STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. IIAPArPA#H AND ARBITRATION 1 By George Miller Calhoun There is nothing in the orators to indicate that in the time of Demosthenes Siafxaprvpla was ever employed in actions that were subject to public arbitration. 2 But irapaypa^ri Was employed in many actions which fall within this class, and there are allusions to Trapaypaai in arbitration cases. The problems that suggest them- selves in this connection center around two points, the time at which the irapaypari must be filed and its effect upon the handling of the case. Did the defendant lose the right to present a special plea when a case was referred to the arbitrator, or could he still file it with that official during the progress of the arbitration ? In the event of an appeal from the arbitrator's decision, could a irapaypa^j] be filed while the case was for the second time in the hands of the magistrate who had originally received the pleadings? Furthermore, was the arbitrator empowered to decide upon the merits of the special plea and give an award, just as he would have done in the original action, or did the presentation of a irapaypari, no matter at what stage in the proceedings, effect the withdrawal of the case from his jurisdic- tion? A solution of these problems is important for our under- standing of arbitration as well as of special pleas, but they have received scant attention. Lipsius apparently has given no special thought to these ques- tions, but he observes that irapaypa4>ri "war vor der Antomosie ein- zubringen," and evidently believes that the filing of a special plea terminated the possibility of arbitration, for he says, "1st eine Einrede gegen die Klage nicht erfolgt oder zuriickgewiesen, so hat .... der Gerichtsvorstand sie an einen offentlichen Schiedsrichter 1 A continuation of the study of special pleas in Attic law that was begun in Class. Phil. XIII, 169-85. 2 The only instances of Suinaprvpia from this period are in Siaducouriai KKr/pov (.Class. Phil., XIII, 174), which were not subject to arbitration, as Bonner has shown ("The Jurisdiction of Athenian Arbitrators," Class. Phil., II, 409 ff.; cf. Lipsius, Recht, pp. 981 f.). [Classical Philology XIV, January, 1919 J 20 UapaypaQr] and Abbitration 21 zu verweisen." 1 His further account of the various steps in the preparation of a case for trial suggests that he regards arbitration and Trapaypaii as mutually exclusive. The earlier discussion by Schoemann, while it does not contain any explicit statement on this point, seems none the less to imply the view that Lipsius later expresses. 2 Other studies, when they do not proceed upon this same assumption, ignore the problem altogether. Probably it was customary for a defendant to present his irapa- ypari when called on to plead, 3 and it would be a delightf ully simple solution of our difficulty if we could assume, with Lipsius, that the filing of a special plea must precede the avrafioffia and that it pre- cluded the possibility of arbitration. But a case which seems hitherto not to have been studied in this connection stands in the way. In Apollodorus v. Phormion the cause comes into court on a irapay pari, and yet we find unmistakable evidence that it has been heard before a public arbitrator. 4 This undoubted instance of arbitration and special plea in one and the same case renders the view of Lipsius quite untenable, for one or the other of his assump- tions must be abandoned. Either a Trapaypa^rj could be filed after reference to an arbitrator, or special pleas entered in arbitration cases took the usual course and were decided by the arbitrator. In this instance, however, we do not know whether the special plea was filed before the reference with the instructing magistrate, or later with the arbitrator, or even after an appeal had been taken. Consequently it does not prove that an arbitrator could give an award in a irapaypaifri). At this point it may be well to consider a number of passages in which irapaypar] is mentioned in connection with arbitration. In 1 Recht, p. 835; cf. p. 845. 2 MSL, pp. 825 ff., especially p. 833. 3 Class. Phil., XIII, 170. The introduction in one instance (Isaeus 5. 16) of a SiafiapTvpia just prior to the kurw^oala does not warrant the sweeping conclusion (Recht, p. 835, n. 20) that both Siap.aprvpia and Tapaypaii must invariably be filed at this stage. * All circumstances of this case harmonize with the accepted view that the arbi- tration was public. There was a single arbitrator (Dem. 36. 