STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 108 Book Keviews unconscious of the generalizing power of art, the great artistic secret which it is the imperishable honor of Aristotle to have first detached; as it is equally the honor of Professor Butcher to have so nobly developed this first excellence of Greek art. More than this, he has not fathomed the significance of Aristotle's jut/upm, where Aristotle again parts com- pany with Plato. Half of the power of art lies in the fact that the emo- tions are not expressed but "imitated," objectivized. The tyranny of the actual is broken, the self-regarding taint is purged away, and the "pain" of pity and fear is transmuted. There are no greater landmarks in aesthetics than these two; and they probably exhaust Aristotle's first conception of xaflapo-is. It is a great pity that Butcher hampered himself with Bernays' " emotional relief " (as he sums it up). Emotional satisfaction or pleasure, when the emotions are forms of pain, is the subtle difficulty into which Bernays was searching equally with Aristotle, and which I hold Butcher would indisputably have solved had he fully sounded the content of &' d/uapiw. If Knoke objects that thus we make Kadapa-K a generic property of art, while Aristotle is confining it to tragedy, I would point out that the same difficulty attaches to (nrov&uas. It is poetry (therefore even comedy as well as tragedy) that is 6/3ov is not nature's crude material. He will find, too, that the balance of pity and fear belongs intimately to his theory of the Awts, and is involved in &' a^taprlav. Professor Knoke was happily ignorant of Butcher's work, which gives his essay peculiar value. His examination of previous German opinion cannot be excelled for completeness and brevity. University College, Toronto Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle. By John I. Beaee. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906. Pp. viii + 354. 12s. M. Every student of Greek philosophy will welcome most heartily this work of diligent scholarship and intelligent criticism. The 'higher' reaches of philosophy, or metaphysic, are purposely disregarded by the author in order to limit the inquiry to the problems of empirical psychology. Such limitation was no doubt wise, as the investigation of particular questions clearly formulated is the best means of clearing up difficulties. Few will be found, therefore, to criticize the procedure of Professor Beare, though many will share the hope that he will go on in due time to take up other phases of early Greek thought. In his Introduction the author says (p. 1): The aim of the following pages is to give a close historial account of the various theories, partly physiological and partly psychological, by which the Book Reviews 109 Greek philosophers from Alcmaeon to Aristotle endeavored to explain the elementary phenomena of cognition. The pre-Aristotelian writers who applied themselves to this subject, and of whose writings we possess any considerable information, are Alcmaeon of Crotona, Empedocles, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Plato. We propose to set forth here their specu- lations, together with those of Aristotle, as to the so-called Five Senses, Sen- sation in general, and the psychical processes, such as Imagination and Memory, which involve the synthetic function referred by Aristotle to Sense, and named by his Latin commentators the Sensus Communis. These words adequately express the scope and method of the inquiry. Of the works elucidated in detail, Aristotle's De anima has received much attention and the excellence of the translations and commentaries leaves comparatively little to be desired; but the same cannot be said of the Parva naturalia of Aristotle and the fragment of Theophrastus' De sensu. To those who have been baffled by the inadequacy of the means for intelligent study of these works Beare's book will prove a boon indeed. In the detailed exposition of these works I have found nothing which was clearly wrong, though there are many points at which one might incline to a different view from that adopted by the author. There are other passages, however, in which Beare seems to have been misled by somewhat uncritically following authority. This is particularly true where he indicates the supposed relation of a given philosopher's psychol- ogy to his metaphysics — just where one should expect a slip in view of his express disregard of the latter field. To cite but a single instance: Speaking (p. 37) of Anaxagoras' explanation of perception as affected by the operation of contrary upon contrary, Beare says: "This accords .... with his metaphysical doctrine of voSs aiuyrjs." It would be interesting to learn the grounds for this assertion, which is made, I believe, on the authority of Zeller. Again (ibid.), "The contrariety required by the doc- trine of Anaxagoras as one of the conditions of perception exists for all possible cases; since, according to the Anaxagorean doctrine irav lv ttovtC, we have within us the contraries of all possible external objects." It would be strange if Anaxagoras employed the principle irav iv iravri to provide for the interaction of contraries in the field of perception, whereas elsewhere (e. g., in nutrition) he utilized it to furnish a basis for the action of like on like. Beare has not really faced the problem of interaction in perception, according to the testimony of Aristotle and Theophrastus. He seems to have overlooked the fact that Diogenes of Apollonia, who emphatically asserted the operation of like upon like, held much the same psychological opinions as Anaxagoras. I have stated my conclusions on this matter elsewhere ("Qualitative Change in Pre-Socratic Philosophy," Arch, filr Gesch. der Philos. XIX, pp. 369 ff.). It would be ungracious, however, to close a notice of so excellent a book with criticism. The work is certain to receive the favorable atten- tion which it so richly deserves. W. A. Heidel