by the two Sophists ib. Digitized by Google XXXV111 CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. CHAPTER XIX. — continued. Page Contrast between the two different modes of interrogation . . . . 529 Wherein this contrast does not consist 530 Wherein it does consist . . .. 531 I’ngc The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired while it is going on, is shown at the eud to produce no real admira- tion, but the contrary .. .. 541 Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists — their bidding for the applause of the by-standers 532 Comparison of the Euthydemus Mistaken representations about the Sophists — Aristotle’s definition — no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist and with the Parmenides ib. the Dialectician 542 Necessity of settling accounts with Philosophical purpose of the Eu- the negative, before we venture thydemus— exposure of fallacies. upon the affirmative, is common in Plato's dramatic manner, by to both : in the one the process multiplication of particular ex- is solitary and serious ; in the atnplcs 544 other, it is vulgarised and ludi- crous 533 Opiniou of Stallbaum and other Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of fallacies: Plato enumerates them without classi- critics about the Euthyddmus, fication 545 that Euthyddmus and Dionyso- dorus represent the way in which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors 534 That opinion is unfounded. So- Fallacies of equivocation propound- ed by the two Sophists in the Euthydemus ib. Fallacies — a dido secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter — in the Euthy lerates was much more Eristic domus 546 than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continu- ous speech or lecture .. .. 535 Sokrates in the Euthydemus is Obstinacy shown by the two So- phists in their replies — determi- nation not to contradict them- selves 547 drawn suitably to the purpose of Farther verbal equivocations .. ib. that dialogue 536 Fallacies involving deeper logical The two Sophists in the Euthy- principles— contradiction is im- domus are not to be taken as possible. — To speak falsely is real persons, or representatives impossible 548 of real persons ib. Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias —-possession of good things is useless, unless we also have in- telligence how to use them .. 537 But intelligence — of what? It must be such intelligence, or such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and the right use of it when made .. 538 Where is such an art to be found ? The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be found. Ends in puzzle .. .. 539 Review' of the cross-examination Plato’s Euthydemus is the earliest known attempt to set out and expose fallacies — the only way of exposing fallacies is to exem- plify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion proved is known aliunde to be false and absurd ib. Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and propa- gated by Athenian Sophists — they arc inherent inadvertencies and liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them . . . . 550 just pursued by Sokrates. It is Wide-spread prevalence of erro- very suggestive -puts the mind neous belief, misguided by one upon what to look for . . . . 540 or other of these fallacies, at- Comparison with other dialogues — tested by Sokrates, Plato, Racon, Republic, Phi 16 bus, Protugoras. &c. — complete enumeration of The only distinct answer is found heads of fallacies by Mill .. .. 551 in the Protagoras ib. Value of formal debate as a means Digitized by Google CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. XXX IX CHAPTER XIX. — continued. Page for testing and confuting fal- lacies 554 Without the habit of formal de- bate, Plato could not have com- posed his Euthydcmus, nor Ari- stotle the treatise De Sophisticis Klenchis 555 Probable popularity of the Euthy- demus at Athens — welcomed by all the enemies of Dialectic .. tb. Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this inference by opponents — Conversation be- tween Sokrates and Kriton .. 556 Altered tone in speaking of Euthy- demus — Disparagement of per- sons half-philosophers, half-poli- ticians Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his sons — Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher— tells him to search for himself Euthyddmus is here cited a9 re- presentative of Dialectic and philosophy Who is the person here intended by Plato, half-philosopher, half- politician? Is it Isokratcs? .. Variable feeling at different times, between Plato and Isokratcs Page 557 558 559 560 562 Digitized by Google Digitized by Google PLATO PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. CHAPTER I. SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE, BEFORE AND IN THE TIME OF SOKRATES. The life of Plato extends from 427-347 b.o. Ho was born in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, and he ln died at the age of 80, about the time when Olynthus was taken by the Macedonian Philip. The last years of his life thus witnessed a melancholy breach of ULo' in the integrity of the Hellenic world, and even exhibited data from which a far-sighted Hellenic politician might have anticipated something like the coming subjugation, realised afterwards by the victory of Philip at Chseroneia. But during the first half of Plato’s life, no such anticipations seemed even within the limits of possibility. The forces of Hellas, though discordant among themselves, were superabundant as to defensive efficacy, and were disposed rather to aggression against foreign enemies, especially against a country then so little formidable as Macedonia. It was under this contempla- tion of Hellas self-acting and self-sufficing — an aggregate of cities, each a political unit, yet held together by strong ties of race, language, religion, and common feelings of various kinds — that the mind of Plato was both formed and matured. In appreciating, as far as our scanty evidence allows, the circumstances which determined his intellectual and specu- lative character, I shall be compelled to touch briefly upon the various philosophical theories which were propounded VOL. i. b Digitized by Google 2 PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. Chap. I. anterior to Sokrates — as well as to repeat some matters already brought to view in the sixteenth, sixty-seventh, and sixty-eighth chapters of my History of Greece. To us, as to Herodotus in his day, the philosophical specu- Eitriy Greek kition of tho Greeks begins with the theology and M»iAUui« cosmology of Homer and Hesiod. The series of Siituc per^ divine persons and attributes, and generations, pre- «ntht- sented by these poets, and especially the Theogony of Sui'so* Hesiod, supplied at one time full satisfaction to the phenomena. curjosj(y ()f Greeks respecting the past liistory and present agencies of the world around them. In tho emphatic censure bestowed by Herakleitus on the poets and philo- sophers who preceded him, as having much knowledge but no sense — he includes Hesiod, as well as Pythagoras, Xeno- phanes, and Hokatreus : upon Homer and Archilochus he is still more severe, declaring that they ought to be banished from the public festivals and scourged.* The sentiment of curiosity as it then existed was only secondary and derivative, arising out of some of the strong primary or personal senti- ments— fear or hope, antipathy or sympathy, — impression of present weakness, — unsatisfied appetites and longings, — wonder and awe under the presence of the terror striking phenomena of nature, &c. Under this state of the mind, when problems suggested themselves for solution, the answers afforded by Polytheism gave more satisfaction than could have been afforded by any other hypothesis. Among tho indefinite multitude of invisible, personal, quasi-human, agents, with different attributes and dispositions, some one could be found to account for every perplexing phenomenon. Tho question asked was, not, What are the antecedent condi- tions or causes of rain, thunder, or earthquakes, but, Who rains and thunders? Who produces earthquakes ? b The Hesiodic Greek was satisfied when informed that it was Zeus or Poseidon. To be told of physical agencies would have appeared to him not merely unsatisfactory, but absurd, ridi- * Diogcu. Luort. ix. 1. FI o\v^a9rjtr) *E Karcuov' t6v 6* "Ofirjpov fipcurKtv &£iov v&ov oh SiSatTKer (oh t pun, np. Proclum flvai f>axl(tcsi« ' or mythical cosmogony, of Hesiod and the other of physical , ii r\ \ • •genc/fin old poets : while Epimennles and the Orphic poets aonaL Water, put forth different theogonies, blended with mystical theprlmor- 1 ° J dm mb- dogmas. It was, however, in the same century, and stance, or # ° . * ; •pxi- in the first half of it, that Thales, of Miletus (620-5G0 b.c.), set the example of a new vein of thought. Instead of the Homeric Okcanus, father of all things, Thales assumed the material substance, Water, as the primordial matter and the universal substratum of everything in nature. By various transmutations, all other substances were gene- rated from water ; all of them, when destroyed, returned into water. Like the old poets, Thales conceived the surface of the earth to be flat and round ; but he did not, like them, regard it as stretching down to the depths of Tartarus : he supposed it to be flat and shallow, floating on the immensity of the watery expanse or Ocean/ This is the main feature of the Thaletiau hypothesis, about which, however, its author seems to have left no writing. Aristotle says little about Thales, and that little in a tone of so much doubt/ that we can hardly confide in the opinions and discoveries ascribed to him by others. h 1 Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 3, p. 983, b. 21. De Ccolo, ii. 13, p. 294, ft. 29. 6aA>}f, 6 rris ToiawTTjj ipxnvkr tpiKo- trotpia;, &c., Seneca, Natural. Qiucst. vi. 6. Pherekydes, Epimenides, &c„ were contemporary with the earliest Ionic philosophers (Brandis, Handbuch der Phil. s. 23). According to Plutarch (Aqu® ot Ignis Comparatio, p. 955, init.), most persona believed that Hesiod, by the word Chaos, meant Water. Zeno tho Stoic adopted this interpretation (Sehol. Apollon. Rhod. i. 498 i. On the other hand. Bocchylidcs tho poet, and after him Zenodotus, called Air by the name Chaos 1 Sehol. Hesiod. Thoogon. p. 392, Gnisf.). Hermann considers ihat the Hesiodic Chaos means empty space (see tho note of Brandis, Ilandb. 1 Phil. p. 71). r See two passages in Aristotle De | Anima. i. 2, and i. 5. j b Cicero says (Do Naturtt Deorum, I i. 10), “ Thales — aquam dixit oaso initium rerum, Deum antem earn mentem, quae ex nquft euncta fingeret.” That the latter half of this Ciceronian statement, respecting the doctrine of Thales, is at least unfounded, and probably erroneous, is recognised by Preller, Brandis, and Zeller. Prcller, Histor. Philos. Grice, cx Fontium Loeis Contexts, sect. 15 ; Brandis, . Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos. Beet. 31, p. 118; Zeller, Die Philos, der Griechcn, vol. i. p. 151, ed. 2. It is stated by Herodotus that Thales foretold the year of the memorable solar Digitized by GoogI Chap. I. ANAXIMANDER. 5 The next of the Ionic philosophers, and the first who pub- lished his opinions in writing, was Anaximander, of An„tatn. Miletus, the countryman and younger contempo- dSmlsip ** rary of Tliales (570-520 b.c.). He too searched for UhJSJu!? an ’A pxv, a primordial Something or principle, self- existent and comprehending in its own nature a ^0™'^ generative, motive, or transmutative force. Not thinking that water, or any other known and definite ?“,T™ne.— substance fulfilled these conditions, he adopted as the and geologi- foundation of his hypothesis a substance which he 011 doctr,nt8- called the Infinite or Indeterminate. Under this name he con- ceived Body simply, without any positive or determinate pro- perties, yet including the fundamental contraries, Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, &c., in a potential or latent state, including farther a self-changing and self-developing force,1 and being moreover immortal and indestructible.11 By this inherent force, and by the evolution of one or more of these dormant con- trary qualities, were generated the various definite substances of nature — Air, Fire, Water, etc. But every determinate sub- stance thus generated was, after a certain time, destroyed and resolved again into the Indeterminate mass. “ From thence all substances proceed, and into this they relapse : each in its turn thus making atonement to the others, and suffering the penalty of injustice.”1 Anaximander conceived separate eclipse which happened during the battle between the Medea and the Ly- dians (Herod, i. 74). This eclipse seems to have occurred in b.c. 585, according to the best recent astrono- mical enquiries by Professor Airy. 1 Seo Zeller, Philosophic der Grie- chcu, vol. i. p. 157, eeq. od. 2nd. Anaximander conceived rb Antipov as infinite matter; the Pythagoreans and Plato conceived it as a distinct nature by itself— as a subject, not us a predicate (Aristotel. Physic, iii. 4, p. 203, a. 2). About these fundamental contraries, Aristotle Bays (Physic, i. 4, init.) : oi 4k rov 4vbs 4vovaas rks ivavrib- njraf iKKplvtodai, Snmtp tAva^lixavbp6s v 8* rj yivtcls 4p. Kvang. i. 8, xv. 23-40-47 ; Stobams Edog. i. p. 510. Anaximander sup- posed that eclipses of the sun and moon ' wero caused by the occasional closing j of these apertures (Euseb. xv. 50-51). The port of tho sun visible to us was, in his opinion, not smaller than the earth, and of tho purest tire (Diogon. ii. 1). Kudemus, in his history of astro- } nomy, mentioned Anaximander as tho first who had discussed the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies (Simplikius ad Aristot. Do Cudo, ap. Schoi. Brand, p. 497, a. 1 2 . ■ Aristotel. Metcorol. ii. 2, p. 355, a. 21, which is referred by Alexander of Aphrodisias to Anaximander ; also Do Ccelo, ii. 13, p. 295, b. 12. A doctrine somewhat like it is ascribed even to Thales. Bee Alexan- der’s Commentary on Aristotel. Mcta- pliys. i. p. 983, b. 17. The reason hero assigned by Anaxi- mander why tile Earth remained still, is the earliest example in Greek philo- sophy of that fallacy callod tho prin- ciple of the Sufficient Reason, so well analysed and elucidated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logie, book v. ch. 3, sect. 5. Tho remarks which Aristotle himself makes upon it are also) very interesting, when he cites the opiuion of Anaxi- mander. Compare Plato, Phaodou, p. 109, c. 132, with the citations m Wyttenbach’s note. Digitized by Google CflAr. I. ANAXIMENES. 7 peripheral regions of the Kosmos. Animals were produced from the primitive muddy fluid of the earth : first, fishes and other lower animals — next, in process of time man, when cir- cumstances permitted his development.0 We learn farther respecting the doctrines of Anaximander, that he proposed physical explanations of thunder, lightning, and other metteo- rological phenomena : p memorable as the earliest attempt of speculation in that department, at a time when such events inspired the strongest religious awe, and were regarded as the most especial manifestations of purposes of the Gods. He is said also to have been the first who tried to represent the surface and divisions of the earth on a brazen plate, the earliest rudiment of a map or chart."1 The third physical philosopher produced by Miletus, seem- ingly before the time of her terrible disasters suffered Ansitoenes from the Persians after the Ionic revolt between 500-494 B.C., was Anaximenes, who struck out a n^ouiof third hypothesis. He assumed, as the primordial substance, and as the source of all generation or trans- rim:f“:t'on' mutation. Air, eternal in duration, infinite in extent. He thus returned to the principle of the Thaletian theory, selecting for bis beginning a known substance, though not the same substance as Thales. To explain how generation of new products was possible (as Anaximander had tried to explain by his theory of evolution of latent contraries), Anaximenes adverted to the facts of condensation and rarefaction, which he connected respectively with cold and heat/ The Infinite 0 Plutarch, Placit. Philos, v. 19. p Plutarch, Placit. Philos, iii. 3 ; Seneca, Qurest. Nut. ii. 18-19. 1 Strabo, i. p. 7. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 1 ) states that Anaximander affirmed the figure of the earth to be spherical ; and L)r. Who well, in his History of the Inductive Sciences, follows his state- ment. But Schleiermacher (Ueber Anaximnndros, vol. ii. p. 204 of his Stimmtlichc Werke) and Gruppe (Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, p. 38) contest this assertion, ami prefer that of Plutarch (an. Eusebium Pnep. Evang. i. 8, Placit. Philos, iii. 10), which I have ad on ted in the text. It is to be remembered that Diogenes himself, in another placo (ix. 21), affirms Parmenides to have been the first who propounded the spherical figure of the earth. See the facts upon this subject collected and discussed in the instructive dissertation of L. Oct- tinger, Die Vorstelluugen dcr Griechen und Romer ueber die Erdenls II im- mebkorper, p. 38 : Freiburg, 1850. r Origen. Philoaophumen. c. 7 ; Siraplikius in Aristot. Physic, f. 32 ; Brandis, Gesch. Phil. p. 145. Cicero, Academic, ii. 37, 118. “ Anaximenes infinitum aorn, sed ea, quae ex eo orirentur, definite.” The comic poet Philemon introduced in one of his dramas, of which a short Digitized by Google 8 PRE-S0KRAT1C PHILOSOPHY. Chap. I. Air, possessing and exercising an inherent generative and developing power, perpetually in motion, passing from dense to rare or from rare to dense, became in its utmost rarefac- tion, Fire and yEtlier ; when passing through successive stages of increased condensation it became first cloud, next water, theh earth, and, lastly, in its utmost density, stone.' Sur- rounding, embracing, and pervading the Kosmos, it also embodied and carried with it a vital principle, which animals obtained from it by inspiration, and which they lost as soon as they ceased to breathe.4 Anaximenes included in his treatise (which was written in a clear Ionic dialect) many speculations on astronomy and meteorology, differing widely from those of Anaximander. He conceived the Earth as a broad, flat, round plate, resting on the air." Earth, Sun, and Moon were in his view condensed air, the Sun acquiring heat by the extreme and incessant velocity with which ho moved. The Heaven was not an entire hollow sphere encompassing the Earth below as well as above, but a hemisphere covering the Earth above, and revolving laterally round it like a cap round the head.1 The general principle of cosmogony, involved in the hypo- thesis of these three Milesians — one primordial substance or Something endued with motive and transmutative force, so as to generate all the variety of products, each successive and transient, which our senses witness — was taken up with more or less modification by others, especially by Diogenes of Apollonia, of whom I shall speak presently. But there were three other men who struck out different veins of thought — Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Herakleitus: the two former seemingly contemporary with Anaximenes (550-490 B.c.) the latter somewhat later. Of Pythagoras I have spoken at some length in the thirty- seventh chapter of my History of Greece. Speculative ori- fragment is preserved (Frag. 2, Mci- neke), the omnipresent and omniscient Air, to deliver the prologue : o&tos, t V ryw 'Arjp, t>v ay Tit 6 rofioirui tea i At a. ryot 6', & 0 yip Fragmente ties Archytna, cap. 5, p. Gl- x<*,Pts ti\-qtp6r ts &y xp<^bf^a np &pi0p

s to wparov appoadiv, rb tv 4v rep ft 4a

v tp-qO-rjt rav antithesis — Tb *Ev — rj dipiaros Avar — (Tvtu Trdvruv. is the form given by Plato to the • Concerning the Pythagorean doc- Pythagorean doctrine. Eudorns (in trines on Harmonics, sett Boeckh’s Simplisms ad Aristot. Physic, fol. 39) Philolaus, p. 60-84, with his copious seems to blend the two together. 1 and learned comments. * Aristot. Metaph. A. 5, p. 985, b. b Karsten. Xenophanis Fragm., s. 23. ol IlvQayoptToi twv pa(h]/xd rwv 4, p. 9, 10. a^dfxtvot TpwT o t TaSra irpo^* 3d by Google Chap. I. XENOPHANES. 17 Xenophanes takes his point of departure, not from Thales or Anaximander, hut from the same ancient the- Htacrtsnrai ogonies which they had forsaken. But he follows J^dThro. a very different road. The most prominent fea- S$ou»d ture in his poems (so far as they remain), is the nlM' directness and asperity with which he attacks the received opinions respecting the Gods — and the poets Hesiod and Homer, the popular exponents of those opinions. Xeno- phanes not only condemns these poets for having ascribed to the Gods discreditable exploits, but even calls in question the existence of the Gods, and ridicules the anthropomorphic conception which pervaded the Hellenic faith. “ If horses or lions could paint, they would delineate their Gods in form like themselves. The Ethiopians conceive their Gods as black, the Thracians conceive theirs as fair and with reddish hair.”® Dissatisfied with much of the customary worship and festivals, Xenophanes repudiated divination altogether, and condemned the extravagant respect shown to victors in Olympic contests,' 1 not less than the lugubrious ceremonies in honour of Leukothea. He discountenanced all Theogony, or assertion of the birth of Gods, as impious, and as inconsistent with the prominent attribute of immortality ascribed to them.6 He maintained that there was but one God, identical with, or a personification of the whole Uranus. “ The whole Kosmos, or the whole God, sees, hears, and thinks.” The divine nature (he said) did not admit of the conception of separate persons one governing the other, or of want and imperfection in any way/ Though Xenophanes thus appears (like Pythagoras) mainly as a religious dogmatist, yet theogony and cosmo- m, doctrine 0f gony were so intimately connected in the sixth or eon^S century b.g, that he at the same time struck out a Komdos is Ena new philosophical theory. His negation of theo- — *Ev Kal liar. r .. r Non-En« in- gony was tantamount to a negation ot cosmogony, admi^ibu. • Xcnophanis Fragm. 5-6-7 p. 4 1 seq. ! 85, od. KarsU-n ; Aria to tel. Rhetoric, ed. Karsten; Clemens Alcxaudr. Strom. , ii. 23; Metaphys. i. 5, p. 986, b. 19. v. ]). 601 ; vii. p. 711. ' 1 Xenoph. Frag. 1-2, p. 35. " Xenophan. Fragm. 19, p. 63, e universe as an indivisible and unchangeable whole. 10,7 Such a creed was altogether at variance with com- mon perception, which apprehends the universe as a plurality of substances, distinguishable, divisible, changeable, &c. And Xenophanes could not represent his One and All, which ex- cluded all change, to be the substratum out of which pheno- menal variety was generated — as Water, Air, the Infinite, had been represented by the Ionic philosophers. The sense of this contradiction, without knowing how to resolve it, appears to have occasioned the mournful complaints of irre- mediable doubt and uncertainty, preserved as fragments from his poems. “ No man (he exclaims) knows clearly about the Gods or the universe : even if he speak what is perfectly true, « Timon, fragment of the Silli ap. Sext. Empiric. Hypot. Pyrrh. i. 33, sect. 224. oh-jttj yap epet' voov eipvtxa tfu. €i* ravro t« nav avtkvtTt), nav 6t ot> am warrrj awAictSfievop niav tit $v Zeller ^Geschichte der Griecli. Phibw. i. p. 403, ed. 2) maintains, in my opinion justly, that the Ens Parmo- nideum is conceived by its author as extended. Striitupell (Geachichte der theor. Phil, der Griecli. s. 41) repre- sents it as unextended : but this view seems not reconcileablo with the re- maining Fragments. r Parm. Fmg. v. 102. Digitized by £k)Ogle Chap. I. PARMENIDES. 21 tive, consisted all that Parmenides called Truth. Every- thing else belonged to the region of Opinion, which h* recognise, embraced all that was phenomenal, relative, and opinion, Pbe- . . nomenaland transient: all that involved a relerence to mans relative, . . . ,1 , . “f"10 from senses, apprehension, and appreciation, all the m- *“• definite diversity of observed facts and inferences. Plurality, succession, change, motion, generation, destruction, division of parts, &c., belonged to this category. Parmenides did not deny that he and other men had perceptions and beliefs cor- responding to these tenns, but he denied their application to the Ens or the self-existent. We are conscious of succession, but the self-existent has no succession : we perceive change of colour and other sensible qualities, and change of place or motion, but Ens neither changes nor moves. We talk of things generated or destroyed — things coming into being or going out of being — but this phrase can have no application to the self-existent Ens, which is always and cannot properly be called either past or future." Nothing is really generated or destroyed, but only in appearance to us, or relatively to our apprehension.* In like manner we perceive plurality of objects, and divide objects into parts. But Ens is essentially One, and cannot be divided." Though you may divide a piece of matter, you cannot divide the extension of which that matter forms part: you cannot (to use the expression of Hobbes") pull asunder the first mile from the second, or the • Parmcnid. Fr. v. 97. — is-ti to yc po ip' ew«i5rjtr s ytvtffiv Kal tpUnpay' ovOtv y bp ofrrc ylyvtaOal ipatriv of/T € tf>0tipt(T0ai t£>v uvtqjv, a A A a H 6 vo v 8 u k « i V V) fi“i v* oTov ol wtpl M«A irj(Ti (Jlapptvltirisi rd 6vra, Kadb 6vra, Jv iffrlv. This chapter, in which Tennemann gives an account of the Eh -a tic philosophy, npixiars to me one of the best and most instructive in hia work. x 14 To make parts,— or to port or divide, Space or Time, — is nothing else but to consider one and another within the some : so that if any man Digitized by Google 22 PRE-SOK It ATIC PHILOSOPHY. Cuap. I. first hour from the second. The milestone, or the striking of the clock, serve as marks to assist you in making a mental division, and in considering or describing one hour and one mile apart from the next. This, however, is your own act, relative to yourself: there is no real division of extension into miles, or of duration into hours. You may consider the same space or time as one or as many, according to your con- venience : as one hour or as sixty minutes, as one mile or eight furlongs. But all this is a process of your own mind and thoughts ; another man may divide the same total in a way different from you. Your division noway modifies the reality without you, whatever that may be — the Extended and Enduring Ens — which remains still a continuous One, undi- vided and unchanged. The Ens of Parmenides thus coincided mainly with that Panneoidean whicli (sinco Kant) has been called the Noumeuon RUndacom- — the Thing in itself — the Absolute : or rather From piiXi1 with that which, by a frequent illusion, passes for meno ogy. Absolute — no notice being taken of the cogitant and believing mind, as if cogitation and belief, cogitata and credita, would bo had without it By Ens was understood the remnant in his mind, after leaving out all that abstrac- tion, as far as it had then been carried, could leave out It was the minimum indispensable to the continuance of thought ; you cannot think (Parmenides says) without think- divklo space or time, the diverge eon- chap. vii. 5, vol. i p. 96, ed. Molcsworth. ceptions he lias are more, by one, tlmn “ Expansion and duration have this the parts which ho makes. For his farthor agreement, tliut though they first conception ia of that which is to are both considered by us at hairing be divided— then, of somo part of it— parts, yet their jorta are not separable and again of some other part of it : one from another, not even in thought ; and so forwards, as long ns ho goes in though tile parts of bodies from which dividing. But it ia to be noted, that we take our measure of the one— ond here, by division, I do not mean the the parts of motion, from which wo severing or pulling asunder of ono | take the measure of the other— may Hpace or time from another (for does I be interrupted or separated.” — Locke, any man think that one hemisphere Essay on the Humnu Understanding, may be separated from the other hemi- book ii. eh. 15, a 11. sphere, or the first hour from the se- In the Platonic Parmenides, p. 157, cond?), but diversity of consideration : we find the remarkable conception of so that division is not made by the ope- what ho calls ri i(ai<oii— is the ana- logon of modem Physics. Purmcnides (ho says) indicated most truly the con- trast ami divergence between Ontology and Physics ; but he ought to have gone farther, and shown how they could l)0 reconciled and brought into harmony. This 'Marbach a i linns) was not even attempted, much less achieved, by Parmenides ; but it was afterwards attempted by Plato, and achieved by Aristotle. Marbach is right in saying that the reconciliation was attempted by Plato; but he is not right (I think; in saying that it was achieved by Aristotle — nor by any one sineo Aristotle. It is the merit of Parmenides to have brought out the two points of view as radically distinct, and to have seen that the phenomenal world, if expluincd at all, must be explained upon general prin- ciples of its own, raised out of its own data of facts —not by means of an il- lusory Absolute and Real. The subse- quent philosophers, in so far as they hit! and slurred over this distinction, appear to me to have receded rather than advanced. b Parmen. Fr. v. 109. ir ry on the body, and u{)on the proportions of its elemental composition : that a certain f See especially the remarkable pas- j menides bold this opinion about the sage from Stolwcus, Eclog. Phys. i. 23, figure of the earth, the fact ia honour- p. 482, cited in Karaten, Frag. Parm. able to liia acuteness; for Ixtukippus, p. 241, and Cicero, Do Natur. Deor. I Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes the i. 11, a. 28, with the Commentary of ■ Apolloniate, and Demokritus,al 1 thought Krischc. Forechungen auf dem Gebietc the earth to bo a flat, round surface, der altcn Philosophic, viii. p. 98, ecqq. like a dish or a drum : Plato speaks It is impossible to make out with ' about it in so confused a manner that any clearness the Kosmos and its gene- his opinion cannot bo made out : and ration as conceived by Parmenides. ' Aristotle was the first who both affirmed Wo cannot attain moro than a general and proved it to be Spherical. Tho approximation to it. opinion had been propounded by mne * Diogen. Laert. ix. 21, viii. 48 ; philosophers earlier tlmn Anaxagoras, Strabo, ii. p. 93 (on the authority of who controverted it. See the disserta- Poseidonius). Plutarch (Placit, Philos. tion of L. Oettinger, Die Vorstollungen iii 11) and others ascribe to Parmenides der Oriechen fiber die Krrle als Him- the recognition not of five zones, but melsknrper, Freiburg, 1850, p. 42-46. only of two. If it bo true that Pur- h Diogen. Laert. ix. 22. Digitized by Google Chap. I. HEHAKLEITUS. 27 limited knowledge was possessed by every object in Nature, animate or inanimate.1 Before we pass from Parmenides to his pupil and successor Zeno, who developed the negative and dialectic side of the Eleatic doctrine, it will be convenient to notice various other theories of the same century: first among them that of Herakleitus, who forms as it were the contrast and antithesis to Xenophanes and Parmenides. Herakleitus of Ephesus, known throughout antiquity by the denomination of the Obscure, comes certainly after Pythagoras and Xenophanes — and apparently -hisob«mre before Parmenides. Of the two first he made • i . n . ... , . pbors, conQ- special mention, in one of the sentences, alike brief «nusdo*m»- his lost treatise : — “ Much learning does not teach reason : otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythago- ras, Xenophanes and Hekatseus.” In another passage He- rakleitus spoke of the “ extensive knowledge, cleverness, and wicked arts” of Pythagoras. He declared that Homer as well as Archilochus deserved to be scourged and expelled from the public festivals.1* His thoughts were all embodied in one single treatise, which he is said to have deposited in the temple of the Ephesian Artemis. It was composed in a style most perplexing and difficult to understand, full of metaphor, symbolical illustration, and antithesis : but this very circumstance imparted to it an air of poetical impres- siveness and oracular profundity.1 It exercised a powerful 1 Parmen. Frog. v. 145 ; Theophras- tus, De .Sensu, Karsten, p. 268. Parmenides (according to Theophras- tus j thought that the dead hotly, having lost its fiery element, had no perception of light, or heat, or sound ; but that it lmd perception of darkness, cold, and silence — kcU b\oos hi irav rb by tx*iv rtva yvuxTtv. k Diogen. L. ix. 1. TlovXvfiaOiri v6ov ov SiSdurKer 'Htrlohoy yap by thihtiunc* real Tlu0ay6pr}yt a&6if hi ’SLtiyoi^a.v*a Kal * Ekcctcuov , «fec. lb. viii. 6. UuOayiprjs Myrifrdpxou Iffroplr^v iivdpanrtav paKurra xitnatPy Kal 4ic\*t&ptvos r au- ras rhs auyypatpas 4*oiri**y iwurov aotpl-qyy rou\upa$ritrjy, HOHorfx^V1'- 1 Diogen. Laert. ix. 1-6. Thoo- Cnstus conceived that Herakleitus left the work unfinished, from eccentricity of temperament (tnrb pt- Xay xaAfos). Of him, as of various othera, it was imagined by some that his obscurity was intentional (Cicero, Nat. Dcor. i. 26, De Finib. 2, 5). The words of Lucretius ubout Herakleitus are remarkable i. 641) : — “Clams ob obscuraro llnguoxu magis Inter inane* Quamde graves Inter Grecos qul vera re- qaimnt: Omnia entm stolid i magis admirantur ainant- qoc In vends qua* sub verbis latitantia cernunl." Even Aristotle complains of the difii- Digitized by Google 28 PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. Chap. I. influence on the speculative minds of Greece, both in the Platonic ago and subsequently: the Stoics especially both commented on it largely (though with many dissentient opinions among the commentators), and borrowed with partial modifications much of its doctrine.” The expositors followed by Lucretius and Cicero conceived Poctrine or Herakleitus as having proclaimed Fire to be the — perpetual universal and all-pervading element of nature ;n as Rrm-nttion Thales had recognised water, and Anaximenes air. und deatruo- , , , .. tion— every- Ihis interpretation was countenanced by some strik- thing flows, . 1 . . , nothing mg passages of Herakleitus : but when we put stands— Iran- o I o _ p * sujon of the together all that remains from him, it appears that elements Into 0 # x * SckwSdH hi* main doctrine was not physical, but meta- ind forwards, physical or ontological : that the want of adequate general terms induced him to clothe it in a multitude of symbolical illustrations, among which fire was only one, though the most prominent and most significant.0 Xeno- phanes and the Eleates bad recognised, as the only objective reality. One extended Substance or absolute Ens, perpetual, infinite, indeterminate, incapable of change or modification. They denied the objective reality of motion, change, gene- ration, and destruction — considering all these to be purely relative and phenomenal. Herakleitus on the contrary denied everything in the nature of a permanent and per- petual substratum : lie laid down nothing as permanent and perpetual except the process of change — the alternate se- quence of generation and destruction, without beginning or end — generation and destruction being in fact coincident or identical, two sides of the same process, since the gene- ration of one particular state was the destruction of its ante- cedent contrary. All reality consisted in the succession and culty of understanding Herakleitus, und even of determining the proper punctuation (Rhetoric, iii. 5). " Cicero, Nut. Door. iii. 14, 35. n To sonic it Appeared that Hcra- kleitus lmrdly distinguished Fire from Air. Aristotel. De Anima, i. 2 ; Sext. Empiric, adv. Mathemat. vii. 127-129, ix. 300. ° Zeller’s account of the philosophy of Herakleitus, in the second edition of his Philosophic der Gricchcn, vol. i. p. 450-496, is instructive. Mar bach also is useful (Grech, der Phil. s. 46-49) ; and his (Hegelian) exposition of Hera- kleitus is further developed by Ferdi- nand Lussalle (Die Philosophic Hera- kleitus dee Dunklen, published 185”<). This last work is very copious and elaborate, throwing great light upon a subject essentially obscure and diffi- cult. Digitized by Google Cbap. 1. HERAKLEITUS. 29 transition, the coming and going, of these finite and particular states : what ho conceived as the infinite and universal, was the continuous process of transition from one finite state to the next — the perpetual work of destruction and generation combined, which terminated one finite state in order to make room for a new and contrary state. This endless process of transition, or ever-repeated act of generation and destruction in one, was represented f by Herakleitus under a variety of metaphors and ™p“o£y firolr]v ou t4 pity t4 verschiedenen Existenz-formen bil- 8' 06, 4AA a irctvra teal 4«1. dAA4 Aa*- den/’ Digitized by Google Chap. I. HERAKLEITUS. 31 process on one side, and the persistence of particular states on the other. The universal law or process is generative and destructive, positive and negative, both in one : but the par- ticular realities in which it manifests itself are all positive, each succeeding to its antecedent, and each striving to main- tain itself against the negativity or destructive interference of the universal process. Each particular reality represented rest and fixity : each held ground as long as it could against the pressuro of the constant cosmical force, essentially mov- ing, destroying, and renovating. Herakleitus condemns such pretensions of particular states to separate stability, inasmuch as it keeps back the legitimate action of the universal force, in the work of destruction and renovation. The theory of Herakleitus thus recognised no permanent substratum, or Ens, either material or immaterial Ill0JtnGUU Kal k, cfyai 54 icayton ou8(y, %v 8c rt p.6vov inroficyciy, ov raSha tt&vtcl **- tpvKtv ftirtp io'tKCUTiv &\\oi rc iroAAol \cycip #cai 'HpcUXftToy 6 * Ey, ofs rb «T vai oh x ^ 5 o h a l a t i s yiyo p cvy A A A* a ( ) i y y c- v « 4perat : Aristotle, Metaphys. iii. 8, p. 1012, b. 24. toiKe 8’ 6 ply 'HpajcXelrov \6yos, A lyuev irdyra flvai kcu plj eJyai, airayra iX if$rj sroiety : Aristot. Topic, viii. 5, p. 155, b., olov dyaOby ko! KaKbv elyai ravrbvy KaOairfp 'HpdK\ftr6s aU>crai — rb y bp ovnxis ari Primo Frigido, c. 17, p. 952, F.). rrjs Kirfiatut abidairacrroy aurd Kal Tho distinction made by Hera- \ptep*vov Tcpbs iamb Schowt — rjj 8i kleitus, but not clearly marked out or bXr)6cia tovtot* airrb iamb SiaStx 6- preserved, between tho ideal fire or p*¥ov> obbiirmi rb ainb pivei — tj yap universal process, and the elementary l^(\Kvcrdticra 8 id tt^t dtppbrriros Upas fire or first stage towards realisation, 6pov t« yafO-q Ka\ *ir is brought out by Lassalle (Herokleitos, A lyvvv iKKavdtiaa ptrtTOiij- vol. ii. p. 25-29). B-n, Ac. VOL. I. I) Digitized by Google 34 PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY, Chap. I. trough was for the time reversed, so that the dark side was turned towards us; and the different phases of the moon were occasioned by the gradual turning round of the trough in which her light was contained. Of the phenomena of thunder and lightning also, Herakleitus offered some explana- tion, referring them to aggregations and conflagrations of the clouds, and violent currents of winds.11 Another hypothesis was often ascribed to Herakleitus, and was really embraced by several of the Stoics in later times — that there would come a time when all existing things would be destroyed by fire (eKTrvpmcrii), and afterwards again brought into reality in a fresh series of changes. But this hypothesis appears to have been conceived by him metaphysically rather than physically. Fire was not intended to designate the physical process of combustion, but was a symbolical phrase for the universal process ; the perpetual agency of conjoint destruction and renovation, manifesting itself in the putting forth and re-absorption of particulars, and having no other reality except as immanent in these particulars.' The determinate Kosmos of the present moment is perpetually destroyed, passing into fire or the indeterminate : it is perpetually reno- vated or passes out of fire into water, earth — out of the in- determinate, into the various determinate modifications. At the same time, though Herakleitus seems to have mainly employed these symbols for the purpose of signifying or typifying a metaphysical conception, yet there was no clear apprehension, even in his own mind, of this generality, apart from all symbols : so that the illustration came to count as a physical fact by itself, and has been so understood by many." b Aristot. Metoorol. ii. e. p. 355, a. Flato, Republ. vi. p. 498, c. 11 ; Plu- tarcli. Do Exilic, c. 11, p. 004 A.; Plutarch, Do bid. ot Ostrid. o. 48, p. 370, E. ; Diogen. L. ix. 10 : Plu- tarch, Placit. Philos, ii. 17-22-24-28, p. 889-891 ; Stobmus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 594. About tho doctrino of tho Stoics, built in part upon this of Herakleitus, see Cicero, Natur. Door. ii. 46 ; Seneca, Queest. Natur. ii. 5, vi. 10. 0 Aristot. or Psoudo-Aristot. De 51 undo, 4k vivTuv Jy sal 4£ iy'ot vdsra. * See Lnssallo, Herakleitos, voL ii. s. 20-27, p. 254-258. Compare about the obscure and de- bated meaning of the Heraklciteau iicriipwffif' Schleiennacher, Heraklei- tos, p. 103 ; Zeller, Gesch. der Philos, vol. l. p. 477-479. The won! 5uwv aytfpec 4vl£ys, denote, not any distinct or fixed local XwpurtMs 5* duro&dK A«i %v irportpov re gion, but the rotatory movement or tlx* pvypoviKifv bvvap.iv 4v dyprjyo- circulation of the elements, fire, water, p6icoi *al pi*Xovri voepip. Ob y&p t p6. t» . . did not mesa his view the public were wrong, collectively ns well u»RM*m<>f 1 ° J most men as as individually. The universal reason to which he a a, but »• a *' ought to be. made appeal, was not the reason of most men as it actually is, but that which, in his theory, ought to be their reason : “ that which formed the perpetual and governing process throughout all nature, though most men neither recognised nor attended to it, but turned away from it in different directions equally wrong. No man was truly possessed of reason, unless his individual mind understood the general scheme of the universe, and moved in full sympathy with its perpetual movement and alternation or unity of contraries." The universal process contained in itself a sum-total of particular contraries which were suc- cessively produced and destroyed : to know the universal was to know these contraries in one, and to recognise them as {uovfft v ol xoAAoi us iSlav 4xoyT*s is cited by Lossalle, ii. p. 330, describing the licruklciteun doc- trine, Sia t vino 4k tvs dvudvpidatus airr^v (Kfyer (Herakleitus) r uv y ip yrpaypdruy 4v kiv4<**i Smuy Sriv Kal ri yiyoMTKoy xi vpdypara 4v kivvj i«l rivai Kara tS yvUGTlKOV 4v Kivqfffl. Digitized by Google 38 PllE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. Chap. I. transient, but correlative and inseparable, manifestations, each implying the other— not ns having each a separate reality and each excluding its contrary.0 In so far as a man’s mind maintained its kindred nature and perpetual conjoint movement with the universal, he acquired true knowledge ; but the individualising influences arising from the hotly usually overpowered this kindred with the universal, and obstructed the continuity of this movement, so that most persons became plunged in error and illusion. The absolute of Herakleitus stands thus at the opposite Htrakieina pole as compared with that of Parmenides: it is idle pole from absolute movement, change, generation and destruc- i onuenuka. ^jQn — negation of all substance and stability,1* except as a temporary and unbecoming resistance of each successi\e particular to tho destroying and renewing current of the universal. The Heal, on this theory, was a generalisation, not of substances, but of facts, events, changes, revolutions, destructions, generations, &c., determined by a law of justice or necessity which endured, and which alone endured, for ever. Herakleitus had many followers, who adopted his doctrine wholly or partially, and who gave to it develop- ments which he had not adverted to, perhaps might not have acknowledged.11 It was found an apt theme by those who, • Stobnus, Eclog. Phys. p. 58 ; j and tbo passage of Philo Jiulrcus, cited by Schleiermacher, p. 437 ; as , well as more fully by Lasaulle, vol. ii. p. 265-267. (Quia rerum divinnr. | Inured, p. 503, Mangey j, Ip yap rb 4£ aptyo'iv riiv iyavritay, olt rfxrjBfyros I yvupipa rb ivbvria’ Ou toDt’ 4(rr\v 5 Qatriv t'EAAijp« rby p 4yav koI bolbtpoy Trap* abro?s 'HpebtAftToi', K«paAaioy t fjs airrov TrpofrTijtrdptyoy la$, av\uv a>s ivptffti Kcuyrj ; iraAai bv ybp tPpijpa M afvfffds 4*, ov&t Tit ovAo*A*Vou SaraTOio TfAomj, aAAa fiovov ftt£t< T t &tdAAafi? rt fiiyiiruiV iart, ^uoTt)xov (Love and Discord) Ktivun7trai curntTOf aiujv. These ore new Empetloklean veraca, derived from the recently published fragments of Hippolytus(Hfer. Refat. j ami printed by 8tein, v. 110, in hia collection of the Fragments of Em- pcdoklea, p. 43. Compare auother paaaage in the same treatise of Hip- poly tu*, p. 251. v Emped. Fr. v. 59. Ovtwc dppovirp irvco'ip rpv^Mp ttmjpiKTai afaupo* cvcAotc prft, povijj wtptyrf$ti yaiaiv. Plutarch, Do Facie in Orbe Lunio, c. 12. Atx>ut tlio divinity ascribed by Em- pedoklcs to Bpluorus, see Ariatot. Mctaphys. B. 4, p. 1000, a. 20. Sravra yap in toutov ’vtlvovt) tAA \a iarlv ttK^v 6 0*01 (i.c. Spine rus;. Ei yap Hy %v to vtixot iv rots Trpdypatn. tv tiv ?iv Sravra Sr tp-rpriv, (Empedokles). See Prollcr, Ilist. Philoe. ex Fontibus Contcxta, sect. 171, 172, ed. 3. The condition of things which Empedokles calls Spherus may be illustrated (translating his Love and Enmity into the modem phraseology of attraction and repukion) from an eminent modem work on Physics : — “ Were there only atoms and attrac- tion, ns now explained, the whole material of creation would rush into clone contact, and the universe would be one huge solid mass of stillness and death. There is heat or caloric, however, which directly counteracts attraction, and singularly modifies the results. It lias been described by some as a most subtile fluid pervading all things as water docs a sjxinge : others have accouutcd it merely a vibration among the atoms. The truth is, that wo know little more of heot ns a cause of repulsion, than of gravity as a cause of attraction : but wo can study and classify the phenomena of both most accurately.” 'Dr. Amott, Elements of Physics, vol. i. p. 26.) * Emp. Fr. 66-70, Karst rrdv7a yap e(t iij< r«A« pt^tro yvtc Btolo Digitized by Google 42 l’RE-SOKRATIC FHILOSOII1Y. Chap. I. mass. This mass, under the simultaneous and conflicting influences of Love and Enmity, became distributed partly into homogeneous portions where each of the four elements was accumulated by itself — partly into compounds or indi- vidual substances, where two or more elements were found in conjunction. Like had an appetite for Like — Air for Air, Fire for Fire, and so forth : and a farther extension of this appetite brought about the mixture of different elements in harmonious compounds. First, the Air disengaged itself, and occupied a position surrounding the central mass of Earth and Water: next, the Fire also broke forth, and placed itself externally to the air, immediately in contact with the outermost crystalline sphere, formed of condensed and frozen air, which formed the wall encompassing the lvosmos. A remnant of Fire and Air still remained embodied in the Earth, but the great mass of both so distributed themselves, that the former occupied most part of one hemisphere, the latter most part of the other.* The rapid and uniform rota- tion of the Kosmos, caused by the exterior Fire, compressed the interior elements, squeezed the water out of the earth like perspiration from the living body, and thus formed the sea. The same rotation caused the earth to remain un- moved, by counterbalancing and resisting its downward pres- sure or gravity.” In the course of the rotation, the light hemisphere of Fire, and the comparatively dark hemisphere of Air, alternately came above the horizon : hence the inter- change of day and night. Empedokles (like the Pytha- goreans) supposed the Sun to be not self-luminous, but to be a glassy or crystalline body which collected and reflected the light from the hemisphere of Fire. He regarded the fixed stars as fastened to the exterior crystalline sphere, and revolving along with it, but the planets as moving free and detached from any sphere.0 He supposed the alternations of winter and summer to arise from a change in the proportions * Plutarch up. Euseh. Prop. Evnnj?. 1 De Ccolo, ii. 13, 14; iii. 2, 2. r)jy yrtv i. 8, 10; Plutarch, Placit. Philos, ii. G, t rijs Slnjs i\p*puv, &c. Empedokles p. 887 ; Aristot. Ethic. Nic. viii. 2. j called the sea Ibpwra ttjj yrjs. Einp. h Emped. Fr. 185, Karsteii. aldbp Fr. 451, Kareten ; Aristot. Meteor, ii. 8. ay rS>v Tcrrapcov trro ixtiuy rjyttro yiyvt ffdau ' r^y ruy avyQtrwv crupdruv dia- dpUXTKOV, Ac. Empedokles illustrates this influx and cfHux of air in respiration by the klepsydra, a vessel with one high and narrow neck, but with a broad bottom pierced with many small holes. When the neck was kept closed by the finger or otherwise, the vessel might be plunged into water, but no water would et Sensili, a. 12, vol. i. p. 651, ed. Schneider). n Emp. Ft. v. 275, setjq. Karst. The comments of Aristotle on this theory of Empedokles are hardly per- tinent : they refer to respiration by the nostrils, which was not what Kmpe- doklea had in view (Aristot. Do Rcspi- rat. c. 3). ° Karsten, Do Emp. Philoaoph. p. Digitized by Google 46 PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPI1Y. CnAP. I. The doctrine of pores and effluvia, which formed so eonspi- n.*irin» or cuous an item in the physics of Empedokles, was porn - ex- applied by him to explain sensation. He main- jiVwpikm,- tained the general doctrine (which Parmenides had nlcAtion of advanced before him, and which Plato retained with tlie aeti- after him), that sensation was produced by like aet- — uk™!S-un* ing upon like : Herakleitus before liim, and Anaxa- e goras after him, held that it was produced by unlike acting upon unlike. Empedokles tried (what Purmenides hnd not tried) to apply his doctrine to the various senses separately.11 51 an was composed of the same four elements as the universe around him ; and since like always tended towards like, so by each of the four elements within himself, he perceived and knew the like element without. Effluvia from all bodies entered his pores, wherever they found a suitable chanuel : hence he perceived and knew earth by earth, water by water, and so forth.11 Empedokles, assuming perception and knowledge to be produced by such intercom- munication of the four elements, believed that not man and animals only, but plants and other substances besides, per- ceived and knew in the same way. Everything possessed a certain measure of knowledge, though less in degree than man, who was a more compound structure/ Perception and ascend into it through the holes in the bottom, because of the resistance of the nir within. As soon as the neck was freed from pressure*, and the air within allowed to oseajK!, the water would im- mediately rush up through the holes in the bottom. This illustration is interesting. It shows that Empedokles was distinctly aware of the pressure of the air a« countervailing the ascending move- ment of the water, and the removal of that pressure as allowing such move- ment. ov&4 t> oyyot 4* o/x/9poc «$t tr ttritv «iri Tprfna.ro. wvxva, Ac. This dealing with the klepsydrn seems to have been a favourite amusement with children. p Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 2, p. 647, Schneid. v Emp. Frag. Karst, v. 2G5, seq. yvutff, or* vdvrwv t'urlv anoppoal, 6 tyivovr o, Ac. ib. v. 322. yairj p.iv yap yai ontuiraptv, v4an 4' v4up, alOtpi 4' aidepa Stoy, drop tvpi » rvp diSrjAo y, trTOpyrj Si aropyrfy, »«i«coc 4* re wwn Avypw. Theophrastus, do Sensu, c. 10, p. 650, Schneid. Aristotle says that Empedokles re- garded each of these six as a f foul, vital principle ) by itself. Sextus Empiricus treats Emjwdokles as con- sidering each of the six to lie a Kpirif piov dA riBtias (Aristot. Do Animu, l. 2; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 116). v Emp. Ft. v. 313, Karst, ap. Sext. Empir. cont Mathem. viii. 286; also apud Diogen. L. viii. 77. navra yap icrtfi •fipoi'rjcri v *\rty Kai yatparot ala ay. Stein gives fEmp. Fr. v. 221) several lines immediately preceding this from Digitized by Google Chap. I. EMFEDOKLES. 47 knowledge was more developed in different animals, in pro- portion as their elementary composition was more mixed and varied. The blood, as the most compound portion of the whole body, was the principal seat of intelligence.’ In regard to vision, Empedokles supposed that it was operated mainly by the fire or light within the eye, sen*? or though aided by the light without. The interior vlslon‘ of the eye was of fire and water, the exterior coat was a thin layer of earth and air. Colours were brought to the eye as effluvia from objects, and became apprehended as sensations by passing into the alternate pores or ducts of fire and water : white colour was fitted to (or in symmetry with) the pores of fire, black colour with those of water.1 Some animals had the proportions of fire and water in their eyes better adjusted, or more conveniently located, than others : in some, the fire was in excess, or too much on the outside, so as to obstruct the pores or ducts of water : in others, water was in excess, and fire in defect The latter were the animals which saw better by day than by night, a great force of external light being required to help out the deficiency of light within : the former class of animals saw better by night, because, when there was little light without, the watery ducts were less com- pletely obstructed — or left more free to receive the influx of black colour suited to them.® In regard to hearing, Empedokles said that the ear was like a bell or trumpet set in motion by the air with- <* out; through which motion, the solid parts were eut*. the treatise of Hippolytus ; but they oversight of Empedokles : but it cannot are sadly corrupt. | be so considered, for Empedokles (as Parmenides had held the same opi- well as Parmenides) appears to havo nion before— sal SAwr war to ir *xtLV , accepted tho consequence, and to havo ti ra -yr£»Tir—up. Theophrust. do Seusu, denied all such difference, except one s. 1. j of degree, as to perception and know- Thcophrastus, in commenting upon lodge, the doctrine of Empedokles, takes as * Emp. Frag. 310, Karst, ofpo yip one of his grounds of objection — That avdpwwou wtpiwdp&ior fori rorjaa. Empedokles, in maintaining sensation Comp. Thonphrast. do Seusu, s. 11. and knowledge to he produced by in- I 1 Emp. Frag. v. 301-310, Karst, ri flux of the elements into pores, made ! r* ir fiijrty^ir tipyptvoy irydyiov wvp, no difference between animated and &a. Thenphr. Do Sensu, s. 7, 8 ; Ari- inanimate substances (Theophr. Do slot. De Sensu, c. 3 ; Aristot, Do Gen. Sens. s. 12-23). Theophrastus puts , et Corrupt, i. 8. this as if it were an inconsistency or I * Theophrastus De Sensu, s. 7, 8. Digitized by Google 48 PRE-SOKKATIC PHILOSOPHY. Chap. I. brought into shock against the air flowing in, and caused the sensation of sound within.1 Smell was, in his view, an adjunct of the respiratory process: persons of acute smell were those who had the strongest breathing : olfactory effluvia came from many bodies, and especially from such as were b'ght and thin, Respecting taste and touch, he gave no farther explanation than his general doctrine of effluvia and pores : he seems to have thought that such interpenetra- tion was intelligible by itself, since here was immediate and actual contact. Generally, in respect to all the senses, he laid it down that pleasure ensued when the matter which flows in was not merely fitted in point of structure to pene- trate the interior pores or ducts (which was the condition of all sensation), but also harmonious with them in respect to elementary mixture. y Empedokles held various opinions in common with the Pythagoreans and the brotherhood of the Orphic mysteries — especially that of the metempsychosis. He represented himself as having passed through prior states of existence, as a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish. He proclaims it as an obligation of justice, absolute and universal, not to kill any- thing that had life : he denounces as an abomination the sacrificing or eating of an animal, in whom per- haps might dwell the soul of a deceased friend or power. brother.* His religious faith, however, and his opinions about Gods, Damons, and the human soul, stood apart (mostly in a different poem) from his doctrines on kos- * Thoophrnst. Do £ensu, b. 9-21. Empedoklcs described the car under the metaphor of at ipKivov b(oy, “ the fleshy branch.” y Thoophrast. De Sensu, b. 9, 10. The criticisms of Theophrastus upon this theory of Empedokles are extremely interesting, as illustrating the change in the Grecian physiological point of view during a century and a half : but I reserve them until I come to the Aristotelian age. I may remark, how- ever, that Theophrastus. disputing the doctrine of sensory effluvia generally, disputes the existence of the olfac- tory effluvia not less than the rest s. 20}. 1 Emp. Fmg. v. 980-410, Knrsten ; Plutarch, De Esu Camium, p. 998. Aristot. Rhetoric, i. 19. iar\ ydp, Hairrfvovrai *rd*'T«r, tyvaa noivbv StKauoy koX iStKov, k& v nrjtitpla irpbs aAA^Aour Koivuyla avvBi]K7] *Ep.irt6oK\Tjs \*yci irtp} rov KTtiytiy t b f/A^vxov' rouro ykp oe, rtai fit v Stjcctioi', rial 8’ ow btKtuov , "AAA a rb warnin' rogigor, Sia r tvpvy.*- ioms \l9ipoi Tcrarat, 8ia r‘ airXtrov avyijs. Sext. Empiric, ndv. Mnthem. ix. 127. Digitized by Google Chap. I. ANAXAGORAS. 49 mology and physiology. In common with many Pythago- reans, he laid great stress on the existence of Dromons (of intermediate order and power between Gods and men), some of whom had been expelled from the Gods in consequence of their crimes, and were condemned to pass a long period of exile, as souls embodied in various men or animals. He laments the misery of the human soul, in himself as well as in others, condemned to this long period of expiatory degra- dation, before they could regain the society of the Gods.