18, 33; 45. 23, 58, 10), the sessions were held b> rg iroucikji aroq, (ibid. 45. 17), witnesses were sworn (ibid. 58), and at the conclusion of the arbitration the documents were sealed in the boxes and kept by the magistrate until the trial (ibid. 57-58; cf. infra, p. 28). 22 George Miller Calhoun the speech Against Midias Demosthenes says that in his action against Midias for abusive language the public arbitrator Straton, kirei.br) iroO' fjicev r) Kvpia, ■Ka.vra. 8' 1\hr] 5iei;e\rj\v8ei ravra t&k t&v vbfiwv, vira)- juooicu Kai irapaypaai, /cat ovSev eW' r\v \mohovwov, .... KarehiifT-qcrev. 1 And in the speech Against Euergus and Mnesibulus the speaker tells us that when he and Theophemus had each brought an action for assault against the other, and the two suits were in the hands of arbi- trators, eireiSr) r) airocjxuns r)v rfjs hiah-qs, 6 fiev Qe64>rjfws irapeypafaro Kai wrufivvro, eyd) 5e iriarevoiv ifiavrca firjSev aSiKelv elafjei.v els vfias. 2 Again he tells us that Theophemus got his action before a dicastic court first ov wapaypaoiJ.evov ifiov ovS' virofivvfilvov? Here appar- ently we have evidence that a irapaypari could be filed with an arbitrator. Schoemann, however, developed the view that in these passages irapaypa^r) has no connection whatever with the special plea but is a written application for adjournment, affirmed by an oath (i>7rw- fxoala). He further conjectured that this mode of petition for adjournment was admissible in other forms of procedure as well as in arbitration. 4 Substantially the same solution is offered by Lipsius in Das attische Recht, though he distinguishes vwufioixia as an affidavit for adjournment, distinct from the rapaypaf), and does not suggest that a rapaypar) of this sort was employed in any proceeding other than arbitration and avaKpiais.*' In addition to the passages quoted above, Lipsius cites notes of Pollux and the Lex. Cantabr. on the fir) ovva Slur). Pollux says r) Se fir) ovaa SUcq ovrais upofia^ero' birbrav tis irapa SiairrfTals Tapaypa\pafievos Kai xnrofioaaiievos votxov r) airoSrj- filav els rr)v Kvpiav fir) airaPTr) 6\fl, H-rjv, kt\. 6 In the Lex. Cantabr. the following statement is credited to Demetrius of Phalerum: eviovs \eyet. t&v Kpivofievusv mKorexvelv rots di&Kovcnv avrCKayxavovras rr)v fir) ovaav eviovs 8e hadeves to SUaiov 1 Dem. 21. 84. The context shows clearly that the irapaypatfrai, as in the following case, formed part of the arbitration proceedings. 2 [Dem.] 47. 45. 3 Ibid. 39. 4 Pages 697 f., especially n. 11 (ed. 1824). Schoemann's conclusions were adopted without modification by Lipsius in his revision (MSL, p. 910, especially n. 412). Hubert (De arbitris atticis et privalis et publicis [Leipzig, 1885], p. 39, n. 2) is inclined to question the correctness of Schoemann's view but makes no attempt to test it critically (cf. infra, p. 25, n. 1). 6 Pages 229, 836. 6 8. 60. Uapaypaii and Arbitration 23 ifxcwTas Kai StSoiK&ras rfy KaraSiairav xpbvovs lp.^HK\eiv nal ovci^eis otas hoKeiv elvai eifkbyovs, Kai t6 p,h> irpurov irapaypae, kt\. % Schoemann presented no evidence in support of his interpreta- tion other than the quotation of the passages now under discussion. Nor does Lipsius make any attempt to explain his grounds for saying of these irapaypaai, "Mit der Einrede gegen die Zulassigkeit der Klage hat sie natiirlich nichts zu tun," 2 or for assuming that the word here means "petition for adjournment." Certainly the bare citation of these passages does not constitute any argument for deny- ing to the word its usual and f amiliar meaning. In the three passages quoted from Demosthenes Tapaypaj) is merely paired with inru- pxxxia as one means of delaying the progress of arbitration. There is nothing to prevent our taking it in the usual sense, for it has not been proved that a special plea could not be filed with an arbitrator, nor does the fact that the presentation of a irapaypaii involved delay and might have a purely dilatory intent justify us in explaining it as a petition for adjournment any more in the case of an arbitrator than of any other magistrate. 8 In the statement credited to Deme- trius we find merely the enumeration of three dilatory measures, rd pkv irpurov Trapaypafaadat., elra virbuwoOai .... Kai Tekevravras, kt\. And in the Pollux note we have nothing more than the familiar pairing of irapaypa4>ii and vTrosp-oaia, with the expansion of the latter term by the addition of vlxrov fj airob-qniav, and an apparently erro- neous connection of the two with the SUr} amj ofoa.