STOP Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR. Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early- journal-content . JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 480 Notes and Discussions themselves faithful and active under the new leaders whom the state may appoint, and meanwhile to elect temporary commanders. The response is a demand, proceeding chiefly from their political friends, that they themselves remain in office till their successors arrive. Without the unanimous assent of the soldiers, they fear to do this, so they deprecate any factious resistance to the will of the state (although apparently they would not be unwilling to remain if the demand were unanimous) and prudently appeal to the men to remember their past services and give them a fair hearing in case anyone in the camp has any charge to bring against them. When no one makes any complaint, but the demand that they remain in office until their successors arrive becomes unanimous, they consent to do so. George Miller Calhoun The University op Texas THE CASE OF THE MARCELLI In Cicero's De Oratore (i. 39. 176) Crassus, in discussing the importance of knowledge of technical law, says: Quid? qua de re inter Marcelhs et Claudios patricios centumviri iudicarunt, cum Marcelli ab liberti filio stirpe, Claudii patricii eiusdem hominis hereditatem gente ad se dicerent redisse, nonne in ea causa fuit oratoribus de toto stirpis et gentilitatis iure dicendum f The explanations that have been offered of this difficult passage are many and various. Two may be given as types. Roby in his note on the passage in A. S. Wilkins' edition of the De Oratore 3 (1895) believes the situation to have been the following. 1 A slave belonging to a Marcellus had been manumitted and thus, though free, was still attached to the manumittor and his family. His son, however, was ingenuus, and therefore had no patron. If this son died, his property would fall, first, to his own immediate heirs; second, to his agnates; thirdi and finally, would pass by the law of the Twelve Tables to his gens. That law runs (Lex XII Tab. v. 4, Brans Fontes 7 , p. 23) : Si intestate moritur cui sum heres nee escit, adgnatus proximus familiam habeto: si adgnatus nee escit, gentiles familiam habento. This freedman's son did die intestate, and the question arose: Who are his clansmen? The Claudii were an old clan, subdivided long ago into at least two important branches. One of these, the Marcelli, whatever its origin, was plebeian. Now the Marcelli by virtue of their distinction and age might well claim full gentile rights, and the issue in the case at bar is whether such a claim could be maintained against that of the patrician Claudians to be the only members of the Claudian gens. Piderit (De Oratore 2 , p. 368) gives the following version: A slave of the (patrician) Claudii, belonging as such to their family, is manumitted and enters the family of the Marcelli. Upon the death of this man's son the 1 Substituted by Wilkins for his own note in previous editions. Notes and Discussions 481 Claudii claim the right of patrons, the Marcelli that of relations, "weil er seiner nachsten Abkunft naeh (stirpe) zu ihnen gehore." Most commentators 1 incline toward the theory set forth by Roby that the Marcelli and the Claudii stood opposed as two separate organizations to vindicate against each other the gentile reversion to the estate. 2 Piderit's version is cited only for his insistance upon the word stirpe. Other- wise his suppositions have no determinable relation to the words of the text. If we examine the passage, one thing at least is plain. The Claudii claim as gentiles. Cicero in the Topica (6. 29) has given us a vigorously discussed definition of gentiles: Gentiles sunt inter se qui eodem nomine sunt, qui ab ingenuis oriundi sunt, quorum maiorum nemo serniutem servivit, qui capite non sunt deminuti. If this definition is accurate — and Cicero cites for it the weighty authority of the pontif ex Q. Scaevola — this man can have had no gentiles whatever. He would be excluded by both the second and third qualification. The sugges- tion of Ortolan (Joe. cit.) that the Claudians may have been gentiles to him, while he did not bear that relation toward them, is rendered inadmissible by the words gentiles inter se. However, we need not take the words too literally. The citation of the pontif ex Scaevola as authority justifies the assumption that the definition was framed for sacral purposes, where minutiae might well be insisted upon that the practical law would disregard. We may safely suppose that for all ordinary legal relations, an ingenuus would be reckoned in the clan of which he bore the name. 3 » So Ortolan, Expl. historique (iii. 8) 1051, n. 1, regards the claim of the Claudii as that of a famille supirieure; and Greenidge Roman Legal Procedure, p. 184. 