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JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. THE JURISDICTION OF ATHENIAN ARBITRATOES By Robert J. Bonner The earlier writers on Greek legal antiquities insisted strongly upon a comparatively limited jurisdiction for the public arbitrators. Disregarding to some extent the scanty and often obscure notices of the lexicographers, they examined with great care the extant speeches, seizing upon every bit of evidence that seemed to sup- port the view that arbitration was not always compulsory in private suits. So convincing were the arguments of Hudtwalcker' and Meier ^ that their leading opponents were won over to their view and thus the matter stood until Hubert and Lipsius' insisted upon giving due weight to the testimony of the lexicographers and turned the balance in favor of compulsory arbitration for nearly all private suits. This view was apparently so strongly confirmed by Aristotle [Ath. Const. 53) that it has won universal acceptance. My reason for reopening a question thus satisfactorily settled is the conviction that the statement of Lipsius,* " dass die Offentlichen Diateten fttr Privatprocesse die unerlassliche erste Instanz bil- deten," is too sweeping. Aristotle, after discussing the cases that came within the jurisdiction of the Eleven, the eleraycoyel'; and the cnroheKrai, con- tinues with a description of the duties of the Forty tt/jo? ov? ra? aXKa<; SUa^ \a^x'^vov(7iv. This body decided all cases under ten drachmas; other cases were handed to the arbitrators. If there was an appeal from their award the case was referred back to the Forty and by them brought to trial. The words ra? SXKa'i StVa? are taken to mean that all private suits except those previously mentioned came within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators;' and 1 Ueber die dffentlichen und Privatschiedsrichter in Athen, 1812. ^Die Privatschiedsrichter und Offentliche Diateten Athens, 1846. SLipsius, Attische Process" (1887), pp. 1009 ff. ; Hubert De arbitris Atticis et privatis etpublicis (1885), p. 38. *Ber. d, sdch. Gesellsch. d. Wiss, (1891), p. 58. This has been repeated in similar form by all subsequent writers. ^Lipsius op. cit., p. 57; cf. Sandys' note on Arist. Ath. Const. 53. 1. [Classical Philology II, October, 1907] 407 408 Robert J. Bonnek so far as the Greek is concerned this is the natural interpretation of the words. But the difficulty encountered in attempting to reconcile this interpretation with Aristotle's subsequent statements is practically unsurmountable. He nowhere mentions the arbitra- tors apart from the Forty. These two groups of legal officers are so closely linked together that, as Pischinger' rightly insists, cases could go to the arbitrators only through the Forty. Indeed Aristotle says very distinctly that the cases of resident aliens went from the polemarch to the arbitrators through the Forty. We should expect the same practice to be followed by other magi- strates. Lipsius^ believes that each magistrate sent his cases directly to the proper arbitrator without the intervention of the Forty. This view, however, finds no support in Aristotle. Suits originating with the archon or the thesmothetae would have to go through an intolerably cumbersome procedure. This in itself is enough to arouse suspicion. For example, a case is entered be- fore the archon; he holds an apaKpia-K and sends it to the Forty. From them it goes to the proper arbitrator and thence, in case of appeal, back to the Forty or the archon. For here we find con- flicting statements in Aristotle. In one place we are told that appeals from an arbitrator's award went to the Forty, who took them into court;' in another that the archon took his own cases into court.* To escape this contradiction, Pischinger resorts to the doubtful expedient of denying the accuracy of Aristotle. Relying on Harpocration he holds that all cases which came to the arbitrators were referred back on appeal to the magistrates who first received them. But the words «al v dveKpive iracnv rjp.lv rol<; dp,(j)(,a^r]Tovcn, Kal avaKpiva6vov Sweat (57. 