* In one of his remaining fragments, he announces himself almost as a God upon earth, and professes his willingness as well as ability to impart to a favoured pupil the most won- derful gifts — powers to excite or abate the winds, to bring about rain or dry weather, to raise men from the dead.b He was in fact a man of universal pretensions; not merely an expositor of nature, but a rhetorician, poet, physician, pro- phet, and conjuror. Gorgias the rhetor had been personally present at his magical ceremonies.0 None of the remaining fragments of Empedokles are more remarkable than a few, in which he deplores the CompUlnl of impossibility of finding out any great or compre- hensive truth, amidst the distraction and the suffer- Ending out ings of our short life. Every man took a different trulh' road, confiding only in his own accidental experience or par- ticular impressions ; but no man could obtain or communicate satisfaction about the whole/1 Anaxagoras of Klazomenro, a friend of the Athenian Peri- kles, and contemporary of Empedokles — was a man of far simpler and less ambitious character: devoted to physical * Emp. Frag. v. 5-18, Karst.; com- pare Herod, ii. 123 ; Plato, Phaxlrus, 55, p. 216 C. ; Plutarch, De Lad. et Oaind. e. 26. Plutarch observes in another place on the large proportion of religious myst icism blended with the philosophy of Empedokles — Xoac pa-njr . 'AAA* $ri(p irAficrra tvi, ravra 4ySrj\6rara ty f-KcurrSy 4atrl xay iv itovt! ptplxdai, Si6n iray 4k irarr&y iupw v yiyvipuyoy’ ^ovro Soku* flycu rfyy 11 or them, the infinite mass of Air and /Ether (Fire), which surrounded the mixed mass and kept it together.1 Thus all things continued for an infinite time in a tho con»titu. state of rest and nullity. The fundamental con- cnt particle* . t _ _ _ _ in movement, tranes, — wet, dry, hot, cold, light, dark, dense, rare, — in their intimate contact neutralised each other.® Upon this inert mass supervened the agency of Nous or mind. The cliaracteristic virtue of mind was, that it alone was com- pletely distinct, peculiar, pure in itself, unmixed with any thing else : thus marked out from all other tilings which were indissolubly mingled with each other. Having no communion of nature with other things, it was noway acted upon by them, but was its own master or autocratic, and was of very great force. It was moreover the thinnest and purest of all things; possessing complete knowledge respecting all other things. It was like to itself throughout — the greater mani- festations of mind similar to the less.” But though other things could not act upon mind, mind Movement of could act upon them. It first originated movement tho m*», ori- in the quiescent mass. The movement impressed Sous on a was that of rotation, which first began on a small but gradually scale, then gradually extended itself around, be- cxU’udiuK it- . D I . - wir. Like coming more efficacious as it extended, and still particle* con- . , _ , _ grcgate to- continuing to extend itself around more and more. 1 Anaxag. Frag. 1 ; Sehaub. p. 65. | and Do Ccolo, iii. 301, a. 12, *ki»4- ’Opov irdvra xp%tlara dirtipa Kal ra/y yap &px*rai (Anaxagoras; Kocrpo- ir\7}0oj koI (rpiKobrijra. Kal ydp rb lrottlv. trptKpbv Airttpoy qv. Kal irdyrwv dpov n Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Sclrnub. iiyrwv oiibty t6bif\oy inrb trputpd- Tx the remaining multitude. Thus flesh, bone, and tir»urpnr«or other similar portions of the animal organism, were i»>i oti.or (according to Anaxagoras) more nearly pure (with i* one constituent more thoroughly preponderant, and ciVih, tSS] all other coexistent natures more thoroughly sub- or ordinate and latent) than the four Empedoklean elements, Air, Fire, Earth, &c. ; which were compounds wherein many of the numerous ingredients present were equally effective, so that the manifestations were more con- ° Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Sch. Kal vyjs ir«pix»pi70’ioj rris (vfixdarjs rods iKpdryatv, &pTiri;c insunt vires: proprio silo ponder© Aristot. De Anim&, i. 2, G5-6-13. nsec, qua) mentis vi ninta et eocreta Aristotle says that the languago of sunt, feruntur in cum locum, quo nuno Anaxagoras about vous and "'as sunt.” not perfectly clear or consistent. But Compare Alexnnd. Aphmd. ap. Scho- it (as ms also from Plato De Legg. xii. lia ad Aristot. Physic, ii. p. 194, a. p. 907, B, that Anaxagoras made no fSchol. p. 348 a Brandis), Marlnch, distinction between eoOr and ilfvx^l. Lehrbuch der Qesch. Philos, s. 54, noto Compare Plato, Kmtylus, p. 100 A. 2, p. 82 : Preller, Hist. Phil, ex fontibua h Annxng. Fr. 8, and Schauhoch’s contexta, s. 53, with his comment. Comm. p. 112-150. e Plato, Pliaedo, c. 107, 108, p. 98 ; “ Mens erat id, quod movebat molcm ' Plato, De Legg. xii. p. 907 B; Aristot. homeeomeriarmn : nac mtione, per hunc Metaphya. A. 4, p. 985, b. 18, Plato, motum h monte cxritatum, secretio Turneus, 34 A, 88 E. Digitized by Google 58 PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. Chap. I. assuming good purposes of Nous which each combination was intended to answer — but by physical analogies, well or ill chosen, and especially by the working of the grand cosmical rotation."1 This we learn from Plato and Aristotle, who blame Anaxa- goras for inconsistency in deserting his own hypothesis, and puto ami in invoking explanations from physical agencies, to wam'.-' Anai- the neglect of Nous and its supposed optimising Swriin* his purposes. But Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge own theory, ^y )ijs remaining fragments, seems not to have committed any such inconsistency. He did not proclaim his Nous to be a powerful extra-cosmical Architect, like the Demiurgus of Plato — nor an intra-cosmical, immanent, un- deliberating, instinct (such as Aristotle calls Nature), tending towards the production and renewal of regular forms and conjunctions, yet operating along with other agencies which produced concomitants irregular, unpredictable, often even obstructive and monstrous. Anaxagoras appears to conceive his Nous as one among numerous other real agents in Nature, material like the rest, yet differing from the rest as being powerful, simple, and pure from all mixture,* as being endued with universal cognizance, as being the earliest to act in point of time, and as furnishing the primary con- dition to the activity of the rest by setting on foot the cosmical rotation. The Homoeomeries are coetemal with, d Aristoph. Nub. 380, 828. al$4pios Afyos — Atyor &aai\«v(i, rbv A? Kt)\oku% — the sting of which applies to Anaxagoras and his doctrines — Anaxagoras Siyous nyas ayofa-ovs hva- lurypatpwv — t p rod vov awpa^lcf. iral avoia (Clemens Alexandria Stromat. ii. p. 304). To root* (in the active sense, t. e. to cause movement in) and to Imoic, arc the two attributes of the Anaxngorean NoC* (Aristotel. De Anima, i. 2. p. 405, a. 18j. * Anaxagoras, Fr. 8, p. 100, Schauta «(TTi yap ArirroTaroi' « jravTwK XPVt** rur, 4c. This means, not that yovs was unex- tended or immaterial, but that it was thinner or more subtle than cither fire or air. Heraklcitus regarded rb rtpU- Xov as \uyiK by Kal K yevraros in the series of phy- sical theorists. b Diogen. An. Fragm. ii. c. 29 ; Panzerb. Theopnrastus Do Sensu, s. 39. el yhp ra Iv ry5f k 6 a pep yvy iivra yrj kcu 55 cop Kai r&AAa, 5 aa epalyercu 4v 5e ry nSerpep Hyra, el t oxnecov n if* rb Prepay rov irepov erepoy iby rjj ISljj epverei, Kai pi) rb airrb 4by pereiriirre tco\ Aa^wy #cai fare- polovro’ ovbapr) o6r e pltryeffOai &AA^- \ois i)bvyaro o(ne &v fxipiov tow 6todj trrifxuov dvai, Sri w oA- Aaitts wpbs &AAa rbv vovv txovr °^' dpuficv oth ’ iucovopitv. The Bfimc opi- | u ion — that sensation, like thought, is a mental process, depending on physical conditions- is ascribed to Strato (the j disciple and successor of Theophrastus by Porphyry, De Abstinentia, iii. 21. | 2-rpctrojwoy tow (pvaikou \6yos torlv dwoStiKvvtav y us ou8i aivxh aytis A iOous teal i rap’ ainb todt* avuyvp.ovs' xlrroma xoWdtcis M rijs yris a&4vvva8ai' *a$dv(p rhv iv Kiybs xorafiois Trvpot&cltt >ra bar r 4 pa ir4rpivov. This remarkable anticipation of modem astronomy — tho recognition of aerolites as a class of non- luminous earthy bodies revolving round the son, but occasionally coming within the sphere of the tortus attraction, be- coming luminous in our atmosphere, falling on the earth, and there being ex- tinguished— is noticed by Alex, von Humboldt in his Kosmos, vol. i. p. 98- 104, Eng. trnns. He says — “ The opi- nion of Diogenes of Apollonia entirely accords with that of the present day/’ p. 110. Tho charm and value of that j interesting hook is greatly enhanced by j his frequent reference to the ancient ' points of view on astronomical subjects. ° Plutarch, Placit. Philos, ii. 8 ; Panzerbieter, Diog. Ap. c. 76-78 ; 1 Schauboch ad Anaxngor. Fr. p. 175. p Plutarch ap. Eusebium, Pra»p. Evnng. i. 8. i Prellor, Hist. Philoeoph. Graoc.- Rom. ex fontibus oontexta, sect. 68. Preller thinks that Diogenes employed his chief attention “ in animautium naturu ex oeris principio repetendA and that he was less full “ in cogni- tione twv n*r*&pt*v” But tlie frag- ments scarcely justify this. F 2 Digitized by Google PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. Chap. I. (>8 Nearly contemporary with Anaxagoras and Empedokles, two i/nwpptu other enquirers propounded a new physical theory kriiu»- very different from those already noticed — usually Atomic the- * ' , . , oT7' known under the name of the atomic theory. . 1 his theory, though originating with the Eleate Leukippus, ob- tained celebrity chiefly from his pupil Demokritus of Abd£ra, its expositor ami improver. Demokritus (born seemingly in B.c. 4G0, and reported to have reached extreme old age) was nine years younger than Sokrates, thirty-three years older than Plato, and forty years younger than Anaxagoras. The age of I.eukippus is not known, but he can hardly have been much younger than Anaxagoras/ Of Leukippus we know nothing : of Demokritus, very- little mngiifr. — yet enough to exhibit a life, like that of Anax- agoras, consecrated to philosophical investigation, p*™™™"1 and neglectful not merely of politics, but even of temokrtiut. inherited patrimony." Ilia attention was chiefly turned towards the study of Nature, with conceptions less vague, and a more enlarged observation of facts, than any of his contemporaries had ever bestowed, lie was enabled to boast that no one had surpassed him in extent of tra- velling over foreign lands, in intelligent research and con- verse with enlightened natives, or in following out the geometrical relations of lines/ He spent several years in visiting Egypt, Asia Minor, and Persia. His writings were numerous, and on many different subjects, including ethics, as well as physics, astronomy, and anthropology. None of them have been preserved. But we read even from critics like Dionysius of Halikamassus and Cicero, that they were composed in an impressive and semi -poetical style, not unworthy to be mentioned in analogy with Plato ; while in r Diogen. Loert. ix. 41. Sec the chronology of Demokritus discussed in Mullacn, Frag. Dein. p. 12-25 ; ami in Zeller, Gcsch. Pliiloeoph. vol. i. p. I 570-581, 2nd edit. The statement of Apollodorua as to the date of his birth, appears more trustworthy than the earlier dab* assigned by Thrasyllus (B.c. 470). Demokritus declared him- ! self to be forty years younger tlian Anaxagoras. • Dionys. ix. 30-39. * Dcmokrit. Fmgm. 0, p. 238, ed. Muliach. Compare ib. p. 41 ; Diogcn. Laert. ix. 35 ; Strabo, xv. p. 703. Pliny, Hist. Nutur. “ Ekroocritus — vitam inter exjierimentA eonsumpsit,” Ac. Digitized by Google Chap. I. DEMOKIUTUS. 69 range and diversity of subjects they are hardly inferior to Aristotle.11 The theory of Leukippus and Demokritus (we have no means of distinguishing the two) appears to have E(.ullon grown out of the Eleatic theory.1 Parmenides the Uft*. Eleate (as I have already stated) in distinguishing Ens, the self-existent, real, or absolute, on one side menklC8' — from the phenomenal and relative on the other — con- ceived the former in such a way that its connection with the latter was dissolved. The real and absolute, according to him, was One, extended, enduring, continuous, unchange- able, immoveable : the conception of Ens included these affirmations, and at the same time excluded peremptorily Non- Ens, or the contrary of Ens. Now the plural, unextended, transient, discontinuous, changeable, and moving, implied a mixture of Ens and Non-Ens, or a partial transition from one to the other. Hence (since Non-Ens was inadmissible) such plurality, &c., could not belong to the real or absolute (ultra-phenomenal), and could only be affirmed as pheno- menal or relative. In the latter sense, Parmenides did affirm it, and even tried to explain it : he explained the phenomenal facts from phenomenal assumptions, apart from and inde- pendent of the absolute. While thus breaking down the bridge between the phenomenal on one side and the absolute on the other, he nevertheless recognised each in a sphere of its own. • Cicero, Orat. c. 20; Dionys. Do Comp. Verbor. c. 24 ; Sextus Empir. udv. Mathem.* vii. 265. Ari^tcpiros, 6 Trj At bs vj 7 irapfiKaCdjuyos, &C. Diogenes (ix. 45-48) enumerates the titles of the treatises of Demokritus, as edited in tho days of Tiberius by the rhetor Thrasyllus : who distributed i them into tetralogies, as he also distri- | buted the dialogues of Plato. It was probably the charm of style, common to Demokritus with Plato, which in- duced the rhetor thus to edit them both. In regard to scope and spirit of j philosophy, the difference between the i two was so marked, that Plato is said to have had a positive antiputhy to the works of Demokritus, and a desire to burn them (^Aristoxenus ap. Diog. Lucrt. ix. 40). It could hardly bo from congeniality of doctrine that the samo editor attacned himself to both. It has been remarked that Plato never one© names Demokritus, while Aristotle cites him very frequently, sometimes with marked praise. * Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic, fol. 7 A. AfiWnros .... Kotva>yj)(ras rio pp.*vlSp rps < pi\oj fioKtt, rijy lyarrlav. Aristotel. De Gener. et Corr. i. 8, p. 251, a. 31, Diogen. Laert. ix. 30. Digitized by Google 70 PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. Chap. 1. This bridge the atomists undertook to re-establish. They nemukritcan admitted that Ens could not really change — that AtoiSf- tliere could be no real generation, or destruction — Vacua— Kn. no transformation of qualities — no transition of ana Non-En«. many jnto 0ne, or 0f one into many. But they denied the unity and continuity and immobility of Ens : they affirmed that it was essentially discontinuous, plural, and moving. They distinguished the extended, which Par- menides had treated as an Unum continuum, into extension with body, and extension without body: into plenum and vacuum, matter and space. They conceived themselves to have thus found positive meanings both for Ens and Non- Ens. That which Parmenides called Non-Ens or nothing, was in their judgment the vacuum ; not less self-existent than that which he called Something. They established their point by showing, that Ens, thus interpreted, would become reconcileable to the phenomena of sense : which latter they assumed as their basis to start from. Assuming motion us a phenomenal fact, obvious and incontestable, they asserted that it could not even appear to be a fact, without supposing vacuum as well as body to be real : and the proof that both of them were real was, that only in this manner could sense and reason be reconciled. Farther, they proved the existence of a vacuum by appeal to direct physical observation, which showed that bodies were porous, compressible; and capable of receiving into themselves new matter in the way of nutri- tion. Instead of the Parmenidean Ens, one and continuous, we have a Demokritean Ens, essentially many and discon- tinuous : plena and vacua, spaces full and spaces empty, being infinitely intermingled.y There existed atoms innumerable, r It is chiefly in the eighth chapter | of tlie treatise De Gener. et Corr. (1. 8) that Aristotle traces the doctrine of ! Leukippus as haying grown out of ; that of the Eleates. Atuxonros 8' tfiyOTj \6yovs , oTum x pbs r^v aXd\rj rf pi At£tv rov ivbpbs (Demokritus) 4v $ Stopifrrai, p.7) j uaAAov rb Six, ^ rb Upbbv dvar Mr fxlv dvofidfav rb crw/ia, Digitized by Google Char I. DEM0KB1TUS. 71 each one in itself essentially a plenum, admitting no vacant space within it, and therefore indivisible as well as inde- structible: but each severed from the rest by surrounding vacant space. The atom could undergo no change : but by means of the empty space around, it could freely move. Each atom was too small to be visible : yet all atoms were not equally small: there were fundamental differences be- tween them in figure and magnitude : and they had no other qualities except figure and magnitude. As no atom could bo divided into two, so no two atoms could merge into one. Yet though two or more atoms could not so merge together as to lose their real separate individuality, they might nevertheless come into such close approximation as to appear one, and to act on our senses as a phenomenal combination manifesting itself by new sensible properties.1 The bridge, broken down by Parmenides, between the real and the phenomenal world, was thus in theory re-established. For the real world, as described by Demokritus, differed entirely pnjbiy 8$ rb Kfvbv, Kai roirrov tpvciy nyh Kai inr6trratriy iSiay f xoyrot • The affirmation of Demokritus — That Nothing existed, just as much as Something — appears a paradox which wo must probably understand as im- plying that he hero adopted, for the sake of argument, the language of the Eleatcs, his opponents. They called the vacuum Nothing, but Demokritus did not so call it. If < said Demokritus) you call vacuum Nothing, then I say that Nothing exists as well as {Something. The direct observations by which Demokritus showed the existence of a vacuum were — 1. A vessel with ashes in it will hold as much water ns if it were empty: hence we know that there are pores in the ashes, into which the water is received. 2. Wine can be compressed in skins. 3. The growth of organised bodies proves that they have pores, through which new matter in the form of nourishment is admitted. (Aristot. Physic, iv. 0, p. 213, h.) Besides this, Demokritus set forth motion as an indisputable feet, ascer- tained by the evidence of sens© : and affirmed Hint motion wns impossible, except ou the assumption tliat vacuum j existed. Mclissus, the disciple of Par- menides, inverted tlio reasoning, in 1 arguing against the reality of motion. If it be real (ho said), then there must exist a vacuum : but no vacuum does or can exist : therefore there is no real motion. (Aristot. Physic, iv. 6.) Since Demokritus started from those facts of sense, as the base of his hypo* thesis of atoms and vacua, so Aristotle (Gen. et. Corr. i. 2 ; Do AnimA, i. 2) might reasonably say that he took sensible appearances as truth. But we find Demokritus also describing reason as an improvement and enlightenment of sense, and complaining bow little of truth was discoverable by man. See Mullock, Demokritus (p. 414, 415). Compare Philipson— *TAt; &.y6p*wtrn — Berlin, 1831. * Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 25, t& jrpwra fxtytdrj rd &8ialp*ru trripta. Diogeu. Laert. ix. 44 ; Plu- tarch, adv. Koloten. p. 1110 seq. Zeller, Gesch. der Philos, vol. i. p. 583-588, ed. 2nd ; Aristotel. Metaphys. I Z. 13, p. 1039, a. 10, b.8vyarov tlv&l wer), ore yet spoken of ns p. 185 : Diogen. Laert. ix. 72. objects of sense : they are os it wero t Aristotel. Gen. ct Corr. i. 8, p, 825, microscopic objects, and the yernriij a. 29. 'Avtipa t& r\rj8os sal iipara yvw^v, or intelligence, is conceived as Sia rtjy (T^iKpdrtjra t itv hyKnv. &c. supplying something of a microscopic Morbach observes .justly that the power. Marhaeh, IsJirbuch der Go- Demokritenn atoms, though not really schichto der Philosophic, sect. 58, vol. i. objects of senso in consequence of their p. 94.) Digitized by Google 76 PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. Chap. I. nations as to form the existing Kosmos ; and not that system alone, but also many other cosmical systems, independent of and different from each other, which he supposed to exist. IIow this was done we cannot clearly make out, not having before us the original treatise of Demokritus, called the Great Diakosmos. It is certain, however, that he did not invoke any separate agency to set the atoms in motion — such as the Love and Discord of Empedokles — the Nous or Intelligence of Anaxa- goras. Demokritus supposed that the atoms moved by an inherent force of their own : that this motion was as much without beginning as the atoms them- selves : h that eternal motion was no less natural, required any special cause to account for it, than eternal rest. “ Such is the course of nature — such is and always has been the fact,” was his ultimatum.1 He farther maintained that all the motions of the atoms were neces- sary— that is, that they followed each other in a deter- minate order, each depending upon some one or more antecedents, according to fixed laws, which he could not ex- plain.11 Fixed laws, known or unknown, he recognised always. No separate force mi ulred to set die atoms In mo- tion—they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms natur- ally tend to- wards like. Itotatory mo- tion, the capital fact of the Kosmoa. no more h Aristotel. De Coblo, iii. 2, 3, p. 300, b. 9. A tvKlirirtf> trod AtinoKplry, ro7s A iyovfftv ael Ktvutr6cu rh irpwra cru- fxara, &c. (Physic, viii. 3, 3, p. 253, b. 12, viii. 9, p. 205, b. 23; Cicero, Do Finib. i. 6, 17.) 1 Aristot. General Animal, ii. 6, p. 742, b. 20 ; Physic. viii. 1, p. 252, b. 32. Aristotle blames Demokritus for tli us acquiescing in the general course of nature os au ultimatum, and for omitting all reference to final causes. M. Lafaist, in a good dissertation Sur la Philosophic Atomistique (Paris, 1833, p. 78), sliows that this is exactly the ultimatum of natural philosophers at the present day. “Un phenomene so passoit il, si on lui en demamloit la raison, il (Demokritus) rtfpondoit, 'La chose se passe ainsi. pnrccqu’ello s'est toujours passee ainsi.' C'est, en d’autres tenues, la seule reponso quo font au- jourd’hui les naturalistcs. Suivant eux, une pierre, quand elle n’est pas sou- tenue, tombe en vertu de la loi de la posanteur. Quest ce que la loi de la pcsantcur ? La generalisation dc ce fuit plusieure fois observe*, qu’une pierre tombe quaml elle n’est pus soutenue. Le phe'nombne tlans uu cas part ic ul ier arrive ainsi, poreequo toujours il cat arrive ainsi. Le pnneipe qu’implique Implication dee naturalistes modernes est cclle de Demokrite, c’est que la nature demeure oonstante a elle-meme. I m proposition do Demokrite — * Tel phenomene a lieu de cette fu<;on, pareequo toujours il a eu lieu de cette menu- fatin’ — est la premiere forme qu' ait revetuo le principe de la sta- j bilito des lois natu relies/ k Aristotle Physic, ii. 4, p. 196, a. 25) says that Demokritus ( he seems to mean Demokritus i described the mo- tion of the atoms to form the cosmical system, as having taken place rov avrofi&Tou. Upon which Mullnch | (Dem. Frag. p. 382; justly remarks — I “ Casu i ivb ravTOfiarov) videntur fieri, queo natural i quadnm necessitate cujus leges ignoramus, evenire dicuntur. Bed quamvis Aristo teles nuturulem Ab- I deritani philosophi necessitatem vitato ' avayKris vocabulo, quod alii aliter Digitized by Google CltAP. I. DEMOKRITUS. 77 Fortuno or chance was only a fiction imagined by men to cover their own want of knowledge and foresight."1 Demo- kritus seems to have supposed that like atoms had a spon- taneous tendency towards like; that all, when uncombined, tended naturally downwards, yet with unequal force, owing to their different size, and weight proportional to size; that this unequal force brought them into impact and collision one with another, out of which was generated a rotatory motion, gradually extending itself, and comprehending a larger and larger number of them, up to a certain point, when an exterior membrane or shell was formed around them.n This rotatory motion was the capital fact which both constituted the Kosmos, and maintained the severance of its central and peripheral masses — Earth and Water in the centre — Air, Fire, and the celestial bodies, ©ear the circumference. Demokritus, Anaxagoras, and Einpedokles, imagined different preliminary hypotheses to get at the fact of rotation ; but all employed the fact, when arrived at, as a basis from which to usurpabant, casum et fbrtunam vocaret — ipse tii men Democritus abhorrens ab iis omnibus qua) destinntam causa rum seriem tollerent nruraque natururn per- turbs rent, nihil juris fortumo et casui in singulis rebus concessit.” Zeller lias a like remark upon the phrase of Aristotle, which is calculated to mislead as to the doctrine of Demo- kritus (Clesch. Philos, i. p. 000, 2nd. ed.). Dugald Stewart, in one of the Dis- sertations prefixed to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, has the like comment re- specting the fundamental principle of tne Epicurean (identical quoad hoc with the Demokritean philosophy. “ I cannot conclude this note without recurring to an observation ascribed by I.aplace to Leibnitz — ‘that the blind chance of the Epicureans involves the supposition of an effect taking place without a cause.* This is a very in- correct statement of the philosophy taught by Lucretius, which nowhere gives countenance to such a supposi- tion. The distinguishing tenet of this sect was, that the order of the universe does not imply the existence of intelli- gent causes, but may be accounted for by the active powers belonging to tho atoms of matter: which active powers, being exerted through an indefinitely long period of time, might have pro- duced, nay must have produced, exactly sucli a combination of things as that with which wo are surrounded. This does not call in question the necessity of a cause to produce every effect, but* on the contrary, virtually assumes tho truth of that axiom. It only excludes from these causes the attribute of in- telligence. In the same way, when I apply the words blind chance to the throw of a die, I do not mean to deny that I am ultimately tho cause of tho particular event that is to take place : but only to intimate that I do not hero act as a designing cause, in conse- quence of ray ignorance of the various accidents to which the die is subjected while shaken in the box. If I am not mistaken, this Epicurean theory ap- proaches very nearly to the scheme which it is the main object of tho Essay on Probabilities (by Laplace ) to inculcate.” (Stewart —First Disserta- tion, part ii. p. 139, note.) m Deiuoknt. Frag. p. 167, ed. Mul- lach ; Eusebius, Pnep. Evang. xiv. 27. A.vQpxot tvxvs *t5u\oy ix\daairro xp6 * Nor do we know how far he carried out that theory into detail by tracing the various phenomenal manifestations to their basis in atomic reality, and by showing what particular magnitude, figure, and arrangement of atoms belonged to each. It was only in some special cases that he thus connected de- terminate atoms with compounds of determinate quality : for example, in regard to the four Empedoklean elements. The atoms constituting heat or fire he affirmed to be small and glo- bular, the most mobile, rapid, and penetrating of all : those con- stituting air, water, and eart h, were an assemblage of all varieties of figures, but differed from each other in magnitude — the atoms of air being apparently smallest, those of earth largest/ In regard to mind or soul generally, he identified it with o^nSod^L or ®rc’ conceiving it to consist in the same wuh w'or very small, globular, rapidly moveable atoms, pene- throuffr1 trating everywhere: which he illustrated by eoin- ptanu! aod parison with the fine dust seen in sunbeams when sinning through a doorway. That these were the tcraingled ^ constituent atoms of mind, he proved by tho fact, LuTSrn111 that its first, and most essential property was to wdpZrtEta. move the body, and to be itself moved.1 Mind, ° Demokrit. Fregm. p. 208, Mnllach. ' Aristotle, Ocn. et Corr. i. 8, p.320, iv oh T)a\ Sivy euro iravrbs n. 5 ; Do Coeln, iii. 8, p, 300, b. 35 ; &TOKpiv«reai •Kuyroltuv tiStter, See. Theophrastus, De Scnsu, s. 04. Diog. Luert. ix. 31-44. • Aristotel. Do Aninm, i. 2, 2-3, p. p Zeller, Gcscli. Ph. i. p. 612, erl. 2nd. 403, b. 28 ; i. 3, p. 406, b. 20 ; Cirero, s Mullnch, Dcmokr. Fragm. p. 305 Tnseul. Disput. i. 11; Diogen. Laert. scqrj. ix. 44. Digitized by Google Chap. I. DEMOKRITUS. 79 soul, the vital principle, fire, heat, &c., were in the opinion of Demokritus, substantially identical — not confined to man or even to animals, but diffused in unequal proportions, throughout plants, the air, and nature generally. Sensation, thought, knowledge, were all motions of mind or of these restless mental particles, which Demokritus supposed to be distributed over every part of the living body, mingling and alternating with the corporeal particles.1 It was the essential condition of life, that the mental particles should be maintained in proper number and distribution throughout the body; but by their subtle nature they were constantly tending to escape, being squeezed or thrust out at all aper- tures by the pressure of air on all the external parts. Such tendency was counteracted by the process of respiration, whereby mental or vital particles, being abundantly distri- buted throughout the air, were inhaled along with air, and formed an inward current which either prevented the escape, or compensated the loss, of those wliich were tending out- wards. When breathing ceased, such inward current being no longer kept up, the vital particles in the interior were speedily forced out, and death ensued." Though Demokritus conceived these mental particles as distributed all over the body, yet he recognised ^ . J ° Different different mental aptitudes attached to different parts menmi «pu- of the body. Besides the special organs of sense, he considered intelligence as attached to the brain, gja* lho passion to the heart, and appetite to the liver : 1 the same tripartite division afterwards adopted by Plato. He gave an explanation of perception or sensation in its different varieties, as well as of intelligence or thought Sensation * Aristotel. De Respirat (o. 4, p. 472. a. 5), \4yci (Demokritus) y ^vxb Kai rb Otp/xbv rairrbv, ri i rpSna (Xxhp^rcL 4ptiv oltc 8rt y'tycrat trvpp.4rpa>s 4xov

v \ov iv ni'flpwTroiai paraLoramy, *0by tvpijrat 4>petCjv i (Kurlpiik*, Hacdw, 200.) *• llltiil in bi» robiw vereor. ne forte rearb Impia t<> ratiotiis itiirc ckinmta. viomquo Kndugrcdi scelerls.” ( Lucre tius, i. 85.) Compare Valckenaer, Diatiib. Eurip. j»p. 38, 30, cap. 5. About the accusations against So- krats, of lending the youth to contract doubts anti to slight the authority of their fathers, see Xenoph. Memor. i. , 2, 52 ; Plato, Gorgins, 522 13, p. 79, Menon, p. 70. A touching anecdote, illustrating this displeasure of the fathers against Sokrntes, may bo found in Xenophon, Cyropaxl. iii. 1.* 39, where I the father of Tigrunes puts to death the troy ui KairtATjerpuav kcli flpaivs j \6ytav axpi(3 Afvrordruy A j/fwv Uptv — also Hnme, 149, h. When Euripides (8 mnjviKbs t« Karri \6‘ F.vpimBrfs, itrtBtud'vm roi« Au/woiuratf #cai to i? ^aAaiTirjTOpoif, orrtp ear' iv*A6ov irA^oj' oi 8* OKpoeuperoi n’ur di-riAcryiwK *ai \vyit'is, bv ZotpOKAfjs ' Ap- icuv 088001, Adyip iviptvos pdvtp pdvos. Here the dissenter who proclaims his sincere convictions is spoken of with ropect : compare the contrary feeling Digitized by Google 264 PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. Chap. VI. him), far from recognising the infallibility of established King Nomos, were bold enough’ to try and condemn him, and to imagine (each of them) a new No^oy of his own, representing the political Art or Theory of Politics — a notion which would not have been understood by Themistokles or Aristeides. The dislike so constantly felt by communities having Aversion to- established opinions, towards free speculation and k rates ap- dialectic, was aggravated in its application to his extreme Sokrates, because his dialectic was not only novel, qp*Kh.‘7Hb but also public, obtrusive, and indiscriminate.* tan f«i« ' f The name of Sokrates, after his death, was cm- kr»)»iedKc a ployed not merely by Plato, but by all the Sokratic universal ; 1 * . * ' . , ’ must be uii- companions, to cover their own ethical speculations : ders t<>< h| as a * t 1 •ppracuun* moreover, all of them either composed works or gave i’imu/’Ou- lectures. But in either case, readers or hearers sou-cu. were comparatively few in number, and were chiefly persons prompted by some special taste or interest : while Sokrates passed his day in the most public place, eager to Leges, ix. 881 A, and in the tenth book generally. In the striking passage of the Republic, referred to in n previous i note (vi. 4112), Plato declares the lessons taught by tin* multitude— the contagion | of established custom and tradition, communicated by the crowd of earnest assembled believers— to bo of over- whelming and almost omnipotent force. The individual philosopher (he says), who examines for himself and tries to stand against it, can hardly maintain himself without special divine aid. • In the dialogue called Politikus, Plato announces formally and expli- citly (whnt the historical Sokrates bod asserted before him, Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10) the exclusive pretensions of the BcurtAcvr Tex*,‘*^y (representing poli- tical science, art, or theory) to. rule mankind— the illusory nature of all other titles to rule — and the mis- chievous working of all existing governments. The samo view is de- veloped in the Republic and the Leges. Compare also Anstotel. Ethic. Nikom. X. p. 1180, b. 27 ad tin. In a remarkable pansage of the Leges (i. C37 D, 638 C , Plato observes, in touching upon the discrepancy be- tween different local institutions at Sparta, Krete, Kcos, Tarcntnm, See. : — ** If natives of different cities argue with each other about their respective institutions, each of them has a good and sufficient reason. This is the custom with us ; with you perhap$ it is different. Rut we, who are now conversing, do not apply our criticisms to the private citizen ; we criticise the lawgiver himself, and try to deter- mine whether his laws arc good or had.” rjpiv St ter nv oi> wepl rwr ayBpcciruy r wv &\\u >y 6 \6yos, a\X'a frtpi tu>v vounQtTwv attrwy Kaurias rt | /cal hpsTrjs. King Nomos was not at all pleased to be thus put upon his trial. * Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. ** Est enim philosophin paucis contenta ju- dicibus, multi tudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspeeta et in- visu,” Ac. The extreme publicity, and indis- , criminate, aggressive conversation of Sokrates, is strongly insisted on by I Tliemistius (Omt. xxvi. p. 384, 'Ti rip tov Xi-yuv) as aggravating the displea- Bure of the public against him. Digitized by Google Chap. VI. TIIE DIALOGUES. 265 interrogate every one, and sometimes forcing his interro- gations even upon reluctant hearers." That he could have been allowed to persist in this course of life for thirty years, when we read his own account (in the Platonic Apology) of the antipathy which he provoked — and when we recollect that the Thirty, during their short dominion, put him under an interdict — is a remarkable proof of the comparative tolerunce of Athenian practice. However this may be, it is from the conversation of Sokrates that the Platonic Dialogues of Search take their rise, and we must read them under those same funda- mental postulates which Sokrates enuntiates to the Dikasts. “ False persuasion of knowledge is almost universal : the Elenchus, which eradicates this, is salutary and indispen- sable : the dialectic search for truth between two active, . self-working minds, both of them ignorant, yet both feeling their own ignorance, is instructive, as well as fascinating, though it should end without finding any truth at all, and without any other result than that of discover- ing some proposed hypotheses to be untrue.” The modern reader must bo invited to keep these postulates in mind, if ho would fairly appreciate the Platonic Dialogues of Search. He must learn to esteem the mental exercise of free debate as valuable in itself,* even though the goal recedes before him iu proportion to the steps which he makes in advance. He perceives a lively antithesis of opinions, several distinct and dissentient points of view opened, various tentatives of advance made and broken off. He has the first half of the process of truth-seeking, without the last ; and even without full certainty that the last half can be worked out, or that the problem as propounded is one which admits of an affirmative solution.7 But Plato pre- * Xenophon, Memor. iT. 2, 3-5-40. * Aristotel. Topicn. i. p. 101, a 29, with the Soholion of Alexander of Aphrodisiaa, who remarks that the habit of colloquial debate had been very frequent in the davg of Aristotle, and afterwards ; but had comparatively ceased in his own time, having been exchanged for written treatises. P. 254, b. Schol, Brandis ; also Plato, Par- menid. pp. 135, 1341, and the Com- mentary of l’roklus thereupon, p, 776 seqq., and p. 917, ed. Stnllhsiuin. r A passage in one of the speeches composed by Lysias, addressed by a plaintiff in court to the Dikasts, shows how debate and free antithesis of opposite opinions, were accounted as Digitized by Google 266 PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. Ciiap. VI. sumes that the search will be renewed, either by the same interlocutors or by others. He reckons upon responsive energy in the youthful subject : he addresses himself to men of earnest purpose and stirring intellect, who will be spurred on by the dialectic exercise itself to farther pursuit — men who, having listened to the working out of different points of view, will meditate on these points for themselves, and apply a judicial estimate conformable to the measure of their own minds. Those respondents, who, after having been puzzled and put to shamo by one cross-examination, became disgusted and never presented themselves again — were despised by Sokrates as lazy and stupid.' For him, as well essential to tho process rou fiv j — koI 4y& pikv scd to it — and could enforce tho grounds of tho one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premisses appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason ; and as a discipline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of tho ‘ Socratici viri/ But tho modern mind owes far more to both than it is gener- ally willing to admit ; and the present modes of instruction contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies tho place either of the one or of tho other. ... It is the fasltion of the present time to disparage negative logic— that which points out weak- nesses in theory or errors in practico, j without establishing positive truths. 1 Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result, 1 but as a moans to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy tho , name, it cannot be valued too highly ; and until jxcplo are again systematic- ally trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but tho mathematical and physical departments of 8|>eculation. On any other subject no one’s opinion-? deserve the name of kuowlcdge, except so far us ho has either lind forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, tho same mental process which would have been required of him in carry- ing on an active controversy with opjxments.” • See Plato, Republic, vii. 518, B, C, about iraiScta. as developing rijy 4t/ov - | tray 4 Katrrov dvyauiy iv rfj ijtvxji : and 534, about 4ir nrrrmv, with its test, rb Oovyai Ka't bt^atrdai \6yoy. Com pare also Republic, v. 477, 478, with Theaetct. Digitized by Google 268 PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. Chap. VI. Plato conceives knowledge, we may easily see that it cannot he produced, or even approached, by direct, demonstrative, didactic, communication : by simply announcing to the hearer, and lodging in his memory, a theorem to be proved, together with the steps whereby it is proved. He must be made familiar with each subject on many sides, and under several different aspects and analogies: he must have had before him objections with their refutation, and the fallacious arguments which appear to prove the theorem, but do not really prove it : b he must be introduced to the principal counter-theorems, with the means whereby an opponent will enforce them : he must be practised^in the use of equivocal terms and sophistry, either to be detected when the opponent is cross-examining him, or to be employed when he is cross- examining an opponent. All these accomplishments must be acquired, together with full promptitude uud flexibility, before he will bo competent to perform those two difficult functions, which Plato considers to be the test of knowledge. You may say that such a result is indefinitely distant and hopeless : Plato considers it attainable, though he admits the arduous efforts which it will cost. But the point which I wish to show is, that if attainable at all, it can only be attained through a long and varied course of such dialectic discussion as that which we read in the Platonic Dialogues of Search. The state and aptitude of mind called knowledge, can only be generated as a last result of this continued prac- 175. C, D ; riimdon, 76, B ; Phffidms, ' 276 ; and Sympos. 202 A. t6 opda 5 o- Kal &v*v rov ^x(iy Sovyeu, ovk ola 0* Bn ofrre 4wi oesH adapted ethical, social, and political : matters especially human d (to use the phrase of Sokrates himself) «»i society, familiar to every man, — handled, unphilosophically, by speakers in the assembly, pleaders in the dikastery, dra- matists in the theatre. Now it is exactly upon such topics that debate can bo mado most interesting, varied, and abun- dant. The facts, multifarious in themselves, connected with man and society, depend upon a variety of causes, co-operat- ing and conflicting. Account must be taken of many different points of view, each of which has a certain rango of appli- cation, and each of which serves to limit or modify the others: the generalities, even when true, are true only on the balance, and under ordinary circumstances; they are liable to. exception, if those circumstances undergo important change. There are always objections, real as well as ap- parent, which require to be rebutted or elucidated. To such changeful and complicated states of fact, the Platonic dia- lectic was adapted : furnishing abundant premisses and com- parisons, bringing into notice many distinct points of view, each of which must be looked at and appreciated, before any tenable principle can be arrived at. Not only Platonic method and result, but also Platonic topics, are thus well suited to each other. The general terms of ethics were familiar but undefined: the tentative definitions suggested, followed up by objections available against each, included a large and in- structive survey of ethical phenomena in all their bearings. The negative procedure is so conspicuous, and even so preponderant, in the Platonic dialogues, that no puto.ioe.not historian of philosophy can omit to notice it. But !io™'fnr"X many of them (like Xenophon in describing So- which he ha. « Longinus, Do Sublim. 8. G. koItoi a succeeding chapter about the Hip- rh -Kpayfta h6ff\riirToy’ t) ykp ruv \6ywv 1 pins Minor. Kpiais »oAAijr (trr i xclpat rtKtvrtuoif 6 Xciiop. Mem. i. 1, 12-15. imytrtnipa. ComjMire wlmt is said in Digitized by Google 270 PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. Chap. VL mined. The krates) assign to it only a suliordinate place and a nnd negative qualified application: while some (and Schleier- vein* are In 4 1 1 ' him com- macher especially) represent all the doubts and tinct. hu difficulties in the negative dialogues as exercises to dognutt are 0 ° enunciation* call forth the intellectual efforts of the reader, pre- a prion of _ lmrnt°ry full and satisfactory solutions which tnent Plato has given in the dogmatic dialogues at the end. The first half of this hypothesis I accept : the last half I believe to be unfounded. The doubts and difficulties were certainly exercises to the mind of Plato himself, and were intended as exercises to his readers: but ho has nowhere provided a key to the solution of them. Where ho propounds positive dogmas, he does not bring them face to face with objections, nor verify their authority by showing that they afford satisfactory solution of the difficulties exhibited in his negative procedure. The two currents of his speculation, the affirmative and the negative, are distinct and independent of each other. Where the affirmative is especially pre- sent (as in Tinueus), the negative altogether disappears. Timoens is made to proclaim the most sweeping theories, not one of which the real Sokrates would have suffered to pass without abundant cross-examination : but the Platonic Sokrates hears them with respectful silence, and commends afterwards. The declaration so often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a teacher — that he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them upon others, but cannot dis- cover any good solution of them — this declaration, which is usually considered mere irony, is literally time.' The Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and absolute, which the commentators often announce as if it cleared up all diffi- culties— not only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones belonging to itself. When Plato comes forward to affirm, his dogmas are altogether h priori: they enunciate precon- ceptions or hypotheses, which derive their hold upon his belief, not from any aptitude for solving the objections which he has raised, but from deep and solemn sentiment of some c See the ronverwition between Menipptis and Sokmtes. (Lueinn, Dining. Mnrtuor. xx.) i Digitized by Coogle Chap. VI. THE DIALOGUES. 271 kind or other — religious, ethical, aesthetical, poetical, &c., the worship of numerical symmetry or exactness, &c. The dogmas are enuntiations of some grand sentiment of the divine, good, just, beautiful, symmetrical, &c., f which Plato follows out into corollaries. But this is a process of itself ; and while he is performing it, the doubts previously raised are not called up to be solved, but are forgotten or kept out of sight. It is therefore a mistake to suppose* that Plato f Dionysius of Haliknrnussus re- marks that tho topics upon which Pinto renounces tho character of a searcher, and passes into that of a vehement affirmative dogmatist, are those which arc above human investiga- tion and evidence — the transcendental : wed y dip Akuvos (Plato) ri 66yp.ara ovw afrrbf axoatv(T- pcArs stak'd, again and again, by tho Platonic Snkmtos, ns his real purpose*. Munk is nt liberty to tnat it as ridi- culous ; but the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic Sokrates disclaims tlio jwedagogic function, de- scribing himself as nothing more than a fellow searcher with the rest. So too Munk declares 'p. 79-90, and Zeller also, Philos, der Grioch. vol. ii. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato could not ve composed the Parmenides, in- cluding, ns it docs, such an assemblage of difficulties and objections against tho theory of Ideas, until he poosossed the means of solving nil of them him- self. This is a hold assertion, alto- gether conjectural ; for there is no solution of them given in any of Plato’s writings, and the solutions to Digitized by Google 272 PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. CnAP. VI. ties knots in one dialogue only with a view to untie them in another ; and that the doubts which he propounds are already fully solved in his own mind, only that ho defers the an- nouncement of the solution until the embarrassed hearer has struggled to find it for himself. Some critics, assuming confidently that Plato must have Hypothesis produced a full breadth of positive philosophy to MtaSluhto1 countervail his own negative fertility, yet not find- ?uiu«for >ng enough of it in the written dialogues — look for uwTbp com- 'f elsewhere. Tennemanu tlunks, and his opinion is 'solution partly shared by Boeckh and K. F. Hermann, that * the direct, affirmative, and highest principles of riato’s philosophy were enunciated only in his untenable. ]e,.tures : that the core, the central points, the great principles of his system (der Kern) were revealed thus orally to a few select students in plain and broad terms, while the dialogues were intentionally written so as to convey only indirect hints, illustratioiis, applications of these great prin- ciples, together with refutation of various errors opposed to them : that Plato did not think it safe or prudent to make any full, direct, or systematic revelation to the general public.11 which Muni alludes as given by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to be satisfactory, which I do not admit) travel much beyond the limits of Plato. Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (Ueber die Aechtheit dcr Platon. Sehrif- ten. p. 10.‘M04) ; that Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues, though he appears as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a matured thinker, who has already gone through the in- vestigation for himself, and solved all the difficulties, but who goes back upon the work of search over again, for the instruction of the interlocutors. “ The special talent and dexterity (Vir- tuosi tat i which Sokrates displays in conducting the dialogue, can only bo explained by supposing that he has already acquired for himself a firm and certain conviction on the question dis- cussed.” This opinion of Ueberweg appears to ine quite untenable, as well as in- consistent with a previous opinion which he had given elsewhere (Pla- tonische Welt-eeele, p. 69*70). — That the Platonic Ideenlehre was altogether insufficient for explanation. The im- pression which the Dialogues of Search make upon me is directly the reverse. My difficulty is, to under- stand how the constructor of all these puzzles, if he has the answer ready drawn up in his pocket, can avoid letting it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the literal declarations, often repeated, of Bokratcs ; while Munk and Ueberweg contradict them. For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates (even in the Republic, ono of his most expository compositions) see a re- markable passage, Rep. v. p. 450 E. aTTiarovtrra ical farovyra £ua rout A oyous irotticrOai, t 81) iyb 8pa>. &©. h Tenneraann, Gesch. der rhilos. ii. pp. 205-220. H'-rmann, Ueber Plato's Schrifcteller Motive, pp. 290-294. Hermann considers this reserve and double doctrine to he unworthy of Digitized by Google Chap. VI. THE DIALOGUES. 273 I have already said that I think this opinion untenable. Among the few points which we know respecting the oral lectures, one is, that they were delivered not to a select and prepared few, but to a numerous and unprepared audience : while among the written dialogues, there are some which, far from being popular or adapted to an ordinary understanding, are highly perplexing and abstruse. The Tima; us does not confine itself to indirect hints, but delivers positive dogmas about the super-sensible world : though they are of a mystical cast, as we know that the oral lectures De Bono were also. Towards filling up this gap, then, the oral lectures cannot be shown to lend any assistance. The cardinal point of cwciertstic difference between them and the dialogues was, that they were delivered by Plato himself, in his own wredeurmd name ; whereas he never published any written com- °w> n*m«. ... . . . * _ * In what Tosition in ins own name. But we do not know oth« n*i*ct* *■ , . _ tliey departed enough to say, in what particular way this difference ^ would manifest itself. Besides the oral lectures, de- 0101,01 “?• livered to a numerous auditory, it is very probable that Plato held special communications upon philosophy with a few ad- vanced pupils. Here however we are completely in the dark. Yet I see nothing, either in these supposed private communi- cations or in the oral lectures, to controvert what was said in the last page — that Plato’s affirmative philosophy is not fitted on to his negative philosophy, but grows out of other mental impulses, distinct and apart. Plato (as Aristotle tells us1) felt it difficult to determine, whether the march of philo- sophy was an ascending one toward the principia (ap^cis), or a descending one down from the principia. A good philo- sophy ought to suffice for both, conjointly and alternately : in Plato’s philosophy, there is no road explicable either up- wards or downwards, between the two : no justifiable mode Plato, and nseribes it to Protagoras ! Auffaesung erhoben wurden, ohne jc- and other Sophists, on the authority doch ttber den namlichen Gegenstand. of a passage in tho Theoetetus (152 C), 1 Boweit die Rede auf denaeltien kom- wliicn does not at all sustain his alle- i men mnsste, etwas wesentlich Ver- gation. achiedenes zn lehren ” (p. 293). Hermann considers “ die akmama- I 1 Aristot Eth. Nikom. i. 4. *5 yip tisehen Lehren als Fortsetznng und 1 xal nxdroiF liript t tovto koI itfrrti, Schlusstein der schriftlichen, die dort . rirtpor iirb riv ipxir, 1) ir 1 rat erst zur vollon Klarheit principieller I ipx^. forte rj iS6s. VOL. I. T Digitized by Google 274 PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. Crap. VL of participation (fieOefa) between the two disparate worlds — intellect and sense. The principia of Plato take an impres- sive hold on the imagination : but they remove few or none of the Platonic difficulties ; and they only seem to do this because the Sokratic Elenchus, so effective whenever it is applied, is never seriously brought to bear against them. With persons who complain of prolixity in the dialogue — Apart from of threads which are taken up only to be broken off, “"itoTuui’wi devious turns and “passages which lead to nothing” interest In A a0*-*! . . w the pruoMof — of much talk “ about it and about it, without any deh*t«j)rr». peremptory decision from an authorised judge — enquiry i» « with such complainants Plato has no sympathy. valuable pri- 1 . .. J r . J viiege,nota He feels a strong interest in the process of en- tiresome obll- , ° 1 gallon. quiry, m the debate per se: and he presumes a like interest in his readers. He has no wish to shorten the process, nor to reach the end and dismiss the question as settled.11 On the contrary, he claims it as the privilege of philosophical research, that persons engaged in such discus- sions are noway tied to time; they are not like judicial pleaders, who, with a klepsydra or water-clock to measure k As an illustration of that clues of minds which take delight in the March for truth in different directions, I copy the following passage re- specting Dr. Priestley, from an excel- lent modem scientific biography. “ Dr. Priestley had seen so much of the evil of obstinate adherence to opinions which time had rendered decrepit, not venerable— and hod been so richly rewarded in his capacity of natural philosopher, by his adventurous explorations of new territories in science — tliat he unavoidably and un- consciously over-estimated the value of what was novel, and held himself free to clinnge his opinions to an extent not easily sympathised with by minds of a different order. Some men love to rest in truth, or at least in settled opinions, and ore uneasy till they find repoae. They alter their beliefs with gnat reluctance, and dread the charge of inconsistency, even in refexenoe to trifling matters. Priestley, on the other liand, was a follower after truth, who delighted in the chase, and teas all his life long jtursuing, not resting in it. On all subjects which interested him he held by certain cardinal doctrines, but he left the outlines of his systems to be filled ap as he gained experience, and to an extent very few men have done, disavowed any attempt to re- concile his changing views with each other, or to deprecate the charge of inconsistency. ... I think it must lie acknowledged by all who have studied his writings, that in his scientific researches at least lie carried this feeling too far; and tliat often when he had reached a truth in which he might and should have rested, his dread of anything liko a too hasty stereotyping of a supposed diseovory, induced him to welcome whatever seemed to justify liim in renewing the pursuit of truth, and thus led him completely ostmv. Priestley indeed missed many a discovery, the clue to which was in his hands and in his alone, by not knowing where to stop." (Dr. Geo. Wilson — Life of the Hon. H. Cavendish, among the publications of the Cnvendish Society, 1851, p. 110- 111.) Digitized by Google Cuap. VI. / THE DIALOGUES. 275 the length of each speech, are under slavish dependance on the feelings of the Dikasta, and are therefore obliged to keep strictly to the point.1® Whoever desires accurate training of mind must submit to go through a long and tiresome circuit." Plato regards the process of enquiry as being in itself, both a stimulus and a discipline, in which the minds both of questioner and respondent are implicated and improved, each being indispensable to the other : he also represents it as a process, carried on under the immediate inspiration of the moment, without reflection or foreknowledge of the result.0 Lastly, Plato has an interest in the dialogue. " Plato, Thcrctet. p. 172. n Plato, Republic, v. 450 B. ptrpov St y, t ravry Iriov. Kal Kaktos 7', l$r\% ktytis. The Republic, from the second book to the cloeo, is one of those Platonic compositions in which Sokratcs is most expository. We find a remarkable passage in Des Cartes, wherein that very self- working philosopher expresses his con- viction that the looger he continued enquiring the more his own mind would become armed for the better ap- preciation of truth —and in which he strongly protests against any barrier restraining the indefinite liberty of enquiry. “ Et encore qu’il y en ait peut-fitre d'aussi bien senses pormi les rerses ou les Chinois que panni nous, il me sem- bloit que le plus utile dtoit, de me reglcr scion ceux avec lesquels j’aurois a vivre; et qye pour savoir quclles etoieut ve'ri tablemen t lours opinions, je devois plutdt prendre garde k oe qu'ils pratiquaient qu*a ce qu'ils disaient ; non seulement k cause qu'en la corrup- tion dc nos mceurs, il y apeu de gent ffui veuiltent dire tout ce qu its croient — mats aussi a cause que plusieurs Tignorent eux memes. Car Taction de la pensee , par laqueUe on croit une chose, etant iliffer ente de cede par laqueUe on connoit quon la croit , cues sont sou vent Tune sans T autre. Et entre plusieurs opinions cgalcmcnt revues, jc nc choisissoia que les plus nmderees ; taut U cause que ce sont toujours les plus commodes jjout la pratique, et vraiscmblablement les mejlleures — tous execs ayans ooutumc d etre mauvais — comme aussi a fin do me detourner moins du vrai chemin, en cas que ie faillisse, quo si, ayant choisi l'un deg deux extremes, c’eOt 6te l’autre qu il eut fallu suivre. *' Et partieulifcrement, je mettois entre les ezeet toutes les promesses par le*{ueUe* on retranche quelque chose de sa libtfrU ; non que je d&approuvasse les lois, qui pour r&ncdier a l'incon stance des esprits foibles, permettent, loraquon a quelque bon desscin (ou mcrae, pour la surety du commerce, quelque desscin qui n’estqu’ indifferent;, qu'on tasse des veeux ou des contrats qui obligent a y T 2 Digitized by Google 276 PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. Chap. VI. not merely as a mental discipline, but as an artistic piece of workmanship, whereby the taste and imagination are charmed. The dialogue was to him what the tragedy was to Sophokles, and the rhetorical discourse to Isokrates. Ho went on “ comb- ing and curling it ” (to use the phrase of Dionysius) for as many years as Isokrates bestowed on the composition of the Panegyrical Oration. He handles the dialectic drama so as to exhibit some one among the many diverse ethical points of view, and to allow what it involves as well as what it ex- cludes in the way of consequence. We shall not find tho ethical point of view always the same : there are material inconsistencies and differences in this respect between one dialogue and another. But amidst all these differences — and partly indeed by paw h» reason of these differences — Plato succeeds in in- thui My™* spiring his readers with much of the same interest tiTproSw of in the process of dialectic enquiry which he evi- Mtlni'u)"1''" dently felt in his own bosom. The charm, with waa to him- which lie invests the process of philosophising, is one main cause of the preservation of his writings from the terrible shipwreck which has overtaken so much of the abundant contemporary literature. It constitutes also one of his principal titles to the gratitude of intellectual men. This is a merit which may be claimed for Cicero also, but hardly for Aristotle, in so far as we can judge from the pre- served portion of the Aristotelian writings : whether for the other viri Socratici his contemporaries, or in what proportion, we are unable to say. Plato’s works chnrmed and instructed all ; so that they were read not merely by disciples and admirers (as the Stoic and Epikurean treatises were), but by those who dissented from him as well as by those who agreed with him.p The process of philosophising is one not naturally perseverer — maia a cause que je ne voyoia au monde aucune chose* qui de- meoTHt toujours en memo £tat, et que comme pour mon particulier , jo me promettois de perfectionner de plus en men jutjemens, d mom point de lee r entire ptres, f cuese pens? commetire , une grande fault contre It bon sen*, si, pareeque j apj/routfois alors qudque I chose, je me fusee, oblige de la prendre j pour bonne encore apres , lorsquelle ! auroit pevl-etre ctssi tie l itre , ou que fauroie eeestf de Tedimer Idle.” Dia- ! coura de la Methode, part iii, p. 147- 148, Cousin edit. ** Cicero, Tuac. Diap. ii. 3, 8. Cicero further commenda the Stoic Pauietiua for having relinquished the Digitized by Google Chap. VI. THE DIALOGUES. 