STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS THE DIPLOMACY OP Q. MARCIUS IN 169 B.C. In the summer of 169 b.c, the third year of Rome's failure to defeat Perseus, Q. Marcius Philippus, the consul, was besieged in an extremely dangerous position in southern Macedonia. He held a narrow valley of a few square miles, closed on the south and west by mountains, and on the east by the sea. Across the deep bed of the Enipeus, blocking the way to Macedonia, was the army of Perseus (Liv. 44. 8). For supplies the consul was dependent upon what could be brought up the narrow trail of the Peneus, and this was threatened by Macedonian garrisons on the south and east. On his arrival, Marcius had attempted to march northward, but finding that Perseus had left no forage, he was obliged to retreat, thus demoralizing his army with the impression of failure (Liv. 44. 8). He then attempted to remove the menace to his communi- cations by attacking Meliboea in the south, but Perseus sent a detach- ment of troops to the rescue, and Marcius, effectively checkmated, was reduced to the necessity of intrenching himself and awaiting the arrival of his successor. He had, in fact, been caught in a trap, and his error was the less excusable since he had been similarly ensnared by the Ligu- rians in 186. That mistake had cost him some 4,000 soldiers, and had given him a reputation for bad generalship: "saltus unde eum Ligures fugaverunt, Marcius est appellatus " (Liv. 39. 20). Polybius, who happened to be present in the Macedonian campaign, expresses his astonishment at the rashness of the whole plan. It resulted, he says, in so demoralizing the army that it was ready to surrender at a war cry and a blare of trumpets! ' He adds that if the enemy had been a Philip instead of a Perseus, the Roman army would have been destroyed. 2 Now it happened that while the Romans were thus situated, envoys came from Rhodes to express their good will to the Romans. Marcius took one of them aside and suggested that the Rhodians ought to make some attempt to bring the war to a close (Pol. 28. 17). Polybius 3 offers 1 Diodorus 30. 10, depending upon Polybius, says : Kpavyrjs yap pJivov ^v xP^ a Ke " atikiriyyos ets rb t^v ffTpanav t&v -woKsfduv Xafieiv aixpAXwrov. 2 Livy44. 4 (from Polybius): "Si hostem similem antiquis Macedonum regibus habuisset consul, magna clades accipi potuerit." Swbrepa d£ tout 1 iwotei rbv ' Avrloxov VTroirTetiwv, p.i\ wore KparJitras rijs' AXel-avdpelas /3apu$ f(peSpos aurois ytvujTai rod wpbs rbv Tlepffta woXtfwv xpbvov Xap^avovros . . . . , f) Oeaip&v 8, Kal KaXas iXwlSas ix uv birtp t&v anofiriooiiivuv, e/3oi5\ero robs 'PodLovs TpovO^as tiefflras ctoro5e<£ai, Kal tovto icpa^as Sovvat twi '¥wfj.alois atpopp.ds eiXbyovs eis rb povXeueaffai irepl airr&v us av airots tpalvryrai, to pin aKpiflis ou po.'5io>> elireiv, Sok& Si p.S.XXov rb TeXevTatov eiprip,4vov, il- av ipapripriae ra jmt' oXlyov avp.§avTa rots 'PoStots. 358 Notes and Discussions 359 two possible explanations for Marcius' action: either (a) Marcius made his request in good faith, desiring to have peace established with Perseus before King Antiochus could take Alexandria and turn upon the Romans, or (6) Marcius made the request with treacherous intent, hoping that the Rhodians might be tempted into some indiscretion which would give the Romans a pretext for subduing them. Polybius then adds: "I am inclined to adopt the latter explanation, drawing my conclusions from what soon happened to the Rhodians." This explanation which attributes an unusual degree of treachery to Marcius is the one adopted by prac- tically all of our historians. 1 It seems to me, however, that there is good reason to question Polybius' judgment on this point. Polybius offers the theory very guardedly and in a query. In fact he does not base his tentative supposition upon any data now inaccessible, but, as he says, upon the a posteriori grounds of Rhodes' later misfor- tunes. He therefore gives us the right to question his conclusions. Now, in examining the view of Polybius, we soon notice that he treats Marcius in a suspiciously indirect way. Usually when this historian wishes to praise or blame, he employs very blunt terms, but Marcius, for some reason, is handled with cynical queries and innuendoes that seem to reveal a deep-seated personal enmity. It is not difficult to find the cause of this feeling. Marcius had, during this very year (169), opposed the plans of Polybius, who wished to lead a detachment of soldiers to the aid of Egypt (Pol. 29. 25). In fact, as early as the year 182, Marcius had probably incurred the hatred of Polybius by reporting adversely to the senate upon the policy of the Achaean patriotic party (Pol. 23. 9). This dislike for Marcius reveals itself repeatedly in the history. For instance, in the account of the opening of the war in 172 (Liv. 42. 43, based upon Polybius) we read that Marcius treacherously induced Per- seus to "make truce" (" indutiae," Livy; avo^ai, Pol. 27. 5) and send new embassies to Rome, thereby gaining more time for Roman armament. It is now impossible to control the data for a full criticism of this passage, but it must be clear that the account is garbled. One can hardly under- stand what is meant by a temporary truce six months before hostilities have been begun, nor can one see what would be gained in the autumn by a month's truce, since Rome could not in any case begin the war before spring when the new consuls would take command and the season's campaign be opened. Again, in 28. 13, Polybius acknowledges that he personally used his political influence to the detriment of Marcius' repu- tation. The facts are as follows. Appius, a Roman general, had asked the Achaeans for a contingent of 5,000 soldiers. Marcius, hearing of this, at once sent Polybius home to state that, as consul, he vetoed this request, i See Ihne III. 241 ; Peter I. 475, and Studien 149; Rospatt in Phil. XXIX. 581 ; Herzberg I. 203 ; Van Gelder, Qeschichte der Rhodier 149 ; Niese III. 157 (with some doubt) . 