2 It is very likely that the Marcelli, in numbers, were at least equal to the other Claudii, and that, in popular estimation, the plebeian and patrician families were co-ordinate in importance and even in nobility. So we hear Asconius, in Scaurianam, p. 33 (Kiessling) , fuerunt enim duae familiae Claudiae, earum quae Marcellorum appellata est plebeia, quae Pulchrorum patricia. It is this double character of the gens, as well as the adoption of P. Clodius, to which Cicero alludes when he affects to doubt (Pro Scauro 15. 34) whether C. Claudius was patrician or plebeian. That the Marcelli possessed at least one important privilege of a gens, that of the patronatus of conquered peoples, we know from the Verrines, particularly in Verr., Act II, L. ii. 49. 122: C. Claudius (Appi filius Pulcher) adhibitis omnibus Marcellis qui turn erant, de eorum sententia leges Halaesiuis dedit. This took place in 95 B.C., in the consulship of the very Crassus in whose mouth Cicero puts this discussion. ' Besides, Cicero's definition is not quite accurate from the logical point of view for which alone it is introduced. As stated, it would exclude from gentile communion a man who had been captured by the enemy and restored to his rights as a citizen by ransom or escape iure postliminii. Boethius in his commentary on this passage of the Topica notices this: Quid si libertorum nepotes civium Romanorum eodem nomine nuncupantur t num gentilitas ulla est t Ne id quidem quoniam ab antiquitate ingenuorum gentilitas ducitur. Boethius correctly, if somewhat surreptitiously, adds the words civium Romanorum. The servitus must be a iusta servitus under Roman citizens. 482 Notes and Discussions Granting that this freedman had gentiles and that the Claudii patricii asserted their right to be so regarded, was this claim controverted by the Marcelli ? If that were the case, the passage would have run : cum et Marcelli ab liberti filio et Claudii patricii eiusdem hominis hereditatem gente ad se rediisse dicerent. If anything seems obvious, it is that the two claimed on altogether different legal theories. This is borne out by the phrase de toto stirpis ac genlilitatis iure of the following sentence. It might be conceivable that stirpe is, in a sense, a variant for gente, but stirps ac gentilitas is plainly not a doublette. Besides it would be difficult to find an instance of the use of stirps in the sense of family, large or small, i.e., that group of men connected by a real sacral and an assumed blood bond. Gens and familia are constantly so employed, the former of a large group, the latter, more generally of a large or small one. Further, we find the damns, like the Greek oUta, to describe a rather narrow family group, often the narrowest possible one. All these terms not only have a literary currency in these senses but are so accepted in the more precise terminology of law. Stirps, on the contrary, regularly denotes relationship, and is used where its English equivalent "stock" would be employed. 1 The natural interpretation of Cicero's words is that the Marcelli claimed as relations, the Claudians as members of the dead man's gens. If as relations, we may ask : What relations ? If the intestate's father had been the property of all the Marcelli in common — an aedituus of a family shrine, for example — the family, as such, would have been his patroni and the relation of patronus and libertus was a quasi-parental one. But we have no reason for assuming that the patronatus extended beyond the person of the affranchised slave himself; 2 nor can we justify the use of stirps in such a connection. If, then, it was an individual Marcellus whose freedman was the intestate's father, it cannot have been the whole family, but a certain number of men of that name, who are the claimants here. Stirps in the sense of relationship is necessarily very broad, and includes not only the agnates of the Twelve Tables, but all who would in later law be known as cognates. In the early empire, the praetor had long modified the rigor of the civil law by allowing, after agnates, the entrance of cognati into the inheritance, 3 up to the sixth or even seventh degree. 