277 attractive except to a few minds : the more therefore do we owe to the colloquy of Sokrates and the writing of Plato, who handled it so as to diffuse the appetite for enquiry, and for sifting dissentient opinions. The stimulating and suggestive influence exercised by Plato — the variety of new roads pointed out to the free enquiring mind — are in themselves sufficiently valuable — whatever we may think of the positive results in which he himself acquiesced.*1 I have said thus much respecting what is common to the Dialogues of Search, because this is a species of composition now rare and strange. Modern readers do not understand what is meant by publishing an enquiry without any result — a story without an end. Respecting the Dialogues of Expo- sition, there is not the like difficulty. This is a species of composition, the purpose of which is generally understood. Whether the exposition be clear or obscure — orderly or con- fused— true or false— we shall see when we come to examine each separately. But these Dialogues of Exposition exhibit Plato in a different character: as the counterpart, not of Sokrates, but of Lykurgus (Republic and Leges) or of Pytha- goras (in Timaius)/ A farther remark which may be made, bearing upon most of the dialogues, relates to matter and not to manner. Everywhere (both in the Dialogues of Search and in those of exposition) the process of generalisation is kept in view and brought into conscious notice, directly or indirectly. The rela- tion of the universal to its particulars, the contrast tnited throughout the Platonic Dialogue* of Starch - ge- neral term* of the constant and essential with the variable and SnimSe* accidental, are turned and returned in a thousand different ways. The principles of classification, with *n*‘y*i*- “ tristitiam et asperitatom ” of his Stoic predecessors, Zeno, Chrysippus, 4c., and for endeavouring to repro- duce the style and graces of Plato and Aristotle, whom ho was always com- mendiug to his students (De Finib. iv. 28). s The observation which Cicero applies to Varro, is applicable to the Platonic writings also. " Philosophiam rnultis locis inchoatti : ad impcllendum satis, ad edocendum paruin " (Academ. Poster, i. 3, 9). I sbaU say more about this when I touch upon the Platonic Kleitnphon ; an unfinished dialogue which takes up the point of viow here indicated by Cicero. ’ 6eo the citation from Plutarch in an earlier note of this chapter. Digitized by Google 278 PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. Chap. VI. the breaking down of an extensive genus into species and sub-species, form the special subject of illustration in two of the most elaborate Platonic dialogues, and are often par- tially applied in the rest. To see the One in the Many, and the Many in the One, is represented as the great aim and characteristic attribute of the real philosopher. The testing of general terms, and of abstractions already embodied in familiar language, by interrogations applying them to many concrete and particular cases — is one manifestation of the Sokratic cross-examining process, which Plato multiplies and diversifies without limit. It is in his writings and in the conversation of Sokrates, that general terms and propositions first become the subject of conscious attention and analysis : and Plato was well aware that he was here opening the new road towards formal logic, unknown to his predecessors, un- familiar even to his contemporaries. This process is indeed often overlaid in his writings by exuberant poetical imagery and by transcendental hypothesis : but the important fact is, that it was constantly present to his own mind and is im- pressed upon the notice of his readers. After these various remarks, having a common bearing The Du- upon all, or nearly all, the Platonic dialogues, I bo reviewed shall proceed to give some account of each dialogue comjMitioM separately. It is doubtless both practicable and «nu»r,'utat useful to illustrate one of them by others, sometimes tmtingcach . . . , . oner, i.ut in the way of analogy, sometimes m that of con- without am J in- trast. But I shall not affect to handle them as ter-depend- , , , contributories to one positive doctrinal system — nor as occupying each an intentional place in the gradual unfold- ing of one preconceived scheme — nor as successive mani- festations of change, knowable and determinable, in the views of the author. For us they exist as distinct imaginary con- versations, composed by the same author at unknown times and under unknown specialties of circumstance. Of course it is necessary to prefer some one order for reviewing the Dialogues, and for that purpose more or less of hypothesis must be admitted ; but I shall endeavour to assume as little as possible. Digitized by Google Chap. VI. THE DIALOGUES. 279 The order which I shall adopt for considering the dia- logues coincides to a certain extent with that which order »t u* ° . .1 _ ixi* DUloguM, some other expositors have adopted. It begins «*<*»«» with those dialogues which delineate Sokrates, and them under _ _ _ . _ , separate re- which confine themselves to the subjects and points jfcw^Apo- of view belonging to him, known as he is upon the independent testimony of Xenophon. First of all will come the Platonic Apology, containing k8t- the explicit negative programme of Sokrates, enunciated by himself a month before his death, when Plato was 28 years of age. Last of all, I shall take those dialogues which depart most widely from Sokrates, and which are believed to be the products of Plato’s most advanced age — Timams, JKritias, and Leges, with the sequel, Epinomis. These dialogues present a glaring contrast to the searching questions, the negative acuteness, the confessed ignorance, of Sokrates : Plato in his old age has not maintained consistency with his youth, as Sokrates did, but has passed round from the negative to the affirmative pole of philosophy. Between the Apology — and the dialogues named as last — I shall examine the intermediate dialogues accord- Kr)k>n and ing as they seem to approximate or recede from Sokrates and the negative dialectic. Here, how- •**gv ip't aotpurrarov that; pda it Mi iyart ravra Xiytts ; ovSl ov y dp S4\ xov tf/tvStral yt’ ov ydp lov ov Si at\-f]VT) v ipa y opt fa Btovs Bipus avrtp. Kal xoXvy ply xP^vov tlvaiy &awtp ol &AA01 HyBpunroi ; rjx6povyy &C. Digitized by Google Chap. VII. THE GOD ALONE WISE. 285 applying his Elenchus, and putting to them testing interro- gations, he found them all without exception destitute of any real wisdom, yet fully persuaded that they were wise, and incapable of being shaken in that persuasion. The artisans indeed did really know each his own special trade ; but then, on account of this knowledge, they believed themselves to be wise on other great matters also. So also the poets were great in their own compositions; but on being questioned respecting these very compositions, they were unable to give any rational or consistent explanations : so that they plainly appeared to have written beautiful verses, not from any wisdom of their own, but through inspiration from the Gods, or spontaneous promptings of nature. The result was, that these men were all proved to possess no more real wisdom than Sokrates : but he was aware of his own deficiency ; while they were fully convinced of their own wisdom, and could not be made sensible of the contrary. In this way Sokrates justified the certificate of superiority vouchsafed to him by the oracle. He, like all other persons, was destitute of wisdom; but he was the only one who knew, or could be made to feel, his own real mental condition. With others, and most of all with the most conspicuous men, the false per- suasion of their own wisdom was universal and inexpugnable.* This then was the philosophical mission of Sokrates, im- posed upon him by the Delphian oracle, and in F^Mpw. which he passed the mature portion of his life : to tiaSom a cross-examine every one, to expose that false per- S*oo3»toiw suasion of knowledge which every one felt, and to “ ''lse demonstrate the truth of that which the oracle really meant declaring the superior wisdom of Sokrates. “People sup- pose me to be wise myself” (says Sokrates) “on those matters on which I detect and prove the non-wisdom of others.1 But that is a mistake. The God alone is wise, and his oracle declares human wisdom to be worth little or nothing, employ- ing the name of Sokrates as an example. He is the wisest of men, who, like Sokrates, knows well that he is in truth k Plato, Apolog. C. 8-9, pp. 22-23. I fie iKdtrrore ol -wapAv res ravra ainbv 1 Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23. otomai ydp [ c hat iroipbv, & hv &\Aov 4^e\ey^u>. Digitized by Google 286 APOLOGY OF SOKRATES. Chap. VII. worthless so far as wisdom is concerned.™ The really dis- graceful ignorance is — to think that you know what you do not really know,”” “ The God has marked for me my post, to pass my life in Kmphatic^ the search for wisdom, cross-examining myself as Lknlto of well us others : I shall be disgraced, if I desert that fxamining post, from fear either of death or of any other evil.”0 mission » # # * l^bhnby Even if you Dikasts acquit me, I snail not alter me ood. my course : I shall continue, as long as I hold life and strength, to exhort and interrogate in my usual strain, telling every one whom I meetp — You, a citizen of the great and intelligent Athens, are you not ashamed of busying yourself to procure wealth, reputation, and glory, in the greatest possible quantity — while you take neither thought nor pains about truth, or wisdom, or the fullest measure of goodness for your mind ? If any one denies the charge, and professes that he doe « take thought for these objects, — I shall not let him off without questioning, cross-examining, and exposing him.q And if he appears to me to affirm that he is virtuous without being so in reality, I shall reproach him for caring least about the greater matter, and most about the smaller. This course I shall pursue with every one whom I meet, young or old, citizen or non-citizen : most of all with you citizens, because you are- most nearly connected with me. For this, you know, is what the God commands, and I think that no greater blessing has ever happened to the city than this ministration of mine under orders from the God. For I go about incessantly persuading you all, old as well as young, not to care about your bodies, or about riches, so much as about acquiring the largest measure of virtue for your minds. I urge upon you that virtue is not the fruit of “ Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A, c. 17, p. 28 E. ■ Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 B. ical roOro oi/K atiadia iffrlv a&rij 1] iirovtliiarros, ^ toO olradai tl&tym & oOk oTZ«v ; ° Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 28 E. * Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29. oi w ■wavvouM 0a, &C. * Plato, Apol. ib. /cal 4dy ns vfxwv ap.(pi(T$ririi(rr) ical dyai 8«, 6yu&iu>, &C. Digitized by Google Chap. VII. HIS PERSEVERANCE. 287 wealth, — but that wealth, together with all the other things good for mankind publicly and privately, are the fruits of virtue/ If I am a corruptor of youth, it is by these dis- courses that I corrupt them : and if any one gives a different version of my discourses, he talks idly. Accordingly, men of Athens, I must tell you plainly: — decide with Anytus, or not, — acquit me or not — I shall do nothing different from what I have done, even if I am to die many times over for it.” Such is the description given by Sokrates of his own pro- fession and standing purpose, imposed upon him as He ^ dt. a duty by the Delphian God. He neglected all labour either for profit, or for political importance, or for the public service ; he devoted himself, from w morning till night, to the task of stirring up the ‘ Athenian public, as the gadfly worries a large and f , ft ital ytKotdTfpov fiirfly, KpocKflpfvov rp ir6\(t irirb rod Otod &(Twtp Imrqt ptf- ydA

s 4yd tfrtyju. irAtlovs faoyrat vfxdt ot 4A*yxoyrfsy ot\ vdy 4yd> Karf7xoyt vp.f 7s 54 obn t )oBdvfT &y8pt t 'AOpyafoi. c. 21, p. 33 A. iyio 8( 8i8d(TKa\oi p4v. oi/Scybs ir&iror' 4ytv6ppy : C. 4, p. 19 E, Digitized by Google Chap. VII. IMPRESSION ON ZENO. 289 viduala, who possess the art of making mankind wiser or better — just as in the case of horses, none but a few practised trainers know how to make them better, while the handling of these or other animals, by ordinary men, certainly does not improve the animals, and generally even makes them worse.* But where any 6uch select few are to be found, who alone can train men, — Sokrates is obliged to inquire from others ; he cannot divine for himself.” He is perpetually going about, with the lantern of cross-examination, in search of a wise man : but he can find only those who pretend to be wise, and whom his cross-examination exposes as pretenders.” This then is the mission and vocation of Sokrates — 1. To cross-examine men, and to destroy that false persuasion of wisdom and virtue which is so widely diffused among them. 2. To reproach them; and make them ashamed of pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom and virtue.d But Sokrates is not empowered to do more for them. He cannot impart any positive knowledge to heal their ignorance. He cannot teach them what wisdom or virtue is. Such is the substance of the Platonfc Apology of Sokrates. How strong was the impression which it made, on Impm,si„n many philosophical readers, we may judge from the puum'te v, Kal riv haruy Kal ray £fyu>v try nya otupat (Torpbv tlvar Kal Strttbdy urn pp Sorer ry 8t if fityrjtiuy 4vS*lKvvpeu Kti ovk tan aorpr is. c.‘32, p. 41 B. * Plato, Apol. c. 33, p. 41 E. * Themistius, Omt. xxiii. (SophisWs) p. 357, Dindorf. Ta SI a tp t Z-ijyuyos dprbr]\d at ion Kal pbbptva. irrrb tto\- A dry, St I aitrbv aj iartepdaour dvodoyla 4k t’Ofi'KTjr Ijyayty «ij arjy noiKlAyjy. This statement deserves full belief : it probably came from Zeno himself, a voluminous writer. The father of Zeno was a merchant who traded with Athens, and brought back books for his son to read, Sokratic books among tlic in. Dingen. Inert, vii. 31. Respecting another statement made by Themistius in the same page, I do not feel so certain. He says that the ac- cusatory discourse pronounced against Sokrates by Anytus was composed by PolykrateB, as a \oy6ypaipos, and paid for This may be the fact : but the words of Isokrates in the Busiris rather lead me to the belief that the «>nr yopla Xarrcpdrout composed by Poly- VOI,. I. V Digitized by Google 290 APOLOGY OF SOKBATES. Chap. VII. cerity, wliat he regards as the intellectual and moral de- ficiencies of his countrymen, as well as the unpalateable medicine and treatment which he was enjoined to administer to them. With equal sincerity does he declare the limits within which that treatment was confined. But neither of his two most eminent companions can Fiu-ni of endure to restrict his competence within such narrow limits. Xenophon f affirms that Sokrates was assi- sljtnlte.for duous in communicating useful instruction and po- «?mpiiflrd sitive edification to his hearers. Plato sometimes, ufroilghmit though more rarely, intimates the same : but for the S*«oareb-c* most part, and in the Dialogues of Search through- M? out, he keeps Sokrates within the circle of procedure 'ulirg° IL which the Apology claims for him. These dialogues exemplify in detail the aggressive Qperations, announced therein by Sokrates in general terms as his missionary life- purpose, against contemporaries of note, very different from each other — against aspiring youths, statesmen, generals. Rhetors, Sophists, orthodox pietists, poets, rhapsodes, &c. Sokrates cross-examines them all, and convicts them of hu- miliating ignorance: but he does not furnish, nor does he profess to be able to furnish, any solution of his own diffi- culties. Many of the persons cross-examined bear historical names : but I think it necessary to warn the reader, that all of them speak both language and sentiments provided for them by Plato, and not their own.* kratcs was a sophistical exercise, com- posed to acquire reputation and pupils, not a discourse really delivered in the Dikes tery. 1 Xenophon, Manor, i. 2-64, i. 3-1, i. 4-2, iv. 2-40, iv. 3-4. s It might soem superfluous to give such a warning; but many commen- tators speak as if thoy required it. They denounce the Platonic speakers in harsh terms, which have no perti- nence, unless supposed to bo applied to a real man expressing his own thoughts and feelings. It is useless to enjoin us, as Stall- bauin and Steinhart do, to mark the aristocratical conceit of Menon ! — the pouifMHis ostentation and pretensivc verbosity of Protagoras and Gorgias ! — the exorbitant selfishness of Polus and Kalliklca I — the impudent brutality of ; Thrusymachus ! — wlien all these per- j sons speak entirely uudor tho prompt- ing of Plato himself. You might just as well judge of So- krates by wliat we read in the Nubcs of Aristophanes, or of Meton by what we And in the Aves, as doscribe the historical characters of the above- named personages out of tho Platonic 1 dialogues. They ought to be appre- ! dated as dramatic pictures, drest up by the author for his own purpose, and delivering such opinions as he assigns to them — whether he intends them to bo refuted by others, or not. Digitized by Google Chap. VII. MODERN ASSUMPTION. 291 The disclaimer, so often repeated by Sokrates, — that he possessed neither positive knowledge nor wisdom A.*«mpu examination from one man to another, as portions of accredited faith. “My accusers Melctus and ,uthor' n Plato, Apol. S. p. 28 D. ol &v r is iavrby rd^rj 1) Tjyricrdfifyos fU\T toy, 1) i 'nr * dpxoyros rax&jit iyravda 8 ft, &s 4/xol 8otct7, fiivovra Kiv8vvt0* iv, Ac. Xenophon, Mcraorab. iv. 8, 11. x Spfids 4y*pyu£6p€voy, d\\d rU,r of ’ J ’ tnnrt: be matters.4 We must be afraid and ashamed of him •pi*'*1* “ . tin; judgment more than of all the rest. Not the verdict of the ?.f “’L0"*,. many, but that of the one man skilful about just and unjust, and that of truth itself, must be listened d,b*’0' to. Otherwise we shall suffer the like debasement and cor- ruption of mind as of body in the former case. Life will become yet more worthless. True — the many may put us to death. But what we ought to care for most, is, not simply to live, but to live well, justly, honourably.® Sokrates thus proceeds : The point to bo decided, therefore, with reference to your proposition, Kriton, is, not what will be generally said if I decline, but whether it will be just or unjust — right or wrong — if I comply; that is, if I consent to escape from prison, against the will of the Athenians and against the sentence of law. To decide the point, I assume this principle, which we have often before agreed upon in our reasonings, principle, and which must stand unshaken now.' IC!k™ie“"ory We ought not in any case whatever to act wrong the qn™ttoS . i riv , . till w9h Triton. or unjustly. lo act so is in every case both bad i. the pro- i i* i « . i i ccnllng re- fer the accent and dishonourable to the ap:ent, what- commended ^ . . n _ . Ju.t or ut>- ever may be its consequences. Even though others Ju»t? Never - * ° ■ any caee to act wrong to us, we ought not to act wrong to them in return. Even though others do evil to us, we ought not to do evil to them in return.* This is the principle which I assume as true, though I know that very few persons hold it, or ever will soknue. hold it. Most men say the contrary — that when mi * other persons do wrong or harm to us, we may do Sand that d Plato, Krito, c. 7, p. 47 D. #rol Slj Kal wtpl Sixaluy koI AS fxcwK, Kal alirxpuv Kal koA ir, kou ayadwv Kal xax&v, i r*pl uv vvv tcrriv y /3ouAlj, ■wArtpoy rfj r uv iroKKuv S6{rj S*? iffias tirtirQai Kal "herein he imagines the Laws of Athens to remonstrate with liim on his purpose of secretly quitting the prison, in order to evade a sentence legally pronounced. By his birth, and long resi- dence in Athens, he has entered into a covenant to obey exactly and faithfully what the laws prescribe. Though the laws should deal unjustly with him, he has no right of redress against them — neither by open disobedience, nor force, nor evasion. Their rights over him are even more uncontrolled and indefeasible than those of his father and mother. The laws allow to every citizen full liberty of try- ing to persuade the assembled public : but the citizen who fails in persuading, must obey the public when they enact a law adverse to his views. Sokrates having been distin- guished beyond all others for the constancy of his residence at Athens, has thus shown that he was well satisfied with the city, and with those laws without which it could not exist as a city. If he now violates his covenants and his duty, by breaking prison like a runaway slave, he will forfeit all the reputation to which he has pretended during his long life, as a preacher of justice and virtue.1 This striking discourse, the general drift of which I have briefly described, appears intended by Plato — as far as I can ‘ l'iutn, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 I). OlJa yap Zn ixlyois run ravra teal Sotcti teal Oh oZv odrw ZtZoKrai Kod oh /*9), roZrois oZk fs ; Compare the opposite impulse, to revenge yourself upon your country from which you believe yourself to have received wrong, set forth in the speech of Alkibiados at Sparta after he had been exiled by the Athenians. Thucyd. vi. 92. ital rb . &AA’ iv $ dv KaBuTTurrotv v6ixmv robs trw6vr*s). It was also the judg- ment formed respecting Sokrates by the Roman censor* the elder Cato; a man very much like the Athenian Anytus, constitutional and patriotic as a citizen, devoted to the active duties of political life, but thoroughly averse to philosophy and speculative debate, as Anytus is depicted in the Menon of Plato. — Plutarch, Cuto c. 23, a passage already cited in a note on the chapter next but one preceding. The accusation of “ putting himself above the laws,” appears in the same way in the Nubes of Aristophanes, 1035-1402, &c. its rjtiv kcuvoTs irfydyncurttf Kal 8«|tots SfuXtTy ffdu roiv Kadtardnuv v6,uuv uirtp- the pale of democratical citizenship, and exculpated from the charge of incivism. But when wo read the language of So- krates both in the Apology and in the Gorgias, we find a very different picture given of the relations between him and Athens. We find him there presented as an isolated and eccentric individual, a dissenter, not only departing alto- gether from the character and purposes general among his fellow-citizens, but also certain to incur dangerous antipathy, in so far as he publicly proclaimed what he was. The Kriton takes him up as having become a victim to such antipathy ; yet as reconciling himself with the laws by voluntarily accepting the sentence; and as persuaded to do so, more- over, by a piece of rhetoric imbued with the most genuine " Plato, Kriton, c. 14, p. 52 B. ov yhp (lv roTf riv &\\uv 'A&rjvaiajv airdv- t u/v SiaT]fila XPV reXeirrav.0 Still, however, though adopting the democratical vein of stmsokntm sentiment for this purpose, Sokrates is made to m^iopumr"1 adopt it on a ground peculiar to himself. His indi- to obey, from viduality is thus upheld. He holds the sentence victiun ; by a pronounced against him to have been unjust, but weigits with he renounces all use of that plea, because the him, but 1 11 dm wrigS014 8en^ence has been legally pronounced by the judi- wiibothcri dal authority of the city, and because he has entered into a covenant with the city. He entertains the firm conviction that no one ought to act unjustly, or to do evil to others, in any case : not even in the case in which they have done injustice or evil to him. “ This” (says So- krates) “ is my conviction, and the principle of my reasoning. Few persons do accept it, or ever will : yet between those who do accept it, and those who do not — there can be no common counsel : by necessity of the case, each looks upon the other, and upon the reasonings of the other, with contempt” t This general doctrine, peculiar to Sokrates, is decisive ThMwnmgiM per se, in its application to the actual case, and coroiuuT might have been made to conclude the dialogue, sokratic But Sokrates introduces it as a foundation to the reason, but Sn^oom- ar&umenk* urged by the personified Athenian No- “ mos : — which, however, are not corollaries from it, ciumm. por at all peculiar to Sokrates, but represent sen- timents held by the Athenian democrats more cordially than they were by Sokrates. It is thus that the dialogue Kritou embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct ele- ments— constitutional allegiance, and Sokratic individuality. Apart from the express purpose of this dialogue, however, Emphaiic the general doctrine here proclaimed bv Sokrates declaration of , . 4 v . * the authority deserves attention, in regard to the other Platonic of Individual . i*i • mi nsMtmand dialogues which we shall soon review. I he doctrine conscience, , ° t [ndivida&i evolves an emphatic declaration of the paramount him«if. authority of individual reason and conscience; for Plato, Phnxlon, p. 117 D. r Plato, Kriton, c. 10, p. 49 D. Digitized by Google Chap. VIII. RHETORICAL. 305 the individual himself — but for him alone. “This” (says Sokrates) “ is, and has long been my conviction. It is the basis of the whole reasoning. Look well whether you agree to it : for few persons do agree to it, or ever will : and between those who do, and those who do not, there can be no common deliberation: they must of necessity despise each other.” Here we have the Protagorean dogma, Homo Mensura — which Sokrates will be found combating in the Theset&us, — proclaimed by Sokrates himself. As things appear to me, so they are to me : as they appear to you, so they are to you. My reason and conscience is the measure for me : yours for you. It is for you to see whether yours agrees with mine. I shall revert to this doctrine 'in handling other Platonic dialogues, particularly the Theaetetus. I have already observed that the tone of the Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical — especially the harangue -ni0 Kriton ascribed to Athens. The business of the rhetorician is to plant and establish some given point of per- J‘”l;cpwr' suasion, whether as to a general resolution or a par- RhJSS ticular fact, in the bosoms of certain auditors before ”“'ctlc' him : hence he gives prominence and emphasis to some views of the question, suppressing or discrediting others, and espe- cially keeping out of sight all the difficulties surrounding the conclusion at which he is aiming. On the other hand, the business of the dialectician is, not to establish any foreknown conclusion, but to find out which among all supposable con- clusions are untenable, and which is the most tenable or best. Hence all the difficulties attending every one of them must be brought fully into view and dismissed : until this has been done, the process is not terminated, nor can we tell whether any assured conclusion is attainable or not. Now Plato, in some of his dialogues, especially the Gorgias, greatly depreciates rhetoric and its purpose of persuasion : elsewhere he employs it himself with ability and effect. The discourse which we read in the Kriton is one of his best spe- cimens : appealing to pre-established and wide spread emo- tions, veneration for parents, love of country, respect for covenants — to justify the resolution of Sokrates in the actual VOL. i. x Digitized by Google 30ti KRITON. Chap. VIII. case : working up these sentiments into fervour, but neglect- ing all difficulties, limits, and counter-considerations : assuming that the familiar phrases of ethics and politics are perfectly understood and indisputable. But these lastrmentioned elements — difficulties, qualifica- tions, necessity for definitions even of the most hackneyed words— would have been brought into the foreground had Sokrates pursued the dialectical path, which (as we know both from Xenophon and Plato) was his real habit and genius. He was per- petually engaged (says Xenophons) in dialectic “ What is the Holy, what Ls the Unholy ? What is the Honourable and the Base? What is the Just and the Unjust? &c.” Now in the rhetorical appeal embodied in the i Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 16. AMs 1 enemies induced the people to sanction 5* irtpl rutv byOpwirtiu/y cul JheAryero. the resolutions proposal by » party n the harangue the special matter of genuine Sokratic in the Kriton, liad it been delivered by , dialectics. any opjwnent whom he sought to per- Schleiermaeher (Einleitung zum Kri- plex or confute*. What is a law ? ton, pp. 233, 234) considers the Kriton What are the limits of obedience to as a eonqtohition of special occasion — the laws? Are there no limits (ns Gelegenheitschrift — which I think is Hobbes is so much denounced for true ; but which may lx? mid also, in my maintaining) ? While the oligarchy of judgment, of every Platonic dialogue. Thirty were the constituted authority The term, however, in^chleiermachor’s at Athens, they ordered Sokrates him- writing, lias a peculiar inclining, viz. self, together with four other citizens, a composition for which there is no to go anti am*st a citizen whom they place m the regular rank and file of oonsidiTed dangerous to the state, the the Platonic dialogues, as he marshals Salaminian Leon. The other four them. He remarks the absence of dia- obeyod the order : Sok rates alone dis- lcctic in the Kriton, and he adduces obeyed, and takes credit for having this as one reason for supjxising it uot done so, considering Leon to bo inno- to be genuine. cent. Which was in the right hero? But it is no surprise to me to find the four obedient citizens, or the one Plato rhetorical in one dialogue, dia- disobedient? Might not the four have Icctical in others. Variety, ami want used substantially th«* same arguments of system, seem to me among his most to justify their obedience, as those manifest attributes, which Sokratee hears from personified The view taken of the Kritou by Athens in the Kriton? We must rt*- Steinhart (Einleit. pp. 291-302), in the member that the Thirty had come into first page of his very rhetorical Intro- authority by resolutions passed under , duction, coincides pretty much with constitutional forms, though fear of mine. The Kriton make* power- ful appeal to the emotion*, but overlooks the ratioci na- tive diffi- culties. or supposes them to be solved. enquiry. Digitized by Google Chap. VIII. PUBLIC INCOMPETENCE. 307 Kriton, the important question, What is the Just and the Unjust? (i. e. Justice and Injustice in general) is assumed to be already determined and out of the reach of dispute. We are called upon to determine what is just and unjust in a particular case, as if we already knew what justice and in- justice meant generally: to enquire about modifications of justice, before we have ascertained its essence. This is the fundamental assumption involved in the rhetorical process ; which assumption we shall find Plato often deprecating as un philosophical and preposterous. So far indeed Sokratea goes in this dialogue, to affirm a positive analogy. That Just and Honourable are, to the mind, what health and strength are to the body: — Unjust and Base, what distemper and weakness are to the body. And he follows this up by saying, that the general public are incompetent to determine what is just or honourable — as they are incompetent to decide what is wholesome or un- wholesome. Respecting both one and the other, you must consult some one among the professional Experts, who alone are competent to advise.' Both these two doctrines will be found recurring often, in our survey of the dialogues. The first of the two lrllxim. is an obscure and imperfect reply to the great Sokratic problem — What is Justice? What is In- justice ? but it is an analogy useful to keep in mind, as a help to the exposition of many passages in pert‘ which Plato is yet more obscure. The second of the two will also recur frequently. It sets out an antithesis of great moment in the Platonic dialogues — “The one specially in- structed, professional, theorising, Expert — verms (the ISi&rai of the time and place, or) common sense, common sentiment, intuition, instinct, prejudice,” &c. (all these names meaning the same objective reality, but diversified according as the speaker may happen to regard the particular case to which he is alluding). Tins antithesis appears as an answer when we put the question — What is the ultimate authority ? where r Plato, Kriton, o. 7, p. 47. tou iybr. «( rlt itrriv Jraitir, &c. x 2 Digitized by Google 308 KR1TON. Chap. VIII. does the right of final decision reside, on problems and dis- putes ethical, political, aesthetical? It resides (Sokrates here answers) with some one among a few professional Experts. They are the only persons competent I shall go more fully into this question elsewhere. Here Procedure of I shall merely notice the application which Sokrates tJhiToom*fl*r 7mikes (in the Kriton) of the general doctrine. We CT* Stared might anticipate that after having declared that none was fit to pronounce upon the Just and the Unjust, worthy^ except a professional Expert, — he would have pro- Kiptrl “■ ceeded to name some person corresponding to that designation — to justify the title of that person to confidence by such evidences as Plato requires in other dialogues — and then to cite the decision of the judge named, on the case in hand. This is what Sokrates would have done, if the case had been one of health or sickness. He would have said — “ I appeal to Hippokrates, Akumenus, &c., as professional Experts on medicine : they have given proof of competence by special study, successful practice, writing, teaching, Ac. : they pronounce so and so.” He would not have considered himself competent to form a judgment or announce a decision of his own. But here, when the case in hand is that of Just and Unjust, soicr»u* *i* conduct of Sokrates is altogether different. He “uSifftT specifies no professional Expert, and he proceeds to ."ihoriiy in ^y down a dogma of his own; in which he tells us that few or none will agree, though it is funds* coiucicnce. raentul, so that dissenters on the point must despise each other as heretics. We thus see that it is he alone who steps in to act himself the part* of professional Expert, though he does not openly assume the title. The ultimate authority is proclaimed in words to reside with some un- named Expert: in fact and reality, he finds it in his own reason and conscience. You are not competent to judge for yourself: you must consult the professional Expert: but your own reason and conscience must signify to you who the Expert is. The analogy here produced by Plato— of questions about Digitized by Google Ciiap. VIII. SOK HATES AS THE EXPERT. 309 health and sickness — is followed out only in its negative operation ; as it serves to scare away the multitude, and dis- credit the Vox I’opuli. But when this has been done, no oracular man can be produced or authenticated. In other dialogues, wo shall find Sokrates regretting the absence of such an oracular man, but professing inability to proceed without him. In the Ivriton, he undertakes the duty himself: unmindful of the many emphatic speeches in which he had proclaimed his own ignorance, and taken credit for confessing it without reserve. Digitized by Google 310 EUTHYPHRON. Chap. IX. CHAPTER IX. EUTHYPIIRON. The dialogue called Euthypliron, over and above its con- tribution to the ethical enquiries of Plato, has a certain bear- ing on the character and exculpation of Sokrates. It will therefore come conveniently in immediate sequel to the Apology and the Kriton. The indictment by Meletus against Sokrates is assumed to situation have been formally entered in the office of the King supposed in * _ . . _ tbe ittaioguo Archon. Sokrates has come to plead to it. In — Inter* 1 locum™. the portico before that office, he meets Euthypliron : a man of ultra-pious pretensions, possessing special religious knowledge (either from revelation directly to himself, or from having been initiated in the various mysteries consecrated throughout Greece), delivering authoritative opinions on doubtful theological points, and prophesying future events.* What brings you here, Sokrates (asks Euthypliron), away from your usual haunts? Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment against you ? Yes (replies Sokrates), a young man named Meletus. He indictment takes commendable interest in the training of youth, by Meletus ....... _ ° , TT against and has indicted me as a corruptor of youth, lie Antipathy of says that I corrupt them by teaching belief in new niana towards gods, and unbelief in the true and ancient gods, her ticai Euthyph . — I understand : it is because you talk opinions. about the Dmmon or Genius often communicating with you, that Meletus calls you an innovator in religion. He knows that such calumnies find ready admission with most minds.” So also, people laugh at me, when I talk about a Plato, Euthyphr. o. 2, p. 3 D ; compare Herodot. ii. 51. b Plato, Euthyph. c. 2, p. 3 C : #n s P. 5 A. : a&T68pa fit A«t, 8 v nva fiovvrai, dr oZv s B; compare Phaxlrus, 252 C) — only that ho conceives the attributes and proceedings of the Gods differently from Sokrates. 1 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 7, p. 6 A, 'A pd 7« tovt’ (any, oh tvcKa r^y 8Ui)v 1 v Btwv 8vffx*pdis »o>i At o- btxofiai; 8t h 8 tj, &>s (oik* , ]atoniC ethics, I will say one word on the portion positions of which has preceded, and which appears to bear on (be Athenian the position and character of Sokrates. He (So- puwit. krates) has incurred odium from the Dikastery and the public, because he is heretical and incredulous. “ He does not believe in those Gods in whom the city believes, but introduces religious novelties ” — to use the words of the indictment preferred against him by Melctus. The Athenian public felt the same displeasure and offence in hearing their divine legends, such as those of Zeus and Kronus,1 called in question or criticised in an ethical spirit different from their own — as is felt by Jews or Christians when various narratives of the Old Testament are criticised in an adverse spirit, and when the proceedings ascribed to Jehovah are represented as unworthy of a just and beneficent god. We read in Herodotus what was the sentiment of pious contem- poraries respecting narratives of divine matters. Herodotus keeps back many of them by design, and announces that he will never recite them except in case of necessity : while in one instance, where he has been betrayed into criticism upon a few of them, as inconsiderate and incredible, lie is seized with misgivings, and prays that gods and heroes will not be offended with him.™ The freethinkers, among whom Sokrates was numbered, were the persons from whom adverse criticism came. It is these men who are depicted by orthodox oppo- 1 I shall say more* about Plato’s views on the theological legends generally believed by his countrymen, when I come to the language which he puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the second and third books of the Republic. Eusebius considers it mat- ter of praise when lie says “ that Plato rejected all the opinions of hiacouutry- men concerning the Gods and exposed their absurdity” — 8 wws rt irdtras ras varplovs irtpl ruy dewv {nro\4)tpei$ i)0 f- T«i, Kol tV arovlav avriuv Si4)\*yx*v’ (Prmp. Evan. xiii. 1 ) — -tlie very same thing which is averred in the indict- ment laid by Melctus against Sokrates. m Herodot. ii. 65 : t&v Si *Xv*k*v avurai Tck Iphy tl \iy oipi. Kara0alr)y &y rtp \Aytp is ra 6f7a irpTjypara, ra iyu Tvy iwirpa ucrar, iyuytcalp KaraAaufiavi/MVOS throy .... 45. A*- yovcri Si »oAA& Kal &.Wa tLvdruTKiirrtes oi "EAATyver, fitijOijs Si avritau Kal 85« & pu06s iariy rbv xcpi rod ,HpdK\eos A iyovci .... in Si *ya i6vra r by 'HpcbfAea, *al in &yOpwirov, its Si) ,k,a- and short coming, and disregarding the judgment of the multitude, as Sokrates does in the Kriton.i Euthyphron stands forward as the champion of the Gods, determined not to leave unpunished the man who has committed impiety, let him be who he may/ These lofty religious pretensions impel him, with full persuasion of right, to indict his own father for homicide, under the circumstances above described. Now in the eyes of the Athenian public, there could hardly be any act more abhorrent, than that of a man thus invoking upon his own father the severest penalties of law. It would probably be not less abhorrent than that of a son beating his own father. When therefore we read, in the Nubes of Aristo- phanes, the dramatic moral set forth against Sokrates, “ See the consequences to which free-thinking and the new system of education lead" — the son Pheidippides beating his own father, and justifying the action as right, by citing the violence of Zeus towards his father Kronus” — we may take “ Aristophan. Nubes. 905-1080. ° Aristophanes, Nubes, 994-1333- 1444. Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 49. ZwKpdrrjs — tout war (pas irpoiniKatclfriy 45i8at ov rbv abiKovvra 8et tiibbvai SIk7jv’ iAA* ( kcivo taws &p.8i 8t6n ay 6/xty6v ion , 5iA rovro dyer at, aAAa 8t6n Hytrou, Sid rovro ityiptcyov ob8h 8i6rt < p6pttv6v tort is not easy to see. Tho former may mean to affirm the beginning of an action, tho latter the continuance : but in this case the inference would not necessarily follow. Compare Aristotel. Physica, p. 185, b. 25, with the Scholion of Simplikius, p. 330, a. 2d ed. Bekk., where /SaStf"*' ton is recognised as equivalent to Digitized by Google 320 EUTHYPHRON. Chap. IX. of which the holy comes to be loved by all the Gods, or to be the subject of various other attributes.' Euthyph. — I hardly know how to tell you what I think. None of my explanations will stand. Your ingenuity turns and twists them in every way. Sokr. — If I am ingenious, it is against my own will for I am most anxious that some one of the answers should stand unshaken. But I will now put you in the way of making a different answer. You will admit that all which is holy is necessarily just. But is all that is just necessarily holy ? Euthyphron does not at first understand the question. He sukratM does not comprehend the relation between two new timwrr. words, generic and specific with reference to each The Holy li > . ° r , „ , one branch or other : the former embracing all that the latter variety of the , ° that i rlnch em traces, anc* more besides (denoting more objects, cerMininto- comi°t'nS fewer attributes). This is explained by mentot'L anal°gfe8 aa t\t7rtu 6ir8 Btwv, ttrt in l 8^ x duk>- wych obtains favour from the Gods : not that which they are .ST-^tbe1* 18 gainful to them, nor that which they love. Eu- r're thyph. — Nay : I think they love it especially. Spring to Sokr. — Then it appears that the holy is what the u>e oods. Gods love ? Euthyph. — Unquestionably. Sokr. — But this is the very same explanation which we Tha is the rejected a short time ago as untenable.1 It was -—af agreed between us, that to be loved by the Gods was not of the essence of holiness, and could not serve tion whlc was before declared iurnSb ' ™t' a3 an explanation of holiness : though it might be truly affirmed thereof as an accompanying predicate. mbr«*«oir Bet us therefore try again to discover what holiness the dialogue. ^ j rejy UpQn y0U help me, and I am sure that you must know, since under a confident persuasion that you know, you are indicting your own father for homicide. Euthyph. — “ The investigation must stand over to another time, I have engagements now which call me elsewhere.” So Plato breaks off the dialogue. It is conceived in the truly Sokratic spirit : — an Elenchus applied to im- plicit and unexamined faith, even though that faith be accredited among the public as orthodoxy : war- fare against the confident persuasion of knowledge, upon topics familiar to every one, and on which deep sentiments, and confused notions have grown up by association in every one’s mind, without deliberate study, systematic teaching, or testing cross-examination. Euthyphron is a man who feels unshaken confidence in his own knowledge, and still more in his own correct religious belief. Sokrates appears in his received character as confessing ignorance, soliciting instruction, and exposing inconsistencies and con- tradiction in that which is given to him for instruction. We must (as I have before remarked) take this ignorance TtaquMUcra on the part of the Platonic Sokrates not as assumed, dlfflcuft, on«n but as very real. In no part of the Platonic writ- 10 ings do we find any tenable definition of the Holy unable to and the Unholy, such as is here demanded from Sokratic spirit of the dialogue — confessed Ignorance applying the Klenchua to false per- suasion of knowledge. 1 Plato, Euthyphron, c. 19, p. 15. fx€fxyri self — with deep regret that he can do no more. “ Sokrates” (says Aristotle k) “put questions, but gave no answers: for he professed not to know.” In those dialogues where Plato makes him attempt more (there also, against his own will and protest, as in the Philebus and Republic), the affirmative Sokrates will be found only to stand his ground because no negative Sokrates is allowed to attack him. I insist upon this the rather, because the Platonic commentators usually present the dialogues in a different light, as if such modesty on the part of Sokrates was altogether simulated ; as if he was himselfj1 from the beginning, aware of the proper answer to his own questions, but refrained designedly from announ- cing it : nay, sometimes as if the answers were in themselves easy, and as if the respondents who failed must be below par in respect of intelligence. This is an erroneous conception. The questions put by Sokrates, though relating to familiar topics, are always difficult ; they are often even impossible to answer, because they postulate and require to be assigned a common objective concept which is not to bo found. They only appear easy to one who has never attempted the task of answering under the pressure of cross-examination. Most persons indeed never make any such trial, but go on affirming confidently as if they knew, without trial. It is exactly against such illusory confidence of knowledge that Sokrates directs his questions : the fact belongs to our days no less than to his.m The assumptions of some Platonic commentators — that Sokrates and Plato of course knew the answers to their own k Aristotel. Sophist. Elench. p. 183, expressed by the preposition of: and b. 7. fvt! sol SiA roOro iuxpirris iipd to if no has not beforehand employed his sol otiK iiTKpfrrra* inpiO\6yei yap ott« though he cannot put it m words — these assurnp- Platonic t ° * * procedure. tions were also made by many of Plato s contempo- raries, who depreciated his questions as frivolous and unpro- fitable. The rhetor and historian Tlieopompus (one of the most eminent among the numerous pupils of Isokrates, and at the same timo unfriendly to l’lato, though younger in age), thus criticised Plato’s requirement, that these familiar terms should be defined : “ What ! (said he) have none of us before your time talked about the Good and the Just? Or do you suppose that we cannot follow out what each of them is, and that wo pronounce the words as empty and unmeaning sounds ? ” " Theopompus was the scholar of Isokrates, and both of them probably took the same view, as to the useless- ness of that colloquial analysis which aims at determining the definition of familiar ethical or political words.0 They con- sidered that Plato and Sokrates, instead of clearing up what was confused, wasted their ingenuity in perplexing what was already clear. They preferred the rhetorical handling (such us we noticed in the Kriton) which works upon ready-made pre-established sentiments, and impresses a strong emotional conviction, but presumes that all the intellectual problems have already been solved. All this shows the novelty of the Sokratic point of view : objective the distinction between the essential constituent and Kibicft, the accidental accompaniment, p and the search for a dl»tlnfrui*hcd , „ . . * ' ’ by Sokrat*# dehnition corresponding to the former : which search from the * ° subjective, was first prosecuted by Sokrates (as Aristotle q points out) and was taken up from him by Plato. It was » EpiktOtug, ii. 17, 4-10. Ti J’ /{a- irarwv to&j xoWobs tout * ttrriv, Sir tp nal Gt&xopirov rby ft^ropa' Sr irot» *al TWdrwvi lyttakfi, &ov\ecr0at tKaara 6pi(*a9ai. T i yap \tyu ; Oi»5eb Tjpwy irpb trow fArycv £ yaffby tj Sinaioy ; pb xapaKo\ov$ovyrts rl fori roxncov tKaarov, teal tctvws 4 teal Aiyvir~ rluv, *ol 'P upalcov pdxv' °v T°^» Sri rb Saiov -wdyruv Kporipj)riovy Kal 4v iravrl ptra8ia>Kr4ov — aAAa *6rfp6y itrnv benny tovto, t b xotpflov ™ui who it w that acts unjustly — which of his actions are s,kr«f_ unjust — or under what circumstances they are so. Position of J . . , . . *1. _ sokruej nod The emotion m each mans mind, as well as the PUto In regard to it. word by which it is expressed, is the same : " but the person, or the acts, to which it is applied by each, although partly the same, are often so different, and sometimes so opposite, as to occasion violent dispute. There is subjective agreement, with objective disagreement. It is upon this disconformity that the Sokratic cross-examination is brought to bear, making his hearers feel its existence, for the first time, and dispelling their fancy of supposed knowledge as well as of supposed unanimity. Sokrates required them to define the general word — to assign some common objective characteristic, corresponding in all cases to the common sub- jective feeling represented by the word. But no man could comply with his requirement, nor could ho himself comply with it, any more than his respondents. So far Sokrates proceeded, and no farther, according to Aristotle. He never altogether lost his hold on particulars : he assumed that there must be something common to them all, if you could but find out what it was, constituting the objective meaning of the general term. Plato made a step beyond him, though think , opine, reason, hope, fear, &o. and upon what grounds, ho shall thereby read and know what are the thought* and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope, Ac., not tho similitude of the dyed* of the passions, which are tho things desired, feared, hoped, &c., for these tho constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man’s heart, blotted and confounded as they are with lying, dissembling, counterfeiting, and er- roneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searoheth hearts.” — Intro- duction to Leviatluui. • Plato, Ibuthyphron, p. 8, U-D. Euripides, Phceuissie, 498— «i irae r«. t that J 0 4 " It i* loved by that Sokrates introduced a new mode of looking at UK-uwa- a this Is true, all the particulars, and searched among them for but is not iu some common feature which he did not find. The Holy (and the Unholy) is a word freely pronounced by every speaker, and familiarly understood by every hearer, as if it denoted something one and the same in all these particulars.11 What is that something — the common essence or idea? Euthyphron cannot tell; though he agrees with Sokrates that there must bo such essence. His attempts to explain it prove failures. The definition of the Holy — that it is what the Gods love — is suggested in this dialogue, but rejected. The Holy is not Holy because the Gods love it : on the contrary, its holiness is an independent fact, and the Gods love it because it is 1 Ariatot. Metaphys. M. 1078, b. 30. 1086, b, 4. * l'lato, Euthyphron, p. 5 D, 6 E. Digitized by Google 328 EUTHYP11R0N. Chap. IX. Holy. The Holy is thus an essence, per se, common to, or partaken by, all holy persons and things. So at least the Platonic Sokrates here regards it But the Views of the Xenophon lie Sokrates respecting the Holy— different from those of the Platonic Sokrates — ho disallows any common absolute general typo of the Holy — he recognises on indefinite variety of types, dis- cordant and relative. Xenophontic Sokrates, if we can trust the Memora- bilia, would not have concurred in this view: for we read that upon all points connected with piety or religious observance, he followed the precept which the Pythian priestess delivered as an answer to all who consulted the Delphian oracle on similar questions — You will act piously by conforming to the law of the city. Sokrates (we are told) not only acted upon this precept himself, but advised his friends to do the like, and regarded those who acted otherwise as foolish and over-subtle triflers.x It is plain that this doctrine disallows all supposition of any general essence, called the .Holy, to be discovered and appealed to, as type in cases of doubt ; and recognises the equal title of many separate local, discordant, and variable types, each under the sanction of King Nomos. The pro- cedure of Sokrates in the Euthyphron would not have been approved by the Xenophontic Sokrates. It is in the spirit of Plato, and is an instance of that disposition which he manifests yet more strongly in the Republic and elsewhere, to look for his supreme authority in philosophical theory and not in the constituted societies around him : thus to innovate in matters religious as well as political — a reproach to him among his own contemporaries, an honour to him among various subsequent Christian writers. Plato, not conforming to any one of the modes of religious belief actually prevalent in his contemporary world, postulates a canon, suitable to the exigencies of his own mind, of that which the Gods ought to love and must love. In this respect as in others, he is in marked contrast with Herodotus — a largo observer of man- kind, very pious in his own way, curious in comparing the x Compares Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3, ! rots AAAot y waprfyti, rovs 8$ &\Aa?v 1. r« y&p riutfi'a — Nojuy iroKfws — iroiovyras ireptlpyovs Kal jAarulovs ayaiptt xoiovy ray cl «rc/3a>s kv woifiy ivipu (,y tlvai. 2a?tcpaTTjy t« ourw teal airrbi Ixolci Kal Digitized by Google Chav. IX. WHAT IT REPRESENTS. 329 actual practices consecrated among different nations, but not pretending to supersede them by any canon of his own. Though the Holy, and the Unholy, are pronounced to be each an essence, partaken of by all the particulars tik- Holy a so-called ; yet what that essence is, the dialogue Just-not _ . . 1 ■t'l t ° tenable as a JjiUthyphron noway determines, .hven the sue:- definition, gestion of Sokrates — that the Holy is a branch of bringing to the Just, only requiring to bo distinguished by some assignable mark from the other branches of the *«“«■ Just — is of no avail, since the Just itself had been previously declared to be one of the matters in perpetual dispute. It procures for Sokrates however the opportunity of illustrating the logical subordination of terms ; the less general compre- hended in the more general, and requiring to be parted off by some differentia from the rest of what this latter compre- hends. Plato illustrates the matter at some length and apparently with a marked purpose of drawing attention to it We must keep in mind, that logical distinctions hud at that time received neither special attention nor special names — however they may have been unconsciously followed in practice. What I remarked about tko Ivriton, appears to me also true about the Euthyphron. It represents Plato’s The smby- . i 1 , phron re- manner of replying to the charge of impiety ad- vanced by Melctus and his friends against Sokrates, ^plying w •' ° 7 the cluirgc of just as the four first chapters of the Memorabilia imPiom? If not then, upon what other occasions will you tender your counsel? Aik. — When they are debating about affairs of their own. Sokr. — But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs of shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing. Altaian* Aik. — Wien they are discussing war and peace, or .'.iviwu"- any other business concerning the city. Sokr. — quciion. or - ; . war and xou mean when they are discussing the question pw- quo*. . . , . i ii i ” ^ i • tlon» of So- witli whom they shall make war or peace, and in there- J . 1 upon. Wo what manner? But it is certain that we must tnoft whom fight those whom it is best to fight — also when it is best — and as long as it is best. Aik. — Cer- ld' tainly. Sokr. — Now, if the Athenians wished to know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how “')a,u long it was best — which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or the professional trainer? Aik. — The trainer, undoubtedly. Sokr. — So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when you talk about better, in wrestling or singing, what standard do you refer to ? