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JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. THE COST TO ATHENS OF HER SECOND EMPIRE 1 By Frank Eglbston Robbins In the following pages an attempt will be made to restore some of the more important items in the balance sheet of the Athenian mili- tary and naval establishments during the years 378-369 B.C. The writer does not begin this undertaking without foreknowledge of the difficulties that attend upon an investigation of this sort, where each question that arises requires that all the factors involved be first discovered, then correlated and interpreted. Such inquiries would be doubly hazardous were it not for the numerous researches that in late years have been made upon special problems of Greek history and finance, which both furnish new instruments to the student of ancient life and show him the method which he must adopt in his own work; to the men that have made them he must be profoundly grateful. The present essay uses the results of these studies at every step and has for its objects both to cast some light upon the subject of state expenditures and to discover a new way of approach to the vexed questions of the amounts of the tribute, of the state revenues, and of the surplus, in the second Athenian empire. One of the peculiar embarrassments of the investigator of this period is that none of these points is clearly and definitely decided by the sources, in spite of the rich material afforded by Demosthenes, Xenophon, Diodorus, and the inscriptions. It is in order to take 1 The following abbreviations are used in citing the works most frequently referred to: Busolt=G. Busolt, "Der zweite athenische Bund," J.f.kl.Ph., Suppl. 7, 643 ff. ; Beloch=Beloch, Griechische Geschichte; Beloch, A. P.=Beloch, Die attische Politik seit Perikles; Meyer=E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, Bd. 5; Gilbert =G. Gilbert, The Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, translated by E. J. Brooks and T. Nicklin (London, 1895); Boeckh=A. Boeckh, Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener, 3d ed., revised by M. Frankel (Berlin, 1886) ; Boeckh, S. =Boeckh, Urkunden Uber das Seewesen des attischen Staates, Bd. 3 of the Staatshaushaltung, edition of Berlin, 1840; A.A. =B. Keil, Anonymus Argentinensis (Strassburg, 1902); Marshall =F. H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy (Cambridge, 1905). Citations of Xeno- phon refer to the Hellenica unless otherwise specified. The writer wishes to acknowl- edge gratefully the criticism of Professor William Scott Ferguson, of Harvard University. [Classical Philology XIII, October, 1918] 361 362 Feank Egleston Robbins advantage of one bit of exact information amid this uncertainty, that is, the amount of the war taxes voted during the first ten years of the Second League, that the scope of this paper is limited to the years 378-369. It must be added, by way of preface, that in the present essay far more attention has been paid to the expenditures of Athens than to her receipts, and that in fact the aim of the paper is to furnish a basis for further investigation of Athenian revenues. This atti- tude has been adopted because the amounts expended can usually be conjectured with some degree of certainty, 1 while there are fewer principles whereby to govern estimates of the receipts. Yet even in the question of expense there enter many elements that cannot be reduced to figures. Dishonesty, for example, would tend to increase cost, but though we know that the Greeks were only too prone to laxity in this regard and can cite instances from the history of the Second League, 2 we could never estimate the effect of such delin- quency upon finance. Inefficiency also spoils rule-of-thumb reckon- ings. Generals who wasted effort and failed in their mission must certainly have spent more than the normal amount, and if sometimes we find old campaigners, like Timotheus, unable to cope with diffi- cult situations, much greater must have been the ineffectiveness of the amateur generals of Athens. 3 Again, not all the military and naval operations are reported by the historians; the greater ones are described satisfactorily enough, but minor expeditions, the main- tenance of garrisons and posts, and the use of ships for convoy service, all inconspicuous but still expensive features of warfare, are usually neglected. It is also hard to calculate the cost of fortifications, ship- yards, and munitions, and incidental expenses incurred by com- manders over and above the pay of their troops; while on the other hand booty and forage secured by the forces reduced expenses in a measure that is seldom precisely known. For all these reasons we can expect to arrive at only an approximation of the truth. 1 Cf. Boeckh's remark (I, 357) and below, p. 386. 2 E.g., the instance reported by Aeschin. i. 56 (Hegesander, treasurer of the general Timomachus, profits to the amount of 80 minas from the "simplicity" of the general) . 3 The system of trierarchies left many loopholes for dishonesty or malingering. Cost to Athens of Second Empire 363 The items of expense to be considered may be enumerated as follows: 1 I. Maintenance of the navy. 1. Cost of re-establishing the navy in 378. 2. Cost of replacement and increase in the navy, 377-369. 3. Extraordinary repairs to war ships. 4. Cost of new shiphouses; stores and munitions; mainte- nance of the Piraeus. II. Operating expenses of army and navy. 1. Regularly maintained armaments, o) Guard ships and sea police. b) Garrisons outside of Attica. c) The sacred triremes. d) The cavalry. 2. Occasional armaments, military and naval expeditions. To meet these charges there were the following sources of revenue : 2 (1) the war tax (elo-#opd) of the Athenians; (2) the tribute ( irpo$ AlytviiTas TroXe;u iiiKKbvnw 'AStivaiav rty \k twv kpyvpetwv irpbaobov, txarbv T&Xapra, hiavkiieadai, KwXiMras iireiv ira\aubv Tpiqlpobv ruiv in irXwfju>"' !irijU«X]e[t]opa of 10 talents was applied to this purpose. 