STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Classical Philology Volume X "January I9I5 Number i PERJURY BEFORE ATHENIAN ARBITRATORS By George Miller Calhoun In the pseudo-Demosthenic speech Against Phormion is found the somewhat surprising assertion that no punishment was provided for those who gave false testimony before arbitrators: ov yap 'dfwiov kariv, u avdpes 'Adrjvatot, els rd uperepa Trphaaira ep/3Xexpjra rd fcv&V Haprvpeiv /cat irpds SiaiTijry ' Trap' vp.lv y&v yap 6py?i jueyaXij Kal rt/twpla MuceiTai rots rd if/evt>7J naprvpovai, irpds Se t SiaLTtyry aiavSv- vcos teal avai avayKiftTai. See Gilbert, The Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens (London, 1895), p. 389; Caillemer in Daremberg et Saglio, II, p. 127. 2 Cf. Dikaiomata, pp. 53 f. 8 The fact that a prosecution for perjury sometimes originated with the successful party to the suit is no indication that it possessed importance apart from the original action, since the complaint had to be filed before the outcome of the case was known (Ar. Cons. Ath. pag. 35 [Blass]; cf. Lipsius, op. cit., pp. 780-81). As regards the possibility that the false deposition might not be presented at the jury trial, it is impossible to determine whether or not there was a requirement that all evidence considered by the arbitrator be presented. The documents of course came to the clerk of the court in the sealed ix'voi, but it is possible that the litigant may have been permitted to pass over any which he did not wish to present. The only instance in which we know that this was done, however, is in the informal appeal of a private arbitration, and no inference can be drawn from it regarding the practice in regular appeals from the public arbitrators ([Dem.] 34. 46). Since the jury court in such cases sat as a court of appeal, it is likely that the evidence upon which the arbi- trator had based his verdict had to be presented in toto. * Op. cit., p. 39. 5 Op. cit., p. 782. 4 George Miller Calhoun were never brought against witnesses for testimony given before arbitrators. 1 However, it may be objected that litigants did not in actual practice avail themselves of a provision which the law against perjury none the less contained. Such a contention cannot be absolutely disproved, but it may be noted that there is considerable evidence against its probability. In the first place, the method of handling documents in public arbitrations made prosecution for perjury difficult if not impossible. As I have elsewhere noted, 2 a SLur/ ^/evSoixaprvpicav was based upon the written deposition which had been attested by the witness, and the latter was held strictly accountable for the statements therein contained. This procedure was made possible only by the fact that the deposition was read to the affiant by the clerk of the court and, if made the basis of a perjury charge, probably remained in official custody until the case came to a hearing. 3 It was imperative that there should be not even a suspicion that the document had been misread or had been tampered with after having been attested. 4 Now the procedure in arbitration seems to have been very loose and informal, 5 and there was apparently no provision for the official care of documents during the course of the hearing. Depositions seem to have been read to witnesses by the litigants and not by the arbi- trators. 6 I have been unable to discover any justification for the assumption that the arbitrators received and filed the depositions severally during the course of the proceedings as they were attested by 1 Rentzsch, it is true, suggests the possibility of a summary tirlaicrpfus before the arbitrator in ease the successful party to an arbitration wished to prosecute a witness of the opponent, but admits that he has no evidence to offer in support of his theory: "magnam veri speciem habere videtur testem falsum apud diaetetam productum etatim potuisse peti fevSop.apr. in iudicio non antea actione principe iterum acta. Sed quoniam certa argumenta non habeo, quibus haec sententia fulciatur, hanc con- troversiam disceptare non audeo" (op. cit., p. 40). But the cases in which a litigant, if he had won a judgment before an arbitrator and his opponents had not appealed, would wish to prosecute a witness before a jury court must have been very few indeed, for the only possible motive for such a proceeding would be personal animus against the witness. We can well afford, with Lipsius, to disregard this possibility and not attempt a speculative reconstruction of the Athenian system of justice according to the mathe- matical laws of permutation and combination. 2 "Documentary Frauds in Litigation at Athens," Class. Phil., IX, 139-40. a Cf. Plato Laws 937B. 4 "Frauds," p. 140, n. 1; for the misreading of documents, ibid., p. 139. 6 See Leisi, op. cit, p. 78; Bonner, op. cit., p. 52; Hubert, op. cit., p. 43. 6 Cf. Dem. xxix. 19-20: (rvyypdfas ravr' tutXtvov fxaprvpttp. Perjury before Athenian Arbitrators 5 the witnesses. 1 Aristotle's account of arbitration in his time is as follows: ol 8k [the arbitrators] irapakajOdpTes, i&v p,i) 8vpu)ptiy tup ivriSiicav eis t6 Sacaarripiov, €/ij3aX6jTes raj naprvpias /cat tAj irpoKkqaeis ical rovs pbpovs eis txivovs, X^pls l&v tcis rod diMKovros, xwpls 8e raj rod (frebyovros, koli tovtovs KaTaap.6Poi., Kal ri\v yvuxnv rod duuTrjTOv yeypaixp.evrjv iv ypap,- p.a.Te'u$ irpoaapTrjaavTes, ivapabihbacnv, kt\. 2 This gives the impression that the documents were officially taken in charge by the arbitrator only after the announcement of an appeal, which was made after the verdict had been given at the close of the hearing. 3 If further proof be needed, it is found in the story of Apollodorus that, at the arbitration of his suit against Phormion, Stephanus stole one of his depositions when he had risen and gone to the altar to swear a witness, 4 which can be explained only on the supposition that liti- gants kept possession of their depositions during hearings before arbitrators. 