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ἘΠῚ ΠΤ 





SOPHISTES AND POLITICUS 
OF PLATO, 


WITH 
A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES, 


BY THE 


REV. LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A. 


PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS. 





OXFORD: 
AT THE CLARENDON PRUESS. 


M.DCCC,LXVII. 








ΤῸ THE SENATUS 


OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS 


This χουνε fs respectfully Enseriber. 





Tois κοινῇ τι πράττουσιν ἀγαπητὸν ὁμονοεῖν. 
Plat. Polit. 260 b. 





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PREFACE. 


THE present work is a continuation of an edition 
of Plato's Thezetetus which appeared at Oxford in 
1861. Where these are inconsistent with each 
other, the editor hopes that his later will be 
found to correct his earlier views. 

Bekker’s various readings from thirteen MSS., 
and Stallbaum’s from the six collated by him, 
have been carefully consulted in revising the text. 
It is to be regretted that later editors of Plato 
have not had the opportunity of collating the seven 
MSS. which Bekker saw in Italy in 1817-18, but 
does not refer to in his Commentary. Schneider 
also, in his edition of the Republic, mentions having 
seen at Florence a MS. containing the Politicus, 
which appeared to him to be of considerable value. 
The readings of the Bodleian MS. are fully re- 
corded by Gaisford in his Lectiones Platonice, 
the publication of which led Bekker to dispense 


φ 6) 


PREFACE. 


with his intended visit to Oxford (“nolui actum 
agere”). The MS., however, has been consulted 
afresh, and several new readings from it will be 
found in the notes, for the most part of little 
moment, and agreeing with Vat. A. and Ven. II. 
The special errors of the Bodleian, as of other 
MSS. of the calligraphi, are generally of a super- 
ficial kind. The omission of accents and of the 
iota of the imperfect diphthongs is curiously fre- 
quent. In these dialogues this MS. has only one 
instance of contraction, viz. owe for οὐράνῳ in 
Polit. 273 c. But there is, perhaps, evidence of 
the earlier use of contractions in the mistaken 
expansion of ἄκρων into ἀκριβῶν (Theeet. 148 c), and 
of πραγμάτειαν into παραδειγμάτειαν (Polit. 279 a). 
Compare Phileb. 36 e: πάσαις ἀφροσύναις Vv. 1. παρα- 
φροσύναις. 

Corrupt places have been marked with obeli, 
and the most probable corrections are printed in 
large type in the notes. Words whose authority 
is doubtful, from their omission in some MSS., are 
bracketed. 

A few conjectural emendations, which appeared — 
highly probable, have been admitted or retained 
from former editions. These are marked with 
asterisks, that the reader may have some intima- 


tion of the state of the text. 








PREFACE. 9 


The Sophist has been edited in Germany, with 
explanatory notes, by Heindorf and Stallbaum : 
the Politicus only by Stallbaum, who, although 
abundantly familiar with Plato, is inferior to 
Heindorf in taste and judgment. Many scholars 
have contributed to the elucidation of particular 
points. But these dialogues, perhaps more than 
most other ancient writings, require for their 
interpretation that they should be taken as a 
separate whole, and studied by their own light. 
To δ᾽ αἴτιον, ὡς οἶμαι, προϊοῦσιν οὐχ ἧττον ἔσται 


καταφανές. (Polit. 287 b.) 






ἢ 





ae | 





ΓΜ δι} , | i 


ee EG PO Aa iT Ba 








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. ae 
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Ξ- i Ἢ) 
dee i 








THE 


SOPHIST AND STATESMAN 


Or 


ΡΙΑΤΟ. 





GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


AS the discovery of truth and the direction of life are the 
twofold function of philosophy, so Plato saw a twofold counter- 
feit of his ideal educator and governor in the professors of 
wisdom and the public men of his time. The one corrupted in- 
quiry with controversy, the other spoiled politics with faction. 
These Sophists and party leaders seemed to exhaust between 
them the serious interest of the Greek world; for the poets, 
sculptors, painters, and other “imitators with their child’s 
play,” were by this time of less account. There might be 
jealousies between these two great powers, who formed the 
itellect and heart of every state, but they were usually in 
league, and together held the public ear. Rarely, either in 
the present or the past, might be traced the footprints of a 
more august presence; of a Divine spirit “coming down in 
the hkeness”’ of sage or legislator. Such glimpses of the Phi- 
losopher and true potentate were few and far between, and 
he had always been either misunderstood or rejected by man- 
kind. The writer of these dialogues, whom for the present 
we assume to be Plato, seems to have viewed this spectacle 
with a feeling strangely mixed of curiosity, interest, and scorn. 
In approaching his subject by a circuitous track, he makes 
inquiry the vehicle of satire, and satire of inquiry. But it is 
not to be inferred from this that the inquiry or even the per- 
plexity which he exhibits here is merely ironical. On the 
b 


il GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


contrary, Plato is nowhere more intensely speculative, nor is 
the aim of his discussion anywhere more real. This appears 
even trom the form in which the questions are asked. In 
other dialogues the character of Gorgias or Protagoras, Thra- 
symachus or Polus, is dramatized, and certain hints thrown out 
as to the nature of their profession; casual remarks are made 
on the career of Pericles, Themistocles, and other servants of 
the state: but here not a single name is mentioned; the spirit 
of inquiry (as described in the Thestetus) refuses to descend 
to individuals or to things near at hand, and the ideal Sophist, 
the ideal Statesman, each character in the utmost generality, 
is at once represented and defined. Again, in other dialogues 
certain abstract questions are proposed, such as, What is cou- 
rage, prudence, justice? and in the Thezetetus, What is know- 
ledge? But even “Sophistic” is not a purely abstract con- 
ception: the Sophists were a real class of persons, having, as 
Plato believed, certain common characteristics. The state also 
is an essentially complex thing, and the statesman can only 
be known in relation to the state. This union of the universal 
and the real, this personifying of a general notion, this attempt 
to descend into the complexity of life without losing hold of 
metaphysical conceptions, may be regarded, even on an external 
view, as a leading peculiarity of these two dialogues. 

And the form in this case truly indicates the substance; for 
these writings are, together with the Thezetetus, the most dis- 
tinct record which remains to us of a great effort, of which other 
traces are found in the Parmenides and Philebus, by which Plato 
endeavoured to bridge over the gulf which the first impulse of 
philosophy had made between the absoluteness of Knowledge 
and Being and the relativeness of Sensation and Appearance. 
In some dialogues the phenomenal side of this antithesis, while 
dramatically represented with great liveliness, is dialectically 
annihilated; opinion, custom, the conceit of knowledge, are 
brought on the stage with ironical circumstance for a prepared 
overthrow; and the difficulty is stated, but not fully met—How 
can virtue, not based on science, be virtue at all? But here 
the same difficulty is presented in a more general aspect. The 
hollowness of pretended wisdom, and the futility of existing 
governments, are taken for granted or summarily proved. But 
the question 15, How can the real and the apparent, the ideal 




















GENERAL INTRODUCTION. iil 


and actual, coexist? And yet they must. For the non- 
existent cannot be the object of attack; and unless true ideas 
can be brought to bear on the actual circumstances of men, 
there is no hope of remedying the evils of which the world is 
full. This speculative doubt, while giving rise to certain 
changes in Plato’s theory of Knowledge, forms the link be- 
tween these dialogues and the Theetetus. That their con- 
nexion with that dialogue is not merely outward, is the more 
probable because the Thesxtetus, though ending, like the 
Philebus, with a promise of further talk, wears no appearance 
of being the first instalment of a larger design. But if, as 
would appear from this, the two dialogues were conceived and 
written at a later time, their author would not, without good 
reason, present them as a continuation of an earlier writing. 
And it may be regarded as a sufficient reason, that he was 
now engaged with the more objective phase of the same anti- 
thesis, of which the subjective aspect was developed in the 
Thezetetus; for the opposition between the Absolute and 
Relative, which the mind experiences in contrasting Know- 
ledge with Sensation and Opinion, is also seen by her as the 
contrast between the Real and the Unreal, and between the 
Ideal and the Actual; when, for instance, the pretended wise 
man is compared with the true lover of wisdom, and the great 
men of this world with the perfect King. The chief aim of 
each inquiry, however, is not so much to point the antithesis, 
as to draw together the opposite poles; to find room for the 
relative beside the absolute; to obtain a meeting-point between 
idea and fact. As in the Theetetus the question, ‘‘ How is 
false opinion possible?”? was met by an unsuccessful effort 
to conceive the mode in which thought acts on sensation 
and memory, so in the ‘“‘Sophist” there is raised the parallel 
question, How can that which is not, appear to be? And 
this doubt is, for the present at least, removed by raising 
Difference (i.e. Negation) to the rank of an idea or category, 
which has “communion” with, or participates in, Reality or 
Being, and may thus become the object of thought. The cor- 
responding difficulty in the Politicus has a double aspect. First, 
What place is there for an ideal of government at all? This 
question is answered by the supposition of alternate cycles, in 
which the world is first guided and then left alone by God. 


b2 


1V GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


Secondly, How is science to be applied to government during 
the inferior cycle in which we now live? The latter question 
is only provisionally answered; but in a way which points to 
the conception of an accommodation or δεύτερος πλοῦς, which 
Plato afterwards embodied in the Laws. 

The main difficulty which assumes these different forms (that 
of the relation of ideas to phenomena) is clearly stated in the 
Parmenides (to which dialogue allusion is made in the Thea- 
tetus, and again in the Sophist), and receives a passing notice 
at the opening of the Philebus. And the final elucidation of 
the whole subject, the delineation of the bright form of Being, 
the reconcilement of the speculative with the practical reason, 
and the attainment of a perfect method, were probably the 
destined task of the “ Philosopher,” a dialogue which was to 
have ended this series or tetralogy of dialogues, but which it 
does not appear that Plato ever composed. Whether he in- 
stinctively turned back from an impossible enterprize, or whe- 
ther, after he had once descended into the phenomenal world, 
ethical and cosmical interests predominated over the merely 
speculative, it is clear that the aspiration after an ideal 
certainty which appears in these dialogues, and also in the 
Republic and elsewhere, but which is here combined with a 
promise that the very exactness of truth (αὐτὸ τἀκριβές, Polit. 
284 4) shall be hereafter displayed, is nowhere satisfied. Nor 
was the hope attainable in the infancy of science. But it is 
not unlikely that Plato intended to place this keystone of the 
dialectical fabric when he should take in hand to define the 
Philosopher. 

We have before us, therefore, the middle portion of an 
unfinished work, looking backwards on the Thezetetus, pro- 
bably across an interval (with a momentary glance at the 
Parmenides), and forwards to an unwritten dialogue. Having 
taken note of this, we may draw a little closer,—to a point, 
however, from which the two dialogues can still be taken in 
one view. There are marked and obvious differences be- 
tween them. But these will be better seen when they are 
examined separately: in a general survey it is more im- 
portant to notice, without exaggerating, the features which 
they have in common. 

§ 1. The subjects of both dialogues are nearly related to 





GENERAL INTRODUCTION, V 


each other. The Sophist and Statesman were, as already 
noticed, the main representatives of the world as it then was, 
of the leading thoughts and principles of Plato’s contempo- 
raries. Could these typical men be reduced under definitions ¢ 
Was a scientific knowledge of them possible? Did the vague- 
ness of the science which they professed extend also to them- 
selves? In what relation did the Sophist stand to the Philo- 
sopher, or the members of existing governments to the true 
King? There is however this difference of treatment: that 
whereas the “ Sophist” is from the beginning a search for the 
definition of pretended knowledge, the distinction between 
reality and pretence only appears in the Politicus towards 
the close. 

§ 2. In both an extreme or premature ideal theory is modi- 
fied: in the Sophist the dictum of Parmenides annihilating 
“ Not-Being ;” in the Politicus the Pythagorean notion of a 
theocracy under the Divine King. The mere abstract ‘ num- 
bers” of the same school, are exchanged in the Politicus (an 
another connexion) for a relative standard determined by the 
idea of Good (τὸ μέτριον) ; and, in the Sophist, either the 
same Pythagoreans, or the Megarians, or some of Plato’s own 
followers, are criticized as the “ Friends of Ideas.” 

§ 3. In both there is a deep vein of irony, or rather of 
satire. The assertion of Socher, that in these dialogues the 
Socratic irony is silent, could only be justified if it had been 
meant that the irony is rather that of Plato. The humour 
with which the chase after the Sophist is maintained, the fear 
of his great cunning, the solemnity with which he is described 
as a soul-purifier ; and in the Politicus, the notion of the crane 
exalting himself at man’s expense, the quiet substitution of 
Lydians and Phrygians for Hellenes as distinguished from 
Barbarians, and the description of a state in which navigation 
and medicine should be administered according to legal pre- 
scription, are touches of an irony singularly Platonic. It is 
true that the wild playfulness of the Phedrus and the dramatic 
liveliness of the Republic are absent, and that the humour 
is not unmixed with bitterness; but the occasional shadow of 
misanthropy is not more unlike the caustic cheerfulness of 
the Gorgias and Meno, than is the sad smile and sober 
colouring of the Laws. Two points may be noticed in which 


vi GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


the dialectical method conveys the effect of irony. First, 
it is remarked that science is a great leyeller, she cares 
equally for small and great; hence the physician and the bath- 
man are equally good examples of the purifier; the general 
is a species of huntsman, so is the vermin-killer ; priest, pro- 
phet, archon-basileus, are servants equally with the shopkeeper 
and the household slave. Akin to this is the mode in which 
the Sophist is thrust down by the process of divisions, and is 
found in a low place amongst the class of imitators; just as 
Pleasure in the Philebus, after aiming at the highest rank, has 
assigned to her, by the same process, the fifth and lowest. 

§ 4. Both dialogues are pervaded, or rather haunted, by 
the idea of scientific method. Every inquiry, even that con- 
cerning Government, is held to be important, chiefly as an 
exercise by which the dialectical faculty may be improved. 
The nature and function of this power are described in each 
dialogue in language which forcibly recals the well-known 
passages of the Phedrus and Philebus, and which even the 
most doubtful critic must admit to have a Platonic flavour. 

“To distinguish things according to their kinds, and neither 
to account the same form to be another nor another to be the 
same, is surely the work of dialectic. And the dialectician 
is he who adequately perceives one idea pervading many 
separate things, and many distinct ideas embraced by one, 
and many such wholes pervaded and knit together in one 
crowning form,—many also completely isolated and sundered. 
And what is this but to know how to distinguish the respects 
in which each kind admits or rejects communion with other 
kinds?” (Soph. 253 d, e.) 

“ But because they have not been accustomed to distinguish 
the subject of an inquiry into its forms, they not only confound 
things so widely different as the More and the Too-much, the 
moment they see a similarity between them, but fall also into 
the converse error of dividing things not according to their 
parts ; whereas the right way 15, when one first perceives com- 
munity in a multitude of things, not to desist till one have 
seen all the differences contained within that common nature, 
all, that is, which rest upon any logical distinction; and on 
the other hand when dissimilarities are seen in a mass of 
objects, the eye should be incapable of contentment or rest, 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. vil 


until one have confined all that is kindred within the pale of 
one resemblance, and fenced them round with the new crea- 
tion of a single kind or category.” (Polit. 285 a—c.) 

The notions of Sameness and Difference, and of the corre- 
sponding arts of collection or combination, and division or 
distinction (συναγωγή, διαίρεσις, συγκριτική, διακριτική), are pro- 
minent in many places of these dialogues. The Elenchus is 
described as purifying, that is, dividing the good from the 
bad. The chief “ kinds” next to Being, are Same and Other. 
Dialectic is the science of the communion and exclusion of 
kinds, and language itself would be impossible without a 
similar process of combination and distinction. And these 
logical forms have also a practical bearing ; for the art of 
the true statesman, like that of the weaver, consists in com- 
bining elements which have been first separated and purified. 
Thus it appears that the process of classification, involving 
generalization and division (συναγωγή and διαίρεσις), is only a 
particular application of a form of thought to which a meta- 
physical and a practical as well as a logical importance is 
attributed. But it has been felt that the_ “ dichotomous” 
classifications of these dialogues are a caricature of method, 
and are unlike anything which is to be found elsewhere in 
Plato. “Are we to suppose,” it has been asked*, “that the 
Dichotomous Method of the Sophistes Dialogue (I may add 
of the Politicus, for the method is the same in this dialogue 
also) is the method of division of a subject according to its 
natural members, of which Plato speaks in the Phedrus?” 
Is it the same, it may be further asked, which Plato has him- 
self used in the Phedrus, Gorgias, Philebus, Republic, and 
elsewhere ? The likeness is unmistakeable, (compare espe- 
cially the close of the “ Sophist” with that of the Philebus and 
of the sixth book of the Republic); but so also is the differ- 
ence, consisting partly in the extent to which the method is 
carried, and partly in the arbitrary and superficial character 
of some of the divisions, when compared with the dialectical 
analysis of madness in the Pheedrus, or with that of pleasure 
in the Philebus. And although there is no reason to suppose 
that the division of each kind into two parts only was a novelty 
(for this is required in the Philebus), there appears a further 


a By Dr. Whewell. Cambridge Phil. Soc. Tr. vol. ix. pt. 4. p. 594. 


vill GENERAL INTRODUCTION, 


refinement on this notion, when, in the Politicus (262 b), the 
pupil is advised to divide each as nearly as possible in half. 