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art ? Aik. — Yes. Sokr. — Answer me in like manner about war or peace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen, whom, and at what periods, it is better to fight, and better not to fight ? What in this last case do you mean by better ? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?0 Aik. — I cannot say. Sokr. — But is it not a disgrace, since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom it is better for them to war, — not to be able to say to what end your better refers ? c Plato, Alkib. i. c, d. 1-12, p. 108- I p.ovv koKXwv. ■ Plato, Alkib. i. c. 18, p. 112 A. Solcr. T l 84 81) ; vvv * ** pi Si/catatv Kol &81kocv aydpuixuy teal xpayfidrccy, V ol xoAAol 8okov(t[ ZvKparcs. Sokr. T i 8af ; ndXiaTa xtpl airruv bicupiptadcu ; Alkib. iroKv yt. Digitized by Google 336 AT.KIBIADES I. Chap. X. others : and how can you pretend to know, who have learnt from no other teachers? Aik. — From what you say, it is impossible. Sokr. — No : not from what I say, but from what you say yourself. I merely ask questions : it is you who give all the answers/ And what you have said amounts to this — that Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself ? Aik. But Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about what is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident: they debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice and expediency do not always coincide. Many per- sons commit great crimes, and are great gainers by doing so : others again behave justly, and suffer from it.8 Sokr. — Do you then profess to know what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt — or when did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of questions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner. But we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and expediency are not coincident. Persuade me of this, by interrogating me as I interrogated you. Aik. — That is beyond my power. Sokr. — But when you rise *to address the assembly, you will have to persuade them. If you can persuade them, you can persuado^me. Assume me to be the assembly, and practise upon me.h Aik. — You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is for you to speak, and prove the point. Sokr. — No : I can only question: you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the point is determined by your own answers.1 Answer far- ther amend- ed. 'Hie Athenians do not generally debate about Just or un- just—which they consider plain to every one — but about expe- dient and inexpedient, which are not coinci- dent with Just and un- just. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks So- krates to ex- plain. So- k rates de- clines: he can do no- thing but question. * Plato/ Alkib. i. c. 19, p. 112 ; c. i 20, p. 113. k Plato, Alkib. i. c. 20, p. 113. Olfxcu ply oKiydius ’A Orjyalout 0ov Aeu- eerOai i e6repa Sixaiirtpa ff iSiKtarepa- fjLtv ybp rotatrra ijyovyreu Srj\a ely at, &C. b Plato, Aik. i p. 114 B-C. This same argument is addressed by So- krntes to Glaukon, in Xenop. Memor. iii. G. 14-15. 1 Plato, Alkib. i. c. 23, p. 114 E. OitKovy el \4yeis Sri ravO* oCrws fx€l* ftdXiar' ei-qt ireirein racteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic method : i"» - s.*™- i i • • r • i . . method — both in its negative and positive aspect By the negative, false persuasion of knowledge is exposed. Alkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and unjust, which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated for himself — which he has picked up from the multitude, and supposes to be clear to every one, but about which nevertheless there is so much difference of appreciation among the multitude, that fierce and perpetual quarrels are going on. On the positive side, Sokrates re- stricts himself to the function of questioning: he neither affirms nor denies any thing. It is Alkibiades who affirms or denies every thing, and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own mind, instigated indeed, but not taught, by the questions of his companion. By a farther series of questions, Sokrates next brings Alkibiades to the admission that what is just, is also AlkjbUde, honourable, good, expedient — what is unjust, is dis- liSju’Sa1” honourable, evil, inexpedient: and that whoever acts justly and honourably, thereby acquires happi- ness. Admitting, first, that an act which is good, «u honourable, just, expedient, &c., considered in one bX’S^3’- aspect or in reference to some of its conditions — prwu^for may be at the same time bad, dishonourable, unjust, inexpedient, Ac., considered in another aspect or Si r<‘n*onlng in reference to other conditions ; Sokrates never- ™ * theless brings his respondent to admit, that every act, in so far as it is just and honourable , is also good and expedient.* And he contends farther, that whoever acts honourably, does k Pinto, Alkib. i. r. 24-25, p. 115. O vkovv rabrrjv r^v fiorjdfiay koAijv pikv Aiyus yard t V ^inx^P7l(riv vov < rutaat obs lift, rovro 8 ' ftrriv avtipia. , . . . KOLKT)y 8* y* Kurd robs Bavdrovs r« >col rd tAtnj. O vkovv o>5€ Sikcuov Tcpoaayopivtiv iKdffryjv r&y srpd^(ur th rtp i) Kaxbv d-rtpyd&rai, ko.ki]v KoActt, ft dya Bbv, dyaBijv KArjrdov. VOL. I. *Ap’ odv Kal $ dyadbv, koA by, — Si Ktueby, o ucrxpdy ; Ned. Compare Plato, Republic, v. p. 471), where lie maintains that in every par- ticular case, what is just, honourable, virtuous, Ac., is also unjust, dishonour- able, vicious, Ac. Nothing remains unchanged, nor excludes the contrary, except the pure, self-existent. Idea or general Concept.— abrb-8iKcuo form ; that is, of being ignorant, and yet confidently equally Igno- m 7 0 ° J . . . mnt. But believing himself to know.” But other Athenian the reel O . , °PIin™“' statesmen are no wiser. Even Penkles is proved EEdMUto' to l,e equally deficient — by the fact that he has Sin'™ the" never been able to teach or improve any one else, sSlSmLi not even his own sons and those whom he loved uSutic best.0 “ At any rate ” (contends Alkibiades) “ I am twkli as good as my competitors, and can hold my ground u^m*Aiki- against them.” But Sokrates reminds him that the S^e’uim£if real competitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners, liable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he pretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of un- usual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia are of nobler breed, as well as more highly and care- fully trained, than the Athenian statesmen.1’ Alkibiades must be rescued from his present ignorance, and exalted so as to be capable of competing with these kings: which object cannot be attained except through the auxiliary inter- position of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to be him- self already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no 1 Plato, Alkib. i. c. 2G, p. 11G E. m The words *1 rparTfiv — tirrpayia havo a double sense, like our “ doing well/’ Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 175; Steinhart, Einl. p. 149. We have, o. 2G, p. 1 1G B., the equi- vocation between koAmj vpamiv and trpdrrtiv^ also with koxm* irpdrrtiy , p. 134 A, 135 A ; compare Heindorf ad Platon. Charmid. c. 42, p. 172 A c. 48, p. 174 B; also Platon. Gorging p. 507 C., where similar equivocal meanings occur. " Plato, Alkib. i. c. 29-30, p. 118. ° Plato, Alkibiad. L c. 81, p. 118- 119. r Plato, Alkib. i. c. 34-42, p. 120- 124. Digitized by Google Chap. X. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES. 339 farther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain it for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his interrogatories.*1 The dialogue then continues. Sokr. — We wish to become as good as possible. But in what sort of virtue? Botgo«j- Alk. — In that virtue which belongs to good men. Sokr. — Yes, but good, in what matters? Aik. — 1"^Lf‘fre,un' Evidently, to men who are good in transacting busi- ness. Sokr. — Ay, but what kind of business ? busi- ness relating to horses, or to navigation ? If that be meant, we must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners ? Aik. — No, I mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in Athens. Sokr. — You mean the intelligent men. Every man is good, in reference to that which he understands : every man is bad, in reference to that which he does not understand. Aik. — Of course. Sokr. — The cobbler under- stands shoemaking, and is therefore good at that : he does not understand weaving, and is therefore bad at that. The same man thus, in your view, will be both good and bad?r Aik. — No : that cannot be. Sokr. — Whom then do you mean, when you talk of the good f Aik. — I mean those who are competent to command in the city. Sokr. — But to com- mand, whom or what — horses or men ? Aik. — To command men. Sokr. — But what men, and under w hat circumstances ? sick men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in what occupations? Aik. — I mean, men living in social and commercial relation with each other, ns we live here ; men who live in common possession of the same laws and government. Sokr. — When men aro in com- munion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend ? Aik. — It is the art of the pilot ; and the pur- pose towards which it tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea. Sokr. — When men are in social and political communion, to what purpose does the art of com- ’ Plato, Alkib. i. c. 42-43, p. 124. » Pinto, Aik. i. c. 43, p. 125 B. 'O airrbs &pa rovrtp yt rtf A 6ytf Kanos rt Kai ayaOos. I’lato glides unconsciously lxerc, na in other ports of his reasonings, a diclu •ecundam quill, ad ditium rimpliciter. Z 2 Digitized by Google 340 ALKIBIADES I. AND IT. Cbap. X. manding them tend? Aik. — Towards the better preservation and administration of the city.* Sokr. — But what do you mean by better ? What is that, the presence or absence of which makes better or worse ? If in regard to the manage- ment of the body, you put to me the same question, l should reply, that it is the presence of health, and the absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the city ? Aik. — I should say, when friendship and unanimity among the citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent. Sokr. — This unanimity, of what nature is it ? Respecting what subject ? What is the art or science for realising it ? If 1 ask you what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will say, the arithmetical and the metretic art. Aik. — I mean that friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives, father and son, husband and wife. Sokr. — But how can there be unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of them knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning and weaving, which the husband does not know, — or about military duties, which the wife does not know, — how can there be unanimity between the two? Aik. — No: there cannot be. Sokr. — Nor friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together? Aik. — Apparently there cannot, Sokr. — Then when men and women each perform their own special duties, there can be uo friendship between them. Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen performs his own special duties ? or (which is the same thing) when each citizen acts justly ? Aik. — Not so : I think there may be friendship, when each person j>er- forms his or her own business. Sokr. — Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become good men? Aik. — In truth, I am puzzled myself to say. I find myself A auSnSi ln a state disgraceful ignorance, of which I had no humiliated, previous suspicion. Sokr. — Do not be discouraged, ignorance, if you had made this discovery when you were fifty ■ Plato, Alkib. i. c. 45, p. 120 A. Tt 5e ; %y tru ica\t?s «i >0ov\lay, tls rl forty ; Aik. E Is rb &mivoy rjjy w6\ iv StotKtiy Kal (Tu'^ftrOai. Sokr. * Afitivov b* btoiKurai na\ t7ir tl piy yip alrrb faSov utTroySas Td'njKOrrcrfni!, XoAdrA.k. aoi tTiptXySfiycu better — if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy rnwH^nti- without reason — the possession of knowledge upon £*Konh &yev vov 8d(p rerto’revrdras . . , 'O p$t olv, 8r§ y * i o&rd . . . 'O be r^y raAovpevyv roAvpaBeiay ral roAv- tcxWo*' rerrypevos, dpipavbs be Lv raurys rys irtardipys, dydpeyos be orb ptus irdtrrys rwy &AA wyn ip' ot*x 1 T(? 6m biKcuws roA \

learnt the costly festivals of Athens. It has procured for a the i ct , . , proper lan- the Spartans more continued prosperity than the Athenians have enjoyed.1 The Gods honour wise Guds- H« and just men, — that is, men who know what they ought to say and do both towards Gods and towards men — more than numerous and splendid offerings.” ofSulu«*«- You see, therefore, that it is not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice, until you have learnt wliat is the proper lan- guage to be used, and what are the really good gifts to be prayed for. Otherwise your sacrifice will not prove accept- able, and you may even bring upon yourself positive mischief." Aik. — When sliall I be able to leam this, and who is there to teach me? I shall be delighted to meet him. Sokr. — There is a person at hand most anxious for your improvement. What he must do is, first to disperse the darkness from your mind, — next, to impart that which will teach you to discrimi- nate evil from good, which at present you are unable to do. Aik. — I shall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object. Until then, I postpone my intended sacrifice : and I tender ray sacrificial wreath to you, in gratitude for your counsel.” Sokr. — I accept the wreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation between us, to help us out of the present embarrassment 1 Plato, Alkib. ii. c. 19. p. 148. I “ Plato, Alkib. ii. e. 22. p. 150. “ Plato, Alkib. ii, c. 22, p. 150. | » Plato, Alkib. ii. c. 23-24, p. 151. Digitized by Google 348 ALKIBIADKS I. AND II. CnAP. X. The two dialogues, called First and Second Alkibiades, of rwrenrat which I have just given some account, resemble each critical opl- _ . , nicitf rwpcct- other more than most of the Platonic dialogues, not In* these two . . , i dialogues. merely in the personages introduced, but in general spirit, in subject, and even in illustrations. The First Alki- biades was recognised as authentic by all critics without exception, until the days of Schleiermacher. Nay, it was not only recognised, but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of all the Platonic compositions; proper to be studied first, as a key to all the rest Such was the view of Jamblichus and Proklus, transmitted to modern times ; until it received a harsh contradiction from Schleiermacher, who declared the dialogue to be both worthless and spurious. The Second Alkibiades was also admitted both by Thrasyllus, and by the general body of critics in ancient times: but there were some persons (as we learn from Athenteus) p who con- sidered it to be a work of Xenophon ; perceiving probably (what is the fact) that it bears much analogy to several con- versations which Xenophon has set down. But those who held this opinion are not to be considered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a forgery or imitation of Plato. Compositions emanating from Xenophon are just as much Sokratic, probably even more Sokratic, than the most unquestioned Platonic dialogues, besides that they must of necessity be contemporary also. Schleiermacher has gone much farther : declaring the Second as well as the First to be an unworthy imitation of Plato, s Here Ast agrees with Schleiermacher fully, including both Grounds for the First and Second Alkib. in his large list of the tbcm-i«w spurious. Most of the subsequent critics go with the. second Schleiermacher only half-way: Socher, Hermann, than against * / uic First. Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, recognise the First Alkibiades, but disallow the Second.' In my judgment, t Athenseus, xi. p. 506. reasons, besides what is urged in liis t Seo the Einleitung of Schicicr- Introduction, niacher to Alkib. i. part ii. vol. iii. p. r Socher, Uber Platon's Schriften, p. ‘2H8 scq. Einleitung to Alkib. ii. part , 112. Stall!, mm, Frolegg. to Aikin. i. vol. ii. p. 365 set). His notes on the i. and ii vol. v. pp. 171-304. K. F. two dialogues contain various additional Hermann, Gescb. und Byst.der Platon. Digitized by Google Chap. X. GENUINENESS OF THE DIALOGUES. 349 Schleiermacher and Ast are more consistently right, or more consistently wrong, in rejecting both, than the other critics who find or make so capital a distinction between the two. The similarity of tone and topics between the two is obvious, and is indeed admitted by all. Moreover, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should say that the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the Second than against the First ; and that Schleiermacher, reasoning upon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against the Second, would have no difficulty in showing that his own objections against the First were still more forcible. The long speech assigned in the First Alkibiades to Sokrates, about the pri- vileges of the Spartan and Persian kings,* including the men- tion of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes, and the Magian religion, appears to me more unusual with Plato than anything which I find in the Second Alkibiades. It is more Xenophontic * • than Platonic. But I must here repeat, that because I find, in this or any other dialogue, some peculiarities not usual with n,e suppo<*ut three months or so, then fell into disgrace and retired to Cher- sonese, never revisiting Athens. In 406 b.c. Alkibiades was again in banishment, out of the reach of All such warnings os Hermann and Stein- hart suppose that Plato intended to address to him in Alkib. i. Steinliart says (p. 152), u In dieser Zoit also, tcenige Jahre noth seiner tri- umphirenden Riiekkehr , wo Alkibiades,0 &c. Now Alkibiades left the Athenian service, irrevocably, within less than one year after his triumphant return. Steinhnrt has not realised in his mind the historical and chronological conditions of the period. * Xenoph. Memnr. iii. 6. Digitized by Google 352 ALKIBIADES I. AND II. Chap. X. had heard of this conversation, but whether the fact be so or not, we see the same situation idealised by him in Alkibiades L, and worked out in a way of his own. Again, we find in the Xenophontic Memorabilia another colloquy, wherein Sokrates cross-questions, perplexes, and humiliates, the studious youth Euthydemus,* whom he regards as over confident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with him- self. It was among the specialties of Sokrates to humiliate confident young men, with a view to their future improve- ment. He made his conversation “ an instrument of chastise- ment,” in the language of Xenophon : or (to use a phrase of Plato himself in the Lysis) he conceived “ that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love, was, not to exalt and puff them up, but to subdue and humiliate them.”b If Plato wished to idealise this feature in the character of vitnms of ^ Sokrates, no name could be more suitable to his pur- di»r»ct. r of pose than that of Alkibiades : who, having possessed Mt towra"8 ^ a y°uth t“e greyest personal beauty (to which in sokrate*. Sokrates was exquisitely sensible) had become in his mature life distinguished not less for unprincipled am- bition and insolence, than for energy and ability. We know the real Alkibiades both from Thucydides and Xenophon, and we also know that Alkibiades had in his youth so far frequented the society of Sokrates as to catch some of that dialectic ingenuity, which the latter was expected and be- lieved to impart.' The contrast, as well as the companion- ship, between Sokrates and Alkibiades was eminently sug- gestive to the writers of Sokratic dialogues, and nearly all • Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2. b Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, 1. (rKftpd/xtyoi ui) p.6vov & Uuvoi (Sokrates) k o A a- a r 17 p l o v f v e k a rovs Trdyr' olo- ufvouf ttScvai ij\eyx€yi kal & Xiywv (ruv5o7/A«p«uf ro?s (rvySiarpl- fiovtrivj &c. in the Platonic Lysis, the youthful Lysis says to Sokrates, “ Talk to Meuexenus, 1 V ainbv ko- Ac i XP b to** rcubiKois SiaXtytcrOai, rawtiyovyra Kal av IfKovtr a ivSpb r i^iovicrrov ru>v kva- f}*&T\K6ro6v vaph f}atri\4ay b f tv ko.B' tv Ikouttok, 4v ytyyoiro, t-rpcurm- defined language, for good and honourable things practice of generally. He commends that practice. Xenophon ft* 0 ^ 1 1 ^ favours un- tells us that the historical Sokrates observed it:’ denned -hi* views about but he tells us also that the historical Sokrates, theaemi-re- gular, semi- though not praying for any special presents from the Gods, yet prayed for and believed himself to <^~£° receive special revelations and advice as to what was good to be done or avoided in particular cases. win'toK*' He held that these special revelations were essential to any tolerable life: that the dispensations of the Gods, though administered upon regular principles on certain subjects and up to a certain point, were kept by them designedly inscru- table beyond that point : but that the Gods would, if properly solicited, afford premonitory warnings to any favoured person, such as would enable him to keep out of the way of evil, and put himself in the way of good. He declared that to consult and obey oracles and prophets was not less a maxim of pru- dence than a duty of piety : for himself, he was farther privi- leged through his divine sign or monitor, which he implicitly followed.* Such premonitory warnings were the only special favour which he thought it suitable to pray for — besides good things generally. For special presents he did not pray, because he professed not to know whether any of the ordi- nary objects of desire were good or bad. He proves in his conversation with Euthydemus, that all those acqui- sitions which are usually accounted means of happiness — beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, nay, even good health and wisdom — are sometimes good or causes of happiness, sometimes evil or causes of misery ; and therefore cannot r Xenop. Mem. i. 3, 2 ; Plat. Aik. ; tewKav oi 0*o\ , pavOdyt or & 84 pb 5 jjAa ii. p. 143-148. ! roTs foOptl/irots tor i, vapacrOcu 8(& pay- * These opinions of Sokrates are runjs wapi r&y d ie»ve* what relation does it stand to the Pleasurable and till* unde- terminal the Painful ? These are points which Plato here leaves undetermined. We shall find him again touching them, and trying different * Plato, Aik. ii. p. 147 A. i 51 tb I 305 A; Euthyclfimus, 291 B, 292 B. ri;v Ka\ovntvi}v toAuu adtiav xal » oKv~ I Compare Xenophon, (Ekonomicns, i. T«xelax ki KTTin*yoi, bpiftaros 51 tav rail- 8, 13. % rrjr t nr 4*urr^/ir|f, 51 5*5 ! 1 I-oges, iii. 089 A-D, 691 A. fiiai IxctffT^r Tuiy &\Kwv, &c. * Xeuoph. Mentor, i. 2, 17, iv. 3, 1. 1 Plato, Politikus, 292 B, 304 B, 1 Xenoph. Mcmor. iv. 6, 8, iv. 7, 7. Digitized by Google Chap. X. GOOD EXTOLLED BUT NOT DEFINED. 363 ways of determining them, in the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Republic, and elsewhere. We have here the title and the postulate, but nothing more, of a comprehensive Teleo- logy, or right comparative estimate of ends and means one against another, so as to decide when, how far, under what circumstances, &c., each ought to be pursued. We shall see what Plato does in other dialogues to connect this title and postulate with a more definite meaning. Digitized by Google 364 HIPPIAS MAJOR. Chap. XI. CHAPTER XI. HIPPIAS MAJOR — HIPPIAS MINOR. Both these two dialogues are carried on between Sokrates HippiM and the Eleian Sophist Hippias. The general con- ception of Hippias — described as accomplished, elo- or'ibT'dm*r quent, and successful, yet made to say vain and .nd“‘ silly things — is the same in both dialogues : in both also the polemics of Sokrates against him are con- ducted in a like spirit, of affected deference mingled with insulting sarcasm. Indeed the figure assigned to Hip- piaa is so contemptible, that even an admiring critic like Stallbaum cannot avoid noticing the “ petulans pene et pro- terva in Hippiam oratio,” and intimating that Plato has handled Hippias more coarsely than any one else. Such petulance Stallbaum attempts to excuse by saying that the dialogue is a youthful composition of Plato : * while Schleier- against Hippias. * Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Hipp. Maj. p. 149-150; also Stein li art (Einleitung, p. 42-43), who aays, after an outpouring of his usual invective against the Sophist : — M Nevertheless tne coarse jesting of the dialogue seems almost to exceed the admissible hmit of comic effect,” Ac. Again, p. 50, Steinhart talks of the banter which Sokrates carries on with Hippias, in a way not less cruel (grausam than purposeless, tormenting him with a string of suc- cessive new propositions about the j definition of the Beautiful, which pro- positions, as fast as Hippias catches at them he again withdraws of his owm accord, and thus at last dismisses him (as he had dismissed Ion) uninstructed and unimproved, without even leaving behind in him the sting of anger, Ac. It requires a powerful hatred against the persons called Sophists, to make a critic take pleasure in a comedy wherein silly and ridiculous speeches are fastened upon the name of one of 1 them, in his own day not merely honoured but acknowledged as deserv- ing honour by remarkable and varied accomplishments — and to make the critic describe the historical Hippias (whom we only know from Plato and Xenophon — see Steinhart, note 7, p. 89 ; Socher, p. 221) as if he had really delivered these speeches, or something equally absurd. How this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of individual taste. For my part, I agree with Ast in thinking it misplaced and unbecom- ing; and I am not surprised that he wishes to remove the dialogue from the Platonic canon, though I do not concur either in this inference, or in the general principle on which it proceeds, viz., that all objections against tho composition of a dialo^e are to be held as Being also objections Against its genuineness as a work of Plato. The Nubcs of Aristophanes, greatly superior as a comedy to the Hippias of Plato, Digitized by Google Chap. XI. INSULTING TONE TOWARDS HIPPIAS. 365 macher numbers it among the reasons for suspecting the dialogue, and Ast, among the reasons for declaring positively that Plato is not the author.b This last conclusion I do not at all accept : nor even the hypothesis of Stallbaum, if it be tendered as an excuse for improprieties of tone : for I believe that the earliest of Plato’s dialogues was composed after he was twenty-eight years of age — that is, after the death of Sokrates. It is however noway improbable, that both the Greater and Lesser Hippias may have been among Plato’s earlier compositions. We see by the Memorabilia of Xeno- phon that there was repeated and acrimonious controversy between Sokrates and Hippias: so that wo may probably suppose feelings of special dislike, determining Plato to com- pose two distinct dialogues, in which an imaginary Hippias is mocked and scourged by an imaginary Sokrates. One considerable point in the Hippias Major appears to have a bearing on the debate between Sokrates and ReiJ d(ib4la Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia : in which debate, Hippias taunts Sokrates with always com- bating and deriding the opinions of others, while evading to give opinions of his own. It appears «r that some antecedent debates between the two had thAt d< t“U!' turned upon the definition of the Just, and that on these occasions Hippias had been the respondent, Sokrates the objector. Hippias professes to have reflected upon these debates, and to be now prepared with a definition which neither Sokrates nor any one else can successfully assail, but he will not say what the definition is, until Sokrates has laid down one of his own. In reply to this challenge, So- krates declares the Just to be equivalent to the Lawful or is turned to an abusive purpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the character of the real So- krates. K. F. Hermann, in my judgment, takes a more rational view of the Hip- pias Major ( Geach. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 487-G47). Instead of expatiat- ing on the glory of Plato in deriding an accomplished contemporary, he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which the dialogue brings to view ; and he reminds us justly of the intellectual condition of the age, when even elementary distinctions in logic and grammar had been scarcely at- tended to. Both K. F. Hermann and Socher consider the Hippias to be not a iuvenile production of Plato, but to belong to his middle age. b Schleierm.Einleitung,p. 401 ; Ast, Platon’s Leben und Schriffcen, p. 457- 459. Digitized by Google 366 H1PPIAS MAJOR. Chap. XI. Customary : he defends this against various objections of Hip- pias, who concludes by admitting it," Probably this debate, as reported by Xenophon, or something very like it, really took place. If so, we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of Hippias, in a case where Sokrates, if he had been the objector, would have found such strong ones — and the feeble replies given by Sokrates, whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties, not in solving them.4 Among the remarks which Sokrates makes in illustration to Hippias, one is — that Lykurgus had ensured superiority to Sparta by creating in the Spartans a habit of implicit obedience to the laws.” Such is the character of the Xeno- phontic debate. Here, in the beginning of the Hippias Major, the Platonic owning of Sokrates remarks that Hippias has been long absent iiToJir-iifp- from Athens: which absence the latter explains, by saying that he has visited many cities in Greece, whichh*lh»d giving lectures with great success, and receiving SSESf high pay : and that especially he has often visited Sparta, partly to give lectures, but partly also to by hiTi*o*ret* transact diplomatic business for his countrymen the Eleians, who trusted him more than any one else for such duties. His lectures (he says) were eminently in- structive and valuable for the training of youth : moreover they were so generally approved, that even from a small Sicilian town called Inykus, he obtained a considerable sum in fees. Upon this Sokrates asks — In which of the cities were your Hippiiw had gains the largest : probably at Sparta ? Hip. — No : lUCcesH at I received nothing at all at Sparta. Sokr. — How ? tjKjarun/ You amaze me ! Were not your lectures calculated did not admit . J uotii*Their *° lmProve the Spartan youth? or did not the aw forbw.. Spartans desire to have their youth improved ? or c Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4-12-25. j N^os 'Xcn. Memor. i. 2, 42). All d Compare the puzzling questions ! the difficulties in determining the which Alkibiodcs when a youth is definition of Ntfyior, occur also in deter- reported to have addressed to Pcriklos, j mining that of NS/xtpoy, which includes and which he must unquestionably j lioth Jus Script um and Jus Moribus have heard from Sokrates himself, ! Hecepturn. respecting the meaning of the word 1 * Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 15. Digitized by Google Chap. XI. LECTURES AT SPARTA. 367 had they no money? Hip. — Neither one nor the other. The Spartans, like others, desire the improvement of their youth ; they also have plenty of money : moreover my lectures were very beneficial, to them as well as to the rest/ Sokr. — How could it happen then, that at Sparta, a city great and eminent for its good laws, your valuable instructions were left unrewarded ; while you received so much at the incon- siderable town of Inykus? Hip. — It is not the custom of the country, Sokrates, for the Spartans to change their laws, or to educate their sons in a way different from their ordinary routine. Sokr. — How say you ? It is not the custom of the country for the Spartans to do right, but to do wrong ? Hip. — I shall not say that, Sokrates. Sokr. — But surely they would do right, in educating their children better and not worse ? Hip. — Yes, they would do right : but it is not lawful for them to admit a foreign mode of education. If any one could have obtained payment there for education, I should have obtained a great deal : for they listen to me with delight and applaud me : but, as I told you, their law forbids. Sokr. — Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city ? — Hip. — Law is enacted with a view to benefit; but Quwtton, it sometimes hurts, if it be badly enacted/ Sokr. — Tti^'inw- But what? Do not the enactors enact it as the wv» «tm . - , . . . . the Profit- maximum of good, without which the citizens can- abM^ not live a regulated life ? Hip. — Certainly : they [»» do so. Sokr. — Therefore, when those who try to ax-y an. \ they fall to enact laws miss the attainment of good, they also miss the lawful and law itself. How say you? — Hip. — They do so, if you speak with strict pro- ^X^1* priety : but such is not the language which men U*"ul- commonly use. Sokr. — What men ? the knowing ? or the ignorant ? Hip. — The Many. Sokr. — The Many : is it they who know what truth is ? Hip. — Assuredly not. Sokr. — But surely those who do know, account the profitable to be in truth more lawful than the unprofitable, to all men. Don’t you admit this ? Hip. — Yes, I admit they account it I Plato, Hipp. Maj. 283-284. * Plato, Hipp. Maj. 284 C-D. Digitized by Google 368 HIPPIAS MAJOR. Chap. XI. so in truth. Sokr. — Well, and it is so, too : the truth i^as the knowing men account it. Hip. — Most certainly. Sokr. — Now you affirm, that it is more profitable to the Spartans to be educated according to your scheme, foreign as it is, than according to their own native scheme. Hip. — I affirm it, and with truth too. Sofcr. — You affirm besides, that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful ? Hip. — I said so. Sokr. — According to your reasoning, then, it is more lawful for the Spartan children to be educated by llippias, and more unlawful for them to be educated by their fathers — if in reality they will be more benefited by you ? Hip. — But they will be more benefited by me. Sokr. The Spartans therefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to confide to you their sons ? Hip. — I admit that they do: indeed your reasoning seems to make in my favour, so that I am noway called upon to resist it. Sokr. — We find then, after all, that the Spartans are enemies of law, and that too in the most important matters — though they are esteemed the most exemplary followers of law.h Perhaps Plato intended the above argument as a derisory comparison taunt against the Sophist Hippias, for being vain men'onSj enough to think his own tuition better than that of Platonic . tp i i • • Sokrai<». the Spartan community. It such was his intention, with that of r *iii . theXeno- the argument might have been retorted against tnuM. Plato himself, for his propositions in the Republic and Leges : and we know that the enemies of Plato did taunt him with his inability to get these schemes adopted in any actual community. But the argument becomes interesting when we compare it with the debate before referred to in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, where Sokrates maintains against Hippias that the Just is equivalent to the Lawful. In that Xenophontic dialogue, all the difficulties which em- barrass this explanation are kept out of sight, and Sokrates is represented as gaining an easy victory over Hippias. In this Platonic dialogue, the equivocal use of the word vofupov * Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285. Digitized by Google Chap. XI. LAW ACTUAL AND IDEAL. 369 is expressly adverted to, and Sokrates reduces Hippias to a supposed absurdity, by making him pronounce the Spartans to be enemies of law : — napavofiovs bearing a double sense, and the proposition being true in one sense, false in the other. In the argument of the Platonic Sokrates, a law which does not attain its intended purpose of benefiting the community, is no law at all, — not lawful : 1 so that we are driven back again upon the objections of Alkibiades against Perikles (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) in regard to what constitutes a law. In the argument of the Xenophontic Sokrates, law means a law actually established, by official authority or custom — and the Spartans are produced as eminent examples of a lawfully minded community. As far as we can assign positive opinion to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Major, he declares that the profitable or useful (being that which men always aim at in making law), is The Lawful, whether actually established or not : and that the unprofitable or hurtful (being that which men always intend to escape) is The Unlawful, whether prescribed by any living authority or not. This (he says) is the opinion of the wise men who know : though the ignorant vulgar hold the contrary opinion. The explanation of to SUeuov given by the Xenophontic Sokrates (to hutaiov = to vofujjwv), would be equivalent, if we construe to voynyuov in the sense of the Platonic Sokrates (in Hippias Major) to an affirmation that The Just was the generally useful — To Blkowv = to koivt) avfiepov. There exists however in all this, a prevalent confusion be- tween Law (or the Lawful) as actually established — -n,tjU5lor and Law (or the Lawful) as it ought to bo established, P00*1.1*. I.h» in the judgment of the critic, or of those whom he Ku'u’ihe follows : that is (to use the phrase of Mr. Austin SSoowhidi in his ‘Province of Jurisprudence’) Law as it would be, if it conformed to its assumed measure or test. In the first of these senses, to v6fii/u>v is not one “dll'n'' and the same, but variable according to place and time — one thing at Sparta, another thing elsewhere : accordingly it 1 Compare a similar argnmont of Sokrates against Thrnsjnnachna— Republic, i. 339. VOL. I. 2 B Digitized by Google 370 Him AS MAJOR. Chap. XI. would not satisfy the demand of Plato’s mind, when he asks for an explanation of to SIkcliov. It is an explanation in the second of the two senses which Plato seeks — a common measure or test applicable universally, at all times and places- In so far as he ever finds one, it is that which I have men- tioned above as delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in this dialogue : viz., the J ust or Good, that which ought to be the measure or test of Law and Positive Morality, is, the bene- ficial or profitable. This (I repeat) is the only approach to a solution which we ever find in Plato. But this is seldom clearly enunciated, never systematically followed out, and sometimes, in appearance, even denied. I resume the thread of the Hippias Major. Sokrates asks i.*cture« or Hippias what sort of lectures they were that he de- .wtL“*ot hvered with so much success at Sparta ? The Spar- rootrrfor" tans (Hippias replies) knew nothing and cared StltaTupm n°tbing about letters, geometry, arithmetic, astro- -w^u'pifr- nomy : but they took delight in hearing tales about bwnuft', heroes, early ancestors, foundation-legends of cities, honournbic &c., which his mnemonic artifice enabled him to for youth. deiiver.k The Spartans delight in you (observes Sokrates) as children delight in old women’s tales. Yes (replies Hippias), but that is not all : I discoursed to them also, recently, about fine and honourable pursuits, much to their admiration : I supposed a conversation between Nestor and Neoptolemus, after the capture of Troy, in which the veteran, answering a question put by his youthful companion, enlarged upon those pursuits which it was fine, honourable, beautiful, for a young man to engage in. My discourse is excellent, and obtained from the Spartans great applause. I am going to deliver it again here at Athens, in the school- room of Pheidostratus ; and I invite you, Sokrates, to come and hear it, with as many friends as you can bring.1 I shall come willingly (replies Sokrates). But first answer me one small question, which will rescue me from a present 1 Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285 E. 1 Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 A-B. Digitized by Google Chap. XI. WHAT IS BEAUTY? 371 embarrassment Just now, I was shamefully puzzled in con- versation with a friend, to whom I had been praising Question put some things as honourable and beautiful, — blaming K«!af , ,7° , , TT - ° of a friend other things as mean and uglv. He surprised me inui-ucic- , B . tti*7 i ci, ground, who by the interrogation — How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful, and what are ugly ? »>«■ Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful? Be»«ufui? I, in my stupidity, was altogether puzzled, and could not answer the question. But after I had parted from him, I became mortified and angry with myself ; and I vowed that the next time I met any wise man like you, I would put the question to him, and learn how to answer it ; so that I might be able to renew the conversation with my friend. Your coming here is most opportune. I entreat you to answer and explain to me clearly what the Beautiful is ; in order that I may not again incur the like mortification. You can easily answer: it is a small matter for you, with your numerous attainments. Oh — yes — a small matter (replies Hippias) ; the question is easy to answer. I could teach you to answer h many questions harder than that ; so that no man ,u«uoJ h'My shall be able to convict you in dialogue.” Sokrates then proceeds to interrogate Hippias, in the name of the absentee, starting one difficulty after another as if sug- gested by this unknown prompter, and pretending to be him- self under awe of so impracticable a disputant. All persons are just, through Justice — wise, through Wis- dom— good, through Goodness or the Good — beau- Jo,Ua, wu. tiful, through Beauty or the Beautiful. Now Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty or the Beau- wsTtb"®' tiful, must each be something. Tell me what the Beautiful is? llfuU Hippias does not conceive the question. Does the man want to know. What is a beautiful thing ? Sokr. — No ; he wants to know what is The Beautiful. Hip. — I do not see the difference. I answer that a beautiful maiden is a beau- tiful thing. No one can deny that.” * Plat. Hipp. Maj. 28R C-P " Plat. Hipp. Maj. 287 A. 2 B 2 Digitized by Google 372 HirriAS MAJOR. Chap. XI. Sokr. — My disputatious friend will not accept your answer. Hippuu. fioe* He wants you to tell him, What is the Self-Beau- Bi.nct the tiful ? — that Something through which, or by reason h* u»wen of which, all beautiful things become beautiful. Am by Indicating , ... 0 . ... _ . . one pMticu- I to tell him, it is because a beautuul maiden is a foi oiijeot. beautiful thing ? He will say — Is not a beautiful mare, a beautiful thing also ? and a beautiful lyre as well ? Hip. — Yes ; both of them are so. Sokr. — Ay, and a beautiful pot, my friend will add, well moulded and rounded by a skilful potter, is a beautiful thing too. Hip. — How, Sokrates ? Who can your disputatious friend be ? Some ill-taught man, surely ; since he introduces such trivial names into a dignified debate. Sokr. — Yes; that is his character: not polite, but vulgar, anxious for nothing else but the truth. Hip. — A pot, if it be beautifully made, must certainly be called beautiful ; yet still, all such objects are unworthy to be counted as beautiful, if compared with a maiden, a mare, or a lyre. Sokr.— I understand. You follow the analogy suggested cross-que*- by Herakleitus in his dictum — That the most beau- tiful ape is ugly, if compared with the human race, jw* So you say, the most beautiful pot is ugly, when compared with the race of maidens. Hip. — Yes. ufu*on‘ Irby That is my meaning. Sokr. — Then my friend will S^SdS’00, ask y°u hi return, whether the race of maidens is cullr Srcwn- n°t 08 much inferior to the race of Gods, as the pot OKm»ttme. to the maiden ? whether the most beautiful maiden will not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess ? not br.uuroi. wjjet],er the wisest of men will not appear an ape, when compared to the Gods, either in beauty or in wisdom." Hip. — No one can dispute it. Sokr. — My friend will smile and say — You forget what was the question put I asked you, What is the Beautiful ? — the Self-Beautiful : and your answer gives me, as the Self-Beautiful, something which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than ugly ? If I had asked you, from the first, what it was that was both beautiful and ugly, your answer would have been pertinent to the question. Can you still think that the Self-Beautiful, " Plat. Hipp. Maj. 289. Digitized by Google Chap. XI HIPPIAS REFUTED BY SOK RATES. 373 — that Something, by the presence of which all other things become beautiful, — is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre ? Hip. — I have another answer to which your friend can take no exception. That, by the presence of which s«®nd all things become beautiful, is Gold. What was pL-°ki !t before ugly, will (we all know), when ornamented with gold, appear beautiful. Sokr. — You little things 1 s* _ . . . TT ... come beautl- know what sort of man my friend is. He will an. sc™uny * B applied to laugh at your answer, and ask you — Do you think, &«»*«. then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as a hipp'»» 4 about vulgar sculptor ? How came he not to make the statue ot “a*0*1**- AthenS all gold, instead of making (as he has done) the face, hands, and feet of ivory, and the pupils of the eyes of a par- ticular stone ? Is not ivory also beautiful, and particular kinds of stone# Hip. — Yes, each is beautiful, where it is be- coming. Sokr. — And ugly, where it is not becoming.11 Hip. — Doubtless. I admit that what is becoming or suitable, makes that to which it is applied appear beautiful : that which is not becoming or suitable, makes it appear ugly. Sokr. — My friend will next ask you, when you are boiling the beau- tiful pot of which we spoke just now, full of beautiful soup, what sort of ladle will be suitable and becoming — one made of gold, or of fig-tree wood ? Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and the wooden ladle turn it out good? Is not the wooden ladle, therefore, better than the golden ? Hip. — By Herakles, Sokrates! what a coarse and stupid fellow your friend is! I cannot continue to converse with a man who talks of such matters. Sokr. — I am not surprised that you, with your fine attire and lofty reputation, are offended with these low allusions. But I have nothing to spoil by inter- course with this man ; and I entreat you to persevere, as a favour to me. He will ask you whether a wooden soup-ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold, — since it is more suitable and becoming ? So that though you said — The Self- Beautiful is Gold — you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more beautiful than fig-tree wood ? Hip. — I acknowledge that it is so. But I have another ► Pint. Hipp. Maj. 230. Digitized by Google 374 H1PPIAS MAJOR. Chap. XJ. answer ready which will silence your friend. I presume you Third »nsw*r wish me to indicate as Tlie Beautiful, something qn.«^* which will never appear ugly to any one, at any time, proof rs ven or ®t any place.’ Sokr. — That is exactly what I Sunive'Sl desire. Hip. — Well, I affirm, then, that to every application. maU) fjtvftys, and everywhere, the following is most beautiful. A man being healthy, rich, honoured by the Greeks — having come to old age and buried his own parents well — to be himself buried by his own sons well and mag- nificently. Sokr. — Your answer sounds imposing; but my friend will laugh it to scorn, and will remind me again, that his question pointed to the Beautiful itself T — something which, being present as attribute in any subject, will make that subject (whether stone, wood, man, God, action, study, &c.) beautiful. Now that which you have^teerted to be beautiful to every one everywhere, was not beautiful to Achilles, who accepted by preference the lot of dying before his father — nor is it so to the heroes, or to the sons of Gods, who do not survive or bury their fathers. To some, there- fore, what you specify is beautiful — to others, it is not beau- tiful but ugly : that is, it is both beautiful and ugly, like the maiden, the lyre, the pot, on which we have already remarked. Hip. — I did not speak about the Gods or Heroes. Your friend is intolerable, for touching on such profanities.* Sokr. — However, you cannot deny that what you have indicated is beautiful only for the sons of men, and not for the sons of Gods. My friend will thus make good his reproach against your answer. He will tell me, that all the answers, which we have as yet given, are too absurd. And he may perhaps at the same time himself suggest another, as he sometimes does in pity for my embarrassment. Sokrates then mentions, as coming from hints of the absent Farther an- friend, three or four different explanations of the gated hy8 Self-Beautiful : each of which, when first introduced, u he approves, and Hippias approves also : but each aiji« or Be- of which he proceeds successively to test and con- * Plato, Hipp. Maj. 201 C-D. r Plato, Hipp. Mnj. 292 D. • Plato, Hipp. Maj. 29.3 B. Digitized by Google Chap. XI. SOKRATES REFUTED BY HIMSELF. 375 demn. It is to be remarked that all of them are coming - ... . Objection* general explanations : not consisting in conspicuous UKreunio- particular instances, like those which had come from Hippias. His explanations are the following : — 1. The suitable or becoming (which had before been glanced at). It is the suitable or becoming which consti- tutes the Beautiful.' To this Sokrates objects : The suitable, or becoming, is what causes objects to appear beautiful — not what causes them to be really beautiful. Now the latter is that which we are seeking. The two conditions do not always go together. Those objects, institutions, and pursuits which are really beau- tiful (fine, honourable) very often do not appear so, either to in- dividuals or to cities collectively ; so that there is perpetual dispute and fighting on the subject The suitable or becoming, therefore, as it is certainly what makes objects appear beau- tiful, so it cannot be what makes them really beautiful.0 2. The useful or profitable. — We call objects beautiful, looking to the purpose wliich they are calculated or a- The u»™ • , . *i . or profitable intended to serve: the human body, with a view to -oy«uoni . , —It will not running, wrestling, and other exercises — a horse, an ox, a cock, looking to the service required from them — im- plements, vehicles on land and ships at sea, instruments for music and other arts — all upon the same principle, looking to the end which they accomplish or help to accomplish. Laws and pursuits are characterised in the same way. In each of these, we give the name Beautiful to the useful, in so far as it is useful, when it is useful, and for the purpose to which it is useful. To that which is useless or hurtful, in the same manner, we give the name Ugly.* Now that which is capable of accomplishing each end, is useful for such end : that which is incapable, is useless. It is therefore capacity, or power, which is beautiful : incapacity, or impotence, is ugly.T Most certainly (replies Hippias) : this is especially true in 1 Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E. ” Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 B-E. * Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 C-U. 1 Plat Hipp. Maj. 295 E. Ovkovv rb Swarbw f Kamov &rfpyclf«r0a<, ti$ Ixtp Svyarby, fit touto yai xeiaifioy rb Si SSvyarov, &XP7 imoy ; . . . A'Vauit n'ty Spa, Ka\6y — iSvyapla Jf, altrypiv ; Digitized by Google 37ti I1IPPIA8 MAJOR. Chap. XL our cities and communities, wherein political power is the finest thing possible — political impotence, the meanest. Yet, on closer inspection (continues Sokrates), such a theory will not hold. Power is employed by all men, though unwillingly, for bad purposes: and each man, through such employment of his power, does much more harm than good, beginning with his childhood. Now power, which is useful for the doing of evil, can never be called beautiful.* You cannot therefore say that Power, taken absolutely, is beautiful. You must add the qualification — Power used for the production of some good, is beautiful. This, then, would be the profitable — the cause or generator of good.* But the cause is different from its effect : — the generator or father is different from the generated or son. The beautiful would, upon this view, be the cause of the good. But then the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good different from the beautiful ? Who can admit this ? It is obviously wrong : it is the most ridiculous theory which we have yet hit upon.b 3. The Beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or a. The Beau- pleasurable : that which characterises those things tirui a • r . . ° variety of the winch cause pleasure to us through sight and hear- Pleasurable . , b & , -that which mg. Ihus the men, the ornaments, the works of la received e ’ ’ eye°and the painting or sculpture, upon w hich we look with ad- Cir miration,' are called beautiful : also songs, music, poetry, fable, discourse, in like manner : nay even laws, cus- toms, pursuits, which we consider beautiful, might be brought under the same head.'1 The objector, however, must now be dealt with. He will Objections to this last — What pro- perty is there common to ask us — Upon what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? Do you deny that • Plat. Hipp. Maj. 296 C-D. • Plat. Hipp. Mai. 297 B. b Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 D-E. et o!6y r* it ttiv, iK(lyu> v that ( Kty&vytva) In y*Koi6npos tcSm wpwrcyy. e Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 A-B. d Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 D. Professor Bain observes : — “ The eye and the ear are the great avenues to the mind for the «ethetic class of in- fluences. The other senses are more or less in the monopolist interest. But the blue sky, the green wood, and all the beauties of the landscape, can fill the vision of a countless throng of admirers. So with the pleasing sounds, &c.” 'Bain, ‘The Emotions and the Will,’ ch, xiv. p. 248. The .Esthetic Emotions, i Digitized by Google Chap. XI. PLEASURES OF THE EYE AND EAR. 377 these others (those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really pleasures? No, surely (we shall *hl'bl£nfe” reply) ; we admit them to be pleasures, — but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful : espe- ^ cially the pleasures of sex, which as pleasures are the greatest of all, but which are ugly and dis- Uful! graceful to behold. He will answer — I understand you : you are ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful, because they do not seem so to the multitude : but I did not ask you, what seems beautiful to the multitude — I asked you, what is beautiful.* You mean to affirm, that all pleasures which do not belong to sight and hearing, are not beautiful : Do you mean, all which do not belong to both ? or all which do not belong to one or the other? We shall reply — To either one of the two — or to both the two. Well ! but, why (he will ask) do you single out these pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively ? What is there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction ? All pleasures are alike, so far forth as pleasures, differing only in the more or less. Next, the pleasures of sight cannot be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through sight — for that reason would not apply to the pleasures of hearing: nor again can the pleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through hearing/ We must find something possessed as well by sight as by hearing, common to both, and peculiar to them, — which confers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each. Any attribute of one, which does not also belong to the other, will not be sufficient for our purpose." Beauty must depend upon some essential * Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A. MavOdvco, hv faces fait], leal iyui, Sri xdAai alirxvyeirSt ravras rat ijSovds tpdvai KaXds elvai, Sri ov Sole* t roil dydpunro is' oAA‘ iyui oh rovro iipu rwv, S Sox si r o is t o Wot s K a\b v sfyai, &AA 'S, ri tanv. 1 Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E. » Plato, Hipp. Muj. 800 B. A separate argument between Sokratea and Hippies is here aa it were inter- polated ; Hippiaa affirms that he doea not ace how any predicate can be true of both which is not true of either sepa- rately. Sokratea points out that two men are Both — two men are even in number : while each is One, an odd num- ber. You cannot say of the two that they ore ono, nor can you say of cither that ho is Both. There arc two cloaBes of predicates ; some which are true of either but nut true of the two together, or vice rend; some again which arc true of the two and true also of each one — such as just, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-308 B. Digitized by Google 378 HIPPIAS MAJOR CHAr. xr. characteristic which both have in common.11 We must there- fore look out for some such characteristic, which belongs to both as well as to each separately. Now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve. ThJreta- The pleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, Mchandgu? are distinguished from other pleasures by being the thTm" most innocuous and the best* It is for this reason EeiiTghmfr that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, {JSflubic is profitable pleasure— or pleasure producing good ftpSothu- — for the profitable is, that which produces good.k arc callcl Nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied b'*nUfuL even with this. He will tell us — You declare the This will not hold— The Profitable to the cause of Good, and la therefore different from Good — To say that the Beautiful la the Pro- fi table, ia to say that it ia different from Good — But this baa been already declared In- admissible. Beautiful to be Pleasure producing good. But we before agreed, that the producing agent or cause, is different from what is produced or the effect Ac- cordingly, the Beautiful is different from the Good : or, in other words, the Beautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful — if each of them is a different thing.1 Now these propositions we have already pro- nounced to be inadmissible, so that your present ex- planation will not stand better than the preceding. Thus finish the three distinct explanations of To koXov, Remarks which Plato in this dialogue causes to be first sug- rSSognt- gested by Sokrates, successively accepted by Hip- pias, and successively refuted by Sokrates. In h Plat Hipp. Mftj. 302 C. tj7 oforf? rjj fir’ kn4>6rtpa 4*opi4inp foyr, elirtp dpv rial ko! &4\riarai, Kal ap.