2) were subject to arbitration. How could an arbitrator settle a murder case? And yet these cases must be included equally with those that were within the jurisdiction of the other archons. If, however, they be excepted the whole case so far as Aristotle is concerned falls to the ground. Evidently Aristotle has used to;? aXXa? Bikw; loosely. All the difficulties above mentioned disappear, if we understand him to mean that all private suits not otherwise assigned in his treatise belong to the Forty and that these cases alone were subject to arbitration. It is extremely doubtful if anyone would have tried to read this view into Aristotle had it not been for the evidence of the extant speeches.' In the Orators a number of arbitration cases appear which have long been regarded as falling within the jurisdiction of the archon and the thesmothetae. I give here Pischinger's list of these cases.^ I. Archontisactiones. (1) ewiTpoTrvs: Lys. 32; Dem. 27; 29. (2) K\-ijpov: Dam. 43. 31. (3) Status familiae: Dem. 40. 10. II. Thesmothetarum actiones. (1) kXotttjs: Dem. 22. 27, 28. (2) Status civitatis: Lys. 23; Isaeus 12; (Dem.) 59, 60. It is worth while to examine carefully the adequacy of the evidence relied upon by Pischinger in constructing this list. It has been observed' that in none of the so-called inheritance cases [kXtjpov), which are comparatively numerous, is there any men- tion of arbitration.* The argument ex silentio is materially strengthened by the peculiar situation that occurs in Callistrcdus V. Olympiodorus already discussed. On two occasions'* litigants 1 Pischinger op. cit, p. 34: "non enim pagorum iudices soli, sed etiam alii magig- tratus arbitris causas instruendas tradebant, id quod ex orationibus Demosthenis satis intellegitur." 2 Op. cit., p. 35. 3 Hubert op. cit., p. 38. ? etSoVa?.' To the same effect are the words of the speaker in another case of Isaeus:'' oDtrre av eVl TOVToy rov \6yov KaTa<^evv 6.pxovTos, 6t€ iviKri0evTav(.p6v, on t' dp,i(TOv ovk etr^' otrrts ov\ ■^yeiro tZv eiSoToiV Siktjv /x« Xr)v yi,yvop.fviav ovk tcrO' ocrTts ov^ ■^yeiTO Ttov eiSoTtov SiKrjv jxe. Xri^ptaOai Trap' avrSiv, eTraSr] rd^KTr' dvrjp elvai SoKi/JLairOeirjV. — Dem. 30. 6. For the ava.Kpiai'; could not be held until Demosthenes had attained his majority. Schafer^ is probably right in paraphrasing thus: "Umsonst war das Stadtgesprftch biszudem Archonten gedrungen." The case was so notorious that it was common gossip everywhere, even in the highest quarters. Moreover, in Aristotle's account of the archon's duties, we find no mention of a Sikt) eTrtT/JOTrr}?, nor any general statement of jurisdiction that includes it. The whole passage so bristles with details that it would seem to be fairly ^Histoire du droit privi des Athiniens II, p. 273. 2 Aphobus was fined ten talents (Dem. 29. 60). Such irregularities as the retention of the widow's dower and the failure to rent the house could surely have been rectified. 3 Demosthenes und seine Zeit I, p. 270. The Jurisdiction of Athenian Arbitrators 415 exhaustive, and in any event, none of the suits mentioned could be instituted during the minority of a ward.' The evidence of the lexicographers'^ is valueless in comparison with Aristotle. Pollux, who is most explicit, does speak of a Sixr) eir it po'n-rj<; opcpavwv, but he is merely reproducing Aristotle without the details and includes under this single head Aristotle's (Si*??) ek emTpo'irri'; icaTcunaav(ov of Photius and Harpocration cannot include more than the suits speciiied by Aristotle. The consideration that the archon is after all the proper official to deal with litigation involving guardian and ward is of little weight, since the Sikt) eTriTpoTri)'; was really only a special kind of damage suit which could not be instituted until the wardship was terminated.* Another case cited by Pischinger is Boeotus et al. v. Manilas, which is referred to in Mantitheus v. Boeotus.