3 Even before the time of the Second League some accommodations for ships must have been arranged, and there is mention of structures of one sort or another in the inscriptions. 4 These were probably not of an expensive character. In 330-329 there were at least 372 shiphouses, according to I.G., II, 807, col. c. Assuming that at least half of the amount later raised annually was applied during 378-369, we may allow 50 talents to meet these items. This is of course low and will not account for all the purchases of munitions nor for maintenance. 5 1 The amount to which reference was made (p. 364) as the payment by which the trierarch was allowed to fulfil his obligation to repair his ship. 2 Even in the years 396 or 395 veaaoiKoi. existed; cf. Oxyrh. Pap. V, No. 842, col. 1 , 11. 1 ff . 3 Boeckh, I, 254, Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, p. 10, with notes. 4 Boeckh, S., pp. 64 ff., on shiphouses and storehouses. 6 For the rigging no great expense would be regularly required as it was exacted of the trierarchs when possible. But they sometimes fell into arrears and occasionally special efforts were made to collect outstanding debts of rigging or its equivalent in money (Dem. xlvii. 21 ff.). Satyrus, however, seems to have expended 34 talents of war taxes in arrears for antin); Dem. xxii. 63. Cost to Athens of Second Empire 373 ii. operating expenses 1. Regularly maintained armaments. — a) Guard ships and sea police: It is a well-known fact that the Athenians kept constantly in commission ships known as the sacred triremes, and it is further- more proved that at least in the fifth century regular cruising fleets or guard ships (povpi5es vrjes) were kept in commission from year to year. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War these numbered 20 and service on them was a regular means of support for a large number of citizens. 1 For the maintenance of guard ships during the fourth century there is no such direct proof, but their existence must be demonstrated from the precedent established in the fifth century, from the argument that may be drawn from the manifest need for them, and from a few bits of positive testimony. More than any other Greek city Athens was dependent upon the importation of corn, 2 and it was to her a matter of life 'and death that the trade routes by sea should be kept open. Her foes realized this, and in time of war attempted to block the passage of the corn fleet, as Pollis did before the battle of Naxos, 3 but even in times of peace pirates and privateers were a constant menace. The pirates often moved together in regularly organized fleets, and equally organized policing was necessary to cope with them. Privateers, who sometimes received governmental encouragement to attack enemy shipping, are of course to be distinguished from the outlaw pirates (KaTairovTiaTai) , but the state that suffered doubtless regarded the one with as little favor as the other. Throughout the period that Athens was at war with Sparta in the fourth century, both during the Corinthian War and from 378 to 371, Aegina, an island always hostile and never a member of the Second League, was the headquarters of privateers who assailed the shipping and the coast villages of Attica. Xenophon, as has been remarked above, tells of their depredations and of the steps that the Athenians found necessary to take to guard against them. The Aeginetans on this occasion acted with the sanction of Sparta, and upon the breaking 'Arist. Const. Ath. e. 24 and Sandys' note; the latter calculates that 11 ships were stationed at Naupactus, but this naval base did not exist in the fourth century. 2 Dem. xx. 31; Grundy, Thucydides and the History of His Age, pp. 58 ff., 186 ff. 3 Diod. xv. 34. 3. 374 Frank Egleston Robbins out of hostilities again in 378 this encouragement was probably renewed. Certainly the raids from Aegina were continued, and the distress caused by them and by the necessity of constant watchful- ness against them was one of the reasons why Athens was quite ready to make peace in 374. x It is obvious that as long as this danger lasted Athens would have to garrison her coast villages and patrol the home waters with her ships. The danger from outlaw pirates was not confined to times of war but was ever present, and there is abundant evidence for the fact that the Aegean, and especially the Hellespontine region, was over- ridden with freebooters, who passed all bounds of insolence and violence unless means were taken to check them. The sea swarmed with them after the peace of Antalcidas was made, Isocrates says; 2 and his testimony seems to imply both that Athens in better times managed to suppress the pirates to some extent, and that Sparta in her ascendancy was less successful. Probably, too, when he wrote there had been an improvement in conditions, now that Athens had again resumed importance as a sea power. But with all her efforts and with all her hostility to the pirates Athens could not rid the sea of them; they sacked towns and made them the bases of their marauding expeditions, 3 and they preyed incessantly upon commerce. Philip is represented as writing to the Athenians that they overlooked it when the pirates took refuge at Thasos, while Hegesippus declares on the other hand that in proposing to maintain with Athens a joint police of the sea Philip wished either to force her to admit her inability to keep the sea open without aid or else to get her to safeguard his own commerce; he was at any rate on this excuse building ships and sailing among the islands in a way that was alarming to Athens. 