4 When he began to do so, we do not know, but we do know that the second century b.c. witnessed an enormous activity on the part of the praetors not only in completing and assisting but also in correcting the civil law. It is probable enough that the 1 The nearest approach to the sense required for the common rendering of the passage is in the expression in stirpes and in capita, applied to the division of inheritances. This, however, is a very different thing from the use of stirps as the equivalent of familia. 1 Ortolan (op. cit., p. 44). » Gaius iii. 25. 30; Ulp. Fg. xxviii. 7; (Ulp.) Collat. xvi, viii. Filii sobrini sobrinaeve — Paul. Sent. iv. 11. 7. Notes and Discussions 483 portion of the praetor's edict on that subject (unde cognati 1 ) had become, not indeed tralatician, but, in substance, of common occurrence in the edicts of successive praetors as early as 150 B.C. The rights of such cognati could be enforced under praetorian formulae, and the lex Aebutia had opened the court of the urban praetor to these formulae. 2 But the centum viral court was explicitly excepted by the law. There only the older legis actiones were available. There would, therefore, have been no scope for such a litis contestatio in the proceedings in iure as to permit the index or recuperatores to consider the claims of cognati. Indeed not even the constitution of the indicium was within the power of the praetor. Recitation of the verba solemnia left him no choice but the reference of the matter to the standing indicium of the centumviri. If not as cognates, the only possible claim that the term stirps allows is that of agnates. Is there any set of circumstances under which the Marcelli might be called the agnati of the deceased intestate? Concubinage of female slaves is an inseparable incident of all slave- holding societies, 3 and a common result of such a relation was the emancipa- tion of the slave and her child. Between citizens and slaves there was of course no conceivable connvbium, and the child of such a slave, though recognized as the offspring of a citizen, was none the less a slave. 4 After emancipation, this child had, of course, no legally enforceable claim upon his natural father. But as we postulate agnitio on the part of the father, there would be a real blood tie between this libertus and his legitimate brothers of which the law did, in certain respects, take cognizance. 6 One can easily understand the existence of close personal relations, in despite of the bar sinister, between the legitimate and illegitimate children. If we suppose the deceased intestate to have been the son of such a libertus, the sons and grandsons of the original emancipator would be patrui and patrueles to him. Assuming agnitio and close association, the Marcelli of this case, patrueles perhaps of the deceased, may easily have regarded themselves as kinsmen of the dead man and the issue joined here may have been to determine whether a claim so based was valid, whether relationship on the wrong side of the blanket conferred a ius stirpis and was not to test the rights of the Marcelli to be called a gens. We may find confirmation for our conclusion in the fact stated before, that in 95 b.c. — certainly not far from 1 Lenel. Edictum perpetuum xxiv. B. 3, in Bruns Fontes 1 , p. 216. ! The date of the lex Aebutia is much disputed. The consensus of opinion places t nearer to 150 b.c. than to the later date advocated by some. (Cf. Cuq. in Dar. Sagl. Diet. des. Ant., s.v. "Leges Publicae," p. 1127.) This case of the Marcelli is not likely to have occurred much before 100 B.C. » Not, of course, the legal concubinatus, which required always a liberta or a free woman. Cf. Digest xxv. 7. ' Ulp. Pig. v. 3. 9. « Paul on the Edict, Digest 23. 2. 14. 2. 484 Notes and Discussions the date of this case — an excellent understanding prevailed between the Claudii patricii and the Marcelli, as to certain very highly valued rights — an understanding which is scarcely likely to have existed, if a few years before the two branches were at bitter feud on a question that cannot fail to have aroused bad blood. 