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JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. ROME'S FIRST COINAGE By Tennet Frank i. ostia and the first issue op bronze Although Mommsen in his Milnzwesen accepted the Roman tra- dition that Servius Tullius issued stamped copper as a medium of exchange and that a regular coinage was instituted in the fifth cen- tury b.c, recent criticism has succeeded in confuting the tradition, and it is now currently held with Haeberlin (Systematik des dltesten rom. Miinzwesens, 1905-7) that Rome's first coins were issued about 335 b.c. The chief arguments for this late date are (1) that the designs upon the earliest coins and bars, however rude, show the influence of fourth-century art; (2) that the silver coins (issued not at Rome but at Capua), which are assumed to be contemporaneous, should be assigned to a time when Capua was a "dependency" of Rome, that is, not before the Latin war; (3) that the symbol found on the early bronze coins, the prow, seems to refer to Rome's capture of the fleet of Antium (338 B.C.). The first argument based upon artistic considerations seems to be valid so far as it goes. It disproves Pliny's very early dating and enables us to place the coinage not very definitely, to be sure, but at least in the fourth century. The second argument is based upon too many assumptions to be of any force. There is little reason to believe that the Roman-Campanian silver issued at Capua had any direct connection with the Roman bronze mintage. It seems indeed to have been issued at first as an emergency coinage with which to finance the armies that were campaigning in the south where trade demanded silver. Capua may well have been independent at the time and may have coined the money not at command but by contract 1 for Rome and her generals. The coins were issued on a Greek standard and we cannot even be sure that any convenient rate of exchange was established between them and the Roman bronze. 1 Frank, Roman Imperialism, p. 41. [Classical Philology XIV, October, 1919] 314 Rome's First Coinage 315 For the third argument, connecting the symbol of the prow with the capture of Antium, there is no foundation in ancient sources, and it brings the coinage down to a date which entails violence to several known facts. I wish to suggest that the symbol of the prow may commemorate Rome's establishment of her first maritime colony, Ostia, an event which evidence now available seems to place about the middle of the fourth century. Several years ago L. R. Taylor (Cults of Ostia, pp. 3 ff .) pointed out that Festus assigns the coloniza- tion of Ostia, not to Ancus Marcius, as Cicero does, but to a sub- sequent date, and that the municipal government of the colony preserved a double system of officials that implies the superimposing of a colony on an already existing village. To these valid arguments further confirmatory evidence may now be added. The fact that two different tribus, the Voturia and the Palatine, are of about equal importance at Ostia would indicate that by the side of an early village which probably arose in the regal period and which belonged to the Voturia tribus of the coast region, a colony of Roman citizens was later planted which kept the Palatine tribus of the city, since the colony of Ostia was conceived of as practically a fragment of Rome. Recent excavations at Ostia have provided some interesting data in this connection. Just before the war Calza discovered the gate of an inner fortification (Notizie Scav. [1914], p. 426) which encloses an area of only a few blocks at the very center of the town. I find that this wall consists of that peculiar scoriated tufa which was used in the fourth-century fortification of the Palatine hill at Rome, a ma- terial which came from near Fidenae and which had perhaps been a part of Fidenae's walls, removed for new uses after that city was destroyed. 1 Since the building stone at Rome during the regal period was uniformly "cappellaccio" cut on the old Roman measure, while this tufa both at Ostia and on the Palatine is cut on the so-called new Roman foot, the wall can hardly be of regal construction. Since furthermore this tufa comes from Veian-Fidenate territory, the wall cannot be placed in the fifth century when that territory was not yet Roman. This brings the Ostian fortification found by 1 See "Notes on the Servian Wall," Am. Jour. Arch. (1918), p. 182; the Palatine walls of this material are indicated in Jordan-Huelsen, III, plate opposite p. 40, marked a, /S, y. Fidenae was destroyed some time after the capture of Veii. 316 Tenney Frank Calza, and probably the colonization of Ostia, well down into the fourth century. 