^ It is a suit brought by two young men to compel their putative father to recognize them as his legitimate sons. The case was settled in favor of the plaintiffs before an arbitrator by an evidentiary oath of the mother. As it does not belong to any of the classes of suits mentioned by Aristotle as coming before the archon, and there is no mention of the archon in the notice of the suit, we have no valid reason for regarding it as falling within his juris- diction. One of the arbitration suits mentioned by Pischinger is an appeal from the decision of the deme denying the plaintiil's citi- zenship." It has always been a matter of surprise that a case in- volving so serious a penalty as slavery should have been subject to arbitration, particularly when an Attic deme was the defendant. Nevertheless Schomann's' view that such cases were treated as private suits has been generally accepted. But Aristotle's* refer- ence to these suits shows conclusively that they were regarded as 1 Beauchet op. cit. II, p. 280. 2 This evidence is conveniently collected in Sandys' edition of Aristotle's Ath. Const., p. 206. ^Ath. Const. 56. 6. * Beauchet op. cit. II, p. 303. 5 Dem. 40. 9 ff. 6 Isaeus 12. U. ^ On Isaeus, p. 478. SArist. Ath. Const. 59. 4. Lipsius Attisches Becht. p. 70, failing to observe the signiiicance of this passage, still adheres to Schomann's view. 416 KOBEET J. BONNEK public. After enumerating the 'ypaai which came before tlie thesmothetae, he adds: ii(Tayovv. It is quite another matter. A mere child is refused admittance to a phratry, not to a deme, and his father brings the action. Besides, the present case is a private suit, while the other is public.^ In Euctemon and Diodorus v. Androtion one of the plaintiffs, in discussing the various means of redress that lie open to an aggrieved person,' mentions larceny as a crime that may be dealt with in four distinct ways. One of these is a civil action (hUj) /cXo'tttjs) which was subject to arbitration. But nothing is said about the magistrate who would preside at the trial in this kind of case. Meier and Schomann* suggest, without giving any reason for their view that it belongs to the thesmothetae. Similarly I am at a loss to know why Pischinger regards the suit against Pancleon' as an arbitration case or why he assigns it to the thesmothetae, for there is no reference to arbitration in any part of the speech. Neither are the thesmothetae mentioned. It is true that some have erroneously regarded toxk tti 'l-n-iroOwvrCh BiKa^ovTa^ as arbitrators, but Lipsius^ rightly regards these as the Forty. At this point a brief summary of my position may be helpful, ras aXXas Swca? cannot include all suits subsequently mentioned by Aristotle, because — 1. The language of both Aristotle and Demosthenes is incom- patible with the intervening of arbitration between the archon's avaKpicTK and the trial. 2. Aristotle would be involved in a contradiction, for, while he says in one place that the arbitrators acted only in conjunction with the Forty who introduced arbitrated cases into court if there 1 Aristotle Ath. Const. 59. 4. It is unlikely that ApoUodorus, the speaker, care- lessly uses dlK-ri for ypaipri, because we are told that he was well versed iu the law (Dem. 59. 15). 2Dem. 22. 27, 28. "Att. Process, p. 453: "Die Behorde, vor welche diese Klage gehQrt, war bei der Dike und Graphe warscheinlich das Collegium der Thesmotheten, bei deu audern Klag- formeu aber gewiss die Elfmauuer." ■* Lysias 23. 2 ; cf . Schuckburg's note on this passage. ^Atf. Process, p. 90, n. 143. 418 EoBEKT J. Bonner was an appeal, he elsewhere says that the archon himself intro- duced into court all cases within his own jurisdiction. 3. Too much is proved. We should be obliged to regard the BiKM <^6vov as arbitration cases — a manifest absurdity. 4.. It cannot be satisfactorily shown that a single arbitration case mentioned in the Orators belonged to the jurisdiction either of the archon or of the thesmothetae. Two of the cases regarded by Pischinger as arbitration suits did not in fact come under the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. A third is a public suit in which an arbitrator could not appear in his ordinary capacity. In the remaining five cases there is no internal evidence to connect them with any particular magistrate. External evidence also is lacking. Clearly the onus probandi is upon those who undertake to deter- mine what magistrate had charge of these cases. As yet no satisfactory proof has been offered. University op Chicago