* In none of 1 S.v. nil ovaa S£/ct). Lipsius calls attention to the fact that the sentence which is here omitted is not to be understood as part of the quotation from Demetrius (Recht, p. 229, n. 39). It may be added that the first sentence is obviously an introductory summary, and that the quotation proper begins with ivlovs Si. The text as quoted here contains some necessary corrections by Dobree. 2 Recht, p. 836, n. 22; MSL, p. 910. 3 Cf . Dem. 36. 2 : rr)V fttn dbv Tapaypa4>^v brou}' hnKpovovrts XpOVOVS Cfilt'OLWflCV, ktX. 4 The wording of the note might seem at first sight to support the view that vapaypml'&iJKvos refers to a petition for adjournment, for it is clear that the filing of a special plea in bar could not have been prerequisite to a p,i) oiaa S'uci). But it is no more reasonable to hold that a petition for adjournment was prerequisite. The manifest impossibility of such a limitation has led Heffter (pp. 359 f.), Platner (I, 396 f.), Caillemer (Daremberg et Saglio, II, 128), Hubert (op. cit., pp. 48 f.), and 24 George Miller Calhoun these is there the slightest indication that the writers had in mind anything else than the ordinary irapaypa^ij. 1 No better argument for this interpretation can be based on the scholia to the Midias passage, where we find in the first note irapaypacfn) glossed by aXX?; avaPokrjs irp6(f>aovTo "ov irpos Sicutj/tV p,e Kpiveadcu 5e?, aXXd irpos apxovra q decixodinqv, oil ri. 2 Lipsius (MSL, pp. 973 f. ; Becht, pp. 960 f.) to maintain against Hudtwalcker (Ueber die dffentlichen und Privat-Schiedsrichter in Athen [Jena, 1812], pp. 112 f.) the necessity for assuming that it was permitted to bring a /j.ii ovaa SUrj in cases of unavoidable absence where it had been impossible to file a petition for adjournment in advance. But in making this assumption we are flatly rejecting the statement of Pollux. Hubert (loc. tit.), it is true, attempts to explain the Pollux note by interpreting forojuoo-A/uecos of the oath mentioned by Demosthenes (21. 86) as one of the steps in the institution of a pet/ ovaa Ski;. But aside from the fact that this affords no expla- nation of irapaypaif/anei'os and involves a rather fanciful distinction between ri/v oiairav avriXayxavftv and riiv jui) ovaav avrCKayxavav, it may be noted that \mo- noaanevos, if it belongs here at all, refers to a time prior to the default judgment and cannot be understood of the oath mentioned by Demosthenes. The true solution of the difficulty is not far to seek, and it is remarkable that it has escaped notice. Although the Pollux note and that of the Lex. Cantdbr. are regarded by Lipsius (MSL, p. 910, n. 412; Recht, p. 229, n. 39) as essentially the same, they are in fact concerned with two entirely different matters. In the former we have a description of the Itil c&oa SUai; in the latter there is quoted from Demetrius an account, not of the /«) otaa i'uai at all, but of the way in which litigants availed themselves of this proceed- ing to obstruct the progress of litigation. It is one of three maneuvers that serve this purpose: first they try special pleas, then affidavits for adjournment, and finally they absent themselves from the closing session with a view to reopening the whole proceeding by a /«) ovaa SIktj. It is clear that the presence of the words irapaypa\f'a- naios Kal inronooanevos vbtrov fl avoSrinLav in an otherwise simple and direct account of the y.ii otaa i'uai is the result of a careless misreading of the statement of Demetrius. A glance at Dem. 21. 84 ff. and 39. 37 will make perfectly clear what Demetrius had in mind. 1 The expression oi pbvov orl rod kolvov ko2 yvwpinov rlSerai. in Harpocration and Suidas (s.». irapaypaii) suggests that the lexicographers recognized no other technical meaning for Tapaypo&h than that with which we are familiar. 2 As Lipsius observes (Recht, p. 849, n. 11 fin.), there is no evidence that a vapaypajyh could be brought on the ground that an action was instituted before the proper time. In the opinion of the writer the phrase irapaypa«r$ai. xpovov properly referred to pleas based on the irpode&nias vd/xos. The scholiast's explanation is obvi- ously an awkward attempt to explain the passage in hand. Hapaypari and Arbitration 25 Until the Schoemann-Lipsius interpretation is supported by some valid argument, and proof is adduced that Tapaypari can have the meaning they would attach to it, we must hold that in these passages the word is employed in its ordinary and usual sense, and that a irapaypari could be filed with an arbitrator as well as with the instructing magistrate. 