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JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. EVIDENCE IN THE AREOPAGUS By Robert J. Bonner The law cited by Demosthenes which required testimonial evi- dence to be reduced to writing before being produced in court has generally been regarded as applicable to all courts in all periods. But recent investigation has made it clear that the law was not in force earlier than 390 b.c. 1 And in the absence of an explicit state- ment that the law applied to all courts it seems worth while to inquire what justification there is for the tacit assumption that evidence produced before the Areopagus and other courts of similar jurisdiction was ever required to be in writing. The extant speeches delivered before the " Blutgerichte," to adopt a convenient German designation of the Areopagus and other courts of similar jurisdiction, belong to the period before the enact- ment of the law requiring evidence to be in writing, and so they exhibit no indications of the use of written evidence. For the period after the enactment of the law there is an Areopagus case, cited by the plaintiff in Mantitheus v. Boeotus, which is significant. Boeotus, it is alleged, had contrived to involve his brother Mantitheus in a quarrel. Then, claiming that he had been wounded in the fight which ensued, he laid an indictment for wounding with intent. At the trial it was established by testimony that the wound was really self-inflicted. Euthydicus, a physician, testified that Boeotus had requested him to make an incision in his scalp. ovros 8 ' i/xdi fitra MevocXeovs tov iravruv tovtwv apxiTtKTOvos «rij8ovA.ewas Kal i£ avrtXoyias Kal XoiSoptas irXtfyas a\r)V avrov Tpavp-aros c« 'Apeiov wdyov fit trpoatKakia-aTO, «>s vya&ev Cf. Antiphon i. 3; v. 14, 88. « Philippi, Der Areopag, p. 85. Cf. Meier und Schdmann, Der attische Process', p. 494. * For the proceedings of the &p&Kpuru see Evidence in Athenian Courts, pp. 48 ff., and Leisi, op. cit., pp. 82-83. 452 Robert J. Bonner official act of the magistrate in charge of the case right up to the time of going to trial. 1 But this theory fails to account for the appearance of documents at the trial the contents of which were unknown to the opposing litigant. For neither litigant need be ignorant of the contents of a document filed at the avd/cpiaR. And yet on several occasions the language of the speaker clearly implies the possibility of a document's being filed without his knowledge. Now the filing of a document under circumstances which rendered it impossible for a litigant with the exercise of due diligence to acquaint himself with its contents before it was read in court cannot properly be regarded as part of the proceedings of the avaKpiaiv. In effect such evidence was produced for the first time at the trial. One of the chief objects of the wpoSiKaaiai was to determine before what court the case should come and whether the accuser was the proper party to conduct the prosecution. 2 As a rule little or no evidence apart from the statements of the parties would be required to enable the magistrate to reach a decision on these points. Philippi believes that all witnesses were sworn at a preliminary investigation. But Gilbert has shown that the evidence cited does not support this view. The available information regarding the ■n-poStKaaiai is meager; but a case cited by the speaker in Isocrates' adversus Callimachum (52 ff.) throws some light on the proceedings so far as the production of evidence is concerned. 3 The facts are as fol- lows. The brother-in-law of Callimachus had a quarrel with one Cra- tinus, which resulted in a personal encounter. In the course of the fight a female slave was injured. Callimachus assisted his brother-in-law to conceal the woman, and gave out that she had died as the result of a blow inflicted by Cratinus. An indictment for manslaughter was laid before the king archon who brought the case into the court in the Palladium. Cratinus, however, becoming aware of the real situation succeeded in locating the woman; but being determined to catch the plotters e7r' avrod>pq> Ktucovpyovvre; , he kept his dis- covery secret until the day of the trial when he produced the woman alive and well to the utter confusion of the prosecutors. It is 1 Thalheim, op. cit. ^Gilbert, Griechische Staatsalterth&mer, I, 432. 3 The date of this speech is about 400 B.C. Evidence in the Areopagus 453 useless to inquire what Cratinus did in the preliminary investigations to lead the prosecutors to conclude that the plot was succeeding. Manifestly he did not disclose his real defense nor produce the evi- dence upon which he relied to establish his innocence. That the woman was real evidence 1 and not a witness is of no consequence. The case clearly establishes the fact that the law did not require all the evidence to be produced before the trial. The rules governing the competency of witnesses were not the same for the "Blutgerichte" as for the other courts. Thus an otherwise competent witness before the Areopagus was disqualified unless he was able to swear to the truth or falsity of the charge. It is probable that this rule was operative in the other "Blutgerichte." 