It has been suggested, in order to explain this difference, 
that the Theztetus and Sophista (with the Politicus) were 
meant respectively to serve as examples of the two parts of the 
Dialectic process; the Thestetus of συναγωγή, the Sophista 
and Politicus of διαίρεσις. But although the Thestetus affords 
many good specimens of Socratic induction, it is not less fertile 
in the negative instances by which that induction was tested. 
Generalization thus alternates with distinction or division”. 
On the other hand, no more striking example of συναγωγή 
could be given than the generalization of θηρευτική in the 
Sophist, or the seven categories of industry in the Politicus. 
And in the latter dialogue a separate discussion is devoted to 
the subject of example, that is, the act of bringing resemblances 
together (συνάγειν). The existence of such an intention, then, 
can hardly be established, and the comparison of the Thesx- 
tetus only throws the characteristic peculiarity of these dia- 
logues into stronger relief. 

We learn from a comic fragment® (quoted at length by 
Dr.Thompson of Cambridge, in his paper on the genuineness of 
the Sophista) that when Plato, Speusippus, and Menedemus were 
together in the Academy, they and their scholars were ridi- 
culed for their endless minute classification of natural objects ; 
and Aristotle speaks more than once of “ written divisions” 
(γεγραμμέναι διαιρέσεις), which, as they seem in some points to 
have coincided with those advanced in these dialogues, may be 
conjectured to have been extant in the school of Plato. It seems 
not improbable that this new passion for classification as a me- 
thod of science, which had a germ in Socrates and the Eleaties, 
and ripened afterwards into the analytic of Aristotle, was in 
full bloom at the Academy when these dialogues were written, 
and that Plato, who entered into every phase of thought, but 


Ξε τς 
συναγωγῇ, διαίρεσις, 
ἐπιστήμη = αἴσθησις" ἐπιστήμη οὐκ αἴσθησις" 
ᾧ αἰσθανόμεθα -- ψυχή. δόξα ἀληθής, ψευδής" 


ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου" 





ἀληθής 





κίνησις = ἀλλοίωσις, φορά. 


ο Athen. II. 59; Com. Gr. Fr. VIII. p. 370, ed. Meineke. 





GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 1X 


was entirely possessed by none, took up the method, as he 
takes up that of etymologies in the Cratylus, “for the day.” 
This may account for the unusual number of the divisions. 
But how is the peculiar nature of many of them to be ex- 
plained ? 

a. First, the lesson is meant to be progressive. Thus the 
external and superficial character of some distinctions is at once 
accounted for by the often-repeated Platonic maxim, that the 
elements of truth must be spelt out in easy syllables, before 
the meaning of truth can be read. The most obvious data of 
sense and experience are the primer of thought. The simplest 
examples are chosen to illustrate principles of reason, not as 
being adequate, but because they can be apprehended at once. 

But there may be also traced in the method of these dia- 
logues a progress of a deeper kind. The argument of the 
Thestetus, though generally destructive, left two results: 
first, that the mind gathers from the impressions of different 
senses certain common perceptions; and secondly, that know- 
ledge and right opinion imply distinction, 1. 6. definition by 
the characteristic difference. This definition by difference, we 
will suppose, was becoming recognised as an organ of know- 
ledge, and the youth of Plato’s school were delighted with 
their new exercise. We can imagine them, according to their 
master’s description, rejoicing as if they had found a treasure of 
inexhaustible wisdom, first rolling up the ball and then unrolling 
and dividing, and never content till they had made everybody 
else to share their wonder. The negative aspect of Socratic 
inquiry, the controversial dialectic of Zeno, the Pythagorean 
συστοιχίαι, had all contributed something to the intellectual 
fashion now in vogue. In the “ Sophist” Plato chooses to con- 
verse with this “old friend with a new face,” he will assay to 
prove this weapon, which is obviously two-edged, and no less 
available for controversy than for inquiry. He begins with an 
example, which he executes in the most approved style, and 
the method is found to be abundantly adequate to define the 
fisherman. Then he tries several passes at the Sophist, but 
does not transfix him, though the creature is soon driven into 
a corner, and his enemy exults in an approaching triumph, 
when suddenly the wily monster disarms him and turns against 
him his own weapon. (Soph. 239 d.) 

c 


x GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


The exclusive divisions by which the game has been so 
far pursued proceeded on the ground that Difference meant 
logical exclusion; that, for instance, because making is dif- 
ferent from acquiring, production and acquisition cannot be 
attributes of the same art: and we have been surprised to see 
the Sophist starting up on the left side of the cordon which 
we had drawn, when we thought to have secured him on the 
right. At last he seems to be convicted of pretence, that is 
of appearing to be what he is not. He retorts that “ what- 
is-not” has no Being, and can neither be defined nor criti- 
cized: a position which is only met by reconsidering the whole 
question of negation and difference, and also of Being, in a 
discussion where the vaunted method of exclusions is laid aside. 
It is at last found that ideas which are distinguished from each 
other may still be mutually related. Whereon follows the 
remark that mere “ oppositions of science” are not philosophy. 
(Soph. 259.) The effect of this discovery may be traced in 
the Politicus. Not only are the two elements of generalization 
and distinction much more nearly balanced (it was always im- 
possible for either of them to be entirely absent), but more 
care is taken to define the relation between the members of 
each division. The respondent is significantly warned that 
every logical segment must be a natural part, and have a 
form of its own, i. 6. that the distinction must have a rational 
ground or principle; he is told that the external resemblances 
and differences of objects are easily mastered, but that there 
are qualities of another sort, which cannot be perceived with- 
out a “vision and a faculty divine.” A mistake arising from 
dividing without generalizing sufficiently is corrected; side by 
side with the partition of science appears “the interrogation 
of every nature, in order to learn what special contribution — 
each has to offer from the store of experience to the treasury 
of wisdom ;” and we are reminded that it is not enough to 
define a subject by a single characteristic difference, for that 
nothing is completely known, until all other species, at least 
those of the same genus, have been also distinguished and 
defined. (Pol. 262, 285 e, 275, 272 6, 281 6.) 

Thus mere logical division by means of negatives is criticized 
by Plato on nearly the same ground as by Aristotle, who ob- 
jects that a negative term as such is not divisible. “ Aristotle,” 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xi 


says Mr. G. H. Lewes, “ has here pointed out the scientific 
error of all classification founded on negatives, and his criti- 
cism reaches even the familiar division founded by Lamarck 
between vertebrata and invertebrata. The vertebrata form a 
natural division, characterized by an obvious peculiarity, but 
to lump together all other animals, no matter how manifestly 
different, merely on the negative character of their having 
no vertebral column, is, except as a provisional expedient, 
eminently unphilosophic.” But Plato employs division by 
exclusions precisely as a provisional expedient. His object 
is not the classification of many things but the definition 
of one*. He never attempts to divide a class which is only 
known by a negative characteristic’. And he has himself 
striven to remedy the defect in question; for he has observed 
that things are not perfectly distinguished until the mutually 
exclusive positive qualities of both are known. 

8. Further, the end of this progressive lesson in dialectic is 
not to exalt a formal method, but to quicken and regulate the 
free action of the inquiring mind. Plato never conceived, as 
some modern philosophers have done, that a new method 
could possibly level intellects, or become a substitute for inven- 
tion. He never imagines a form of thinking as separable 
from thought. His dialectic is not a dead organon, but an 
inspiration, a divine gift, which may be imperfectly described 
im words, and by oral teaching may be awakened and stimu- 
lated in the philosophic nature, but cannot be once for all 
embodied in a book of aphorisms or a Chrestomathy. Dialectic 
is the right application to the highest subjects of the twin 
operations of distinction and combination, which are present as 
elements in the simplest exercise of the reason: whether the 
difference and resemblance noted be that of two fingers or of 
two virtues, the process is essentially the same. But thought 
is liable to perversion, and Plato is never weary of distinguish- 
ing argument from controversy (διαλεκτικὴ from ἀντιλογικὴ or 


ἃ This remark also supplies an an- 
swer to the other objection of Ari- 
stotle, that the species of a genus are 
by this method sometimes unnaturally 
separated (e. g. birds are divided be- 
tween the land and water animals), 


and to Mr. Grote’s observation that 
Plato would have objected to class 
the wolf with the dog. 

© He always follows the ‘right 
hand” section: κατὰ τοὐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ 
μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος. Soph. 264 6. 


Cc 2 


Xil GENEKAL INTRODUCTION. 


ἐριστική). Perhaps controversy is too respectable a name for 
that ape of the Klenchus, a barren hybrid between Zenonian 
and Socratic method, which seems to have been a fayourite 
pastime in the schools of Athens as well as Megara. The 
faults which Plato assigns to the devotees of this “ illogical 
logic” of disputation are chiefly the following. (1) They con- 
fused verbal with real agreement and difference. (2) They 
assumed that agreement and difference must mutually exclude 
each other not only in idea but in fact’. (3) They argued 
about first principles when consequences were in question, and 
vice versa. (Pheed. 101 6.) (4) They generalized too hastily 
both in the way of induction and deduction. (Phileb. 17.) 
(5) They chose sensible in the place of ideal distinctions. 
(6) They substituted abstract reasoning from a single isolated 
notion for real inquiry into the nature of things. (7) They 
preferred the exercise of logical ingenuity to the common 
interests of mankind. (‘* Water, the cheapest of commodities, 
is the best, says Pindar,” Euthyd, 304 b.) (8) From the 
want of any true command of ideas, they distinguished in the 
wrong place and failed to distinguish in the right. These 
errors arose in great measure from making victory and not 
truth the end of discussion, and the mental result of the pro- 
cess was a vain-glorious scepticism. Such at least is Plato’s ver- 
dict on the character and tendency of much of the intellectual 
activity of his day. And he has occasionally, even in the 
person of Socrates, given not unconscious illustration of this 
Attic euphuism, just as our own master of thought and ex- 
pression sometimes condescended ‘to speak most infallibly” 
in the “ conceited” vein of his contemporaries. 

Now it is a chief purpose of the present dialogues to coun- 
teract this vice of the reason, by conveying wholesome ideas 
about logical method. And one idea which they convey with 
tolerable clearness, by example if not by precept, is that the 
right course to be followed in an inquiry cannot be altogether 
prescribed by rules, but is in great measure the direct result 
of original thought and inventive power in the inquirer. 


f Plato seizes upon this as the key- gested, in the infancy of logic, the 
stone of their method, a principle bor- notion that positive and negative attri- 
rowed from the Eleatics,who in saying, butes are absolutely incommunicable. 
“* Being is,” “ Not-Being is not,” sug- & Cf. especially Pheedr. 269 e. 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. ΧΙ 


Whether the method of divisions or some other shall be em- 
ployed, what general form shall be selected for the primary 
division, where to draw the line in each subdivision, when 
to introduce example and comparison, when to exchange 
logical for metaphysical reasoning, and when to seek the 
aid of imagination; all such points are entirely left to the 
prescient insight and selective judgment of the leader of the 
discussion. 

y. Another lesson not doubtfully taught in these pages is, 
that the subtilty of nature is not exhausted by a single line 
of classification. The several paths by which the Sophist is 
approached, and the shorter and longer way to the definition 
of the genus Homo in the Politicus (not to dwell now on the 
ironical humour of this passage), shew that method has not yet 
stiffened into system. The division of the arts of life not into 
two but seven distinct “limbs,” warrants the same inference, 
which is strengthened by the comparison of other dialogues 
(see next section), and by the playful and satirical uses of 
generalization and division noticed above. (§ 3.) In both dia- 
logues the “divisions” at the opening and the close belong 
rather to the framework than the substance of the thought, 
and the real movement of the argument is almost wholly in- 
dependent of this outward form; though certainly not inde- 
pendent of the great laws of agreement and difference, of 
which Plato’s συναγωγή and διαίρεσις are the expression. 

Plato’s views on method, when thus stated, may appear 
strangely simple, as the errors to which they are opposed 
were gross; but the errors, however gross, were typical: 
and his thoughts, however simple, may find many an instruc- 
tive application in the later history of science. That all true 
method is an extension of the natural operation of the mind, 
and, instead of making inquiry an easy task for all men, is 
inseparable from that last and highest acquisition and gift, the 
philosophic spirit, are maxims of which the schoolmen and 
Bacon were equally in need. The “ prudens questio” of the 
latter (the “mental initiative” of Coleridge) is a notion which, 
at the expense of consistency, redeems the misconception of a 
levelling method by approaching to the Platonic point of view. 
Nor is it fair to speak of the method which Plato approved as 
merely subjective (G. H. Lewes), in the face of his protest 


ΧΙΥ͂ GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


against the arbitrary manipulation of logical forms. His 
metaphysical ardour does not prevent him from blaming, but 
rather constrains him to chastise those who in their frigid 
ingenuity closed their eyes to the light of facts. THis faith in 
dialectic was, in other words, a faith in an order of the Uni- 
verse which could be discovered by the patient use of genuine 
inquiry, and by this alone. Although verification, in the 
modern sense, was almost entirely absent from his method, 
and his idea of “nature” was of course different from that 
which later discoveries have made familiar ; yet the importance 
which he attaches to the duty of following the real lines and 
veins of things as they are, of “hitting the joint” in carving 
the body of truth, and, what amounts to the same thing, the 
stress which he lays on the distinction between an accidental 
and a natural part (μέρος and εἶδος, a mere:portion and ἃ 
form), are indications of a general conception of the: task. of 
philosophy, which is not to be confounded with the ‘German 
notion of evolving thought from itself, or the Scotch method of 
introspection in psychology. How facts are to be ascertained, 
he has not determined ; but that the discoveries of the true phi- 
losopher are matters of fact, and not mere notions of his own 
mind, is an axiom without which much that he has written 
would be unintelligible. But it is no less an axiom with him 
that every true fact is also an idea, and were it not so would 
be incognizable ; and that the only real concatenation of things 
as they are, is that which dialectic gradually reveals to the 
inquiring reason. Would Bacon have said otherwise, if “form” 
were substituted for “idea,” and for ‘ dialectic” the “ interro- 
gation of nature,” a phrase which occurs almost verbatim in 
Plato’s Politicus? Or will any modern reasoner dispute the 
assertion that the Laws of Nature are only discoverable by 
the right exercise of Mind? 

Plato’s contribution to the positive science of Method was 
indeed most simple, but, at that juncture in the history of 
philosophy, of extreme value. Not to anticipate further here, 
what must be described at length in examining the “ Sophist,” 
his position is briefly this, that to divorce analysis from syn- 
thesis, negation from affirmation, variety from unity, distinc- 
tion from mutual relation, is fatal to the mterests of inquiry. 


h Compare Protag. 329 d. 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XV 


“Cupid comes forth from an egg whereon Night hath 
brooded, i.e. Knowledge is obtained by exclusions and nega- 
tives.” Yes, but Knowledge is affirmative, and the negations 
are seen in the result, only like the dark spaces on a polarized 
spectrum, caused, as natural philosophers tell us, by the mu- 
tual interferences of waves of light. 

A contrast and a parallel, both taken from within the limits 
of the Platonic dialogues, may fitly conclude this section. 

a. When the peculiar form of dialectical exercise which at 
first sight appears to reign in the Sophist and Statesman, ‘is 
compared with that of the more purely Socratic dialogues, 
abstracting from the Pythagorean notion of bisection and the 
Eleatic absoluteness of distinction, this mode of handling a 
subject appears like an abridgment of Socratic procedure. 
From long familiarity with the successive steps, the disciple is 
ready for a more summary process, and a generalization and 
distinction to which Socrates would have led the way through 
a morning of ironical banter, is now disposed of by a few 
rapid strokes. The argument from pleasure being the good 
to science being virtue, which fills several pages of the Pro- 
tagoras, would not have occupied ten lines of the Sophist. 
And a further stage of this transition from conversational 
profuseness towards scientific exactness and compression may 
be observed in the latter of these two dialogues, where the 
dichotomies, by which the art of weaving is defined, are enu- 
merated in close succession in a single sentence; a doubly 
condensed form of intellectual nutriment, which proves too 
strong for the respondent to assimilate at once. (Pol. 279 e— 
2,80 b.) 

