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JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HOMER 1 By Robert J. Bonner Laws in the sense in which the Xenophontic Pericles 2 defined them — Trdvre; ya\p olirot vofioi elalv ovs to ir\rj0o<; avveXdov Kal Soki- fidaav eypayjre, pd£ov a re Set iroieiv Kal a p,r\ — are not found in Homer. But there were nevertheless definite ideas of a re Bel iroielv Kal a ixrj, though they had not yet been formulated in codes and constitutions. And the notion of orderliness and of obedi- ence to the prevailing standards of right and justice was expressed by such words as evvofiir}, evijyeo-iTj, and evBiicirj. The OefitaTe<; were the nearest approach to laws. Strictly speaking they were pro- nouncements of the king indicating in an authoritative fashion what was right and proper (#e/u?) in a particular set of circum- stances. The usual occasion was the arbitration of a dispute. To the Zeus-born and Zeus-nurtured king was granted the scepter and the de/Mo-res. 3 When the lesser chiefs as representatives of the ruling aristocracy dispensed justice they, too, were intrusted with the Oefwrrei and held the scepter when they pronounced judgment.* Originally the decisions were regarded as divine inspirations ; but the use of the adjective atcokiai in connection with Oefiitrre; shows that the notion of a divine source had practically disappeared. 5 None of these inspired judgments are recorded in 'Special phases of the legal history of Greece in the Homeric age, e.g., the mean- ing of diiuarcs, the trial scene pictured on the shield of Achilles, and the punishment of homicides, have always attracted a great deal of attention. Of the trial scene Leaf observes " there are probably no twelve consecutive lines in the Homeric poems which have been obscured by so many explanations" (Journal of Hellenic Studies VIII, 122 f£.). But no one, I believe, has collected all the data furnished by the poems for a first chapter of Greek legal history. The present paper is the result of an attempt to reconstruct the Homeric judicial system. 2 Xen. Memorab. i. 2, 42. 3 \auv iikov t' dird BvpJov l\oipvqv • ■jrpopoiv Kev 8q tirara ACa KponWa \iToip.rp'. s i Od. xvi. 97 ff. 2 Od. xviii. 139 ff. 8 Odysseus punished with death the goatherd and the faithless maidservants. * Od. ix. 114 ft. Amyntor cursed his son and drove him into banishment for debauching his concubine (II. ix. 447ff.). Other instances of punishment inflicted are noticed in the general discussion of homicide. 'One of Odysseus' charges against the suitors was that they had debauched his female servants. 6 Od. iv. 536. ill. xxiv. 480. When Odysseus desires to conceal his identity and account for his wandering from Crete he pretends that he slew a man (Od. xiii. 259). »Od. xiv. 402 ff. Justice in the Age of Homer 15 The suitors even propose to seek the counsel of the gods regard- ing the contemplated murder of Telemachus. 1 Outside of the circle of the dead man's kinsmen and friends 2 there is no indica- tion of any popular sentiment against ordinary homicide. It would be hard to imagine a more cowardly murder than the fic- titious slaying of the son of Idomeneus by Odysseus. And yet Eumaeus receives the self-confessed murderer, as he supposed, with all the respect due a stranger in accordance with the pre- vailing customs. 3 There are a number of homicides mentioned who were living as honored members of communities to which they had come as exiles. The slaying of parents, however, met with universal condemnation. Phoenix, the aged companion of Achilles, tells of his feud with his father and of his design to slay him. But owing to his fear of "the people's voice and the many reproaches of men," who would call him parricide, he refrained.* In later Greek story Orestes slew his mother Clytemnestra; but in Homer it is neither stated nor necessarily implied that he was responsible for her death. So the honor he won for avenging his father's murder does not imply public approval of matricide under any circumstances. 5 And we may be sure that the wife who compassed the death of her husband would be roundly con- demned. Menelaus has nothing to say of Clytemnestra's share in the plot against Agamemnon; Aegistheus is alone responsible for his death. Nestor, too, seems to lay the blame of her treachery to her husband upon Aegistheus and the iiolpa de&v, though he does call her arvyep-q^ Agamemnon's spirit speaks bitterly of her, and says she has brought disgrace not only upon herself but upon her whole sex. 7 As a rule men shrank from slaying a guest. Heracles' murder of Iphitus is aggravated by the fact that Iphitus was his guest. 8 And the refusal of Eumaeus to ac- cept Odysseus' wager which has already been quoted affords fur- ther evidence of this prevailing sentiment. 9 1 Od. xvi. 402. "Ibid. iii. 310; iv. 535. *Ibid. xiii. 259ff. i Il. ix. 459 ff. ; of. Buchholz Homerische Realien II, 83. * Od. i. 298. *Zbid. iii. 269 ff., 310. Ubid. xi. 429 ff. s Ibid. xxi. 27 ff. : 8s /uy i-etvov tkvra xariKTavev

