STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Book Reviews 105 The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus. By William A. Oldfather and Howard Vernon Canter. University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. IV, No. 2, June, 1915. Pp. 118. $0.75. The writers of this monograph attempt two things: to show that the traditional view of the Germanic policy of Augustus is untenable, and to advocate a more natural and satisfactory theory. The attack on the old position leads them into a critical examination of the sources, and of the views of modern scholars. The verdict on the sources is that they are meager, unsatisfactory, and full of rhetorical influence. In the account of the battle of Teutoberg Forest the two best sources, Dio and Tacitus, are contradictory and incomplete. On the whole the criticism of the sources is well taken, but one could wish for a more searching examination of indi- vidual points, for at times statements that seem probable are rejected because they are found in authors whose reputation is somewhat tarnished. There are some generalizations that must be accepted with reservation, like the following: "Floras was concocting a melodrama; Dio arranging an expla- nation which would save the credit of Rome and the Roman soldier by putting all the blame on the dead who tell no tales; Velleius distorting everything in maiorem gloriam of Tiberius, for whom Varus must serve as a foil at every turn" (an account of the administration of Varus, p. 101). The modern view has assumed that Augustus attempted the conquest of Germany, but abandoned the undertaking after the defeat of Varus. Various theories have been advanced to prove both of these assumptions. These are taken up in detail and subjected to criticism. It is shown that the population and resources of Germany were far less than most scholars have believed; so that if Germany remained free it was due to the fault of the Romans rather than to the might of the Germans and their leader Arminius. As proof of the weakness of Germany the completeness of Charlemagne's conquest is cited, but no account is taken of the fact that he was thirty-four years at the task. Our authors claim that there has been no satisfactory theory advanced to explain why Augustus desired the con- quest of Germany. That of von Ranke, who believed that Augustus was trying to build a world-empire, is contrary to the express statement of Augustus and the spirit of his whole life. Kornemann's view that the influence of the adopted sons of Augustus forced him to abandon his peace policy in 2 B.C. rests on a hypercritical analysis of the res gestae, and has no real facts to support it. The theory of Gardthausen and others that the safety of Gaul demanded the conquest of Germany is found to be untenable, because such a policy — i.e., protecting a frontier by new conquests — leads to indefinite expansion until a natural barrier is reached, and no such barrier is found in the plains of Northern Europe. Nor is Meyer's view that 106 Book Reviews Augustus was trying to find a shorter frontier found more satisfactory, because the few miles saved by the Elbe-Danube frontier do not compensate for the expense of a larger army. Certainly new forces would be needed, for if the legions were removed from the Rhine to the Elbe, additional forces must be raised to act as a police force in Gaul. That Germany was ever reduced to the form of a province is also open to suspicion. Strabo and Pliny do not mention such a fact, and there are few traces of any permanent occupation such as roads and towns. In face of such negative evidence the words of Florus and Velleius can hardly be believed. It is, however, not a serious argument against occupation to say that Roman legions did not winter in Germany, because they seldom did in campaigns in other countries. The importance of the battle of Teutoberg Forest, our authors think, has been magnified unduly. They find no reason for the usual assumption that this battle marks the turning-point of Rome's policy in the north. If there was ever a change of policy, it came in the reign of Tiberius, and for different reasons. If, however, it is assumed that Augustus was not trying to conquer the Germans, but to force them to keep the peace by a series of raids, then most of the difficulties of the old view disappear. He was trying to create a series of friendly tribes along the frontier to act as a buffer state. This is the testimony of the sources, unless one reads them with a preconceived idea of conquest. It is also in harmony with the policy used by Augustus in other places. He made raids into Arabia, Ethiopia, and Dacia; and the buffer state was used in Armenia and Numidia. Such a theory, too, would account for the absence of all material evidences of occupation, and for the silence of Strabo and Pliny. The theory has much to commend it, but there are still difficulties. The raids into Dacia and Arabia are not a parallel, because they were not repeated for a number of years, as was the case in Germany; later, when Dacia menaced Roman territory, as had Germany, Trajan's policy was one of conquest. The principle of the buffer state could hardly apply, for it would have to be a buffer against itself, since the region of danger was the district of the Elbe-Rhine. It seems doubtful, too, whether in the unsettled and half-civilized condition of the Germans such a state could have been maintained. Again, it seems more natural to include the German cam- paigns with the great advance made in the eastern Alps and along the Danube, where there was admitted conquest. At least the rebellions of 6 a.d. in the Danube region and that of 9 a.d. in Germany are due to an attempt to collect a tax, which seems to point to permanent occupation in both districts. It is true that the testimony of Florus and Velleius is not conclusive, but in view of the fact that Pannonia has much the same history as Germany, it seems that this essay is hardly justified in rejecting their testimony outright. Book Reviews 107 The essay is interesting, and the claims of the new theory are well pre- sented. Whether the theory has been proved or not, a determined assault has been made on the old position and some of its defenses damaged; in any new discussion of the question this work should be considered. J. F. Ferguson Bbtn Mawe Poseidonios und die jiidisch-christliche Genesisexegese. Von Dr. Karl Gronau. Leipzig, Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1914. Pp. viii+ 313. M. 12. In this treatise Dr. Gronau investigates the source of the Hexaemeros and irp6cre)(e (reavria of Basil, the Hexaemeros, irepl KaTotorao-eios awOpiairov and De anima et resurrectione of Gregory of Nyssa. He finds this source in Posidonius' commentary on the Timaeus, amplified, perhaps, by the addi- tion of material from other works of the same author, and handed down in the philosophical schools with little alteration. Gronau takes as the basis of his argument the results of the voluminous literature on Posidonius written in the last forty years. His general method of procedure is this: To prove a Posidonian origin for a passage he cites parallels from authors supposed to depend upon Posidonius. Then by pointing out reminiscences of the Timaeus or by showing, often with the aid of Chalcidius, that the subject falls within the range of a commentary on the Timaeus, he attempts to prove that the source is Posidonius' commentary. While Gronau is able to show the presence in Basil and Gregory of scien- tific ideas which are attested as Posidonius' or which may be plausibly attributed to him, and of commonplaces to which he may well have given expression, but of which he was clearly not the originator, he fails utterly, in my opinion, to prove the use of a single Posidonian source. We know very little about Posidonius' commentary on the Timaeus; there are but few references to it in antiquity. The earliest important attempt to determine its contents and influence was in Schmekel's Die mittlere Stoa; and later writers have used his conclusions as the basis of new investigations without stopping to verify them. Further, the presence of St oic elements in an author of later antiquity does not justify us in assuming that whatever he has of a philosophic nature must come from a Stoic source. We find, indeed, in Basil and Gregory a considerable amount of material which demonstrably cannot go back to the Stoa. Gronau begins with the investigation of Homily 6 of Basil's Hexaemeros. This without question contains scientific material taken ultimately from Posidonius. I see no proof, however, of the presence of anything Posidonian in Homily 1. Gronau tries to explain by reference to Posidonius a some- what striking parallel between Basil 49C ff. and Johannes Lydus De mensibus