STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Notes and Discussions 85 It is probable that not only in Old French but in all the Romance lan- guages there is evidence of this pronunciation. Italian incollerirsi can only- come from incdlerire. Spanish Saragossa, which can only come from Caesar- augusta, is evidence that this accentuation was so firmly established as to be capable of analogical extension. Charles Exon University College, Galwat VARIA SOCRATICA ONCE MORE May I take the opportunity, kindly offered me by Professor Shorey, of making a brief reply on some of the main points of his criticism in the July number ? In several cases I think I can show that his objections have been already met by anticipation in my book itself. And in any case, whatever may be the fate of my own views, there is a real problem to be solved by anyone who believes Aristotle's famous account of the genesis of Platonism in Meta- physics A and M. As throughout the metaphysical and philosophical books, Aristotle's main thesis is obviously to show that Platonism was a refined and qualified Pythagoreanism; yet the well-known passage of A about the influ- ence of Cratylus and Socrates seems to account for the irpayixartia IIXaTtovos without any reference to the Pythagorean theories. If Aristotle is relating the facts correctly, as I believe he is, there must be some way of accounting for this seeming incoherence. My proposed solution (V.S., p. 38, 68) is that the way in which early Pythagoreanism came to influence Plato was through Socrates himself; my critics who reject this solution ought at least to propose a rival one and moreover to weaken by actual counter-evidence the cumulative argument for the Pythagorean character of Socrates' beliefs based on the concurrent testimony of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes. Dr. Shorey seems to find a special absurdity in my having detected the a-lafw. — aijiM theory in the Frogs as a "crowning proof" of the impiety of Euripides. If he means that Aristophanes is not really serious in his attack on Euripides I agree with him, but neither do I believe him to be serious in the Clouds. The charges in both cases are made mainly in fun, as the author of the Symposium knew, but still they are there, and it is true, as I said, that the professed indictment of Euripides as impious culminates in the charge of his having made a heroine say t« 8' o'Sev ei to tftv /x4v ion. KarOaveiv ; The point is even made a second time at vs. 1477 where the whole line in question is flung in the author's teeth. Now it is quite certain (a) that the doctrine that our true life lies beyond the grave is of Orphic provenance, (b) that it is exactly what was meant by those who derived crS/wi from oijfm, and (c) that it is this belief which is the basis of the ixtkerr) Oavdrov of the Phaedo. Hence I am quite entitled to argue from the use made of the famous line in the Frogs that the doctrine would appear "impious" to the ordinary Athenian of ca., 400 b.c. Whether Aristophanes personally thought the impiety a serious one is immaterial to my reasoning. 86 Notes and Discussions With regard to my use of Empedocles to explain a striking metaphor in Aeschylus, I will only observe that though in "newspaper English," as Ruskin used to call it, metaphors of a violent kind are often used without any con- sciousness of their meaning, great poets' metaphors are not employed in this unconscious way. If Aeschylus speaks of a vision of coming evil as appearing "in front of the heart," we may be sure that he is being guided by a perfectly definite conception and we have the duty and the right to ask what that conception is. When we take into account the Sicilian connections of our poet it is almost inconceivable that he knew nothing of the verses of his brilliant younger contemporary, and it therefore becomes suggestive to find that the Empedoclean theory of perception happens to afford exactly the picture we want to make the whole matter clear. Nor am I ashamed to have learned something from Dr. Verrall, as who of us has not ? I am no believer in some of Dr. Verrall's views, but I am sure that to have learned where and why they are wrong (when they are wrong) is in itself no mean education. As to the Platonic correspondence, I cannot, of course, argue the case for its genuineness— in the main — here. I will only say (1) that my convic- tion on the point has arisen from a perception of the worthlessness of the evidence I have found for myself or learned from others against its genuine- ness; (2) that the appearance of the "letters" in our best and oldest MSS shows that they figured as part of the Platonic corpus in the archives of the Academy, and that I do not see what early Academician could have forged, e.g., Ep. vii, or Ep. xiii, and palmed his work off on his colleagues as Plato's. The impossibility of the thing becomes patent when one bears in mind that linguistic evidence shows that the forgery, if there was a forgery, must have been committed in the fourth century, and so to say, almost before Plato's ashes were cold. What sort of success the Alexandrian and post- Alexandrian composers of "pseudo-epigraphic" correspondence would