1 The tradition that Ancus Marcius had founded Ostia can readily be explained if we may, with Pais, assume that the colony was planted by C. Marcius Rutilus, 2 that aggressive personality — the first plebeian dictator, the first plebeian censor, four times consul — under whose administration Rome made so many innovations about the middle of the fourth century. This Marcius is closely connected both with the history of Ostia and with several economic measures of impor- tance. In his first consulship in 358 B.C., the maximum rate of inter- est allowed by the twelve tables was reaffirmed as 8| per cent, and a tax on the manumission of slaves was first imposed (Livy vii. 16). Two years later Marcius was made dictator to defend the salt basins at the mouth of the Tiber from the invading Etruscans. 3 In his second consulship in 352, Livy (vii. 21) records progress in building the walls of Rome, also the appointment of a bankruptcy commission which devised excellent methods of liquidating debts, said to be oppressive at the time. In 351 Marcius was made censor, an office which no plebeian had held before him. In 344 when consul for the third time (Livy vii. 28) the temple of Juno Moneta was dedicated, the very temple which became the home of the Roman mint; furthermore in the same year a vigorous judicial campaign was opened against money-lenders. Finally in 342, Marcius' fourth consulship, the surprising attempt was made to suppress by law all interest charges. Livy 4 attributes this law to Genucius, a tribune, but the 1 A village probably existed at Ostia before this colonization, as Festus implies. Indeed a few fragments of the very old cappellaccio blocks have been found as shop- foundations near the "Vulcan" temple. There is every reason to believe that the Etruscan kings of Rome developed the salinae near the Tiber mouth, and also that they had some share in the vigorous maritime commerce of Tuscany. The village doubtless dwindled when the Roman republic lost this trade in the fifth century. It is a curious fact that Antium is the only other colony besides Ostia mentioned as having its lands assigned in strips (Laciniae, Liber Col. 229, 18). Antium was settled in 338. 2 So, for example, Pliny (31, 41) attributes the first building of the Marcian aque- duct of 145 B.C. to Ancus Marcius; Pais, Sloria di Roma, I, 308. 3 Livy vii. 7 ; Diodorus xvi. 36. It seems to be significant that the salinae are mentioned and not Ostia. When seven years later (Livy vii. 25) sea-rovers devastated the coast, "Ostia Tiberis" is mentioned. The colony may have been planted in the meantime in consequence of the Etruscan raid. 4 Livy vii. 42, confirmed indirectly by Tacitus Ann. 16 and Appian B.C. i. 54. See Billeter, Der Zinsfuss, p. 135. Rome's First Coinage 317 jurist Gaius attributes it or a duplicate of it to Marcius himself. Perhaps a plebiscite, then of dubious legal standing, was legalized by a lex carried through the centuriate assembly by this popular leader. Considering now the facts that Marcius was called upon to defend the salinae at the Tiber mouth in 358, that Ostia was appar- ently colonized by a Marcius, who according to Festus was not Ancus Marcius, and that archaeology proves this foundation to belong to the fourth century, furthermore that in 352 Marcius was active in re-erecting the fortifications of Rome which consist in part of the same peculiar material that we find in the inner walls of Ostia, and finally that Ostia is mentioned in Livy's record for the year 349, I think it wholly probable that Ostia was colonized between 358 and 349. Returning to the question of the earliest coins with their symbol of the prow, it is, as we have seen, a modern conjecture that connects the design with the capture of the ships of Antium in 338. If Ostia, Rome's first seaport, was founded soon after 358, it would for several reasons be convenient to find in the design of these coins a com- memoration of that event. The economic disturbances which provoked the ultra-radical attack upon interest in 342 are far more readily understood if we may assume the introduction of coinage before rather than after that date. Before the introduction of coinage the Romans, interested largely in agriculture, had managed their simple trading as best they could by direct bartering and by the employment of cattle and pounds of copper as media of exchange. It is clear that the issue of coins must have upset the peaceful tenor of that sluggish trade and have acted as does any sudden inflation of currency. It must have stimulated buying and selling, and invited foreign traders to the port; it must have