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JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. AIAMAPTTPIA, UAPArPA$H, AND THE LAW OF ARCHINUS Bt George Miller Calhoun I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL PLEAS Attic law of the fourth century admitted two forms of special plea in bar of action, irapaypcufrr] and otafiapTVpla. No known instance of either antedates the archonship of Euclides, and opinions differ as to their relative antiquity. The facts which may be regarded as established are as follows : Hapaypafth, as we find it in the procedure of Demosthenes' time, was instituted by the law of Archinus. At first it comprehended only pleas based op the amnesty of 403, but at some time during the first half of the fourth century the procedure was extended to include those brought on other grounds. 1 Prior to this extension, however, special pleas traversing the admissibiUty of actions were judged separately from the main issue, and the original plaintiff spoke first. 2 When this separation of special from general traverse was first practiced has not been determined, nor has it been established that the term irapaypatpi) was applied to special pleas prior to the enactment of the law of Archinus. 3 There can be no reason for doubting the assertion with which Isocrates' speech Against Callimachus opens, that this is the first special plea based on the law of Archinus which has come before a court. The speaker begins: El ph> nai aXXoi rivte yjtrav rjycovurnevoi Toiavrr)v irapaypa^v, air' ovtov tov irplt.yna.Tos iipx6p.r]v a.v tovs Xoyous 7roiei<7#ai- vvv o' av&y Kt] irepl tov vopov ttp&tov eiireiv, kv apxpurfiriTovpjtv, rijv lf/ij&v ipt]T€, nai p,r)Sels vfxav 6avpAo"Q, 5i6ri fabyajv tt/v 5'ucrjv irpbrtpos Xiyca tov omkovtos. 1 MSL, pp. 852 ff.; Wilamowitz, Aristotdes und Athen (Berlin, 1893), II, 368-69; Glotz in Daremberg et Saglio Diet. Ant., IV, 325 (s.». " Paragraphs "); Kennedy, The Orations of Demosthenes (London, 1894), III, 379; Lipsius, Das Attische Recht und Bechtsverfahren (Leipzig, 1905-15), pp. 846-47. 2 MSL, p. 853; Wilamowitz, op. cit., p. 369; Lipsius, Recht, p. 846. The basis for this conclusion is the case in which the undated speech of Lysias Against Pancleon was delivered. The original plaintiff speaks first and the argument is confined to the special plea, to which the general term ivTiypa^ is applied. 3 MSL, pp. 852 ff.; Lipsius, Recht, pp. 846-47. [Classical Philologi XIII, April, 1918] 169 170 George Miller Calhotjn Manifestly a irapaypcujyfi is no new thing to the jury, the particular features of this kind of Tapaypaij (roiavrriv) are what require expla- nation. These, the speaker states, are primarily the point raised by the Tapaypaxfrri (ir(pi &v apxpLa^Tovfiev) and the fact that the original defendant speaks first. In the opinion of the writer, this clearly establishes that the separate hearing of special pleas was not unknown prior to the passage of the law of Archinus, and that to some of these special pleas the name irapaypa rts SiKa^r]Tai irapb. tovs opKovs, ££elvat t$ 0e6- yovr*. Tapayp&ipcurdat, rovs 8' apxovras irepl tovtov irpwrov eicrayuv, \iyav B4 irpbrepov rbv irapaypcul/anevov, birbrepos d' av ri TT7 I^S> "rip &r&>j8eXiai' 6ei\av. Evidently wapaypbif/curdai refers to a pre- existent process, which is applied, with its terminology and pro- cedure, to actions that contravene the amnesty. Stripped of the provisions which the speaker describes as innovations, the earlier procedure appears to have been about as follows: A defendant, when called on to plead, stated his exception and got the magistrate to make note of it (irapeypb-ipaTo) on the written plaint. In the action brought against Pancleon 1 by Aristodicus, the defendant seems to have adopted this course in entering a special plea, which was in this instance interrupted by the plaintiff's diafiaprvpia. In case the defendant incorporated the exception into his pleading, as Pancleon did in his later litigation (avreypafaTo), the special plea itself was called avTiypcupi)? In the Herodes "murder" case the defendant devotes a con- siderable part of his argument to the contention that the offense with which he stands charged properly does not admit of hbti&s and cLTaywyi] in the court of the Eleven. 3 Wilamowitz, 4 followed by Lipsius, 5 argues from this that special pleas interposing formal objections could not have been judged separately prior to 415. The 1 Lys. 23. 13: iv t% ivra/Mxrlg. yhp T7js iUift f)p airy i\a%ev ' ApiffriSucos oinoal, &fupiri 171 logic on which this conclusion is based is sadly at fault. What might hold true of wSei^is surely cannot be applied to all legal actions. It would be just as reasonable to argue from the Agoratus case, where similar formal objections are anticipated by the accuser, that xapa- ypaii was not practiced in 398, a manifest absurdity. 