STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. HORACE SATIRES i. 3. 112-13 AND PLATO THEAETETUS 172 A, B By Paul Shokey It is generally recognized that the description in Horace Satires i. 3. 99 ff. of the primitive human horde, mutum et turpe pecus, and his account of the origin of civilization are Epicurean, and further illustration of this point would be superfluous. But the more particular sources of Horace's theory of the beginnings of law and justice seem to have been neglected by all the commentators that I have been able to consult. Iura inventa metu iniusti fateare necesse est, he writes (111). "You must admit that law and justice are mere inventions and that their origin is the fear of injustice." This is the doctrine of the ethical skeptics whose case is restated by Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second book of Plato's Republic. Cf., e.g., 360 D, Sia tov tov ahKttaBai fybfiov. It was adopted in substance by Epicurus who makes justice the creation of the form of social contract glanced at by Glaucon and Adeimantus in their argument. He uses, it is true, the expression to rfjs vaeus dUaiop, but he uses it, as it were, in quotation marks to explain that in his analysis it is derivative and not, as for Plato and the Stoics, primary. Cf. Sententia 31, Usener, p. 78, to ttjs (frixreus himiov karl (rvufioXov tov avfupepovTOS els to firi fi\airT€iv aKkijhovs p-qbe PKcurTeadcu. 1 And to preclude all misapprehension he further explains, Sententia 34, that injustice is not an evil in itself but only in respect to its consequences. 17 adida ov naff' eavrqv kclkov, k.t.X. The entire Republic of Plato controverts this view. Aristotle's Rhetoric 1373 b 6 formulates the repudiation of this doctrine by common sense. There exists, he says, by nature a certain common justice and injustice which all men divine even if there be no KOivwpia between them nor any voews. And Cicero, sometimes speaking for himself, sometimes for the Stoics, repeatedly says, e.g., de Fin. ii. 18-19, that nisi aequitas, fides, iustitia proficiscantur a natura et si omnia haec ad utilitatem refer- antur virum bonum non posse repperiri. Horace as a convinced Epicurean quietly and dogmatically reaffirms the Epicurean opinion. The protest in Plato's Laws, 892, against a purely materialistic conception of nature and the natural anticipates and includes Epicurean utilitarianism and all similar theories. Absolute material- ism allows the term "natural" only in application to the move- ments and qualities of natural bodies. The entire moral order which man discovers or creates in his world is a later non-natural artificial invention. 1 Thus far all is fairly obvious, but Horace goes on to point out a distinction which Plato does not dwell upon in the Laws but which he is careful to make elsewhere and which, I think, modern commentators have overlooked. Philosophies of absolute materialism or unqualified relativity may lay it down that, strictly speaking, nothing is natural but the movements of natural bodies or the immediate animal sensations. But in ordinary speech the utilitarian moralist may concede that the "good" in the sense of the "useful" or the "pleasurable" is an idea given by nature, though the just is not. Nature, and our human nature, does distinguish what we like from what we dislike, and what we like we call "good." In this sense "good" and "bad" are distinguished by nature. What the utilitarian denies is that original nature can also distinguish between the just and the unjust. These are subsidiary artificial conceptions devised to help us get what we like and avoid what we dislike, to secure the good and shun the evil. Cf. Plato Republic 359 A, to i*ev enevyeiv rb he aipelv. This distinction may be Epicurean. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 8. 93) attributes in terms to the Cyrenaics the statement: tx-qbiv n elvai viav iyown. This is Burnet's text. I prefer, as Wilamowitz does, Campbell's Sow ye Si/ and Xkyovoiv, but we are not now concerned with text criticism. Horace Satires and Plato Theaetetus 167 iravriiiraffi rbv TJpcaraydpov \oyov \£yoviav ayovaiv to mean "judge this wisdom thus." On these blunders he bases the argument that the transition to the next topic is forced and that the famous digression contrasting the philosopher with the lawyer stands in no intelligible relation to what precedes. We expect a condemnation of the doctrine, he says : Aber Sokrates gibt das Verwerfungsurteil nicht ab, sondern sagt sie denken uber diese Weisheit so — das gibt nur eine lange Abschweifung. "Wir haben ja Zeit." Nun denken wir, legt Sokrates los. Statt dessen; "Wieder ist mir klar geworden, dass ein Philosoph vor Gericht sich blamieren muss." Wir sind eben so konsterniert wie Theodorus und sagen irSs 8j) ovv Aeyeis. 1 All this is nodus in scirpo. The course of the thought and the real transition are perfectly clear and simple. This change of front, this position supposed to be taken up by those who don't push the Protagorean doctrine to extremes, raises still another question for discussion, \6yos . ... Ik \byov. 2 If, which I do not believe either necessary or probable, &Se ircos is forward-looking, it looks forward only to the discussion of this question. "Well," says Theodorus, "we have leisure, have we not?" — and this idea of the contrast between the leisure of philosophy and the petty preoccupations of the lawyer and the politician is what forms the transition to the wonderful portrayal of the two types, which in accordance with the principles of his art Plato aptly introduces to relieve the tedium of uninterrupted dialectics. In 177 C 6 the dis- cussion is picked up at precisely the point at which it is dropped. We are reminded of the exact issue that has been formulated, and the new X670S is taken up for examination. Apart from the cer- tainty of the meaning of the Greek, nobody who reads the entire 1 Incidentally I may note that ir&s 5ij oli> \kytis, of course, does not express consternation or surprise. 2 Cf . Euripides Troades 706, iXX' in \6yov yd.p SXXos iicpaivei \6yos, which Professor Murray prettily renders: "Ah, how thought to thought still beckons," but which in view of the context I should be tempted to paraphrase "Life is just one — thing after another." 168 Paul Shokey passage attentively and follows the thought can have any doubt that this is the intended connection of ideas. The matter is now fully explained in the Chicago dissertation of Mrs. Grace Hadley Billings on The Art of Transition in Plato, page 24. Professor Wilamo- witz' further argument that the digression must have been com- posed to express Plato's disappointment at the failure of the political ambitions with which he composed the Republic shatters on the consideration of its close resemblance to the treatment of the same theme in the Gorgias and the Republic itself, but I will leave the working out of this comparison and these parallels to the reader. 1 If Professor Wilamowitz would frankly admit that he has mis- construed Plato in his haste and that this passage therefore affords no support to his theory of the composition of the Theaetetus, I should be glad to express regret for the harshness of harping on what would then be a mere oversight. But if he insists on his impossible translation, and continues to bolster up his ingenious analyses of the defective composition of the Iliad and the Platonic dialogues by what are demonstrably misinterpretations of the text, I shall be driven to aggravate my offense by repeating the words of Professor John Burnet in the Classical Quarterly for October, 1920: "Most of his conjectures are wrong and many of them suggest doubts as to his knowledge of Platonic Greek." 1 Cf., e.g., Gorgias 486 B, 526 E, 527 A; Republic 517-18.