4 Ancient states, as Athens in the case of Thasos and Sparta in that of Aegina, do not seem to have seriously objected to the establishment of piratical holds as thorns in the side of an enemy; but Athens certainly cannot have allowed the pirates to 1 Xen. vi. 2.1. On the Athenian fleets dispatched at this time see pp. 366-67, above. 2 iv. 115. 3 Halonesus ([Dem.] vii. 2 ff .) , Halopekonnesus ([Dem.] xxiii. 166-67) . At the latter place the pirates were regularly besieged by Cephisodotus and were relieved by Charidemus. 4 (Dem.) xii. 2; vii. 14 ff. Cost to Athens of Second Empire 375 threaten her necessary food supply from the Euxine. After the siege of Samos in 366-365 Athens was constantly interested in the Cher- sonese and seems to have maintained regularly a fleet and a force of men near the Hellespont, one of the duties of which was to see that the corn fleet came safely through the Hellespont. 1 In addition the commanders of the Athenian forces among the islands in the fourth century made it a part of their duty to care for the safe convoy of the corn fleet through their waters, 2 and there is record of the assignment of special convoy duties to state officers. 3 It is perfectly obvious that all through the fourth century some means had to be taken to insure the safe arrival of these supplies. In addition to this strong argument from probability there are a few passages in the literature that may be easily construed to imply the existence of a squadron in home waters always ready to do guard duty or to perform on short notice other tasks which would not require a large number of ships. In the first place it seems very probable that when Sparta in 404 allowed Athens to retain only 12 ships this fleet was reckoned to be the minimum number that would be needed to patrol the Athenian coasts and the trade routes, and doubtless two of the 12 were the sacred triremes. Such protection was absolutely necessary for the existence of Athens and at the same time would not allow her to menace Spartan supremacy. Next, it has been observed 4 that during the Corinthian War squadrons of from 10 to 13 vessels operated in defense of Attica while the main fleet was overseas; and that, after 387, Isocrates complains of the relaxed vigilance over the pirates. Finally, two incidents in the history of the Second League point to the maintenance of a cruising fleet. In 372 Iphicrates made every possible effort to take a strong fleet to the west on short notice; his vigorous measures excite the admiration of Xenophon,who reports, among other details: wpocreka^e 8k Kal irapa ruv 'Adrjvaluv nal e'i irov tl$ vavs wepl rr\v 'Attiktiv «rX«i 1 Dem. 1. 6, 17, 19, 20 ff. (Athenian Hellespontine fleet required to act as escort). 2 Cf. especially Antiphanes ap. Athen. viii. 342 E, and Wilhelm, Urkunden trag- ischer Auffilhrungen, p. 248; Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, p. 142, n. 3. 3 Dem. xviii. 73 (one of the inserted documents) : a squadron of 20 ships sent to the Hellespont. Trierarchs appointed iiri ri)v v\a.Kijv t&v Xqitt&v in 335-334 : I.G., II, 804, col. b, ll. 32 ff. 4 See p. 365. 376 Frank Egleston Robbins Kal rfjv ILapaXov icai rfjv XaXa/Mviav (vi. 2. 14). This must mean that he took the regular coast patrol ships; so Grote 1 assumes, who remarks that when the fleet reached Sphacteria and found that the Corcyrean crisis was past the extra ships were doubtless sent back. The other incident occurred in 366. Corinth, having learned that Athens desired to acquire a permanent foothold, requested that the Athenian garrisons in her territory be removed, and Chares suddenly appeared off Cenchrea with a fleet. 2 The maneuver accomplished nothing and was but a display of force, but in view of the fact that it was so hastily executed it seems probable that Chares could call upon a small guard fleet that was immediately available. The facts mentioned are certainly enough to show that there was a guard fleet in the fourth century, especially when they are taken in connection with our knowledge that this was no new thing but had been regarded as a regular and necessary institution in the fifth century. But the fleet was probably not a large one. In the first place, it was not successful enough in the suppression of piracy; the proposal of Moerocles in 340 or thereabouts to secure greater pro- tection of commerce against piracy shows that the evil persisted to an alarming extent. 3 Again, in 404 it seems to have been composed of 10 ships and during the Corinthian War of from 10 to 13. The 20 guard ships at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War were main- tained at a time when the enemies of Athens menaced her from all sides and when the business of her great maritime empire demanded constant activity among the islands, and furthermore, half of them seem to have been required for the station at Naupactus. Probably in the fourth century no more than 10 ships were needed and then not for the full cruising season, except when the Aeginetan pirates were active. As an average for the decade, four months cruising each year is enough to estimate for the full strength of the squadron, for they would not always sail together and in the years when the great fleets under Timotheus or Chabrias were at sea there would not be so much need for their protection. The expense of such a fleet for this length of time would be 266f talents, or roundly 260 talents. 4 i History of Greece, X, 135. 2 Xen. vii. 4. 5. 3 (Dem.) lviii. 53, assigned to ca. 340 by Blass, Chronologic!, Demosthenica, p. 33. Cf. (Dem.) lviii. 56. 4 On the method of calculation see pp. 371-72. Cost to Athens of Second Empire 377 b) Garrisons outside of Attica; c) sacred triremes; d) cavalry: It is useless to speculate as to the expenditures made by the Athenians in maintaining garrisons, for the matter is very indefinite; but it may be worth while to review the evidence that garrisons were from time to time placed outside Attica. Just before the Peloponnesian War 2,000 men yearly were employed in this way, 1 but when the Second League was organized Athens declared her intention of giving up the practice. 