STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Book Reviews 235 first volume, the quality of Mr. Harmon's version will more than justify its existence. It is quite as readable and racy as that of the Fowlers, and, as befits a Loeb translation, follows the text more closely than their purpose required them to do. Mr. Harmon is generally very happy in rendering idiom by idiom, and technicality by technicality; his descriptions vie with the original in aptness and variety of phrase, and in the turning of scabrous passages he exhibits a periphrastic ingenuity worthy of a purer cause. The explanatory and critical notes, though brief, are helpful, to the point, and up to date, and will make this edition of value even to scholars. Mr. Harmon evidently knows his Lucian. Errors and oversights are very few. I give what I believe to be a nearly complete list of his mistaken or disputable renderings: Lapiths 26: wpbs x°-P lv a " T< ? cweerTiv is no * "likes to be with him" but is an indulgent (over-complaisant) tutor; cf. Demosthenes' irpos x'W &r)p.rryop£iv. Ibid. 28: ov8' av ip.irapao-)(66vunrq re Xap.irpd is not quite "a splendid flow of language." Heracles 4: o$ olpai rot iirixa>pux is to explain to cpavepd, and his chief objection to Platonism is that its assumption of immaterial ovauu contributes nothing to such an explanation (992 a 24 ff.). More weighty is the casual suggestion that the topics of ZH© are rather the preparation for, than the main body of, a metaphysical system. But the answer to this is that all metaphysics and especially the metaphysics of Aristotle consist mainly of introductions and preparations and false starts and recapitulations. A final proof of the impossibility of admitting ZH© in the same series with A and MN is said to be that Z regards the ideas as not yet refuted whereas they have been explicitly refuted in A 8-9. But every reader is aware that Aristotle always regards the ideas as sufficiently refuted for a sneer (Tcpm'cr/uiTa) and sufficiently an open question for a renewal of the assault upon them. Z regards the ideas as unrefuted only in the sense that it keeps returning to the attack, and this is almost equally true of MN. I am not arguing for the retention of MN in their present place, but only against the throwing-out of ZH® on insufficient grounds. I do not think that we have evidence enough to determine the history of MN; but what we have points to them as an appendix especially reserved for the more detailed discussion of ideas and numbers. The numerous repetitions and awkward transitions in the Metaphysics supply Dr. Jaeger with material for a great many more ingenious minor com- binations which it would require a volume as large as his own to test. There is a certain plausibility in the general assumption that variant doublets represent substituted or alternative lectures in repeated courses. But he often finds such doublets where we probably have nothing more than the natural self -repetition of a hurried metaphysician possessed of some fixed ideas, but uncertain of his goal. Twice in A 7 Aristotle triumphantly proclaims that the pre-Socratics had suggested no idea of cause not included in his own classification. There is nothing surprising, then, in the recurrence of this complacent remark in A 10. By arroptai. Aristotle sometimes means objections to the systems he is criticizing and sometimes the problems which they suggest for-his own thought. His use of the word supplies no basis for theories of the construction of the Metaphysics. He is at any time capable of using the same word in different senses in the same paragraph. There are few writers whose style will less bear pressing by the rigor of philological logic. But though I am unable to share Dr. Jaeger's confidence in the power of pure philological analysis to reconstruct with certainty the composition of Book Reviews 239 the Metaphysics, no student of Aristotle can fail to derive a great deal of instruction and stimulus from his close grappling with the many problems presented by the text as it stands. Especially interesting is the second part, entitled "Die literarische Stellung und Form der Metaphysik," which is elaborated, evidently under the influence of von Wilamowitz, into some- thing like a systematic history of the delivery and publication of professional lectures in antiquity. Paul Shorby Sophistik und Rhetorik. Das Bildungsideal des e3 Xe'yeiv in seinem Verhaltnis zur Philosophie des V. Jahrhunderts. Von H. Gompebz. Leipzig: Teubner, 1912. Pp. vi+292. M. 10. The writer, who must be distinguished from his father, the author of Greek Thinkers, has chosen for his special domain the border-land of philoso- phy, rhetoric, and sophistic in the fifth and fourth centuries. The main thesis of the present volume is that sophistic was in its essence rhetoric — the theory and practice of the art ev Xeytiv — and that all philosophic, scientific, or other special interests which modern historians of philosophy attribute by tradition to the fifth-century Sophists are to be taken in strict subordination to this dominant end. In confirmation of this presumption, he undertakes a broad and somewhat prolix survey of the extant tradition as conveniently collected in Diels. Gorgias' treatise on Nature or the Non- existent is not a serious exposition of critical skepticism, but the maintenance of a paradoxical thesis in the style and the logical divisions of his Praise of Helen and his Defence of Palamedes, the genuineness of which Gomperz defends at length. Thrasymachus did not teach the ethical nihilism attrib- uted to him by Plato. The famous fragment to the effect that the gods do not concern themselves with human affairs since men obviously make no use of justice must have been a mere jest of one of the virepfiakkovres or exaggerating discourses. The Thrasymachus of the first book of the Republic is merely a dramatic representative of an unknown contemporary attacked by Plato — the author of the Clitophon which Gomperz thinks was written about 390. This unknown writer, after there exposing the negative and unsatisfactory character of all Socratic definitions of justice, probably went on in a lost supplement to the Clitophon to develop as his own definition the formula which Plato attributes to Thrasymachus — that justice is the advantage of the stronger. Antiphon the Sophist is to be distinguished from the orator. Though a student of Empedocles, he is not properly speaking a philosopher; he is the rhetorician of the elevated commonplace, as Gorgias is the rhetorician of the paradox. The predominance of the merely formal over the substantive interest in Hippias, the Anonymus of Iamblichus, and the Dialexeis is easily demonstrated. Prodicus' advanced course in synonyms was not a scientific