B. The parallel of the Philebus will be frequently suggested 
as we proceed by many likenesses of style and structure. We 
now confine ourselves to one point, which bears immediately 
on the question of method. There is a passage near the 
opening of that dialogue (p. 16) which distinguishes the right 
from the wrong application of the eternal opposition and inter- 
change of the One and the Many to the analysis and synthesis 
of ideas. It is interesting to examine hew far the directions 
there given correspond to the procedure here employed. 

“In every enquiry we should set before us one idea, which 
we shall find, if we look for it, in the subject of our investiga- 


Χν] GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


tion.” So in each of these inquiries the idea of Knowledge, or 
of a person who knows, is immediately recognised and selected 
for analysis. ‘And in this one idea we must look for two, if 
we can find two, or if not two, then the smallest number pos- 
sible.” This rule is also strictly followed, which is the more 
noticeable, because no such principle is laid down in the Pha- 
drus. In the case of the seven “summa genera” of civil life 
(Polit. 287 ¢), we are expressly told that it is impossible to 
divide them into two parts; and it would be obviously difficult 
to reduce the number, except by an abscissio infiniti, which 
would be out of place, because some of the kinds which are 
in direct competition with the kingly art would then be left 
undefined. ‘ We must then proceed to subdivide these units, 
until we see, not only that the one idea is both one and many, 
but also how many are its real subdivisions.” In the Sophist 
and Politicus, as well as in the Pheedrus, the notion of the 
ἄτμητον εἶδος, or species infima, has an important place (ef. 
Soph. 289 d), and the danger of passing at once from the 
highest generality to the lowest specialty is exemplified (e. g. 
Polit. 263). 

“In like manner, when one is compelled to start from the 
indefinite (in cases where there is not immediately apparent a 
single comprehensive idea), he ought not all at once to spring 
from infinity to unity, but should find a number in the undis- 
tinguished mass, and so proceed from number to number 
until he reaches unity.” (Phil. 18 b.) It is more dificult to 
prove that this precept is exactly obeyed. But the cautious 
spirit thus enjomed may be illustrated from several instances 
of gradual generalization, as where the speakers ery a halt 
to count up the number of forms in which the Sophist has 
appeared, previous to one of these being selected as the most 
universally applicable (Soph. 231 d); or where from the 
narrower generalization, “nurture of men,” they pass on to 
the wider conception of “care or superintendence of men” 
(Polit. 275); or where from the comparison of the king and 
the weaver (implying a provisional generalization) is evolved 
the more general notion of an art of combination (συγκριτική) 
(Ib. 282 b). 

§ 5. The forms of Sameness and Difference appear in the 
Sophist amongst the five kinds or forms which are selected 




















GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XVil 


for examination as being the “ greatest,” or the most universal. 
“ Being,” the highest of all, was found to embrace the oppo- 
site principles of “ motion,” the essence of the materialist, and 
“rest,” that of the idealist philosopher. On comparing these 
three “‘ kinds,” each is seen to have sameness and difference,— 
to be the same with itself, different from the other two. And 
these predicates of sameness and difference are found to be 
no less universally applicable than the form of Being. Thus 
Being, Sameness, and Difference, to use Aristotelian language, 
are universal predicaments, or categories. Everything, of 
which we can speak, exists, is the same in one relation, different 
in others, and is either at rest or in motion or both in different 
ways. “ Number” is incidentally mentioned in the same dia- 
logue (238 b) as being also an inseparable attribute of every 
possible term. 

Again, in the latter part of the Politicus, there is an enume- 
ration of seven kinds, as an ultimate division of the industries 
which are the helpers of the ruling power in a state. These 
are — raw-material, instruments, reservoirs, vehicles, cover- 
ings, amusements, food. To these swmma genera of human 
labour is added the work of servants of every sort. And it 
is not obscurely implied, that with the addition of the royal 
science as a moving and regulating cause, this enumeration 
affords an exhaustive analysis of human activity. Thus in both 
dialogues there is seen a tendency to select certain natures or 
ideas as being the highest and most comprehensive, either of 
all ideas, or of the ideas belonging to a particular subject. 

If we except the Timzeus, where something similar is observ- 
able in the constitution of the Psychical Substance (p. 35) and 
in the five elements, which however are not viewed as by any 
means ultimate’, the only other dialogue where there is a 
similar enumeration of categories is the Philebus, where Being 
is analyzed into Limit, the Unlimited, their union, and the 
cause of this; and the end of Being, or the good, is embraced 
in five kinds, Measure, Symmetry, Reality, Mind, and Pleasure. 
An approach, however, to a similar notion may be traced in 
two places of the Theetetus: first, where the ideas selected 
as the undoubted objects of pure mind are Being, Not-Being, 


i Tim. 48 Ὁ: οὐδ᾽ ἐν συλλαβῆς εἴδεσι μόνον. A remarkable anticipation of 
modern chemistry. 
d 


XVill GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


Sameness and Difference, Likeness and Unlikeness, and Num- 
> of the mind, while 
most of the “birds” or knowledges are collected in larger or 
smaller groups, a few are seen careering through every part. 
(Thezt. 197 6.) 

This peculiarity of these three dialogues, Philebus, Sophista, 
Politicus, affords a point of comparison or rather of approxi- 
mation between Plato and Aristotle. The only previous 
attempt at ultimate classification had been the συσστοιχίαι of 
the Pythagoreans, and in the greater number of Plato’s dia- 
logues, even where ideas (or forms) are mentioned, there 15 no 
selection of a certain number as supreme and as embracing all 
others, except partially in the case of moral ideas. Even 
when the form of good is described in the Republic as surpass- 
ing in glory and dignity the idea of Being, this saying has 
rather a cosmological and ethical than a logical or metaphy- 
sical meaning. But here not only is the word γένος for the 
first time* employed in the technical sense, but each of the 
terms so described is viewed as a universal, containing a 
variety of species, and obtained by a process of induction 
(συναγωγή. See Phileb. p. 25); and each enumeration is, for 
the time being, and in relation to the particular question raised, 
regarded as ultimate. This is therefore a nearer approach to 
a doctrine of categories than the casual reference to quantity 
(Soph. 245 d, Phileb. 24 ὁ), quality (Rep. 4, 438 Ὁ, Theszet. 
182 b), relation (Soph. 255 ¢, Phil. 51 c), action and passion 
(Thezet. and Soph.), in scattered passages. 

But the categories of Plato are not connected with the theory 
of Predication, towards which, as appears even from Soph. 
261 ο, Plato had made but little progress. Even those of the 
“‘ Sophist” are rather ontological than logical, and are more 
nearly analogous to the “four causes” of the Metaphysics: 
denoting, to use a convenient distinction of Plotinus, rather 
the elements than the kinds of Bemg. And he is less bound 
than Aristotle to his own forms of thought. The enumeration 
is In no two places the same. In the highest region of dia- 
lectic Plato still asserts the freedom of Mind. He “stands 


ber); and again, where in the “ aviary’ 


i Theet. 185 ἃ. Compare Parmenides, p. 129 e, where Rest and Motion are 
added to these. 


k The only exception is in Phedrus, 271 b. 

















GENERAL INTRODUCTION. ΧΙΧ 


behind” the forms which he has invented to express what 
cannot be fully expressed, the electric play of thought. Col- 
lection and distinction, union and division, finite and infinite, 
same and other, one and many, Being and Not-Being, are 
various names for the two poles on whose attraction and repul- 
sion depend the “ high-strung harmonies” of the ideal world. 

§ 6. Not less peculiar than the method of these dialogues 
is their structure, style, and diction, which, however, receive 
considerable illustration from the Philebus, Timeeus, and Laws. 

To take first what is most obvious, Socrates is no longer the 

chief speaker. A stranger from Elea, with whom Theodorus, 
Thextetus, and the younger Socrates have been conversing, 
_accompanies them to the place of meeting, where they are 
expected by Socrates; who, with his accustomed pertinacious 
politeness, brings on a conversation, but with the exception of 
a few words when there is a change of subject, is silent for 
the remainder of the morning. In this respect this pair of 
dialogues is like the Parmenides, Timeeus, and Critias, and 
resembles the two last named also in another equally external 
point, namely, that each pair form the middle part of an 
unfinished tetralogy. Plato has only twice thus connected 
dialogues in a series. The Theetetus, Sophist, Statesman, 
and Philosopher, are in this the counterpart of the Republic, 
Timeeus, Critias, and Hermocrates. 

The retirement of Socrates, however, though in keeping 
with, will not account for, the other peculiarities of which we 
are now to speak. For the few words assigned to him at the 
beginning partake of the general change of tone. Nor can this 
be ascribed to the subject; for the subjects of either dialogue, 
though related to each other, are wholly distinct. 

Every reader of Plato must have felt a difference in passing 
from the Republic or Pheedrus to the Sophist and Politicus; 
or, may it not be added? to the Philebus or the Laws. He is 
like one who, after walking with a gifted friend in town and 
country, and hearing him converse with all men, sits down to 
listen to a lecture from the same person. There is an air of 
self-imposed restraint, at the first glance distinguishable from 
the absolute conversational freedom of the Gorgias, a didactic 
tone, unlike the Socratic dissimulation of knowledge, a vein 
of refined and biting satire, which may be contrasted as well 


d 2 


xx GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


as compared with the naive and playful humour of the Pheedrus 
or Charmides. As the student proceeds, he is struck by the 
more elaborate, though not more regular conformation of the 
periods, by the more frequent, almost monotonous recurrence 
of a certain rhythmical cadence, which he may have noticed 
here and there in the Pheedrus, Republic, and Thezetetus', by 
the precision of manner into which the Socratic urbanity has 
been transformed. And if he examines more minutely into 
the diction, he will find that the natural order is more often 
inverted than in the dialogues with which he is familiar, and 
that a greater fondness is shewn for unusual words, both 
poetical and technical, than in any dialogue except the Phe- 
drus, Republic, Timeus, and Laws. In some respects the 
language approaches to that of tragedy, in others to the 
formality of an Aristotelian treatise. 

(1) To dwell a little more at length on some of these points: 
and first, on the more didactic and systematic manner of the con- 
versation. Nothing can exceed the courtesy and modesty both 
of Socrates and the Stranger in the opening scene, but when 
the Eleatic guest and his respondent have once crossed blades, 
he deals with him, not without pleasantry, but with a becoming 
degree of gravity, and secundum artem. There are no sallies, 
like those of Glaucon in the Republic, no sudden bursts of 
eloquence, as in the Pheedrus. With a tone of mild authority 
the philosopher, for the edification of the bystanders, guides 
his pupil by a path familiar to himself to conclusions which 
he foreknows. He acknowledges from the first that he is 
thoroughly conversant with the whole subject (διακηκοέναι γέ 
φησιν ἱκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμνημονεῖν), and warns his new acquaint- 
ances that the argument will be a long one. 

The peculiarity in question is obviously shared by the Par- 
menides ; less obviously, though still perceptibly, by the 
Theetetus. It is also observable in the Philebus, Timzeus, 
and Laws. 

The Philebus has certainly more of the well-known playful- 
ness and familiarity of Socratic talk, more light and shade, 
and, in parts, more dramatic liveliness. The fine contrast, 
for example, between the eager Protarchus and the petulant 


1 See also the myth in the Protagoras. 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XX1 


Philebus is unlike the almost featureless masks of the facile 
respondents in these dialogues. But such lighter elements are 
controlled by a certain degree of formality, and by the con- 
sciousness of method. The speakers are playing at a “ labo- 
rious game ™,” to which they are evidently not unaccustomed, 
and which proceeds according to certain rules. We are not in 
the market-place, or the house of Callias, but in the groves of 
Academe. And though the “boys” are not quite so tractable 
as Thezetetus, Socrates guides them by a regularly intricate 
road to a definite end, which has a positive as well as a nega- 
tive import. The structure of the Philebus is in many ways 
nearer to the Sophist than that of either is to any other 
writing. As the ideal pretender is chased through the one 
dialogue, so the idea of pleasure, more or less personified, is 
hunted down in the other. The difficulties which arise in both 
are solved by means of a harmony of ideas (called in the Phi- 
lebus κόσμος τις ἀσώματος, a “ bodiless creation”). In both, the 
transitions (μεταβάσεις) of the argument are only surpassed in 
dialectical subtilty by the Theztetus. Both account for false- 
hood by a similar analysis of mental states; both examine 
contemporary philosophers as diviners of that which they do 
not clearly know. In both, higher subjects are discussed than 
that proposed at the outset, which is accordingly thrust down, 
in both by a similar method of divisions, to the lowest place in 
the scale of knowledge or of being. In some of these respects 
the Politicus also presents some analogy to the Philebus; and 
. they resemble each other in the importance which they both 
attach to the philosophy of Measure. On the whole, the style 
of the Philebus may be described as intermediate between that 
of the Republic and that of the Sophist. That of the Sophist 
and Politicus, again, is intermediate between the Philebus and 
the Timzeus and Laws. In these the gravity of tone already 
noticed is deepened into solemnity, and becomes the pervading 
characteristic. The keen though suppressed irony of the So- 
phist and Politicus, directed not towards the respondent, but 
against mankind, is here softened (like wine becoming first 
austere, then mellow), and either disappears, or is replaced by 
grave and gentle reflections on human nothingness. The 


τὰ Parm. 137 Ὁ: πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν: 


XXil GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


bitterness of a mind which had many thoughts which could 
not be realized, now takes the sober colouring of an eye 


“That hath kept watch o’er man’s mortality ;” 


and the didactic manner of the chief speaker is more decided. 
There is the most perfect modesty, but no dissimulation of 
knowledge. The leader of the conversation speaks with an 
authority to which the rest defer. The results, though still 
only approximate, are in the highest degree positive, and the 
method is throughout constructive. The thoughts of a life- 
time had assumed something like a permanent shape: and 
they were the writer’s own. ‘They were still living thoughts, 
and could give a reason of themselves; but they no longer 
needed the art of Socrates to bring them ‘into being. Cicero 
was substantially if not literally right in assuming the Athenian 
Stranger in the Laws to be Plato himself. 

(2) The loss of conversational freedom and _ liveliness is 
accompanied by a corresponding decline of poetical grace and 
power. The fire of enthusiasm is not extinct by any means, 
but is concentrated on a few great objects (Dialectic, Being, 
the Philosopher, the creation and preservation of the universe 
by God), and is less ready to light up with a spontaneous glow 
every new world of imagination. The language is less instinet 
with harmonious energy. ‘The fondness for poetic words is of 
the kind which belongs rather to a learned rhetoric than to 
poetry. The genius loci, so powerful in the Phzedrus, is here 
forgotten. The Eleatic Stranger is hke the Sophist he de- 
scribes, whose “ sense is shut” to everything but the dry hight 
of reason. Speaking in a palzestra, he alludes in the most 
distant and general way, when the topic is suggested by his 
argument, to “ certain exercises in which men are trained in 
groups at Athens and elsewhere.” (Polit. 294d.) Speaking at 
the time when Athens was ringing with the trial of Socrates, 
he never once alludes to a matter so sublunary. Indeed he 
expressly disowns any intention of giving pleasure, and lays 
down the principle that the standard by which the propor- 
tions of an argument are to be judged is not that of artistic 
symmetry. (Ib. 286 d.) Such was not the spirit of the pre- 
cept that “an argument must be like the picture of a lying 
ereature, having head and feet and every member drawn in 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXill 


seemly proportion to each other and the whole.’ (Phedr. 
“64. 0.) It has been remarked that the allusions to previous 
writings, such as the Republic, which occur in the Laws, are 
unlike the manner of the earlier dialogues, where every 
touch is in perfect dramatic keeping. Now, not to mention 
the manifest allusion to the Parmenides in Soph. 217 ὁ (more 
pointed than in Theet. 183 6), the direct reference to the 
argument of the “ Sophist” im Polit. 284 Ὁ (καθάπερ ἐν τῷ 
σοφιστῇ προσηναγκάσαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ Ov), though not violating 
propriety, because the company is unchanged, has more of a 
literary than a dramatic turn, and is more in the manner of 
a treatise than of a dialogue. And this is still more obviously 
the case in Soph. 253 c, where the Stranger quotes the lan- 
guage of a conversation at which he had not been present. 
(Theeet. 172 ἃ.) 