1 The Herodes speech can prove at the most only that about 415 a plea to the jurisdiction could not intervene in &5«t^is. 2 As a matter of fact there is absolutely no evidence as to when the separate hearing of special pleas was first practiced. As regards the relative antiquity of ira.pa.ypa4*h and SianaprvpLa, there is a great diversity of opinion. Lipsius believes the question cannot be answered. 3 Leisi is inclined to assign the introduction of both processes to the archonship of Euclides. 4 Glotz regards xapa- ypcupri as an outgrowth of foapaprvpia, which was the more ancient. 5 Apparently this view is based solely on his assumption that Siajuaprupia was "une vague survivance de l'antique conjuration," for he offers no other proof. But the question must be considered in the light of the conclusions that have been reached above. Aiafiaprvpia unques- tionably antedates the irapaypacfyfi of Archinus. This is established by a circumstance of which the effect apparently has not hitherto been noticed. In the very speech which describes this irapaypari as an innovation and explains it in detail, a case of dianaprvpia is casually alluded to as a proceeding with which the jury is per- fectly familiar. 6 On the other hand it cannot be demonstrated that 1 Agoratus is charged with having compassed the death of a number of promi- nent democrats by filing informations against them (Lys. 13. 2: iv^xrave, nymrfy acot' Ixelvav yevi/xeros). The basis of the prosecution throughout is that he "slew" (cf. iirdicreive, loc. cit., and 42, 63, 64, 84, 85), and the speaker repeatedly demands his condemnation as a "slayer" (cf. ai and aPTiypcupai, that preceded 403. It is true that the terms irapaypaxj>'fl and ivriypa^ cannot have been employed prior to the introduction of written plaints, but this goes as far back as our earliest sources for Attic law. 1 To sum up these conclusions briefly, the course of development was as follows : Prior to the archonship of Euclides a defendant could enter an exceptive plea by incorporating it into his pleading (d»ri- ypar)), or by getting the magistrate to note it on the plaint (japaypaii), or by putting forward a witness (Sta/xaprupia). 2 The second mode of procedure was applied by Archinus to cases in which the amnesty was made the ground for the exception, and later it completely superseded the first, so that in the time of Demosthenes all special pleas were introduced either by irapaypaufrii or by 5ia- juaprupta. 3 II. THEIR RESPECTIVE SCOPE AND FUNCTIONS Aiafiaprvpia and irapaypari were quite distinct from one another in form, though similar in effect. The procedure is for the most part well established; its details have been set forth repeatedly and the contrasts emphasized. 4 But here apparently investigation has stopped. The purposes which were served by providing two forms of plea, and the precise limits within which these were severally admis- sible, have received but slight attention. Dareste undertook unsuc- cessfully to establish the distinction that Siajuaprupia involved a i Cf. [Xen.] Cone. Ath. 3. 2. 2 The theory of Schoemann that Ifanoola was a form of special plea which was superseded in the fourth century by rapaypatpii rests on an ancient misinterpretation of Aristoph. Eccl. 1026. Cf . Lipsius, Recht, p. 847, n. 6, p. 902, n. 3 fin. Wilamowitz is of course correct in assuming that there was a time when exceptive pleas were not given separate consideration, but his erroneous inference from the Herodes case leads him to put into the brief compass of less than twenty years a process of development that probably occupied a longer time. 3 Although originally a wapaypcupj was no doubt simply a notation affixed by the magistrate to the plaint, as Trapayp&^ 173 positive assertion of fact. 1 Others deny expressly or by implication that there was any fundamental distinction of purpose between the two forms. Kennedy 2 assumes, and Glotz 3 affirms, that they were identical in scope and intention. Platner rather vaguely character- izes Siapaprvpia as "eine Art Paragraphe," 4 employed under cir- cumstances "nirgends bemerkt, vermuthlich aber dann, wenn ohne die Einwendung derselben ein Rechtsverlust zu befurchten steht, also z.B. in dem Fall, wenn zwei liber eine Sache streiten, woran einem Dritten Rechte zustehen." 5 Lipsius in Der Attische Process regarded the two pleas as identical, save in form, applicable alike to public and to private actions, with the sole distinction that in inheritance cases Siapaprvpia only is found. 6 In his later work he notes that the law 7T€pi 5>v pi) elvai St/cas apparently made no distinction in regard to the applicability of the two forms, but that in the majority of the ■jrapaypcujyf] cases which have come down to us exceptions that are not final are raised. 