STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. UTI LEGASSIT By W. H. Kirk The fact that the Roman jurists were not in the habit of going back of the Twelve Tables sufficiently explains why they found the base of testamentary succession in Twelve Tables v. 3, "uti legassit suae rei ita ius esto." Modern writers agree that the wills made calatis comitiis and in procinctu were older than the code; they disagree as to the purpose of this clause, which does not implicitly recognize an existing institution (as the ancient right of the suies heres is recognized in v. 4, "si intestato moritur cui suus heres nee escit"), but enacts a new rule. One view is thus expressed by Girard, Droit remain, page 804 : C'est une disposition qui a etabli la liberty dans le testament primitive- ment soumis au controle des cornices Ant^rieurement c'&tait le peuple qui legabat, qui legem dicebat sur la res du testateur Desormais c'est le testateur qui fait sur tout cela une lex dont la soumission au peuple n'est plus que de pure forme. One objection to this I find in the word by which "having made no will" is expressed in v. 4. If in 450 b.c. legare was the technical term for "make a will," and if down to that year the act was regarded as a lex, not as a testamentum, some form of lex or legare with a negative might be expected in place of intestato. That compound cannot have been used in this sense until testari was well established as the technical term for the act in question and therefore not until the assembled citizens had come to be regarded as mere witnesses. Its employment in the Twelve Tables proves that the will, if it ever was an act of legislation, had ceased to be such long before the code was drawn up. Another difficulty I find in the etymology attributed to legare. The derivation of this verb from lex is as old at least as Ulpian (Reg. 24.1) and has been repeated by many modern writers from Brisson down. But the primitive sense postulated by this derivation does not agree with the sense of the compounds. These all mean "send," delegare also "commit" — significations not easily or naturally [Classical Philology XVI, July, 1921] 246 "Uti Legassit" 247 developed from an original legem dicere. 1 I have no other etymology to offer; but if, setting aside the question of derivation, we look only at the sense, it is, I think, possible to conclude that the uses of the simple verb and its compounds are consistent with the assumption of a legare originally synonymous with mittere. The two verbs stand side by side in Lex Iul. munic. 150, "per legatos quos .... legarei mitti censuerint," as their derivatives do in Cic. Verr. iii. 73, "dimisso atque ablegato consilio." No doubt at this period the simple legare was already used only of sending in an official capacity, as in Sail. lug. 21. 4 and 25. 4. There is apparently a contrast between an unofficial and an official negotiator in Cic. Alt. x. 1. 4, "filium Brundisium de pace misit .... me legatum iri non arbitror"; Fam. iii. 8. 4, "privatae rei causa legari," seems to be ironical. The substantive legatus is like Gallo-Latin missus; Sail. lug. 83. 1, "legatos ad Bocchum mittit," is paralleled by Greg. Tur. H. Fr. ii. 27, "missos ad regem dirigit," except that Gregory uses mittere as freely as dirigere. With a dative legare denotes "send for the benefit of" and consequently "appoint as aide to"; the primary sense, still distinguishable in Manil. 57, "ne legaretur A. Gabinius Cn. Pompeio" (Pompey was abroad and the appointment was to be made by the senate), is quite lost in Fam. vi. 6. 10, "Cassium sibi legavit." In the private law of the same period legare is apparently a synonym of dare: Lex Falcid., "ut earn pecuniam easque res qui- busque dare legare volet," ibid., "quibus quid ita datum legatumve erit"; and two centuries later Gaius, ii. 193, giving do lego as the formula for creating a legacy per vindicationem, adds: "sed et si alterum verbum positum sit, veluti 'do' aut 'lego,' aeque per vindica- tionem legatum est." That this was the oldest form of legacy seems proved (Karlowa, Privatrecht, p. 916) by the name legatum, 2 derived from this formula and extended to other bequests made by other words. The formula itself is evidently drawn from the nuncupatio of the testator who was making a will per aes et libram, Gai. ii. 104, 1 Or legem ferre, as Jhering, Geist d. rdm. Bechts, I, 146, interprets the verb. Vanicek, Etymol. Worterb., gives as the primary meaning "etwas gesetzlich ver- fugen oder thun." 2 Perhaps, also, by the fact that this form of legacy was confined to objects belong- ing to the testator ex iure Quiritium (Gai. ii. 196) ; the Twelve Tables said suae rei. 248 W. H. Kirk "ita do, ita lego, ita testor, itaque vos Quirites testimonium mihi perhibetote." But here the words do and lego cannot be synonyms, else we should have ita do lego; each of the clauses introduced by ita denotes a different act. What lego means, appears from Plaut. Cos. 100, "quin potius quod legatumst tibi negotium id curas?" cf. Cic. Fatn. xiii. 26. 