<2>' tKero Kpelwv' Ayapiiivuv || 'Arpel- Sr/s ws et nv 1 irl^riTov fieravd6vo<; a/cova-tos and fyovos kicovcrios. Patroclus committed the homicide for which he was banished, ovk iOeXcov. This case shows further that not even extreme youth saved one from the penalties of manslaughter. 1 There is no clue to the origin of the practice of taking blood- money. It has been suggested that it was to defray the expenses of sacrifices to appease the spirit of the dead. There is a hint of this in Achilles' promise to share with the spirit of Patroclus the ransom he received for Hector's body. 2 Neither is there any trace of the modern idea of compensation measured by the damages suffered by surviving relatives. 3 Adultery, seduction, or rape was punished by the husband or nearest relative in the case of a free woman, by the master in the case of a slave. Aegistheus' adultery with Clytemnestra is regarded as aggravating the murder of Agamemnon, and his death at the hands of Orestes is an expiation of the seduction as well as of the murder. 4 The injured husband might slay the adulterer or he might, like Hephaestus in the lay of Demodocus, exact a fine. 5 Anteia, the wife of Proetus, falsely accused Bellerophon of attemped rape and insisted that her husband should slay him. 1 ebri ne TVT0bv i&rra Mevolrtos (^ 'Oirdevros tfyayev vp.irepbvS'' a.v$poKTafyrios, oiK (BiKiav, dpup' & may refer to the restitution of the dowry only ; but the next line, e« yap rov irarpm Kaica, ire( e ^s /lot <50^\\eTai, 06 rt v4ov 7c, 0*8' SKlyor —Od. iii. 366-67. The use of this excuse by Athena shows that these claims were not uncommon. 22 Robert J. Bonner course involved considerable risk is clear from the fate of Iphitus, who was slain by Heracles while seeking to recover some stolen horses. As a rule the whole community took up these claims and took steps to obtain compensation. Thus Odysseus when a mere lad was sent by his father and the council of elders to Messenia to obtain redress for the theft of a number of sheep by Messenians. 1 The attitude of a community toward a marauder who thus exposed them to claims for damages is well illustrated by the measures taken by the Ithacans to punish Eupeithes who, by joining in a Taphian raid against a friendly people, had rendered the Ithacans liable to claims for redress. It was only the intervention of Odysseus that saved him from death and confiscation of property. 2 Failing redress by peaceful means the injured people usually resorted to reprisals. The accruing booty was divided among those who had suffered loss of property by the elders acting as a court of claims. 3 Such a claim was called %/jeto?. It is obvious that communities possessing any sort of organiza- tion must make some provision for the amicable settlement of dis- putes between citizens. The possession of ayopal @ov\r)6poi and OefuaTes distinguishes the civilized communities from the bar- barous peoples of the Homeric age just as Biktj and vo/xos marked the same distinction in later times. 4 But modern investigators are by no means agreed as to the kind of provision that was made for the administration of justice. Three different views have been advanced: (1) The parties chose arbitrators who had no power to enforce their awards. (2) The judges were chosen from among the yepovre; and like modern judges had the power of en- forcing their decisions. (3) The judges were really magistrates and represented the king. 5 Unquestionably the administration of lOd. xxi. 16 ff. 2 Od. xvi. 420 ff . This incident will receive fuller treatment in the discussion of the judicial power of the people. s Il. xi. 685 ft. Cf. Lecrivain "Le droit de se faire justice soi-meme et les repre- sailles," Memoires de L'Academie des Sciences de Toulouse (1897) 277. Lecrivain and the writers whom he quotes dismiss the Homeric period with a mere reference to the mission of Odysseus and the raid of Nestor. * Od. ix. 112 ; Herod, iv. 106. 