facilitated borrowing for new ventures, not to speak of needless and perilous ones; and since under certain con- ditions prices tend to increase with the quantity of currency, there were doubtless many miscalculations and many failures. How this situation quickly led to a financial crisis can readily be conceived. It seems likely that this was really the condition that called for the bankruptcy commission of Marcius in 352, the forceful reduction of the rate of interest to 4| per cent in 347, the official attempt to 318 Tenney Frank restrain money-lenders in 344, and finally the drastic effort to outlaw the collection of interest in 342. This last measure was of course misdirected, and later notices prove that it was a failure; but the Romans were then experimenting with a wholly new situation which they had no means of understanding, and it is not surprising that in their helplessness they struck rabidly at the occasion rather than at the real cause. If furthermore it was the farseeing radical, Marcius, who inter- ested himself in commerce to the extent of founding the seaport of Ostia and issuing money, we can better understand the meaning of the commercial treaty made with Carthage in 348. 1 The terms of this document were largely Carthaginian in origin but they prove at least that Carthage then looked upon the Romans as potential if not actual rivals in the trade of the Mediterranean, and this implies that Rome had adopted some measure of commercial significance. There may also be some proof of Carthaginian influence in the fact that the new mint was housed in the temple dedicated in 344 to Juno 2 who was recognized as a tutelary divinity of the Carthaginians. The evidence here gathered together is, in the nature of the case, not conclusive, but when the ancient historians are demonstrably incorrect, one must appeal to the best that archaeology can offer. The evidence, such as it is, harmonizes well with the theory that Rome's first coinage was instituted about the middle of the fourth century, and that the ship's prow on these coins was intended to commemorate the colonization of Rome's seaport at Ostia. II. WAS THE COINAGE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC MONOMETALLIC? Contrary to the current view, I think it can be shown that Rome attempted for nearly two centuries to issue both its silver and its bronze practically at market value and to preserve a real bimetallic standard, and that the several changes in the monetary system during the Republic were mainly due to this policy. 3 1 Livy vii. 27. Polybius (iii. 24) gives a copy of it without date, but the political provisions of the treaty which he records are appropriate to Livy's date, not to that which Diodorus seems to accept, i.e., 306. 2 See Assmann, Klio, VI, 477. 3 Modern bimetallism with a "free and unlimited coinage" of two metals is some- what different, since Rome always coined limited issues according to calculated needs. Rome's First Coinage 319 The important stages in Rome's early coinage were the following: 1. Circa 350-312 b.c. o) Roman bronze issued in pounds and uncial fractions (the old pound =273 grams). o) Silver didrachmas issued at Capua weighing 7 . 58 grams. If exchange was 120:1, the didrachma=3| asses; if 108:1, the didrachma = 3 asses. 2. Circa 312 b.c. a) Roman bronze continues as before. b) Silver didrachmas issued at Capua reduced to 6 . 82 grams. If exchange was 120:1, the didrachma=3 asses. 3. 312-268 b.c. a) There was now a gradual reduction of weight in the bronze pieces, at first (circa 300 ?) to 6 ounces and later, by irregu- lar gradations, to 2 ounces, i.e., one-sixth of the original. b) The Roman-Campanian didrachmas remained as in 312. The rate of exchange during this period is a matter of dispute. 4. In 268 a completely new system, the denarial, was devised, and the new silver was coined in the city, all in fractions of the new Roman pound of 327 grams. a) A bronze as of two Roman ounces = 54. 5 grams. b) A silver denarius 1 (= decern asses) of 4.55 grams = 4 scruples. The rate of exchange was therefore 120: 1 (10X54.6 = 120X4.55). 5. In 217, the most critical year of the Second Punic War: a) The bronze as was reduced to one ounce. b) A new "denarius," slightly reduced in weight, was issued to exchange for 16 bronze asses. The rate of exchange seems to have been 112:1. In the main there is now little disagreement among scholars regarding the stages of this evolution; the various "reductions," however, have been and are variously interpreted. Pliny, like his contemporaries who lived at a time when emperors began to lighten and alloy the coinage for fraudulent purposes, looked upon these 1 This denarius probably competed more than successfully in foreign trade with the Attic drachma since it was . 