(3) Yet although there is less of spontaneous movement and 
artistic lightness of structure than in some other dialogues, there 
is more appearance of studied order and arrangement. Thus 
a reason is given for the introduction of the example of the 
fisherman in the Sophist, and the example of the weaver in 
the Politicus occasions an explanation of the use and meaning 
of example as an instrument of thought. And in making the 
transition from the dichotomies to the myth in the same 
dialogue, the Stranger gives due notice of the change, and 
anticipates the course to be taken when they return from this 
digression. The “ preludes” and “ recapitulations” of which 
the Phedrus speaks so disdainfully are now recommended 
with some emphasis by Plato. This avowedly conscious and 
studied arrangement of the parts of a discourse is still more 
noticeable in the early books of the Laws, where, to explain 
the tediousness of the preliminary discussion, the speaker says 
(1, 638 e) that he is endeavouring to make apparent the right 
method to be pursued in all such arguments. He is in fact, 
like the Stranger in the Politicus, giving an Example of 
Example. Such carefulness about the form of a writing, at a 
time when the form was really becoming less perfect, and also 
the composition of great works, and the connexion of succes- 
sive pieces in a series, may be thought to indicate a different 
sense of the value of books from that expressed in a well- 
known passage of the Phedrus. And this suspicion is con- 


ΧΧΙΥ GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


firmed by a striking expression in the Laws, where the chief 
speaker, reviewing the conversation which they had held since 
dawn, maintains that no better education could be devised for 
youth, than to learn by heart this new kind of poetry, which 
he and his companions haye poured forth, “ not unaccompanied 
with airs from Heaven.” (Lege. 7, 811 6.) 

§ 7. (Δύναιτο δ᾽ ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο, καὶ Tas ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος 
ὀνομασθείσας τέχνας ταύτας ἐπαριθμεῖν, καὶ τὰ σὺν αὐταῖς ὀνόματα, 
εἴτε σπουδάζων ἐχρῆτο τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἴτέ καὶ μή. λέγω δέ, διὰ τὸ 
ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν ὀνομάτων βιαιότερον χρῆσθαι. Pollux, Onomasticon, 
VIN. 55; 7.296) 7.) 

More palpable, though not more real, than these general 
nuances of style, are certain peculiarities of diction. Of these 
perhaps the most obvious to a cursory reader is the use of 
technical expressions. Mr, Cope has well observed, in the 
Preface to his translation of the Gorgias, that one of the 
most striking peculiarities of Plato’s philosophical writings is 
the almost entire absence of any scientific terminology. He 
adds, that ‘with the exception of one or two peculiar terms, 
such as εἶδος or ἰδέα and διαλεκτική, and the special appro- 
priation of διάνοια and θυμοειδές in the Republic, and possibly 
one or two others, Plato’s philosophy is absolutely devoid of 
any technical phraseology.” 

This remark applies with perfect truth to the Gorgias, Pro- 
tagoras, Pheedo, and most other dialogues. The technicalities 
which occur in the Pheedrus (except διαλεκτικός, συναγωγή; 
διαίρεσις) are quoted with contempt. But the Theeetetus 
already bears the marks of an opposite tendency, which 
becomes more decided in the Philebus, Sophist, and Politicus. 
Each theory advanced in the Thezetetus is characterized by 
an incipient terminology, which, like the theories themselves, 
is not entirely set aside. Thus to express the doctrine of 
Sense we have κίνησις, ποιοῦν, πάσχον, αἴσθησις, αἰσθητόν, φορά, 
ποῖ᾽ ἄττα, αἰσθανόμενα, αἰσθητής, κριτήριον, τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, ποι- 
drys, each having a definite meaning required by the theory ; 
and two of them, αἰσθητὴς and ποιότης, being evidently new- 
fangled words. Other terms of the same kind which are pro- 
duced in the later phases of the discussion are ἐκμαγεῖον, μνη- 
μεῖον, ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν, κεκτῆσθαι, ἐπιστητά, στοιχεῖον, συλλαβή, 
διαφορότης. ‘There are words of a more general character, 


-- 




















GENERAL INTRODUCTION. ΧΧΥ 


such as ἀναλαβεῖν, ‘to resume,’ διορίζεσθαι, ‘to distinguish,’ 
which receive a preciseness of meaning from familiar use which 
they could not have had in ordinary speaking or writing. It 
is true that even Plato’s technicalities are fresh from the mint ; 
they retain the gloss of novelty, and the hues of life. But no 
student of these dialogues can doubt that there was floating 
before him the conception of a scientific language, based on 
dialectic, which should express more perfectly than they were 
known to the first name-giver the true sections and combina- 
tions of things. The Heracliteans were indeed ridiculed in the 
Thezetetus (183 b), because their theory confounded the ordi- 
nary use of speech: but even this ridicule shews that the 
notion of a philosophic vocabulary was already there. (Cf. 
ib. 166 b.) And in defence of one of the strangest of his 
coinages (δοξομιμητικὴ), towards the conclusion of the Sophist, 
the Stranger gravely says that for want of the power of 
dividing “kinds” into their “forms” the vocabulary of the 
ancients was most defective. (Compare Cratylus, 436-439.) 
Yet he is careful to vary his new-made words, so as to avoid 
the hearer’s being enslaved to them, and commends the youth 
with whom he converses for not setting too high a value on 
the choice of a name. (Καλῶς ye, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν διαφυλάξῃς 
TO μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς TO γῆρας 
ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως. Polit. 261 e.) Thus it is evident that 
the mvention of new terms was intended to enrich language, 
and not to limit thought. 

Of the words in these dialogues which are either new or 
receive a distinctly new significance, there are many which 
Plato does not use again; but there are others which are 
found to recur, especially in the Laws. The following are not 
used again by Plato :— τ 

Soph.—* ἀγόρασις, ἀδιανόητος, * ἁμιλλητικός, * ἀνδραποδιστι- 
κός, + ἀνθρωπικός, * ἀνθρωποθηρία, Τ ἀπατητικός (Xen.), * ἀσπα- 
λιευτικός, ὃ αὐτοπωλικός, αὐτουργικός (M.Anton.), * βαλανευτικός, 
* δημολογικός, * δοξομιμητής, * δοξομιμητικός, Ἔ δοξοπαιδευτικός, 
δωρητικός (Philo.), δωροφορικός (Ael.), * εἰδωλοποιϊκός, * εἰδωλο-- 
ποιός, * εἰδωλουργικός, * ἐναντιοποιολογικός, Ἷ ἐπιδεικτικός, * ἑρκο- 
θηρικός, * CwoOnpia, * ζωοθηρικός, ᾿ἡδυντικός, ᾿ἡμεροθηρικός, ἔθαυ- 

* ἅπαξ λεγόμενα. + Used by Aristotle. The places out of Plato where 


the rest occur are chiefly in later Greek. 
[3] 


ΧΧΥΪ GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


μα(σϑγτοποιϊκός, * ἰδιοθηρευτικός, * ἰδιοθηρία, tioropixds, + κολαστι- 
κός, {κτητικός, * μαθηματοπωλικός, + μεταβλητικός, Ἷ νευστικός, 
* νομισματοπωλικός, οἰκειωτικός, οἰκετικός, Ἐὀρθολογία, * πεζοθηρία, 
Ἔ πεζοθηρικός, πιθανουργικός, | πληκτικός, * προσομιλητικός, * πυρ- 
εὐτική, πωλητικός, * σπογγιστικός, ft συνεχεία, τριοδοντία, φαν- 
ταστικός, * φθειριστικός, * χειρωτικός, * χρηματοφθορικός, * ψευ- 
δουργός, * ψυχεμπορικός. 

Polit.—* ἀγελαιοκομικός, * ἀγελαιοτροφία, * ἀγελαιοτροφικός, 
ἡ ἀκέραστος, ft ἀκέρατος, ft ἀκέρως, ἀκεστική, * ἀνθρωπονομικός, 
ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονικός, ἄστροφος (=without a twist), Τ ἄτρητος, ὃ αὐτεπι- 
τακτής, * αὐτεπιτακτικός, γνωστικός, * γομφωτικός, * δερματουργι- 
KOs,  διακωλυτικός, * ἐπιθηματουργία, T ἐπιμελητικός (Xen.), ἐπι- 
στατικός,  ἐπιτακτικός, ft ἐργαστικός, * εὐθυπλοκία, * ζωογενής, 
ζωοτροφία, ζωοτροφικός (Clem. Alex.), Γθρεπτικός, ἰδιογενής, * ἰδιο- 
γονία, ἰδιότης, δ ἰδιοτρόφος (Ar. uses ἰδιότροφος), * ἱματιουργικός, 
Χ ἱπποφορβία, 1 ἵπποφορβός, κελευστικός (Plut.), * κερκιστικός, κη- 
ρυκικός (Clem. Alex.), * κοινογενής, * κοινογονία, * κοινοτροφικός, 
T κριτικός, * κροκονητικός, ὃ μαγευτικός, * μονοτροφία, * νηστικός, 
νομευτικός, νυμφευτής (=one who unites in marriages), * favTi- 
κός, Τ ξηροβατικός, * ξηροτροφικός, ὃ πεζονομικός, περίβλημα; περι- 
κάλυμμα, { πιλητικός, + πλυντικός, * προβληματουργικός, πρωτο- 
γενής, * πτεροφυής, ῥυθμικός (Plut.), σιτουργός, στεκτικός, στημο- 
νονητικός, * στημονοφυής, * στρεπτικός, συγκριτικός, συμπλεκτικός; 
συνθετικός, * συνύφανσις, συστροφή (abstract), ταλασιουργικός, 
τιθασεία, + τρῆσις, τρητός, τρίχινος, * ὑγροτροφικός, * φλοιστικός, 
φράγμα, χαλκοτυπική. 

Soph. Polit.—* ἀμφισβητητικός, αὐτοπωλής, * γ(κ)ναφευτικός. 

The following are found in other dialogues :— 

* ἀγκιστρευτικὸς (Soph., * ἀγκιστρεία Lege.), ἀγράμματος (Po- 
lit. Tim. Critias), ἀγωνιστική (Soph. Legg.), ἀμυντήριος (Polit. 
Legg.), βιαστικός (Soph. Legg.), διαλυτικός (Polit. Tim.), δοξο- 
copia (Soph. Phil.), εἰκαστική (Soph. Lege.), εἰρωνικός (Soph. 
Legg.), * ἐνυγροθηρικός (Soph., * ἐνυγροθηρευτής Legg.), ἡ ἔνυ- 
dpos (Soph. Polit. Tim. Legg.), + καθαρτικός (Soph. Tim.), * vov- 
θετητικός (Soph. Legg.), ὀρνιθευτικός (Soph., ὀρνιθευτής Lege.), 
παίγνιον (Polit. Lege.), πλεκτικός (Polit. Legg.), σκέπασμα (Po- 
lit. Lege.), στασιαστικός (Polit., στασιωτεία Lege.), στέγασμα 
(Polit. Tim. Critias), + σύγκρισις (Soph. Phil. Tim. Legeg.), φαρ- 
μακοποσία (Soph. Legg.). 

Besides this class of words, whose use is thus shewn to be 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXVil 


not wholly confined to the two dialogues, there may be ob- 
served in them two other kinds of a language approaching 
technical, which are nearly related to each other: terms ex- 
pressing the operations of dialectic, and words connected with 
the mathematical and physical sciences. 

a. Of the former sort are Soph.—dvrideors, ἀντίκειμαι, ἀπο- 
τελεύτησις, * ἀσύννους, διπλόη, ἐναντιολογία, μακρόλογος, προμε- 
λετῶ, f φάσις. Polit.—BeBaiwors, διαζητῶ, 1 διονομάζω, διχάζω, 
Ἷ διχοτομῶ, ἐκτροπή (τοῦ λόγου), ἐνάργεια (met. from painting), 
λεπτουργῶ, * μεσοτομῶ, ὀνομασία, παχέως, | προσαποφαίνω, συ- 
νάμφω. Soph. Polit.—ouvréurw (=assist in dividing). And, 
recurring elsewhere in Plato,—dzopepi¢w (Polit. Legg.), ἀπο- 
σχίζω (Polit. Lege.), +doxioTos (Soph. Tim.), ἄτομος (Soph., 
ef. ἄτμητος Pheedr.), γένος (as a metaphysical term, Parm, 
Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg., and once in Pheedr.), Ἔγνώ- 
plots (Polit. Lege.), δεσμός (a bond uniting ideas, Soph. 
Polit. Phil. Parm. Tim. Legg.), διάγνωσις (Soph. Lege.), δια- 
λογίζομαι (Soph. Phil. Tim.), διαμερίζω (Polit. Phil. Legg.), 
Ἔδιανόησις (Polit. Tim. Lege.), * διαπορῶ (to raise a difficulty, 
Soph. Tim. Legg.), διακριβολογοῦμαι (Soph. Tim.), διαχωρίζω 
(Polit. Phil. Tim.), f8copiopds (Polit. Tim.), ἐκκρίνω (Polit. 
Legg.), ἐπινέμω (Polit. Legg.), ft μέθεξις (Soph. Parm.), μερίζω 
(Soph. Polit. Parm. Tim.), μερίς (Soph. Legg.), παρωνύμιον 
(Soph. Legg.), προομολογοῦμαι (Soph. Tim.), προσκοινωνῶ 
(Soph. Lege.), συγκεφαλαιοῦμαι (Soph. Phil.), ¢ σύνολος (Soph. 
Polit. Lege.), * συνομολογία (Soph. Lege.), σχίζω (Soph. Polit. 
Phil. Tim.), τομή (metaphorical, Soph. Polit. Tim. Legg.). 

β. Words expressing physical and mathematical conceptions : 
Soph.—parrw, διακινῷ (3 226 Ὁ), πόρκος, FmAacrds. Polit.— 
* ἀφαιρετός, γνάψις, εὐήτριος, ἕψησις, κολλητός, * KpoKwdns, ὕμε- 
ταλλεύω, νέω, νήθω, νῆμα, * ξαντής, πλέξις, σπάρτον, * συγκερ- 
κίζω. Recurring—dperpos (Soph. Phil. Tim. Legg.), ἀνακύ- 
κλησις (Polit. ἀνακυκλοῦμαι Tim.), ἀνατολή (Polit. Lege.), 
ἀνειλίττω (Phileb., ἀνείλιξις Polit.), ἀπλανής (Polit. Tim. Legg.), 
ἄφεσις (Polit. Legg.), βρόχος (Soph. Critias), + γένεσις (of 
production in general, Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg.), γυμνα- 
στής (Polit. Lege., παιδοτριβὴς is the usual word in Plato), 
Ἶ διάθεσις (Soph. Phil. Tim. Legg.), διαθραύω (Soph. Tim.), 
διάκρισις (Soph. Phil. Tim. Legg.), Τ διηθεῖν (Soph. Tim.), 
* δρυοτομική (Polit., *dpvoroula Legg.), ἐπισκευάζομαι (Polit. 

e 2 


ΧΧΥΠῚ GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


Legg.), ἐπισπεύδω (Polit. Legg.), εὔκυκλος (Soph., quotation 
from Parm., Tim.), ἰσοπαλὲς (Soph. quotation from Parm., 
Tim.), κατακόσμησις (Polit. Tim.), καταθραύω (Polit. Tim.), 
Ἔ κύκλησις (Polit. Tim.), κύρτος (Soph. Tim. Legg.), ξαίνω 
(Soph. Polit. Legg.), μέτρησις (Polit. Legg.), μετρητὸς (Polit. 
Legg.), παράλλαξις (Polit. Tim.), παράφορος (Soph. Legg., 
παραφορότης Tim.), πῆξις (Polit. Phil.), πλάτος (the dimension 
of breadth, Soph. Polit. Critias, Legg.), πλέγμα (Soph. Polit. 
Tim. Legg.), προβολὴ (Polit. Tim. Legg.), * ῥαφή (Polit. Tim.), 
σύγκρασις (Polit. Phil.), σύγκρισις (Soph. Phil. Tim, Lege.), 
σύμμιξις (Soph. Polit. Phil. Tim. Legg.), συμπιλῷ (Polit. 
Tim.), * συμποδηγοῦμαι (Polit., ποδηγεῖν Legg.), συμφυής (Soph. 
Tim. Legg.), συνυφαίνω (Polit. Tim.), σῶμα, “body in gene- 
νὰ], Ξε τὸ σωματοειδές (Soph. Phil. Tim. Legg. 896), τηκτός 
(Soph. Critias), τροπή, as an astronomical term (Polit. Tim. 
Legg.), ὕλην (Polit. Phil. Tim. Critias, Legg.), ὑπεροχὴ (Polit. 
Legg.), ὑφή (Polit. Legg.). 