5 These views are conveniently summarized by Thonissen Le Droit Pinal de la Ripublique Ath&nienne 23. Pinsler, Das Homerische KOnigtum 320-21, 329, denies that a king ever acted as judge. Justice in the Age of Homer 23 justice began with arbitration. Naturally the disputants would seek to obtain the services of a person who had a reputation for impartiality and wisdom without regard to rank or official position. We even hear of a woman, Arete, queen of the Phaecians, who acted as an arbitrator. 1 But the prestige of the king must have marked him as the natural arbitrator. And it is the arbitral func- tion of the Homeric kings that Aristotle 2 has in mind when he says ras St/ea? eicpivov. Homer, it is true, nowhere pictures a king dispensing justice. But this is a mere accident, for Idomeneus proposed to Ajax to submit their dispute to Agamemnon. 3 And Minos settling disputes in the spirit land certainly had his prototype in such kings as Nestor who -rrepl olSe St/ca? and Sarpedon who Avkitjv elpvro ZLkt)6ilx,€vov • o /jjkv cv)(c.to iravr cwroSovvai l Il.sy\. 387-88; Od. xii. 439. 2 Hesiod Works and Days 35ff. ; cf. Gilbert op. cit. 461. s Il. xxiii. 485 ; Lang, Leaf and Myers' translation. * Od. xiv. 391 ff . ; cf . ibid. xvi. 102-3. 6 Dareste Annuaire des Mudes Grecques XVIII, 91. «Il. xviii. 497-508. Justice in the Age of Homer 25 500 Srjp.ii> irwJMWTKitiV, 6 8' dvatvero p.r)8iv iXecrdai • a/A(D 8' XicrOrjV iirl Icrropi irtipap kXeaQax. \aol 8 aptporipoicrw iirrfirvov, d/*<£is dparyoi • K-qpvKts 8' dpa Aaov iprjrvov • ol 8c yipovrts ijar' iirl ^earoiox \i'0ois ltpV(ov • Totcrtv eira/r' rjuraov, ap.oi/3r)8is St SiKa£ov. k«ito 8' dp' ev jitecrcrotcrt Sua) xpvcrolo TaXavra, 508 T(3 SojUcv, os /t«Ta Tourt 8iK)7v WuvraTa et7roi. A man had been killed some time before the trial, and his kins- men and friends rallied to take vengeance on the slayer, whose friends also supported him in large numbers. Finally the bulk of the community was ranged on one side or the other. 1 A com- promise seemed advisable, and an agreement to settle the blood- feud for a sum of money was reached. The scene on the shield presents the principals disputing about the payment. The one claims that he has paid the money in full ; the other denies it. In the market place each man, surrounded by his partisans who had sided with him in the earlier stages of the feud, tells his side of the case to those within hearing. At length one challenges the other to stake a talent apiece and refer the dispute to arbitration. An agreement to abide by the verdict is made and confirmed by oaths. 2 The talents constituting the wager are deposited before the elders seated in the place of justice, each with a scepter, the emblem of the judicial office. Around them surge the partisans so closely that the heralds are obliged to restrain them. The liti- gants then present their cases amid the applause of their parti- sans. In succession the elders express their views; the majority determined the verdict. The two talents were awarded to the winner of the suit. A more detailed discussion of the difficulties with which these lines fairly bristle will serve to make clear the basis of this inter- pretation. Many scholars have maintained that the deep popular interest can be accounted for only by assuming that the homicide is an issue. My theory that the present dispute is connected with an earlier feud will account for the interest in a case involv- 1 This I infer from the deep interest which the people take in the trial. 2 For an agreement (^ijrpij) of this kind see Od. xiv. 393 ff. 26 Robert J. Bonner ing a mere debt. Those who regard the homicide as the issue interpet 6 fiev ei^ero train 1 cnroSovvat, to mean "the one promised to pay all," and 6 8' avaivero firjBev ekecrOat, to mean "the other refused to accept anything." ' It may be admitted that linguis- tically this translation is possible, though Lipsius 2 argues convin- cingly against it. It is assumed that the arbitration is to deter- mine whether the relative shall be obliged to accept blood-money. A minor difficulty lies in the word iravra (499). How could a man who insisted on his right to pay a blood-price because the homicide was, let us say, a/coiio-ios be said to promise to pay all? But there is a more serious difficulty. There is nothing to show that relatives could be forced to accept blood-money; neither is there any evidence of a growing popular sentiment in favor of a settlement. 