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JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. A CHAPTER IN THE STORY OF ROMAN IMPERIALISM By Tenney Frank "La proclamation de l'independance .... s'explique aussi bien par un machiavelisnie raffine que par un philhellenisme sincere," says Colin 1 in discussing the end of the second Mace- donian war. As a matter of fact, the present-day historians of Rome have with a monotonous unanimity employed those two terms when attempting to explain Rome's purposes in invading the East. Mommsen vigorously combats the charge — a very old one — that Rome was capable of nothing but unscrupulous clever- ness. He insists that Flamininus was inspired by a sincere love for Hellas, though, true to the spirit of Bismarck's day, he adds that this blind sentiment must be considered no less criminal than the alleged lack of principle. The majority, however, well repre- sented by Ihne, Peter, and Duruy, have reverted to the older charge of machiavelianism. It would seem as if our historians, saturated in the diplomacy of the nineteenth century, will not read the history of a simpler day simply, for fear of incurring the suspicion of being simpletons. At any rate, it is difficult to escape the conviction that they are detecting too many of the inventions of the modern political game in the tentative states- manship of an ingenuous bourgeois senate. The modern historian was not the first to commit this sin. The taint of contemporary theory was quick to touch even the Roman historians who treated the times of Flamininus. Rome had full possession of Greece within fifty years after perpetual freedom was so pompously proclaimed at the Isthmian games of 196. In view of that fact it would be surprising if the diplomacy of Mum- mius, of Sulla, of Caesar, and of Augustus had not influenced the successively contemporaneous historians to attribute their new- found cleverness to the senate of Scipio's day. I propose in this paper to trace in outline the growth of Roman imperialism through the period of 200-180 b. o. and at l Rome et la Grice, p. 83. [Classical Philology IV, April, 1909] 118 A Chapter in the Story of Roman Imperialism 119 the same time to examine some of the historical sources of the period with a view to eliminating anachronisms of the kind that I have just indicated. Perhaps I may also be permitted now and then to question the accuracy of our historians in interpreting those sources, if by doing so I can make my own point more readily understood. As for the influence of the events that pre- cede the year 200, I shall attempt to make the correct deductions without discussion. To be sure, if one were to give a complete treatment of the subject, one would be compelled to review the history of Rome from its very beginnings. In this paper, how- ever, I must begin at the point where it is usually alleged that imperialism was emerging into a policy which was to be adopted or rejected with full consciousness of its meaning. A discussion of the wars within Italy up to the limits of the natural boundaries is not absolutely essential to the question in hand. The Roman statesmen did not appeal to the history of the conquest of Italy 1 for precedent to determine Rome's foreign policy. Again, no one would seriously contend that the Cartha- ginian wars were in any literal sense undertaken for the sake of conquest. In that life-and-death struggle, Rome, whether through actual or imagined necessity, involved herself in the possession of foreign territory in Sicily and Spain, but her refusal to touch African soil quite clearly indicates that she had little desire for any land-holding other than was absolutely necessary for the immediate safeguarding of Italy. The continued possession of Spain does not refute this general statement, since that territory had been seized for the purpose of cutting off Punic resources during the war, and was later held through characteristic Roman inability to execute a retreat. In seeking the first evidences of a definite Roman policy of foreign conquest for the sake of permanent possession, it is usual to begin with the invasion of the East, or, more exactly, with the 1 There are a few significant phrases connected with the ceremonies that preceded the declaration of war and with the ancient regulation of triumphs which show how closely warfare was associated with the extension of territory. Such are the frequently occurring words prolatio finium and propagare fines (cf. Livy xxxi. 5. 7, and Oic. De rep. 3. 