4}att, rb i xoiovv r&yaBbv rb 8c wotovv koI rb Toto6fi*vov, Zrtpov vvv 4 KaAdy ? and to objections against the theory of the Xenophontic Sokrates— it is worth while to compare the views of modern philosophers. Dugald Stewart says (on the Beautiful. ‘ Philosophical Essays,’ p. 214 Hfq.j, “ It lias long been a favourite problem with philosophers to ascertain the com- mon quality or qualities which entitle a thing to the denomination of Beau- tiful. But the success of their specu- lations has been so inconsiderable, that little can be inferred from them except the impossibility of the problem to which they have been directed. The speculations which havo given occasion to these remarks havo evidently origi- nated in a prejudice which has de- scended to modern times from the scholastic ages— That when a word admits of a variety of significations, these different significations must all be species of the same genus, and must consequently include Borne essen- tial idea common to every individual to which the generic term can bo applied. Of this principle, which has been an abundant source of obscurity Digitized by Google 382 HIPPIAS MAJOR. Chap. XI. krates, and the objecting Sokrates, are not on the stage at once. The concluding observations of this dialogue, interchanged between Hippias and Sokrates, are interesting as bringing out the antithesis between rhetoric and dialectic — between the concrete and exemplifying, as contrasted with the abstract and analytical. Immediately after Sokrates has brought his own third suggestion to an inextricable embarrassment, Hip- pias remarks — “ Well, Sokrates, what do you think now of all these reason- cnciudin* ings of yours ? They are what I declared them to be just now> — scrapings and parings of discourse, ri3,p- divided into minute fragments. But the really beautiful and precious acquirement is, to be able and mystery in the different sciences, made for its own purpose— or a con- it would be easy to expose the un- venient boiling pot— or a soup-ladle soundness and futility. Socrates, made of fig-tree wood — ns the Platonic whoso plain good sense appears, on Sokrates affirms in the Hippias "288 D, this as on other occasions, to have 290 D . The Beautiful and the Use- fortified his understanding to a won- ful sometimes coincide ; more often, or derful degree against the metaphysical at least very often, they do not. Hip- subtleties which misled his successors pias is made to protest, in this dialogue, — was evidently apprised fully of the against the mention of such vulgar ob- justice of the foregoing remarks, if any jocts os the pot and the ladle ; and this reliance can be placed on the account is apparently intended by Plato as a given by Xenophon of his conversation ; defective point in liis character, denot- with Aristippus about the Good and ing silly affectation and conceit, like the Beautiful,” &c. his fine apparel. But Dugald Stewart Stewart then proceeds to translate a would have agreed in the sentiment portion of the Xenophontic dialogue ascribed to Hippias — that vulgar and (Memorab. iii. 8 . But unfortunately mean objects have no place in an he does not translate tho whole of it. inquiry into the Beautiful ; and that If ho had, he would have seen that ho they belong, when well-formed for lias misconceived the opinion of So- their respective purposes, to the cate- krates, who maintains the very doctrine gory of the Useful, hero disallowed by Stewart. Sokrates The Xenophontic Sokrates in the holds, That there is an essential idea Memorabilia is mistaken in confound- common to all beautiful objects, viz. : ing the Beautiful with the Good and the fact of being conducive to human the Useful. But his remarks are security, comfort, or enjoyment. This valuable in another point of view, as is unquestionably an important com- they insist most forcibly on the mon property, though the multifarious essential relativity both of the Beauti- objects which possess it may be unlike ful and the Good, in all other respects. The doctrine of Dugald Stewart is As to the general theory, I think j supported by Mr. John Stuart Mill that Stewart is right. It is his compli- | ( * System of Logic,’ iv. 4, 5, p. 220 ment to Sokrates, on this occasion, seq.'i; and Professor Bain has ex- which I consider misplaced. He cer- pounded the whole subject still more tainly would not have agreed with fully in a chapter (xiv. p. 247 seq., on Sokrates (nor should I agree with him) the .Esthetic Emotions) of his work in calling by the epithet beautiful a on tho Emotions and the Will, basket for carrying dung when well | Chap. XI. RHETORIC VERSUS DIALECTIC. 383 to set out well and finely a regular discourse before tlie Dikastery or the public assembly, to persuade your auditors, and to depart carrying with you not the least but the greatest of all prizes — safety for yourself, your property, and your friends. These are the real objects to strive for. Leave off your petty cavils, that you may not look like an extreme simpleton, handling silly trifles as you do at present.”* “ My dear Hippias (replies Sokrates) “ you are a happy man ; since you know what pursuits a man ought to follow, and have yourself followed them, as you say, with good success. But I, as it seems, am under the grasp of an un- accountable fortune : for I am always fluctuating and puzzling myself, and when I lay my puzzle before you wise men, I am requited by you with hard words. I am told just what you have now been telling me, that I busy myself about matters silly, petty, and worthless. When on the contrary, overborne by your authority, I declare as you do, that it is the finest thing possible to be able to set out well and beauti- fully a regular discourse before the public assembly, and bring it to successful conclusion — then there are other men at hand who heap upon me bitter reproaches : especially that one man, my nearest kinsman and inmate, who never omits to condemn me. When on my return home he hears mo repeat what you have told me, ho asks, if I am not ashamed of my impudence in talking about beautiful (honourable) pursuits, when I am so manifestly convicted upon this sub- ject, of not even knowing what the Beautiful (Honourable) is. How can you (he says), being ignorant what the Beau- tiful is, know who has set out a discourse beautifully and who has not — who has performed a beautiful exploit and who has not ? Since you are in a condition so disgraceful, can you think life better for you than death ? Such then is my fate — to hear disparagement and reproaches from you on the one side, and from him on the other. Necessity however perhaps requires that I should endure all these discomforts : for it will be nothing strange if I profit by them. Indeed I think that I have already profited both by your society, Hip- * Pint.. Hipp. Mnj. 804 A. Digitized by Google 384 HIFPIAS MAJOR. Chap. XI. pias, and by his : for I now think that I know what the proverb means — Beautiful (Honourable) things are diffi- cult.”* Here is a suitable termination for one of the Dialogues of Rhetoric • Search : “ My mind has been embarrassed by con- inaiectic. tradictions as yet unreconciled : but this is a stage indispensable to future improvement.” We have moreover an interesting passage of arms between Rhetoric and Dialectic : two contemporaneous and contending agencies, among the stirring minds of Athens, in the time of Plato and Isokrates. The Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of reality — of breaking up the integrity of those concretes, which occur in nature each as continuous and in- divisible wholes. Each of the analogous particular cases forms a continuum or concrete by itself, which may be com- pared with the others, but cannot be taken to pieces, and studied in separate fragments." The Dialectician on his side treats the Abstract (to koXov) as the real Integer, and the highest abstraction as the first of all integers, containing in itself and capable of evolving all the subordinate integers : the various accompaniments, which go along with each Ab- stract to make up a concrete, he disregards os shadowy and transient disguises. Hippias accuses Sobrates of never taking into his view Mm who Wholes, and of confining his attention to separate rSi'itfcJooo- parts and fragments, obtained by logical analysis and subdivision. Aristophanes, when he attacks Urt/oat the Dialectic of Sokrates, takes the same ground, phiiiMophers. empi0yjng numerous comic metaphors to illustrate the small and impalpable fragments handled, and the subtle transpositions which they underwent in the reasoning. Iso- krates again deprecates the over-subtlety of dialectic debate, * Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 D-E. 1 ko2 5 lav t kji a <& par a tt)s oti alas * Plat. Hipp. Maj. 301 B. *AAA& v * $ v k 6r a. Compare 301 E. 81) trb, & SuKparfi, ri fiir 8Xa ruv The words Siavturi tra-uara rrjf -Kpa yniruv ov erttoirusy oC8’ tictivot, obirlas vt6af tiiaXtytcrdar KpovtTt 5 r as can be to the logical term Concrete , &vo\aju/3a»'OPTfT t8 xaAbv koI tKourroy opposed to Abstract. Nature furnishes ray bvrvv iv rots A 6yois Karartp.yoyrts- only Concrete, not Abstracte. 8<& ravra oXnu ptyaAa A avddyft vpias Digitized by Google Chap. XI. CONCRETE VERSUS ABSTRACT. 385 contrasting it with discussions (in his opinion) more useful ; wherein entire situations, each with its full clothing and assemblage of circumstances, were reviewed and estimated.* All these are protests — by persons accustomed to deal with real life, and to talk to auditors both numerous and common- place— against that conscious analysis and close attention to general and abstract terms, which Sokrates first insisted on and transmitted to his disciples. On the other side, we have the emphatic declaration made by the Platonic Sokrates (and made still earlier by the Xenophoutic y or historical Sokrates) — That a man was not fit to talk about beautiful things in the concrete — that he had no right to affirm or deny such an attribute, with respect to any given subject — that he was not even fit to live — unless he could explain what was meant by The Beautiful, or Beauty in the abstract. Here are two distinct and conflicting intellectual habits ; the antithesis between which, indicated in this dialogue, is described at large and forcibly in the Theastetus.* When Hippias accuses Sokrates of neglecting to notice Wholes or Aggregates, this is true in the sense of Orient a8- Concrete Wholes — the phenomenal sequences and AbSnctor co-existences, perceived by sense or imagined. But the Universal (as Aristotle says)* is one kind of mud«rel Wrhole : a Logical Whole, having logical parts. In the minds of Sokrates and riato, the Logical nakafcun. Whole, separable into its logical parts and into them only, was preponderant. * Aristophan. Nubcs, 130. \6yuv aKpifSw v (rxit'SaAa/J.oui — wanrdArj. Nub. 261, Avcs, 430. \tirrordra/y X'bpwv Ifpfv. Nub. 357. yvwpais \rwra7s. Nub. 1386. (TKapiv tccu- pwv Otu'prfy avu&ovktvoyrai, tl 6b k a 0' 8 A ti> »» r utv ir pay p.dr at v Ac- 7 ovras — which is almost exactly the phrase ascribed to Hippias by Plato in this Hippias Major. Also Isokrates, Coutrn Sophistaa, s. 24*25, whore he contrasts the useless \oyl6ia, debated VOL. I. by the contentious dialecticians (8o- kmtes and Plato being probably in- cluded in. this designation , with his own A^ot iro\iriKoi. Compare also Isokrates, Or. xv. Do Permutationo, 8. 211-213-285-287, and Isokr. Nikokles, a. 67. y Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16. * Plato, Theietet. pp. 173-174-175. a Aristot Physic. 1. 1. rb y dp 8a ov Hard rb)v afcrOrjaiv yyvpifivrcpor, r b Si k a O 6 \ ou 8 A ov r t i r fi* ptj r b k a 6 6 A o v. Compare Siiu- plikius, Schol. Brandis ad loc. p. 324, a. 10-26. 2 c Digitized by Google 886 HIPP1AS MAJOR. Chap. XI. One other point deserves peculiar notice, in the dialogue Antitvaii* of under our review. The problem started is, What is Reutire. ber« the Beautiful — the Self-Beautiful, or Beauty per 'se : d»bau- by and it is assumed that this must be Something b — Itito, in . . rrcani to that from the accession of which, each particular the Idea of _ * n«»my. beautiful tiling becomes beautiful. But Sokrates presently comes to make a distinction between that which is really beautiful and that which appears to be beautiful. Some things (he says) appear beautiful, but are not so in reality: some are beautiful, but do not appear so. The problem, as he states it, is, to find, not what it is that makes objects appear beautiful, but what it is that makes them really beautiful. This distinction, as we find it in the language of Hippias, is one of degree only :c that is beautiful, which appears so to every one and at all times. But in the language of Sokrates, the distinction is radical : to be beau- tiful is one thing, to appear beautiful is another : whatever makes a thing appear beautiful without being so in reality, is a mere engine of deceit, and not what Sokrates is enquir- ing for.d The Self-Beautiful or real Beauty is so, whether any one perceives it to be beautiful or not : it is an Absolute, which exists per se, having no relation to any sentient or per- cipient subject.* At any rate, such is the manner in which Plato conceives it, when he starts here as a problem to en- quire, What it is. Herein we note one of the material points of disagreement between Plato and his master : for Sokrates (in the Xeno- b Pinto, Hipp. Maj. 286 E. ainb rb xaXby 8, ti Cm? ; 287 D, 289 D. c Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 D, 292 E. * Plato, Hipp. Ma;.294 A-B, 299 A. • Dr. Hutcheson, in his inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, observes (sect i. and ii. p. 14- 16):— "Beauty is either original or com- parative, or, if any like the terms Letter, absolute or relative ; only let it be observed, that by absolute or original, is uot understood any qualitv supposed to be in tho object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any mind which perceives it For Beauty, like other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes tho perception of some mind Our inquiry is only about the qualities which are beautiful to men, or about the foundation of their sense of beauty, for (as above hinted j Beauty has al- ways relation to the sense of some mind ; and when we afterwards show how generally the objects tliat occur to us are beautiful, we mean tlrnt such objects are agreeable to the sense of men, &c." Tho same Is repeated, sect iv. p. 40, sect. vi. p. 72. Chap. XI. BEAUTY— ABSOLUTE OR RELATIVE. 387 phontic Memorabilia) affirms distinctly that beauty is alto- gether relative to human wants and appreciations. The Real and Absolute, on the one hand, wherein alone reside truth and beauty — as against the phenomenal and relative, on the other hand, the world of illusion and meanness — this is an antithesis which we shall find often reproduced in Plato. I shall take it up more at large, when I come to discuss his argument against Protagoras in the Theaetetus. I now come to the Lesser Hippias : in which (as we have already seen in the Greater) that Sophist is described nippa. , • , „ / , , r . Minor— Cbfl- by epithets, atlirmmg varied and extensive accom- r^u-rs ««! ; , n . •IluaUon plishments, as master of arithmetic, geometry, astro- •npi***. uomy, poetry (especially that of Homer), legendary lore, music, metrical and rhythmical diversities, &c. His memory was prodigious, and ho had even invented for himself a technical scheme for assisting memory. He had composed poems, epic, lyric, and tragic, as well as many works in prose : he was, besides, a splendid lecturer on ethical and political subjects, and professed to answer any question which might be asked. Furthermore, he was skilful in many kinds of manual dexterity : having woven his own garments, plaited his own girdle, made his own shoes, engraved his own seal- ring, and fabricated for himself a curry comb and oil-flask/ Lastly, he is described as wearing fine and showy apparel. What he is made to say is rather in harmony with this last point of character, than with the preceding. He talks with silliness and presumption, so as to invite and excuse the derisory sting of Sokrates. There is a third interlocutor, Eudikus: but he says very little, and other auditors are alluded to generally, who say nothing.* 1 Plato, Hipp. Minor, 8G8. will not pass tlio same sentence upon * Plato, Hipp. Minor, 369 D, 378 B. the Hippias Major Schleierm. Kinleit, Ast rejects both tho dialogues called j vol. ii. pp. 293-296, vol. v. 399-403. by the name of Hippias, ns not com- I Ast, Platon’s Leben und Schriften. pp. posed by Plato. Sohleiennnoher doubts 457-404). nlxuit both, nnd rejects the Hippias Stallbaum defends both the dialogues Minor 'which he considers ns perhaps ns genuine works of Plato, and in my worked up by n Plutonic scholar from judgment with good reason (Prolegg. a genuine sketch by Pinto himself) but ad Hipp. Maj. vol. iv. pp. 145-150 2 c 2 Digitized by Google 388 HIPPIAS MINOR. CnAP. XI. In the Hippias Minor, that Sophist appears as having just Hipping has concluded a lecture upon Homer, in which he had a lecture, in extolled Achilles as better than Odysseus : Achilles being depicted as veracious and straightforward, Odysseus as mendacious and full of tricks. Sokrates, vvraciun, who had been among the auditors, cross-examines forward bcro, Hippias uifou the subject of this affirmation. htlcrUun 1 the rnciHia- Homer (savs Ilippias) considers veracious men, cluu* and ' / rr / . a»fty. and mendacious meu, to be not merely different, but opposite : and I agree with him. Permit me (Sokrates remarks) to usk some questions about the meaning of this from you, since I cannot ask any from Homer himself. You will answer both for yourself and kim.h ad Hipp. Minor, pp. 227-235). Stein- hart Einleit. p. 99) and Sochcr (Ucber Platon, p. 144 seq., 215 soq.) maintain tin? same opinion on those dialogues as Stalll mum. It is to be remarked that Schleicrmarlier states the reasons both for and against the genuineness of the dialogues; and 1 think that even in his own statement the reasons for pro- Miderote. The reasons which both ddeiemmeher and Ast produce its proving the spuriousness, are in iny view quite insufficient to sustain their conclusion. There is bad taste, so- phistry, an overdose of banter and derision (they soy very truly ), iti the jmrt assigned to Sokrates; there arc also differences of view, as compared with Sokrates in other dialogues ; various other affirmations 'they tell us) art; nU Platonic. 1 admit much of this, but I still do not accept their conclusion. These critics cannot bear to admit any Platonic work as genuine unless it affords to them ground for superlative admiration and glorification of the author. This jmstulate 1 alto- gether contest; and I think that dif- ferences of view, as between Sokrates in one dialogue and Sokrates in an- other, an' both naturally to be expected and actually manifested (witness the Protagoras and Gorgins). Moreover Ast designates (p. 404) a doctrine as “ durcliaus unsokratisch " which Stall- Imum justly remarks 1 p. 233 to have been actually affirmed by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia. tStall- bauw thinks that both the two dia- logues (Socher, that the Hippias Minor only; were composed by Plato among his earlier works, and this may proWihly lx; true. The citation und refutation of the Hippias Minor by Aristotle ( Mctaphys. A. 1025, a. 0) counts with me ns a strong c<>rn>lx>m- tive proof that the dialogue is Plato’s work. Schleiennaeher and Ast set this evidence aside because Aristotle dm1* not name Plato as the author. But if the dialogue had lx'cn comjmsed by any one less celebrated than Plato, Aristotle would have named tin; author. M» •ntion by Aristotle, though without Plato's name, is of greater value to support the genuineness than the purely internal grounds stated by Ast and Bchleienuncher against it. h Plat. Hipp. Minor, 305 C-D. The remark here made by Bokrotcs — “ The jxxd is not hen; to answer for himself, so that you cannot put auy questions to him ” — is a point of view familiar to Plato : insisted upon forcibly in the Protagoras (347 K), and farther generalised in the Phcedrus, so as to apply to all written matter compaied with ixrsonal converse (Phaxlrus, p. 275 D). This ought to count, so far as it goes, n« a fragment of proof that the Hippias Minor is a genuine work of Plato, instead of which Sehleiormacher treats it (p. 295) as evincing a poor copy, made by some imitator of Plato, from the Protagoras. I Digitized by Google Chap. XI. MENDACITY— WHAT IS IT ? 389 Mendacious men (answers Hippias, to a string of questions, somewhat prolix) are capable, intelligent, wise : they are not incapable or ignorant. If a man be incapable of speaking falsely, or ignorant, ho is not mendacious. Now the capable man is one who can make sure of doing what he wishes to do, at the time and occasion when he does wish it, without let or hindrance.' You, Ilippias (says Sokrates), are expert on matters of arithmetic: you can make sure of answering truly n>isi«con- . ,7 tested by any question put to you on the subject You are sukran*. , 1 . J J The verad- better on the subject than the ignorant man, who ousuumnnd J . ° the menda- cannot make sure of doing the same. But as you clou» ,“*n Y # " are one and can make sure of answering truly, so likewise you can make sure of answering falsely, whenever ma" “ lm you choose to do so. Now the ignorant man cannot 'JJ make sure of answering falsely. He may, by reason of his ignorance, when he wishes to answer falsely, answer truly without intending it. You, therefore, the intelligent man and the good in arithmetic, are better than the ignorant and the bad for both pur- elXrrafe '« poses — for speaking falsely, and for speaking truly.k th' <>u,*,• What is true about arithmetic, is true in other departments also. The only man who can speak falsely when- Anilogy of ever he chooses, is the man who can speak truly Jtto'ouij'ite whenever he chooses. Now, the mendacious man, as we agreed, is the man who can speak falsely *rfU*'*™ whenever he chooses. Accordingly, the mendacious when hTcUc man, and the veracious man, are the same. They cboosnk are not different, still less opposite : — nay, the two epithets belong only to one and the same person. The veracious man is not better than the mendacious — seeing that he is one and the same.1 1 Plat. Hipp. Minor. 3G0 B-C. k Plato, Hippias Minor, 306 E. TIbt, «firc p $ op- Aoio ^tvfatrScu. kotA to ouri 5oio ; 1 Plato, Hipp. Minor, 367 C, 368 E, [ 369 A-B. Digitized by Google 390 IIIPPIAS MINOR. Chap. XI. You see, therefore, Hippias, that the distinction which you drew and which you said that Homer drew, between Achilles nnd Odysseus, will not hold. You called Achilles veracious, and Odysseus veracious : but if one of the two epithets belongs to either of them, the other must belong to him also.® Sokrates then tries to make out that Achilles speaks v>w of falsehood in the Iliad, and speaks it very cleverly, £££* because he does so in a way to escape detection from Odysseus himself. To this Hippias replies, Aolm*1*1 thut if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, he does it innocently, without any purpose of cheating or in- juring any one ; whereas the falsehoods of Odysseus are delivered with fraudulent and wicked intent." It is impossible (he contends) that men who de- ceive and do wrong wilfully and intentionally, should be better tlum those who do so unwillingly and without design. The laws deal much more severely with the former than with the latter.® Upon this point, Hippias (says Sokrates), I dissent from you entirely. I am, unhappily, a stupid person, who cannot find out the reality of things : and this appears plainly enough when I come to talk with wise men like you, for I always find myself differing from you. My only salvation consists in my earnest anxiety to put questions and learn from you, and in m . iiu to my gratitude for your answers and teaching. I oniighti-n him think tliat those who hurt mankind, or cheat, or lie, BIN BJltin Pr ' ' ' llipptM maintains that if Achillea ever B{ M-aka fa Iso- hood, it is with on in* nocent pur- nut*. whereas (Wy.KH-us does the like with fraudu- lent purpose. Issue here taken. 80 k rales con- tends Unit those who hurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better thau those w bo do the like unwillingly. He entreats hi. uucuom. or (j0 wrong( wilfully — arc better than those who do the same unwillingly. Sometimes, indeed, from my stu- pidity, the opposite view presents itself to me, and I become confused. But now, after talking with you, the fit of con- fidence has come round upon me again — to pronounce and characterise the persons who do wrong unwillingly, as worse than those who do wrong unlfully. I entreat you to heal this disorder of my mind. You will do me much more good than if you cured my body of a distemper. But it will be useless for “ I’lut. Hijip. Minor, 360 H. » Pint. Hipp. Minor, 370 E. ” Pint. Hipp. Minor, 372 A. Digitized by Google Chap. XI. ESTIMATE OF WILFUL WRONGDOING. 891 you to give me one of your long discourses : for I warn you that I cannot follow it. The only way to confer upon me real service, will be to answer my questions again, as you have hitherto done. Assist me, Eudikus, in persuading Hippias to do so. Assistance from me (says Eudikus) will hardly be needed, for Hippias professed himself ready to answer any man’s questions. Yes — I did so (replies Hippias) — but Sokrates always brings trouble into the debate, and proceeds liko one disposed to do mischief. Eudikus repeats his request, and Hippias, in deference to him, consents to resume the task of answering.11 Sokrates then produces a string of questions, with a view to show that those who do wrong wilfully, are better than those who do wrong unwillingly. He appeals to various analogies. In running, the good runner is he who runs quickly, the bad runner is he who runs slowly. What is evil and base in running, is, to run slowly. It is the good runner who does this iEJVwtii evil wilfully : it is the bad runner who does it un- willingly.1* The like is true about wrestling and XXn’aiig other bodily exercises. He that is good in the hecw£. body, can work either strongly or feebly, — can do X^y0 either what is honourable or what is base ; so that chooses, when he does what is base, he does it wilfully. But he that is bad in the body does what is base unwillingly, not being able to help it.1 What is true about the bodily movements depending upon strength, is not less true about those depending on grace and elegance. To be wilfully ungraceful, belongs only to the well-constituted body : none but the budly-constituted body is ungraceful without wishing it. The same also, about the feet, voice, eyes, ears, nose : of these organs, those which act badly through will and intention, are preferable to those which act badly without will or intention. Lameness of feet is a misfortune and disgrace : feet which go lame only by intention are much to be preferred.* * Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 B. I ' Plat. Hipp, Min. 374 B. ' . i Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 D-E. | • Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 C-D. Digitized by Google 392 niPPlAS MINOR. Chap. XI. that of one who mitutea even when he intend* to biU A pain, in the instruments which we use, a rudder or a how, — or the animals about us, horses or dogs, — those are better, with which we work badly when we choose ; those are worse, with which wo work badly without design, and' con- trary to our own wishes. It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his a is brit/T mark by design, than that of one who misses when u, iwve i ti.c |ie (rje8 | , j t. The like about all other arts — the mlna uf a physician, the harper, the flute-player. In each of S£t£i?uiiiT these artists, that mind is better, which goes wrong wh,1. mi^» wilfully — that mind is worse, which goes wrong un- bTtatmd* willingly, while wishing to go right. In regard to the minds of our slaves, we should all prefer those which go wrong only when they choose, to those which go wrong without their own choice.* Having carried his examination through this string of ana- logous particulars, and having obtained from Hippias succes- sive answers — “ Yes — true in that particular case,” Sok rates proceeds to sum up the result : Sokr. — Well ! should we not wish to have our own minds as good ns possible? Hip. — Yes. Solcr. — We have seen that they will bo better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully, than if they do so unwilliugly ? Hip. — But it will be dreadful, iSokrates, if the willing wrong-doers are to pass for better men than the unwilling. Sokr. — Nevertheless — it seems so : — from what we have i>i»K-nt«iKi said. Hip.— It does not seem so to me. Sokr. — lepOdMIKt * # ofjiijipiM. I thought that it would have seemed so to you, as it does to me. However, answer me once more — Is not justice either a certain mental capacity ? or else know- ledge ? or both together ? “ Hip. — Y es ! it is. Sokr. — If justice be a capacity of the mind, the more capable mind will also be the juster : and we have already seen that the more capable soul is the better. Hip. — We have. Sokr. — If it be know- ledge, the more knowing or wiser mind will of course be the juster: if it be a combination of both capacity and know- % Plat, Uipp. Min. 37*r) H-D. na, loavvri ot*xl h r Is iortpa ; Digitized by Google Chap. XT. UNWILLING WRONGDOER— WORST MAN. 393 lodge, that mind which is more capable as well as more knowing, will bo the juster — that which is less capable and less knowing, will be the more unjust. Hip. — So it appears. Sokr. — Now we have shown that the more capable and know- ing mind is at once the better mind, and more competent to exert itself both ways — to do what is honourable as well as what is base — in every employment. II ip. — Yes. Sokr. — When, therefore, such a mind does what is baso, it does so wilfully, through its capacity or intelligence, which we have seen to be of the nature of justice ? Hip. — It seems so. Sokr. — Doing baso things, is acting unjustly : doing honoumble things, is acting justly. Accordingly, when this more capable and better mind acts unjustly, it will do so wilfully ; while the less capable and worse mind will do so without willing it ? Hip. — Apparently. Sokr. — Now the good man is he that has the good mind : the bad man is he that has the bad mind. It Conclusion — belongs therefore to the good man to do wrong buiu..-Ru«i wilfully, to the bad man, to do wrong without wish- evil wilfully: . . * . . . . . vii i .the bn«l man ing it — that is, if the good man be he that lias the «-u ® , # . , unwillingly. good mind? Hip. — But that is unquestionable — mppiMc»n- ° 1 1 not rental the that he has it. Sokr. — Accordingly, ho that goes re““on',n* ° * n but will not wrong and does base and unjust thiugs wilfully, if there bo any such character — can be no other than the good man. Hip. — I do not know how to con- cede that to you, Sok rates.1 Sokr. — Nor I, how to concede it to myself, llippias : yet so it must appear to us, now at least, from the past debate. As I told you long ago, I waver hither and thither upon this matter; my conclusions never remain the same. No wonder indeed that I and other vulgar men waver: but if you wise men waver also, that becomes a fearful mischief to us also, since we cannot even by coming to you escape from our embarrassment.7 I will here again remind the reader, that in this, as in the other dialogues, the real speaker is Plato throughout: and * Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 E, 370 B. t Plato, Hipp. Min. 376 C. Digitized by Google 394 HIPPIAS MINOR. Chap. XI. that it is he alone, who prefixes the different names to words determined by himself. Now, if the dialogue just concluded had come down to us with the parts inverted, and with the reasoning of Remarks on Sokrates assigned to Hippias, most critics would ta^ertS! the probably have produced it as a tissue of sophistry dUlogao would h»ve been cited by critics iw a specimen of the bo- justifying the harsh epithets which they bestow upon the Athenian Sophists — as persons who con- sidered truth and falsehood to be on a par — sub- nlrrupl “'n'of verters of morality — and corruptors of the youth of the sophisa. ^jjeDg i j}ut M we rea(j au which in the mouth of Hippias would have passed for sophistry, is here put forward by Sokrates ; while Hippias not only resists his conclusions, and adheres to the received ethical sentiment tenaciously, even when he is unable to defend it — but hates the propositions forced upon him, protests against the perverse captiousness of Sokrates, and requires much pressing to induce him to continue the debate. Upon the views adopted by the critics, Hippias ought to receive credit for this conduct, as a friend of virtue and morality. To me, such reluctance to debate appears a defect rather than a merit ; but I cite the * Accordingly ono of the Platonic critics, Schwalbe ((Euvrea de Platon, p. 110), explain!) Pluto's purpose in the Hippias Minor by saying, that So- kretes here serves out to the Sophists a specimen of their own procedure, and gives them an example of sophistical dialectic, by defending a sophistical thesis in a sophistical manner : That he chooses and demonstrates at length the thesis— the liar is not different from the truth-teller — as an exposure of tho sophistical art of proving tho contrary of any given proposition, and for the purpose of deriding and un- masking the false morality of Hipping, who in this dialogue talks reasonably enough. Schwalbe, while be affirms that this is the purpose of Plato, admits that the part here assigned to Sokrates is unworthy of him ; oud Steinhort main- tains that Plato never could have had any such purpose — “ however fre- quently ” (Steinliart says), “ sophistical artifices tuny occur in this conversation of Sokrates, which artifices Sokrates no more disdained to employ than any other philosopher or rhetorician of that day ” (“ so hiiufig auch in soinen Eriir- terungen sophistische Kimstgriffe vor- kommen mdgen, dio Sokrates elien bo wenig verschmaht hot, als irgeud ein Philosoph oder Eedekiinstler dieser Zeit”). Steinliart, Einleitong zum Hipp, Minor, p. 109. I do not admit the purpose hero ascribed to Plato by Schwalbe, hut I refer to tho passage os illustrating what Platonic critics think of the reasoning assigned to Sokrates in the Hippias Minor, and the hypotheses which they introduce to colour it. The passage cited from 8teinhart ahfo — that Sokrates no more disdained to employ sophistical artifices than any other philosopher or rhetorician of tho ago — la worthy of note, as coming from ono who is so very bitter in his invec- tives against the sophistry of the per- sons called Sophists, of which we have no specimens left. Cuap. XI. ITS SCOPE. 395 dialogue as illustrating what I have already said in another place — that Sokrates and Plato threw out more startling novelties in ethical doctrine, than either Hippias or Prota- goras, or any of the other persons denounced as Sophists. That Plato intended to represent this accomplished Sophist as humiliated by Sokrates, is evident enough : and j,olTOlk4| the words put into his mouth are suited to this pur- pose. The eloquent lecturer, so soon as his admir- ing crowd of auditors has retired, proves unable to l,y Sgkr*lCT parry the questions of a single expert dialectician who remains behind, upon a matter which appears to him almost self-evident, and upon which every one (from Homer down- ward) agrees with him. Besides this, however, Plato is not satisfied without making him say very simple and absurd things. All this is the personal, polemical, comic, scope of the dialogue. It lends (whether well-placed or not) a certain animation and variety, which the author naturally looked out for, in an aggregate of dialogues all handling analogous matters about man and society. But though the polemical purpose of the dialogue is thus plain, its philosophical purpose perplexes the critics consider- ably. They do not like to see Sokrates employing sophistry against the Sophists : that is, as they think, casting out devils by the help of Beelzebub. Aud certainly, upon the theory which they adopt, respecting the relation between Plato and Sokrates on one side, and the Sophists on the other, I think this dialogue is very difficult to explain. But I do not think it is difficult, upon a true theory of the Platonic writings. In a former cliapter, I tried to elucidate the general cha- racter and purpose of those Dialogues of Search, rhu«ophi<*i which occupy moro than half the Thrasyllean Canon, i n i*i f 1 li • i i —theory of and ot which we have already reviewed two or three tbenwuguea * . # of Search specimens — Euthyphron, Alkibiades, &c. We have seen that they are distinguished by the absence of Knowledge ■' ° 1 J *a underblwd any affirmative conclusion : that they prove nothing, '’at*- but only, at the most, disprove one or more supposable solu- tions: that they are not processes in which one man who knows communicates his knowledge to ignorant hearers, but Digitized by Google 396 HIPPIAS MINOR. CnAP. XI. in which all are alike ignorant, and all are employed, either in groping, or guessing, or testing the guesses of the rest Wo have farther seen Jthat the value of these Dialogues depends upon the Platonic theory about knowledge; that Plato did not consider any one to know, who could not explain to others all tliat he knew, reply to the cross-examination of a Sokratic Elenchus, and cross-examine others to test their knowledge: that knowledge in this Rense could not be at- tained by hearing, or rending, or committing to memory a theorem, together with the steps of reasoning which directly conducted to it: — but thnt there was required, besides, an acquaintance with many counter-theorems, each having more or less appearance of truth ; as well as with various embar- rassing aspects and plausible delusions on the subject, which an expert cross-examiner would not fail to urge. Unless you are practised in meeting all the difficulties which he can devise, you cannot be said to know. Moreover, it is in this last portion of the conditions of knowledge, that most aspi- rants are found wanting. Now the Greater and Lesser Hippias are peculiar spe- ■rbo wpi>i.« ciroens of these Dialogues of Search, and each serves piuSmtiaiof purpose above indicated. The Greater Hippias soimtaMKto enumerates a string of tentatives, each one of which SamftuiMi. ends in acknowledged failure: the Lesser Hippias htaiMbiuiy enuntiates a thesis, which Sokrates proceeds to de- monstrate, by plausible arguments such as Hippias tbe'oiwer*" is forced to admit. But though Hippias admits Krrvr in tbo each successive step, he still mistrusts the corn elusion, and suspects that he has been misled — a feeling which Plato* describes elsewhere as being frequent among the respondents of Sokrates. Nay, Sokrates himself • Plato, Rcpubl. vi. 487 B. I atpdAjia #cal ivdyriov rois lrpdnoi^ A>»a- Kal 6 'Abttfxayros'Cl ZwKparft, (fa, j y rwv crpnKpuv scepticism and uncertainty. ^wl r*A*vrr\s rwy A oyuy, ptya rb Digitized by Google Chap. XI. CONFUSION AND ERROR. 397 shares in the mistrust — presents himself as an unwilling pro- pounder of arguments which forco themselves upon himb — and complains of his own mental embarrassment. Now you may call this sophistry, if you please ; and you may silence its propounders by calling them hard names. But such ethical prudery — hiding all the uncomfortable logical puzzles which start up when you begin to analyse an established sen- timent, and treating them as non-existent because you refuse to look at them — is not the way to attain what l'lato calls knowledge. If there be any argument, the process of whicli seems indisputable, while yet its conclusion contradicts, or seems to contradict, what is known upon other evidence — the full and patient analysis of that argument is indispensable, before you can become master of the truth and able to defend it. Until you have gone through such analysis, your mind must remain in that state of confusion which is indicated by Sokrates at the end of tho Lesser Hippias. As it is a part of the process of Search, to travel in tho path of the Greater Hippias — that is, to go through a string of erroneous solu- tions, each of which can be proved, by reasons shown, to be erroneous: so it is an equally important part of the same process, to travel in the path of the Lesser Hippias — that is, to acquaint ourselves with all those arguments, bearing on the case, in which two contrary conclusions appear to bo both of them plausibly demonstrated, and in which therefore we cannot as yet determine which of them is erroneous — or whether both are not erroneous. The Greater Hippias exhibits errors, — the Lesser Hippias puts before us confusion. With both these enemies the Searcher for truth must contend : and Bacon tells us, that confusion is the worst enemy of the two— “ C’itius emergit veritas ex errore, quam ex confusione.” l'lato, in the Lesser Hippias, having in hand a genuine Sok ratio thesis, does not disdain to invest Sokrates with tho task (sophistical, as some call it, yet not the less useful and instructive) of setting forth at large this case of confusion, and avowing his inability to clear it up. It is enough for b Pluto, lli)i|>. Miuor, 373 U ; also the last seutcucc of the dialogue. Digitized by Google 398 HIPPiAS MINOR. ('hap. XI. Sokrates that he brings home the painful sense of confusion to the feelings of his hearer as well as to his own. In that painful sentiment lies the stimulus provocative of farther intellectual effort0 The dialogue ends ; but the process of search, far from ending along with it, is emphatically declared to be unfinished, and to be in a condition not merely unsatis- factory but intolerable, not to be relieved except by farther investigation, which thus becomes a necessary sequel. There are two circumstances which lend particular interest to this dialogue — Hippias Minor. 1. That the thesis out of which the confusion arises, is one which we know to have been laid down by the historical Sokrates himself. 2. That Aristotle expressly notices this thesis, as well as the dialogue in which it is contained, and combats it Sokrates in his conversation with the youthful Euthy- The ih<*u demus (in the Xenopliontic Memorabilia) maintains, U!.*re !.^Iled that of two persons, each of whom deceives his fiends in a maimer to produce mischief, the one uTrkiislr who does so wilfully is not so unjust as the one who x™H,ph.‘mic does so unwillingly.11 Euthydemus (like Hippias Mrtuortbiiia. jQ ^jg ,ija]0glie) maintains the opposite, but is re- futed by Sokrates ; who argues that justice is a matter to be learnt and known like letters ; that the lettered man, who has learnt and knows letters, can write wrongly when he chooses, but never writes wrongly unless he chooses — while it is only the unlettered man who writes wrongly unwillingly and without intending it : that in like manner the just man, he tliat has learnt and knows justice, never commits injustice unless when he intends it — while the unjust man, who has not learnt and does not know justice, commits injustice whether ho will or not It is the just man therefore, and c Seo the passage in Republic, vii. 523-524, where the irapcucKrfriKby koI iytpriKov TTjf vo-fiatoes is declared to arise from tlie pain of a felt con- tradiction. 4 Xenoph. Meinor. iv. 2, 19. r&y ht 5 )) rovs y ; The natural meaning of iwl £Aa/3]7 would be, “for the purpose of mis- I chief ; ” and Schneider, in his Index, I gives “ nocendi caustL" But in that meaning the question would involve an impossibility, for tlio words 6 &icm exclude any sucb. purjfoso. Digitized by Google Chap. XI. REMARK OF ARISTOTLE. 399 nono but the just man (Sokrates maintains), who commits in- justice knowingly and wilfully : it is the unjust man who commits injustice without wishing or intending it.0 This is the same view which is worked out by the riatonic Sokrates in the Hippias Minor: beginning with the anti- thesis between the veracious and mendacious man (as So- krates begins in Xenophon) ; and concluding with the general result — that it belongs to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly. Aristotle/ in commenting upon this doctrine of the Hip- pias Minor, remarks justly, that Plato understands Arutotic r , J J , , combats the the epithets veracious and mendacious in a sense Ar- 4 gu merits different from that which they usually bear. Plato “• understands the words as designating one who can tell the truth if he chooses — one who can speak falsely if he chooses : and in this sense he argues plausibly that the two epithets go together, and that no man can bo mendacious unless he be also veracious. Aristotle points out that the epithets in their received meaning are applied, not to the power itself, but to the habitual and intentional use of that power. The power itself is doubtless presupposed or implied as one con- dition to the applicability of the epithets, and is one common condition to the applicability of both epithets: but the dis- tinction, which they are intended to draw, regards the in- tentions and dispositions with which the power is employed. So also Aristotle observes that Plato’s conclusion — “ He that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that does wrong unwillingly,” is falsely collected from induction or analogy. The analogy of the special arts and accomplishments, upon which the argument is built, is not applicable. Better has reference, not to the amount of intelligence but to the dis- positions and habitual intentions ; though it presupposes a certain state and amount of intelligence as indispensable. Both Sokrates and Plato (in many of his dialogues) commit the error of which the above is one particular manifestation — that of dwelling exclusively on the intellectual conditions * Xenoph. Mcnior. iv. 2, 19-22. I a. 8 ; compare Etliic. Nikomach. iv. p. 1 Amtotel. Mctaphys. a. p. 1025, | 1127, b. 16. Digitized by Google 400 niPPIAS MINOR. Chap. XT. of human conduct,* and omitting to give pro|>er attention Mhmkcor to emotional and volitional, ns essentially co- ca ^t1**1*1 operating or preponderating in the complex mean- cidlS'.ly’ *nS ethical attributes. The reasoning ascribed to l^uaiami" tlio Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Minor exem- faamui con* plifies this one-sided view. What he says is true, ducL but it is only a part of the truth. When he speaks of a person “ who does wrong unwillingly,” ho seems to have in view one who does wrong without knowing that he does so : one whose intelligence is so defective that he does not know when he speaks truth and when ho speaks falsehood. Now a jierson thus unhappily circumstanced must be regarded as half-witted or imbecile, coming under that head which the Xcnophontic Sokrates called madness : h unfit to perform any part in society, and requiring to be placed under tutelage. Compared with such a person, the opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be defended ; that the mendacious person, who can tell truth when he chooses, is the better of the two — in the sense of less mischievous or dangerous. But he is the object of a very different sentiment; moreover, this is not the comparison present to o.ur minds when we call one man veracious, another man mendacious. We always assume, in every one, a measure of intelligence equal or superior to the admissible minimum ; under such assumption, wo compare two persons, one of whom speaks to the best of his knowledge and belief — the other, contrary to his knowledge and belief. Wo approve the former and disapprove the latter, according to the different intention and purpose of each (as Aristotle observes) ; that is, looking at them under the point of view of emotion and volition — which is logically distinguishable from the intelligence, though always acting in conjunction with it. Again, the analogy of the special arts, upon which the * Aristotle has very just observa- Ethic. Eudcra. i. 121C, b. 4. The tions on these views of Sokrates, and reniAiks of Aristotle upon Sokrates on the incompleteness of his views when and Plato evince a real progress iu he resolved all virtue into knowledge, ethical theory. all vice into ignorance. See, among h Xenop. Manor, iii. 9, 7. robs other passages, Aristot. Kthicn Magna, 6irjfiaprrtK6raSy &y oi xoAAol yiyvut- i. 1182, a. 10, 1183, b. 9, 1190, b. 28; ctkovci, fiaivopityovs icaAfiv, &c. Digitized by Google Chap. XI. GOOD OK BAD — HOW UNDERSTOOD. 401 Platonic Sokrates dwells in the Hippias Minor, fails in sus- taining his inference. By a good runner, wrestler, >rh harper, singer, speaker, &c., we undoubtedly mean one who can, if he pleases, perform some one of these operations well ; although he can also, if he pleases, perform them badly. But the epithets good or bad, in this ease, consider exclusively that ele- ir'pra'iMMid ment which was left out, and leave out that element bUun*‘ which was exclusively considered, in the former case. The good singer is declared to stand distinguished from the bad singer, or from the IBulrrg 9 (who, if he sings at all, will cer- tainly sing badly), by an attribute belonging to his intelligence and vocal organs. To sing well, is a special accomplishment, which is possessed only by a few, and which no man is blamed for not possessing. The distinction between such special ac- complishments, and justice or rectitude of behaviour, is well brought out in the speech which Plato puts into the mouth of the Sophist Protagoras ( dialogue Protagoras ).‘ “ The special artists ” (he says) “ are few in number : one of them is suffi- cient for many private citizens. But every citizen, without exception, must possess justice and a sense of shame : if he docs not, ho must be put away as a nuisance — otherwise, society could not be maintained.” The special artist is a citizen also ; and as such, must be subject to the obligations binding on all citizens universally. In predicating of him that he is good or bad as a citizen, wo merely assume him to possess the average intelligence of the community ; and the epithet declares whether his emotional and volitional at- tributes exceed, or fall short of, the minimum required in the application of that intelligence to his social obligations. It is thus that the words good or bad when applied to him as a citizen, have a totally different bearing from that which the same words have when applied to him in his character of special artist. The value of these debates in the Platonic dialogues con- sists in their raising questions like the preceding, for the 1 Pluto, Protngoma, p. 322. vor.. i. 2 » Digitized by Google 402 HIPPJAS MINOR. Chap. XI. reflection of the reader — whether the Platonic Sokrates may v.in»of» or may n°t he represented ns taking what we think the right view of the question. For a Dialogue of •Sin!wu«, Search, the great merit is, that it should be sug- «hilu bring gestive ; that it should bring before our attention different the conditions requisite for a right and proper use Sr^i’6°uon of these common ethical epithets, and the state of errev ew. cjrcum8tances which is tacitly implied whenever any one uses them. No man ever learns to reflect upon the meaning of such familiar epithets, which he has been using all his life — unless the process be forced upon his attention by some special conversation which brings home to him an un- comfortable sentiment of perplexity and contradiction. If a man intends to acquire any grasp of ethical or political theory, he must render himself master, not only of the sound argu- ments and the guiding analogies, but also of the unsound arguments and the misleading analogies, which bear upon each portion of it. There is one other point of similitude deserving notice. Antithesis between the Greater and Lesser Hippias. In both Rh"^ ami of them, Hippias makes special complaint of So- oiaiectic. k rates, for breaking the question in pieces and picking out the minute puzzling fragments — instead of keep- ing it together as a whole, and applying to it the predicates which it merits when so considered.* Here is the standing antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic: between those unconsciously acquired mental combinations, which are poured out in eloquent, impressive, unconditional, and undistinguish- ing generalities — and the logical analysis which resolves the generality into its specialties, bringing to view inconsistencies, contradictions, limits, qualifications, &c. I have already touched upon this at the close of the Greater Hippias. k Flato, Hippias Min. 369 B. 2u>Kpa res, ad av nvas roiodrovs »Af- Ktis Adyovs, tea) airo Kaufravun' ft av $ 8vaxj axAotj (iVar, ftiaAc- KrtKbs, 6 wporariKbs teal dvaranteds- tan St rb irpordvcaOai. Ik iroitiv rd xAri« (St? ydp tv SAa>f Ai i iXo/cepbes or 6 (fuXoKepBrp: — the nipp^m love of gain or the lover of gain. Sokrates asks his whau! um companion to dehne the word. The companion Lover of replies — He is one who thinks it right to gain from it» one who tilings worth nothing.* Does he do this (asks So- right pin krates) knowing that the things are worth nothing ? or not knowing? If the latter, he is simply igno- kr»i™ cross- tti_° . i>i ii/* ^ . examine* rant. He knows it perfectly well (is the reply), npooun* . . . , , . i explanation. Ho is cunning and wicked ; and it is because he No man . i , /.•iii expects to cannot resist the temptation of gam, that lie has the p™ awn * ° it. i tilings n hich impudence to make profit by such things, thougli well aware that they are worth nothing. Sokr. — n",ihu.g: in Suppose a husbandman, knowing that the plant which he is tending is worthless — and yet thinking 6aju' that he ought to gain by it : does not that correspond to your description of the lover of gain ? Comp. — The lover of gain, Sokrates, thinks that lie ought to gain from every thing. Sokr. — Do not answer in that reckless manner, b as if you liad been wronged by any one ; but answer with attention. You agree that the lover of gain knows the value of that from which he intends to derive profit ; and that the husband- " ri« In, llipjtnrrh. 225. ol Kf a^iCxuv t uv uTjJii'f.i a(’uct‘ '■ l*!iitn, Ili|i|mrcli. 225 K. 2 d 2 Digitized by Google 404 HirPARCHDS - MINOS. Ciiap. XII. man is the person cognizant of the value of plants. Comp. — Yes : I agree. Sokr. — Do not therefore attempt, you are so young, to deceive an old man like me, by giving answers not in conformity with your own admissions : but tell me plainly. Do you beliovo that the experienced husbandman, when he knows that he is planting a tree worth nothing, thinks that he shall gain by it-? Comp. — No, certainly: I do not be- lieve it. Sokrates then proceeds to multiply illustrations to the same general point. The good horseman does not expect to gain by worthless food given to his horse : the good pilot, by worthless tackle put into his ship : the good commander, by worthless arms delivered to his soldiers : tire good fifer, harper, bowman, by employing worthless instruments of their respective arts, if they know them to be worthless. None of these persons (concludes Sokrates) correspond to o»in a good, your description of the lover of gain. Where loves guixl : then can you find a lover of gain ? On your ex- thenfurc all , . ° r e, men are planation, no man is so.c Comp. — I mean, So- gain. krates, that the lovers of gain are those, who, through greediness, long eagerly for things altogether petty and worthless; and thus display a love of gain/1 Sokr- — Not surely knowing them to be worthless — for this we have shown to be impossible — but ignorant that they are worthless, and believing them to be valuable. Comp. — It appears so. Sokr. — Now gain is the opposite of loss: and loss is evil and hurt to every one: therefore gain (as the opposite of loss) is good. Comp. — Yes. Sokr. — It appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers of gain ? Comp. — Yes : it appears so. Sokr. — Do not you yourself love good — all good things? Comp. — Certainly. Sokr. — And I too, and every one else. All men love good things, and hate evil. Now we agreed that gain was a good : so that by this reasoning, it appears that all men are lovers of gain — while by the former reasoning, we made out that e Plat. Hipparch. 226 D. iir\ij SctfKparci, /3ouAo)xa» A iytiv rov- *al tpiAoKcpSoutriy. rovs tpi\uK(pSf?s eJyat, ot ixda'roTf irwb Digitized by Google Chap. XII. APPARENT CONTRADICTION. 405 none were so.e Which of the two shall we adopt, to avoid error? Comp. — We shall commit no error, Sokrates, if we rightly conceive the lover of gain. Ho is one who busies himself upon, and seeks to gain from, things from which good men do not venture to gain. Sokr. — But, my friend, we agreed just now, that gain was a good, and that all men always love good. It Appmnt ,, . . ^ i ^ ° , contradiction. follows therefore, that good men, as well as others, soicrat™ . | , , accn«ea tbe love all gams, jf gains are good things. Comp. — comjwnion Not, certainly, those gains by which they will after- wards be hurt. Sokr. — Be hurt: you mean, by i*n-tort«i •' J upon which they will become losers. Comp. — I mean s«kiai«>. that and nothing else. Sokr. — Do they become losers by gain, or by loss ? Comp. — By both : by loss, and by evil gain. Sokr. — Does it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil ? Comp. — No. Sokr. — Well ! we agreed just now that gain was the opposite of loss, which was evil ; and that, being the opposite of evil, gain was good. Comp. — That was what we agreed. Sokr. — You see how it is: you are trying to deceive me ; you purposely contradict what we just now agreed upon. Comp. — Not at all, by Zeus : on the con- trary it is you, Sokrates, who deceive me, wriggling up and down in your talk, I cannot tell how.f Sokr. — Be careful what you say : I should be very culpable, if I dis- obeyed a good and wise monitor. Comp. — Whom do you mean ? and what do you mean ? Sokr. — Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus. Sokrates then describes at some length the excellent cha- racter of Hipparchus : his beneficent rule, his wisdom, creept m- his anxiety for the moral improvement of the Athe- n»ny nians : the causes, different from what was com- u* Wim- rnonly believed, which led to his death ; and the ***■»« » wholesome precepts which he during his life had i°gy «i Hip- x # * J parch us by caused to be inscribed on various busts of Hermes ***«'«. * Plat. Hipparch. 227 C. 'EraZp. Ov Af , & 2»Kpar«r aAAa f Plat. Hipparch. 228 A. robv6.mop cis. i»pokoy4\aap*p. Digitized by Google 406 HIPPARCHUS -MINOS. Chap. XII. throughout Attica. One of these busts or Hermre bore the words — Do not deceive a friend.8 The Companion resumes: — Apparently, Sokrates, cither you do not account me your friend, or you do not obey Hip- parchus: for you are certainly deceiving me in some un- accountable way in your talk. You cannot persuade me to the contrary'. Sofcr. — Well theu ! in order that you may not think your- s»krau» self deceived, you may take back any move that cuuipnniun you choose — as if wo were playing at draughts. «,nie..rbfe< Which of your admissions do you wish to retract — answers. The ' * aim panton That all men desire pood things? That loss (to be jjjjj a loser) is evil ? That gain is the opposite of loss ; gain is ova that to gain is the opposite of to lose? That to gain, as being the opposite of evil, is a good thing ? Comp. — No. I do not retract any one of these. Sokr. — You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other gain evil? Comp. — Yes, that is what I do think.*1 Sokr. — Well, I give you back that move : let it stand as you say. Some gain is good : other gain is bad. But surely the good gain is no more gain, than the bad gain : both are gain, alike and equally. Comp. — How do you mean ? Sokrates theu illustrates his question by two or three analogies. Bad food is just as much food, os good food: i- Tint. Ilipporch. 228 B-229 D. The picture hero given of Hip- parchus deserves notice. We are in- formed that lie was older than his brother Hippiaa,which was the general belief at Athens, as Thucydides (i. 20, vi. 58 ) affirms, though himself contra- dicting it, and a dinning that llippias was the elder brother. Plato however agrees with Thucydides in this point, that the three years after the assassina- tion of Hipparchus, during which Hippias ruloa alone, were years of oppression and tyranny ; and that the hateful recollection of the Peisistra- tid.*c, which always survived in the minds of the Athenians, was derived from these three last years. The picture which Plato lu re gives of Hipparchus is such ns wo might expect from a philosopher. He dwells upon the imins which Hipparchus took to have the recitation of the Homeric poems made frequent and complete; also upon his intimacy with the poets Auakroon and Simonides. The colour- ing which Plato gives to the intimacy between Aristogeiton and Harmodius is also jjcculiar. The ^patrr^s is repre- sented by Plato as eager for the educa- tion and improvement of the ipwpnvoi\ and the jealousy felt towards Hip- parchus is described as arising from the distinguished knowledge and abilities of Hipparchus, which rendered him so much superior and more effective os an educator. h Plat. Hipparch. 229 E, 230 A. Digitized by Google Chap. XII. GENERAL CONCEPTION OF GAIN. 407 bad drink, as much as good drink : a good man is no more man than a bad man.' S"”**00*1* Safer. — In like manner, bad gain, and good gain, are (both of them) gain alike — neither of them more whil'LTh"' or less than the other. Such being the case, what pro‘ is that common quality possessed by both, which ^lh induces you to call them by the same name Gain ? k Would you call Gain any acquisition which one makes either with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all?1 Comp. — Yes. I should call that gain. Sokr. — For example, if after being at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an excel- Enilmmtea- lent dinner, you acquire an illness ? Comp. — Not at S™' all: that is no gain. Sokr. — But if from the banquet you acquire health, would that be gain or loss ? Comp. — It would be gain. Sokr. — Not every acquisition therefore is gain, but only such acquisitions as are good and not evil : if the acquisition be evil, it is loss. Comp. — Exactly so. Sokr. — Well now, you see, you are come round again to the very same point : Gain is good. Loss is evil. Comp. — I am puzzled what to say.