2 The exigencies of war, of course, might demand temporary guards, and as the league again grew more like an empire they were sometimes sent to revolted towns, but probably they never gained the permanent character of the garrisons of the fifth century. The only attested case where a garrison was placed in a city of the league is that of Andros, as shown by I.G., II, 62, but this falls outside the decade under discussion. In this case the expense was to be paid from the island tributes. More often the garrisons were placed either as offensive or as defensive military measures, as when Chabrias left one to annoy Oreus in 378-377, or when they held exposed positions like Potidaea. 3 Again, forces left for some time in certain regions, as those sent to help Corinth and the Peloponnesians against Theban invasion, and the battalion led by Stesicles to Zacynthus and Corcyra, practically amount to garri- sons. But no estimate of cost can be made. The sacred triremes at this time probably were two, the "Paralus" and the "Salaminia," waiving the question whether there was a special craft for the Delian voyage. The latter was a small boat and its upkeep purely a religious matter; but the two former were the express ships of the state, whose crews, whether at sea or not, were paid through the year by the state. They received 4 obols a day, and Boeckh reckons the annual cost of the two ships at 16 talents l,333j drachmas. 4 It is probable that this money came out of the war chest and should therefore enter our reckoning. 5 For ten years it would total in round numbers 160 talents. 1 Arist. Const. Ath. 24. 2 See Busolt, p. 729; Gilbert, p. 439; I.G., II, 17, U. 20 ff. 3 Diod. xv. 30. 5; xvi. 8. 5. 4 Boeckh, I, 305 ff.; Gilbert, p. 348, n. 4; Kohler, A.M., VIII, 168 ff. 6 Gilbert so judges (p. 348, n. 3). The sacred triremes were sometimes used as "warships; Xen. vi. 2. 14; Dem. xxi. 174. 378 Frank Egleston Robbins The cavalry was paid even in time of peace about 40 talents for the support of their horses. 1 Gilbert says that this came from the war funds; Boeckh, from the current revenues. The former seems more likely. In times of war, on active service, the cavalryman received a drachma a day. 2. Occasional armaments; military and naval expeditions. — Boeckh states 2 that if the necessary details are known about Greek military operations it is possible to estimate their cost. The factors that have to be considered are the number of men, the length of service, and the rate of pay; by simple arithmetic the normal cost can be figured from these, but of course to the result should be added the inevitable incidental expenses and the cost of munitions and fortifications, while from it should be subtracted any amounts that are acquired as booty or otherwise and applied to the cost of an expedition. Since the incidental expenses are impossible to estimate, and the value of booty and reprisals is often difficult to discover, at best only approximate accuracy can be secured. In view of the general agreement of modern investigators it may be assumed without further argument that both soldiers and sailors in the fourth century were paid usually at the rate of 4 obols a day, including wage {txiados) and ration money {airnpicnov) , 3 and that for financial purposes the crew of a trireme was reckoned at 200. 4 On this basis we may record and estimate the cost of the military and naval operations of this decade. They are as follows: Gilbert, p. 348, n. 4; Boeckh, I, 317. Xen. Hipparch. i. 19; I.G., I, 188: pay- ment in 410-409 of more than 16 talents in four prytanies by the treasurers of Athena to the Hellenatomiae, crtros i'jnrois. Payments still made in Demosthenes' time; Dem. xxiv. 97. 2 1, 357. 3 Boeckh, I, 340 ff.; Francotte, L' Industrie dans la Grece antique, II, 34; Busolt, p. 721; A. J. Reinach, "Les mercenaires et les colonies militaires de Pergame," Rev. Arch. (1908), pp. 174 ff., especially p. 201. The locus classicus on this matter is Dem. iv. 28, which seems to deal with the ordinary rates. In times of especial stress they were raised. Other citations on rate of pay: 4 obols a day, Xen. Anab. i. 3. 21 (1 daric, or 20 drachmas, a month, raised to 1J darics); 3 obols a day, Xen. Hell. i. 5. 5; Thuc. viii. 29; 1 drachma a day, Thuc. ibid.; 2 drachmas a day. Thuc. iii. 17. 3; promises of extraordinary pay, Xen. Anab. vii. 2. 36; 3. 10. 4 Torr, Ancient Ships 11; Boeckh I, 346 ff.; but Zimmern, Greek Commonwealth 401, 411, reckons on the basis of 170 rowers, 10 marines, and 8 officers at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Cost to Athens of Second Empire 379 1. 378. Mobilization of the troops after the attempt of Sphodrias to surprise the city. 1 Probably no expenditure involved. 2. 377, end of March to end of April. Chabrias in Boeotia opposes Agesilaus on his second raid. 2 Little was done, and Chabrias was at sea the rest of the year. The number of men is not known, but in the preceding spring on a similar occasion Chabrias had led 5,000 mercenaries and 200 cavalry into Boeotia. 3 The pay of this body for a month would be 18 talents 40 minas (16 talents 40 minas for the infantry and 2 talents for the cavalry), and may be taken as a fair basis for estimating the cost of the second campaign at about the same amount, in round numbers 15 talents. 3. 377, summer; activity of Chabrias in the Aegean with a fleet. 