3 Quite the contrary is the case. Banishment, as we have seen, is the usual fate of the slayer. Moreover the accept- ance of blood-money is cited as an example of extreme self-re- straint.* But it by no means follows that the passion of the man is restrained if he accepted blood -money under compulsion; his heart might still be seething with anger and a desire for revenge. Surely the poet is thinking of a man who acted of his own free will. Leist 5 assumes that when the homicide was aicovo-io<; the relatives were obliged to accept money. Unfortunately for this theory, in the only instance of 6vo<; aicov ' 6 yjkv iv d^fup pMvei a&rov 7r6XX' d7T0Te£6vo? atcovaios and 6vos e/eowrto? played no part in determining the fate of the slayer, neither is it a necessary assumption to explain the trial scene. Various r6les have been assigned to the people. Gilbert suggests that they are compurgators (Eideshelfer) ;' others believe that they decided to which of the elders the prize of two talents went. The lencop has been variously identified as a witness, as the king, as the chair- man of the yepovres. The scholiast regards the icrrcop as a wit- ness; but this view is now regarded as incorrect. An objection urged by Dareste 2 is fatal. If the case was to be decided by the testimony of a witness, what need was there of pleas by the parties or of discussions by the elders? Dareste's 3 former view that eVt iaropi merely means "by arbitration" is the most satisfactory. There is no evidence that either a king or an elder acting as an arbitrator selected by the parties ever referred the case to the council of elders. If it was customary for the king to ask the aid of the elders in arbitrations why did not Idomeneus instead of naming Agamemnon as the proposed arbitrator in the dispute be- tween himself and Ajax offer to submit the matter to the 'Apyeitov fjyrjTope; rjBe pe'SovTes as did Menelaus in his dispute with Antilo- chus?* Neither is there any mention of a presiding officer of the council of elders in this connection. 5 The former view 6 that 1. 506 refers to the litigants has been generally abandoned, though much may be said in its favor. But 1 Gilbert op. cit. 469, n. 1. 2 Annuaire des Mudes Grecques (1884) 94 ff, s Op. cit. 95. "L' foray) et les y4povres sontune seule et meme chose." (So also Iripsius Leipz. Stud. [1890] 231.) His later view in Nouvelles Itt/udes D'histoire du Droit (1902) 11, is that the tarap is the sole judge and that the elders are assessors. *Il. xxiii. 485, 573. 5 After the Pylians had made a successful raid on the Eleans, the king selected a portion of the plunder to recoup losses he had suffered at the hands of the Elean raiders. The elders acting as a court of claims divided the remainder amongst those who had lost property. If the king acted in this case he is not distinguished from the nobles (II. xi. 670ff.). 6 Doederlein translates Sltcafrv by causam suam agebant, and Heyne by alter post alterum causam egerunt. It is evident that tfiaoov suits the eager litigants better than the judicial elders. But the stumbling-block is Slicafrv. It is said that Siicdfa in the active is never used of a litigant. To maintain this rule we are obliged to regard Menelaus both as plaintiff and judge in the same case (II. xxiii. 570). This case is discussed later. There is a distinct change of scene. The poet is now describing the 28 Robert J. Bonner so far as the legal interpretation is concerned it is of no conse- quence. Of vital importance, however, is the interpretation of 1. 508. According to the most widespread view it refers to the judges. This interpretation introduces an unparalleled feature into the trial. It is not strictly a counterpart of the Roman practice of giving a reward to the judge in the Legis actio sacra- menti, for here the reward goes to only one of many judges. Sir Henry Maine believes that the two talents were for the judge "who shall explain the grounds of his decision most to the satisfaction of the audience." 