175 grams heavier. It soon became supreme within the Roman federation. 320 Tennby Frank "reductions" as merely examples of debasement, and his opinion reasserts itself not infrequently in our modern handbooks. 1 On examination it is difficult to see what a small democratic state, dependent upon trade with all its neighbors, could gain by issuing fraudulent coin. In the Republic the citizens issued their coins in the first place to pay themselves for army service, war materials, and the like. These citizens would hardly have voted themselves pay- ment in debased money. Furthermore in the foreign trade of that day, where innumerable issues were current, all suspected coins were weighed and could pass only at- intrinsic value. The case was wholly different in Pliny's day when the autocrat, who was the largest paymaster in the state, could make temporary profits by paying his state expenses in a reduced coin, and when also the state extended over most of the world so that practically all trade was "domestic" and therefore at the mercy of the autocrat's mintage. It was of course such considerations that kept the coins of many small Greek republics as well as of the Roman republic up to the standard, while those of most Greek tyrants, of Roman emperors, as of the German, French, and English autocrats of a later day, fell to surprising depths. It is now more usual to assume that between 312 and 270 b.c. the bronze as dropped from one pound to two ounces because bronze was gradually assuming the position of token money in a mono- metallic system. This explanation, however, disregards the fact that Rome repeatedly made heroic efforts during the Republic to readjust the weights of silver and bronze coins in order to preserve the ratio recognized by the market; furthermore it assumes that the normal market ratio between silver and bronze remained practically stationary (circa 120 : 1) through a period when there were demon- strably very serious fluctuations in value. If on the contrary we assume that Rome tried faithfully to adhere to bimetallism we shall escape from these objections. That Rome attempted at various times to preserve a bimetallic system with bronze and silver at market ratios is unmistakable. So for instance 1 Even Haeberlin supposes that the reduction of the bronze as to a half pound was due to an effort on the part of the democracy to relieve debtors, and it is with this theory in mind that he places the change in 286 B.C., the date of the Hortensian law. If, as I suggest, the reduction was due to an attempt to keep the rate of exchange at market value, we may place the reduction nearer the year 300. Rome's First Coinage 321 in 312 when the silver didrachma of the Roman-Campanian coinage was reduced by ten per cent of its weight, the departure from a standard current in Campania was apparently made for the simple purpose of equating this coin with the bronze as (X3) at the market value of 120:1. Again when in 268 the new denarial system was devised a similar violence was done to foreign exchange, and a denarius that would entail serious loss in its exchange with the lighter drachmas was adopted in order to re-establish a working connection with the two-ounce as that had become current at Rome. Later when in the Punic war the bronze as was struck in one-ounce pieces and equated with one-sixteenth of a sixteen-os denarius, the govern- ment again showed its reluctance to force the bronze currency into the position of token money by promising to pay its soldiers at the ten-as rate as before and by weighing the new coins on the basis of a 112: 1 ratio which was doubtless then the market ratio. All this goes to show that the government at different times over a long period was unwilling to abandon bimetallism. The only logical conclusion is that such was its settled policy in the intervals also, and that the variations in the size of Roman coins during this time corresponded to fluctuations in the value of bronze and were in no wise due to a desire to deprive bronze of its standing as legal tender. That bronze and silver did greatly fluctuate in price during this period can readily be proved. While ancient price-lists of metals often fail us, the evidence suffices for our purposes and may be found collected in Reinach, "L'histoire par les mommies," and Glotz, "Le prix des denies a D61os," Journal des Savants, 1913. At the beginning of the fourth century gold was worth about fourteen times as much as silver in Greece. The plundering of the gold treasuries of Delphi in 354, the discovery of