2, "quibus ea negotia mandavimus," Cael. Farn. viii. 1.1, "hunc laborem alteri delegavi." Gaius in his account of the oral will per aes et libram, says ii. 102, "amico familiam suam .... mancipio dabat eumque rogabat quid cuique post mortem suam dari vellet, [103] familiae emptor .... heredis locum optine- bat et ob id ei mandabat testator quid," etc. In the testator's nuncupatio the word lego corresponds to the rogabat and mandabat of Gaius. Ita do, "thus I give," expresses the conveyance of the property to the beneficiaries; ita lego, "thus I commit," expresses the charge laid upon the executor of consummating the conveyance; the execution of the will was a negotium quod legalum fuit. The verb legare has here, as in Plaut. Cos. loc. tit., a sense belonging not to the simple mittere, but to its compound committere and to the compound delegare. In the earlier, purely oral, will the executor was the familiae emptor; his formal appointment was made by the words which he himself uttered in effecting the mancipation, Gai. ii. 104, "familiam pecuniamque tuam endo mandatela tua custodelaque mea 1 esse aio eaque, quo tu iure testamentum facere possis secundum legem puplicam, hoc aere .... esto mihi empta." When the written will was introduced, the testator appointed the real executor by the words ille heres esto. Thus the commission which had previously been given to the familiae emptor was now given to the heir; the nuncupatory formula referred not to the preceding oral declarations, the fuller nuncupatio (Karlowa, p. 855, Girard, p. 809 n. 2), of the testator, but to the document which he exhibited to the witnesses. Into this document the words do lego were introduced, so that the 1 This reading of Seckel and Kiibler seems to me preferable to that of Krilger and Studemund, endo mandatelam custodelamque meam. But it is important to note that, as Girard says, "qu'on admette une restitution ou l'autre, la formule atteste toujours que le familiae emptor n'est pas destine a conserver l'heredite." Also with either reading the phrase constitutes, as Karlowa and Sohm both say, an acknowl- edgment by the familiae emptor that he is the mandatary of the testator. "Uti Legassit" 249 vesting of title in beneficiaries other than the heir 1 was effected by the same words as before. It is probable that the word lego alike in the nuncupatio and in the tabulae testamenti was at first under- stood as referring to the heir; it may have been still so understood in the time of Plautus. When the verb had ceased to be used, as Plautus could still use it, in the sense of mandare, do lego became merely a traditional formula; finally the second verb was under- stood as synonymous with the first. I have said that ita do expressed a conveyance of ownership to the beneficiaries; Maine, Ancient Law, chapter vi, and Sohm, Institutes, page 544 (Eng. tr.), call the familiae emptor owner of the estate which was mancipated to him. But the words dp and lego can hardly have been used otherwise in the oral than in the written will; and in the latter they vested ownership in the legatee (Gai. ii. 194), not in the heir. Moreover the words of mancipation show that the familiae emptor did not become owner. In the man- cipation of a child the purchaser and intending manumitter claimed the child as his (Gai. i. 119, "meum esse aio"); he had to acquire ownership, because he could not manumit or remancipate one who was not his own. But the familiae emptor claimed only that the estate was in his custody to act as the testator's agent 2 and make the latter 's gift effective by conveying possession. The rule of the Twelve Tables vi. 1, "cum nexum faciet mancipiumque uti lingua nuncupassit ita ius esto," applies here. The law will recognize in the person receiving by mancipation ownership or merely custody, according as he claims the one or the other. The comitial will and that made in procinctu were founded in ancient custom. The will per aes et libram (in its first form really an imperfect conveyance inter vivos, to be perfected, after the death of the conveyor, by his agent) must have been in its inception 1 Of course the heir was at this time not necessarily a beneficiary; the data legata might include the whole property. Only if the testator instituted as heir a person whom he desired to benefit, would the latter be residuary legatee as well as executor. 2 It is true that, as Sohm says, p. 543, "the mandatum and the transfer of owner- ship are not mutually incompatible"; they were combined in the fideicommissum. But if do lego had meant Titio do, Titio lego reddat restituat (Gai. ii. 250), the formula could not have given to the legatee a rei vindicatio, but only a personal action such as was given him by the words heres meus dare damnas esto (Gai. ii. 201, 204). 250 W. H. Kirk extra-legal. We need not suppose an insignis quorundam perfidia (Inst. ii. 23. 1; cf. Cic. Fin. ii. 55) to account for the fact that, being recognized as desirable, it was formally legalized; the question might well arise whether dispositions made by a man at the point of death should be allowed to defeat expectations based on the ancient rules of intestate succession. The code, by the clause uti legassit, decided the question in favor of the dying man ; thereafter a decedent, when saying ita lego, felt assured that his mandate was legally valid. There remains the question how this interpretation accords with the form in which Ulpian quotes Twelve Tables v. 3: "uti legassit super pecunia tutelave suae rei 1 ita ius esto." A guardian was appointed by the word do (Gai. i. 149), not do lego or lego; and it is not to be supposed that the familiae emptor any more than his successor, the heir, was charged with any responsibility in the matter. But compare Papin. Dig. xxvi. 2. 26. pr., "tutela com- munium liberorum matri testamento patris frustra mandatur," 28. pr., "qui tutelam testamento mandatam excusationis iure sus- cipere noluit," Ulp. Dig. xxvi. 7. 3. 3, "ei potissimum se tutelam commissurum praetor dicat cui testator delegavit." The formal acceptance of the mandate by the familiae emptor was an indispens- able element in the making of a will by civil law; the datio tutoris, as a clause in the will, contained only the offer of a mandate which might or might not be accepted. But the guardianship was a negotium mandatum, delegatum, or, as Plautus has it, legatum; the clause uti legassit covered the case of both mandataries, of the one who declared his acceptance in presence of the testator, and of the one whose acceptance or refusal was formally signified only after the testator's death. Rutgers College 1 A double complement, prepositional phrase and legal genitive, as in Lex Cornelia de sicariis: "cui sorte obvenerit quaestio de sicariis eius quod in urbe .... factum erit."