4 The size of his fleet and the length of his campaign are not reported; the fleet, however, must have been large enough to command respect, while it was not powerful enough to reduce Oreus, and the voyage must have lasted the rest of the cruising season, after the campaign in Boeotia, from May till November, six months. Timotheus took Samos with 30 ships and a force of peltasts; Chabrias' fleet would be no larger, and perhaps would best be estimated at about 20 sail. On this basis the cost would be about 20 talents, from which no deductions for booty or assistance from the islanders should be made, for there seems to have been little chance to secure booty, save at Oreus, and an Athenian general would not wish to ask for funds from the islanders while soliciting them as allies. 4. 376, spring. Third expedition of Chabrias into Boeotia; details unknown; cost probably about the same as that of the former (No. 2). 5 5. 376, summer. The accounts of the battle of Naxos are full but confused. 6 Diodorus says that the Athenian fleet numbered 83 ; 1 Xen. v. 4. 21, Diod. xv. 29. 7. 2 Xen. v. 4. 47 ff.; Diod. xv. 34; ci. Busolt, p. 745; Meyer, p. 388; Marshall, p. 58. The time estimate is Busolt's. 3 Diod. xv. 32. 2; of. Beloch, II, 237; see Kromayer, Klio, III, 47 ff., for evidence that 5,000 or 6,000 men were usually dispatched on ordinary campaigns by Athens. 4 Diod. xv. 30. 2-5; Beloch, A.P., p. 316; Busolt, p. 745; Meyer, p. 387. 5 Xen. v. 4. 59; Beloch, II, 237. 6 Diod. xv. 34 ff.; Dem. xx. 77-80; Xen. v. 4. 61 ff.; Plutarch Phoc. 6; Polyaenus iii. 11. 2; Meyer, p. 393, Marshall, pp. 59 f. 380 Frank Egleston Robbins in the battle 18 Athenian and 24 Spartan ships were lost and 8 Spartan ships captured, crews and all, and that Chabrias returned with much spoils. Demosthenes reports that in the battle Chabrias took 49 triremes, won over many cities for the league, and brought home more than 3,000 captives and over 110 talents in booty, besides which he took more than 20 triremes, one or two at a time. Summing up the deeds of Chabrias he again states the number of captured ships as 70. Demosthenes' declaration that Chabrias never lost a city, a garrison, a man, or a ship may be discounted as a natural and pardon- able eulogy of that gallant officer; by his own fault Chabrias probably never had incurred such losses, but it is evident that the battle at Naxos was not won without some damage to the Athenian fleet. Aeschines (iii. 222) implies this, and it is safe to follow the definite statement of Diodorus that 18 ships were lost. Pollis had commenced his action in the summer and the battle occurred in September (six- teenth of Boedromion). After the battle Chabrias most probably delayed only long enough to complete the reduction of Naxos, not a hard task after the victory, before sailing home, so that the length of the campaign was only four months at most. The normal pay for his fleet at this time would be 221 talents, 20 minas, or 220 talents in round numbers. On the credit side, the captured ships have been dealt with elsewhere; the 110 talents are to be counted, together with the value of the 3,000 captives 1 ransomed or sold as slaves. As a basis for calculation we may use the statement of Diodorus (xv. 47. 7) that the crews of 9 Sicilian ships captured by the Athenians were redeemed for 60 talents; the 3,000 represent the crews of 15 ships and at the same rate would bring 100 talents. 2 This makes the total credit item 210 talents. 6. 375, spring-summer. After the battle of Naxos, Chabrias cruised in the Aegean, relieved Abdera in Thrace from an attack by the Triballi, and brought many cities into the league. 3 These events 1 Diodorus merely reports that he took 8 ships with their crews, or 1,6Q0 men. We follow Demosthenes' account. 2 About 2 minas a man; sold as slaves they would realize more; cf. Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, pp. 67-68. 3 Diod. xv. 36. 4 (putting it in the year after the battle) . I follow the usual opinion (see Busolt, p. 760; Beloch, A. P., p. 316; Meyer, p. 394; Marshall, pp. 60 f.) in assign- ing this cruise to the year 375 ; Grote (X, 118) puts it immediately after the battle of Naxos. Naxos probably was taken and forced to join the league after the battle (see Cost to Athens op Second Empire 381 would afford sufficient occupation for the eight months of the cruising season of that year. Diodorus says simply that Chabrias went perk Svvaneus ; but his fleet was enough to effect the relief of Abdera and can hardly have been less than 30 ships. 1 Timotheus at the same time had a fleet of 60 sail, and on this account Chabrias may not have been able to take as many as he had had the previous year. The normal cost for 30 ships would be 180 talents, but it may be assumed that the contributions of the Abderites and the booty taken would reduce this one-third, to 120 talents. 7. Spring 375-summer 374; Timotheus with 60 ships sailed around the Peloponnesus, gained a battle at Alyzia in June (twelfth of Skirophorion), won over Corcyra and other western cities, and remained in the west until the declaration of peace in the summer of 374. 2 The fleet was away for at least 15 months, but the ancient custom was to pay soldiers and sailors only during active service, and we may assume that Timotheus, who was as good a manager as Iphicrates, would find some way to provide for his men during the winter; perhaps as Iphicrates did, by securing farm work for them. The pay need be reckoned for only twelve months, therefore, and would amount to 480 talents normally. The whole of this amount, however, should not be charged to Timotheus. He has already been credited with taking several ships, 3 but besides this he seems to have contributed by his own devices large sums of money, doubtless in part by levying on hostile cities. Timotheus enjoys the reputation, indeed, of having been able on nearly every occasion to defray the cost of his operations without calling on the treasury, and this rests almost entirely on the testimony of Isocrates, although there are other stories current which show that Timotheus was really a clever military financier. Because Isocrates is so evidently a prejudiced witness in all matters relating to his close Gilbert, p. 445 and notes 1, 2, refuting Busolt, pp. 757 ff.), and repairs were required by the fleet; this would leave no time for the relief of Abdera in 376. It is better to assign to Chabrias the addition of the Aegean cities to the league (so Busolt, pp. 761 ff.) than to Timotheus (Schaefer's view). 