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JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS NOTE ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS ii. 3. 5. 1104 b 21 &' ^Sovos St (tot A.vjra? avXai yivovrax, T<3 Suokuv Tavras kcu. evyeiv, i) as p.r) Bet rj ore ov Set r/ s wro tow Aoyov 8topt£crat to Totovro. ktX.. In the Classical Review for June 1913, pp. 113 ff., Mr. J. Cook Wilson discusses the force of wo tov Aoyov in the passage, the problem for him being whether Aoyos here means "reason," or, as many editors take it, "defini- tion," "rule," "formula." To the interpretation, "definition," or "rule," he rightly objects, after others, that the definition or formula has not yet been given. Accordingly with the aid of many parallel passages he decides that the meaning is Reason, nearly, if not quite, in the sense in which opflos \6yos is used frequently throughout the Ethics. That \oyos may sometimes be a virtual synonym of opObs Aoyos needed no proof. But in assuming that to be its meaning here, Mr. Wilson overlooks, I think, another characteristic Aristotelian use of Aoyos which is the true key to the passage. Aris- totle 1 not infrequently opposes Aoyos or Kara tov Aoyov as "a priori" to "a posteriori" reasoning based on the facts, or induction, tlo-aywyq, or perception, aZo-Orjo-is. By "a priori" I mean, of course, not metaphysically a priori, but something apparent to logical, verbal, or dialectical inspection, without further investi- gation of the concrete facts. In many such passages the Xoyos in question is the definition, and the a priori method is simply deduction from the definition. These cases we may disregard: cf., for example, de partibus animalium 653 b, 22; pol. 1326 a, 29. But in others the thing that is apparent by or through Xoyos is a generalization, an alternative, a classification, or indefinite list of categories and distinctions, and that is the case here. Mere a priori logical or dialec- tical reflection tells us at once that wrong action may be wrong either sub- stantively in the content of the act or in respect of time (or place or quantity, and so forth), and all the other distinctions which the reasoning faculty suggests to us. The turn of phrase oo-ax«>s aAAws, etc., is in itself, perhaps, 1 Cf. de generat. anim. 760 b, 27; 729 b, 8: xard re Sii rbv \iyov oBxu (palvercu ical M tuv tpyuv, de -part, animal. 666 o, 18; de generat. animal. 740 a, 4; de generat. et corrupt. 336 b, 15; dejuvent. et senect. 468 a, 20; de part, animal. 646 a, 29; phys. 210 6, 8; 262 a, 17; de part, animal. 653 6, 22, etc. 477 478 Notes and Discussions a sufficient warning that this is the meaning. For this or something like this is Aristotle's ordinary way of summing up in irapaXuxj/K the categories and other obvious and indispensable logical distinctions which he does not care to enumerate in full, cf. Met. 1005 b, 19: to yap avrb apua vjrapx«v rt Kal p.r) virap)(a.v aSvvaTov Tip avT Kal Kara to avTO' xai oca aXXa irpooSio- pio-aL/jLeO' av, iv, Troaov, iroiov Kal oo~a aXXa rouavra; Met. 1026 a, 36 ff; Top. 146 6, 20; irakiv iir' iviiav el p\t) Sitopoce tov iroo-ov rj trolov -q irov rj Kara. Tas aAAas Suupopds, olov c£tAs Xiyovo-iv, aXX' ovk js rjSovrjs Kal Trjs Avmjs al avkai yivovrai e£eis, 8?;Aa8>7 tov Shokuv ttjv rjSovijV tooTrtp ov Sit, Kal are ov Set, Kal irdkiv (pevyav tt)v Avht/v oTt ov Sit, koC lis ov Set Kal oVou ov Set - Kai oo~ai aAAai Trtpiorduras irovrjpav iroiovo-i rijv £f[rrKTiv T>js ijoWijs i) ttjv tpvyrjv tj}s Xvirrji. The reason here is not, then, the opt96s Xoyos or right reason of ethics, but the dialectical reason that notes categories, distinctions, classifications. It is undoubtedly true that from the metaphysical point of view Aristotle is not always able to keep them apart in the theory of the ethics. But such ultimate metaphysical difficulties would not warrant us in confounding plain, practical distinctions in his ordinary terminology. It is interesting to observe that while nearly all editors known to me make unnecessary difficulties about the passage, the translations of Williams and Weldon instinctively give the right meaning. Williams renders: "the various forms of error that are logically conceivable." Paul Shoeey