γι As the terms just enumerated betray Plato’s love for 
those physical pursuits which were rejected by Socrates, so 
the new word ἀθεότης, which occurs only in the Politicus and 
Laws in all Greek literature before the death of Plato (unless 
we must add the seventh Platonic Epistle), affords an indi- 
cation of his tendency to religious thought. And it is a fact 
worth noticing in this connexion that the word ἅγιος is con- 
fined to the Sophist, Critias, and Laws, amongst the Platonic 
writings, and οἱ κρείττονες as a euphemism for of θεοί to Soph. 
2.16 Ὁ, Epist. 7, 326 e. 

Perhaps the notion of technical language (voces artis) may 
be thought to be unduly stretched in being extended to some 
of the words under the last two headings. But in whatever 
way they are described they are equally suitable to be adduced 
in the present section, whose object is to define and illus- 
trate peculiarities of diction. There remain to be noticed 
words borrowed from the poets, and especially from the trage- 
dians: respecting which it may be observed that the affecta- 
tion of unusual phrases, which appears in the Pheedrus as the 
result of a half playful dithyrambic and epic fervour, at which 


® The introduction of this word is πρωτογενὲς εἶδος in the Politicus is 
interesting in connexion with Ari- one of the few anticipations in 
stotle’s Material Cause, of which the Plato. 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXIX 


Socrates himself wonders, is here interwoven with graye and 
unimpassioned talk, giving a tone of sustained dignity to the 
style. ΤῸ this class (6) belong :— 

Soph. — ἀντίσταθμος, ἄξενος, ampatia, ἀρχαιοπρεπής, ἄφθεγ- 
κτος, δυσειδής, εἶα δή, εἰσύστερον, Τκαθιδρύω, μαλθακῶς, νεῖκος 
(quoted from Emped.), ὀλισθηρός, ῥυμή, ὑψόθεν. 

Polit.—dAefnrijpios (Xen.), ἅλις (Xen.), ἀπαγριῶ (Theophr.), 
ἀπολέμως ἔχειν, ἄπτην, ὅ ἀργυραμοιβός (cf. χρυσαμοιβός), Bon- 
λάτης, βουφορβός, γενειῶ, δίωγμα, ἐξανθῶ, εὔγνωστος, εὔκριτος, 
ἔφεδρος, θίασος, κάταγμα, κερασφόρος, μελαίνεσθαι, νομεύω, 
ὅπλισμα, παρεία, περιωπή, πολυπλανής, προσφθέγγομαι, συντρέχω. 
Under this head also might have been classed ἄστροφος and 
νυμφευτής. 

Soph. Polit.—dzepnpdo. 

᾿Αγήρως (Pol. Phil. Tim. Legg.), ἀθῷος (Soph. Legg.), ἀντά- 
fos (Polit. Lege., in the former with tacit reference to the 
line of Homer which is quoted in Symp. 214 Ὁ), ἄπλετος 
(Soph. Legg.), yerovd (Polit. Legg.), δεσποτίς (Polit. Tim. 
Lege.), διαλαγχάνω (Polit. Critias), διαπεράω (Soph. Tim.), 
ἐπεύχομαι (Soph. Critia. Legg.), εὐώνυμος ( = of auspicious 
name (Pind.), (Polit. Legg.), ἡσυχαῖος (Polit. Legg.), κρηπίς 
(Polit. Legg.), κρυφαῖος (Soph. Tim.), ὃ μέχριπερ (Soph. Polit. 
Phileb.), ξένιος (Ζεύς) (Soph. Legg.), ὅπῃπερ (Soph. Tim. 
Leges.), ἵπάμπαν (Polit. Tim. Legg.), παραφροσύνη (Soph. 
Phileb. 2, παράφρων Legg.), (μή) πλαστῶς (Soph. Legg.), 
πολιός (Polit. Parm. Tim.), στέλλομαι (Soph. Phileb. Legg.), 
t cbvdpopos (Polit. Lege.), fovvvoyos (Polit. Tim. Critia. Legg.), 
Τσύντροφος (Polit. Lege.), τριπλοῦς (Polit. Tim. Legg.), xep- 
gatos (Soph. Tim. Legg.). Next to which, for convenience 
sake, may be classed some unusual compounds and derivatives 
which have a similar rhetorical effect (ε) :— 

Soph.—* ἀπομαρτύρομαι, ἀπόρρησις, * δυσθήρευτος, témdddakis, 
εὐηνίως (adv.), καθό, κυλίνδησις, κώλυσις, προτάττομαι, *oKoTEL- 
νότης. 

Polit.—taméppnua, *yepavoBeria, διαβουλεύομαι, δυσκατα- 
μάθητος, ἐγκαιρία, εἰστελῶ, ἔντευξις, ἐξαφανίζω, * ἑρμηνευτής, 
ἐφέδρα, ἰδιότης, ὃ κοινώνησις, ὃ᾽᾿ μετασκευωροῦμαι, “ἥ᾿ ὁλόσχιστος, 
δμηρεία, πάμφυλος, πρόκρισις, Τῥητορεία, ἵσυγκαταμίγνυμι (Hur. 
Η. Fur.), *ovppipoduar, Ἰσυμπαρακολουθῶ, συναγυρμός, συναπο- 
τελῶ, ὃ συνδιακυβερνῶ, σωφρονικός, Γχηνοβωτία, *xiAlavdpos. 


XXX GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


᾿Αγράμματος (Polit. Tim. Critias), ἀκρατής (Soph. Legg.), 
ἀνάστατος (Soph. Legg.), ἀπιδεῖν (Soph. Phileb. Legg.), ἀφερ- 
μηνεύω (Soph. Legg.), ἀφύλακτος (Polit. Lege.), ἔγκαιρος (Polit. 
Legg.), ἔκδοσις (Polit. Legg.), ἐμπορεύτικος (Polit., ἐμπορεύομαι 
Lege.), ἐνάριθμος (Soph. Phileb.), ἐπίκλην (Soph. Phileb. Tim.), 
εὐλαβής (Polit. Lege.), εὐπρεπής (Soph. Polit. Legg.), Τἠρεμαῖος 
(Polit. Legg.), {θυραυλεῖν (Polit. Legg.), ἰταμότης (Polit., 
ἰταμῶς Legg.), καταπαύω (Polit. Phileb.), μεθημερινός (Soph. 
Tim.), μηνυτής (Polit. Lege.), ἐμίσθωσις (Soph. Legg.), povap- 
xla (Polit. Lege.), Τνομοθέτημα (Polit. Legg.), περιλείπῳ (Polit. 
Tim. Critia. Legg.), προσμίγνυμι (Polit. Legg.), προστυχής 
(γίγνεσθαί τινι), (Polit. Legg.), σκοτοδινία (Soph. Legg.), συγ- 
γυμναστής (Soph. Lege.), συγκατασκευάζω (Polit. Legg.), συλ- 
λαγχάνω (Polit. Tim.), συναπεργάζεσθαι (Polit. Tim.), *ovv- 
διαπονῷ (Soph. Legg.), συνεφέπομαι (Soph. Tim. Critia. Legg.), 
τολμηρός (Soph. Legg.), τὰ φωνηθέντα (Soph. Tim.), χαλεπότης 
(Soph. Critia. Legg.). 

The facts thus enumerated indicate as characteristic of the 
language of these dialogues, (1) An extreme minuteness of 
distinction, giving rise to new compounds and derivatives, and 
to the employment of old words with new shades of meaning. 
(2) An affectation of variety, leading to different modes of ex- 
pressing the same thing. (3) Combined with these a learned 
fulness of diction, commanding the resources of the written as 
well as of the spoken language, and moulding old words to 
the expression of new ideas: e. g. νυμφευτής, “one who brings 
together in marriage ;” ἀγράμματος, “unwritten ;” dotpodos, 
“ without twisting.” (4) The frequent and familiar use of 
words denoting physical and mathematical as well as ethical 
conceptions. To which may be added (5) the tendency to 
fix in language some of the leading generalizations of philo- 
sophy. This last point affords a partial approach to the 
terminology of Aristotle, who has adopted several of the terms 
here used. The re-adoption of words from the poets and 
early writers, and the invention of new compounds, are charac- 
teristic also of Isocrates and Xenophon; and many of the 
words thus introduced became part of the vocabulary of the 
later prose writers. But when the five points are taken to- 
gether, the language of these dialogues is seen to be that of 
Plato, with the peculiarities somewhat exaggerated; the most 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXXI 


marked features being the invention of technical expressions 
and the preference for words belonging to the tragic period 
of Greek poetry. 

That these dialogues shew an increased tendency to the 
use of a peculiar diction, is proved sufficiently by the occur- 
rence in 108 pages (ed. St.) of 270 words not found else- 
where in Plato, and upwards of go words not found in 
other Greck writers. It is true that 60 of these go words, 
and about go of the 270, may be set down to the method 
of dichotomies, but there remain the goodly allowance of about 
180 words peculiar to these amongst the Platonic dialogues, 
and at least 30 ἅπαξ εἰρημένα, a number which might be in- 
creased if it were lawful to add those words which do not occur 
earlier, and which later Platonists, like Plutarch and Clemens 
Alexandrinus, have evidently adopted from this source. 

But there are Platonic dialogues in which there are equally 
marked peculiarities of diction. These are the Phedrus, Re- 
public, Timzeus (including the fragment of the Critias), and 
Laws. The first of these abounds in poetical words, and 
there is probably no writing of equal length from which so 
rich a vocabulary could be procured. But this may partly 
be accounted for by the unwonted enthusiasm which Socrates 
confesses that he feels “swelling in his breast.” The rich 
garment of expression, “stiff with cloth of gold,” is confessedly 
worn for the occasion; and though bearing a certain relation 
to the language of these dialogues, has an air of wildness and 
novelty, and a brilliance of unpremeditated force which is 
absent here. The case of the Phedrus then may for the 
present be treated as exceptional. And the same may be said 
of the Republic, which abounds in peculiar words, not from 
singularity, but from an overflowing richness and variety. 

The Timeeus, Critias, and Laws, in 436 pages have 1492 
words which occur nowhere else in Plato. Of these nearly a 
third part belong to the Timzus and Critias, which in ΟἹ pages 
have 427 words which occur in no other Platonic dialogue. 
This large proportion is no doubt in part due to the peculiarity 
of subject; but in the Laws alone, which as a political and 
ethical treatise is not materially different in this respect from 
the greater number of Plato’s writings, there are (in 345 pages) 
nearly a thousand words which he has not used elsewhere. 


XXXU GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 

It remains to ask whether in those dialogues which have 
a peculiar vocabulary the peculiarities are of the same kind. 
This question may be partly answered by glancing at the lists 
of words given above, and counting the number of those in 
each category which occur in the Sophist or Politicus, and in 
the Timzeus, Critias, or Laws, but appear in no other dialogue. 
The coincidences noticed under the first head will appear 
especially striking. It will also be seen that the coincidences 
with the Philebus, although not numerous are characteristic, 
especially under 8. See especially γένος, γένεσις, πῆξις, σῶμα, 
This line of proof might be indefinitely extended by 
adducing words peculiar to the latter dialogues but similar in 
kind to those peculiar to the former4, and words which 
though not peculiar to them are found to occur with in- 
creased frequency in both". It may be left to the student 
to examine these analogies for himself; but to give cogency 
to these “concomitant variations” it is necessary to present 
the negative side of the inquiry. It has been shewn that the 
Sophist and Politicus on the one hand, and the Timeeus, Critias, 
and Laws on the other, have certain peculiarities of diction ; 
and also that these peculiarities are to some extent the same 
or similar. It must be further inquired whether any other dia- 
logues equally with the Sophist and Politicus share the pecu- 
harities of the Timzeus, Critias, and Laws. If account be taken 
of what I have ventured to call the technical words, the 
answer is clear. There is no dialogue which equally with 
these five combines the various elements of diction above- 
mentioned. In poetical and rhetorical words the Pheedrus 
ean hardly be exceeded; but the number of words which 
occur only in the Phedrus, Timeus, Critias, and Laws, is less 
in proportion than the number of those occurring only in the 
Sophist, Politicus, Timzeus, Critias, and Laws; and considerably 
less than these confined to the Politicus, Timeeus, Critias, and 
Laws, although slightly exceeding those found only in the 


ὑλή. 


a Such as ἄβιος, Legg. (δ.); ἀβίαστος, 
Tim. (6.) ; ἀβούλητος, Legg. (a.); ἀγε- 
ves, Tim. (α.) ; ἀγέννητος“, Tim.(a.); ay- 
νεύω, ἁγνεία, Lege. (y.); ἀγχιστεία, 
Legg.(5.); ἀγώνισμα, Legg. (δ.) ; ἀδιε- 
ρεύνητος Tim. (ε.); ἀειφυγία, Legg. 
(ε.); ἄθλημα, Lege. (8.); &6Aa, Tim. 


Legg. (5.); ἀθύρω, Legg. (8.); ἄθυτος, 
Legg. (6.) 

τ Such as φράζω, mepiexw, περιλαμ- 
βάνω, μετρητικός, ἀπεργάζομαι, μέτο- 
χος, προαιρεῖσθαι, ἐμφανίζω, φῦλον, φαν- 
τάζεσθαι, ἀπόφασις, ῥηθέν, πρόσρημα, 
the indefinite πότερος. 











GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXXII 


Sophist, Timeus, Critias, and Laws. But, if the Pheedrus 
is treated as exceptional, there is no other dialogue which 
equally with these approximates to the language of the later 
dialogues, as measured by the number of words (in proportion 
to the number of pages) which the dialogue in question shares 
with the Timzus, Critias, or Laws, and with no other. The 
Sophist, which is neither physical nor ethical, but dialectical, 
and for this reason cannot be expected to abound in variety 
of words, is nearer to the Timeeus, Critias, Laws, when tried by 
this test, than the Republic, which abounds in peculiar words, 
which is linked by the author to the Timzeus, and whose gene- 
ral subject is closely similar to that of the Laws; while the 
proportion of the Politicus is five times that of the Gorgias, 
and nearly ten times that of the Meno. The following table 
exhibits approximately the numerical ratios of the several dia- 
Jogues according to the number of words at once common and 
peculiar to each with the Timeus, Critias, and Laws :— 





Polit. το. Pheedo 35. thyphr. Gorg. 3. 
ea τὰ Symp. 24. Huthyd. 1. 

Rohtsjer Phileb. 3. Critias +. 

Pheedr. 14. Ton 2. Parm. Hipp. Min. τ. 

Soph. 135. Theset, 2. Men. 52. 

Rep. δ. Prot. Lach. Lys.4. Ale. I. 4. 

Menex. 4. Crat. Apol. Eu- Charmid. +4. 


The position of the Parmenides in this list, like that of the Phe- 
drus, is partly accounted for by exceptional circumstances. 

§ 8. In grammar, structure of sentences, and rhythm, these 
dialogues present the same affinities which were found in ex- 
amining their vocabulary and general style. Bearing a certain 
resemblance to Plato’s other writings generally, they approach 
most nearly to the Philebus, Timseus, Critias, and Laws. 

(1) With respect to the grammar this remark will be seen 
to be justified by many parallel passages which have been col- 
lected in the notes to this edition. Of the following idioms 
several may be paralleled from other dialogues: some from 
other authors: but when taken together, they will be seen to 
be especially characteristic of the group thus indicated. 