24). These phrases, however, were stereotyped by the year 200 and were apparently not taken literally as containing any requirements in extra-marine war- fare. 120 Tenney Frank second Macedonian war. Rome, of course, had even before that war secured a foothold on the Greek coast, but only because of the necessity of suppressing the Illyrian pirates who had been plundering Italian seaports. Somewhat later Philip, by his treacherous move against Rome in the worst days of the Punic war, compelled her to invade Macedonia in order to form a coali- tion of Greeks against Philip. No new possessions, however, accrued to Rome from this invasion. She was satisfied with hav- ing diverted Philip, and, when the Aetolians withdrew from the quarrel, she signed a treaty with Philip accepting the status quo ante. Coming now to the second Macedonian war, I shall take space only to point out some inaccuracies of our sources in their treat- ment of Rome's motives for undertaking the war, and in their statements concerning the terms of peace offered and the final settlement made. By doing so, I hope to indicate the way to a safer interpretation of the facts. The motives of the Romans in entering upon the war were seemingly not clearly understood by the historians of a hundred years later. At any rate they found Rome's reasons inadequate, and felt the necessity of adding others more plausible in the light of contemporaneous politics. To illustrate this point, I shall con- trast the account of Polybius with the accounts of later writers. From Polybius (Book xvi) we get a simple statement of the case: Philip had attacked possessions of Attalus, Rhodes, Egypt, and Athens; these powers, being "friends" of Rome appealed to her for aid; Rome declared war in response to these petitions.. That is all. I find no implication in Polybius that Rome's reasons were then considered insufficient. And yet from that time to this, with the exception of Mommsen — who has his own way of justi- fying success — writers have found it difficult to pardon Rome's behavior. This is not surprising. If we are to rely upon Poly- bius, we must conclude that Rome entered the war for the defense of nations with whom she had treaties of "friendship" (amicitia) only, and not of defensive alliance. Since Rome was not in the habit of acting in this way during the late Republic, historians naturally sought more adequate explanations. In the first place, A Chapter in the Story of Koman Imperialism 121 Livy revises the list of appealing nations. He gives the position of importance to Aetolia, 1 feeling, doubtless, that the other powers mentioned were not so closely bound to Rome as to justify her in undertaking a war in their defense. Aetolia had at least been an ally in one war. Livy furthermore adds the alleged fact that Philip had recently offered aid to Hannibal against Rome (Livy xxxi. 1. 10 and 11. 10), a story which has, of course, no respect- able foundation. Pompeius Trogus has the same fiction and produces it as the predominant cause of the war. At the ingenu- ous motivation of Polybius he can only sneer: Titulo ferendi sociis auxilii bellum aduersus Philippum decern itur (Just. xxx. 3. 6; cf. Livy xxxi. 14. 6, haudquaquam digna causa). Cassius Dio writes in the same spirit: xpapevoi pev tt? t&v 'ILWrjvwv em- ficuria \afirj, — Fr. lvii. 1. It is evident then that these historians had some difficulty in finding a justification for Rome's declaration of war. Their skepticism as to the sincerity of Rome's profession is regularly assumed to be well founded. It is my conviction that all these doubts rest upon a misunderstanding of the obliga- tion which a treaty of amicitia entailed in the earlier days of Rome. We know that in the last century of the Republic, when Rome was supreme, all treaties, whatever their polite wording, were in their execution favorable to Rome. Not only were the socii obliged to send their contingent to Rome at call, but the amid, too, knew that they did not possess the privilege of neutrality if Rome was at war. On the other hand, Rome was under no obli- gation to reciprocate when the amid were in distress. Her "friends" might come to the senate and humbly petition for aid, but they usually returned infecta re (cf. the case of the Aedui, Caes. B. O. 6. 12 and 1. 33) . In view of this consideration, we forget — as the Romans themselves soon forgot — that the term amidtia must have involved mutual obligations in the early days of Rome's foreign administration. We know, of course, that a treaty of "friendship" did not, strictly speaking, impose the necessities of a defensive alliance. All that it distinctly guaran- ■Livy xxxi. 1. 9: uacuos deinde pace Punica iam Romanos et infensos Philippo cum ob infldam aduersus Aetolos aliosque regionis eiusdem socios pacem turn ob auxilia cum pecunia nuper in Africam missa Hannibali, etc. 122 Tenney Frank teed was peace between the contracting parties. 