™ Sokr. — You have good reason to be puzzled. But tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much, that is gain ? Comp. — Yes : but not it is essential if it be evil : it is gain, if it be a good, like gold or silver. Sokr. — I will ask you about gold and »h»ii t* ° silver. Suppose a man by laying out one pound merely in _ , , . J J p . . . quantity, but of gold acquires two pounds of silver, is it gam in value, or loss? Comp. — It is loss, decidedly, Sokrates: gold is twelve times the value of silver. Sokr. — «h» preaui* ° > — Uie pro- Nevertheless he has acquired more : double is more than half. Comp. — Not in value : doublo silver is not more than half gold. Sokr. — It appears then Q“1*1 u 0o°*1- that we must include value as essential to gain, not merely 1 Plato, Hipparch, 230 C. wd\iv xeptT/>^x€IJ «« t& ainb— k Plat. Hipparch. 230 E. 5ia rl rb p\v KtpSos kyaBbv tpatytrai, ^ bb xor« apupbrepa ainb. xtpSos tcaAus ; rl , fo/ita kok6v ; rainbv iv afjLon’ua^u you- But now, whether you have imiiun u been persuaded or not, you at least concur with mo compelled 1 in affirming that all gains, whether small or great, t!oCilsimtU“t are g0Oi\oicepS&, defines it in this Stote of mlnd last sense, as conveying or connoting a reproach. 2* He gives three different explanations of it (always JjSSSinqohr in this sense), loosely worded, each of which Sokrates shows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases niU‘'n luu"J' are compared, and the question is put (so constantly recurring in Plato’s writings), what is the state of the agent’s mind as to knowledge? The cross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to know, — then there is no man cor- responding to the definition of a <£iXo/cepS>j? : if the agent bo supposed not to know — then, on the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The Companion is persuaded * Aristotle adverts to this class of j a. 9). Oe t da a 5’ ^wi8«x*tcu irpa{ir, ethical epithets, connoting both an I ou8i rdy xd6osf rrjy fitadrvfra’ fvt a attribute in the person designated, and yap tvOvs uv6ixaarai avy*i\r}fjLfi4ya p.trd an unfavourable sentiment in the rrjs av\6Trtrosf olov, &c. speaker (Ethic. Nikom. ii. 6, p. 1107, I Digitized by Google 416 HIPPARCHUS — MINOS. Chap. XII. that there in bad gain, an well as good gain, what is the mean- ing of the word gain t None Is found. that there is such a thing as “ love of gain ” in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable definition, to dis- criminate it from “love of gain” in the ordinary or innocent sense. The same question comes back in another form, after So- Aiming krates has given the liberty of retractation. The Col- locutor maintains that there is bad gain, as well as good gain. But what is that common, generic, quality, designated by the word gain, apart from these two distinctive epithets ? He cannot find it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which is torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of gain, that which a man acquires must be good ; and it must surpass, in value as well as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order to acquire it But when thus under- stood, all gains are good. There is no meaning in the dis- tinction between good and bad gains : all men are lovers of gain. With this confusion, the dialogue closes. The Sokratic rnrpow of notion of good, as what every one loves — evil as what every one hates — also of evil-doing, as performed by every evil-doer only through ignorance or mis- take— is brought out and applied to test the ethical phraseology of a common-place respondent. But it only serves to lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity, without clearing up any thing. Herein, so far as I can see, lies Plato’s purpose in the dialogue. The respondent is made aware of the confusion, which he did not know before ; and this, in Plato's view, is a progress. The respondent cannot avoid giving con trad ictoi-y answers, under an acute cross-examination : but he does not adopt any new belief. He says to Sokrates at the close — “ The debate has constrained rather than persuaded me.”h This is a simple but instructive declaration of the force put by Sokrates upon his collocutors; and of the reactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds, with a view to extricate themselves Plato in the dialogue — To lay bare the confu- sion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clouring ft up. h Plato, Ilipparch. 232 B. ijriyKaKf y ip (& \6yos) paWor ifi* y « fi Wireiirfi'. Digitized by Google Chap. XII. HIPPARCHUS IS NOT SPURIOUS. 417 from a painful sense of contradiction. If such effort be provoked, Plato’s purpose is attained. One peculiarity there is, analogous to what we have already seen in the Hippias Major. It is not merely the Collocutor who charges Sokrates, but also Sokrates who accuses the Col- locutor— each charging the other with attempts to deceive a friend.1 This seems intended by Plato to create an occasion for introducing what he had to say about Hipparchus — apropos of the motto on the Ilipparchean Hermes — pt) vofxl&rai ; note on this passage nrque enim ° Plato, Minna, 314 P. ko! h^v . illtid demonstratum eat, eaacm om- 2 E 2 Digitized by Google 420 IIIITARCHUS — MINOS. Chap. XII. non-existent things aro not existent. Whoever therefore fails to attain the existent and real, fails to attain the lawful and just. It is only the man of art and knowledge, in this or that department, who attains the existent, the real, the right, true, lawful, just. Thus the authoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine, are those laid down by practitioners who know that subject, all of whom agree in what they lay down : the laws of cookery, the laws of agri- culture and of gardening — are rescripts delivered by artists who know respectively each of those subjects. So also about Just and Unjust, about the political and social arrangements of the city — the authoritative rescripts or laws are, those laid down by the artists or men of knowledge in that department, all of whom agree in laying down the same : that is, all the men of art called kings or lawgivers. It is only the right, the true, the real — that which these artists attain — which is pro- perly a law and is entitled to be so called. That which is not right is not a law, — ought not to be so called — and is only supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men.q That the reasoning of Sokrates in this dialogue is confused Kffuwniru! of and unsound (as M. Boeckh and other critics have uif^Minos'iB remarked), I perfectly agree. But it is not the less bat completely Platonic ; resting upon views and doc- Tnu‘!'iuM 1 trines much cherished and often reproduced by Plato. The dialogue Minos presents, in a rude and •SwftdgM awkward manner, without explanation or amplifica- i*w, 'except* tion, that worship of the Abstract and the Ideal, uiinka ought wliich Plato, in other and longer dialogues, seeks to diversify as well as to elaborate. The definitions of Law hero combated and given by Sokrates, illustrate this. The good, the true, the right, the beautiful, the real — all coalesce in the mind of Plato. There is nothing (in his view) real, except The Good, The Just, &c. (to avro-aryaSov ; aino- BUawv — Absolute Goodness and Justice) : particular good and just things have no reality, they are no more good aud nibus legitima esse — sed hint urn, esse. Sod omnia scriptor hie cou- notionem ” f rattier the sentiment or fundit.” emotion) ** legit imi omnibus candezn « Plato, Minos, 317 C. by Google Chap. XII. LAW ACTUAL— LAW IDEAL. 421 just than bad and unjust — they are one or the other, accord- ing to circumstances — they are ever variable, floating midway between the real and unreal/ The real alone is knowablo, correlating with knowledge or with the knowing Intelligence Notfc. As Sokrates distinguishes elsewhere to hbcaiov or avTo-&i'/ccuov from ra SUaia — so here he distinguishes (vo/mos from ra vafu&fieva) Law, from the assemblage of actual commands or customs received as laws among mankind. These latter are variable according to time and place ; but Law is always one and the same. Plato will acknowledge nothing to be Law, except that which (he thinks) ought to be Law; that which emanates from a lawgiver of con- summate knowledge, who aims at the accomplishment of the good and the real, and knows how to discover and realise that end. So far as “ the decree of the city ” coincides with what would have been enacted by this lawgiver (i e., so far as it is good and right), Sokrates admits it as a valid explanation of Law ; but no farther. He considers the phrase bad law to express a logical impossibility, involving a contradiction in adjecto .* What others call a bad law, he regards as beiug no real law, but only a fallacious image, mistaken for such by the ignorant. He does not consider such ignorant persons as qualified to judge : he recognises only the judgment of the knowing one or few, among whom he affirms that there can be no difference of opinion. Every one admits just things to be just, — unjust things to be unjust, — heavy things to bo heavy, — the existent and the real, to be the existent and the real. If then the lawgiver in any of his laws fails to attain tliis reality, he fails in the very purpose essential to the con- ception of law : 4 t. e., his pretended law is no law at all. By Law, then, Plato means — not the assemblage of actual positive rules, nor any general property common to and cha- T See tlic remarkable passage in the fifth book of the Republic, pp. 479-480 ; compare vii. 538 E. • Plato, Minos, 314 D. The same argument is brought to liear by the Platonic Sokrates against llippias in the Ilippius Major, 284- i 285. If the laws are not really profit- able, which is the only real nurposo for which they were established, they are no laws at all. The Spartans are wapayofiot. Some of the answers assigned hi Hippias (284 D) are per- tinent enough ; but he is overborne. 1 Plato, Minos, 31 G 13. *Os ttv &pa rod oyros apaprdyT), rov yofilfiov afxafn&vet. Digitized by Google 422 HI1TARCHUS— MINOS. Chap. XII. racteristic of them, nor the free determination of an assembled n.iowor- Demos as distinguished from the mandates of a Sd!S?ifhn despot — but the Type of Law as it ought to be, thr'w'Ilrkof and as it would be, if prescribed by a perfectly instructive wise ruler, aiming at good and knowing how to !!iTwiMy realise it. This, which is the ideal of his own mind, Plato worships and reasons upon as if it were the only reality : as Law by nature, or natural Law, distin- guished from actual positive laws : which last have either been set by some ill-qualified historical ruler, or have grown up insen- sibly. Knowledge, art, philosophy, systematic and construc- tive, applied by some one or few exalted individuals, is (in his view) the only cause capable of producing that typical result which is true, good, real, permanent, and worthy of the generic name. In the Minos, this general Platonic view is applied to iHOemit ap- Law : in the Politikus, to government and social Hit. general administration: in the Kratylus, to naming or lan- IMntonlc _ _ „ * *ii view, in the miage. In the 1 olitikus, we nnd the .received clas- gification of governments (monarchy, aristocracy, tuude^f8*0’ an<^ democracy) discarded as improper, and the as- i". G°- sertion advanced, That there is only one government vomment, # ° Names. Ac. right, true, genuine, really existing — government by the uncontrolled authority and superintendance of the man of exalted intelligence : he who is master in the art of governing, whether such man do in fact hold power any- where or not. All other governments are degenerate substi- tutes for this type, some receding from it less, some more." Again, in the Kratylus, where names and name-giving are u Plato, Politikus, 293 C-D. raCrrjy Ciaffpoyrus opO^y tlvai icai poPTjv iro- A it ( lay y 4v fj tls 2t v f&puncot rous Cp\ovras &A770rir4oy. Saras 84 &K\as \4yoptv, oit yy rial as oCh’ Cyrus oC a as A e kt 4 ovy aAAa pLfpip.rjp.4yas ravrrjv, tts ptv tvvipovs \4yopty , 4irl rck koAAi'oj, t&s 84 &\\as ^irl ra ova pfpiprjaBai. The historical (Xenopliontio) 80- krates asserts this same position in Xenophon's Memorabilia (iii. 9, 10 . “ Bokmtes said that Kings and Rulers were those who knew how to command, not those who held the sceptre or were chosen by election or lot, or liad ac- quired power by force or fraud,” &c. The Kings of Sparta nnd Macedonia, the BoeAl) and Arjpos of Athens, the Despot of Syracuse nr Phere, are here declared to lie not real rulers at nil. Digitized by Google Chap. XII. NATURAL RECTITUDE OF LAW. 423 discussed, Sokrates 1 maintains that things can only he named according to their true and real nature — that there is, belong- ing to each thing, one special and appropriate Name-Form, discernible only by the sagacity of the intelligent Lawgiver : who alone is competent to bestow upon each thing its right, true, genuine, real name, possessing rectitude by nature (ppOorrfi vcrei).J This Name-Form (according to Sokrates) is the same in all languages in so far as they are constructed by different intelligent Lawgivers, although the letters and syl- lables in which they may clothe the Form are very different.* If names be not thus apportioned by the systematic purpose of an intelligent Lawgiver, but raised up by insensible and unsystematic growth — they will be unworthy substitutes for the genuine type, though they are the best which actual societies possess: according to the opinion announced by Kratylus in that same dialogue, they will not be names at all.* The Kretan Minos (we here find it affirmed),' son, com- panion, and pupil of Zeus, has learnt to establish Kiji°*jon laws of this divine type or natural rectitude : the b-'v|nf? ... , , - . .r . llalud law* proof of which is, that the uncient lvretan laws onthudivine have for immemorial ages remained, and still do remain, b unchanged. But when Sokrates tries to determine. Wherein consists this Law-Typo? What is it that the wise Lawgiver prescribes for the minds of the citizens — as the wise gymnastic trainer prescribes proper measure of nourish- ment and exercise for their bodies? — the question is left unanswered. Sokrates confesses with shame that he cannot answer it : and the dialogue ends in a blank. The reader — m Plato, Kratylus, 387 D. r Plato, Kratvl. 388 A-E. * Plato, Kraty 1. 389 E, 390 A, 432 E. O ukovv our (i> s a£uLocts kcu t bv rofiodJnjr r 6r re Jr$dSf na\ rbr Jr rots &ap&apoir, tots b.v rb rov oriptaros dbos dnobibtp t6 Trpo(TT}Kov irdarcp Jr brroiataovr av\- \afia7s, ovbty X(IPU vofioSJrriy drat rbr JyOdSt fl rbr birovour &A\o6t\ Coin-, pare this with tho Minos, 315 E, 310 D, i where Sokrates evades, by an hyjio- | thesis very similar, the objection made , by the collocutor, tliut the laws in : one country are very different from i those in another — taon yap ouk Jrrotts ravra ptcrawerreuducra oti Tavrd Jarir. • Plato, Kraty 1. 430 A. 432 A, 433 D, 435 C. Kratylus says that a name badly given is no name at ull ; just as 8o- kratos says in tho Minos that a bad law is no law at all. b Pluto, Minos, 310 B, 321 A. Digitized by Google 424 HIPPARCHUS — MINOS. Chap. XII. according to Plato’s manner — is to be piqued and shamed into the effort of meditating the question for himself. An attempt to answer this question will be found in Plato’s The Minos Treatise Do Legibus — in the projected Kretan colony, of which he there sketches the fundamental SS'in/1 hnvs. Aristophanes of Byzantium very naturally Mr1* placed this treatise as sequel to the Minos ; second Lcpa- in the Trilogy of which the Minos was first.0 Whoever has followed the abstract of tho Minos, which I explanation* have iust given, will remark tho different expla- «>f lb© word it iii i*i i* i*i« con- nations of the word Law — both those which are dis- fusion in Its meaning. allowed, and that which is preferred, though left incomplete, by Sokrates. On this same subject, there are in many writers, modern as well as ancient, two distinct modes of confusion traceable — pointed out by eminent recent jurists, such as Mr. Bentham, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Maine. 1. Be- tween Law as it is, and Law as it ought to be. 2. Between Laws Imperative, set by intelligent rulers, and enforced by penal sanction — and Laws signifying uniformities of fact ex- pressed in general termB, such as the Law of Gravitation, Crystallization, &c. We can hardly say that in the dialogue Minos, Plato falls into the first of these two modes of con- fusion : for he expressly says that he only recognises the Ideal of Law, or Law as it ought to be (actual Laws every- where being disallowed, except in so far as they conform thereunto). But he does fall into tho second, when ho iden- tifies the Lawful with the Beal or Existent. His Ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact. There is also much confusion, if we compare tho Minos with other dialogues : wherein Plato frequently talks of Laws as tho laws and customs actually existing or imperative in any given state — Athens, Sparta, or elsewhere (No/ao? = rcrgnmus ad alteram jiartem nostra) argumentutiouis, eamque diam fimiiorem, do nimia simililutliue Platoni- corum aliquot looorum, qum imitationem iloccat subesse. Nam de hoc quidem oonveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem so ipsum baud posBo imitari •’ nisi si quia dubitet do sank cjus monte" (p. 23 . Again, p. 2(1, “ Jum vero in nostro colloquio Symposium, Politicum, Euthyphronem, Protngoram, Gorgiam, Cmtylum, Philebum, dialogos espressos ac tanttmi non compilable roperies.” And M. Uoeckh goes on to specify various passages of tho Minos, which ho considers to have been imitated, and badly imitated, from ono or other of these dialogues. I cannot agreo with M. Uoeckh in regarding this nimia similitudo os the strongest part of his case. On tho contrary, I consider it os the weakest : because his own premisses (in my judgment) not only do not prove his conclu- sion, but go far to prove the opposite. When we find him insisting, in such strong language, upon tho great analogy which subsists between the Minos and seven of the incontestable Platonic dialogues, this is surely a fair proof Hurt its author is tho some as their author. To me it apiiears as conclusive os internal evidence ever can be ; unless there be some disproof aliunde to overthrow it. But M. Uoeckh produces no such disproof. He oonverts these analogies into testi- mony in his own favour, simply by bestowing upon them the name imitatio, — stulia imitatio (p. 27). This word involves an hypothesis, whereby the point to be proved is assumed — viz. : difference of uuthorship. “ Plato cannot have imitated himself’ (M. Uoeckh observes). I cannot admit such impossibility, even if you describe the fact in that phrase : but if you say “ Pinto in one dia- logue thought and wrote like Plato in another ” — you describe the tame fact in a different phrase, and it then appears not merely possible but natural and probable. Those very reul analogies, to which M. Uoeckh points in the word imitatio, ore in my judgment cases of the Platonic thought in one dialogue being like the Platonio thought in another. The similitudo, between Minos and these other dialogues, can hardly be called nimia, for M. Uoeckh himself points out that it is accompanied with much difference. It is a similitude, such as we should expect between ono Platonic dialogue and another: with this difference, that whereas, in the Minos, Plato gives the same general views in a manner more brief, crude, abrupt — in the other dialogues he works them out with greater fulness of explanation and illustration, and some degree of chaugo not unimportant. That there should be this amount of difference between one dialogue of Plato and another appears to me perfectly natural. On the other hand — that there should have been a contemjiorary falsarius (scriptor miser, insulsus, vilissimns, to use phrases of M. Uoeckh), who studied and pillaged tho best dialogues of Plato, for the purjwse of putting together a short and |» r- verted abbreviation of them — aud who contrived to get his miserable abbreviation recognized by tho Byzantine Aristophanes among the genuine dialogues uot- Digitized by Google Chap. XII. APPEXDIX. 429 withstanding the existence of the Platonio school — this, I think highly im- probable. I cannot therefore agree with M. Boeckh in thinking, that “ ubiquo so prodens Platnnis imitatio ” (p. 31) is nn irresistible proof of spuriousness : nor can I think that his hypothesis shows itself to advantage, when he says, p. 10 — “ Ipso autem dialogue (Minos) quum post Politieum compositus sit, quod qutednm in eo dicta rebus ibi expositis manifesto nitantur, ut paullo post osten- domus — quis cst qui artifleiosissimum philosophum, jiostquam ibi (in Politico) accumtius de natura legis egisset, do ett iternm pntet negligenter egisse ? ” — I do not think it so impossible as it appears to M. Boeckh, that a philosopher, after having irrillen upon a given subject accuratiu*, should subsequently writo upon it negligenter. But if I granted this ever so fully, I should still contend that there remains another alternative. The negligent workmanship may have preceded the accurate : nn alternative which I think is probably the truth, and which has nothing to exclude it except M. Bocckh’s pure hypothesis, that tho Mines must have been copied from the Politikus. tVliile I admit then that the Hipparchus and Minos arc among tho inferior and earlier compositions of Plato, I still contend that there is no ground for excluding them from the list of his works. Though the Platonic critics of this century are for the most part of an adverso opinion, I have with me the general authority of the critics anterior to tliis century — from Aristophanes of Byzan- tium down to Bentley and Ruhnken — see Boeckh, pp. 7-32. Yxem defends the genuineness of tho Hipparchus — (Ucber Platon’s Klei- tophon, p. 8. Berlin, 184G), Digitized by Google 430 THE AGES. Chap. XIII. CHAPTER XIII. THEAGES. This is among the dialogues declared by Schleiermacher, tim-bri's- Ast, Stallbaum, and various other modern critics, «Pn- to be spurious and unworthy of Plato : the produc- rious by MOM . r . . . , 1 . modem tion of one who was not merely au imitator, but a critics— ... * gToutKi. f.,r, bad and silly imitator.11 Soclmr on the other hand not M.ffl.if.it. defends the dialogue against them, reckoning it as a juvenile production of l>lato.b The arguments which are adduced to prove its spuriousness appear to me altogether insufficient. It has some features of dissimilarity with that which we read in other dialogues — these the above-mentioned critics call un-platonic : it has other features of similarity — theso they call bad imitation by a faharim: lastly, it is in- ferior, as a performance, to the best of the Platonic dialogues. But I am prepared to expect (and have even the authority of Schleiermacher for expecting) that some dialogues will be inferior to others. I also reckon with certainty, that between two dialogues, both genuine, there will lie points of similarity as well as points of dissimilarity. Lastly, the critics find marks of a bad, recent, un-platonic style : but Dionysius of Ilulikarnnssus — a judge at least equally competent upon such a matter — found no such marks. He expressly cites the dialogue as the work of Plato,' and explains the peculiar • Stallbaum, Prolog, pp. 220-225, “ineptus tenebrio,” Ac. Schleier- mac her, Einlcitung, part ii. v. iii. pp. 247-252. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, op. 495-407. Ast speftKH with respect (differing in this respect from the other two of the Theages as a composition, though bo docs not believe it to be the work of Plato. Schleiermacher also admits (see the end of his Kinleitung) that | the style in general has a good Platonic | colouring, though ho considers some particular phrases as un-Platonic. b Richer, Ueber Platon, pp. 92-102. M. Coliet also speaks of it os a work of Plato (Novm Ix*ctionc8, Ac., p. 624. Lugd. Bat. 1858;. e Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor, p. 405, Reisk. Compare Theagea, 121 L>. €is rb Atrrv Karaffalt'orrcs. In general, in discussions on the genuineness of any of the Platonic dialogues, I can do nothing but reply Digitized by Google Chap. XIII. QUESTIONS OF SOKRATES. 431 phraseology assigned to Demodokus by remarking, that the latter is presented as a person of rural habits and occupations. Demodokus, an elderly man (of rank and landed property), and his youthful son Theages, have come from their IVrliIl, of Derne to Athens, and enter into conversation with ^S”® Sokrates: to whom the father explains, that Theages d<*u*»na°’ has contracted, from the conversation of youthful r«Sm'id companions, an extraordinary ardour for the acquisi- tion of wisdom. The son has importuned his father to put him under the tuition of one of the Sophists, d**sin*s to In* who profess to teach wisdom. The father, though I In- tt-tu-hlng not unwilling to comply with the request, is deterred of “ Sopb'*L by the difficulty of finding a good teacher and avoiding a bad one. lie entreats the advice of Sokrates, who invites the young man to explain what it is that he wants, over and above the usual education of an Athenian youth of good family (letters, the harp, wrestling, &c.), which he has already gone through .d Sokr. — You desire wisdom : but what kind of wisdom ? That by which men manage chariots ? or govern horses? or pilot ships ? Theag. — No : that by which men are governed. Sokr. — But what men ? those in a state of sickness — or those who are singing in be a chorus — or those who are under gymnastic training ? Each of these classes has its own governor, who bears a special to the arguments of those critics who consider them spurious. But iu the case of the Theages there is one argu- ment which tends to mark Pluto positively ns the author. In the Theages, p. 125, the senarius hv irpirreivy rovrov iiro- Tpo-x^y, irporpfirti ob&firoTt. ° Pinto, Tneag. 129. p Pinto, Theages, 129 E. ravra 5^ •trim a ttpyxi s trv olffOa' ^ir«8f5ou*' 84 Swori aroi trvytlriy, k&v ti Iv rrj airrij p6vov olwitp tlijy, plf iv T

a\f(rr(poy wap ' dctlyo/v riv\ watSfVfaOai, oT iyKpa-rds ainol dm rift uxpfKdas, fjy wfpfAovat robs avOpwwovs, uuAAoy f) wap * Ipov 8, n hy rvxj] , rovro wpd^at. 2 f 2 Digitized by Google 436 THE AGES. Chap. XIII. self propitious, that will be the best of all : if not, we can then take counsel, whether I shall try to propitiate him by prayer, sacrifice, or any other means which the prophets may recommend — or whether I shall go to some other teacher.1 The Theages figured in the list of Thrasyllus as first in the item*!** on fifth Tetralogy: the other three members of the the Theagfti t # -Analog same Tetralogy being Charmidcs, Laches, Lvsis. uchfci. borne persons considered it suitable to read as first dialogue of all.’' There are several points of analogy between the Theages and the Laches, though with a different turn given to them. Aristeides and Thucydides are mentioned in both of them : Sokrates also is solicited to undertake the duty of teacher. The ardour of the young Theages to acquire wisdom reminds us of Hippokrates at the beginning of the Protagoras. The string of questions put by Sokrates to Theages, requiring that what is called wisdom shall be clearly defined and specialised, has its parallel in many of the Platonic dialogues. Moreover the declaration of Sokrates, that lie knows nothing except about matters of love, but that in them he is a consummate master — is the same as what he explicitly declares both in the Symposion and other dia- logues.* But the chief peculiarity of the Theages consists in the chk-r prcuu* stress which is laid upon the Hannon, the divine arlty of the . , . o i mi • i • • TbcagGft- voice, the inspiration of Sokrates. 1 his divme aux- dRro-Xn “ia,7 18 here described, not only as giving a timely orDmmon. check or warning to Sokrates, when either he or his friends contemplated any inauspicious project — but also as intervening, in the case of those youthful companions with whom he conversed, to promote the improvement of one, to * Plato, Theag. 131 A. I Xenoph. Sympoe. iv. 27. ▼ Diog. L. iii. 59-61. It is not reasonable to treat this 1 Symposion, 177 E. oCrt y dp &y j declaration of Sokrates, in the Theages, xov iyw dwotp-fjrraiui, bs uu5tv T ou, AAAws 51 < i/Tj 0 tj s — Plat. Fhtedon, 117 D. Digitized by Google 438 THE AGES. Chap. XIII. foil. It gave an apparent reason for the perfect singularity of the course pursued by Sokrates : for his preternatural acuteness in one direction, and his avowed incapacity in another : for his mastery of the Elenchus, convicting men of ignorance, and his inability to supply them with knowledge : for his refusal to undertake the duties of a teacher. All these are mysterious features of the Sokratic character. The intervention of the Damon appears to afford an explanation, by converting them into religious mysteries : which, though it be no explanation at all, yet is equally efficacious by stop- ping the mouth of the questioner, and by making him believe that it is guilt and impiety to ask for explanation— as Sokrates himself declared in regard to astronomical phenomena, and as Herodotus feels, when his narrative is crossed by strange religious legends.® In this manner, the Theages is made by Plato to exhibit soitrau*, one way of parrying the difficulty frequently ad- uniuiiy'flnd* dressed to Sokrates by various hearers : “ You tell otSacMcart" ‘ us that the leading citizens cannot even teach their teuch him- own sons, and that the Sophists teach nothing worth ielf. IHffl- , , ,, ,, . , , cuiiy of nod- having : you perpetually call upon us to seek for cuso for hU better teachers, without telling us where such arc refusal. The ° fur- to be found We entreat you to teach us yourself, vxc\m. conformably to your own views. If a leader of political opposition, after years employed in denouncing successive administrators as ignorant and ini- quitous, refuses, when invited, to take upon himself the business of administration — an intelligent admirer must find some decent pretence to colour the refusal. Such a pretence is found for Sokrates in the Theages : “ I am not my own master on this point I am the instrument of a divine ally, without whose active working I can accomplish nothing : who forbids altogether my teaching of one man — tolerates, without assisting, my unavailing lessons to another — assists effica- ciously in my teaching of a third, in which case alone the pupil receives any real benefit. The assistance of this divine r Xenop. Meinor. iv. 7, 5-6 ; Herodot. ii. 3, 45-46. Digitized by Google Chap. XIII. DIVINE PRIVILEGE TO SOKRATES. 439 ally is given or withheld according to motives of his own, which I cannot even foretel, much less influence. I should deceive you therefore if I undertook to teach, when I cannot tell whether I shall do good or harm.” The reply of Theages meets this scruple. He asks per- mission to make the experiment, and promises to propitiate the divine auxiliary by prayer and sacrifice : under which reserve Sokrates gives consent. It is in this way that the Daemon or divine auxiliary serves the purpose of reconciling what would otherwise be rato a** an inconsistency in the proceedings of Sokrates. I h mean, that such is the purpose served in this dia- autfftotiw logue: I know perfectly that Plato deals with the In the surae case differently elsewdiere : but I am not bouud (as Ureter _ _ .11 » h i working 1 have said more than once) to force upon all the «*.niuuy dialogues one and the same point of view. That the agency of the Gods was often aud in the most Ptrson- important cases, essentially undiscoverable and unpredictable, and that in such cases they might sometimes be prevailed on to give special warnings to favoured persons — were doctrines which the historical Sokrates in Xenophon asserts with emphasis.3 The Diemon of Sokrates was believed, both by himself aud his friends, to be a special privilege aud an extreme case of divino favour and communication to him.c It was perfectly applicable to the scope of the Theages, though Plato might not choose always to make the same employment of it. It is used in the same general way in the Themtetus ; 1 doubtless with less expansion, and blended with another analogy (that of the midwife) which introduces a considerable difference.® d Xcnop. Memor. i. 1, 8-9-19. Euripid. Hecnb. 944. < pvpouai 5" airth 0«ol xdAiv tc iral ‘wp6tJa>y rapaypbv ivriBivrcs, cos &yvoos 4y4 8aigla — to i\oeZv. How are we to explain or define it ? What is its province and purport ? Instead of the simple, naked, self-introducing, conver- Kmsue— sation, which we read in the Menon, Hipparchus, Subject and t , .. pc-mons of ihc Mm os, &c., bokrates recounts a scene and colloquy, dialogue — t . * * i>n»matic which occurred when he went into the house of introduction ... — intmung Dionysius the grammatist or school-master,* frc- painaira quented by many elegant and high-born youths as pupils. Two of these youths were engaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical problem, in the presence of various spectators; and especially of two young men, rivals for the affection of one of them. Of these rivals, the one is a person devoted to music, letters, discourse, philosophy: — the other hates and despises these pursuits, devoting himself to gymnastic exercise, and bent on acquiring the maximum of athletic force.b It is much the same con- trast as that between the brothers Amphion and Zethus in the Antiopfi of Euripides — which is beautifully employed as an illustration by Plato in the Gorgias.0 As soon as Sokrates begins his interrogatories, the two Twos™: youths relinquish d their geometrical talk, and turn one or chera to him as attentive listeners : their approach affects literary, de- voimi 10 his emotions hardly less than those of the Erastes. Kj-'iiil! ipMc de first enquires from the athletic Erastes, What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged a Plato, Ernstro, 132. *is Ai ovvalov Cicero Do Orntore, ii. 37, 156. tow ypap/xariarov *l'“mcrary the physician or the farmer in the analogous cases. n£nnui»tA Sokrates then puts a question somewhat different: whtch'uTiu Sokr. — Since we have agreed, that the man who tbcrrnt^ prosecutes philosophy ought not to learn many u^phiutsophcr things, still less all things — what is the best conjec- wmSu ture that we can make, respecting the matters 1‘i'k" “ ulk which he ought to learn? Erast. — The finest and irmclThougti most suitable acquirements for him to aim at, are, not u> pno- ^j10ge wjll yield to him the greatest repu- tation as a philosopher. lie ought to appear accomplished in every variety of science, or at least in all the more impor- tant ; and with that view, to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to know : — that is, what belongs to the intelligent critic, as distinguished from the manual operative: to the planning and superintending architect, as distinguished from the working carpenter.1 Sokr. — But you cannot learn even two different arts to this extent — much less several consider- able arts. Erast. — I do not of course mean that the phi- losopher can be supposed to know each of them accurately, like the artist himself — but only as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated citizen. That is, he shall be able to appreciate, better than other hearers, the observations made by the artist; and farther to deliver a reasonable opinion of his own, so as to be accounted, by all the hearers, more accomplished in the affairs of the art than themselves.m k Plato, Ernst. 134 E, 135 A. I t x«reu • 8®® xtlP°vP7^» 1 Plat. Erast. 135 B. ’6 I wish to know, which of the two you will send for, first and by preference ? Erast. — No doubt — I shall send for the pro- fessional physician. Sokr. — The like also, if you are in danger on shipboard, you will entrust your life to the pilot rather than to the philosopher : and so as to all other matters, so long as a professional man is to be found, the philosopher is of no use? Erast. — So it appears. Sokr. — Our philo- sopher then is one of the useless persons : for we assuredly have professional men at hand. Now we agreed before, that good men were useful, bad men useless.p Erast. — Yes ; that was agreed. Sokr. — If then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be one who has a second-rate knowledge on many philo*°[‘hJ ° J cannot con- subjects, he is useless so long as there exist profes- sional artists on each subject. Your definition can- "Plat. Erast. 135 E, 136 A. koI I ing the quoit and the javelin, wrestling. othat 7 lyvtffdai irtp\ wdv to Sxcuepdv npa \ ° Plat. Erast. 136 B. aAAi Tritrrat v rbv irtkrates same art, which punishes men rightly, makes them coone of better, and best distinguishes the good from the examination. . _ n ° j* on cations bad r whether applied to one, few, or many ? Erast. put to Bbow . ct i mi • / . that there u — It is so/ Sokr. — The art or science, whereby men one ipedtl • i ji » ji * i* • « . . -iSu.«i punish evil doers rightly, is the judicial or justice : inland and ^ 'B hy the same that they know the good apart thon!™i'fr5ru fr°m tbe bad, either one or many. If any man be the guod. a stranger to this art, so as not to know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself, whether he be a good or a bad man ? Erast. — Yes : he is. Solar. — To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in sobriety or tem- perance ; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate. But this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly — or justice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same : and the Delphian rescript, Know thyself, does in fact enjoin the practice both of justice and of sobriety.* Erast. — .So it appears. Sokr. — Now it is by this same art, when practised by a king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed ; it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master, that the house is well-governed : so that this art, justice or sobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical ; and the just and sober man is at once the true king, statesman, house-master.1 Erast. — I admit it. Sokr. — Now let me ask you. You said that it was dis- n Plat. Erast. 137 n. I • Plato, Ernst. 138 A. r Plato, Ernst. 137 C-D. | * Plato, Ernst. 138 C. Digitized by Google Chap. XIV. ART OF GOVERNMENT ESSENTIAL. 447 creditable for tlio philosopher, when in company with a physician or any other craftsman talking about mat- Jn Ull, „rl ters of liis own craft, not to be able to follow what JSwmST he said and comment upon it. Would it not also be discreditable to the philosopher, when listening to SS-boViio’ any king, judge, or house-master, about professional fully qu&li- affairs, not to be able to understand and comment ? tlonei^om- Erast. — Assuredly it would bo most discreditable F",nt 10 “*• upon matters of such grave moment. Sokr. — Shall we say then, that upon these matters also, as well as all others, the philosopher ought to be a Pentathlus or second-rate per- former, useless so long as the special craftsman is at hand ? or shall we not rather affirm, that ho must not confido his own house to any one else, nor be the second-best within it, but must himself judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well administered ? Erast. — That too I admit.0 Sokr. Farther, if his friends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes, — if the city shall command him to act as Dikast or to settle any difficulty, — in those cases also it will be dis- graceful for him to stand second or third, and not to be first- rate ? Erast. — I think it will be. Sokr. — You see then, my friend, philosophy is something very different from much learning and acquaintance with multifarious arts or sciences.* Upon my saying this (so Sokrates concludes his recital of the conversation) the literary one of the two rivals close of the was ashamed and hold his peace ; while the gymnastic Humiliation rival declared that I was in the right, and the other Enwtc*. hearers also commended what I had said. The antithesis between the philo-gymnast, hater of philo- sophy,— and the enthusiastic admirer of philosophy, who nevertheless cannot explain what it is — gives much point and vivacity to * Plato, Erast. 138 E. ndrtpov olv Kai ir*p\ ravra Kfyatficv, wtvrad\ov avrbv 5«iV tlvai na\ uwaKpoVy ri 5cvt«- ptla $xovra rbv yiyvSptvov. -Plato, • Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, Politikus. 283-284. Compare also the ch. x. p. 346. Digitized by Google (’hap. XIV. SECOND-BEST IN MANY THINGS. 449 in general terms : but when it is asked, Where is the person possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental training — neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To suggest a question, and direct attention to it, yet still to leave it unanswered — is a practice familiar with Plato. In this respect the Erast® is like other dialogues. The answer, if any, intended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence is the philosopher himself. The second explanation of philosophy here given — that the philosopher is one who is second-best in many de- view taken _ in 111 , * . oftbe*econd- partments, and a good talker upon all, but inferior be*t critical 1 , " , 1 . talking man, to the special master in each — was supposed by rhrasyllus in ancient times to bo pointed at Demo- p™- kritua, By many Platonic critics, it is referred to practitioner, those persons whom they single out to be called Sophists. I conceive it to be applicable (whether intended or not) to the literary men generally of that age, the persons called Sophists included. That which Perikles expressed by the word, when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty as characteristic features of the Athenian citizen — referred chiefly to the free and abundant discussion, the necessity felt by every one for talking over every thing be- fore it was done, yet accompanied with full energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act.” Speech, ready and pertinent, free conflict of opinion on many different topics — was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge acquired. Sokrates passed his life in talking, with every one indiscriminately, and upon each man’s particular subject ; often perplexing the artist himself. Xenophon recounts con- versations with various professional men — a painter, a sculptor, an armourer — and informs us that it was instruetive to all of them, though Sokrates was no practitioner in any craft.' It was not merely Demokritus, but Plato and Aristotle also, who talked or wrote upon almost every subject included in ’’ Thucyd. ii. 40. «cal tv t« tovtois tt)k af'lav rival daufca^nrOai, /cal trt iv &\\ois. rpt\ovaAovufv yc ip per' cirreXrias, Kal $i\oaoeci4l- t led —dimly indicated— regal or poli- tical art. d The ir«Vra0Aoy or t/ira/cpor, whom Plato criticises in this dialogue, coin- cides with wliat Aristotle calls “ the man of universal education or cul- ture.”— Ethic. Nikom. I. i. 1095 a. 1. tKcurros 34 kj>Iv ti kclXws & ytyv^critti, Kcd rovr&y tariv Kpir-f}S’ KaO' •tKaarov &pa, d wtwaifcufitvov aw\As Si, 6 ir tpl way wtwatdtv^iyof. Digitized by Chap. XIV. PHILOSOPHY HAS A PROVINCE OF HER OWN. 451 purpose in many Platonic dialogues. But what is the peculiar of the philosopher ? Here, as elsewhere, it is marked out in a sort of misty outline, not as by one who already knows and is familiar with it, but as one who is trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded. Here, we have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil, governing, and applying penal sanctions rightly. This is the supreme art or science, of which the philosopher is the professor ; and in which, far from requiring advice from others, he is the only person competent both to advise and to act : the art which exercises control over all other special arts, directing how far, and on what occasions, each of them comes into appliance. It is philosophy, looked at in one of its two aspects : not as a body of speculative truth, to be debated, proved, and dis- criminated from what cannot be proved or can be disproved — but as a critical judgment bearing on actual life, prescribing rules or giving directions in particular cases, with a view to tho attainment of foreknown ends, recognised as expetenda .* This is what Plato understands by the measuring or calcu- lating art, the regal or political art, according as we use the language of tho Protagoras, Politikus, Euthydemus, Bepublic. Both justice and sobriety are branches of this art; and tho distinction between the two loses its importance when tho art is considered as a whole — as we find both in the Erast® and in the Republic/ Here, in the Erast®, this conception of the philosopher as the supreme artist controlling all other artists, is nuiMopber darkly indicated and crudely sketched. We shall pm™ , . . cuu trolling bud the same conception more elaborately illustrated other *ni»u. in other dialogues ; yet never passing out of that state of dreamy grandeur which characterises Plato as an expositor. * Tho difference between the socond vi. 5, pp. 1140-1 HI ; also Ethic. Magn. explanation of philosophy and the third i. pp. 1 107-1 198. explanation, suggested in tho Emst/e, ' See Republic, iv. 433 A ; Gorging, will be found to coincide pretty nearly 52G C; Channidte, 164 B; and Here- with the distinction which Aristotle dorf s note on the passage in the Char- takes much pains to draw between mi.les. trotftia and xdpx*iy (iii. 15). lie docs not intend to suggest any doubt whether there be such a fact ns memory. Eftr tp is sometimes the equivalent of Ixsibljxtp : as we learn from Hermann ad Vigor. VIII. 6 p. 512. There is therefore no fair ground for supposing that Thrasyllus doubted the genuineness of the Erast®. And when I read wliat modem critics say in support of their verdict of condemnation, I feel the more authorised in dissenting from it. I will cite a passage or two from Stallbaum. Stallbaum begins his Prolegomena as follows, pp. 205-206 : “ Quanquam hie libcllus genus dicendi habet punim, cos turn, elegans, nihil ut inveniri queat quod b PlatoniH nut Xcnopliontis elegant i a nbhorre.it— tnmen quin b Boeekhio, Sch lei ermachero, Astio, Sochero, Knobelio, aliis jure mcrihique pro supjxx-iiticio Digitized by Google Chap. XIV. API'EMUX. 453 liabitus sit, haudquaquam dubitamus. Est cnim materia o[)cris adoo non ad Platonis mentem rationomquo elaborate, ut potiua cuivis alii Socmticorum quum huic rectfc ascribi posso videatur.” After stating that the Erastto may be divided into two principal sections, Stallbaum proceeds : — “ Neutra harum ita tmetata est, ut nihil desidcretur, quod ad justam argument! explicationem merito requires — nihil inculcatum reperintur, quod vel nlio modo illustnitum vel omnino omissum esse capias.” I call attention to this sentence as a fair specimen of the grounds upon which tho Platonic critics proceed when they strike dialogues out of the Platonic Canon. If there bo anything wanting in it which is required for what they considor a proper setting forth of the argument — if there bo anyttiing which they would desire to see omitted or otherwise illustrated— this is with them a reason for deciding that it is not Pinto’s work. That is, if there bo any defects in it of any kind, it cannot bo admitted ns Plato’s work hit genuine works hare no defect «. I protest altogether against this ratio decidendi. If I acknowledged it and applied it consistently I should striko out overy dialoguo in tho Canon. Certainly, tho presumption in favour of tho Catalogue of Thrasyllus must be counted as nil : if it will not outweigh such fecblo counter-arguments os these. Ono reason given by Stallbaum for considering tho Erastso as spurious is, that the Sophists are not derided in it. “ Quia est igitur, qui Plntonem sibl persundeat iilos non fuissc costignturum, et omnino non signitlcaturum, quinam illi cssent, advereus quos banc disputationcm instituisset?” It is strange to bo called on by learned men to strike out all dialogues from the Canon in which there is no derision of tho Sophists. Such derision exists already in excess : we hear until wo are tired how mean it is to receive money for lecturing. Again, Stallbaum says that tho persons whose opinions aro hero attacked are not specified by name. But who are tho tiSwe d<* but I see no ground for the disparaging criticism “mw^They which lias often been applied to it. The personage priXluiuo whom it introduces to us as subjected to the cross- lonhfu^een examination of Sokrates is, a rhapsode of celebrity ; triumphant on6 am0Ug a class of artists at that time both useful and esteemed. They recited or sang,' with appropriate accent and gesture, the compositions of Homer and of other epic ]>oets : thus serving to the Grecian epic, the same purpose as the actors served to the dramatic, and the harp-singers (/atfappSoi) to the lyric. There were various solemn festivals, such as that of TEsculapius at Epidaurus, and (most espe- cially) the Panathena3a at Athens, where prizes were awarded for the competition of the rhapsodes. Ion is described as having competed triumphantly in the festival at Epidaurus, and carried off the first prize. He appeared there in a splendid costume, crowned with a golden wreath, amidst a crowd which is described as containing more than 20,000 persons.d • Schleiermacher, Einloit. zum Ion. j Einleitung, p. 15. pp. 2t»l-23G ; Aftt, Leben und Schriften j c The word aStiy is in this very des Platon, p. 466. ! dialogue ( 532 E, 535 A) applied to b K. F. Hermann. Oc^eh. und Syst. tlie rhapsodizing of Ion. dt r Plat. Phil. |»|*. 437-438 : Steinhart, * Plato, Ion, 535 D. Digitized by Google Ciiai*. XV. THE RHAPSODES. 455 Much of the acquaintance of cultivated Greeks with Homer and the other epic poets was both acquired and Functions of maintained through such rhapsodes; the best of whom contended at the festivals, while others, less gwinonot highly gifted as to vocal power and gesticulation, ArbJ^ry ^ gave separate declamations and lectures of their ° x e ... was then own, and even private lessons to individuals.0 Euthydemus, in one of the Xenophontic conversations with Sokrates, and Antisthenes in the Xenophontic Symposion, are made to declare that the rhapsodes as a class were ex- tremely silly. This, if true at all, can apply only to the expositions and comments with which they accompanied their recital of Homer and other poets. Moreover we cannot rea- sonably set it down (though some modem critics do so) as so much incontestable truth : we must consider it as an opinion delivered by one of the speakers in the conversation, but not necessarily well founded/ Unquestionably, the comments made upon Homer (both in that age and afterwards) were often fanciful and misleading. Metrodorus, Anaxagoras, and others, resolved the Homeric narrative into various allegories, physical, ethical, and theological : and most men who had an opinion to defend, rejoiced to be able to support or enforce it by some passages of Homer, well or ill-explained — just as texts of the Bible are quoted in modern times. In this manner, Homer wras pressed into the service of every dis- putant ; and the Homeric poems were presented as containing, or at least as implying, doctrines quite foreign to the age in which they were composed.* The rhapsodes, in so far as they interpreted Homer, were probably not less disposed than others to discover in him * Xcnoph. Sympos. iii. 6. Nikgratus nays that ho heard the rhapsodes nearly every clay. He professes to be able to repeat both the Iliad and the Odyssey from memory. f Xeuophon, Memorab. iv. 2, 10; Sym|)08. iii. 6 ; Plato, Ion, 530 E. Steinhart cites this judgment about the rhapsodes os if it hod been pro- • nounced by the Xenophontic Sokrates himself, which is not the fact (Stein- hart, Einleitung, p. 3). « Diogenes Laert ii. 11 ; Nitzseh, Die Heldensnge der Griecheu, pp. 7-1- 78 ; Lobeck, Agloophamus, p. 157. Seneca, Epistol. 88 : “ modo Stoicum Homerum fuciunt — modo Epicure urn . . . modo Peripateticum, tria genera bonorum inducentem : modo Aaule- micum, inccrta omnia diccntcm. Ap- poret nihil horum esse in illo.cui omnia msimt : ista cnim inter se dissident/* Digitized by Google 45(5 ION. Chap. XV. their own fancies. But the character in which they acquired •rbe [..pui*. most popularity, was, not as expositors, but as re- citera, of the poems. The powerful emotion which, in the process of reciting, they both felt themselves, lion. Power- and communicated to their auditors, is declared in which they this dialogue: “When that which I recite is pathetic” produced. (gjjyg lon)( <* my oyes are filled with tears : when it is awful or terrible, my hair stands on end, and my heart leaps. Moreover I see the spectators also weeping, sympathising with my emotions, and looking aghast at what they hear.” h This assertion of the vehement emotional effect produced by the words of the poet as declaimed or sung by the rhajtsode, deserves all the more credit — because Plato himself, far from looking ujkjii it favourably, either derides or disapproves it. Accepting it as a matter of fact, we see that the influence of rhapsodes, among auditors generally, must have been derived more from their efficacy as actors than from their ability as exjiositors. Ion however is described in this dialogue as combining the i.;n twti. two functions of reciter and expositor : a partuerslu'p expositor— like that of Garrick and Johnson, in regard to Homer w~>m cunfcitleml. Shakspeare. It is in tho last of the two functions, more un nn * instructor that Sokrates here examines him : considering than an a , p^1- Homer, not as a poet appealing to the emotions of hearers, but as a teacher administering lessons and import- ing instruction. Such was the viow of Homer entertained by a large proportion of the Hellenic world. In that capa- city, his poems served as a theme for rhapsodes, as well as for various philosophers and Sophists who wore not rhapsodes, nor accomplished reciters. The reader must keep in mind, in following the questions I’lato disre- gard* and •Unapprove* the poetic or emotional working. put by Sokrates, that this pedagogic and edifying view of Homer is tho only one present to the men of the Sokratic school — and especially to Plato. Of tho genuine functions of the gifted poet, who touches k I'lato, Imi, 535 D-K. intimation remaining of the ntn>n-; Tho description here given is the effect produced by these rhapsodic more interesting because it is the only representations. Digitized by Google Cuap. XV. ION RECITED HOMER ONLY. 457 the chords of strong and diversified emotion — “ qui pectus inuniter angit, Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet” (Horat. Epist. II. 1, 212) — Plato takes no account: or rather, he declares open war against them, either as childish delusions,1 or as mischievous stimulants, tending to exalt the unruly elements of the mind, and to overthrow the sovereign authority of reason. Wo shall find farther manifestations on this point in the ltepublic and Leges. Ion professes to have devoted himself to the study of Homer exclusively, neglecting other poets: so that he can interpret the thoughts, and furnish reflexions H«n« co- upon them, better than any other expositor.11 How or does it happen (asks Sokrates) that you have so him-'iiow much to say about Homer, and nothing at all about IhTilyl'uMM. other j toots ? Homer may be the best of all poets • equally n i m >i i but he is still only one of those who exercise the iic' ' poetic art, and he must necessarily talk about the “r same subjects as other poets. Now the art of poetry is One altogether — like that of painting, sculpture, playing on the flute, playing on the harp, rhapsodizing, &c.* Whoever is competent to judge and explain one artist, — what ho has done well and what he has done ill, — is competent also to judge any other artist in the same profession. I cannot explain to you how it happens (replies Ion): 1 only know the fact incontestably — that when I talk about Homer, my thoughts flow abundantly, and every one tells mo that my discourse is excellent. Quite the reverse, when I talk of any other poet.™ I can explain it (says Sokrates). Your talent in expound- ing Homer is not an art, acquired by system and &Jjj1^Uon method — otherwise it would have been applicable to other poets besides. It is a special gift, imparted iila VmT^oet to you by divine power and inspiration. The like ^ ""J, 1 The question of Sokrates (Ion, 535 D), about the emotion produced in the henrere by the recital of Homer's jioctry, bears out what is here asserted. k Plato, lou, 53G E. 1 Plato, Ion, 531 A, 532 D. wooj- tik^i yip woo tffTi rb tfAov. O ukovv ivtibay Adfip rif k cu AaAtji' T*xtn)v IJkti v oZv 6 avrbs rpowo s rtjs OTcnfcws fan ir«pl anaauv ruu 583 A. m Plato, Ion, 533 C. Digitized by Google 458 ION. Chap. XV. *s true ^le poet whom you expound. His genius Kp£°u does not spring from art, system, or method : it is a thriMTM-q special gift emanating from the inspiration of the "diS^*d Muses." A poet is a light, airy, holy, person, who cannot compose verses at all, so long as his reason remains within him.° The Muses take away liis reason, sub- stituting in place of it their own divine inspiration and special impulse, either towards epic, dithyramb, encomiastic hymns, hyporehemata, Ac., one or other of these. Each poet receives one of these special gifts, but is incompetent for any of the others : whereas, if their ability had been methodical or artistic, it would have displayed itself in all of them alike. Like prophets, and deliverers of oracles, these poets have their reason taken away, and become servants of the Gods.p It is not they who, bereft of their reason, speak in such sub- lime strains : it is the God who speaks to us, and speaks through them. You may see this by Tynniehus of Chalkis ; who composed his Pajan, the finest of all Patans, which is in every one’s mouth, telling us himself, that it w as the invention of the Muses — but who never composed any thing else worth hearing. It is through this worthless poet that the God has sung the most sublime hymn : q for the express purpose of showing us that these fine compositions are not human per- formances at all, but divine: and that the poet is only an interpreter of the Gods, possessed by one or other of them, as the case may be. Homer is thus (continues Sokrates) not a man of art or reason, but the interpreter of the Gods; deprived of his ■ Plato, Ion, 533 E. srdvres ydp oi re ruv ivuv votyral oi dyaBol oSk Ik &AA’ tvBeoi uvres *a\ Karexd- pttvoi vdvra tout a rd KaXa Xtyouat Toiyptara, Kai ol pieXovotol ol dyaBol oxrav tods' Sxrxfp oi KopvPavTtwvres ovk fju tppoves Starts opxovvrat , ofrrw ical oi pteAoxotol oOk fpitppov es tyres rd KaXd pteXy ravra *01000 tv, &c. 0 PlatlS Ion, 031 A. Kovtpov y dp Xpyua irotrjriis fart kcl\ ■KTTjvbv Kod iepbv, Ka\ oit srpArepov olds re sroteiv wplv dv (vOeds re yevyrai Kai tntppwv Kdl & vovs fiijKert 4v aurtp ivjj' e w\ S' dv rovrl txV bSvvaros * as Totetv tcriv dvBpwvos Kal xpy^bV^^' ? Pluto, Ion, 534 C. 5i& ravra 6 Beds ^atpovfievos rovrcov rbr vovv rodrots x/njrai vryperats Kal rots Xpyo’p^pSo'is Kai rots pidvreat rots Betots, V yufts oi dKobovres elStbpev, Sri oi>x ovroi (I01V ol ravra Xeyovrts ovrto toAAou &£ia, iAA’ 6 Bebs avrds tor tv & A«7«*s 5uJitora- transmitted through a succession of different rings, so as to keep suspended several which are a good way removed from itself. So the influence of the Gods is exerted directly and immediately upon Homer : through him, it passes by a second stage to you : through him and you, it passes by a third stage to those auditors whom you so powerfully affect and delight, becoming however comparatively enfeebled at each stage of transition. This remarkable passage — with the comparison given by So- ferates, curious for its early description of the working ™> comp*, of the Magnet — forms the central point or kernel of the central the dialogue called Ion. It is an expansion of a judg- Swo^e. *n ment delivered by Sokrates himself in his Apology to the Di leasts, and it is repeated in more than one i^uvered by 1 r ' Sokrates in place by Plato." Sokrates declares in his Apology ^ ap°Iow. that he had applied his testing cross-examination to several excellent poets, and that finding them unable to give any rational account of their own compositions, he concluded that they composed without any wisdom of their own, under the same inspiration as prophets and declarers of oracles. In the dialogue before us, this thought is strikingly illustrated and amplified. The contrast between systematic, professional, procedure, deliberately taught and consciously acquired, capable Platonic on- of being defended at every step by appeal to intel- Systematic ligible rules founded upon scientific theory, and distinguished enabling the person so qualified to impart his quali- uSiucT8 r I'lato, loti, 533 10. * I'lato, Apnl. Sokr. p. 2*2 D ; Plato, Motion, p. U9 D. Digitized by Google 4C0 ION. Chap. XV. fi cation to others — and a different procedure purely wmSSr impulsive and untliinking, whereby the agent, SSi* having in his mind a conception of the end aimed nitoi!