1 This is the number assumed by Busolt, p. 721. 2 Diod. xv. 36. 5; Xen. v. 4. 63 ff.; Nepos Tim. 1-2; Polyaenus iii. 10. 4, 6, 12, 13, 16, 17; Frontinus ii. 5. 47; Beloeh, II, 242; Busolt, pp. 760 ff.; Meyer, pp. 395, 397-98; Marshall, pp. 62 f. 3 See above, p. 379. 382 Frank Egleston Robbins friend Timotheus, I am unable to believe the literal truth of all that he says of these exploits, 1 and in the present instance a comparison of his account with the more unbiased one of Xenophon leaves me frankly skeptical, though admitting that Timotheus did undoubtedly provide much of his own expense money. Isocrates is undoubtedly trying to make the best possible case for the friend he is defending when he says (xv. 109) . . . . eis p,tv rbv TrepiirXovv tov irtpl IleXo- ■wovv-qaov rpla Kal dixa /xovov Ta\avra Sovarrjs aura) rrjs irokecos Kal rpirfpas irevT-qKovTa Kopavpav eIXe, ktX. Xenophon assigns to Timo- theus a greater number of ships, 60 instead of 50, and a remark which he makes concerning the financial aspect of the matter casts suspicion on the good faith of Isocrates: xPW aTa P-evroi utreivinwiTO 'A6r]vr]$ev ttoWcov yap eSetro, are iroXXds vavs ^x uv ( v - 4- 66). It is hardly probable that the repeated appeals of Timotheus (implied in the imperfect tense) brought him only 13 talents; it is far more reason- able to suppose that the city gave him this amount when he set out than that it was the total amount received by him; 2 and if this small sum is all that he had when he left Athens it is easy to motivate his subsequent appeals for more. Neither on this occasion, when the normal outlay was well over 400 talents, nor on that of the siege of Samos in 364, when the normal pay for his forces would be at least 466 talents 40 minas 3 and probably more, does it seem reasonable to erase enormous sums on the mere word of the General's most devoted admirer. Isocrates' testimony will be allowed all it is worth if we concede that Timotheus himself provided two-thirds of his expenses — twice the proportion assigned to Chabrias above — and thus reduced the actual cost of the cruise to the state to about 160 talents. 8. 374, fall. Stesicles with 600 peltasts operated in Zacynthus and Corcyra from this time on, but there is considerable obscurity about the details. 4 Beloch's view is that he went in the fall of 374, 1 Timotheus' ill success in 373 (see p. 383, below) shows that he was not always able to avert disaster brought on by lack of funds. 2 Midias, as treasurer of the "ParaKis," was intrusted with just about this sum (12 talents) for the Euboean expedition of 357 (Dem. xxi. 174). Marshall (p. 76) says that the 13 talents were "for the entire expenses of the expedition," but he quotes Xenophon, as above. 3 8,000 peltasts and 30 ships for ten months of actual siege, without reckoning the cost of siege works or other expenses. 4 Diod. xv. 47. 4 (calling him Ctesicles and assigning him 500 men) ; Xen. vi. 2. 10. Cost to Athens of Second Empire 383 on the fresh outbreak of hostilities, to Zacynthus, as a temporary- measure until the fleet of Timotheus could sail in the following spring; that he stayed in Zacynthus until the following fall, when he crossed to Corcyra and helped defend the city against Mnasippus in the winter of 373-372. * There is evidence that this force did not come home until the departure of Iphicrates in June, 371. Xenophon (vi. 2. 37) says that in the winter of 372-371 Iphicrates put his sailors to work upon the Corcyrean farms and himself campaigned on the mainland with the hoplites and peltasts. The latter are probably the force of Stesicles, which therefore spent about thirty- three months in all in the west. They may perhaps have been idle the first winter in Zacynthus, but they certainly were not the second nor the third. Allowing for this one winter, their pay for thirty months would be 60 talents. One-half of this amount may be sup- posed to have been met by the allies or otherwise. 9. April-November, 373; the fruitless cruise of Timotheus and his idleness at Calauria. 2 The cruise, which lasted about seven months, would under normal conditions have cost 280 talents, but it is clear that Timotheus had neither full crews nor a full allowance of money. Still there was doubtless a waste of public money as well as of time to enrage the Athenians, and the expedition could hardly put to sea at all without the expenditure of about 50 talents, less than one-quarter of the normal cost. 10. Spring, 372-summer, 371. Iphicrates, who succeeded Timo- theus, undertook the voyage to Corcyra with a speed and efficiency highly praised by Xenophon. 3 Taking the coast guard and the sacred triremes 4 he made up a fleet of 70 sail and probably set out as early in the spring as possible. The Spartans, however, had not remained at Corcyra to give battle, and Iphicrates could only reduce some cities of Cephallenia and capture 9 Sicilian ships, from the ransom of 1 Beloeh, II, 244-45; A.P., p. 359; Meyer, p. 399. Grote, X, 127 gives a different view, which can hardly be correct. Marshall (p. 67) assumes that Stesicles went immediately to Corcyra. 2 Xen. vi. 2. 11; Diod. xv. 47. 2 (much confused); (Dem.) xlix. Marshall (pp. 68 f.) wrongly assumes that Timotheus was active in the Aegean this year, not idle. (Dem.) furnishes the notices of the time limits of this affair. 3 Xen. vi. 2. 13 ff.; (Dem.) xlix. 9 ff.; Meyer, pp. 403 ff. 4 See above, p. 375. 384 Frank Egleston Robbins whose crews he received 60 talents. 