1 Max Radin [I should like to propose a yet different explanation of the case of the Marcelli. Cicero's especial point appears to be that the legal pleader needs a thorough knowledge of law, because out of an apparently simple issue a case of great technical complexity may unexpectedly develop. The case of the Marcelli must, therefore, have been of this character, and all forms of explanation which assume a puzzling question as visible in it from the begin- ning are on that account unsatisfactory. I accordingly prefer to reconstruct the case somewhat as follows: a Marcellus, son of a freedman of that ilk, died intestate, leaving no direct heirs. Under the law of the Twelve Tables the inheritance would fall to the nearest agnate, that is, to the nearest living at the time when it first became certain that the decedent had died intestate (Gaius iii. 11; cf. Just. Inst. iii. 2. 1). Now this nearest agnate had (I surmise) died without entering upon the inheritance. But he left a group of heirs who forthwith claimed the inheritance stirpe, that is, by reason of their direct descent from this nearest agnate. The claim thus appeared perfectly simple and readily adjudicable. But the legal representatives of the gens Claudia were alive to their opportunity, and put in the counter-claim that the right of the deceased nearest agnate to the inheritance from his relative lapsed by his death before he entered upon possession (a voluntary passing-by of the inheritance would have had the same effect), and that to such a right no succession was by law recognized. Therefore, so claimed the Claudii, both direct heirs and agnates qualified to succeed failed the intestate decedent and the inheritance must therefore fall, according to the Twelve Tables, to the Claudii as a gens. They therefore claimed gente as the group of Marcelli claimed stirpe. This was, I take it, the primary issue raised before the centumviral court. Had the law been as well determined and its enunciation as clear as it was when Gaius wrote, there can hardly be a question that the claim of the Marcelli would have been at once thrown out of court, for Gaius (iii. 12) distinctly declares the law to be as I assume the representatives of the gens Claudia claimed. But I imagine that the law on this point had not been distinctly established at the time when the famous suit of the gens Claudia v. certain individual Claudii Marcelli came to trial. Very possibly the decision entered in this case determined the law for the future as Gaius records it. 'The claim of the Claudii need not have been exclusive. They may have sought to share with all existing Marcelli the gentile reversion. Notes and Discussions 485 And one may easily see how the simple issue above outlined became yet further complicated before the case was fairly on. The fact that the intestate decedent was the son of a freedman raised questions concerning the proper definition of agnati. The possibility that the claim of the contesting Marcelli who claimed stirpe might be rejected, and the inheritance pass to the gens, prompted the representatives of the entire body of Claudii Marcelli to interject a claim that they constituted a legally independent gens, upon which, instead of upon the gens Claudia as a whole (or possibly the gens Claudia to the exclusion of the plebeian and illegitimate gens Claudia Mar- cellaf), the inheritance should devolve. Therefore, as Cicero through the mouth of Crassus intimates, the whole complex question of stirpal and gentile relations as concerned with the law of inheritance had to be argued. It may be remarked that at a later date the praetor found the law as recorded by Gaius (iii. 12) too harsh, and deliberately changed it by his edict (Just. Inst. iii. 2. 7), as even before the time of Gaius he had ameliorated a number of the inequitable provisions of the law of inheritance (Gaius iii. 25) . The case of the Marcelli as I have thus hypothetical ly reconstituted it appears to account naturally, simply, reasonably, and in perfect accord with what we know of Roman law, for all the elements involved in Cicero's statement, and it does this without introducing any uncalled-for complexi- ties such as appear to me to have been assumed by certain of the other forms of explanation. I might, to be sure, argue the matter in detail, especially as against the more involved theories, but it hardly seems to me to be necessary. E. T. M.] EMENDATION OP THEOPHRASTUS DE SENS. 64, DIELS VORSOKRATIKER* 375, 44 H\r)v oi% airavrmv airoSlBoxn ras p.opds, aXXa fiakXov rmv xykmv «ai rSv Xprn/idrmv, kol rovrmv aKpi/3«TTepov Sloped ra Trepl robs xt)A.oi>9, avacpipmv rr)v tpavrao-iav wpos avOpmirov. Instead of kcu rovrmv we should probably, not, of course, necessarily, read kv avTaiv