5 It is true that bona fide prosecutions for perjury would generally have originated, not with the party who produced the witness and who had the deposition in charge, but with the opponent. But to have allowed prosecutions for perjury to be based on depositions so carelessly safeguarded would have left the way open for much trick- ery and serious fraud. For example, a litigant could have summoned the witnesses of his opponent, or even the opponent himself, to testify in another case, as Demosthenes summoned Aphobus in his suit against Demon; 6 he could have misread the deposition or altered it after the witness had sworn, 7 and could then have made it the basis 1 This seems to be the view of Leisi, op. tit., pp. 79-80. 2 Cons. Ath. liii. 2. i Loc. cit.; [Dem.] xl. 31; of. Lipsius, op. cit., p. 230. 4 Dem. xlv. 57-58. 6 The deposition had already been attested, for otherwise its absence would have been noticed by Apollodorus when he came to introduce it. The theft seems to have taken place on the last day of the arbitration proceedings. 6 Dem. xxix. 20. 7 It should be noted that the deposition of Aphobus was in effect no more than a memorandum, and was of value as evidence only when accompanied by the chal- lenge to examine the slave who wrote it, who "would recognize his own handwriting and remembered distinctly that this was what Aphobus deposed" (ibid. 21). This shows quite clearly the dangers to which a deposition not in official keeping was exposed. 6 George Miller Calhoun of a perjury charge. Trickery of this kind was not infrequently resorted to with the intention of embarrassing litigants. 1 Under such circumstances, witness service would have become not only annoy- ing but dangerous. Furthermore, to have treated these carelessly kept depositions from an arbitrator's court as of equal weight with the jealously guarded depositions of the regular jury courts would undoubtedly have seriously impaired the dignity and effectiveness of prosecutions for perjury. Thus we see that there was a good practical reason for making a distinction in law between perjury committed at an arbitration and the same offense in a jury court. It is inconceivable that the law should have authorized actions for per- jury against the witnesses at arbitrations and at the same time should have made no provision for assuring ' the integrity of the documents which furnished the sole evidence of what the testimony had been. 2 In the second place, it is significant that Aristotle in his account of arbitration, although he gives the successive steps in the hearing and the appeal in some detail, makes no mention of any provision for the announcement of a perjury prosecution, 3 while in his account of the procedure in jury trials the time for announcing an action for perjury is especially noted. 4 Furthermore, the plaintiff in the action against Euergus and Mnesibulus, in summing up the intent of the law \f/tv8oiJ.apTvplo)i>, says nothing of arbitration, but states expressly that the intention was to prevent the introduction of false testimony before the jury (toi>s Sikcwt&s) and to give the litigant who had lost his case through perjury another chance (inrtikoiirov ayuva) to obtain justice. 6 The emphasis placed on this point is scarcely compatible with the view that the law applied equally to perjury before an 1 For some of the sharp practices of litigants, see the writer's Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation (Austin, 1913), pp. 40 ff. 2 Cf . the precautions taken with documents in perjury prosecutions in Plato's Laws 937B. It is interesting to note that the Ptolemaic laws governing prosecutions for perjury, which allow depositions made before the SiaiTryral to be attacked, make special provision for the care of the documents. These are to be taken in charge by a deputy of the j-o/xo^iiXaf and remitted to the proper court (P. Hal., I, 38 ff.). From the very fact that perjury before the Alexandrian SmiTip-al was actionable, the editors of P. Hal. infer that they occupied a far more important position than the Athenian arbitrators (Dikaiomata, pp. 53 f.). a Cons. Ath. Iiii. 2. * lb. pag. 35. 10 ff. (Blass). 5 [Dem.] xlvii. 1. Peejury before Athenian Arbitrators 7 arbitrator, where, as has been seen, ample protection against injustice was furnished by the privilege of appeal. Finally, it may be noted that no positive evidence is produced in support of the theory that witnesses could be prosecuted for false testimony given before an arbitrator. It is an assumption that rests entirely on our modern feeling that perjury, in a justice' court or before a clerk as much as before the highest court of the land, is an offense against the majesty of the law and the state, and our modern practice of punishment by the state through the agency of a public prosecutor. Traces of any such feeling on the part of the Athenians are slight indeed, 1 and it is very improbable that perjury in arbitra- tions, where the rights of the individual were not seriously threatened, was regarded with alarm. It is extremely likely that the law against perjury was primarily enacted with a view only to preventing the introduction of false testi- mony before the popular courts, which were felt to be the keystone of the Athenian system of justice and the chief safeguards of demo- cratic government. The circumstances noted above, as they became apparent in practice, would have prevented its extension to include testimony before arbitrators. It is quite possible that the enact- ment was prior to the institution of the public arbitrators, and it almost certainly antedated the introduction of compulsory arbi- tration. 2 University of Texas 1 With the exception of a few perfunctory phrases such as birkp t&v vbiuav, etc., the arguments in perjury prosecutions are entirely concerned with the personal wrongs of the plaintiffs. 2 It is now generally agreed that the institution of the public arbitrators ante- dated Euclides (see Lipsius, op. cit., p. 220, n. 2). The law mentioned by Lysius (Jr. or. xix. 2) seems to have been that which provided for compulsory arbitration, and is probably to be dated in the archonship of Euclides (cf. Lipsius, op. cit., p. 220; Hubert, op. cit., p. 21). The law against perjury was probably of much earlier date; at any event it was in effect when the tetralogies of Antiphon were written (cf. Ant. 28. 7).