1 During the winter, while his sailors were put to work on the farms of Corcyra, he campaigned in Acarnania with his own hoplites and the peltasts of Stesicles, and in the spring, with Corcyrean reinforcements, bringing its number up to 90, his fleet sailed to Cephallenia and collected levies from the hostile cities and contributions from the friendly ones. 2 This shows that it was no easy matter to pay his men, and another indication is that his colleague Callistratus sailed back to Athens promising either to send funds or to secure a peace with Sparta, 3 whither in fact he went as an envoy. The peace was made on the fourteenth of Skiro- phorion (July), 371, and Iphicrates was immediately recalled and ordered to restore all that he had taken since the conclusion of the treaty. 4 It has already been remarked that when it was learned that the Spartans were no longer at Corcyra the coast guard ships and the sacred triremes turned back; this would reduce the fleet to about 60. The whole campaign lasted fifteen months. The hoplites who cam- paigned in Acarnania would be the 600 epibatae of his 60 ships; the sailors, therefore, numbering about 11,400, were not paid for the four winter months, and we need not reckon in the pay of the extra ships which turned back, as they are accounted for elsewhere. The sepa- rate items will be: 600 epibatae for fifteen months, 30 talents; 11,400 sailors for eleven months, 418 talents. The total in round numbers is 450 talents. By one stroke Iphicrates secured a prize worth 60 talents, and though there is no evidence as to the success of his other efforts to raise funds it may be assumed that he could provide at least one-half of his expenses, and the whole venture rated at a cost of 200 to 225 talents. 11. The first of the Athenian campaigns in the Peloponnesus in defense of Corinth and Sparta against Thebes falls into the last year of this period. In the spring of 369 Epaminondas marched south and the Athenians voted to assist the Spartans wavdrnxei, according to Xenophon ; Diodorus states that Iphicrates took tovs viovs, numbering 1 Xen. ibid. 33 ff . ; Diod. xv. 47. 7, giving the figure, 60 talents. 2 Xen. ibid. 37 f., see above, p. 383, on the peltasts. 3 Xen. vi. 3. 3. 4 Xen. vi. 4. 1 ; Meyer, p. 406 on the date. Cost to Athens of Second Empire 385 ^OOO. 1 The two expressions probably mean about the same thing, namely, that Athens called out in full force all the citizens of military age save the earliest classes. 2 The campaign itself was a short one, lasting no more than a month. If the twelve thousand were all infantry the cost would be 40 talents, but if, as is probable, the cavalry went, to the number of one thousand, this would be raised to 46 talents 40 minas, or in round numbers 45 talents. The summary of the expenses of all these special expeditions follows: Campaign and General Normal Cost in Talents Known Booty, etc., in Talents Estimated Booty, etc., in Talents 2. 377 Chabrias 15 80 15 220 180 480 60 50 450 45 3. 377 " •> 4. 376 " 5. 376 " 210 6. 375 " 60 7. 375-374 Timotheus. . . . 320 8. 374-372 Stesicles 30 9. 373 Timotheus 10. 372-371 Iphicrates. . . . 11. 369 " (60) 225 1,595 210 635 Total allowances for booty, etc. , 845 talents. Net cost of operations, 750 talents. This may be added into the following summary of all expenditures: I. Cost of re-establishing the navy in 378. Increase of the fleet, 377-369 Extraordinary repairs Dockyards and running expenses II. Guard ships, sea police Sacred triremes Cavalry Special expeditions Talents 150 230 25 50 260 160 400 750 Total 2,025 1 Xen. vi.5.49; Diod. xv. 63, 65; Plutarch Ages. 31 ; Pelop. 2i; Polyaenus iii. 9. 28; Paus. ix. 14. 6 ft". ; Beloch, II, 264; Meyer, pp. 423 ft", (cf. note on p. 425) ; Cavaignac, Hist., p. 308, n. 8. Meyer puts the invasion at the end of December, 370 and the expedition of Iphicrates in February, 369, on the return of Epaminondas. For the present purpose the exact time is immaterial. 2 We may accept Diodorus' report for the present purpose without entering the controversy that has been raised about the military strength of Athens and the mean- ing of the expression Tav8i)fiei. Francotte, V Industrie dans Vantiquite, I, 164, using as data the known fact that 21,000 male citizens were revealed by the census of Demetrius of Phalerum and the vital statistics of modern Belgium, reckons that there were 13,923 men between the ages of twenty and sixty years in Athens at this time. Kromayer, in Klio, III, 47 ft"., puts the total strength of the 10 ii\cu, including men from twenty to fifty years old, at about 10,000, and believes that the number 12,000 on this occasion can be explained by assuming that a body of volunteers from both the older and the younger men, a detachment of cavalry, and a battalion of mercenaries took part in the campaign. 386 Frank Egleston Robbins Whatever the accuracy of the foregoing investigation it can be assumed as certain that the result attained is not too high; it must, on the contrary, be increased in order to make due allowance for mere wastage, incidentals over and above the pay of the soldiers and sailors, garrisons, and minor expeditions, and the erection of forti- fications and other buildings. 