1 Beyond this point it is impossible to follow the proceedings. It would seem necessary to confine the contest for the prize to those of the judges whose opinion agreed with the verdict; otherwise the people might reach a con- clusion at variance with that of the council. For we may be sure that the merits of the case would play a large part in the popular decision. Such a result would assuredly defeat the purpose of the arbitration. On the other hand, if the prize must be assigned to one of the majority judges, what is the basis of the decision? In a case involving a question of fact (i.e., was the money paid as alleged?) there could be but little difference between the affirmative opinions in point of merit. Laurence has emphasized this feature of the theory in a vein of mild and well-deserved satire. 2 It is to avoid this highly improbable situation that Leist, Leaf, and other followers of Maine have without sufficient war- rant assumed that the homicide is itself in issue. This would allow some considerable variety of reasons for reaching the same conclusion, but it involves a difficulty quite as serious, for every- thing in the poems points to the fact that the relatives always decided whether they would accept the blood-price or not. But the line is capable of quite another rendering. Lipsius has shown that in accordance with Homeric usage hUi\v direlv may be rendered "plead a cause." He cites 'A^tXija Siktj ^fieiyfr- a,To, "answered Achilles with a claim of right," and Swca? eipovTo proceedings in court. And it is certainly surprising that the only line which deals with the proceedings should be devoted to the process by which a decision is reached which is of little interest in comparison with the pleas of the parties. 1 Ancient Law 364. 2 " Judges and Litigants," Journal of Philology VIII (1879), 125 ff. Justice in the Age op Homek 29 avaicTa, "they were asking the king concerning their rights." To these may be added en-t prjOevn SiKaia>, "a (fair) claim of right." 1 From the linguistic standpoint there is perhaps but little to choose between the two renderings; but Lipsius finds in fiera rolffi a decisive argument: "Die Bedeutung der Praposition aber lasst nur die Wiedergabe mit 'vor, bei' zu und verbietet die Gleichsetzung mit einem Genetive." Mera rolav simply means "in court." The two talents, then, must go to the man in whose favor the verdict was given. Two views regarding the source and significance of the two talents are prevalent. Lipsius, who regards them as the blood- price paid into court by the slayer, admits that two talents is a small sum for the price of a slain man. In the only other case where blood-money is mentioned the amount is said to have been large: "Yet doth a man accept recompense of his brother's mur- derer or for his dead son; and so the slayer for a great price abideth in his own land." It is pointed out that the close rela- tionship, that of brother or son, accounts for the largeness of the sum. But even if we accept the assumption that in the trial scene the slain man is a distant relative of the plaintiff, the sum is still too small. Two talents are the fourth prize in a chariot race in which the first is a tripod and a woman and the third a caldron. Is not a freeman of more value than a slave woman, and that too not of the best, as may be seen by a comparison with the women offered by Agamemnon to Achilles? 2 Indeed, a woman or a tripod is the usual prize in a chariot race; 3 and a tripod or a caldron is an ordinary wager in a trivial dispute between Ajax and Idomeneus. 4 Was the life of a man held so lightly by even a distant relative? Surely lifelong banishment could not be com- l Od. xi. 570; II. xxiii. 542; Od. xviii. 414; xx. 322. 2 Il. xxiii. 262-70. These women not only were skilled in handiwork (%pya ISvlas), but possessed personal charms (at icdWet ivlxav ipv\a yvmiKuv, II. ix. 130). s Il. xxii.164. This phase of the question is treated by Ridgeway, Journal of Phil- ology X, 30 ft. In a later paper (Journal of Hellenic Studies VIII, 133) he discusses the value of the Homeric talent and shows that it is not too large a sum for a reward to the best judge. He finds that the talent is equal in value to an ox. The results of these investigations tend to confirm the objection that two talents are quite insuffi- cient for the blood-price. *Il. xxiii. 485. 