have been likely to achieve may be judged by anyone who cares to study the so-called ' 'epistles of the Socratic men"; (3) I may add that the weight of modern authority, too, seems to me to be on my own side. I attach special importance in this respect to the judgment of such a scholar and historian as Eduard Meyer. Dr. Shorey, I am glad to find, agrees with me that Aristotle knew nothing of moment about Socrates except what is still recorded for us in Plato's Dialogues. I do not know how he reconciles this view with his adherence to the belief that Aristotle had information (certainly not derived from Plato) about a fundamental disagreement between Socrates and Plato as to the "immanence" of the "universal" in things. Aristotle does, of course, distinguish Socrates' view on this point in Metaphysics M from that of those "who first said" that there are "Ideas." But the whole question is, whom does he mean by these persons, and how did he know of their views ? That he does not primarily mean Plato is clear from his distinguishing these "first believers" in the "Ideas" from those who held that "Ideas" are numbers, a view always treated by him as characteristic of Plato. You might urge that Notes and Discussions 87 the actual words pioy*ds as these "first believers" is not to the point. It merely shows that Aristotle held the Platonic doctrine of "Ideal Numbers" open to the same objections here urged against the unnamed ol jrpSrot. It does not show that these irpunoi were not contemporary with Socrates, nor that I am wrong in interpreting what is said of Socrates as simply reproducing the Platonic assertion that Socrates believed in the relation which Plato calls //.i9c£is. Again it is not quite correct to say that "in my zeal to confute" Aristotle I "condemn" his well-known statement about the debt owed by thinkers to Socrates for his iira.KTt.Kol Xoyoi. Quite on the other hand, I accept Aristotle's statement absolutely; I only contend that it does not justify the conclusion, often drawn in our time, that the account given of his "method" in the Phaedo is untrue. I even went so far as to say that Aristotle's state- ment about Socrates' fondness for iiraKTiKol \6yoi might have been derived entirely from the study of the dialogues (V.S., p. 63). What I try to refute is a view, never expressed by Aristotle, that iiraywy-^ was the one and only logical method known to, or practiced by, Socrates. I observe that Dr. Shorey makes no remark on my essay on the Phrontis- terion. Yet unless the positions of that essay can be refuted, they are enough in themselves to ruin any theory which treats the Phaedo as a piece of free ("very free and very independent" as Mark Tapley said) "idealization." In commenting on my argument as to the appearance of the word 4>afxev in connection with the eiSrj in the Timaeus, Dr. Shorey falls into a curious mistake. He says that the "we" alluded to as saying that there is an eTSos votjtov of fire and the like must mean either "men in general," or at the utmost Socrates and his friends, and therefore proves nothing to my purpose. If he will look up the passage again he will see that the remark is not made by Socrates at all but by Timaeus, and this was precisely my point. The <£a/«V cannot mean "men in general say," for it is certain that "men in general" do not say and never have said that there are vorfra tlby of things. It means then "I and my associates," i.e., Timaeus of Locri and other men of science from Sicily and Magna Graecia. This implies definitely that, according to the view assumed by Plato, not merely was the theory in question as old as the last decades of the fifth century, but also that it was no invention of Socrates himself, but the regular teaching of at least certain groups among the Pythagoreans, and brings us back once more to the assertion of Aristotle, which I believe to be true, that the "philosophy of Plato" agreed in its broad outlines with that of the "Italians," though exhibiting certain special peculiarities (I8ia n\dra>vos), of which a "Theory of Ideas" was not one. These i&a n\aT' iwvrov and kowwv&v nvi are common idioms, though I thought it as well to point out that the former corresponds exactly to Plato's avrb Ka8' airo which thus means simply "by itself," "in isolation." As Professor Burnet puts it, the rpiywov avrb ko.6' avro means what is "just a triangle," without being further specified as an equilateral, or, a right-angled triangle, etc. As to the passage Isocrates xii. 132 ff., if I have misinterpreted its sense, the reason is not ignorance of the "transitional force of phr ovv" — I never supposed the words in this passage to have any other force — and I must add that Blass's interpretation is certainly wrong, since Isocrates is insisting that there are only three iSau of constitution, monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and thus means that neither apurroKpaTia. nor a constitution airb ti/mj/«xt(i)v is to be reckoned among them. I may just lay before the reader for his judgment my own analysis of the passage and leave him to consider whether it does or does not justify the remark to Notes and Discussions 89 which Dr. Shorey objects [§ 130]. The successors of