5. Considered as one continuous dialogue. For confirmation of these assertions, 


see Ast’s Lexicon Platonicuin. 
i 


XXX1V GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


i. The Ionic dative plural of the 2nd declension in ot occurs 
twice in the Politicus: 262 a. διπλασίοισι (MSS. with one ex- 
ception, οἱσὴ); 304 6. ἑπομένοισιν. Several instances of this 
form might, however, be collected from the Timzus and Laws. 
It does not occur elsewhere in Plato. 

ii. Perfects with present (perhaps frequentative) meaning : 

ἐσπούδακα, Soph. 216, 251 6, 259 6; κέχρημαι, ib. 2236; τε- 
θαύμακα, ib. 251 6. Compare τετεύτακα, Rep. 7, 521 6, Tim. 
90 Ὁ. The so-called “aorist of custom” and the perf. pass. 
with middle signification are too common to require special 
mention here. 

iii. The participle is used with the auxiliary verb instead 
of one of the tenses of some other mood : 

Soph. 217 ὁ. ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένῃ; ib. 229 d. ἐστὶν ἔχον; ib. 
235. a. ἔχων τυγχάνει; ib. 244 6. λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον (ἐστίν); 
ib. 245 6. γενέσθαι----ὃν. ib. d. εἰληφὸς φανεῖται; ib. 260 d. 
ἔξαρνον γεγονέναι. Polit. 257 a. ἀκηκοότες εἶναι; ib. 268 c. 
λέγοντες--τυγχάνοιμεν ; ib. 306 b. ἔστον exovre.* 

iv. The cognate accusative of the active becomes the subject 
of the passive yoice. This extension of a common idiom occurs 
sometimes in tragedy, 6. g. Sophocles, Trach. 169. τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔφραζε 
πρὸς θεῶν εἱμαρμένα τῶν Ηρακλείων ἐκτελευτᾶσθαι πόνων (Ξε τὸν 
Ἡρακλῆ τελευτᾶν τοὺς πότους τοιαῦτα, cogn. acc.). In the So- 
phist, where much has to be said of various processes, this form 
of expression is often found convenient, e.g. 221 a. τὸ THs— 
πληγῆς --- ἀνασπώμενον, “the stroke effected by an upward 
jerk ;” cf. Polit. 271 a. τὸ ἐξ ἀλλήλων---γεννώμενον. By a fur- 
ther extension of the same usage, the verbal noun in pa often 
means not the result of an act, but the act or process itself: so 
δήλωμα, Soph. 262 a; γέννημα, ib. 266 e; μίμημα Polit. 274 a; 
and, as I venture to think, σπέρμα, ib. 2726. The case of 
θρέμμα, ib. 289 Ὁ, is even more peculiar; here a transition is 
made from the act to the means by which the act is performed, 
just as often happens with the English verbal noun in ing 
(e. g. furnishings, trappings, dressing, &c.). 

y. One instance at least occurs of the infinitive used for the 
imperative: Soph. 262 6. σύ μοι φράζειν. 

vi. And one of the imperative put interrogatively : 


Ὁ Periphrases are altogether more frequent: 6. g. τέλος ἔχειν, 











GENERAL INTRODUCTION, XXXV 


Polit. 295 0. μὴ ἐξέστω 647 —; Cf. Aeschin. il. 21, ὅτι ἠρξά- 
μὴν μὴ ἀποδημήσω 5 
vii. Partitive genitives are frequent: 6. g. 
Soph. 265 a. τῆς κτητικῆς. 
Polit. 281 6. τῶν αἰτιῶν. 
Cf. Phileb. 56 ἃ. καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητική. 


vii. Attraction, 
of an adverb, Polit. 263. ὅθεν -- ἐντεῦθεν, οὗ. 
of a verb, Soph. 263. ὡς ἔοικε--- γίγνεσθαι: γίγνεται, ws 
ἔοικεν. Cf. Phileb. 6% ¢. 


ix. Apposition, 
a. Sing. and plur. ἐν πάντα, frequent here and in Phileb. 

Polit. 306 ἀ 6. τάχος καὶ σφοδρότητα καὶ ὀξύτητα----οαὐτό. 

Ὁ. Femi. and neut. Soph. τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον. 
9. Mase. and fem. or neut. (concrete and abstract), 

Polit. 259 ἃ. πολιτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὴν καὶ 

βασιλικὸν---ὃν πάντα ταῦτα. 
d. Of clauses, 

(i.) To each other, Polit. 257d. ταῦτα----ποιητέον" οὐκ ἀπο- 
στατέον. 

(1.) To a demonstrative: frequently τὸ δὲ or τὸ δέ γε. 
Soph. 244 a. τὸ δὲ τούτον γίγνηται πᾶν τοὐνάντιον. 
Polit. 263 d. τὸ δέ γε---τάχ᾽ ἂν---διονομάζοι. Ib. 308 6. 
ταὐτὸν δή μοι τοῦθ᾽ ἣ βασιλική φαίνεται, κιτιλ. 

(11.) To a relative, Soph. 227 ὁ. ὅπερ ἤρου, κιτιλ. Ib. 
236 d. ὃ δὲ καὶ τότ᾽ ἠμφεγνόουν, κ-.τ.λ. 


x. The use of the neut. article with the genitive to express 
the abstract notion of a thing, is especially frequent in the 
Politicus and Laws. Polit. 263 ὁ. τὸ τῆς ἀποπλανήσεως. Ib. 
274 d. τὸ τοῦ μυθοῦ. 


xi. Ellipse (more frequent in the Sophist), 
a. Soph. 22.5 a. τῷ δὲ λόγους πρὸς λόγους (γιγνομένῳ). 
Ib. 233 b. μήτ᾽ ἐφαίνοντο (ὀρθῶς ἀντιλέγει»). 
Ib. 235 Ὁ. δέδεικται τοίνυν (δεῖ). 
Ib. 238 c. μὴ ὃν δέ (ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν). 
Ib. 248 6. τὸ δέ (ἂν φαῖεν). 
Polit. 276 c. τί μήν (ἔδει) ;----ἐλέγομεν (δεῖν). 
Ib. 301 ὃ. προσποιῆται δὲ ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων (ἄρχειν). 
f 2 


ΧΧΧΥῚ 


GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


b. Of τὸ μὲν with τὸ δὲ following, 


Soph. 221 6. νευστικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ. 

Ib. 267 b. νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω. 

Polit. 291 6. τυραννίδι, τὸ δὲ βασιλικῇ. Cf. Phileb. 36 6. 
ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ᾽ ἀληθεῖς---ἧδοναί. Hence in Phileb. 66 ο, 
ἐπιστήμας, ταῖς δ᾽ αἰσθήσεσιν, should probably be read 
ἐπιστήμαις with corr. =. Legg. passim. 


e. Of the apodosis after μέν, 


Soph. 240 b. ἐοικὸς μέν. 


Polit. 311 Ὁ. τὸ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν τὸ μὲν διαφερόντως 


ἴσχει. Οὗ Rep.455¢; ὅγιιρ. 2ο7 4; Thesxt. το 16; 
ἌΡΟΙ]. τὸ ἢ. Ci, Hom. 115). ΤΡ» 


xi. Pleonasm, 
a. Simple, of δεῖν, Soph. 221 a. ὅπερ προὐθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευ- 


pelv. Repetition of αὐτός, Polit. 268 a (cf. the frag- 
ment of Ausch. in Rep. 2, 383 ὁ) εἶναι, Ib. 300 0. εἰς 
δύναμιν εἶναι. Comparative, Ib. 288 b ὁ. μᾶλλον --- 
ὀρθότερον. 


b. Redundant or explicit use of the participle, Soph. 225 a. 


ὄνομα λέγειν---τιθεμένους. Lb. 250 6. ᾧ χρῶνται, τὰ μὲν 
χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακωτέρως παραμυθούμενοι. Ib. 
234 6. εἴδωλα λεγόμενα. Tb. 240 ἃ. ἑνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνό- 
ματι φθεγξάμενος. Ib. 243 Ὁ. φθέγξηται λέγων. Ib. 
252 Ὁ. διαιροῦσιν-----διαιρούμενοι. Polit. 274. 6. ἡμάρτο- 
μεν ἀποφηνάμενοι. Ib. 280 6. τέλεον λελεγμένον. Cf. 
Legg. 9, 879 d. εἴτε πάλαι ἐνοικοῦντος, εἴτε νεήλυδος 
ἀφιγμένον. 


(Ν. Β. There is a strong tendency to the use of participial 


expressions generally.) 


c. The same love of explicitness is shewn in the repeti- 


tion, with or without modification, of a verbal notion 
which has been already expressed or implied; often 
causing a return from a more dependent to a less 
dependent construction, as from participle to infini- 
tive, infinitive to subjunctive, infinitive or subjunctive 
to indicative. Soph. 216 e. τότε δὲ σοφισταΐ, τότε δὲ 
δόξαν παράσχοιντ᾽ ἄν. Ib. 225 6. ἀμφισβητεῖται μέν, 
ἀτέχνως δὲ---περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται. Ib. 243 a. χαλεπόν, 
καὶ πλημμελὲς ἐπιτιμᾷν. Tb. 246 d. ποιεῖν---ποιῶμεν. 
Ib. 248 6. λέγουσιν ὅτι---μέν---δὲ----᾿ασίν. Polit. 263 d. 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. XXXVI 


προσείποι. Ib. 293 6. μεμιμῆσθαι. Ib. 299 d. θεασαί- 
μεθα. Ib. 302 c, ἔφαμεν. Cf. Symp.177¢; Apol.1g e. 
xill. Πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον. 
The sentence is sometimes continued as if a word in 
composition were fully expressed. 
Soph. 219 a. ἄτεχνον, ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν ἔχον. 
Ib. 249 ἃ. τῷ---φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι. 
Cf. Lege. 7, 810 ἃ. φιλομαθοῦντι μηδὲ μισοῦντι, 
xiv. “ Pendent” constructions. 
Of the nom., Soph. 247 ὁ. πᾶν ὃ μὴ dvvatol—eicly, ὡς dpa 





τοῦτο Polit. 303 ¢. τοῦτο μὲν ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ δρᾶμα 
καττὰ. 

Gen. with περὶ, Soph. 258 6. περὶ ἐναντίου τινός---χαίρειν 
λέγομεν. 


Dat., Polit. 295 6. τῷ δὲ τὰ δίκαια----κ.τ.λ. 

Δοο., Polit. 295 d. πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ξυμβαῖνον---γέλως ἂν 6 
μέγιστος γίγνοιτο τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετημάτων. Ib. 282 6. 
τὸ μὲν ἀτράκτῳ-- -ὅσα δέ ye ad—. Ib. 283 ἃ. τό γε τῆς 
ὑφαντικῆς μέρος---. 10.506 ο.᾽ Οξύτητα καὶ τάχος ----. With 


παρά, Ib. 300 b. παρὰ γὰρ οἶμαι τοὺς νόμου- ----. 





xv. The construction as well as the diction is often varied 
in successive clauses. 

Soph. 248 Ὁ. γενέσει---πρὸς οὐσίαν. Ib. 244 d. ἢ μηδενὸς--- 
εἰ δέ twos. Ib. 245 6. τε---καὶ μὴν---γε. 

xvi. The subject of the inversion of words belongs rather to 
the structure of sentences than to grammar. But it may be 
well in this place to call attention to the frequency of hyper- 
baton, especially in the use of particles. E.g. Soph. 263 c. 
ἔφαμεν---που. Ib. d. μέντοι. Ib. 264 a. ὅταν---αὖ. 

Several of these modes of expression, such as the redundant 
participle, the use of the auxiliary verb, and the extension of 
the cognate accusative, not to mention the Ionic dative plural, 
and the peculiar effects of attraction, are in the manner of 
tragedy ; and we may therefore be the less surprised at such 
directly tragic forms of expression as Soph. 238 a. μήπω μέγ᾽ 
εἴπῃς. Ib. 235 a. viv ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἤδη τὸν θῆρα μηκέτ᾽ ἀνεῖναι. 





Ib. 229 6. ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον. [Ὁ. 235d. οὐ μή ποτε ἐκφυγὸν 
ἐπεύξηται, or such “ pregnant” constructions as in Polit. 271 a. 
ἄδηλον----διεφθείρετο. Cf. Lege. 11, 926 Ὁ. μαινόμενα κηδεύματα. 





XXXVI GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


(2) It may be remarked generally with regard to the 
structure of the sentences in these dialogues, that they are 
more elaborate and also more irregular than in the greater 
number of Plato’s writings. They have less of the sponta- 
neous movement of conversation, and in the Politicus especially 
are often more redundant and complicated. While the reader’s 
ear is filled with a peculiar stately rhythm, his attention is 
quickened by artificial or poetical collocations of words. These 
traits are clearly marked in the dialogues before us; they 
may be traced also in the Philebus and some parts of the — 
Pheedrus, and they are eminently characteristic of the Laws. 

Note for example the elaborateness and balanced formality 
of the following replies : 

Soph. 217 a. τί δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποῖον περὶ αὐτῶν διαπο- 
ρηθεὶς ἐρέσθαι διενοήθης ; 

Ib. 224 c. καὶ τί τις ἂν ἄλλο εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν πλημμελοίη πλὴν 
τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ σοφιστικὸν γένος ; 

Ib. 226 b. τὸ ποῖον περὶ αὐτῶν βουληθεὶς δηλῶσαι, παραδείγ- | 
ματα προθεὶς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἤρου ; 

Ib. 234 Ὁ. οὐδαμῶς" πάμπολυ γὰρ εἴρηκας εἶδος εἰς ἕν πάντα 
συλλαβὼν καὶ σχεδὸν ποικιλώτατον. 

Polit. 262 6. ποῖον οὖν δὴ φράζεις διαιρουμένους ἡμᾶς οὐκ 
ὀρθῶς ἄρτι δρᾷν; 

Ib. 270 Ὁ. φαίνεται γ᾽ οὖν δὴ καὶ μάλα εἰκότως εἰρῆσθαι πάντα | 
ὅσα διελήλυθας. 

Ib. 277 ἃ. καὶ κινδυνεύει γ᾽, ὦ ξένε, τελέως ἂν ἡμῖν οὕτως 
ἔχειν ἣ περὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν ἀπόδειξις. 

Ib. 284 6. καὶ μέγα γ᾽ ἑκάτερον τμῆμα εἶπες, καὶ πολὺ δια- 
φέρον ἀλλήλοιν. 

Compare with these Phil. 29 d. τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως 
ὑγιαίνων ἄν ποτε φανείη ; Ib. 32 ἃ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις ὅτι ταύτῃ πῇ 
δεῖ διαπορευθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον. Ib. 47 ὁ. Πάντα, ὦ Σώ- 
κρατες; τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διε- 
πέρανας. Tim. 29 ἀ. ἔΑριστα, ὦ Τίμαιε, παντάπασί τε ὡς κελεύεις 
ἀποδεκτέον" τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιόν σον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, 
τὸν δὲ δὴ λόγον ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε. Lege. 1, p. 627 ὁ. Καὶ μάλα 
ἄτοπον, ὦ ξένε, τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ὅμως δ᾽ ὁμολογεῖν οὕτως ἀναγ- 
καιότατον. Ib. 628 ο. Οὕτω πᾶς ἂν ἐθέλοι πρότερον ἢ κείνως περὶ 
τὴν αὑτοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλιν. Ib. 639 6. παντάπασί τινὰ πονηρὸν 
λέγεις, καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀνδρῶν ἄρχοντα, ἀλλά τινων σφόδρα γυναικῶν. 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. KXXIX 


In these and numberless other places there is easily recog- 
nised the presence of a common type. ‘The same careful 
precision is observable in the explicitness with which a ques- 
tion is often stated. See Soph. 218 c; 230 b, c,d; 248 ἃ, e; 
265¢; Polit. 262 c,d,e; 293 a,b; and compare Phil. 12 ο, ἃ ; 
15 b,c; 18 b, 0, d, and Legg. 637. 

Instances of redundaney and complication, of a somewhat 
harsher kind than those of the Phzdrus, Gorgias, or Republic, 
arising more from lengthiness than fulness, will soon enough 
become familiar to the student of these dialogues. Meanwhile 
the following passages may be taken as samples: Soph. 230 
e,d; Polit. 288 ἃ, 293 Ὁ, 298 ὁ, d, 309 Ὁ. Compare Phil. 
17 d,e; Legg. 716 b, 740 d, 779 ἃ. Such irregularities are 
especially frequent in the Politicus and Laws. 

In point of rhythm and the collocation of words, these 
dialogues hold, with the Philebus, an intermediate place be- 
tween the Pheedrus (to which may here be added the Thee- 
tetus and Republic) and the Timezeus, Critias, and Laws. 

