STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Book Reviews 179 The book is written in such an agreeable style that we only dimly realize the long research and painstaking study which enabled the author to draw such illuminating comparisons and present what might have been a dry subject in such a lucid and attractive form. E. Douglas Van Buren Rome The Platonism of Philo Judaeus. By Thomas H. Billings. Uni- versity of Chicago Dissertation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919. Pp. viii+105. In his first chapter Dr. Billings gives a clear and concise survey of the history of Philonic interpretation. It is interesting to note that he is not convinced by the arguments of the scholars who try to show that Philo is largely dependent upon Posidonius. At the end of this chapter Billings states his own point of view: Philo's thought is essentially Platonic, though he frequently adopts the terminology of other schools, and at times assumes a syncretistic attitude, as, for example, in identifying the Platonic Ideas, the Stoic logoi, the angels of the Old Testament, and the Greek demons. In the second chapter, on Philo's conception of the ultimate reality, Billings points out Philo's agreement with Plato and opposition to the Stoics in teaching a dualistic theory of the universe. Philo has been accused of two inconsistencies in his doctrine of God. "On the one hand it is said that while he regards the ultimate reality as an impersonal principle, the supreme genus comprehending in itself all the multiplicity of the species, he puts alongside of this the Jewish conception of a living, personal God. Others point out that while he insists that God absolutely transcends the universe he is equally insistent on the Stoic doctrine that the universe is created, filled, and governed by him." But these inconsistencies are already present, fully developed, in Plato. Zeller is wrong in asserting that Philo's use of owrla. for matter means that he adopts a Stoic point of view opposed to that of Plato. Billings rejects, after Shorey, the identification of Plato's God with the Idea of Good, but he adds: "Whether we make this identification or not, God is still for Plato beyond the world of ideas." Billings makes no attempt to prove this assertion, and I think it is quite impossible to prove it. Further, the identification of God and to ov is a mere reconstruction. Neither Sophist 249 A, which can hardly be called "an eloquent digression," nor Timaeus 38 AB really identifies the two, though, of course, to ov includes God. But it is highly probable, as Billings says, that Philo regarded to ov, especially in the Parmenides, as a philosophical term for God. 180 Book Reviews On page 16 Billings says: "It is sufficient here to point out that the vision of true being is, for Plato, attained, not through intellectual activity, but in moments of divine madness, and under the influence of Eros," and he cites Phaedrus 249 C-E, and Symposium 211 E. But a careful reading of these passages will convince anyone that the vision of ideal beauty, even, can come only after intellectual activity. We may observe how in the Symposium Plato uses the language of the intellect; cf. 210 D: Kcrn'S^ two. iiriv pjxOrfpA- Tiav «ir' £#C£ti/o to fj,d0rifia TcXevrrjurj, o epovi/u>s which enables him to conduct his life with reference to this end. Billings' phrase on page 33 "to ti rjv elvat and «8os, expressions which are Aristotelian equivalents for the ideas of Plato," is highly inaccurate. Billings offers no evidence to prove that the Stoic Logos is derived from the Idea of Good, save the fact that they occupy a similar position in their respective systems. "This reason (the Adyos) differs from the Platonic Idea of Good in that it is identified with God, and in that it is material." And Billings adds in a note "As in Plato we trace things back to one supreme idea, so in the Stoics we trace the Adyoi