gold in Thrace at about the same time and the consequent heavy coinage of gold by Philip of Macedon brought the price down gradually to 12:1 and by 336 to 10:1, where it remained for a long time. Alexander's conquests released very large quantities of both silver and gold so that the ratio between these two metals was but little affected by that event. Prices of commodities, however, naturally rose with this increase of the precious metals. Glotz has shown that such commodities 322 Tenney Frank as wheat, cloth, iron, and human labor doubled in value in Greece during the latter half of the fourth century, and though we do not happen to have price-lists for copper and bronze we may fairly sup- pose that these commodities also doubled in price in relation to the silver of the usual Greek currency. That silver rose only about fifty per cent in relation to gold is due partly to the fact that Alexan- der's booty brought in much silver as well as gold, partly to the fact that Macedonia kept silver as legal tender by the side of gold and in so doing attempted in some measure to respect the old established silver issues generally current throughout Greece. These high prices did not immediately permeate the West, where gold was scarce and where bronze, being heavily produced, was respected as a medium of exchange; however, commerce with Greece was active and a readjustment of prices, though slow, did gradually come. 1 Thus even considering only the changes in the economic conditions of Greece we would expect by the end of the fourth century that Rome would cut 2 the bronze as down to a six-ounce piece, if she desired to keep her silver and bronze pieces at the market value of the commodities. This is apparently what happened, for Haeberlin has no reasonable basis for dating this "reduction" in 286 B.C., the date of the Hortensian law; and his assumption that the "reduction" was made by the radicals in order that debts might be paid with "cheap money" seems unwarranted since such debts were doubtless paid in currency of the higher denominations, which was of course silver. This first "reduction" should probably be dated about 300 b.c. and be explained as a reflection in the West of 1 Greek merchants kept agents to inform themselves of prices in various markets and directed their shipping accordingly. Under such a system prices could not long continue to differ much more than enough to account for the cost of freight. 2 Preserving bimetallism by changing the weight of the coins was an old device in Greece. The coinage of Agathocles of Syracuse of about 300 B.C. furnishes a good contemporaneous instance. In order to provide against the fall in price of gold from 15:1 to 12:1, occasioned as we have explained above, he reduced his silver coins from ten to eight litrae. Of course this process resulted in the melting down of earlier coins of greater weight, but even modern states have had similar experiences. It will be remembered that in 1864 France had to debase her fractional coins because of the discovery of gold in California; three years later she reduced the two-franc piece to the position of token money, and presently was compelled to abandon bimetallism entirely. Had bimetallism survived a few years longer in France, that is, until silver was discovered in Nevada, the gold issues would probably have been similarly reduced in weight. Rome's First Coinage 323 the doubled cost of commodities in general brought about by the heavy increase in the amount of currency issued in Macedonia and Greece during the latter half of the fourth century. During the next thirty years, however, the copper as continued in issue after issue to be reduced still farther, while the Roman- Campanian silver didrachma remained at the weight of 6.82 grams and this process did not stop until the bronze as had been cut from six to two ounces ! The usual supposition that this was made possible by Rome's shifting to a monometallic standard in which bronze became mere token money seems to me untenable. In the first place, the only currency issued at Rome was still bronze and this was of course the principal medium of exchange in the shops of the city; the silver pieces, though circulating at the capital, continued to be issued at Capua for the use of the army in trading with the Greek and Campanian allies during the Samnite wars. Considering that the Romans at home and in their commerce with the North had for two generations reckoned prices in bronze, it must have been necessary to keep that coin respectable. Furthermore, the bronze coin was still worth a third of a double drachma, that is, in modern purchasing value, about seventy-five cents, and