Every reader of Plato is acquainted with the poetic cadences, 
which in his more highly wrought passages he occasionally 
introduces, not without a smile at his own magnificence. In 
the myths especially (to use his own words), he speaks with 
a tragic air, as if telling a tale impressively to children. (Rep. 
8, 545 86. εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν “"On(m)ws δὴ πρῶ- 
TOV στάσις ἔμπεσε," καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς, os πρὸς παῖδας 
ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ws δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας ὑψηλο- 
λογουμένας λέγειν") Examples will readily occur from the 
Protagoras, Symposium, Theetetus (172-177), and the con- 
clusion of the Republic (where note especially the speech of 
Lachesis). It appears from the Pheedrus that these harmonies 
were not unconscious. The Socrates of that dialogue is sur- 
prised to find himself discoursing in this unwonted strain. 
When the afflatus of the higher rhetoric first descends on 
him, he says, “I am speaking almost in dithyrambs,” and 
afterwards, when he breaks out into a verse in the epic 
metre, he remarks on this as. shewing a further access of 
enthusiasm. The ironical shyness with which he at first ex- 


ercises his suddenly acquired gift wears off as he proceeds, 


and in the second long speech, or “palinode,” he evidently 
“forgets that they are at play.” Both speeches, besides 


xl GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


such mock-poetical turns as ξύμμοι λαβέσθε τοῦ μυθοῦ,---πά- 
pire δὴ, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε, are 
full of a sententious solemnity and rich music, to which the 
choice and arrangement of the words contribute largely. 
The following single phrases will partly illustrate this: 246 d. 
ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεύς, ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἅρμα, 
πρῶτος πορεύεται. 247 ἃ. τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τῶν δώδεκα 
ἀριθμῷ τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες. Ib. b. ἀκρὰν ὑπὸ τὴν ὑπου- 
ράνιον ἁψῖδα πορεύονται πρὸς ἄναντες ἤδη. Ib. βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς 
κάκης ἵππος μετέχων. Ib. 248 b. πολλαὶ μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλοὶ 


δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύονται, πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον ἀτελεῖς | 
pa up ’ 


τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας anépxovtai—where the alliteration also adds 
to the effect. 

The music of language, thus half-humorously struck out, 
seems to have had an increasing fascination for Plato, and 
sounds on unreservedly in his latest works. In the Timzeus 
and Laws these tragic and “ dithyrambic” cadences are no 
longer occasional, but perpetual, and the speaker does not 
now “veil his face” with Socratic irony while uttering them. 
There appears an increasing preference for balanced phrases 
and “good mouth-filling” words. The rhythm, however, while 
more laboured, is less varied and less instinct with movement 
and life. The following examples are taken almost at random. 

Tim. 41 6. δέοι δὲ σπαρείσας αὐτὰς εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάσταις 
ἕκαστα ὄργανα χρόνου φῦναι ζώων τὸ θεοσεβέστατον. Ib. 47 b. 
τἄλλα δέ, ὅσα ἐλάττω, τί ἂν ὑμνοῖμεν ; ὧν ὃ μὴ φιλόσοφος τυφλω- 
θεὶς Odupopevos ἂν θρῆνοϊ μᾶτην. Legg. 1, 644 Ὁ. δεῖ δὴ τὴν 
παιδείαν μηδαμοῦ ἀτιμάζειν, ὡς πρῶτον τῶν καλλίστων τοῖς ἀρίστοις 
ἄνδρασι παραγιγνόμενον. Ib. 2, 653 d. θεοὶ δὲ οἰκτείραντες τὸ 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπίπονον πεφυκὸς γένος. Ib. 654 6. μάταιος ὃ μετὰ 
ταῦθ᾽ ἡμῖν περὶ παιδείας ὀρθῆς εἴθ᾽ “Ἑλληνικῆς εἴτε βαρβαρικῆς 
λόγος ἄν εἴη. Ib. 661 Ὁ. τὸ δὴ τέλος ἁπάσης μακαριότητος εἶναι! 
τὸ ταῦτα κεκτημένον ἀθάνατον εἶναι γενόμενον 6 τι τάχιστα. Ib. 
3, 677 6. μυρίαν μέν τινα φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν, γῆς δὲ ἀφθόνου πλῆ- 
Gos πάμπολυ, ζώων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρρόντων BovKOAL ἄττα, καὶ εἴ 
τί που αἰγῶν περιλειφθὲν γένος. Ib. 7. 824 a. ἡ τῶν διαπαύματα 
πόνων ἔχουσα. Ib. 8, 831 6. τοῦ φαγεῖν παντοδαπὰ καὶ πιεῖν 
ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀφροδισίων πᾶσαν πάντως παρασχεῖν πλησμονήν. 
Ib. 842 ο. ἀναγκαῖον νομοθετοῦντά ἐστι τρέπεσθαι. Ib. 4, 716 a, 


b, 9, 854 a, 878 b, 11, 919 a, b. 














GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xi 


If we turn now to the Philebus, Sophist, and Politicus, we 
shall find a rhythm less inflated and monotonous than that of 
the Laws, less free and various than that of the Phadrus, but 
essentially resembling both. If the cadences of the Phadrus 
have a dithyrambic wildness, and those of the Laws are 
oratorical rather than poetical, these would most aptly be com- 
pared to the refined moderation and calm stateliness of Attic 
tragedy. So far as a thing of this kind can be reduced to 
rule, the artifices by which the effect is secured are chiefly 
two: (1) The careful balancing of words so as to relieve the 
tediousness of a lengthened phrase, by the counterposition of 
noun and epithet, verb and participle, subject and object, and 
by the alternation of emphatic and unemphatic words; (2) 
The adjustment of long and short syllables so as to quicken or 
retard the movement of the sentence. (That this is no mere 
fancy maybe gathered from the re-introduction of the Ionic 
dat. plur. in ot.) Sometimes short syllables are accumulated 
as in choric metres: more often a sentence is concluded with 
an Iambic hemistich, or with a dochmiac, each generally ter- 
minating with a dissyllable, which is often divorced from the 
immediate context. But there is something beyond this 
unconscious mechanism, which can be discovered by the ear 
alone. <A very few instances out of many are all that can be 
quoted here. 

Soph. 218 d. εἰ μὴ σύ ποθεν εὐπετεστέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἄλλῆν 
ὁδὸν. 234d. καὶ πάντα πάντῃ ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις 
φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων παραγενομένων. 
442 a. 1) τὸ παράπαν ἐατέον, εἰ τοῦτο Tis εἴργεῖ δρᾷν ὄκνος. 259 d. 
οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινός, ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτο- 
μένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὦν. 

Polit. 261 6. πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονή- 
σεως. Ib. τὴν δὲ ἀγελαιοτροφικὴν ἄρ᾽ ἐννοεῖς πῇ τις δίδυμον 
ἀποφήνας τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίοισι τανῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμισέσιν εἰς 
τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι. 268 Ὁ. οὐκ ἄλλος κρείττων παραμυθεῖσθαι 
καὶ κηλῶν Tpaivew μετὰ τε ὀργάνων καὶ ψιλῷ τῷ στόματι τὴν 
τῆς αὑτοῦ ποίμνης ἄριστα μεταχειριζόμενος μουσικήν. 269 d. τοῖς 
πάντων θειοτάτοις προσῆκεϊ μόνοις. 270 a. τότε δ᾽ ὅταν ἀνεθῇ, 
δι’ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτὸν ἰέναι, κατὰ καιρὸν ἀφεθέντα τοιουτόν, ὥστε ἀνά- 
παλιν πορεύεσθαι πολλὰς περιόδων μυριάδας διὰ τὸ μέγιστον ὃν 
καὶ ἰσορροπώτατον ἐπὶ μεγίστου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἰέναι. 273 ἃ. διὸ 


8 


xlil GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


δὴ τότ᾽ ἤδη θεὸς ὁ κοσμήσας αὐτόν, καθορῶν ἐν ἀπορίαις ὄντα, 
Knoopevos ἵνᾶ μὴ χεϊμαᾶσθεῖς εἰς τὸν τῆς ὁμοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα 
τόπον δύῃ, πᾶλϊν Epedpos αὐτοῦ τῶν πηδαλίων γιγνόμενος, τὰ 
νοσήσαντα καὶ λυθέντα ἐν τῇ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ στρέψας, 
κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρων anépyaterar. 
(This is almost in the manner of the ΤΊηθυβ and Laws.) 
5 \ / , > \ ~ / χὰ Ὁ 

201 d. ἐπεὶ γενόμενόν γ᾽ ἂν οἷον λέγομεν ἀγαπᾶσθαί τε ἂν καὶ 
οἰκεῖν διακυβερνῶντα εὐδαιμόνως ὀρθὴν ἀκριβῶς μόνον πολιτείαν. 
309. θείαν ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένει. 

The following are selected from many parallel examples in 
the Philebus. 18 ἃ. τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα 
ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα, μίαν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν 

Ν / 3 J ΄ \ Ν lal 
γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών. 45 ἃ. τὸ δὲ τῶν 
ἀφρόνων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἡ σφόδρα ἡδονὴ κατέχουσα 

U4 p) if , ALS > yy > @ , 
περιβοήτους ἀπεργάζεται. 46 b. σύμμικτον τοῦτό γ᾽ dp ὦ Σώ- 
κρατες, ἔοικε γίγνεσθαί τι κακόν. (Where there isa manifest 
approach to the structure of an Iambic line: σύμμικτον dp’ ἔοικε 

/ aT “ Ν \ / NWSE , 
γίγνεσθαι κακόν.) 66 Ὁ. πρῶτον μὲν περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον 
y uv pe a Set = 

καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν aldiov ἡρῆσθαϊι φῦσιν. 
67. καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον 
δ Ν 3 - , / ε 4 / 
ἢ τοὺς ev Movon φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἑκάστοτε λόγων. 

Whatever may be thought of a matter which depends so 
much on individual impressions as this of rhythm, there can 
be no question that the transposition of words from their 
natural sequence, either for the sake of sound or emphasis, 
which was noticed occasionally in the Thesetetus, Appendix A. 
p- 218, becomes more frequent in these dialogues. See, for 
instance, the hyperbaton of νῦν in p.218b, and two other 
places of the Sophist; and Polit. 268 6 (πολλὰ---ἔτη), 276 © 
(ἐπιμέλεια---καὶ----τέχνη), 280 d (ὅσαι τε περὶ Tas κλοπὰς Kal τὰς 
βίᾳ πράξεις διακωλυτικὰ ἔργα παρέχονται τέχναι φραγμάτων ἢ“). 

In more than one passage this has been the chief source of 
difficulty to interpreters. Nor will it be denied that the same 
symptom of laborious and artificial arrangement reappears with 
increased frequency in the Laws. 


« Cf. Polit. 300 a. Tod κακοῦ τοῦ πρόσθεν μεῖζον ἔτι τοῦτο γίγνοιτο κακόν : Sug= 
gesting the line τοῦ πρόσθε μεῖζον τοῦτο γίγνεται κακόν. 
* Soph. 253 c. διὰ πάντων εἰ (for εἰ διὰ πάντων). 
Ib. 6. ἰδεῖν μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐναργῶς καὶ τοῦτον. 
Polit. 260 c. τῆς ἐπιτακτικῆς ὡς ὕντα αὐτὸν τέχνης. 


Ib. 270 6. τοῖς ἔντος ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. 








GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xii 


§ 9. The relation of our two dialogues to the Philebus on 
the one hand, and on the other to the Timeus and Laws, which 
is indicated by this general survey of their scope, method, 
style and diction, and may perhaps be confirmed when each is 
examined separately, contains the answer to the question raised 
by Socher, Are these dialogues Platonic or Antiplatonic ? 

The single point of authorship is indeed sufficiently decided 
by three references of Aristotle (Met. vi. 2, § 3, 1026 B, Διὸ 
Πλάτων τρόπον τινὰ ov κακῶς τὴν σοφιστικὴν περὶ TO μὴ ὃν 
ἔταξεν : ib. xi. 8, 1064 B; xii. 2, 1089 C), and in reference to 
the Sophist few Platonic scholars will not feel the force of 
Dr. Thompson’s words (Genuineness of the Sophista, p. 5): 
“50 far as the mere style is concerned, there is no dialogue 
in the whole series more thoroughly Platonic. In their 
structure the periods are those of Plato, and they are unlike 
those of any other writer. Throughout, it seems to me, the 
author is writing his very best. His subject is a dry one; 
and he strives to make it palatable by a more than ordinary 
neatness of phrase, and by a sustained tone of pleasantry. 
His style is terse or fluent, as terseness or fluency is re- 
quired: but the fluency never degenerates into laxity, nor the 
terseness into harshness. The most arid dialectical wastes 
are refreshed by his humour: and bloom in more places 
than one with images of rare brilliancy and felicity. Few 
besides Plato would have thought of describing the endless 
wrangling of two sects (?) who had no principle in common, 
under the image of a battle between gods and giants; and 
_ fewer still, had they conceived the design, would have ex- 
| ecuted it with a touch at once so firm and so fine. What 
inferior master could have kept up so well and with so little 
effort, the fiction of a hunt after a fierce and wily beast, by 
which the Eleatic stranger sustains the ardent Thestetus amid 
_ the toil and weariness of a prolonged logical exercitation? 
_ Or who could so skilfully have interwoven that exercitation 
_ itself with matter so grave and various as that of which the 
dialogue in its central portion is made up? If vivacity in the 
conversations, easy and natural transitions from one subject to 
another, pungency of satire, delicate persiflage, and idiomatic 
raciness of phrase are elements of dramatic power, I know no 
_ dialogue more dramatic than the Sophistes.” 


Ὁ 2 


xliv GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 


But the objections of Socher are not thus met, or rather the 
difficulties which he raised are not explained. And yet the 


solution of them may contribute something towards a theory — 


of these dialogues, and may even throw some light on the | 


history of Plato’s mind. 
1. Socher objects first that the dichotomies, unlike the divi- 


sions of the Gorgias and Philebus, are meaningless, arbitrary, | 
accidental, and tastelessly prolonged. It has been shewn that | 
division as a logical exercise was at one time rife in the school | 
of Plato; that the use of that exercise here is propedeutic and ὦ 
provisional ; and that the method while used is also eriticized, 1 
modified, and partly rejected; that its use here is not more © 


singular than that of etymologies in the Cratylus: and that 


as the Cratylus vein recurs occasionally in these dialogues, so | 
traces of the method of dichotomies appear in the Laws. The | 


use of the method is also seen to be an approach to Aristotle, 
who makes use of some of the divisions which are here in- 
vented. 

2. * The absence of humour, seen especially in the gravity 
with which trivial examples are worked out.” Whatever may 
be thought of the humour of these dialogues, they are not less 
humorous than the Timzeus and Laws. And whoever misses 
humour in them, will probably find the same want in the 
greater part of the Philebus. Socher’s objection is really 
based on the prominence which is given in these dialorues— 
and also in the Philebus and Parmenides, and in a ditterent 
way in the Laws—to the idea of method. And it may be 
retorted that the “ gravity” is often that of the accomplished 
humorist, who does not “himself laugh, to set on some 
quantity of barren spectators to laugh too.” 

3. “Plato identifies Being with the ideas; Not-Being with 
the objects of sense: the object of opinion being intermediate. 
(Rep. v. 477-480.) The Eleatic Stranger takes no account of 
this absolute antithesis of Being and Not-Being. Being, with 
him, is the sum of all positive notions. Plato, on the other 
hand, takes no account of the logical antithesis or correlation 
of Being and Not-Being.” 

4. “ Further, the Sophist contains a criticism of the Platonic 
doctrine of Ideas.” 

These cardinal objections can only be fully met in the sepa- 
rate Introduction to the Sophist. Meanwhile the reader 





GENERAL INTRODUCTION. xlv 


may be asked to bear in mind what has been already said of 
Plato’s modification of his theory of Knowledge, and the un- 
doubted approximation to the Aristotelian point of view which 
appears in the Philebus, Timseus, and Laws. And we may notice, 
as a discrepancy of the same kind, the final rejection in the 
Thestetus of a definition of Knowledge, which might well be 
thought essentially Platonic, namely, “ True opinion able to 
| give a reason of itself” (δόξα ἀληθής μετὰ λόγου). 
5. To the Politicus, besides the general grounds (1 and 2), 
Socher objects that the political notions here advanced are not 
in harmony with the Republic, and still less with earlier dia- 
logues. The examination of this point must also be reserved : 
but we are in a position to remark that there is a third case 
| not put by Socher, viz. Is the Politicus intermediate between 
| the Republic and the Laws ? 
_ 6. Lastly, he observes that the idea of the Divine Govern- 
ment, implied in the mythical description of the Saturnia 
_regna, is wholly unlike what appears in the Pheedo, Republic, 
| Timeus, and Laws: with which the notion of God ever leaving 
the helm of the universe is wholly irreconcilable. The signifi- 
ance of this remark will be developed, when the Politicus is 
considered separately. At present it may be enough to point 
to the well-known passage in the tenth book of the Laws 
(896 e), where an independent evil soul is postulated in order 
_ to account for evil; with which compare Rep. 2, 379 ὁ, “ God, 
since he is good, cannot be the cause of all things, as most 
men say, but of what happens to mankind little is due to him, 
and there is much of which he is not the cause: for our good 
is much less than our evil.” 