1 The Midias passage yields further information. For if Midias had filed special pleas — or, if the plural be rhetorical, a plea — how does it happen that the award was entered, not in the irapaypatfrrj, but in the original suit? 2 The most reasonable inference is that the special plea, or pleas, of the defendant had been summarily denied, presumably by the arbitrator. It is of course possible that the arbitrator could not himself, deny the plea but was obliged to refer it back to the instructing magistrate for decision. 3 Indeed the coupling of vrafjuxria with irapaypa^ in these places tempts one to see in iircofioffla an affidavit for the adjournment that the reference would necessitate. But such a connection between the two proceedings cannot be demonstrated and clearly was unknown to the lexicographers and scholiasts. 4 Furthermore all accounts of arbitration give distinctly the impression that after the preliminary instruction the magistrate took no further part in an arbitration case until the arbitrator made his formal return. And it is a priori prob- able that the arbitrator was given authority to deny irapaypaai of which he judged the intent to be purely dilatory, for, if this were not the case, a suit could have been kept in his court indefinitely by a succession of special pleas. With the right to receive irapaypafai must have been joined that of denying them. From the Theophemus case we learn that a irapaypatfri) could be filed at the conclusion of the arbitration, when the time had come 1 Hubert (pp. tit., p. 43) notes that there was a need for special pleas in the court of the arbitrator as well as of other magistrates, but he makes no attempt to examine the problem critically. If it be objected that we have only one instance of arbitra- tion in the irapaypari cases represented by the extant arguments, attention may be called to the fact that five of the seven speeches are in actions not subject to arbitration. 2 Dem. 21. 81. 3 In the next paper of this series there will be presented reasons for believing that Athenian magistrates were empowered to dismiss irapaypa.tpa.1 summarily. 4 In the notes quoted above the allusion is clearly to the ordinary im-wpoaia, as is shown by vbtrov j) 6,-nobripiav . 26 George Miller Calhoun for the award (iwddri i) aw6(j>arj after he had closed the case and pronounced his award, for there is no evidence that a litigant had any recourse except appeal when the decision was once made. This suggests the possibility that a irapaypaii might be filed with the instructing magistrate when the case was for a second time in his hands after an award and the taking of an appeal. However, this would not only have involved practical complications but would have been inconsistent with the basic principle of public arbitration, which assumed that the case was considered by the arbitrator in its complete and final form and restricted the review on appeal to matters presented by the arbitrator. 2 That the rule closing the case should have been so strictly enforced as to bar the introduction of even a deposition or an excerpt from the laws and yet should have per- mitted the filing of a special plea, which would alter the whole status of the case, is incredible. We must conclude that the right to file a irapaypari terminated at the moment when the arbitrator closed the case and pronounced his award. There remains to determine the effect the acceptance of a irapa- ypacfrii had upon the proceedings in a case otherwise subject to arbitration. Did the arbitrator go on with the consideration and decision of the special plea as he would have done with the original action, or did the acceptance of a -wapaypari entered by Midias was denied, and we do not know what course that of Theophemus followed after 1 The sudden shift to the imperfect, after a succession of aorists, is striking. "When it was time for the award, Theophemus was bringing in a special plea and making affidavit for adjournment, but I . . . . was ready to bring my case before you." Kennedy interprets the situation correctly, though he does not attempt to keep the effect of the tenses. The circumstances appear to have been that, when the time came for an award in the action against Theophemus, the defendant filed a special plea; he then made affidavit for adjournment in the irapaypcujyri proceedings. In the meanwhile his cross-action against the speaker, which was not thus delayed (cf. 39: ol irapaypaoiJiii>ov inov oiS' vTo/ivvukvov), came to a decision, was appealed, and came first before the dicastery. See Hubert, op. cit., p. 40. 