1 Sometimes the sources themselves give indications of these matters, as, for example, when we hear of certain fortifications being built at the Piraeus, in 378 or soon after, in consequence of the raid attempted by Sphodrias, 2 and when Xeno- phon remarks that in 371, when the peace with Sparta was concluded, Athens "withdrew her garrisons from the cities," 3 implying that bodies of men had been placed in various parts of the confederacy for probably the last two years. Evidently the total expenses will greatly exceed the figure 2,025 talents, and probably should be placed between 2,500 and 3,000 talents. The natural sequel to this paper would be an inquiry into the means taken to meet these expenses; but in view of the lack of essen- tial data it is hardly advisable to attempt a definite disposal of the matter without very careful consideration. A few suggestions, however, will be ventured. There was as yet no such thing as a funded national debt and consequently arrangements had to be made to meet immediately all the charges that have been dealt with above. The sources of the funds have been already mentioned, 4 and one of them has been ac- counted for — booty won by the troops. One other, too — gifts of citizens — may be disregarded, 5 and we hear of no voluntary gifts by foreigners during the period. The only remaining possibilities are the war taxes of the Athenians, the surplus of their ordinary revenues, and the tribute of their allies. It has already been shown by Kahrstedt 6 that the amount of the war taxes during this decade was 600 talents. For if Demosthenes, as he says, 7 paid war taxes to the amount of 18 minas in ten years on a 1 See above, p. 372. 4 See above, p. 363. 2 Xen. v. 4. 34. 6 Dem. xxi. 161. s Ibid. vi. 4. 1. 8 Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden Vten und IVten Jahrhunderts, p. 214. 7 xxvii. 37. Cost to Athens of Second Empire 387 Tl/jLTifia of 3 talents, that is, 10 per cent, it follows that the taxes on the rlfirjixa of the whole state — 6,000 talents in round numbers — would amount to 600 talents in the same time. It makes no differ- ence in this connection whether the rtjuTj/xa was, as some claim, the whole valuation, or only a specified part of it. There would be left, then, 1,900 or 2,400 talents to be met from the other sources. There can be no doubt that at this time the surplus revenues (Yd irtpiovra) were turned over to the war chest. The legislation of Eubulus, which diverted all or most of it to the Theoric Fund, had not yet taken place, and the enactment of a war tax was still regarded as an extraordinary measure, signifying that the regular funds were sufficient to cover military expenses if these were not excessive. To discover, however, the exact amount of the surplus would be almost impossible. The natural way is to compare the normal income and expenditure, a precarious proceeding. In the fifth cen- tury, according to Xenophon, 1 the state revenues were 1,000 talents yearly, but according to Aristophanes 2,000 talents, 2 a conflict which may perhaps be reconciled by assuming that the latter writer is speaking of a time after the tributes had already been increased. 3 It is usually agreed that the figure is placed somewhat too high and that the revenues were probably 1,800 talents 4 or 1,500 talents; 5 subtracting about 1,200 talents of tribute, the internal revenues are left at 600 talents or 300 talents. For the fourth century the testi- mony is hard to reconcile; the revenues fluctuated with the prosperity of the state. The so-called Fourth Philippic 6 states that the revenues, which had sunk to 130 talents, have been raised to 400 talents, and in the Vitae decern oratorum 7 it is said that they were raised by Lycurgus to 1,200 talents, having previously been 60 talents yearly, or, as some have claimed, suspecting a flaw in the text, 600 talents. 1 Anab. vii. 1. 27. 3 Boeckh, I, 510. 2 Vesp. 657 ff. * Boeckh, loc. cit. 6 Cavaignac, Etudes sur Vhistoire financikre d'Athenes au IV Steele (Paris, 1908), p. 132. 6 37. Boeckh, loc. cit., assumes the amounts to have been the tribute in both cases but it is doubtful whether the Second League ever produced as much as 400 talents in yearly tribute. 7 842 F. Boeckh, loc. cit., retained the reading 60 talents and regarded it as repre- senting tribute only, comparing Aeschin. ii. 71. 388 Frank Egleston Robbins The revenue in 378-369 would probably be as high as at any period in the fourth century previous to Lycurgus' administration. More investigation of the normal expenditures is needed before any exact statement can be made. At present Boeckh's estimate of 400 talents a year is the only one available. 1 This figure, which includes the military expenses of peaceful times, is thought by Frankel to be too high. 2 In the present state of our knowledge it is hardly worth while to risk further conjecture. It is enough to point out that if the military expense be assumed to total 2,500 talents and the surplus 50 talents a year, the sums supplied by this latter source and the tribute will be respectively 500 talents and 1,400 talents (140 talents yearly) ; if the surplus was 100 talents yearly, these items will become 1,000 talents and 900 talents (90 talents yearly) ; while if the total expendi- ture be placed at 3,000 talents, with annual surpluses of 50 talents, the same figures will be 500 talents and 1,900 talents (190 talents yearly), or, with a surplus of 100 talents, 1,000 talents and 1,400 talents (140 talents yearly). This merely helps to confirm the more moderate of modern estimates of the tribute. 3 University of Michigan 1 1, 320. 2 Note ad loc. 3 Statements of the amount of tribute in the Second League, when trustworthy, apply only to later times when the allies had begun to fall away and the amount was thus greatly reduced; e.g., in 355-354 the tribute was 45 talents according to Demos- thenes xviii. 234, and shortly before 346 according to Aeschin. ii. 71 it was 60 talents. Modern estimates based on the report of the tribute of the Euboean cities and a calculation of the extent of the league at its most prosperous time are generally con- ceded to be useless; on this matter see Gilbert, p. 444 and n. 4, Marshall, pp. 41 f. Busolt's estimate, 350 talents a year, would seem much too high, and Schaefer's, 200 talents, agrees with the results reached above quite closely if the total expenditure reached 3,000 talents and only 50 talents a year were available from the surplus.