7 He now doubts that either plea was admissible in public actions. 8 Nowhere does he suggest that there was any essen- tial difference between them in intent or scope. Now we have seen that irapaypcujyfi completely superseded the practice of incorporating special pleas into the general traverse. Clearly this was because it served the same purpose and was more direct and expeditious. 9 Consequently the very fact that Stapaprvpia, which was more troublesome than Tapaypaxprj and attended with greater risk, 10 continued to be employed throughout the fourth century suggests that the functions of the two proceedings differed materially. 1 Les Plaidoyers civils de Demoslhene, p. xx. Lipsius has observed that in some cases this holds true of trapaypai) covering all the contentions of the plaintiff if he intended to bring his case before the court on a single issue. 10 In SuLfiapTvpla a witness had to be secured to attest the formal deposition. This witness was liable, in case of conviction, to the penalties provided for perjury, a fine, and in some cases probably disfranchisement, while the principal exposed himself to the dangers of a dixit KaKorex"^"- See the writer's " EIHSKHSMS and the AIKH *ETAOMAPTrPIQN," Class. Phil, XI (1916), 386 ff.; Lipsius, Recht, p. 857, n.il fin.; Wyse, Isaeus, p. 233. 174 Geoege Millee Calhoun Furthermore, we find that the cases in which they were severally employed are sharply differentiated in practice. In inheritance cases there is no instance of irapaypcufyri; where a special plea inter- venes, it invariably takes the form of a Sianaprvpia. On the other hand, in other classes of civil suits formal exceptions are uniformly introduced by TapaypaQ'fi, save in two cases, and those of early date. 1 So marked a line of cleavage can scarcely have been accidental. Two explanations only are possible. Either the classes of actions to which these pleas were severally applicable were expressly distinguished by law, or differences in practical working determined the choice of one or the other. The soundness of the first explanation may be tested to some extent by an examination of the legal quotations and allusions found in the arguments that have to do with wapaypwfyfi cases. Lipsius and Glotz have adequately established the grounds on which special pleas were based and have classified the decrees of court to which they gave rise as final or interlocutory. 2 But they have given little atten- tion to the precise form in which these principles were legally enacted. The problem is by no means so simple as might be inferred from the statement of Lipsius that "Ueber die Rechtsfalle der ersteren Art [final exceptions] handelt das Gesetz irepi 5>v m dvai 5Uaj." 3 While a number of grounds for final decrees were, in the Demosthenic period, comprehended in this law, 4 it is clear that others were dis- tributed throughout a great many enactments. For example, the law of Archinus provided for irapaypaai based on the amnesty, 5 and we know of at least three different laws under which irpo8efiv mrafalyeiv ZSwicev 6 vbpas, 2 ol . . . . vbpjoi .... irapayp&ev av tis ajj ml airaW&l-y, jut) SiK&^eadai, 9 &v av ctoraf yivqrai 8'ucr), p.i}k4t' H-tivax 8iK&£e(rO(u, 7 5>v av a"Q ml &iraXXa£i7 tis, pijice'ri tAs 81ms elvai. 8 In the law concerning actions against guardians we find the clause 4av pi) t4vt' Ituv Sucaauvrat, ht]k4t' elvai 8'wqv. 9 In other laws containing exceptions are found ml 81*17 . . . . pi) iarca .... p,r)8t apxh e'ura- yirw irepl tovtov pijfcpla, 10 and p,i) e'urayeiv repl robrwv els t6 Sucaarfipiov JU77S' iin\l/7iitetp tQv apxbvroav pi)8iva, pj/Se mTrjyoptiv i&vruiv, a ovk i&aiv ol vbpai. 11 From these passages one is led to conclude that in general the laws did not prescribe the form to be employed in pleading exceptions. 12 Enactments governing final exceptions con- tained merely such formulas as p-ii icrruv Sweat, pi) 8iKa$4odu>v, pi) e^eVrw Swcaf tadai, pi) apxv doayirw, and the like, singly or in various combinations. Exceptions leading to interlocutory decrees seem to 1 For example Dem. 32. 1; [Dem.] 33. 1-3; 34. 4; Dem. 37. 35-39. 2 [Dem.] 33. 2. « Dem. 38. 5. 3 [Dem.] 34. 4. ' Dem. 36. 25. « Dem. 37. 1; 38. 1. « Dem. 37. 19. 6 Dem. 32. 1. • Dem. 38. 18. 10 [Dem.] 35. 51. The authenticity of this law, as well as of the other documents in the speech, has been questioned, but there is good ground for accepting it as genuine. See Blass, Attische Beredsamkeit, III, i (1893), 562, n. 4. 11 Dem. 24. 54. This law also has been attacked as spurious, but is probably genuine. See Weil, Lea Plaidoyers politiques de Dem., II, 67 ff . n The exception made in regard to the law of Archinus was no doubt necessitated by the circumstances of its enactment. See above, p. 170. 