360 Notes and Discussions and that the Achaeans need not go to the expense of aiding Appius. Marcius deserved some credit for this act among the Achaeans, but Polybius upon presenting the case to the Achaean league strangely sup- pressed all mention of Marcius and gained the desired result by referring to a senatus consultum which covered the case. In fact he goes so far in his account of the incident as to hint that Marcius had forbidden the levy only from a desire to prevent Appius from obtaining any success. This behavior of Polybius seems to imply a certain inability on his part to accord Marcius strict justice. Apart from the authority of Polybius, which in this case proves to be very weak, the supposition which we have been examining bears no mark of reasonableness. We have already said something about the difficulty of Marcius' military position. Marcius himself was under no misappre- hension in the matter. After the rash and unsuccessful activity of the first month he attempted no advance. And yet Marcius was a very ambi- tious man and must sorely have felt the disgrace of having to confess inability to cope with an adversary like Perseus. The truth seems to be that the consul had lost his nerve. He had now wedged himself into a worse position than that which proved so fatal in Liguria in 186, and the memory of the former disaster in a similar situation was enough to shatter his belief in his own generalship. Nothing else can adequately explain his failure to make some attempt at gaining the passes to the northeast by which he might have outflanked the enemy. The failure of this sum- mer's campaign was so apparent, in fact, that the Illyrians were easily induced to take the side of Perseus; and Eumenes and Rhodes, losing faith in Rome, thought it advisable to secure their safety in case of a Macedonian victory. In such circumstances, is it reasonable to suppose that Marcius had the inclination or the leisure to be plotting future wars, or that he entertained such hope of immediate success as to see the neces- sity of creating new imbroglios for Rome? Especially when we find that during the very days that Marcius was supposed to be conspiring against Rhodes, the senate was renewing friendship with the island by bestowing gifts upon her and granting her new commercial favors! Moreover, it is difficult to read cunning into the proposal of Marcius for the further reason that if the Rhodians had followed his request and offered to act as arbitrators (/A«rcVas awoSetiai), no offense need have resulted. What finally did offend the Romans was no such mild offer, but an attempt on the part of the Rhodians to force a cessation of hos- tilities by forming a strong confederation which would act in sympathy with Perseus and Gentius (Pol. 29. 10, 11). This action was not taken by the pro-Roman party and at the suggestion of Marcius, but by the anti- Roman party and because of the success of Perseus in gaining the aid of Gentius with his army and fleet (Pol. 29. 11). The simplest explanation of Marcius' desire for Rhodian interference Notes and Discussions 361 is the one offered by the Ehodian patriots when the request for arbitra- tion was disclosed (Pol. 28. 17 end). They concluded that the consul must be in a difficult plight and would like to have an opportunity to extricate himself under cover of peace negotiations. This seems to me reasonable. Marcius, as we have seen, knew that he could accomplish nothing by arms. But he also knew that Perseus was ready to offer excellent terms, and that there was a possibility that these terms would now be such as to satisfy the senate. If the senate were satisfied, he would not have to return in disgrace as the preceding consuls had done. This whole incident is intrinsically of little importance. It has, how- ever, come to be one of the mainstays of historians who look for cunning in Roman statesmanship. It is certainly significant of the bias of our writers that they should so unanimously have accepted a suggestion inimical to the reputation of Roman integrity when that suggestion was self-confessedly unauthoritative and inherently unreasonable. My pur- pose, then, has been not only to attempt a slight emendation of data, but also to illustrate a protest against what seems to me an unfounded prejudice in the interpretation of Rome's political policies. Tenney Frank Bryn Mawb College THE SO-CALLED "ARCHON BASILEUS" AND PLATO MENEXENU8 238 D Plato, in his description of the n-drpios ■zroXiTtta of Athens, says some call it democracy and some what they please, ean 8k rrj akrfitCa ptr' evSoiia.'S irXtfdovs apio-TOKparia. ftao-iAfjs piv yap ad fjp.iv eiow ovtoi 8k Tore piv Ik yeVovs, rork 8c aiperor iynparks 8k rfjs 7roA.«os to. iroXka to irXrjOos, ras 8k dp^as SiSoxTi ko.1 xparos tols ad So£aow dpio-rois civat - Scholars generally understand fiao-iXrjs here of the so-called "archon basileus." It is so interpreted, I believe, in all the handbooks, and so taken by Wilamowitz (Aristoteles und Athen, II, 41), and by Fustel de Coulanges (Recherches sur quelques problemes d'histoire, 159), who argues that alptroi may well include choice by lot. It is of course always possible that the idea of the archon crossed Plato's mind, but the main thought and context of the passage seem to require another meaning here. Aristocracy and royalty are for Plato allied, not to say identical, conceptions. In Repub- lic 445 B he tells us that the ideal state may be called indifferently by either name according to the number of its rulers. In 587 D the aristo- cratic and the kingly man are identified : iav e« tovtov apio-TOKpariKov ko.1 (3ap£v. In 543 A the philosophic rulers are denominated kings : /SatrtXeas ok avrS>v ttvai tovs iv (pi\oux. tc xal irpos t6v iroXc/tov yeyovdras dpiicrTOUS. There is a presumption, then, that the "kings" which the ideal Athens