could hardly have been reduced to token money in the state of trade then prevailing. The fractional coppers might have been reduced to that condition, but these prove on weighing to retain their proportional amount of metal. Even more serious is the consideration that if the as had represented only a third of its intrinsic value, it would have invited uncontrollable counterfeiting; for the coin was not struck from a finely wrought stamp but moulded from a simple form that any enterprising artisan could have reproduced from any example, thus making equally good coins at a profit of sixty-six per cent. Indeed, as long as Rome issued valuable coins in this easily reproducible form, she was compelled to hold them near the market price of the metal. Issues that were worth more than face value must of neces- sity find their way into the melting-pot, while those that were worth less would be counterfeited. It may seem drastic to assume a threefold rise in value in the first thirty years of the third century, but we have ourselves seen an equally startling rise in the price of copper produced in the first two 324 Tennby Frank years of the war by causes not wholly unlike those then prevalent. 1 The situation at Rome was this. From 326 to 272 b.c. Rome was engaged in a long series of wars with the Samnites, Gauls, Etruscans, and with Pyrrhus. During that period there must have been an enormous demand for copper which was still very largely used in the metallic parts of ships, in wagons, war engines, harnesses, shields, etc. Add to this heavy drain upon the supply the fact that from the time (about 296 b.c.) that the Gauls and Etruscans entered the lists against Rome, the republic's chief supply from the mines of northern Etruria was cut off for many years at a time. Between 300 and 295 and again between 285 and 280 not only was the Etruscan copper industry seriously hampered by warfare in the north but Rome must have found the road to the source blocked. Under such conditions a threefold rise in price is less strange than what happened to the metal in 1914-16 a.d. Pliny (N.H. xxxiv. 34) has by chance pre- served the odd item of information that Rome carried away as booty some 2000 bronze statues from the Etruscan city of Volsinii, captured in 280 b.c, and quotes a Greek who cynically remarked that Rome attacked that city for the sake of those statues. There may have been more than mere humor in the remark. Doubtless many of those portraits went into the furnace to make up for the deprivations of years. As we have seen, when Rome in 268 reformed her coinage on a new system she was able to restore the old-time ratio of 120:1 which had for some years fallen to 20: 1. This was doubtless made possible by the re-establishment of peace prices throughout Italy and by the loads of booty in the form of copper and bronze brought back from Etruscan cities about 280. 2 The restoration of the old ratio was doubtless aided by the fact that Greek trade and industry- had now so far assimilated the extra currency of the last century that the prices of 250 B.C. had generally fallen back to those prevailing before Alexander's conquest. The system adopted in 268 remained unchanged for half a cen- tury; presumably the production of silver and bronze maintained 1 Copper in the American market rose from twelve cents per pound in 1914 to thirty-six cents per pound in 1916. * Rome defeated the Gauls and Etruscans at Lake Vadimo in 285; Volsinii and Vulci were taken in 280. Rome's Fikst Coinage 325 an equable level and the ratio of 120:1 could readily be protected over brief periods of fluctuation because the bronze pieces were now minted with as great care as the silver and could not readily be tampered with. In 217, however, after Rome's terrifying defeat by Hannibal at Trasimene Lake the bronze as was again cut in two, being now reduced to a one-ounce piece. This was, however, done in connection with a small reduction of the silver piece from 4 . 54 to about 4.00 grams 1 and an official pronouncement that the silver piece should henceforth be exchanged not for ten asses but for sixteen. With the real meaning of this strange measure we need not deal exhaustively now. Later writers looked upon the whole meas- ure as populistic and sometimes attributed it to the radical leader Flaminius. 