176 George Milleb Calhoun have been provided in the clause e&p Si r« irapd ravra 5«alf77Tr\ against one suitor would in no wise prejudice the claims of the others, nor would it operate to bar future litigation by still other parties. But dianapTvpia was subject to no such limitation, and it consequently provided a con- venient means of establishing legally an indefeasible title and thereby effectively barring all other claims. Thus a son or daughter whose title to the father's estate was contested could oppose any and all 1 Compare the clause in the Alexandrian law regarding perjury prosecutions (P. Hal. i. 36 ff.: rwi Si irapi ri. yeypapn4i>a irotoviri pi) elrayiiytnos i) dUij tara). From the citations given above it is seen that in the phraseology of the laws the tendency is to use pit %ri 177 claimants by a single Siajuaprvpta, which did not specifically attack the basis of any particular claim but opposed a general bar to all by directly affirming that the estate was "not claimable at law," by reason of the existence of legitimate sons or daughters (jui) briducov rfpai rbv Kkijpov t6v tov 8etvos, ivruv airr<$ ttojZuv yvrja'uov). 1 This proceeding had the very distinct advantage of bringing the claims of sons or daughters at once before the court and thus creating a definite issue, which would be examined by itself and not confused by the introduction of argument and testimony relating to other claims. 2 It is clear that when the court by its verdict affirmed the pleading of the witness, that he "gave true testimony," 3 it legally established a title that effectually barred, not only other present claims, but also those that might be set up in the future. It may be objected that a vapaypa^ also might be so drawn up as to maintain a title by the words jm) brt&uoov tlvai. Conceivably it might, but there is no evidence that it ever was so phrased, for the formula /ti) tiaay&yiftov thai is found invariably. 4 When we con- sider that icapaypa^q was originally and essentially an objection to a particular plaint, at first probably indorsed on the document itself, 6 we are led to conclude that jlm) e'uray&yi.iwv elvai had become an invariable formula. And even if it had been allowable to alter this formula, a irapaypaii would still have been limited in its immedi- ate effect to the particular claim against which it was filed, and against other claims would have had only the value of a precedent, making necessary a troublesome multiplication of legal steps, as has been observed. 6 In view of these considerations and the fact that we find no instance of a itapaypa^ hi an inheritance case, we may conclude that hap.aprvpia was invariably employed. There is no evidence 1 It seems to be the prevailing opinion that testamentary heirs were not entitled to the privilege of Sianaprvpta (MSL, p. 606, n. 328; Wyse, op. tit., p. 234). But this is based on the assumption that the right of Siapaprvpla was inseparable from that of iuPdroKm, which is not, in the opinion of the writer, adequately established by the evidence. 2 This obscuring of the issue in a StaSucaala KMjpov is complained of in [Dem.] Oral. 43, especially 7ff. 5 Cf . the &rriypaij would have been sufficient. Certainly neither the limitations of irapaypacfrri nor the fact that we have no instance of its use in a public cause justify us in denying its admissibil- ity. However, if the writer's analysis of the legislation by which the amnesty was applied and made effective in the archonship of Euclides is correct, more convincing evidence is to be found in the law of Archinus and in the record of certain actions in which the amnesty was involved. Kennedy goes so far as to assert that irapaypa^ was first insti- tuted in the interest of those who were prosecuted for past political offenses, and that its use in civil litigation was an extension of its original functions. 1 This view goes back to Platner, who, without distinguishing between public and private actions, explains irapa- ypart as a measure intended to establish and define by court decisions the precise application of the amnesty, which was necessarily general in its provisions. 2 But it is strange that Platner did not observe the striking circumstance that in not a single case of those he cited to establish the presence of this intention was Tapaypas p.rjT€ xpt&v LiroKOTraX tlev p-fre Si/cot avbducoi. ylyvotvro, aAAa tup vb'uiiv avpfio\aUtiv aX irp&i-eis etev w 5k Srjpoa'uav k' dirbaots rj ypacj>ai eunv ij #acre« $ kvbeil-ets ij iiraycoyai, Toirrosv Zvem tois vbpois ^#u7-a<70€ xpvo-dai tbr' EwcXei&w &pxovros. 3 We have here a striking distinction between private litigation and public actions. The laws governing public actions and prosecutions for political offenses were not retroactive; they were not to hold of any act committed prior to the archonship of Euclides (tois 8k vbpois to?s KupAvois xpyoOu air' EwXeiSov &pxovTos) . 