30 Robert J. Bonner muted for so small a sum. As a wager a talent is not excessive. The tripod or the caldron which are mentioned in the proposed wager between Ajax and Idomeneus might cost more than two talents apiece, as may be inferred from the prize list in the chariot race. The wager has been compared with the poena sponsionis et restipulationis of Roman law which went to the successful litigant. In Attic law it survives in a modified form in the rrapaKara^oX^ deposited by the plaintiff and forfeited in case of failure either to the state or to the defendant according to the nature of the case. 1 In effect the wager corresponds to the damages which according to Homeric practice usually accompanied restitution and redress. But the strongest argument in favor of the wager theory is the general Homeric custom of bringing a dispute to an issue by means of a wager. There are traces of challenge to battle as a means of settling disputes which is in effect a wager. After the chariot race Achilles proposed to give to Eumelus the second prize, because owing to an accident he had lost his leading position and was compelled to drop out. But Antilochus protested and claimed the mare because he was second in the race: Tr]v 8' iyu> ov 8uht9 arep opicov olay aeffXov. No money wager is required in this kind of trial, but Antilochus expresses his willingness to pay the usual damages. This offer is, of course, quite gratuitous. But it serves to show how firmly fixed was the custom of demanding damages along with the restitution of an article wrongfully taken. Menelaus' words, el 8' ay' iya>v at/To? 8ikcutprjriap ade/uo-ros Aveortds eoriv tKeivos os iroXifUtv Zparai imSyj/xiov OKpvoevros. Every community, however, was more or less familiar with wrongdoers whose deeds affected the whole community alike. A common example of this class of offender is the man who by committing depredations upon a neighboring people involves his fellow-citizens in responsibility. Neither the king nor the council ever undertook to deal with offenses of this class. They were punished, if at all, by the people. Even in a Homeric community public opinion was quickly crystallized 2 and easily translated into action through the medium of the popular assembly. According to the prevailing view such action is mere mob violence. 3 But, however much apparent justification this view may have in the differences between the orderliness and precision of modern legal machinery, and the rough-and-ready methods of a primitive people, it is based upon a misconception. The term mob violence is properly applied only to the acts of people who usurp the func- tions of the regular courts. In the absence of any provision for the punishment of public offenders, 4 the people were obliged to take measures for their own protection. If they met together and acted after due deliberation they constituted a popular court quite as much as the Athenian assembly that tried Miltiades. 5 The essential difference between the assembly of the "Ten Thousand" which tried Xenophon for aggravated assault and the mob of soldiers that attacked the market clerks is that in the former case l Il. ix. 63 ff. 2 There was practically no restriction upon freedom of speech. Jebb ("Ancient Organs of Public Opinion," Essays and Addresses 139 ff.) points out how the poet keeps us informed of the trend of public opinion by constantly quoting remarks or conversations that sum up the sentiments of a crowd. s Cf. Lipsius Das attische Becht 6; Gilbert op. cit. 447. Finsler ( " Das Homerische KSnigtum," Neue Jahrb.f. Phil. XVII, 321 ff.) recognizes fully the judicial power of the people, but treats it only incidentally : " Eine richterliche Gewalt hat, wie ebenfalls schon erwahnt worden, der Demos, wenn er den Eupeithes an Leib und Gut straffen will, oder die Frier Halitherses mit Busse und Mentor mit Vernichtung bedrohen." 4 The king in his capacity of general might punish breaches of discipline; cf. II. xii. 248. 5 Herod, vi. 186. This is the first trial before the assembly of which we have any account (Lipsius Das attische Recht 180). 34 Robert J. Bonner they acquainted themselves with the facts, while in the latter many of the participants were entirely ignorant of the cause of the attack. 1 Definite information regarding the right to summon meetings of the people for either deliberative or judicial purposes is lacking. It has been assumed that the right belonged to the king alone ; but no one questioned the authority of Telemachus to call a meeting to deal with the suitors. 2 And yet we may be sure that this point would have been raised by the suitors, who were anxious to prevent the intervention of the people, if the sole right to summon the assembly belonged to the king. At a later time Penelope proposed to have Laertes appeal to the people. 