2 Pliny, 8 who credits it to the aristocratic dictator Fabius of 217 B.C. — correctly, it would seem, since Flaminius died in the disaster that necessitated the measure — adds in the traditional fashion: "Thus the state made a gain of a half." It is not impos- sible that the aristocratic senate in the face of a terrible crisis, when the state credit was falling to the lowest ebb and when those who had good currency and metal would naturally hoard it, might resort to such drastic means of inflation to tide the treasury over the crisis. The government had presently to beg its citizens for gifts of jewelry, to mortgage the public lands, and to impose extraordinary income taxes. Unfortunately the crisis lasted for so many years that the new denarius made a permanent place for itself, of course at its own value. The government doubtless realized the unsoundness and danger of the measure since it raised the soldier's pay to cover the difference. Another possible explanation of the measure is that it was a hasty experiment in fiat money made in order to help the populace meet wartime prices of food. Be that as it may, it is interesting 1 This reduction of the silver coin may have begun before 217. From the point of view of foreign trade it was not in the nature of a debasement but rather of a gradual approximation to the weight of the Greek drachmas with which the denarius competed. In Greece and Sicily where gold was used with silver there was a tendency to reduce the size of the silver drachma to meet the falling price of gold. This in turn enabled the Romans to issue a lighter denarius. Ancient coins also tended to lighten by slow degrees because old coins that were furnished moneyers as samples for the mint were apt to be somewhat worn and therefore a trifle below weight. 2 See Festus (ed. Lindsay) 470. * Pliny N.H. xxxiii. 45. 326 Tenney Frank to see that the senate was still so concerned in preserving the parity of bronze and silver that the new coin was made to exchange with the halved bronze as at the ratio of 112:1. Considering the necessary increase in the price of copper in war time, it is reasonable to suppose that this ratio fairly represents the market values. After the Punic war the uncial bronze survived only about fifty years, when issues of it gradually ceased, to be resumed only for a short period during the stress of the Social War. How Roman shopkeepers fared without new issues of small change is a deep enigma that has not been solved. If we could discover what the price of copper was at this time we should probably find the cause of the withdrawal of bronze in some wide fluctuation of values that made bimetallism impossible. Evidence from the Egyptian papyri of this period shows at least that the price of bronze kept varying excessively, but we do not yet know precisely what coin in Egypt was called the "bronze drachma." All that we now know is that if the Egyptian silver drachma equalled the bronze drachma in weight, the ratio varied from 375:1 to 500:1.* If, as Grenfell and Hunt 2 insist, the bronze drachma did not weigh the same as the silver drachma, the evidence seems to point to a very high price of copper, a ratio indeed that varied from 20: 1 to 35: 1. In either case copper had shifted so far in value from the ratio of 112:1 assumed in the Roman coinage of 217 B.C. that Rome must either drop bimetallism and issue bronze as token money or stop coining bronze. That she took the latter course shows again her remarkable fear of token money, and should warn us not to assume its existence in earlier issues. Indeed, it was not till Rome became supreme in the Medi- terranean world and an autocratic emperor supreme in the state that the government found it possible to issue a coinage that did not represent intrinsic values.' In view of this consistent record of keeping bronze and silver at par, I would revert for a moment to the first silver coinage at Capua, and suggest a possible explanation for its place in the system. 1 Mitteis-Wilcken, Chrestomatie, I, briv. a Tebtunis pap. I, App. 2. 8 Cinna in issuing every seventh denarius in debased form demonstrated what any autocrat would soon be tempted to do. Rome's First Coinage 327 Perhaps after all this coinage was not issued in complete disregard of the system at Rome, as is usually assumed by authorities who insist upon quoting the bronze as as worth 1 : 120 of silver throughout. It is not impossible to suppose that during the Latin War copper rose in value and that exchange then stood 108 : 1 in the market. If that is the case, the original Roman-Campanian double drachma was meant to exchange with three bronze asses as did the lighter double drachma of 312. It seems probable therefore that Rome consistently kept to a bimetallic policy from the beginning until about 150 B.C., when the bronze as was first withdrawn from circulation, and that the bronze as was issued at very nearly its intrinsic value throughout the period of double issues from 340 to 150 B.C. Johns Hopkins University