4 Thus the amnesty was so interpreted as to pro- vide full and complete immunity for all offenses which antedated the J At. Com. Ath. 39. 6; cf. Xen. HeU. 2. 4. 38 ff.; And. 1. 81 ff. 2 And. 1. 82 ff., especially 87. » Ibid., 88. * Ibid., 89. 182 George Miller Calhoun restoration, and not merelyfor those connected with the Thirty. 1 The impossibility of extending this ruling to private suits was manifest; it would at once have rendered all titles to property null and void and would have provoked an endless chaos of litigation. Therefore it was expressly affirmed in the law that all decisions of courts or arbitrators rendered under the democracy were to be valid. This clause seems on the face of it to treat alike the judgments in public and in private actions and to contain no hint of the distinction drawn by Andocides, for Swcas in the sense it must here bear of " court decisions " would cer- tainly not exclude verdicts rendered in public causes. But it must be remembered that shortly before the capitulation, in accordance with the resolution of Patroclides, all court sentences and con- demnations, save a specified few, had been expressly abrogated and revoked and all records of such sentences destroyed, and that in addi- tion all actions pending in connection with official audits had been quashed. 2 Consequently the law Andocides quotes had precisely the effect he describes. All court decisions rendered under the democ- racy in private causes were reaffirmed, while the slate was practically wiped clean as regarded public prosecutions. From the first, apparently, it was the sense of the amnesty that property rights which had existed prior to the revolution should be re-established. 3 But this was not in every case a simple matter, as Platner observes. 4 For in the course of the confiscations insti- tuted by the Thirty considerable property had been dissipated or had passed into the hands of private individuals. Clearly the law which has been quoted, while it forbade that public actions be based on circumstances which antedated the amnesty, left the door open for private litigation. The clause affirming court decisions may even have prompted injured persons to seek redress by this means. It must have resulted in many suits that infringed upon the liberal and generous interpretation of the amnesty favored by the leaders 1 Andocides brings this out clearly and insists upon it repeatedly in describing the several enactments (e.g., 82 : rwv vifiuv .... iroXXois trras ots woWoi tQv xoKt.rwv iroxoi fyav t&v wpbrepov tvexa yevopivuv; 86: woXXo« rdv voXirwr eUr fu>vt, toii Si (card ftfiplo fia.ro. irp&rtpov yeviptva). J Ibid., 73-80. Cf. Busolt, Gr. Gesch., Ill, 1626-27. 5 Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 38: dirUvat Si M t4 iavrOv txatrTOp; cf. Underhill's note ad loc. * Op. til., pp. 151 ff. Siapaprvpia and vapaypcuprj 183 of the restored democracy, 1 and it must have opened an inviting field to the professional sycophant. 2 To curb this gentry and to preserve the spirit of the amnesty in the fullest sense, Archinus proposed and the Srjpos adopted this law permitting defendants to file a plea in bar of any civil suit which contravened the amnesty. That this was the purpose of the enactment, and that it was intended to apply only to civil litigation is indicated by still other considerations than those set forth above. In the first place, the phrasing of the law can be satisfactorily explained only on the supposition that it was intended to apply to civil litigation. The prescription of &r«/SeXia is in itself a serious objection to the view that the law comprehended public as well as private causes, 3 and the clause &v r« Suc&f 7/rai irapa tovs BpKovs, which defines the scope of the enactment, expressly limits its application to civil cases if we understand Swc&f^rai in its normal and proper sense. 4 Furthermore, Archinus was the most enthusiastic proponent of the amnesty, the most uncompromising champion of those who demanded that the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement be scrupulously observed. He it was who kept many of the city party from fleeing in their first panic to Eleusis and who later successfully resisted the attempt to swell the majority of the extreme democrats by the creation of new citizens/ he it was who haled before the fiovki) a man who undertook to disregard the amnesty and persuaded the members to put him to death, summarily, without trial, as an example for others. 6 Are we to believe that Archinus would have proposed for those who sought to bring political > Isoc. 18. 23 ff. * Ibid., 2. 