1 It is evident, however, that in practice it contemplated mutual aid of a practical sort unless the friend was otherwise engaged and could not render aid without offense to other allies. Certainly Rome's amid, even in the days when she was not so powerful as to be awe-inspiring, felt that treaties of this kind placed them under some such obli- gation. The behavior of the Achaean league in 192 (see Livy xxxv. 50), the tone of Ptolemy's message to Rome in 200 (Livy xxxi. 9) and his offer in 190 (Livy xxxvi. 4) as well as that of Masinissa in the same year [ibid.) will illustrate the spirit in which the other signatories of such treaties viewed the obliga- tions which they involved. I believe that Rome's action in declaring war in 200 on the appeal of four of her amici is proof that Rome then assumed that in signing treaties of friendship she was accepting the same obli- gations toward her friends as they toward her. Why should she not ? Rome had then a very sincere respect for Philip, Antiochus, Rhodes, and Attalus. Doubtless she would not have suggested in 200, weakened as she was at that time, that she was facile prin- ceps among these amici. She considered her friends as her peers then, and seeing things in that light, she was ready to interpret the written and implied obligations of her treaties as liberally as did her friends. Her behavior during the war favors this inter- pretation. It is evident from Polybius (Books xvi-xviii) that Attalus is considered the head of the war at first ; Rome is merely sending aid to equals as a friend. It is not till the Roman generals and the Roman armies have proved their ability to secure results that they become the recognized leaders; and it is not till Philip, disgusted with the unending parleyings of the Greek legates, asks permission to treat with Plamininus alone that the pre-eminence of the Romans is acknowledged. If Philip had defeated the coalition at the end of the three years' struggle, history would not have spoken of this as a Roman war. There is another act of Rome's at this time which reveals the fact that the Romans then accepted a treaty of amicitia as involv- ing practical obligations. In the year 200, having signed a treaty l«»Xo nil (piptiv (irl dXX^Xovs, App. B. C. 4. 66. A Chapter in the Story of Roman Imperialism 123 of "friendship" with Masinissa, Rome sent envoys to him who were ordered "polliceri si quid sibi ad firmandum augendumque regnum opus esse indicasset, enixe id populum Rom. merito eius praestaturum" (Livy. xxxi. 11. 12). My conclusion then is that in the days (and they were not many) when Rome still considered the eastern powers as her equals, she in all good faith undertook to interpret the various treaties in as generous a spirit as they did ; that under certain conditions of proximity and need, it was at that time customary to render mutual aid in warfare on the basis of a mere treaty of amicitia; that therefore the reasons which Rome put forth for attacking Philip in 200 need not be questioned as inadequate in spite of the skepticism of later writers. To be sure, Rome did not need more than ten years' experience in the East to learn that her friends were not absolutely necessary to her existence and that their aid was by no means worth full payment in kind. When she had made this discovery, the word amicitia lost some of its importance to her. Rome still permitted her "friends" to help her at times, but she soon ceased to return the favor. By the time that Rome had so far outgrown her friends as to become their virtual master, the historians had no way of understanding Rome's earlier professions. Hence it is that we have heard so much of "pretexts," "hyprocrisy," "political calculation," "commercial- ism," 1 and all the rest, in the later accounts of the second Mace- donian war. 1 1 have little room for controversy, but I may be allowed an occasional note on the excellent work of Colin, quoted above, since it is the most recent discussion that deals with our subject. Colin, pp. 90 ff ., expanding a hint of Mommsen's, tries to show that Rome was strongly influenced by her commercial interest in undertaking this war. Surely those interests had an exceedingly weak voice in the governmental policies of the time. We hear of no strong financial society until 215, and that was apparently formed upon request to raise money when the state was in great distress (Livy xxiii. 