3 And the suitors themselves after their attempt to waylay and kill Telemachus were in dread of another appeal to the people which might result in their banish- ment. 4 Both Nestor and Odysseus were surprised that the people did not interfere to protect Penelope and Telemachus. 5 Aegyptius, an adherent of the suitors, clearly intimates that anyone in dis- tress might appeal to the people provided the matter was of public import. 6 It was always the natural instinct of Greeks to resort to the place of assembly even without special summons when any- thing happened that concerned the whole community. Thus the Ithacans on hearing of the slaughter of the suitors assembled of their own accord in the ayopd. 1 Moreau 8 is unquestionably right iXen. Anab. v. 7. 19 ff. 2 It is surprising to hear that this is the first meeting since the departure of Odysseus. Fanta (Der Stoat in der "Ilias" und " Odyssee" 87) regards this as proof that the king regularly summoned the assembly. There is a strong temptation to regard the statement of Aegyptius as a rhetorical exaggeration. Moreau ("Assemblies Poli- tiques chez Homere," Revue des Etudes Orecques VI [1893], 214) remarks: "II est sans doute extraordinaire qu' Ithaque ait passe vingt ans sans agora, et, si j'osais, je dirais volontiers que je n'en crois rien." Finsler, op. cit. 321, sees in the meeting "die Wiederkehr geordneter Zustftnde." This seems to be correct. The interests of the suitors made it desirable that there should be no meetings; cf. Od. xvi. 361 ff. 8 Od. iv. 735 ff . There is no indication that Laertes had special authority during the absence of Odysseus, whose representative was Mentor (Od. ii. 225 ff.). * Od. xvi. 375 ff . * Od. iii. 214 ff . 6 vvv 8e rls <55' ifyetpe; riva XP eL & Tbaov i'/cct i/e v4wv Av8pwv t if o% irpoyevt&Tepoi etviv; — Od. ii. 28 f. 7 atirol 8' els &yopi)i> kIov aOpioi axri>l**voi *VP- — O&. xxiv. 420. 8 Op. cit. 213. Finsler, op. cit. 327, believes that the right to summon the assembly belonged to the king or to any noble. Justice in the Age of Homer 35 in saying "II n'est pas t6m6raire d'admettre que le droit de convo- cation est un droit populaire ouvert k tous." There was practically no difference between the procedure of a popular court and that of a deliberative assembly. A typical meeting of the people for judicial purposes is that summoned by Telemachus to deal with the suitors. Telemachus brings up what is apparently a private grievance; but as Halitherses hinted, it really concerned the whole people. 1 And the event proved that this was the case, for Odysseus demanded that they make good the material losses occasioned by the constant feasting of the suitors. 2 Three speakers presented the case against the suitors, and four addressed the assembly in their favor. Telemachus did not ask for the punishment of the suitors nor for the restitution of his property. 3 At best he hoped to be able to induce or force them to leave the palace. akXa iro\v irphv pa£d>|JLea■^ , w? icev icaTcnravo-ofiev ol Be icai avrol TraveaOa>v says Halitherses, one of Telemachus' active supporters. 4 But the threats of the suitors deterred the people from taking any active measures. As a result of the slaughter of the suitors Odysseus was himself charged with offenses against the community. After disposing of the bodies of the slain suitors the people resorted to the ayopd. Eupeithes, the father of Antinous, was the first speaker. He began, not by asking aid in avenging the deaths of the suitors, but by asking for the punishment of Odysseus as a public offender : & cj>(\oi, r) fieya epv ive\ oaaa eopyas. Stoning was the usual mode of executing the death penalty, and it may very well be that Hector was referring to contemplated judicial proceedings against Paris before a popular court. The suitors in threatening to fine Halitherses for aiding and abetting Telemachus contemplated the use of the judicial powers of the people for their own ends. No doubt they possessed sufficient ascendancy over the people to secure their acquiescence in the punishment of Halitherses, though the charge against him could not have appealed to any considerable number of them. 3 The University op Chicago l Ibid. xvi. 420 ff. As has been pointed out, it was the practice to hold the whole community responsible for cattle-lifting, even when only a few participated. 2/«. iii. 56 f. 3 at xei> vetbrepov AvSpa TrctXeud Te iroXXd re elSas Tapjidnevos iirie