8 Ar. Cons. Ath. 53. 3; cf. Lipsius, Recht, p. 231, n. 43. B.apaypaii AND Abbitkation 27 its acceptance, neither case throws any light upon this question. If a solution is to be found, the attempt must be made to trace the handling of the irapaypatfrrj in Apollodorus v. Phormion. Should it appear that the participation of the arbitrator was subsequent to the filing of the special plea, we shall have to conclude that irapaypaai filed in arbitration cases were passed upon by the arbitrator and involved no departure from the ordinary procedure. In order to establish this it will be necessary to show either that the special plea was filed prior to the reference, or that the arbitration was completed and the case came into court on appeal in the usual way. Since there is no positive proof that the irapaypai) was filed prior to the reference, we may proceed to a consideration of the latter question. If we could accept the view of Schaefer that in this instance the arbitrator made no award but left the case to be decided by a dicastery, 1 we should be tempted to infer that this was a con- sequence of the Tapaypari, and that a special plea was never passed upon by an arbitrator. But Schaefer's theory will not bear exami- nation. The assumption that a public arbitrator could decline to give an award in a case which had been officially referred to him finds no support in the orators and is absolutely incompatible with the explicit statement of Aristotle that an arbitrator was compelled to complete the arbitration (&K&iaiTav) of all suits sent to him by the magistrates, and that the penalty for refusing to acquit himself of this duty was arifiia. 2 That this requirement was strictly enforced is shown by the award which Straton was compelled, very much against his inclination, to pronounce against Midias. 3 Nor have we any ground for assuming that an award could be waived by mutual agreement of the parties to the suit, except in the event of a com- promise which took the case entirely out of court. 4 And finally we 1 Demosthenes und seine Zeit, III (1858), ii, 164; cf. Sandys, Select Private Orations of Demosthenes, II (1910), xxv. The writer has been unable to discover on what grounds Schaefer based his dictum. Possibly the information contained in Aristotle would have influenced his opinion (cf. following note). 2 Cons. Ath. 53. 5; Pollux 8. 126. See Lipsius, Recht, p. 226; Pischinger, De arbitris Atheniensium publicis (Munich, 1893), pp. 21 ff. 3 Dem. 21. 84. 4 In the instance just cited Straton first begs Demosthenes to "hold over" the arbitration (kicurxtiv rifv Siairar), and then to consent to a single day's adjournment, but he does not suggest the possibility of waiving an award. 28 George Miller Calhoun have conclusive evidence that the arbitration of ApoUodorus v. Phormion was completed and the case brought into court on appeal in the usual way. Apollodorus alleges that one Stephanus, a witness for Phormion, had stolen a deposition from him during the arbitra- tion, when he had left his seat to put a witness on oath. He did not notice its absence until the trial, when he was astounded to find that it was not in the ixivos and at first supposed that the magistrate had tampered with the box. 1 We see from this that the case was formally closed and the documents were put under seal, a proceeding which is inseparable from the final stage of arbitration. Here then is clear proof that an arbitrator was empowered to pass upon questions of admissibility, and that the filing of a irapaypari in cases subject to arbitration entailed no departure from the usual procedure. In a problem of such intricacy, where the available evidence is so slight, any attempt at solution must be ventured with diffidence. But it would seem that the difficulties presented by the cases under consideration are met if we conclude that a irapaypa^ri could be filed with an arbitrator at any time prior to the award; that the arbitrator was empowered to deny summarily any Trapaypari that was obvi- ously evasive; that a irapaypat^r), whether filed with the instruct- ing magistrate prior to the reference or later with the arbitrator, followed the usual course of arbitration. University of California 1 Dem. 45. 57-58.