2 There is no explicit statement that women were not competent witnesses in Athenian courts; but the absence of any reference to the evidence of women in the extant cases and the repeated challenges to accept their evidentiary oaths make it certain that women were not competent witnesses. There is, however, an incident recited in a speech attributed to Demosthenes 3 which can be satisfactorily explained only by assuming that in homicide cases women and children were competent witnesses, as I have elsewhere shown. 4 The prevailing view that slaves were permitted to testify against a defendant charged with homicide has not gone unchallenged, but the arguments advanced against it from time to time have as a rule been rejected. The chief basis for the theory is an isolated state- ment in Antiphon, and a provision in Plato's laws giving slaves a right to testify in homicide cases: eijrtp yap koi paprvpav Igeori oWA iXtvOtpov, tixos toi koi \jnjov ytv&r- Oai irepl avrov tjv, «ai p.rj anpirov airo6av€iv avTov i6vov povov i^io-rm fiaprvpttv (cat crwrjyo- piiv, lav iyyvr]Tr)v d£ui>)(ptmv rj p.i)v pevuv KaTacrrrjcry /*«XP l Stiojs, v Sk Kal riov aWtov 8ov\u>v iv rats fiaprvpiats — ov yap av ePaxravi^flixtv aurovs — irm<: Sikoliov tovt<$ aaprvpovvri 7rtar«u(ravTas SuKpOtipaX /xc; A. fi. 7. The prosecutor meets the objection to accepting a slave's statement without torture by pointing out that in such cases, viz., where the slave was an informer, he was set free, not tortured (7.4) It is plain that in practice the evidence of a slave was produced either as an information or as a statement made under torture. This conclusion is further confirmed by an even more signifi- cant case hitherto unnoticed in this connection, which the plaintiff in Theomnestus v. Neaera 1 cites. Some time previously Stephanus, • (Demosthenes) lix. 9 ff. : iveviyKas yap abr$ alrlav ^«i8§, iis ' kiptSva^i Tore &uc6p£vos M dpaTrtrriv airov IftTwv Trardi-ae yvvaiKa Kal tic tjjs 7rX)77Jjs Te\eirn/) il /LvSpunros, vapas Kvpqraiot etijcrav, vpoetirov ain!^ 4rl IlaXXaSlift tpbvov. 456 Robert J. Bonner the husband of the defendant, prosecuted Apollodorus, the brother- in-law of Theomnestus, for homicide. The case came before the court in the Palladium. In support of this accusation, which was afterward shown to be false, Stephanus produced as witnesses some slaves pretending that they were Cyrenaeans. Here at least is a case in which there were no obstacles in the way of producing slaves as witnesses. Their evidence was against the defendant and they were under the control of the prosecutor. If they were competent witnesses why did Stephanus in pressing a false charge incur an addi- tional risk by pretending that they were freemen? The obvious conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that in practice slaves' evidence was unknown in Athens. This conclusion is materially strengthened by a passage in Antiphon's defense of the choregus, in which he contrasts the means available for confirming the statements of freemen and of slaves — oaths and pledges in the case of the former, torture in the case of the latter. If slaves regularly appeared as witnesses before the "Blutgerichte" such a statement from a defend- ant in a homicide case would be pointless. 1 Leisi 2 has receded in a marked degree from the position taken by Lipsius in respect of the arguments advanced by Guggenheim. He accounts for the absence of slave testimony in the extant cases by pointing out that the law merely permits slaves to testify; it does not forbid their being tortured. Here is his final conclusion. "Im allgemeinen gilt aber eine auf der Folter abgenommene Aussage fur zuverlassiger als ein Zeugnis. Diese Regel wird sich auch auf das Zeugnis von Sklaven erstrecken, und daraus wird es sich erklaren, warum wir weiter nichts von Sklavenzeugnis horen. Das ganze Institut macht den Eindruck von einem Residuum einer friiheren Gerichtsordnung, das aus religioser Scheu vor Anderung der alten geheiligten Satzungen an den Blutgerichtshofen bestehen blieb." In a word the law was obsolete even in the time of Antiphon. It had disappeared without leaving a trace either in legal practice or in legal literature. Under the circumstances it certainly seems preferable to avoid this anomaly by understanding /iaprvpelv in the passage in question to mean what it undoubtedly means in every other passage in Antiphon where it is used of slaves. The University op Chicago » Antiphon vi. 25. ' Op. cit., p. 23.