Theseus set up the best of all governments. It was a democracy which, however, took care to secure that the best men should administer it (SrnxoKpariav .... apio-TOKparla 8k xprn/xan/jv). Such a government is often called 17 airb Ti/oj/uaTw and reckoned as a separate form of constitution [131]. But the right view is that there are only three tSaw Twv iroArraiv, monarchy, oligarchy, democracy. Under any one of these forms of constitution, if the administration is in the hands of the wise and just, you have happiness and a real "rule of the best" [132]; if it is in the hands of rash, violent, self-seeking men, you have misery and the rule of the worst; if the administrators are alternately good and bad, there are corresponding fluctuations in the fortunes of the state [133]. Thus [p.iv ovv of course transitional] this is how the case stands about the koI Swa/xas of the various constitutions — (but it is not now my object to say any more on this general topic) [134]. The argument turns on a dis- tinction between the letter and the spirit of the constitution, and amounts to this. Formally a constitution is always either a monarchy or a democracy or an oligarchy. But its goodness or badness depends not on its formal character, but on the spirit in which the executive, whether one man, a few, or many, administers it. apurroKpaTta, rule by the best, and its opposite, rule by the bad, are distinctions of the spirit in which administration is carried out, and those who introduce these opposites into a classification of forms of government (as all those did who reckoned ij airb Ti/j^ixdriav in as a fourth form, because they thought that that form was synonymous with and insured "rule of the best") commit the fault, as we should now say, of mak- ing a simultaneous division on two different bases. This analysis shows, I think, that Isocrates, in speaking of the three tSan of iroAxrdat is definitely opposing the iSea as something merely outward and superficial to what is in his view the all-important thing, the spirit of the constitution. Such a use of ioea may, I think, fairly be called the very opposite of the Platonic sense. I take the $wras km Swdptis below to mean the real and effectual distinctions in the spirit of government on which the speaker has just declared the weal or woe of cities to depend, as opposed to what he treats as the mere formal distinction between monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy. If I am mistaken on the verbal point, the mistake does not affect the real validity of my argument, and does not arise from any mis- apprehension about the force of fiiv ovv. A. E. Taylor My writing "Socrates" for "Timaeus" was obviously but a slip of the pen. It does not affect my argument, which is based on the natural force of urfids of the ideas to Plato; (2) that what he says of the suggestions and origins of the doctrine, whether in Socrates or the pre- Socratics, is concerned, not with the hypostatized Platonic idea, but with the indispensable prerequisite of that, the apprehension and attempted formula- tion of the definition and general concept; (3) that some of his more specific comparisons and contrasts between Platonism and Pythagoreanism refer to the platonizing Pythagoreans, or the pythagoreanizing Platonists, of the fourth century. If Professor Taylor will restudy pp. 63 and 88 of his Varia Socratica, he will find that he has inadvertently "contaminated," in his argument and paraphrase, two distinct sentences of Aristotle, in a fashion that, to my thinking, invalidates his interpretation. He has blended the ol TTpwroi of 10786 12, and the ra touivtcl tS>v ovtuiv of 10786 31, in the composite English clause "those who first said these [italics mine] are iSau," to which nothing corresponds in Aristotle's text. He may of course hold that this inadvertence does not affect the argument; I shall endeavor Notes and Discussions 91 to show later that it does. In any case, it is best to keep to Aristotle's own language, and to speak either of those who first said that there are ideas (that ideas exist), or those who call these things (definitions, concepts) ideas. I am sorry that my grammatical arguments impressed Professor Taylor as an attempt to instruct him in Greek grammar. I intended no such im- pertinence. In Isocrates xii. 132 I spoke of two errors, as they seemed to me. One did not affect the argument and the phrase is rightly interpreted by Blass. The other concerns the substantive question, whether Isocrates does, or does not, here use iSea in distinct antithesis to true essence or spirit, and so in the opposite of the Platonic sense. I will confine myself to the latter. Isocrates says in effect: There are on the one hand (/iev) only three forms, ideas, or types of government, but (8«) in all of these, good administration yields good results and bad, bad; that is, whichever is best administered is best. This explains his previous protest that aristocracy is not an iSaa or form of govern- ment at all. It is that best administration or administration by the best which may be found in them all. In 134, he goes on with fikv ovv resump- tive and transitional, al /xkv ovv vo-w ko.1 Swafxeii tS>v iroAxTaw o«ts i\ov