48) . The civilization that brought forth the Porcian legislation and the laws forbidding senators to engage in commerce could hardly require many of the products of the East. Colin's view that the publicani had learned through their business in Sicily to desire increase in domain is not plausible. We know that Sicily had hitherto been a burden, not a source of wealth. If commercial interests were powerful enough to exert an influence, they doubtless used it in protesting against the war as did the heavily taxed farmers, for a part of the old loans of 215 were still unpaid and overdue. In fact the senate had to mortgage public lands as security for the instalment due in 200 (Livy xxxi. 13). The day came when commercial interests could force the state to extend her conquests, but it was not in the year 200 nor for many a year then to come. I may add that Colin's skepticism about Rome's sincerity often prevents his acceptance of the 124 Tenney Frank In the accounts of the peace conference at Tempe there are also a few slight misconceptions due to anachronistic interpretation of facts. Polybius 1 shows clearly in the terms offered at Nicaea that Rome had no intention of holding any part of Greek territory surrendered by Philip (Pol. xviii. 1-8), but even he is writing long enough after events to permit a phrase of latter-day color to slip into his narration. The error is a mere trifle, only the insertion of the adverb evdeay;, but it is enough to show how soon Rome's earlier policy began to be misunderstood. In the speech attributed to Flamininus (xviii. 37. 2) the general is explaining why he refuses to dethrone Philip; he is represented as saying: "You do not understand the policy of Rome; oine jap 'Vco/xaiovs ovSecri to irpStTOv iroXefi^aavra^ evOeoK dvaaTaToiR iroielv tovtoxk. iriaTiv fteyeiv . . . . e'/c tcov Kar' 'Avvifiav', i. e., "You may judge from our treatment of Carthage that Rome is not in the custom of destroying her enemies at once!' 1 '' Is Flamininus capable of implying that Rome will ultimately destroy Carthage and Mace- donia? The words are so inconsistent with his entire behavior that I think we must decide that they misreport him. Polybius wrote this part of his history after the capture of Perseus, probably even after the fall of Carthage and Corinth. The implication of simplest interpretation of facts. For instance, he repeatedly points out that the Greeks of 200 b. c. suspected the altruistic professions of the Romans and he adduces their attitude as ground for his skepticism. Now, anyone who reads Pol. x. 25, App. Mao. 9. 3, Paus. vii. 8. 1, Just. xxix. 2, Livy xxx. 25. 14, will be convinced that there was much of this suspicion, even if he attributes half of the language he there finds to vaticinia ex eventu. Nevertheless, Greek suspicion does not prove the Romans hypocrites. The petty Greek states had learned in a hundred years of struggle with ambitious despots like Philip and Antiochus to suspect the professions of the strong. These despots had inherited the policies of Alexander, the first successful imperialist. He and his suc- cessors had created the atmosphere of suspicion and fear in which the Greeks now lived. It would be strange, therefore, if the Greeks had not feared that the Romans in com- ing east would use the methods they had seen in operation at home. I admit that there was much fear and suspicion, but the presence of this does not seem to have been based upon any accurate knowledge of Roman methods. 1 It seems clear to me. Oolin, however, assumes that Flamininus was the author of the movement to liberate Greece, and that he was compelled to struggle with the senate for years to accomplish his purpose (p. 89). Set the very first message sent to Philip in 200, when Flamininus was still a nonentity in the senate, was strongly philhellenic ; fiiJT€ tuiv 'EWJjihov firiSevl iro\efi*?v (Pol. xvi. 34), and the wording of the first offer of peace made by the senate strongly implies that the senate had no intention of retaining any Greek territory. Note the contrast in ix iiiv rrjs "EW&Sos air&aris iiexoipeiv . • • rois 6£ Kark ri)v 'IWvpCSa tStovs irapaSavvai 'Poi/mLon (Pol. xviii. 1. 13). A Chapter in the Story op Koman Imperialism 125 his report must be explained as an anachronism. Appian (Mac. 9. 2) falls into the same error by following Polybius. His words are: o'i ovBeva ttco tv ei/0ii<; air' apx^S averpeyfrav. Livy is clear-headed enough this once to emend his Polybius, for he writes : "illos prioribus omnibus conciliis conloquiisque de condicionibus pacis semper ut ad internecionem bellaretur disseruisse, etc." (xxxiii. 12. 6). In a nearby passage, however, he betrays a temporary misunderstanding of Rome's purposes in Greece. Mis- translating a sentence of Polybius (xviii. 36) he falls into the error of reporting a quarrel between Mamininus and the Aetolians regarding the possession of Thebes : disceptatio inter imperatorem Romanum et Aetolos orta est de Thebis ; nam eas populi Romani jure belli factas esse Quinctius dicebat (xxxiii. 13. 