£of at, proceeds from one intermediate step to another, £2? W"1 without knowing why he does so or how he has come to do so, and without being able to explain his practice if questioned or to impart it to others — this contrast is a favourite one with Plato. The last-mentioned procedure — the unphilosophical or irrational — he conceives under dif- ferent aspects : sometimes as a blind routine or insensibly acquired habit,* sometimes as a stimulus applied from without by some God, superseding the reason of the individual. Such a condition Plato calls madness , and he considers those under it as persons out of their senses. But he recognises different varieties of madness, according to the God from whom it came : the bad madness was a disastrous visitation and dis- temper— the good madness was a privilege and blessing, an inspiration superior to human reason. Among these privi- leged madmen he reckoned prophets and poets ; another variety under the same genus, is, that mental love, between a well-trained adult and a beautiful, intelligent, youth, which he regards as the most exalted of all human emotions." In the Ion, this idea of a privileged madness — inspiration from the Gods superseding reason — is applied not only to the poet, but also to the rhapsode who recites the poem, and even to the auditors whom he addresses. The poet receives the inspi- ration directly from the Gods : he inoculates the rhapsode with it, who again inoculates the auditors — the fervour is, at each successive communication, diminished. The auditor re- presents the last of the rings; held in suspension, through the intermediate agency of other rings, by the inherent force of the magnet.* Wo must remember, that privileged communications from the Gods to men, and special persons recipient thereof, were 1 Plato, Pluedon, p. 82 A ; Gorgias, j nliout Eroe, pp. 244-245-249 D. 4C3 A, 405 A. I * Plato, Ion, 535 E. olrr6s iirriv 6 tt This doctrine is sot forth at length OtaTys ruv tiah-TuAiu'v 6 ta4/if>bb% koJ inroKpiri/St in the Bocoud discourse of Sokrates 6 8i irpwros , aurbs 6 wonjr-fjs. Digitized by Google Chap. XV. SPECIAL INSPIRATION. 4fil acknowledged and witnessed everywhere as a constant phe- nomenon of Grecian life. There were not only SpccU1 |nspl numerous oracular temples, which every one could visit to ask questions in matters of doubt — but also S^Tn'or*- favoured persons who had received from the Gods the gift of predicting the future, of interpreting omens, of determining the good or bad indications uTsokrab»— furnished by animals sacrificed/ In every town or village, — or wherever any body of men were Uiem‘ assembled, — there were always persons who prophesied or delivered oracles, and to whom special revelations were believed to be vouchsafed, during periods of anxiety. No one was more familiar with this fact than the Sokratic disciples : for Sokrates himself had perhaps a greater number of special communications from the Gods than any man of his age : his divine sign having begun when he was a child, and con- tinuing to move him frequently, even upon small matters, until his death: though the revelations were for the most part negative, not affirmative — telling him often what was not to be done — seldom what was to be done — resembling in this respect his own dialogues with other persons. Moreover Sokrates inculcated upon his friends emphatically, that they ought to have constant recourse to prophecy : that none but impious men neglected to do so : that the benevolence of the Gods was nowhere more conspicuous than in their furnishing such special revelations and warnings, to persons whom they favoured: that the Gods administered the affairs of the world partly upon principles of regular sequence, so that men by diligent study might learn what they were to expect, — but partly also, and by design, in a manner irregular and undecy- pherable, such that it could not be fathomed by any human y Not only the xpV oracular temples, &eM are often men- tioned in Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, &c., but Aristotle also re- cognises oi yv/j.(p6\rjwroi teal QtdKijTToi rdtv ivOptixtoy, iwiwvola 5c upoviov nvbs ti'TTrtp 4i‘0ovpoirvyp dtbs bvOpancivri StSvKev obSeh y&p fyvovs 4porfin your capacity of rhapsode ? Ion. — I think lmr!"'know» there is no difference. Sokr. — How say you ? Do ira'wp'mv you affirm that the rhapsodic art, and the strategic competent to art, are one ? Ion. — I think they are one. Sokr. ao Idlers, hav- Then whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good !i'fr!»mrnt general ? Ion. — Unquestionably. Sokr. — And of course, whoever is a good general, is also a good rhapsode ? Ion. — No : I do not think that. Sokr. — Hut you do maintain, that whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? Ion. — Decidedly. Sokr. — You are your- self the best rhapsode in Greece ? Ion. — Uy far. Sokr. — Are you then also the best general in Greece ? Ion. — Cer- tainly I am, Sokrates : and that too, by having learnt it from Homer/ After putting a question or two, not very forcible, to ask how it happens that Ion, being an excellent general, does not obtain a military appointment from Athens, Sparta, or some other city, Sokrates winds up the dialogue as fol- lows : — Well, Ion, if it be really true that you possess a rational Conclusion. and intelligent competence to illustrate the beauties iiomer, not of Homer, you wrong and deceive me, because, after knowledge promising to deliver to me a fine discourse about m.vs, but by Homer, you will not even comply with my pro- divine ir^pi- ... * . ^ n ^ 1 nuion. liinmary entreaty — that you will first tell me what those matters are, on which your superiority bears. You twist every way like Proteus, until at last you slip through * Plato, Ion, 540 D-541 15. Digitized by Google • Pinto, Ion, 540 B-C. Chap. XV. POETS REGARDED AS TEACHERS. 465 my fingers and appear as a general. If your powers of expounding Homer depend on art and intelligence, you are a wrong doer and deceiver, for not fulfilling your promise to me. But you are not chargeable with wrong, if the fact be as I say ; that is, if you know nothing about Homer, but are only able to discourse upon him finely and abundantly, through a divine inspiration with which you are possessed by him. Choose whether you wish me to regard you as a pro- mise-breaker, or as a divine man. Ion.— I choose the last: it is much better to be regarded as a divine mau.g It seems strange to read such language put into Ion’s mouth (we are not warranted in regarding it as The i?wmt»!S what any rhapsode ever did say), as the affirma- usually po*> tion — that every good rhapsode was also a good profcionai general, and that he had become the best of generals and . _ _ . . rL the poet* simply through complete acquaintance with Homer. But this is only a caricature of a sentiment largely ^'I;l1”'“hcn' prevalent at Athens, according to which the works vlew of Ul* * ' n poet, a* pro- of the poets, especially the Homeric poems, were supposed to be a mine of varied instruction, and were taught as such to youth. h In Greece, the <*>* nothin*. general was not often required (except at Sparta, and not always even there) to possess professional experience.* So- t Plato, Ion, 541 E-542 A. cl p*v A^ycir, &s Tcx*q? kuI tTrurriiny oJ6s re cl*0 firjpoy liratyuy, &SiK€ ?r . . . cl fiT) ▼iov?, 'Hpa j, a pirovs 6 S« $(io$*OpLTipos 'Awb rov n real k\4os t1. VOL. I. See these views combated by Plato, | Republ. x. 599-000-600 E. The exaggerated pretension here ascribed to Ion makes him look con- 1 temptible— like the sentiment ascribed ! to him, 535 E, “ If I make the auditors weep, I myself shall laugh and pocket : money/’ &c. 1 Xenop. Mcmor. iii. 5, 21, in the conversation between tbe younger Peri kies and Sokrutes — ruy trrpa- ' rrjyuty ol vAcioto* avrotrxf8td(ovf Sophokles to this military function surprise, cpaT«f, rov (about B.C. 440 ) arose from the extra- avrov kvh p6s 4Uon Sokrates will not allow him to begin : requiring as a preliminary stage that certain preliminary difficulties shall bo first cleared up. Here we have an illustration of Plato’s doctrine, to which I lr“UB,s- adverted in a former chapter,” — that no written geometrical treatise could impart a knowledge of geometry to one ignorant thereof. The geometrical writer begins by laying down a string of definitions and axioms ; and then strikes out boldly in demonstrating his theorems. But Plato would refuse him the liberty of striking out, until he should have cleared up the preliminary difficulties about the definitions and axioms themselves. This the geometrical treatise does not even attempt” * Chap. vi. p. 229. 0 Compare Plato, Republic, vi. 510 C; vii. 533 CD. 2 h 2 Digitized by Google 468 LACHES. Chat. XVI. CHAPTER XVI. LACHES. The main substance of this dialogue consists of a discussion, carried on by Sokrates with Nikias and Laches, respecting Courage. Each of the two latter proposes an explanation of Courage : Sokrates criticises both of them, and reduces each to a confessed contradiction. The discussion is invited, or at least dramatically intro- ijichfu. snb- duced, by two elderly men — Lysimachus, son of sons of t I.V Aristeides the Just, — and Melesias, son of Thucy- mXr it dides the rival of Perikles. Lysimachus and Mele- two young sias, confessing with shame that they are inferior to in., their fathers, because their education has been neg- *on* from a , . . . . mwtwof lected, wish to guard against the same misfortune dm m the case of their own sons : respecting the educa- opinion. tion of whom, they ask the advice of Nikias and Laches. The question turns especially upon the propriety of causing their sons to receive lessons from a master of arms just then in vogue. Nikias and LacliAs, both of them not merely distinguished citizens but also commanders of Athenian armies, are assumed to be well qualified to give advice. Ac- cordingly they deliver their opinions : Nikias approving such lessons as beneficial, in exalting the courage of a young man, and rendering him effective on the field of battle : while Laches takes an opposite view, disparages the masters of arms as being no soldiers, and adds that they are despised by tho Lacedamiouians, to whoso authority on military matters general deference was paid in Greece.* Sokrates, — com- mended greatly by Nikias for his acuteness and sagacity, by Laches for his courage in the battle of Delium, — is invited to take part in the consultation. Being younger than both, he • Plato, Lach&t, c, 6-7. pp. 182-183. Digitized by Google Chap. XVI. SOKRATES GENERALISES THE QUESTION. 4(J9 waits till they have delivered their opinions, and is then called upon to declare with which of the two liis own judg- ment will concur.*1 Sokr. — The question must not be determined by a plurality of votes, but by superiority of knowledge.' If we a were debating about the proper gymnastic discipline secure for these young men, we should consult a known r‘pii« th»t tlie point artist or professional trainer, or at least some one * 4 ckled without who had gone through a course of teaching and practice under the trainer. The first thing to be enquired therefore is, whether, in reference to the point now under discussion, there be any one of us professionally or technically competent, who has studied under good masters, and has proved his own competence as a master by producing well-trained pupils. The next thing is, to understand clearly what it is, with reference to which such competence is required.1* Nikias. — Surely the point before us is, whether it be wise to put these young men under the lessons of the master of arms ? That is what we want to know. Sokr. — Doubtless it is : but that is only one particular branch of a wider and more comprehensive enquiry. When you are considering whether a particular ointment is good for your eyes, it is your eyes, and their general benefit, which form the subject of inves- tigation— not the ointment simply. The person to assist you will be, he who understands professionally the general treat- ment of the eyes. So in this case, you are enquiring whether lessons in arms will be improving for the minds and character of your sons. Look out therefore for some one who is profes- sionally competent, from having studied under good masters, in regard to the general treatment of the mind.” Laches. — But there are various persons who, without ever having studied under masters, possess greater technical competence than b Plato, Lachds, c. 10, p. 184 D. iwurriinjf KplvurBai aXX * ou wX^flct Nikias is made to say that Sokratea fitkkov ko\vs Kpifl^ae aflat, has recently recommended to him d Plato, Lachds, c. 11, p. 185 C. Damon, as a teacher of fiovaiK^i to bis ® Plato, Lachds, c. 11, p. 185 E. sons,* and that Damon had proved an ff tis rjfxur r«XPt«t&f i rtpl ipvxfjf Btpa- udmimblc teacher os well as companion irelav, wal olos tc ko\Cos tovto Btpa- fl80 D). Dornon is mentioned by ircvaat, StSaatcaXot iyaflol Plato generally with much eulogy. I ytyivatn, tovto $ air<- < palvovro *fpl 4iri7Ti&*undT(*v viy yon- (rrSev t§ teal irovT)ft. mu*t to the same result, and which starts even more deci- know what oriun u dedly from the beginning." We are called upon to opinion oq “dvise by what means virtue can be imparted to vVrln.'-' °u « these youths, so as to make them better men. Of whole. a u» course this implies that we know what virtue is: inquire otherwise how can we give advice as to the means of :;r“ acquiring it? Laches. — We could give no advice at courage. ajj Sokr. — We affirm ourselves therefore to know what virtue is ? Laches. — We do. Sokr. — Since therefore we know, we can farther declare what it is.1 Laches. — Of course k Pin to, lachfa, c. 17, p. 189 E. nal tj roidSt (TKf\J/is tis rai/rbv y^ cated, as if it were an explanation of the whole : p*r*£“ur*r but the general feature common to all acts of courage is not declared. Sokrates points out that not men are courageous, not merely among hoplites 'e,1'u‘"ao11- who keep their rank and fight, but also among the Scythian horsemen who fight while running away ; others also are cou- rageous against disease, poverty, political adversity, pain and fear of every sort : others moreover, against desires and plea- sures. What is the common attribute which in all these cases constitutes Courage ? If you asked me what is quick- ness— common to all those cases when a man runs, speaks, plays, learns, &c., quickly — I should tell you that it was that which accomplished much in a little time. Tell me in like manner, what is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage ? Laches at first does not understand the question:" and Sokrates elucidates it by giving the parallel explanation of quickness. Here, as elsewhere, Plato takes great pains to impress the conception in its full generality, and he seems to have found difficulty in making others follow him. “ Plato, Laches, c. 18, p. 190 D. i rtipw 8 h r^v hv8plav ovrus slwsiv. ° Plato, Lochdtf,c. 19-20, pp. 191-192. rls oltra 8vvapui r) aini j iv ribovij kcl\ ttoAiv olv Tcapw €iTtiv avSplav irput- iv \innj koI iv &wav xal 0a^aAcW 4-wurr-finijv 1 • Plato, Laches, c. 26, pp. 19,5-11)6. ftol iv TroKtfUf xa) 4y rois &XA ois Swa- * Plato, Laches, c. 26, p. 196 B. aiv. ■ Plato, Laches, c. 28, p. 197. Kal Laches. — £tow a \4y*i ! — X°*P^S 7^P *pt**i> & Stfopares, (rotfmrrij rh too iTotpta Jtrrlv avSplas. 1 roiavra pjaWov KoptptvtaSai, 1) aySpl 5. It appears from two other puamgra v w6\a ifiot atnijs xpohrrdyai. (c. 26, p. 195 L>, and c. 29, p. 198 lij i Assuredly Ure distinctions which that 6apj>i\ms hero is aiiuply tho Plato pula into the mouth of Nikiaa negation of ttirbs, and cannot be ore nowise more subtle than those Digitized by Google 470 LACHES. Chap. XVI. intelligence befits one in the highest command. What you have said, Nikias, deserves careful examination. You re- member that in taking up the investigation of courage, we reckoned it only as a portion of virtue : you are aware that there are other portions of virtue, such as justice, temperance, and the like. Now you define courage to be, intelligence of what is terrible or not terrible : of that which causes fear, or does not cause fear. But nothing causes fear, except future or apprehended evils: present or past evils cause no fear. Hence courage, as you define it, is intelligence respecting future evils, and future events not evil. But how can there be intelligence respecting the future, except in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and the past? In evory special department, such as medicine, military proceed- ings, agriculture, &c., does not the same man, who knows the phenomena of the future, know also the phenomena of pre- sent and past ? Are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same intelligent mind ?* Since therefore courage, according to your definition, is the S” knowledge of futurities evil and not evil, or future "ntemmor ev‘l and good — and since such knowledge cannot *vU exist without the knowledge of good and evil gene- rally — it follows that courage is the knowledge of wh!>u?ofho good and evil generally.? But a man who knows thus much, cannot be destitute of any part of virtue. tooth/!?’ Ho must possess temperance and justice as well ITM1 03 courage. Courage, therefore, according to your fore wTi. definition, is not a part of virtue, it is the whole. Now Sage01 we began the enquiry by stating that it was only a which he is perpetually putting into the mouth of Sokratcs. He cannot here naan to distinguish the Sophists from Sokratea, but to distinguish the dialectic bilkers, including both one and the other, from the active political leaders. * Plato, Laches, c. 30, p. 198 D. rrtpl 0(7 (»v ( s d\rfd us dyavcucru ft ovtov(t\ & yow pb oT6s r* tipi «txctV* votiv pty y dp ifioiyt Jot tu> trtpl dvSplat J, ti ftrny, ouk oJ8a J* 8irrj fit dpn J t«v iya9uy ir pa£iy acixppotTvvTjv tlycu and side-insinuations. This is the s trot Siopifapai. dramatic art and variety of Plato, J ra Plato, Charmid. c. 27, pp. 164-165. Digitized by Google Chat. XVII. TEMPEBANCE IS SELF-KNOWLEDGE. 485 examine, in conjunction with you, each successive answer." If temperance consists in knowing, it must be a knowledge of something. Krit. — It is so : it is know- Sereuipoo! ledge of a man’s self. Sokr. — What good does this knowledge procure for us? as medical knowledge procures for us health — architectural knowledge, UBowect*1* buildings, &c. ? Krit. — It has no positive result of }Km«? analogous character: but neither have arithmetic 'l*bere is no nor geometry. Sokr. — True, but in arithmetic and geometry, we can at least indicate a something tkekimw. known, distinct from the knowledge. Number and proportion are distinct from arithmetic, the science which takes cognizance of them. Now what is that, of which temperance is the knowledge, — distinct from temperance itself? Krit. — It is on this very point that temperance differs from all the other cognitions. Each of the others is knowledge of some- thing different from itself, but not knowledge of itself: while temperance is knowledge of all the other sciences and of itself also.® Sokr. — If this be so, it will of course be a know- ledge of ignorance, as well as a knowledge of knowledge ? Krit. — Certainly. Sokr. — According to your explanation, then, it is only the temperate man who knows himself He alone is sokmio. able to examine himself, and thus to find out what he really knows and does not know: he alone is with"’ able to examine others, and thus to find out what coguitum aa each man knows, or what each man only believes amKSm io himself to know without really knowing. Temper- Eno^n-dgeof 11 ■ , i . , * knowledge la ance, or self-knowledge, is the knowledge what a impossible, man knows, and what he does not know.p Now Two ques- tions arise upon this : First, is it possible for a man to know, that he knows what he does know, and that he does not know what he does not know ? Next, granting it to be possible, in what way do we gain by it ? The first of these two questions involves much difficulty. How can there be any cognition, " Plato, Charmid. c. 28, p. 165 C. JtAAa?*' trtaryifiAy fir itrr^firj tan Kal ° Plato, Charmid&», c. 30, p. 166 B. aMj iavrrjs, p. 166 E. ai firv &AA an iraaat &AA ou *ia\v tnorrj- p Plato, Charmid. e. 31, p. 167 A. fiat, tavT&v 8* otr tj 5i fiort) ran/ rt Digitized by Google 486 CHAIiMIDES. Cbap. XVII. which is not cognition of a given cognitum, but cognition merely of other cognitions and non-cognitions ? There is no vision except of some colour, no audition except of some sound : there can be no vision of visions, or audition of audi- tions. So likewise, all desire is desire of some pleasure; there is no desire of desires. All volition is volition of some good ; there is no volition of volitions : all love applies to something beautiful — there is no love of other loves. The like is true of fear, opinion, &c. It would be singular there- fore if, contrary to all these analogies, there were any cogni- tion not of some cognitum, but of itself and other cognitions.'1 It is of the essence of cognition to be cognition of some- aii know- thing, and to have its characteristic property with >* rotative reference to some correlate/ What is treater, has to toflio B m # 0 object. its property of being greater in relation to some- thing else, which is less — not in relation to itself. It cannot be greater than itself, for then it would also be less than itself. It cannot include in itself the characteristic property of the correlatum as well as that of the relatum. So too about what is older, younger, heavier, lighter: there is always a something distinct, to which reference is made. Vision does not include in itself both the property of seeing, and that of being seen : the videns is distinct from the visum. A movent implies something else to be moved : a heater something else to be heated. In all these cases (concludes Sokrates) the characteristic ah proper- property is essentially relative, implying something ti?c*'Tv"ry" distinguishable from, yet correlating with, itself. tnreVa* u* May we generalise the proposition, and affirm, That property all properties are relative, and that every thine: in wltll refer- r , . i .... . , „ enceto nature has its characteristic property with refer- *ue. ence, not to itself, but to something else ? Or is this true only of some things and not of all — so that cogni- tion may be in the latter category ? This is an embarrassing question, which I do not feel qua- lified to decide: neither the general question, whether there i Plato, Charmid. c. 33-34, pp. 167- 168. 1 Plato, Charmid. c. 34, p. 168 B. fori /xiv avrb ixurri\fir\ Ttvir ^iri- trrij/nj, Ka) t**® Toiavrriv ivvafiiv &aTf rivbs tlyai. Digitized by Googl Chap. XVII. COGNITION OF COGNITION. 487 be any cases of characteristic properties having no reference to any thing beyond themselves, and therefore not relative, but absolute — nor the particular question, whether cognition be one of those cases, implying no separate cognitum, but being itself both relatum and correlatum — cognition of cog- nition.* But even if cognition of cognition be possible, I shall not admit it as an explanation of what temperance is, until I have satisfied myself that it is beneficial. For I have a pre- sentiment that temperance must be something beneficial and good.1 * Let us concede for the present discussion (continues So- krates) that cognition of cognition is possible. Still Ev n ( how does tliis prove that there can be cognition of Dl0"n °r c,,«- non-cognition ? that a man can know both what ho r^we. , 0 cognition of knows and what he does not know ? For this is KIUon what we declared self-knowledge and temperance JfSu!™ to be.a To have cognition of cognition is one thing : to have cognition of non-cognition is a dif- ^*,*22 ferent thing, not necessarily connected w ith it. If you have cognition of cognition, you will be enabled to distinguish that which is cognition from that which is not — but no more. Now the knowledge or k^wT*ndh" ignorance of the matter of health is one thing, mT* hc known by medical science : that of justice is a dif- know' ferent thing, known by political science. The knowledge of knowledge simply — cognition of cognition — is different from both. The person who possesses this last only, without know- ing either medicine or politics, will become aware that he knows something and possesses some sort of knowledge, and • Plato, CharmidSs, 0. 35-36, pp. 1G8- 169. fitydXov rtvos avZpbs 8«c, Zorns rovro nark wcLvrtev Ikov&s Ztatpfjotrou, vbrtpov GuSi* t Hov Zvrtov r^v atrrov Zvvap.iv abrb xpb s iamb W$vk tv ^X€iy* dAAtt xpbs btKXb—fl rbt piv, rb. 8’ oC‘ teal ft forty a5 Stii 'a our a xpbs 4am a rovrots forty ixtorifpij, $)v 51) ijptts ou) piv ou xtortvot ipamtp i Kayos tlvat ravra ZttXtoOat. * Plato, Clmnnid. c. 36, p. 169 B. wavrai. * Plato, Charmid. c. 44-45, pp. 172- 173. • Plato, Charmid. c. 46, p. 173 D. KaT*5 &y ir parr oi Kal *iroA‘a< — 5ti 8’ hriaTq- pdvoas hv xpdrroyrts «8 irpdrroiptv koI tvbaipoyo7ptvy rovro 8e oCiru> Suvt i- ptda fiaOtiy, 2) &c. ? Krit. — No none of these. Sokr. — Well taovMm then, you see, we do not follow out consistently your doctrine — That the happy man is he who lives P&>rr£ scientifically, or according to knowledge. For all these men live according to knowledge, and still you and evil. ^o noj ajmjt them to be happy. Your definition of happiness applies only to some portion of those who live according to knowledge, but not to all. How are we to dis- tinguish which of them ? Suppose a man to know every thing past, present, and future ; which among the fractions of such omniscience would contribute most to make him happy ? Would they all contribute equally ? Krit. — By no means. Sokr. — Which of them then would contribute most ? Would it be that by which he knew the art of gaming? Krit. — Certainly not Sokr. — Or that by which he knew the art of computing? Krit. — No. Sokr. — Or that by which he knew the conditions of health ? Krit. — That will suit better. Sokr. — But which of them most of all? Krit. — That by which he knew good and evil.® Sokr. — Here then, you have been long dragging me round without tho *n a circle, keeping back the fact, that well-doing JJJJSawfl, and happiness does not arise from living according SJtSSr hi science generally, not of all other matters taken together — but from living according to the science of this one single matter, good and evil. If you exclude this last, and leave only the other sciences, each of these others will work as before : the medical man will heal, the weaver will prepare clothes, the pilot will navigate his vessel, the general will conduct his army — each of them scientifically. Nevertheless that each of these things shall conduce to our well-being and profit, will be an impossibility, if the science of good and evil be wanting.4 Now this science of good and evil, the will be or little or do service. Temperance Is not the science of good and evil, and is of little service. e Plato, Charm, c. 47-48. p. 174. d Plato, CharmidSs, c. 48, 174 D. «t $4kus 4£tkuy Tamijy r^y iwurrlipiiy (of good and evil) 4k tu>v Akkuy 4wiy t« olZ*y% or i ol 8c, teal uy pA) olZty, 8ri ovk Digitized by Google 492 CHARMIDES. Crap. XVII. Yet after these multiplied concessions against strict truth, we have still been unable to establish our definition of tem- perance : for temperance as we defined it has, after all, turned out to bo thoroughly unprofitable. It is plain that we have taken the wrong raid, and that I Temperance (Sokrates) do not know how to conduct the enquiry, be ii good For temperance, whatever it may consist in, must assuredly be a great benefit : and you, Charmides, whether he to are happy if you possess it. How can I tell (rejoins temperate or , , . _ . _ . . not; .mo. Charmides) whether I possess it or not: since even what tern- * . . . prance u men like you and Ivntias cannot discover what remains p # " unknown. if, is ? ** Here ends the dialogue called Charmides,1 after the inter- Kipn. ■ioi» change of a few concluding compliments, forming charmidw part of the great dramatic richness which cliarac- ot pniae and tcrises this dialogue from the beginning. I make devotion to . . ° i i s>krat«s at no attempt to reproduce this latter attnbute ; though the clow or . . r r . , the dialogue, it is one of the peculiar merits of Plato in reference Dramatic , ornament to ethical enquiry, imparting to the subject a charm which does not naturally belong to it. I confine myself to the philosophical bearing of the dialogue. Accord- ing to the express declaration of Sokrates, it ends in nothing but disappointment. No positive result is attained. The problem — What is Temperance ? — remains unsolved, after four or five different solutions have been successively tested and repudiated. The Charmides (like the Laches) is a good illustrative rajdfcu«n specimen of those Dialogues of Search, the general Bpccimcn of character and purpose of which I have explained in S" of my sixth chapter. It proves nothing: it disproves „A(“ several hypotheses : but it exhibits (and therein con- sists its value) the anticipating, guessing, tentative dtaftowdL and eliminating process, without which no defensible oVt f. tovto p}y *al xayrdxan p*ya- j ouSfv&r Urov oi>xl dXoywrtpoy rovr &y \oxp*xis tvytx<*fri)(rafi*v,ov& ixicrKt^d- | (pay tit). This would not appear an ab- ptvot rb abvvarov tlyui, & ns pi) oJbt surdity to Aristotle. See Analvt. Priori*, p-qbapis Tavra (ibt'yai apis yi xwr ii. p. 67, ft. 21 ; Anal. Post. i. ?1. a. 28. bn yap ovk ofot, (pqaly aora 77 h Plato, Churniid. C. 51, p. 176 A. qprripa bpoXayla. tcalroi, is iytppau, i 1 See Appendix at end of chapter. Digitized by Google Chap. XVII. PERIOD OP SEARCH AND GUESSING. 493 conclusions can be obtained — without which, even if such be found, no advocate can be formed capable of defending them against an acute cross-examiner. In most cases, this tentative process is forgotten or ignored : even when recog- nised as a reality, it is set aside with indifference, often with ridicule. A writer who believes himself to have solved any problem, publishes his solution together with the proofs ; and acquires deserved credit for it, if those proofs give satis- faction. But he does not care to preserve, nor do the public care to know, the steps by which such solution has been reached. Nevertheless hi most cases, and in all cases in- volving much difficulty, there has been a process, more or less tedious, of tentative and groping — of guesses at first hailed as promising, then followed out to a certain extent, lastly discovered to be untenable. The history of science, k astronomical, physical, chemical, physiological, &c., wherever it has been at all recorded, attests this constant antecedence of a period of ignorance, confusion, and dispute, even in eases where ultimately a solution has been found com- k It is not often that historians of science take much pains to preserve ami bring together the mistaken guesses and tentatives which have preceded great physical discoveries. One in- stance m which tills has been ably and carefully done is in the * Biography of Cavendish,’ the chemist and natural philosopher, by Dr. Goo. WilHon. The great chemical discovery of the composition of water, accomplished during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, has been claimed os the pri- vilege of three eminent scientific men — Cavendish, Watt, and Imvoisicr. The controversy on the subject, volu- minous and bitter, lias been the means of recording each successive scientific phase and point of view. It will be found admirably expounded in this biography. Wilson sets forth the mis- conceptions, confusion of ideas, ap- proximations to truth seen but not followed out, &' of temperance also ; all of them words in every one’s mouth, and tacitly assumed by every one as known quantities) — the perpetual and confident judgments which mankind are in the habit of delivering — their apportionment of praise and blame, as well as of reward and punishment consequent on praise and blame — without any better basis than that of strong emotion imbibed they know not how, and without being able ” Pinto, Apoloj*. Sokr. pp. 21-22-23. " l’lnto, Symposinn, 213 E, 215-213 ; Menon, 80 A-B. Digitized by Google 496 CITAIiMlDES. Chap. XVII. to render any rational explanation even of the familiar words round which such emotions are grouped. No philosopher has done so much as Plato to depict in detail this important fact — the habitual condition of human society, modern as well as ancient, and for that very reason generally unnoticed.0 The emotional or subjective value of temperance is all that So- krates determines, and which indeed he makes his point of departure. Temperance is essentially among the fine, beau- tiful, honourable, things : p but its rational or objective value (*. e. what is the common object characterising all temperate acts or persons), he cannot determine. Here indeed Plato is not always consistent with himself : for we shall come to other dialogues wherein he professes himself incompetent to say whether a thing be beautiful or not, until it be determined what the thing is:i and we have already found Sokrates declaring (in the Hippias Major), that we cannot determine whether any particular object is beautiful or not, until we have first determined, What is Beauty in the Absolute, or the Self-Beautiful ? a problem nowhere solved by Plato. Among the various unsuccessful definitions of temperance Different propounded, there is more than one which affords ofhv“l>pinin,‘ farther example to show how differently Plato deals rutm'ic with the same subject in different dialogues. Here dialogue*. we kave tjie p)lrage — « f0 ,j0 one’8 own business ” — treated as an unmeaning puzzle, and exhibited as if it were analogous to various other phrases, with which the analogy is more verbal than real. But in the Republic, Plato admits ° “ Whoever has reflected oil tho generation of ideas in his own mind, or lias investigated the causes of mis- understandings among mankind, will be obliged to proclaim as a fact deeply seated in human nature — That most of the misunderstandings and contradic- tions among men, most of tho contro- versies and errors both in science and in society, arise usually from our as- suming (consciously or unconsciously) fundamental maxims and fundamental facts as if they were self-evident, and ns if they must be assumed by every one else besides. Accordingly we never think of closely examining them, until at length experience has taught us that these self-evident matters are exactly what stand most in need of proof, and what form the special root of divergent opinions.”— (L. O. Brdcker — Untersuchungen iiber die Glaub- wiirdigkeit der alt-Rdmischen Ge- schichte, p. 490.) p Plato, Charmid. c. 14, p. 159 R c. 17, p. 160D. 77 Ob> Sokrates in other dialogues; where he insists on andtnratt- tho great value and indispensable necessity of self- c«»ity ruV' knowledge, as a preliminary to all other knowledge u> h.«c pre- — upon the duty of eradicating from men’s minds dl^Ucfnt that false persuasion of their own knowledge which view- they universally cherished — and upon the importance of forcing them to know their own igdorance as well as then- own knowledge. In the face of this last purpose, so fre- quently avowed by the Platonic Sokrates (indirectly even in this very dialogue),* we remark a material discrepancy, when he here proclaims self-knowledge to be impossible. We must judge every dialogue by itself, illustrating it when practicable by comparison with others, but not assuming consistence be- tween them as a postulate a priori. It is a part of Plato’s dramatic and tentative mode of philosophising to work out ’ Plato, Repabl. it. 10, p. 433, vi. Xcnop. Memor. ii. 9, 1. 49G C, viii. 550 A ; Gorgias, p. 526 C. • Plato, Chttrmid. c. 30, p. 166 D. Compare aloo Timams, p. 72 A. VOL. I. 2 K Digitized by Google 498 CHAKMIDES. Chap. XVII. different ethical points of view, and to have present to his mind one or other of them, with peculiar force in each diffe- rent dialogue. The subject is thus brought before us on all its sides, and the reader is familiarised with what a dialec- tician might say, whether capable of being refuted or not. Inconsistency between one dialogue and another is not a fault in the Platonic Dialogues of Search ; but is, on the contrary, a part of the training process, for any student who is destined to acquire that full mastery of question and answer which Plato regards as the characteristic test of knowledge. It is a puzzle and provocative to the internal meditation of the student. In analyzing the Laches, we observed that the definition orange and coura£e given by Nikias was shown by Sokrates *° hftve no meaning, except in so far as it coincided tsi'cl mootn’ "’ith the general knowledge or cognition of good and MfoundJd on evil. Here too, in the Charmides, we are brought cognaMceof ia the last result to the same terminus — the general good and evil. (.QgujtjQn 0f good and evil. But Temperance, as previously defined, is not comprehended under that cognition, and is therefore pronounced to be unprofitable. This coguition of good and evil — the science of the profit- able— is here (in the Charmides) proclaimed by So- krates to have a place of its own among the other sciences ; and even to be first among them, essenti- ally necessary to supervise and direct them, as it had been declared in Alkibiades II. Now the same supervising place and directorship had been claimed by Kritias for Temperance as he defines it — that is, self-knowledge, or the cognition of our cognitions and non- cognitions. But Sokrates doubts even the reality of such self-knowledge: and granting for argument’s sake that it exists, he still does not see how it can be profitable. For the utmost which its supervision can ensure would be, that each description of work shall be scientifically done, by the skilful man, and not by the unskilful. But it is not true, absolutely speaking (he argues), that acting scientifically or with know- ledge is sufficient for well doing or for happiness : for the Distlnclion made be- tween the special sciences and the science of Good and Kvll. With- out this last, the --i--ii.il sciences are of no use. Digitized by Google Chap. XVII. KNOWLEDGE ALWAYS RELATIVE. 499 question must next be asked — Knowledge — of what? Not knowledge of leather-cutting, carpenter’s or brazier’s work, arithmetic, or even medicine : these, and many others, a man may possess, and may act according to them ; but still he will not attain the end of being happy. All cognitions contribute in greater or less proportion towards that end : but what contributes most, and most essentially, is the cognition of good and evil, without which all the rest are insufficient. Of this last-mentioned cognition or science, it is the special object to ensure profit or benefit : ‘ to take care that every- thing done by the other sciences shall be done well or in a manner conducing towards the end Happiness. After this, there is no province left for temperance — £ e., self-knowledge, or the knowledge of cognitions and non-cognitions : no as- signable way in which it can yield any benefit." Two points are here to be noted, as contained and debated in the handling of this dialogue. 1. Knowledge Knowledge, absolutely, is a word without meaning : all know- u” to some ledge is relative, and has a definite object or coo- known. . .... Postulate or nitiim: there can be no scientia mentiarum. 2. diviuatkm Among the various objects of knowledge (cognita, ofTeieoiogy. or cognoscenda), one is, good and evil. There is a science of good and evil, the function of which is, to watch over and compare the results of the other sciences, in order to promote results of happiness, and to prevent results of misery : with- out the supervision of this latter science, the other sciences might be all exactly followed out, but no rational comparison could be had between them.* In other words, there is a science of Ends, estimating the comparative worth of each End in relation to other Ends (Teleology) : distinct from those other more special sciences, which study the means 1 Plato, Charmidds, c. 48, p. 174 D. ! fi oti; *AAAi7r ObB* &pa cu O Ik a8n 7 5^ 7*, is touccv, forrtp ij Ira'ipe &\ky 7 hp aZ airfSo/ufy rovro rb atixppoavvTj, Aaa’ ris fpyov fv ye koI &.ve- oZv axpikiphs ft Trai 2. 2 k 2 Digitized by Google 500 C1IARMIDES. Chap. XVII. each towards a separate End of its own. Here we fall into the same track as we have already indicated in Laches and Alkibiades II. These matters I shall revert to in other dialogues, where „ . we shall find them turned over and canvassed in counge and # £K7h many different ways. One farther observation re- ly Art!**!!!! mains to be made on the Laches and Charmides, tJiXJuS. discussing as they do Courage (which is also again t*0' discussed in the Protagoras) and Temperance. An interesting comparison may be made between them and the third book of the Nikomachean Ethics of Aristotle/ where the same two subjects are handled in the Aristotelian manner. The direct, didactic, systematising, brevity of Aristotle con- trasts remarkably with the indirect and circuitous prolixity, the multiplied suggestive comparisons, the sliifting points of view, wliich we find in Plato. Each has its advantages : and both together will be found not more than sufficient, for any one who is seriously bent on acquiring what Plato calls know- ledge, with the cross-examining power included in it. Ari- stotle is greatly superior to Plato in one important attribute of a philosopher : in the care which he takes to discriminate the different significations of the same word: the univocal and the equivocal, the generieally identical from the re- motely analogical, the proper from the improper, the literal from the metaphorical. Of such precautions we discover little or no trace in Plato ; who sometimes seems not merely to neglect, but even to deride them. Yet Aristotle, assisted as he was by all Plato’s speculations before us, is not to be understood as having superseded the necessity for that nega- tive Elenchus which animates the Platonic Dialogues of Search : nor would his affirmative doctrines have held their grounds before a cross-examining Sokrates. r Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. ill. p. 1115- 1119; also Ethic. Eudem. iii. 1229- 1231. The comments of Aristotle upon the doctrine of Sokrates respecting Courage, seem to relate rather to the Protagoras than to the Laokds of Plato. See Eth. Nik. 11IG, 6,4 ; Eth. End. 1229, a. 15. Digitized by Google Chap. XVII. APPENDIX. 501 APPENDIX. Tho dialogue Charmidds is declared to bo spurious, not only by Ast, but also by Socher (Ast, Platon’s Leb. pp. 419-428 ; Sochor, Ueber Platon, pp. 130-137), Stcinhart maintains the genuineness of the dialogue against them ; declaring (as in regard to the Laches) that he can hardly conceive how critics can mis- take the truly Platonic character of it, though here too, as in the Laches, ho detects “ adolcscentite vestigia ” (Stcinhart, Einleit. zum Cliarmides, pp. 290- 293). Bchleiermacher considers Charmidfis ns well as Laclifis to be appendixes to the Protagoras, which opinion both Stallbaum (Proleg. p. 98) and Stcinhart controvert. The views of Stallbaum respecting tho Charmidds are declared by Steinhnrt (p. 290) to be “ recht ausserlich und oberflachlich.” To me they appear much nearer tho truth than the profound and recondite meanings, the far-sighted indirect hints, which Steinhart himself perceives or supposes in the words of Plato. These critics consider tho dialoguo as composed during the government of tho Thirty at Athens, in which opinion I do not concur. Digitized by Google 502 LYSIS. Chat. XVIII. CHAPTER XVIII. LYSIS. The Lysis, as well as the Charmides, is a dialogue recounted by Sokrates himself, describing both incidents and a »ni] cuaV- conversation in a crowded palaestra : wherein not mldta. Rich* _ _ . r . ness of dm. merely bodily exercises were habitually practised, ins tic incl- * J , A-m in both, but debate was earned on and intellectual mstruc- Youlhfnl , . i«)Amy. tion given by a Sophist named Mikkus, companion and admirer of Sokrates. There is a lively dramatic com- mencement, introducing Sokrates into the palaestra, and de- tailing the preparation and scenic arrangements, before the real discussion opens. It is the day of the Hermaea, or fes- tival of Hermes, celebrated by sacrifice and its accompanying banquets among the frequenters of gymnasia. Lysis, like Charmides, is an Athenian youth, of conspi* swnery and cuous beauty, modesty, and promise. His father the Lysis. Demokrates represents an ancient family of the iExonian Deme in Attica, and is said to be descended from Zeus and the daughter of the Archcgetcs or Heroic Founder of that Deme. The family moreover are so wealthy, that they have gained many victories at the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nernean games, both with horses and with chariots and four. Menexenus, companion of Lysis, is somewhat older, and is his affectionate friend. The persons who invite Sokrates into the palrestra, and give occasion to the debate, are Ktesip- pus and Hippothales : both of them adults, yet in the vigour of age. Hippothales is the Erastes of Lysis, passionately attached to him. He is ridiculed by Ktesippus for per- petually talking about Lysis, as well as for addressing to him compositions both in prose and verse, full of praise and flattery ; extolling not only his personal beauty, but also his splendid ancestry and position.* * Plato, LyeiK, p. 203-205. Digitized by Google C'iiap. XVIII. MODE OF TALKING WITH YOUTH. 503 In reference to these addresses, Sokrates remonstrates with Hippothales on the imprudence and mischief of ad- 0riv.inoflho dressing to a youth flatteries calculated to turn his head. He is himself then invited by Hippothales {J* to exhibit a specimen of the proper mode of talking 'ruST to youth ; such as shall be at once acceptable to 1^,“; for the person addressed, and unobjectionable. Sokrates hu agrees to do so, if an opportunity be afforded him of convers- ing with Lysis.b Accordingly after some well-imagined inci- dents, interesting as marks of Greek manners — Sokrates and Ktesippus with others seat themselves in the palaestra, amidst a crowd of listeners.® Lysis, too modest at first to approach, is emboldened to sit down by seeing Menexenus seated by the side of Sokrates : while Hippothales, not daring to put him- self where Lysis can see him, listens, but conceals himself behind some of the crowd. Sokrates begins the conversation with Menexenus and Lysis jointly : but presently Menexenus is called away for a moment, and he talks with Lysis singly. Sokr. — Well — Lysis — your father and mother love you extremely. Lysis. — Assuredly they do. Sokr. — fenverMUon They would wish you therefore to be as happy as *ah possible. Lysis. — Undoubtedly. Sokr. — Do you think any man happy, who is a slave, and who is not allowed to do any thing that he desires ? Lysis. — I do not think him happy at all. Sokr. — Since therefore your father and mother are so anxious that you should be happy, they of course allow you to do the tilings which you desire, and never reprove nor forbid you. Lysis. — Not at all, by Zeus, Sokrates: there are a great many things that they forbid me. Sokr. — How say you ! they wish you to be happy — and they hinder you from doing what you wish 1 Tell me, for example, when one of your father’s chariots is going to run a race, if you wished to mount and take the reins, would not they allow you to do so ? Lysis. — No — certainly : they would not allow me. Sokr. — But whom do they allow then ? Lysis. — My father employs a paid charioteer. Sokr. — What ! do they permit a hireling, in b i’lato, Lysis, p. 200. c Platn, Lysis, pp. 206-207. Digitized by Google 504 LYSIS. Chap. XVIII. preference to you, to do what he wishes with the horses ? and do they give him pay besides for doing so ? Lysis. — Why — to be sure. Sofcr. — But doubtless, I imagine, they trust the team of mules to your direction ; and if you chose to take the whip and flog, they would allow you ? Lysis. — Allow me ? not at all. Sofcr. — What ! is no one allowed to flog them? Lysis. — Yes — certainly — the mule-groom. Sofcr . — Is he a slave or free ? Lysis. — A slave. Sofcr. — Then, it seems, they esteem a slave higher than you their son ; trust- ing their property to him rather than to you, letting him do what he pleases, while they forbid you. But tell me farther : do they allow you to direct yourself — or do not they even trust you so far as that ? Lysis. — How can you imagine that they trust me ? Sofcr. — But does any one else direct you ? Lysis. — Yes — this tutor here. Sofcr. — Is he a slave ? Lysis. To be suro : belonging to our family. Sofcr. — That is shock- ing : one of free birth to be under the'direction of a slave ! But what is it that he does, as your director ? Lysis. — He conducts me to my teacher’s house. Sofcr. — What ! do they govern you also, these teachers? Lysis. — Undoubtedly they do. Sofcr. — Then your father certainly is bent on putting over you plenty of directors and governors. But surely, when you come home to your mother, she at least, anxious that you should be happy as far as she is concerned, lets you do what you please about the wool or the web, when she is weaving : she does not forbid you to meddle with the bodkin or any of the other instruments of her work ? Lysis. — Ridi- culous 1 not only does she forbid me, but I should be beaten if I did meddle. Sofcr. — How is this, by Herakles? Have you done any wrong to your father and mother ? Lysis. — Never at all, by Zeus. Sofcr. — From what provocation is it, then, that they prevent you in this terrible way, from being happy and doing what you wish? keeping you the whole day in servitude to some one, and never your own master? so that you derive no benefit either from the great wealth of the family, which is managed by every one else rather than by you — or from your own body, noble as it is. Even that is consigned to the watch and direction of another : while you, Chap. XVIII. SERVITUDE OF THE IGNORANT. 505 Lysis, are master of nothing, nor can do any one thing of what you desire. Lysis. — The reason is, Sokrates, that I am not yet old enough. Sokr. — That can hardly be the reason ; for to a certain extent your father and mother do trust you, without waiting for you to grow older. If they want any thing to be written or read for them, they employ you for that purpose in preference to any one in the house : and you are then allowed to write or read first, whichever of the letters you think proper. Again, when you take up the lyre, neither father nor mother hinder you from tightening or relaxing the strings, or striking them either with your finger or with the plectrum. Lysis. — They do not. Sokr. — Why is it then, that they do not hinder you in this last case, as they did in the cases before mentioned ? Lysis. — I suppose it is because I know this last, but did not know the others. Sokr. — Well, my good friend, you see that it is not your increase of years that your father waits for ; but on the very day that he becomes convinced that you know better than he, he will entrust both himself and his property to your management. Lysis. — I suppose that he will. Sokr. — Ay — and your neighbour too will judge in the same way as your father. As soon as he is satisfied that you understand house- management better than he does, which do you think lie will rather do — confide his house to you, or continue to manage it himself ? Lysis. — I think he will confide it to me. Sokr. — The Athenians too : do not you think that they also will put their affairs into your management, as soon as they perceive that you have intelligence adequate to the task ? Lysis. — Yes : I do. Sokr. — What do you say about the Great King also, by Zeus! When his meat is being boiled, would he permit his eldest son who is to succeed to the rule of Asia, to throw in any thing that he pleases into the sauce, rather than us, if we come and prove to him that we know better than his son the way of preparing sauce ? Lysis. — Clearly, he will rather permit us. Sokr. — The Great King will not let his son throw in even a pinch of salt : while we, if we chose to take up an entire handful, should be allowed to throw it in. Lysis. — No doubt. Sokr. — What if his son has Digitized by Google 506 LYSIS. Chap. XVIII. a complaint in his eyes ; would the Great King, knowing him to be ignorant of medicine, allow him even to touch his own eyes — or would he forbid him? Lysis. — He would forbid him. Sokr. — As to us, on the contrary, if he accounted us good physicians, and if we desired even to open the eyes and drop a powder into them, he would not hinder us, in the con- viction that we understood what we were doing. Lysis. — You speak truly. Sokr. — All other matters, in short, on which he believed us to be wiser than himself or his son, he would entrust to us rather than to himself or his son ? Lysis. — Necessarily so, Sokrates. Sokr. — This is the state of the case then, my dear Lysis : On those matters on which we shall have become intelligent, all persons will put trust in us — Greeks as well as barbarians, men as well as women. We shall do whatever we please respecting them : no one will be at all inclined to interfere with us on such matters ; not only we shall be ourselves free, but wre shall have command over others besides. These matters will be really ours, because we shall derive real good from them.'1 As to those subjects, on the contrary, on which we shall not have acquired intelli- gence, no one will trust us to do what we think right : every one, — not merely strangers, but father and mother and nearer relatives if there were any, — will obstruct us as much as they can: we shall be in servitude so far as these subjects are concerned ; and they will be really alien to us, for wre shall derive no real good from them. Do you admit that this is the case?' Lysis. — I do admit it. Sokr. — Shall we then be friends to any one, or will any one love us, on those matters on which we are unprofitable? Lysis. — Certainly not. Sokr. — You see that neither does your lather love you, nor does any man love another, in so far as he is useless ? Lysis. — Apparently not. Sokr. — If then you be- come intelligent, my boy, all persons will be your friends and all persons will be your kinsmen : for you will be useful d Plato, Lysis, 210 C. teal outtls , fipas tKu'v tivui 4/iwoSiti, i ainol rt ■ 4\*v0tpoi 4a6puOa 4v avroi s *al & AAccv HpXOvrcSt rtfifrtpd r * raina fi\ovvt4s i tixnrtp xartpts rrjs * is on accoimt of something and for the sake of some- bocorae door, thing i it is relative both to some producing cause, and to some prospective end. Thus the body, which is in itself neither good nor evil, becomes when sick a friend to the medical art: on account of sickness, which is an evil — and for the sake of health, which is a good. The medical art is dear to us, because health is dear : but is there any thing behind, for the sake of which health also is dear ? It is plain that we cannot push the series of references onward for ever, and that we must come ultimately to something which is dear per se, not from reference to any ulterior aliud — to some primum amabiie, dear by its own nature, to which all other dear things refer, and from which they are deri- vatives." It is this primum amabiie which is the primitive, essential, and constant object of our affections : we love other things only from their being associated with it. Thus suppose a father tenderly attached to his son, and that the son has drunk hemlock, for which wine is an antidote; the father will come by association to prize highly, not merely the wine which saves his son’s life, but even the cup in which the wine is contained. Yet it would be wrong to say that he prizes 1 Plato, Lysis, c. 33, p. 218 A. poverty ol odrt ayadol oCrt kcucoI Siii ravra 5 rj (paifitv h.v kcu rovs ffSrj 6yrts. Stroi kokoI, ov tpiKoaocpovaiy, aotpovs fiifx4rt f?v rovs oZrus iyvoiay “ Pluto, Lysis, c. 36, p. 219 D, TA p fxoyras 8>l\a fxv tlStycu A toatriv. Atb QnAoero- flyat ; Digitized by Google Chap. XVIH. DESIRE THE CAUSE OF DOVE. 513 the wine or tlio cup ns much as his son : for the truth is, that all his solicitude is really on behalf of his son, and extends only in a derivative and secondary way to the wine and the cup. So about gold and silver: we talk of prizing highly gold and silver — but this is incorrect, for what we really prize is, not gold,- but the ulterior something, whatever it be, for the attainment of which gold and other instrumental means are accumulated. In general terms — when we say that B is dear on account of A, we are really speaking of A under the name of B. What is really dear, is that primi- tive object of love, primum amabile, towards which all the affections which we bear to other things, refer and tend.1 Is it then true (continues Sokrates) that good is our pri- mum amabile, and dear to us in itself? If so, is it ThecMUeo, dear to us on account of evil ? that is, only as a remedy for evil ; so that if evil were totally banished, £*££?!,. good would cease to be prized ? Is it true that evil or l,ur own‘ is the cause why any thing is dear to us ?y This cannot be : because even if all evil were banished, the appetites and * Plato, Lysis, c. 37, p. 220 B. aO Are rerprjptvos be ylyverai oh &v rty iupaiprjrcu — too &s foiKtv, Z re tpoo s Kal 7j del avr ov enaaros £vpf}o\ov (191 D) »cal b ivtQupla rvyxAr*i oZtra. — Zutalws Zlv vp.voip.tv ‘'E/wra, is tv re This is tho Haino doctrine as that rtp xap6vn ir\ei* ictus ravra, & 214 A-215 E. Kpir40ov\c • s fiaSius Siokiadalv*! Kal StaSv*rai ijj uas. Sir* rotovroy 6v A tyoo ybp rayadby KaAby flyat. This allusion hi the soft and the smooth is not very clear ; a passage in Mr. Bain's chapter serves to il- lustrate it. “ Among the sensations of the senses wo find some that have the power of awakening tender emotion. The sen- sations that incline to tenderness are, iu the first place, tho effects of very gentle or soft stimulants, such ns soft touches, gentle sounds, slow move- ments, temperute warmth, mild sun- shine. These sensations must lie felt in order to produce the effect, which is j mental and not simply organic. We have st'en that an acute sensation raises u vigorous muscular expression, us in wonder ; a contrast to this is exhibited by gentle pressure or mild radiance. Hence tenderness is passive emotion by pre-eminence : we see it flourish- ing best in the quiescence of the mov- ing members. Remotely there may lie a large amount of action stimulated by it, but the proper outgoing occonqnui- ment of it is organic not muscular." That the sensations of the soft and the smooth dispose to tho Tender Emotion is here pointed out as u fact in human nature, agreeably to tho com] arisen of Pluto. Mr. Bain's treatise has the rare merit of describing fully the physical ns well ns the mental characteristics of each separate emo- tion. “ Plato, Lysis, p. 216 A. ol Trdvkeii by (J. ]31o**ius xi. 37. ° Pinto, Lysis, c. 30, p. 21G D. Atyw toImiv airu/xavT*v6fAfyos, &C. p Plato, Lysis, pp. 210-217, e. 30-32. Plato, Lysis, c. 33, p. 218 C. A* 1- wovtcw Si) oi r b Ktucbr toDto, rb,y Hyvoiav, nyirw S' inr * airrov Hints iyytifioy(% firjSl auadtTs, oAA’ fn i jyov/xfvoi ni) ftSt’vat & nh foamy S16 Si) osion,r which we shall reach presently. r Pluto, Syuipos. pp. 202*203-204. Phtedrus, p. 278 D. Digitized by Google 522 LYSIS. Chap. XVIII. Another theory of HokraU*. The ITlmum A mobile, or original and primary ob- ject of Ix)ve. Particular objects urc Joved Still, however, Sokrates is not fully satisfied with this hypo- thesis, but passes on to another. If we love any- thing, we must love it (he says) for the sake of some- thing. This implies that there must exist, in the background, a something which is the primitive and real object of affection. The various things which we actually love, are not loved for their own sake, rution'^h*" but for the sake of this primum amabile, and as u.he shadows projected by it: just as a man who loves his son, comes to love by association what is salutary or comforting to his son — or as ho loves money for the sake of what money will purchase. The primum amabile, in the view of Sokrates, is Good ; particular things loved, are loved as shadows of good. This is a doctrine which we shall find reproduced in other statement by dialogues. We note with interest here, that it ap- Plato of the ® # * STanenua^ Pears illustrated, by a statement of the general law MBx-uiiun. 0f mental association — the calling up of one idea by other ideas or by sensations, and the transference of affec- tions from one object to others which have been apprehended in conjunction with it, either as antecedents or consequents. Plato states this law clearly in the Phsedon and elsewhere : * but he here conceives it imperfectly : for he seems to believe that, if an affection bo transferred by association from a primitive object A, to other objects, B, C, I), &c., A always continues to be the only real object of affection, while B, C, 1), &c., operate upon the mind merely by carrying it back to A. The affection towards B, C, D, &c., therefore is, in the view of Plato, only the affection for A under other denominations and disguises.