3 ' Exw/SeXf a is found only in connection with private actions (Lipsius, Recht, p. 937) . Assuredly it would not here have been prescribed if the rapaypaip^ had been intended to apply to public as well as private actions. It is a conclusive objection to Ken- nedy's view (cf. above, p. 180) that the law of Archinus originally contemplated only public actions. 4 That Suc&fardai properly refers to private litigation is clearly brought out in Dem. 21. 26; 22. 27; Lys. 1. 44; 13. 65; [And.] 4. 35. Furthermore, throughout the orators the exact meaning of the term is observed with a scrupulous nicety that effectually precludes any possibility of interpreting it loosely in a legal enactment. The writer has been unable to find any instance of its use which would justify us in so understanding it here as even to include public aotions. The only departures from the strict usage noted above are a few instances where the word is used metaphorically, and the figure has every appearance of having been drawn from the field of civil litigation (cf. [Dem.] 7. 8; 59.115; Dem. 24. 121). 6 Ar. Cone. Ath. 40. 1-2. « Ibid., 2. 184 Geoege MiLiiEB Calhoun prosecutions so mild a penalty as that provided in this law; that the man who had put to death, almost with his own hand, one who attempted to violate the amnesty would have been satisfied to mulct offenders of a class which he so heartily detested only in the &rw/3eXia ? It is incredible. We are forced to the conclusion that the law was not intended to apply to public actions, which were sufficiently regulated by the enactments cited by Andocides, but was supplementary to those enactments and had for its purpose merely to check the activities of sycophants and to discourage the flood of civil litigation that impended, much of which came perilously near to violating the amnesty. The influence which public opinion exerted on the magistrates whose duty it was to receive accusations appears to have proved a sufficient safeguard for those who were attacked in public actions on political grounds, 1 save in such cases as that of the notorious informer Agoratus. 2 However, a further obstacle appar- ently was opposed to the use of the courts as a means of satisfying old political grudges by requiring magistrates to take an oath to the effect that they would not receive any action or indictment based on acts committed prior to the archonship of Euclides, except in the case of the exiles. 3 Taking these conclusions with the fact that we have no case of Trapaypa7} in any public cause, the writer is inclined to believe that it was employed only in private actions. As regards dia/iaprvpia the 1 The trial-is against Philon apparently was not permitted to come into court (Isoc. 18. 22) . As late as 382 an attempt to prevent Evander from becoming archon on the ground of his alleged connection with the Thirty was unsuccessful (Lys. Oral. 26; cf. Jebb, Attic Orators, I, 238). In the case of Andocides it may be remarked that, since he was charged simply with impiety in having entered the Eleuainian temple (Jebb, op. cit., I, 112-13), the relation of the charge to his earlier offenses may not have been so apparent as to justify the magistrate in refusing to receive it. There can be little doubt that public opinion favored the defendant (Jebb, op. cit., pp. 114-15). 2 There is reason to believe that the Eleven favored the accusation when they permitted an iirayuy^ and prompted the insertion of the words ^r' airoip'h 185 problem is more difficult, for we are confronted by a scarcity of evidence that makes definite conclusions impossible. Aiafiaprvpia may well have been better adapted to public actions than irapaypaijyi], 1 and the fact that it involved iirufiihia does not, as in the case of irapa- ypcu/yfl, afford any ground for conclusions. 2 But the evidence for its admissibility is of the most doubtful character, 3 and the fact remains that we have no instance of a bia/iaprvpla in a public action. Where the evidence is so slight, it would be unsafe to attempt any positive solution, but the writer is inclined to believe that the practice of interposing special pleas originated and developed solely in connection with civil litigation and was never at any time extended to public actions. All that we know of the legislative program that followed the restoration and of later procedure points to this conclusion. Univebsity op California i Because it could be so worded as to make the exact ground of the exception a "matter of record," which could easily be brought again before a court by merely pro- ducing the original witness (cf. above, pp. 176 f.). 2 In Siafrnprvpla the £rwf)t\la would be computed on the fine proposed in the SIkii fevSoimpTvpluv, a private suit. 8 This evidence is discussed by Lipsius in MSL (p. 841, n. 212) , and with very differ- ent conclusions in Becht (p. 858). The writer is inclined to accept Lipsius' later judgment.