7). In the original account of Polybius there is no implication that Rome is asserting her own claims to any part of the captured territory. The important items in the treaty of peace were, according to Polybius, the immediate liberation of the Greek cities in Asia Minor and Thrace, the transference to the Romans of the surren- dered cities in Greece before the Isthmian games, the surrender of the Macedonian army, and the payment of a war indemnity in ten annual instalments. Later historians could easily have con- sulted the original documents, but apparently they did not. Instead they added items consonant with the spirit of aggrandize- ment which held sway in their own day. Thus, for instance, Quadrigarius (see Livy xxxiii. 30. 8) includes among the terms an agreement to pay a "vectigal" for thirty years, a requirement which would imply a condition of dependence not contemplated by the Romans. Livy, probably drawing upon the annalists, adds as further items of the treaty: bellum extra Macedoniae fines ne iniussu senatus gereret (Philippus), and, ne plus quinque milia armatorum 1 haberet. Such requirements would necessarily make Macedonia a Roman dependency, whereas the treaty as given by Polybius merely provides for the liberation of the Greek states without adding restrictions that would necessitate constant inter- ference from Rome. Even here, then, it is evident that the 'Nissen Krit. U., p. 146, proves on external grounds that these items cannot have been part of the treaty. 126 Tenney Fkank ascendant imperialism of a later day is coloring the accounts of Rome's earlier foreign policy. The Greek and Roman historians betray few inconsistencies or disagreements in treating of the final settlement of affairs in 194-92 and of the final evacuation. It is all the stranger, there- fore, that the majority of the modern discussions of the subject should be full of cynicism regarding Rome's purpose. Our his- torians suspect that the senate did not intend to leave Greece entirely (cf. Colin), or that the settlement of Flamininus virtually consisted in establishing pro-Roman oligarchies which would eventually bring Roman influence back to Greece (cf. Niese), or that the liberation, in so far as it was not an act entirely contrary to political calculation, was, after all, the product of an unreason- ing philhellenism (cf. Mommsen). As for the first point, the suspicion is based upon no definite proof. Since there happens likewise to be no definite refutation, we must rely upon the logic of related facts for a decision, and this militates against the suspicion. Whenever we can find any indication of the senate's purposes in the early stages of the war, they all point quite distinctly in one direction. The senate's first envoy to Philip demanded that he cease attacking Greek cities. The first terms offered by the senate required the evacuation of Greece but the restoration to Rome of the Illyrian territory — a contrast of treatment that implies the intention of liberating the former. The senate's provision that Philip must withdraw his garrisons before the Isthmian games reveals the fact that the senate itself had planned the spectacular proclamation of freedom and intended to make it comprehensive. The apparent permission granted to the decemviri to hold the "three fetters of Greece" until the immediate danger from Antiochus should pass over does not reveal any desire on the senate's part to retain them perma- nently. Had the senate desired them it would have given some slight hint of that desire, whereas apparently the commissioners hardly knew whether or no the matter had been discussed. Furthermore, the settlement of Greek affairs was intrusted to Flamininus: assurance enough that the senate had no desire to pursue a selfish course. In fact, for ten years to come, Rome by A Chapter in the Story of Roman Imperialism 127 sending Flamininus to Greece whenever trouble arose there showed unmistakably her adherence to a policy especially represented by him. That policy demanded complete and perfect liberty for all Greeks and was well set forth in the unequivocal message to Antiochus: ovheva jap en t&v 'EWf/ww ovre •KoXep.ela-Qat, vvv vtr > ovSevbs ovre SovXeveiv ovSevt (Pol. xviii. 47). The Roman senate would not have stood sponsor for that ultimatum with its five negatives if it had coveted any part of Greek soil. For the second point there is absolutely no proof. Flamininus was, to be sure, occupied for a large part of the year 194 in a journey of readjustment through the Greek cities. The best indi- cation of what there was to do and the excellent way in which he did it is to be found in the famous inscription of the Kyretiae, Ditt. 278: eVei teal ev to« \ot7rots tracnv >.oirdi>vri