* Now this is doubtless often the case; but often also, perhaps even more generally, it is not the ease. After a certain length of repetition and habit, all conscious reference to the primitive object of affection will commonly be left out, and the affection towards the secondary object * Plato, Phaedon, pp. 73-74. y dp ' Idea was conceived as a substantive, intelligible, Ens, distinct in its nature from all the particulars bearing the same name, and separated from thojn all by a gulf which admitted no gradations of nearer and farther — yet communicating itself to, or partaken by, all of them, in some inexplicable way. Aristotle combated this doctrine, denying the separate reality of the Idea, and admitting only a common generic essence, dwelling in and pervading the particulars, but pervading them all equally. The general word connoting this generic unity was said by Aristotle (retaining the Platonic phraseology) to be Xey opevov Kara plav ISeav or KaO'ev. “ There is no stronger illustration ‘Analysis of the Human Mind,' ehap- of this than the love of money, which tore xxi. and xxii., and by Professor is the very example that Pluto himself Bain in his works on the Senses and here cites. the Intellect, — Intellect, chap. i. sect. Tile important point to which I here 47-18, p. 407 seq. ed. 2 ; and on tho call attention, in respect to the law of Emotions and tho Will, cliap. iv. sect. Mental Association, is forcibly illus- 4-5. p. 428 seq truted by Mr. J. lines Mill in liis 1 Plato, ltcpubl. vi. pp. 505-500. Digitized by Google 524 LYSIS. Chap. XVIII. But apart from and beyond such generic unity, which im- plied a common essence belonging to all, Aristotle recognised a looser, more imperfect, but more extensive, communion, founded upon common relationship towards some ’A pxh — First Principle — or First Object Such relationship was not always the same in kind : it might be either resemblance, concomitance, antecedence or consequence, &c. : it might also bo different in degree, closer or more remote, direct or indirect. Here then there was room for graduation, or ordi- nation of objects as former and latter, first, second, third, &c., according as, when compared with each other, they were more or less related to the common root. This imperfect com- munion was designated by Aristotle under the title war’ uvaXoyiav, as contrasted with Kara yeves : the predicate which affirmed it was said to be applied, not Kara piav iheav or Kaff ev, but 7 rpo? fiiav vcnv or wpov ev : y it was affirmed neither t Arist. Mctaphys. A 1072, o. 26-29; I naeh Aristotcles,’ Freiburg, 1862, pp. Bonitz, Comin. p.497 id. TJpanov open- ' 85-108-147. rbv — UpuTop vot)t6v (irp&rop opfKrbv The distinction drawn by Aristotle — “ quod per sc appetibile ost et con- between rb Koivbv k«t* Ibtav and rb cupiseitur ” “Quod autern primum Koivbv tear* bivakoylav — between ra est in aliqna serie, id prtecipue etiam | nark play Ibtav ktyiptva, and ra i rpbr habet qualitatem, quro in reiiqu& cer- tv or irpb% play vu])° (says Dr. Whewell) “is steadily than ffwwvupa and more tlian Apuwpa; fixed, though not precisely limited; it intern) ediate between tlie two, having is given, though not circumscribed ; it no common \6yos or generical unity, is determined, not by a boundary and yet not entirely equivocal, but de- | without but by a centnd point within, signuting a noivhv tear ivakoylav : not &c.” The coincidence between this Karbi plav Ibtav ktyAptva, but irpbs tv doctrine and the Aristotelian is real, or ir pbt play tputriv ; having a certain though only partial : rb irpurov tplkov, relation to one common tpvais called t8 irpwroy dptKriv, may be considered as rb irpwruv. Sec the Metaphys. I\ 1003, types of object* love aide, objects desirable, a. 33 — rb 8t by ktytrai ptv woAAax»s, &c., but i) vyiela cannot be considered aAAa vpbs tv Kal plav r ivi X Apuvvpus, &kk' &gic,’ Book iv. ch. 7, pp. 264-267. I whole doctrine is given bv M. Brentano, ! have adverted to this same doctrine in in his valuable treatise, * Von der man- remarking on the Hippias Major, nigfachcn Bedeutung ties Seieuden [ supra, p. 379. Digitized by Google Chap. XVIII. GENERIC AND ANALOGICAL AGGREGATES. 525 entirely arwcovv/iw^ (which would imply generic communion), nor entirely ofAcovvjMos (which would be casual and imply no communion at all), but midway between the two, so as to admit of a graduated communion, and an arrangement as former and later, first cousin, or second, third cousin. Mem- bers of the same Genus were considered to be brothers, all on a par : but wherever there was this graduated cousinship or communion (signified by the words Former and Later, more or less in degree of relationship), Aristotle did not admit a common Genus, nor did Plato admit a Substantive Idea.* Now the 1 1 pMTov t\ov or Primum Amabile which we find in the Lysis, is described as the principium or initial Primura root of one of these imperfectly united aggregates P£u>Wo,m- ramifying into many branches more or less distant, in obedience to one or other of the different laws of A“«lou“.of association. Aristotle expresses the same idea in another form of words : instead of a Primum Ama- bile, he gives us a Prima Amicitia — affirming tliat of a generic the diversities of friendship are not species com- r“ml!' prehended under the same genus, but gradations or degene- racies departing in one direction or other from the First or pure Friendship. The Primum Amabile, in Plato’s view, appears to be the Good, though he does not explicitly declare it : the Prima Amicitia, with Aristotle, is friendship subsist- ing between two good persons, who have had sufficient expe- rience to know, esteem, and trust, each other.* ■ This is attested by Aristotle, Eth. Nik. i. 64, p. 1096, a. 16. Of 8« Kop.1- aavrts t)jv b6£av raxrrr\vt oitK 4-wolovv I94as 4v oh t8 TrpSrtpov ko! t2> Hartpov tyov Buforcp ouSe ruv apidpuv IStav KaTf(TKfva£oy : compare Ethic. Eu- dem. i. 8, 1218, a. 2. He goes on to object that Plato, having laid this down as a general principle, departed from it in recognizing an 1 8 ecu' ayadov, because r&yaObv was predicated in all the categories, in that of oinria as well os in that of irp6s n — rb 8« tca0’ ainb Kal rj oinria irp6r*poy rfj r efSiy 7 evovs, irauirav \4y*aHai 6/awvu- fxws’ irpbs p.1 av y ip Tiva Ktyoyrtu Kal Tcptirriv, Snrircp rb larpiKby, &c. The whole passage is instructive, but is too long to cite. Bonitz gives some good explanations of these passages. Obaervationes Critic® in Aristotclis quro feruntur Magna Moralia et Eudemia, pp. 55-57. Digitized by Google 5 20 LYSIS. Chap. XVI1L In regard to the Platonic Lysis, I have already observed Tbc Good that no positive result can be found in it, and that and Uoamlful. , . oSSneti'or*** a *"e hypotheses broached are successively nega- inchmont. tived. What is kept before the reader’s mind, how- ever, more than anything else, though not embodied in any distinct formula, is — The Good and the Beautiful considered as objects of love or attachment. Digitized by Google Chap. XIX. RUTHYDEMUS. 527 CHAPTER XIX. RUTHYDEMUS. Dramatic vivacity, and comic force, holding up various per- sons to ridicule or contempt, are attributes which Dramatic amt Plato manifests often and abundantly. But the i*r»n«ofti» . | . . . , . . KuthydemuA dialogue in which these qualities reach their maxi- Judgmenuor • i -n i o . various mum, is, the Euthydemus. Some portions of it ctuim. approach to the Nubes of Aristophanes : so that Schleier- macher, Stallbaum, and other admiring critics have some difficulty in explaining, to their own satisfaction,* how Plato, the sublime moralist and lawgiver, can here have admitted so much trifling and buffoonery. Ast even rejects the dialogue as spurious ; declaring it to be unworthy of Plato and insist- ing on various peculiarities, defects, and even absurdities, which offend his critical taste. His conclusion in this case has found no favour : yet I think: it is based on reasons quite as forcible as those upon which other dialogues have been condemned : b upon reasons, which, even if admitted, might prove that the dialogue was an inferior performance, but would not prove that Plato was not the author. Sokrates recounts (to Kriton) a conversation in which he has just been engaged with two Sophists, Euthyde- and mils and Dionysodorus, in the undressing-room be- longing to the gymnasium of the Lykeium. There were present, besides, Kleinias, a youth of remarkable beauty and intelligence, cousin of the great Alkibiades — Ktesippus, an adult man, yet still young, friend of Sokrates and devotedly attached to Kleinias — and a crowd of unnamed persons, partly friends of Kleinias, partly admirers and supporters of the two Sophists. * Schleierumchor, Einleitung zum b Ast, Platon’s Lebenund Sehriften, Euthydcinod, vol. iii. pp. 400-403-407 ; pp. 408-418. Stallbaum, Prolog, in Euthvdem. p. 14. Digitized by Google 528 EUTHYDEMUS. Chap. XIX. This couple are described and treated throughout by So- The two krates, with the utmost admiration and respect : *Kutby«l<»rnus that is, in terms designating such feelings, but in- and hionvso- - - - . . rni (Virus : tended as the extreme of irony or caricature. I hey manner in . —7 , . _ ' which they are masters ol the art of Contention, m its three are here* presented, varieties® — 1. Arms, and the command of soldiers. 2. Judicial and political rhetoric, fighting an opponent liefore the assembled Dikasts or people. 3.' Contentious Dialectic — they can reduce every respondent to a contradiction, if lie will only continue to answer their questions — whether what lie says be true or false.1* All or each of these accomplish- ments they are prepared to teach to any pupil who will pay the required fee : the standing sarcasm of Flato against the paid teacher, occurring here as in so many other places. Lastly, they are brothers, old and almost toothless — natives of Chios, colonists from thence to Thurii, and exiles from Thurii and resident at Athens, yet visiting other cities for the purpose of giving lessons.6 Their dialectic skill is de- scribed as a recent acquisition, — made during their old age, only in the preceding year, — and completing their excellence as professors of the tripartite Eristic. But they now devote themselves to it more than to the other two parts. More- over they advertise themselves as teachers of virtue. The two Sophists, having announced themselves as com- Orniv.nuiion petent to teach virtue and stimulate pupils to a vir- witb tuous life, are entreated by Sokrates to exercise Kleinla6,fir«t . , J . bysokrmto*. their beneficent influence upon the youth Ivleinios, next by the . r J two sophist*, m whose improvement he as well as Ktesippus feels the warmest interest Sokrates gives a specimen of what he • Plato, Euthyd. pp. 271-272. d Plat. Euthyd. p. 272 B. 4tt\*yx*iv rb id A €y6fi*vov, idv re iptubos r aKrjOts rf : — p. 275 C. oi>8lv 8 leupepet, Hur fiovov kiroKpivtadcu 6 vta- vitTKOS. * Plat. Euthyd. p. 273 B-C. “ qunm- vis ensot grandiores natu et eduntul*" aays SUllbuutu in his Proleg. p. 10. He seems to infer this from page 294 C ; tlie inference though not very certain is plausible. Steinhart, in his Einlcitung zuni Euthydemos (vol. iL p. 2 of Hieronym. Muller’s translation of Plato) repeats these antecedents of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, ns recited in the dialogue before us, os if they were matter of real history, exemplifications of the cha- racter of the class cuUod Sophists. He might just as well produce what is said by the comic poets Eupolis and Aris- tophanes— the proceedings as recounted by the Sokratic disciple in the s Irt v4os « 7 — piy oZy vktlovs Zp*y, ovk 4{i ov "f\y Zdardai (to request Parmenides to give a specimen of dialectic) 4 yptirri yap t4 Toiavra iroA* \&y ivdyriov Xiy*ty% 4AAa»y re teal TTjkiKovrtp' 4 yvoovai yap oi -wt/AAol 5ti &y tv ravrrjs rrjs S i4 -rdyruv Zte^ZZov rt kuI irA dtnjt, iZvyaroy 4yrvxZyra r

r$ rov EdOdSt/uod, Ehrt fioi, fywj, 5’ jjffdtro 'Sokrates, abrby iroi^6r(poy &c. xrKopivovra, Hr* SiaAt^orro, *al irpo$v- * Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 39-40. fi6rtpov AicouoKra, n6vos tiA 0*y Compare the remarks of Sokrates in rb JiviowoiUtoVy Trapa.Ki\o(ro »Aovt€iv &7 a06v ; f Plato, Euthydem. pp. 279-280. * Plato, Euthydem. p. 281 C. f/rroy 8« kuku)s Trpdrruv, 6.9 A to $ firroy ctij. Digitized by Google 538 EUTHYDEMU8. Chap. XIX. But to use these good things rightly, depends upon wisdom, knowledge, intelligence. It thus appears that the enume- rated items are not really good, except on the assumption that they are under the guidance of intelligence : if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are not good ; nay, they even produce more harm than good, since they are active instruments in the service of a foolish master.11 “ But what intelligence do we want for the purpose ? Is it mu inMu- a M intelligence ? Or is there any one single variety of intelligence, by the possession of which we shall toSiiSraf1 become good and happy?1 Obviously, it must be £t!«hw,m such as will be profitable to us.k We have seen thenilkuiK1 that there is no good in possessing wealth — that we wanted” should gam nothing by knowing how to acquire ML"" wealth or even to turn stones into gold, unless we at the same time knew how to use it rightly. Nor should we gain any thing by knowing how to make ourselves healthy, or even immortal, unless we knew how to employ rightly our health or immortality. We want knowledge or intelligence, of such a nature, as to include both acting, making, or construction — and rightly using what we have done, made, or constructed.1 The makers of lyres and flutes may be men of skill, but they cannot play upon the instru- ments which they have made : the logographers compose fine discourses, but hand them over for others to deliver. Even masters in the most distinguished arts — such as military com- manders, geometers, arithmeticians, astronomers, &c., do not come up to our requirement. They are all of them varieties under the general class hunters : they find and seize, but hand over what they have seized for others to use. The hunter, when he has caught or killed game, hands it over to the h Plato, Euthyd. p. 282 E. If wo them, p. 288 E. compare this with p. 279 C-D we shall k Plato, Euthyddm. p. 288 E. rira see that the argument of Sokrotes is ir or’ oZy tty Krrjcrdufyoi iTriarbpyv open to the exception which he him- opOvt KTijaatptda ; ip' ou rouro pip self takes in the case of txnvxia — 81s ar\ovy, &n ravrriy fyns iipas ov^tru ; raZrh A 4yuw. Wisdom is counted 1 Plato, Euthyd. p. 289 B. rotairms twice over. ruths ip' bp*v imtrrbpris 8«i, iv $ avp- 4 Plato, Euthydem. p. 282 E. So- iritrrwKfy &pa r6 t« itoiciv koI krates here breaks off the string of ^ 7rl v rfr* a Plato, Euthyd. p. 292 A. ’A yaObv dyaOwy, fotcrr^firiy Si xapaStSdrat firiS*- Sf yi x ov wfioKoyfiffafxtv iAA^Aou — filar iWrjy fj avrijv tat ni]V’ \tytcfity oi/Sir tlvai SAA o ^ fourrfifnjy nvd. I 8^ oSv , v Is wort forty atrri) ; p rl XP*f~ ° Plat. Euthvddm. p. 292 D. ’AAAa rlra 8ij fotor-ii/xriy ; ft rl xpvff6fi*9a ; p Plat. Euthyd. p. 292 E. rwy fiiy y dp tpy tav ot/Stybs abrijv 8«t Digitized by Google 540 EUTHYDEMUS. Chap. XIX. way to receive solution. What is the regal or political art Review nf the which directs or regulates all others ? A man has nation just many different impulses, dispositions, qualities, apti- srfmnwbyit tndes, advantages, possessions, &c., which we describe gentivc— by saying that he is an artist, a general, a tradesman, puU the f J ° .. mmjupon^ clever, just, temperate, brave, strong, rich, powerful, fw- &c. But in the course of life, each particular situation has its different exigencies, while the prospective future has its exigencies also. The whole man is one, with all these distinct and sometimes conflicting attributes : in fol- lowing one impulse, he must resist others — in turning his aptitudes to one object, he must turn them away from others — he must, as Plato says, distinguish the right use of his force from the wrong, by virtue of knowledge, intelligence, reason. Such discriminating intelligence, which in this dialogue is called the Regal or political art, — what is the object of it ? It is intelligence or knowledge — but of what ? Not certainly of the way how each particular act is to be performed — how each particular end is to be attained. Each of these sepa- rately is the object of some special knowledge. But the whole of a man’s life is passed in a series of such particular acts, each of which is the object of some special knowledge : what then remains as the object of Regal or political intelli- gence, upon which our happiness is said to depend ? Or how can it have any object at all ? The question here raised is present to Plato’s mind in other ConijuriBou dialogues, and occurs under other words, as for dialogue* — example, What is good ? Good is the object of the pbiifbuS Regal or political intelligence : but what is Good ? Protagoras. ° r , . ° ’ . In the Republic, he raises this question, but declines answer is to answer it, confessing that he could not make it Prougoraa. intelligible to his hearers:11 in the Gorgias, he takes pains to tell us what it is not : in the Philebus, he does indeed tell us what it is, but in terms which need explanation quite as much as the term which they are brought to explain. There is only one dialogue in which the question is answered affirmatively, in clear and unmistakeable language, and with i Pinto, Republic, vi. pp. 505- .506. Digitized by Google Chap. XIX. IRONICAL ADMIRATION. 541 considerable development — and that is, the Protagoras: where Sokrates asserts and proves at length, that Good is at the bottom identical with pleasure, and Evil with pain : that the measuring or calculating intelligence is the truly regal art of life, upon which the attainment of Good depends : and that the object of that intelligence — the items which we are to measure, calculate, and compare — is pleasures and pains, so as to secure to ourselves as much as possible of the former, and escape as much as possible of the latter. In my remarks on the Protagoras, I shall state the view which I take of the doctrine laid down in that dialogue by Sokrates. Persons may think the answer insufficient > most of the Platonic critics declare it to be absolutely wrong. But at smy rate, it is the only distinct answer which Plato ever gives, to the question raised by Sokrates in the Euthydemus and elsewhere. From the abstract just given of the argument of Sokrates in the Euthydemus, it will be seen to be serious ^ (ilk of and pertinent, though ending with a confession of failure. The observations placed in contrast with it and ascribed to the two Sophists, are distinguished by being neither serious nor pertinent; but parodies S,"*n°aiSe of debate for the most part, put together for the express purpose of appearing obviously silly to the reader. Plato keeps up the dramatic or ironical Ur>ry' appearance, that they are admired and welcomed not only by the hearers, but even by Sokrates himself. Nevertheless, it is made clear at the end that all this is nothing but irony, and that the talk which Plato ascribes to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus produced, according to his own showing, no sentiment of esteem for their abilities among the by-standers, but quite the reverse. Whether there were individual Sophists at Athens who talked in that style, we can neither affirm nor deny : but that there were an established class of persons who did so, and made both money and reputation by it, we may securely deny. It is the more surprising that the Platonic commentators should desire us to regard Euthydemus and Dionysodorus ns representative samples of a special class Digitized by Google 542 EUTHYDEMUS. Chap. XIX. named Sophists, since one of the most eminent of those com- mentators (Stallbaum),' both admits that Sokrates himself was generally numbered in the class and called by the name — and affirms also (incorrectly, in my opinion) that the inter- rogations of Sokrates, which in this dialogue stand contrasted with those of the two Sophists, do not enuntiate the opinions either of Sokrates or of Plato himself, but the opinions of these very Sophists, which Plato adopts and utters for the occasion." The received supposition that there were at Athens a class men called Sophists who made money and repu- tbT.so^st* tation by obvious fallacies employed to bring about deflniifon**— contradictions in dialogue — appears to me to per- guublhio vert th6 representations given of ancient philosophy. iimwn'iJ'-* Aristotle defines a Sophist to be “ one who seeks to sophutMid make money by apparent wisdom which is not real iKulimi. wisdom — the Sophist (he says) is an Eristic who, besides money-making, seeks for nothing but victory in de- bate and humiliation of his opponent : — Distinguishing the Dialectician from the Sophist (he says), the Dialectician im- r Stallbftura, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydera. p. 50. ** Illud quidem ex Aristophauc pariter atquo ipso Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem non tan- tom ab orationom scriptoribus, sc-d etiam ab alii* in vanissimorum sophis- tanmi numero habitum fuisse.” Ib. p. 49 (cited in a previous note). 44 Yi- detiir pervulgata fuisse hominum , opinio, quft Socratem inter vanos »o nhistas numerandum esse exist ima- j bant,'* Again p. 44, where Stallbaum tells us that Sokrates was considered by many to belong 41 misello Sopkia- tanim gregi.’’ ■ Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Euthy- dem. p. 30. “ Cavendum est inagno- pere, ne qu» hie a Socratc dicuntur, pro ipsius docretis habeamus : *un< enim omnia ad mentem Sophtttarum dUputata , quos ille, reprehensis corum opinionibus, sperat eo adductum iri, ut gravem prudentemque earum defen- sionem suscipiant.” Compare p. 60. | Stallbaum says that Plato often rea- sons, adopting for the occasion the j doctrine of the Sophists. See his Prolegg. to the Laches and Charmidca, and still more his Proleg. to the Protagoras, where he tells us that Plato introduces his spokesman So- krates not only as arguing ex mertle Sopkislarttm, but also as employing captious and delusive artifice, such as in this dialogue is ascribed to Euthy- demus and Dionysodorus. — pp. 23-24. “ Itaque Socrates, missa liujus rei dis- putatione, repents ad alia progrtxlitur, scilicet eimilibtu laqueis homiuem denuo irretiturus. Nemini facile obs- cumm erit, hoc quoque loco Prota- goram arguth conausiunculis ddudi” (». e. by Sokrates) “ atque callid/ eo per mover i," & c. u Quauquam nemo erit, quin videat, cal lid/ deludi Prola- goram, ubi ex eo, quod qui injust6 faciat, is neutiquam agat o-u>4\rwp — itcu Bt (in Dialectic) pkv Hard rbv wpoalpciriv, Bta- 5curl Sia\tyt(r0cu. The metaphorical you may both know and not know the sense of in criticism is )to intle**, same thing. Analy. Prior, ii. 87, b. 8. tlupiil out of lode, out of place, Ac. i Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 25. c Plato, Euthydfim. p. 283 C. Ari- Digitized by Google Chap. XIX. FALLACIES EXTRA DICTIONEM, 547 The two Sophists maintain their consistency by making reply in the affirmative to each of these successive ot»tin*<-y questions : though Ktesippus pushes them hard by two SopblftU enquiries as to a string of mean and diverse spe- rep lea- de- cialties.d This is one of the purposes of the dialogue ; not to , _ _ , * 0 contradict to represent the two Sophists as willing to answer thenueivw. any thing, however obviously wrong and false, for the purpose of avoiding defeat in the dispute — as using their best efforts to preserve themselves in the position of questioners, and to evade the position of respondents — and as exacting a cate- gorical answer — Yes or No — to every question which they put, without any qualifying words, and without any assurance that the meaning of the question was understood.0 The base of these fallacious inferences is, That respecting the same subject, you cannot both affirm and deny the same predicate : you cannot say, A is knowing — A is not knowing (emarrrinMv). This is a fallacy more than verbal : it is recog- nised by Aristotle (and by all subsequent logicians) under the name — a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simplieiter. It is very certain that this fallacy is often inadvertently committed by very competent reasoners, including both Plato and Aristotle. Again — Sophroniskus was my father — Chseredemus was the father of Patrokles. — Then Sophroniskus was different Farther * verbal equl- from a father : therefore he was not a father. You are roc.uoi». different from a stone, therefore yon are not a stone : you are different from gold, therefore you are not gold. By parity of reasoning, Sophroniskus is different from a father — therefore he is not a father. Accordingly, you, Sokrates, have no father/ But (retorts Ktesippus upon the couple) your father is different from my father. — Not at all. — How can that be ? — What ! is your father, then, the father of all men and of all animals ? — Certainly he is. A man cannot be at the same time a father, and not a father. He cannot be at the same time a man, and not a man — gold, and not gold/ d Plato, Euthydem. pp.290-294. c Plato, Euthydem. pp. 295-296. 1 Plato, Euthydem. j>p. 297-298. f Plato, Euthydem. p. 298. Some of the fallacies in tho dialog) (nirtpoir Sputa tv ol ivOputwut ra Si tveerk dpav 1) 2 n 2 Digitized by Google 548 EUTHYDEMUS. Chap. XIX. You have got a dog (Euthydemus says to Ktesippus). — Yes. — The dog is the father of puppies? — Yes. — The dog, being a father, is yours ?— Certainly. — Then your father is a dog, and you are brother of the puppies. You beat your dog sometimes ? Then you beat your father.h Those animals, and those alone ar a yours (sheep, oxen, &c.), which you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. But Zeus, Apollo, and Athene are your Gods. The Gods have a soul and are animals. Therefore your Gods are your animals. Now you told us that those alone were your animals, which you could give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. Therefore you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure, Zeus, Apollo, and Athene.1 This fallacy depends upon the double and equivocal mean- ing of yours — one of its different explanations being treated as if it wero the only one. Other puzzles cited in this dialogue go deeper : — Contra- F.iueiM in- diction is impossible — To speak falsely is impossible.11 detpf r logical These paradoxes W’ere maintained by Antisthenes and others, and appear to have been matters of dialectic debate throughout the fourth and third cen- turies. I shall say more of them when I speak about the Megarics and Antisthenes. Here I only note, that in this dialogue, Ktesippus is represented as put to silence by them, and Sobratos as making an answer which is no answer at all.1 We see how much trouble these paradoxes gave to Plato, when we read the Sophistes, in which he handles the last of the two in a manner elaborate, but (to my judgment) unsatisfactory. The Euthydemus of Plato is memorable in the history of Sydtamto philosophy as the earliest known attempt to set out, biown11'** and exhibit to attention, a string of fallacious modes •eiMiwrf of reasoning. Plato makes them all absurd and principle* contradiction la impossible. — To apeak falsely la im possible. al vvara ; ’H oT6y re triyecyra \iyuv ; 1 p. 300 A) arc hardly translatable into ! English, since they depend upon equi- vocal constructions peculiar to the Greek language. Aristotle refers them | to the grinjal head trap' &n«* w- ° t < lades— tin* bate, not unworthy of his namesake Plato Comicus w»> «r * . exposing — or of Aristophanes, Swift, or Voltaire. The so- 10 phisms appear for the most part so silly, as he puts *^rtf*cl^2'l°r them, that the reader askB himself how any one could have been ever imposed upon by such a pal- pable delusion ? Yet such confidence is by no means justified. A sophism, perfectly analogous in cha- lwd.ld racter to those which Plato here exposes to ridicule, may, in another case, easily escape detection from the hearer, and even from the reasoner himself. People are constantly misled by fallacies arising from the same word bearing two senses, from double construction of the same phrase, from unconscious application of a dictum secundum quid, as if it were a dictum simpliciter ; from Petitio Principii, &c., Ignoratio Elenchi, &c. Neither Plato himself, nor Aristotle, can boast of escaping them.m If these fallacies appear, in the examples chosen by Plato for the Eutliydemus, so obviously inconclu- sive that they can deceive no one — the reason lies not in the premisses themselves, but in the particular conclusions to which they lead : which conclusions are known on other grounds to be false, and never to be seriously maintainable by any person. Such conclusions as — “ Sokrates had no father : Sophroniskus, if father'of Sokrates, was father of all men and all animals : In beating your dog, you beat your father : If you know one tiling, you know every thing,” &c., being known aliunde to be false, prove that there has been some fallacy in the pre- misses whereby they have been established. Such cases serve as a reductio ad alsurdum of the antecedent process. They make us aware of one mode of liability to error, and put us on our guard against it in analogous c^es. This is a valuable service, and all the more valuable, because the lia- bility to error is real and widespread, even from fallacies perfectly analogous to those which seem so silly under the particular exemplifications which Plato selects and exposes. " See ft imssngo in Plato’s Clinr- the Gorgiiis, p. 507 D, with the notes midOs, where Heindorf remarks with of Routli and Hciudorf. I liave noticed propriety upon his equivocal use of the hotli passages in discussing these two words «B fps and »i rpdrruy — also dialogues. Digitized by Google 550 EUTBYDEMUS. Chap. XIX. Many of the illustrations of the Platonic Euthydemus are reproduced by Aristotle in the Treatise Do Sophisticis Elencins, together with other fallacies, discriminated with a certain method and system." The true character of these fallacies is very generally over- looked by the Platonic critics, in their apprecia- Mistake of • . ri supposing tion of the Euthydemus ; when they point our at- fallacies to , J ; have boeo tention to the supposed tricks and frauds of the persons whom they called Sophists, as well as to SJy'nJT" mischievous corruptions alleged to arise from Eristic ISwSictM or ft>rmal contentious debate. These critics speak as if they thought that such fallacies were the special pmxMoF7 inventions of Athenian Sophists for the purposes of tSSudo. Athenian Eristic : as if such causes of error were u»°b«rtrd< inoperative on persons of ordinary honesty or intel- “'mx’lng ligence, who never consulted or heard the Sophists. It has been the practice of writers on logic, from Aristotle down to Wliately, to represent logical fallacies as frauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners, whose art Whately assimilates to that of jugglers. This view of the case appears to mo incomplete and misleading. It substitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and essential. The various sophisms, of which Plato in the Euthydemus gives the reductio ad abmrdum, are not the inventions of Sophists. They are erroneous tenden- cies of the reasoning process, frequently incident to human thought and speech : specimens of those ever-renewed “ inad- vertencies of ordinary thinking ” (to recur to a plirase cited in my preface), which it is the peculiar mission of philosophy or “ reasoned truth ” to rectify. Moreover the practice of formal debate, which usually denounced with so much asperity — if it affords on some occasions opportunity to produce such fal- lacies, presents not merely equal opportunity, but the only effective means, for exposing and confuting them. Whately in his Logic,0 like Plato in the Euthydemus, when bringing these 4 Aristotle, Do Sophisticis Elenchis ; also Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ii. p. 1401, R-b. • Whately’s Ix»gic, ch. v. sect. 5. Though Whately, like other logicians, keeps the Sophists in the foreground, as the fraudulent enemy who sow’ tares Digitized by Google Cu. XIX. FALLACIES NATURAL AND SELF-OPERATIVE. 551 fallacies into open daylight in order that every one may de- tect them, may enliven the theme by presenting them as the deliberate tricks of a Sophist. Doubtless they are so by acci- dent : yet their essential character is that of infirmities inci- dent to the intellectue ribi permmw: operative at Athens before Athenian Sophists existed, and in other regions also, vvhera these persons never penetrated. The wide diffusion and constant prevalence of such in- firmities is attested not less by Sokrates in his last ww&ipK— speech, wherein he declares real want of knowledge "f and false persuasion of knowledge to bo universal, the mission of his life being to expose them, though £t«hf»iu. he could not correct them — than by Bacon in his reformatory projects, where he enumerates the various Idola worshipped by the human intellect, £'7"''' and the false tendencies acquired “ in primd di - jy[££[ by geetione mentis. The psychological analysis of the MUL sentiment of belief with its different sources, given in Mr. Alexander Bain’s recent work on the Emotions and tho Will, shows how this takes place ; and exhibits true or sound be- lief, in so far as it ever is acquired, as an acquisition only attained after expulsion of earlier antecedent error. p Of among that which would otherwise come up as a clean crop of wheat — yet ho intimate* also incidentally how wide- spread and frequent such fallacies are, quite apart from dishonest design. He , ssi vs —“It seems by most persons to be j taken for granted, that a Fallacy is to be dreaded merely ns a weapon fashioned and wielded by a skilful Sophist: or, if they allow that a man may with honest intentions slide into one, iinnsciously, in the heat of argument — still they seem to suppose, that where there is no dispute, there is no cause to dread Fallacy. Whereas there is much danger, | even in what may bo called solitary reasoning, of sliding unawares into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far deceived as even to act upon tho conclusion so obtained. By solitary reasoning , is meant the case in which wc are not seeking for arguments to prove a given question, but labouring to elicit from our previous stock of knowledge some useful inference.0 “To speak of all tho fallacies that have ever been enumerated, as too glaring and obvious to need even being mentioned — because the simple in- stances given in books, and there stated in the plainest and consequently most easily detected form, are such as (in that form) would deceive no one — this, surely, shows either extreme weakness or extreme unfairness.”-- Aristotle him- self makes tho same remark as W1 lately — That tho man who is easily taken in by a Fallacy advanced by another, will be cosily misled by the like Fallacy in his own solitary reasoning. Sophist. Eleneh. 16, 175, a. 10. p See tho instructive and original chapter on the generation, sources, and growth of Belief, in Mr. Bain’s work, ‘ Emotions and Will/ p. 568 scq. After laying down the fundamental characteristic of Belief, as referable I altogether to intended action, cither . certain to come or contingent under supposed circumstances, and cnumer&L Digitized by Google 652 EUTHYDEMUS. Chap. XIX. snch error, and of the different ways in which apparent evidence ia mistaken for real evidence, a comprehensive philo- sophical exposition is farther given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the fifth book of his System of Logic, devoted to the sub- ject of Fallacies. Every variety of erroneous procedure is referable to some one or more of the general heads of Fallacy there enumerated. It is the Fallacies of llatiocinatipn, of which the two Sophists, in the Platonic Euthydemus, are made to exhibit specimens : and when we regard such Fal- lacies, as one branch among several in a complete logical scheme, we shall see at once that they are not inventions of the Athenian Sophists — still less inventions for the purpose of Eristic or formal debate. For every ono of these Fallacies is of a nature to ensnare men, and even to ensnare them more easily, in the common, informal, conversation of life — or in ing tho different Sources of Belief. — so strenuously repudiated by Bacon, 1. Intuitive or Instinctive. 2. Ex- is tho offspring of this characteristic perience. 3. Tho Influence of the of tho mental system. With the Emotions (sect. x. p. 579) Mr. Bain active tendency at its maximum, and says : “ Having in our constitution the exercise of intelligence and ac- priiuordiul fouutains of activity in the quired knowledge at the minimum, siHmtaneous and voluntary impulse's, there can issue notliing but a quantity we follow the first clue that experience of rash enterprises. The resj»ectal>lo gives us, and accept the indication name generalisation , implying the best with the whole force of these natural products of enlightened scientific re- promptings. Being under the strongest search, has also a different meaning, impulses to net somehow, an animal expressing ono of the most erroneous accepts any lend that is presented, and impulses and crudest determinations if successful, abides by that lead with of uututored human nature. To ex- tmsliaken confidence. This is that tend some familiar and narrow experi- instinct of credulity so commonly at- cncc, so as to comprehend cases the tributed to the infant tnind. It is not most distant, is a piece of mere reckless the single instance, or the repetition of instinct, demanding severe discipline two or three, that makes up the strong for its correction, I have mentioned tone of confidence; it is the mind’s the case of our supposing all other own active determination, fiuding some miuds constituted lite our own. Tho definite vent in the gratification of its ! veriest infant 1ms got this length in ends, and abiding by the discovery the career of fallacy. Sound belief, with the whole energy of the character, instead of being a pacific and gentle until the occurrence of some check, growth, is in reality the battering of a failure, or contradiction. The force of : series of strongholds, the conquering of belief, therefore, is not one rising from a country in hostile occupation. This zero to a full development by slow is a fact common both to the individual degree's, according to the length of the and to the race. Observation is experience. We must treat it rather unanimous on the point. It will pro- as a strong primitive manifestation, bably bo long ere tho last of the de- derived from the natural activity of lusions attributable to this me -thud of the system, and taking its direction j believing first and proving afterwards and rectification from experience j can bo eradicated from humanity/’ (p. 583). Tho anticipation of nature, I Digitized by Google Chap. XIX. VALUE OF FORMAL DEBATE. 553 their separate thoughts. Besides mistakes on matters of fact, the two main causes which promote the success and encourage the multiplication of Fallacies generally, are first, the emo- tional bias towards particular conclusions, which disposes per- sons to accept any apparent evidence, favourable to such conclusion, as if it were real evidence : next, the careless and elliptical character of common speech, in which some parts of the evidence are merely insinuated, and other parts alto- gether left out It is this last circumstance which gives occasion to the very extensive class of Fallacies called by Mr. Mill Fallacies of Confusion : a class so large, that the greater number of Fallacies might plausibly be brought under it.q i Mill, ‘System of Logic,’ Book V., to which is prefixed the following citation from Hobbes's * Logica.’ “ Errare non moeration of moral or emotional bins in perverting tho intellect, and causing sophisms or fallacies to pro- duce conviction ; and tho increased chance afforded for tho success of a sophism by tho suppression of part of tho premisses, which is unavoidable in informal discussions. “ Bias is not a direct source of wrong conclusions (V. 1-3). We cannot be- lieve a proposition only by wishing, or only by dreading, to believe it Bios acts indirectly by placing Uio intel- lectual grounds of belief in an incom- plete or distorted sliape before a man’s eyes. It makes him shrink from tho irksome labour of a rigorous induction. It operates too by making him look out eagerly for reasons, or apparent reasons, to support opinions which are conformable, or resist those which are repugnant, to his interests or feelings ; ami when the interests or feelings are common to great numbers of persons, reasons aro accepted or pass current which would not for a moment bo listened to in that character, if tho conclusion had nothing more powerful than its reasons to Bpeak in its behalf. The natural or acquired prejudices of mankind aro perpetually throwing up philosophical theories, tho solo recom- mendation of which consists in tho premisses which they afford for prov- ing cherished doctrines, or justifying favourite feelings ; and when any one of these theories has become so thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose, another is always ready to take its place.” — “ Though tho opinions of the generality of mankind, when not dependant upon mere habit and inculcation, have their root much more in the inclinations than in the intellect, it is a necessary condition to tho triumph of the moral bias that it should first pervert the understand- ing.” Again in v. 2, 3. "It is not in the nature of hod reasoning to express itself unambiguously. When a sophist, whether ho is imposing upon himself or attempting to impose upon others, can be constrained to throw his argu- ment into so distinct a form, it nods, in a largo number of cases, no farther exposure. In all arguments, every- where but in tho schools, somo of tho links aro suppressed : a fortiori, when tho arguer either intends’ to deceive, or is a lame and inexpert thinker, little accustomed to bring his reasoning pro- cesses to any test; and it is in those steps of the reasoning which arc mado in this tacit and half-conscious, or even wholly unconscious, manner, that the error oftenest lurks. In order to detect tho fallacy, the proposition thus silently assumed must be supplied, but the reasoncr, most likely, lias never Digitized by Google 554 EUTHYDEMUS. CnAP. XIX. We thus see not only that the fallacious agencies arc self- v*iu« or tor- operative, generating their own weeds in the common soil of human thought and speech, without being confmin«d planted by Athenian Sophists or watered by Eristic fniiade*. — blit that this very Eristic affords the best means of restraining their diffusion. It is only in formal debate that the disputant can be forced to make clear to himself and declare explicitly to others, without reserve or omission, all the premisses upon which his conclusion rests — that every part of these premisses becomes liable to immediate challenge by an opponent — that the question comes distinctly under consideration, what is or is not sufficient evidence — that the premisses of one argument can be compared with the premisses of another, so that if in the former you are tempted to ac- quiesce in them as sufficient because you have a bias favour- able to the conclusion, in the latter you may be made to feel that they are insufficient, because the conclusion which they prove is one which you know to bo untrue (reductio ad ab- surdum). The habit of formal debate (called by those who do not like it, Eristic') is thus an indispensable condition both for the exposure and confutation of fallacies, which exist really asked himself what he was philosophy by the name of Eristics, assuming; Ids couf uter, unless j>er- “Ala ob jener Rhetor nieht (wie ja mitted to extort it from him by the rioch Bpengel selbst gilt nachgewicaen Socratic mode of interrogation, muat hat, alle und jede Speculation mit dan himself judge what the suppressed Naluuen dor Eri stile bezeichnetc.” premiss ought to be, in order to sup- (Untersuchungen iiber die Zeitfolgo port tlio conclusion.” Mr. Mill pro- der Plat. Schriften, p. 257.) In re- oeeds to illustrate this confusion by on ference to the distinction which Ari- excellent passage cited from Whately’s static attempts to draw between Dia- 4 Logic.’ I may add, that Aristotle lectic and Eristic — the former legiti- himself makes a remark substantially mate, the latter illegitimate — we must the same — That the same fallacy, may remark that even in the legitimate be referred to one general head or to j Dialectic the purpose prominent in his another, according to circumstances. [ mind is that of victory over an oppo- Bophist. Elencli. 33. 182, b. 10. nent. He enjoins that you aro not r The Platonic critics talk about the 1 only to guard against your opponent, Eristics ‘as they do about the Sophists) lest he should out-manoeuvre you, but as if that name designated a known you are to conceal and disguise the ami definite class of persons. This is sequence of your questions so as to altogether misleading. The term is out-manoBUvre him. Xph 5* u- vituperntive, and was applied by dif- xiri^aBai irapayyi\\op.fy dir otcpivop.*- fereut persons according to their own vovs, aurobs brixeipovyras wtipatrdai tastes. \av6dvav. Analyt. Prior, ii. CO, a. 82. Ueberweg remarks with great justice, Compare Topic. 108, a. 25. 156, a. 28. that Isokrates called all speculators on 1G4, b. 35. Digitized by Google Chap. XIX. POPULARITY OF THIS DIALOGUE. 555 quite independent of that habit — owing their rise and pre- valence to deep-seated psychological causes. Without the experience acquired by this habit of dialectic debate at Athens, Plato could not have composed WIUlonttbo his Euthydemus, exhibiting a reductio ad absurdum of several verbal fallacies — nor could we have had the logical theories of Aristotle, embodied in the ^d"”‘ Analytica and Topica with its annexed treatise De Jot IoomS Sophisticis Elenchis, in which various fallacies are ^un- discriminated and classified. These theories, and d*Eleochta- the corollaries connected with them, do infinite honour to the comprehensive intellect of Aristotle : but he could not have conceived them without previous study of the ratiocinativo process. He, as the first theorizer, must have had before him abundant arguments explicitly laid out, and contested, or open to be contested, at every step by an opponent.* To- wards such habit of formal argumentation, a strong repugnance was felt by many of the Athenian public, as there is among modern readers generally : but those who felt thus, had pro- bably little interest in the speculations either of Plato or of Aristotle. That the Platonic critics should themselves feel this same repugnance, seems to me not consistent with their admiration for the great dialectician and logician of antiquity : nor can I at all subscribe to their view, when they present to us the inherent infirmities of the human intellect as factitious distempers generated by the habit of formal debate, and by the rapacity of Protagoras, Prodikus, and others. I think it probable that the dialogue of Euthydemus, as far as the point to which I have brought it (». e., Proi»wc where Sobrates finishes his recital to Kriton of the KaIuij- conversation which he had had with the two Sophists), a u><-nS- * , welcomed was among the most popular of all the Platonic' by.nthe . * * . , _ . enemies of dialogues: not merely because of its dramatic nrneciic. vivacity and charm of expression, but because it would be heartily welcomed by the numerous enemies of Dialectic at * Mill, ‘System of Logic,' Rook VI. I rational (acuity, like those of every 1, 1. “Principles of Evidence and | other natural ugeucy, arc only got by Theories of Method, arc not to be con- j seeing the agent at work." structed a priori. The laws of our | Digitized by Google 556 EUTHYDEMUS. Chap. XIX. Plato to the Dialogue, trying to ob- viate this inference by opponents— Conversation between So- krates and Kriton. Athens. We must remember that in the estimation of most persons at Athens, Dialectic included Sokrates aud all the viri Sokratici (Plato among them), just as much as the per- sons called Sophists. The discreditable picture here given of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, would be considered as tell- ing against Dialectic and the Sokratic Elenchus generally : while the rhetors, and others who dealt in long continuous discourse, would treat it as a blow inflicted upon the rival art of dialogue, by the professor of the dialogue himself. In Plato’s view, the dialogue was the special and appropriate manifestation of philosophy. That the natural effect of the picture here drawn by Plato Epilogue of was, to justify the antipathy of those who hated philo- sophy— we may see by the epilogue which Plato has thought fit to annex : an epilogue so little in har- mony with what has preceded, that we might almost imagine it to be an afterthought — yet obviously intended to protect philosophy against imputations. Sokrates having concluded the recital, in his ironical way, by saying that he intended to become a pupil under the two Sophists, and by inviting Kriton to be a pupil along with him — Kriton replies by saying that he is anxious to obtain instruction from any one who can give it, but that he has no sympathy with Euthydemus, and would rather be refuted by him, than learn from him to refute in such a manner. Kriton proceeds to report to Sokrates the remarks of a by-stander (an able writer of discourses for the Dikastery) who had heard all that passed; and who expressed his surprise that Sokrates could have remained so long listening to such non- sense, and manifesting so much deference for a couple of foolish men. Nevertheless (continued the by-stander) this couple are among the most powerful talkers of the day upon philosophy. This shows you how worthless a thing philosophy is: prodigious fuss, with contemptible result — men careless what they say, and carping at every word that they hear.1 Now, Sokrates, (concludes Kriton) this man is wrong for I’lut. EuUijd. pp. 304-305. Digitized by Google Chap. XIX. SEMI-PHILOSOPHERS INFERIOR MEN. 557 depreciating philosophy, and all others who depreciate it are wrong also. But he was right in blaming you, for disputing with such a couple before a large crowd. Sokr. — Wliat kind of person is this censor of philosophy ? Is he a powerful speaker himself in the Dikastery ? Or is he only a composer of discourses to be spoken by others ? Krit. — The latter. I do not think that he has ever spoken in court: but every one says that he knows judicial practice well, and that he composes admirable speeches." Sokr. — I understand the man. lie belongs to that class whom Prodikus describes as the border-men between Attend tone philosophy and politics. Persons of this class ac- oftuu>y-’g 1 i J , • . r t • i . . , . ddimw— IMs- count themselves the wisest ot mankind, and think rungement farther that besides being such in reality, they are ^1^10*°- also admired as such by many : insomuch that the pouuav\by bv, &C. Digitized by Google 560 EUTHYDEMUS. Chap. XIX. however, he comes a pain into consistency with the tone of the earlier part, in the observation which he assigns to Kriton, that most of the professors of philosophy are worthless; to which Sokrates rejoins that this is not less true of all other pro- fessions. The concluding inference is, that philosophy is to be judged, not by its professors, but by itself; and that Kriton must examine it for himself, and either pursue it or leave it alone, according as his own convictions dictated. This is a valuable admonition, and worthy of Sokrates, laying full stress as it does upon the conscientious conviction which the person examining may form for himself. But it is no answer to the question of Kriton ; who says that he had already heard from Sokrates, and was himself convinced, that philosophy was of first-rato importance — and that he only desired to learn where ho could find teachers to forward the progress of his son in it. As in so many other dialogues, Plato leaves the problem started, but unsolved. The impulse towards philosophy being assured, those who feel it ask Plato in what direction they are to move towards it He gives no answer. He can neither perform the service himself, nor recommend any one else, as competent. We shall find such silence made matter of pointed animadversion, in the frag- ment called Kleitophon. The person, whom Kriton here brings forward as the censor of Sokrates and the enemy of philosophy, is peculiarly marked. In general, the persons whom Plato ranks as enemies of Wbo Is the person here intended by Plato, half- philosopher, half-politi- cian ? la It J sokrates? philosophy are the rhetors and politicians : but the example here chosen is not comprised in either of these classes : it is a semi-philosopher, yet a writer of discourses for others. Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Spengel, suppose that Isokrates is the person in- tended: Winckelmann thinks it is Thrasymachus : others refer it to Lysias, or Theodoras of Byzantium : d Socher and Stall- d Stallbanm, Proleg. ad Euthyd. p. as ft matter beyond question the theory 47 ; Winokclmnnn, Prolog, p. XXXV. of Schlcicnnachcr, that the Phwdrua Heindorf, in endeavouring to explain was composed during Plato’s early the difference between Plato's language years. I have already intimated my in the Phredrus and in the Eutliy dissent from this theory, demus respecting Isokrates, assumes Digitized by Google Chap. XIX. PERSON MEANT IS ISOKRATES. 561 banrn doubt whether any special person is intended, or any thing beyond some supposed representative of a class described by attributes. I rather agree with those who refer the passage to Isokrates. . He might naturally be described as one steering a middle course between philosophy and rhetoric : which in fact he himself proclaims in the Oration De Permutatione, and which agrees with the language of Plato in the dialogue Phaedrus, where Isokrates is mentioned by name along with Lysias. In the Phaedrus, moreover, Plato speaks of Isokrates with unusual esteem, especially ns a favourable contrast with Lysias, and as a person who, though not yet a philosopher, may be expected to improve, so as in no long time to deserve that appellation.® We must remember that Plato in the Phaedrus attacks by name, and with considerable asperity, first Lysias, next Theodoras and Thrasymachus the rhetors — all three persons living and of note. Being sure to offend all these, Plato might well feel disposed to avoid making an enemy of Isokrates at the same time, and to except him honourably by name from the vulgar professors of rhetoric. In the Euthydcmus (where the satire is directed not against the rhetors, but against their competitors the dialecticians e Plato, Plisednis, p. 278 D. 1 p. 26). Ueberweg (Untersuch. iiber I have already observed that I do i die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schr. pp. 265- not agree with Schleiermncher and the 267) considers the EuthydGnms later other critics who rank the Phtedrus as (but not much later) than the Pluodras, tho earliest or even among the earliest ! subsequent to the establishment of the compositions of Plato. That it is of Platonic school at Athens (387-386 much later composition I am persuaded, , n.c\). This seems to me more probable but of what particular date can only than the contrary, be conjectured. Tho opinion of K. F. I Schleicrmncher, in arranging the Hermann, Btallbaum, and others, that Platonic dialogues, ranks the Euthy- it was composed about the time when demus as an immediate sequel to the Plato began his school at Athena Menon, and ns presupposing both (387-386 b.c.) is sufficiently probable. Gorgias and Themtetus (Einl. pp. 400- The Euthydcmus may be earlier or 401). Socher agrees in this opinion, may bo later than the Phtedrus. I but Steinhart rejects it (Em lei t. p. 26 , incline to think it later. The opinion placing the Euthydcmus immediately of Stallbaum ^resting upon the men- after the Protagoras, and immediately tion of Alkibiades, p. 275 A), that it before the Menon and the Gorgias ; wns composed in or before 404 b.c., according to him, Euthydcmus, Menon, appears to me untenable (Stallbaum, and Gorgias, form a well markod Proleg. p. 64). Pinto would not bo Trilogy. likely to introduce Sokmtes speaking Neither of these arrangements rests of Alkibiades as a deceased person, at upon any sufficient reasons. The whutever time tho dialogue was com- chronological order cannot be deter- posod. Nor can I agree with Steinhart, mined, who refers it to 402 b.c. (Einleitung, VOL. I. 2 o Digitized by Google EUTHYDEM US. Chap. XIX. 562 or pseudo-dialecticians) he had no similar motive to address compliments to Isokrates : respecting whom he speaks in a manner probably more conformable to his real sentiments, as the unnamed representative of a certain type of character — a semi-philosopher, fancying himself among the first men in Athens, and assuming unwarrantable superiority over the genuine philosopher ; but entitled to nothing more than a decent measure of esteem, such as belonged to sincere me- diocrity of intelligence. That there prevailed at different times different sentiments, variable more or less of reciprocal esteem or reciprocal jea- {wiuanw" lousy, between Plato and Isokrates, ought not to wIuT^kj be matter of surprise. Both of them were cele- laukrau-a. | mited teachers of Athens, each in his own manner, during the last forty years of Plato’s life : both of them enjoyed the favour of foreign princes, and received pupils from outlying, sometimes distant, cities — from Bosphorus and Cyprus in the East, and from Sicily in the West We know moreover that during the years immediately preceding Pluto’s death (317 B.c.), his pupil Aristotle, then rising into importance as a teacher of rhetoric, was engaged in acri- monious literary warfare, seemingly of his own seeking, with Isokrates (then advanced in years) and some of the Iso- kratean pupils. The little which we learn concerning the literary and philosophical world of Athens, represents it as much distracted by feuds and jealousies. Isokrates on his part has in his compositions various passages which appear to allude (no name being mentioned) to Plato among others, in a tone of depreciation/ Isokrates seems, as far as we eau make out, to have been in early life, like Lysias, a composer of speeches to be spoken by clients in the Dikastery. This lucrative profession was tempting, since his family had been nearly ruined during the misfortunes of Athens at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Having gained reputation by such means, Isokrates became ' lsokmti'*, iul Philipp. Or. v. s. 14, Helena'. Or. x. init. ; Panuthenaic. Or. p. 84 : contru Sophivtiui, Or. xiii. ; Or. xii. a. 120, p. 257 : Or. xv. 1)i^. In this character, he corresponded to the description i^fn by Plato in the Euthydemus : being partly a public adviser, partly a phi- losopher. But the general principle oindcr which Plato here attacks him, though conforming to the doctrine of the Platonic Republic, is contrary to that of Plato in other dia- logues. “ You must devote yoimplf either wholly to phi- losophy, or wholly to politilitics.h He dissented altogether from the doctrine here laid down by Plato in the Euthydemus, and many other eminent men would have dissented from it also. As a doctrine of universal application, in fact, it cannot be defended. The opposite scheme of life (which is maintained by Isokrates in De Pennutatione and by Kallikles in the Platonic Gorgias) 1 — that philosophy is to be attentively studied in the earlier years of life as an intellectual training, to arm the mind with knowledge and capacities which may afterwards be applied to the active duties of life — is at least equally defensible, and suits better for other minds of a very high order. Not only Xenophon and other distinguished Greeks, but also most of the best Roman citizens, held the opinion which Plato in the Gorgias ascribes to Kallikles and reprobates through the organ of Sokrates — That philo- sophical study, if prolonged beyond what was necessary for t See the facta about Isokratca in a good Dissertation by II. P. Schroder, Utrecht, 185!), Quicationcs lacerate®, p. 51, seii. Plato, Phajilrua, p. 27H; Plutarch, Periklca, c. 28; Plato, Itepublic, iii. | p. 397. h Cicero, De Orator, iii. 34, 138 ; Orator, iv. 14 ; Brutus, 11, 44. 1 Isokrates, Do Pcriimtutione. Or. xv. sect. 278-288, pp. 485-48G, Bckk. ; Plato, Gorgiaa, pp. 481-485. Digitized by Google EUTHYDEMU8. Chap. XIX. 504 this purpose of adequate intellectual training, and if made the permanent occupation of life, was more hurtful than beneficial.11 Certainly, a man may often fail in the attempt to combine philosophy with active, politics. No one failed in such a career more lamentably than Dion, the friend of Plato — and Plato himself, when he visited Sicily to second Dion. More- over Alkibiades and Kritias were cited by Anytus and the other accusers of Sokratcs as examples of the like mischievous conjunction. But on the^ther hand, Archytas at Tarentum (another friend of Plato ami philosopher) administered his native city with success, as long (seemingly) as Perikles administered Athens. Such men as these two are nowise inferior either to the special jdiilosoplier or to the special politician. Plato has laid down1 an untenable generality, in this passage of the Euthydemus, in order to suit a partieular point which he wished to make against Isokrates, or against the semi-philosopher indicated, whoever else he may have been. k The half-philosophers and half- diffioillimum, cx eapiontii modum ” politicians to whom Sokrates bore (Vit. Agr. c. 4). alludes, are characterised by one of the Tacitus expresses himself in the Platonic critics as “jene oberflach- same manner about the purpose with lichen und eehwiichliehen Nnturen die which Hclvidius Priscus applied him- sich zwiachen beiden Richtungen stel- self to philosophy Hist. iv. 6), “non. Ion, und zur Erreichung selbstauchtigor ut plerique, ut nomine mngnifico segne und beachriinkter Zwecke von beiden , otium velaret, sed quo constantior ad- aufnehmen wn» sic verstehen und was versus fortuity rempublicam enpos- ihnen gefullt ” Sleinhart , Einleit. p. 25). seret.” On the other hand wo find in Tacitus Compare also the memorable passage a striking passage respecting the studies in the Funeral Oration pronounced by of Agricola in his youth at Massilia. Perikles (Thnc. ii. 40 — ovn€v “ MemoriA. teneo, solitum ipsum nar- &v*v fia\cudau, &c., which exhibits tho rare, se in prima juventfi stud i urn like views. philosophise acrius, ultra quam con- Aulus Gellius x. 22 ), who cites the cessum ltomano no semitori, Imusisso— I doctrine which Plato ascribes to Kal- ni prudentia matris incensum ac liklOs in the Gorgias (about the pro- tiagTantem animum exercuisset : Sci- priety of confining philosophy to the licet sublime et erectum ingenium, | function of tmining and preparation for pulchritudinem ac specicm excels® active pursuits), tries to make out that magmeque gloria? vehementius quara this was Plato’s own opinion, cautf* nppetebat : retinuitque, quod est END OF VOLUME I. LONDON : PRINTED RT WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STRUTT, AND t’llARINO rROSS. V 00^0 j-bGL) Digitized by Google Digitized by Google Digitized by Google Digitized by Google