Each of Socher’s objections, although inconclusive, arose 
| from the perception of some real peculiarity, of which those 
| who maintain the genuineness of these dialogues are bound 
to give account. It will appear in the sequel, whether any 
light is thrown upon this subject, when they are viewed, as by 


) the indications of style and diction we have been led to view 





them, in especial connexion with the Theetetus, Philebus, 
Timeeus, Critias, and Laws. 


INTRODUCTION ΤῸ THE SOPHIST. 


OF the title given to this dialogue by the early grammarians, — 
Σοφιστὴς, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, λογικός, the name Sophistes is so — 
far acknowledged by Plato himself, as in an allusion to it | 
which occurs in the succeeding dialogue, the form of reference 
used is ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ: 1. 6. “in discussing or defining the 
Sophist.”” And nothing can be more explicit than the manner 
in which this subject is proposed for definition in the opening 
scene. Yet it may not unnaturally appear to many readers 
that the remaining words, although of less authority, describe 
more accurately the real subject of the dialogue, in which, it 
may be thought, either two distinct inquiries are sought to be 
combined by a tour de force, or the former of these is only 
the occasion, excuse, or starting-point for the latter. 

The questions which occupy the largest and certainly the 
most important place are concerned with the nature of nega- 
tion, the relativity of ideas, and the defects of early speculation 
on the idea of Being. 

It may not seem obvious why these metaphysical questions 
should be necessarily involved in the study of a class of per- 
sons whose procedure and influence was a matter of historical 
fact; or, again, supposing it necessary to raise and discuss 
such difficulties, why they might not have been equally sug- 
gested by some other example. We should bear in mind, 
first, the extremely abstract and general manner in which 
Plato looks at every problem; the rarity of the metaphysical 
atmosphere in which he lived. Rightly or wrongly, he passed. 
at once from the simplest to the deepest matters of thought: 


2 Such an allusion to a previous dialogue is rare in Plato, and can hardly be 
paralleled except from the Timeus and Laws. 








INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST. xlvii 


like one possessed with a great passion, “‘ examples, gross as 
earth,” suggested to him the same themes, always old and 
always new. Just as, in the Philebus, the distinction of 
pleasures into good and bad suggests the problem of the one 
and the many, the description of. the Sophist as a “ phantastic 
artist” raises the whole question of the existence of the appa- 
rent beside the real. But, secondly, the connexion of thought, 
though at first sight remote, is, in this case at least, far from 
being arbitrary or accidental. As the question is a cardinal 
one, so is the instance by which the question is introduced. 
Plato is not merely clothing an ontological discussion in the 
garb of flesh and blood: it is at least equally true that in the 
ontological problem he sums up the difficulties of life and 
experience in the most abstract form: difficulties and con- 
tradictions which he had elsewhere illustrated with dramatic 
power. And the name Sophistes itself expresses a provisional 
generalization, or vindemiatio prima. As in the Theetetus, 

the theory “ Each man the measure of truth to himself” is the 
' most general expression for all opinion that is not founded 
in reason, so the Sophist, even before definition, is, as he is 
described in the Republic, only the conscious reflection and 
embodiment of ordinary thought. 

The fact remains, however, that the dialogue is naturally 
divided into two main portions, one of which is enclosed or 
embedded in the other. In the opening and concluding passages 
(I.) an attempt is made to form a definite conception of the 
genus Sophist by the method of dichotomies, i.e. through 
logical divisions to follow the ramifications of the tree of know- 
ledge till the particular branch which supports him is dis- 
covered. But there is a point (p. 236 d) at which this series 
of divisions is interrupted by what is formally a long digres- 
sion, but really the most serious part of the whole (II.), where 
instead of dividing and subdividing, the mind is carried up to 
reconsider the first principles on which this method of distinc- 
tions, and all criticism and controversy, rest; in other words, 
to examine the meaning of negation, which cannot be deter- 
mined without also examining the nature of positive concep- 
) tions. When this question has been set at rest, the divisions 
are resumed (p. 264 b), and a definition is obtained, in which 
the interlocutors acquiesce with more satisfaction than is 


ΧΙΎΠΙ INTRODUCTION 


usually expressed at the conclusion of a Socratic dialogue. 
It will be convenient to treat these portions separately. 

In I. the problem is presented in the concrete, but still 
in a very general aspect. According to the habit of Socratic | 
induction it 15 assumed that the name Sophist, though applied | 
to a great variety of persons, has one meaning, which may 
be ascertained by a process of definition: just as the word | 
‘angler,’ which is defined as a preliminary example, has one | 
meaning which can be clearly conceived and expressed. A | 
modern respondent might have questioned this assumption | 
at the outset, and have challenged Socrates to proye that the © 
word had the same meaning when applied to the poets by 
Pindar, to the geometers by Socrates himself, to Zeno who 
denied motion, to the Heracliteans who denied all else, to the 
philologer Prodicus, and the astronomer Hippias, to Gorgias 
who ignored speculative truth, and to Protagoras who held 
every proposition to be of equal value. The possibility of 
such a doubt does not occur to Plato. He has in his mind a 
very simple, but a very sweeping distinction, for which the 
names σοφιστὴς and φιλόσοφος afforded the most convenient 
expression: a distinction which occurred to him when he com- 
pared Socrates with other teachers, and which it was the work 
of his life to make clear to himself and others. This was the 
distinction between real and apparent Knowledge; the real 
knowledge which Socrates sought, and the apparent know- 
ledge which the others professed. In the Phedrus and Gorgias 
he had shewn that the so-called art of rhetoric had no scien- 
tific basis: in the Protagoras and Meno, that the virtue which 
was commonly praised and which the public teachers professed 
to give was the result of habit and common opinion and not 
of principle: in the Euthydemus, he had ridiculed the process 
of mere verbal argument as contrasted with the real treatment 
of logical difficulties: in many places he had satirized the 
practice of receiving fees for teaching. The present inquiry is 
more general than any of these; and is also restricted to the 
consideration of the Sophist in the highest and most technical 
sense, in which he is distinguished from the rhetorician and other 
artists, as the professor of knowledge and teacher of virtue. 
It was only in this aspect that the Sophist could compete with 
the philosopher. The name might be applied to particular 





TO THE SOPHIST. 


xlix 


artists, such as the poct or geometer, but only incidentally ; 
and their partial claims were absorbed in the universal pre- 
tensions of the Sophist par excellence. Further, these pre- 
tensions are here idealized: for it is doubtful whether even 
Gorgias or Hippias, who were ready to answer all comers, 
earried their professions to the extent described in pp. 232, 233. 
The nearest approach to an equally general statement of the 
question is made in the Protagoras, pp. 312 b—314 6, where 
Hippocrates is told that he is going to give his mind up to a 
Sophist without knowing what a Sophist is. “It is not enough 
to know that he is an artist, without knowing what is his par- 
ticular work.” (p. 312 ¢,d,e.) ‘Perhaps he is a merchant or 
retail-dealer in the food of the mind. Take care that he does 
not cheat us by praising his wares. Tor, if we buy them, we 
cannot examine them, until we have received them in our own 
persons either for good or ill®.” (pp. 313 e—314 Ὁ. Compare 
Soph. 223, 224.) Here there is the same assumption, which 
appears in the “ Sophist,” that the common name implies a 
common nature. But the analysis of the conception is carried 
only a little way, and the characteristic chosen is external 
merely, (a sufficient answer to those who suspect these dialogues 
because the grounds of distinction which are adopted in them 
are sometimes superficial). 

To return. Although no doubt is entertained that there is 
ἃ common nature answering to the name Sophist, this nature 
is, however, by no means easily found. “ The creature is wily 
and dangerous, and must be hunted with caution and good 
heed.” “He is not to be caught with one hand: we must lay 
our snares in every path, till we have surrounded him.” 
Whether or not the task was rightly chosen, it was no mean 
(19 e), where the itinerant habits of the 
Sophist are said to disqualify him for the 


task of conceiving the true state in act : 
in the Thesetetus, where it is said that 


b Other scattered hints respecting 
the Sophists are found in the Meno, 
where Anytus, who abhors them, can- 
not tell what they are, but knows that 





they are the ruin of their pupils: to 
which Socrates replies, “‘ Perhaps there 
is something in that” (καὶ ἴσως τι λέ- 
yeis): in the Republic, where they are 
regarded more as an effect than as a 
cause, as the mere reflectors of popular 
opinion, only teaching men what they 
desire to be taught: in the Timzus 


those who have “πὸ need of Socrates,” 
i.e. no genuine impulse towards philo- 
sophy, “ may profit by the converse of 
Prodicus, or of other wise and Heayen- 
taught men :” and in the Gorgias (520), 
where Socrates asserts that it is diffi- 
cult to distinguish the Rhetor from the 


᾽ 


Sophist. 


| INTRODUCTION 


effort of generalization, to include in one notion persons 80 
different as Protagoras and Hippias, and still more to embrace 
the versatile activity of any of them in one description. This 
meant little else than to express in one formula the intellectual 
spirit of the age. Plato shews his consciousness of this diffi- 
culty, and at the same time finds an occasion for satire, by 
giving four distinct classifications, according to each of which 
the Sophist may be referred to a different genus, while even 
under the same genus it is not always clear to which of the 
lesser species he belongs. To begin with the most obvious — 
characteristic, all art having been first divided into acquisi- © 
tive and creative, the Sophist is seen to angle for rich young 
men, and is accordingly ranged with the angler under the 
art of hunting, or catching by guile, which is one of the two 
main branches of appropriation without consent: which was 
previously distinguished from acquisition by contract. This 
aspect of him is treated playfully. He is the congener of the 
angler, with whom he parts company when they reach the art 
of hunting live things—the Sophist turning to rich meadow- 
lands of youth, which are irrigated by rivers of wealth. There 
he pursues, not like other huntsmen a wild, but a tame quarry, 
(at least if man is tame): nor this, as kidnappers and warriors 
do, by force, but by persuasion. And he persuades, not hke 
the lawyers, in public, but in private: not like the lover, at his 
own expense, but for reward: and this, not like the flatterer’s 
reward, a bare maintenance from hand to mouth, but in the 
form of money. (218 c—223 Ὁ.) 

This last touch is made the basis of a new line of definition, 
starting from the other main branch of acquisition, viz. ex- 
change. According to this, the Sophist is a merchant of 
mental wares: which may be either taken at second-hand and 
exported from city to city, in which case the Sophist is an 
itinerant trader; or he may be a retail dealer, or a manu- 
facturer, in his own city. (223 c—224 e°.) 

Plato next fixes on a characteristic of a less trivial kind, to 
which he refers afterwards as the most essentially distinctive of 
those which have been put forward. The Sophist talks, as has 
been said, to men in private on a great variety of topics; but 
his conversations have one feature in common. They are con- 


¢ It is curious that paid teaching as re-admitted to Plato’s favour in the 
well as the “ Rhetoric of Nestor” are Laws. 





TO THE SOPHIST. li 


troversial. He is a controversialist and a teacher of the art 
of controversy. This brings him under the remaining branch 
of acquisition without consent, namely, forcible acquisition or 
contention: the art of open, as opposed to that of secret, appro- 
priation. Not that the Sophist is here viewed as acquiring know- 
ledge, but, as one engaged in preventing others from making 
good a position by argument, he is said to be concerned with 
acquisition (ef. p. 219 6: ᾿Επειδὴ δημιουργεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν τούτων, τὰ 
δὲ ὄντα καὶ γεγονότα τὰ μὲν χειροῦται λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι τὰ δὲ 
τοῖς χειρουμένοις οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει). He contends, then, not with 
bodily but mental force; not with long arguments, as in court, 
but through brief questions and replies: not on the infinity of 
details about which men wrangle, but on the general nature of 
the Just and Unjust, and of all other things: not, like some 
wearisome talkers, to the injury of his property, but (to note 
this point once more) to the increase of his gains. The So- 
phist’s procedure is here characterized as essentially abstract 
and negative: being distinguished by the former quality from 
ordinary converse, and by the latter from positive science and 
philosophy. (225 a—226 a.) It is not immediately apparent, 
however, how, under this description, the work of the Sophist is 
to be distinguished from the work of Socrates, except by the 
outward symptom that the one becomes rich by his trade and 
the other poor. And accordingly the two are brought into close 
companionship in the remarkable passage which follows. (226 b- 
231 a). Controversy is, or should be, an art of separating the 
false from the true, of determining what propositions are not 
tenable. And this amounts to a most valuable purification of 
the mind. For of separation there are two kinds, the sepa- 
ration of like from like and the purgation of the good from 
the evil: and of mental evils there are two kinds, that civil 
war of reason and passion which is the disease of the soul, and 
ignorance, or spiritual ugliness, which is either conscious or 
unconscious. Unconscious ignorance is the last stage of mental 
deformity. And it is from this that men are freed when they 
are asked questions about something which they think they 
know, and are thus purged from the obstructions of conceit, 
without which purgation no learning will do them any good. 
This process is no other than the Elenchus. Shall we attri- 
bute this to the Sophist? Plato stands in doubt. 
h 2 


lil INTRODUCTION 


We are thus led from observing a feature of the Sophist 
which any one might verify, to a theory of his end or function 
which is only temporarily admitted, and from which some- 
thing is at once detracted. Jor the value of his office, as a 
purifier of the mind, clearly depends in some measure on the 
reality of the arguments by which he convinces men of error. 
And these are presently shewn to be unreal. Yet Plato had 
a meaning in assigning to him this function even provisionally : 
and we have here perhaps the most striking appreciation of a 
contemporary phase of thought which is to be found in ancient 
philosophy. For it is the simple truth that Protagoras and 
Gorgias did imperfectly and unconsciously a part of the same 
work which Socrates did thoroughly and consciously: that 
their reasonings were to be valued chiefly for their negative 
results: that in breaking up the ground of old beliefs they 
did indispensable service as the pioneers of philosophy: and 
that this clearing of the way, by the application of a shrewd 
and fearless intellect to all matters sacred and profane, fami- 
liar and unfamiliar, and that chiefly in the way of question 
and denial, was a necessary step of progress, as it was cer- 
tainly the most widely-spread intellectual phenomenon of the 
generation which immediately preceded Socrates. The differ- 
ence between him and them, which is left unnoticed here 
though implied in what follows,—partly because the historical 
Socrates no longer exactly squared with Plato’s ideal,—is that 
the Sophist disputes as if he knew; Socrates asks questions 
as one desiring to know: the Sophist is contented with de- 
molishing an opponent’s theory, he is not conscious of any 
further aim; with Socrates each negative result is valued at 
once as a liberation of the mind from error, and as a forward 
step towards the positive apprehension of truth. This union 
or balance of the positive with the negative “arm,” it is 
Plato’s aim in this dialogue to vindicate and preserve. Thus 
the History of Philosophy, although not endorsing the assump- 
tion with which Plato sets out, that the common name Sophist 
must be significant of a common nature, confirms his estimate 
of the general tendency and common function of those to 
whom he assigns the name. 

Up to this point all is tentative and uncertain: and the 
definitions hitherto obtained are phenomenal merely. This is 














TO THE SOPHIST. 11] 


manifest from their number and variety. For of an object 
which is fully comprehended there is one adequate definition 
and only one. In order to come nearer to understanding the 
Sophist’s nature, we take up again the definition which appeared 
most suggestive, that which described his procedure as contro- 
versial. This art of controversy or disputation embraces all 
topics in heaven and earth. And those who admire the 
Sophist believe him to know all the things about which he 
disputes. This pretension refutes itself, for omniscience is not 
given to man. The essence of the Sophist is that he pretends 
to a knowledge which is unreal. Thus the disguises of our 
Proteus are stripped off, and we see him in his true colours, 
neither as a huntsman, nor as a merchant, nor as an intellectual 
wrestler, nor as a physician of the soul, but as the master of an 
art of illusion: a juggler, who imposes with the appearance of 
knowledge on inexperienced minds: just as the painter can pass 
off his shows for realities on the more thoughtless amongst 
young children. Hence he belongs to the multifarious class of 
imitators, or likeness-makers, and, not to dwell at present on 
the cardinal difficulty which this new notion involves, he is 
brought once more under a different summum genus. Hitherto, 
his race has been derived, by different lines, from the art of 
“ vetting,” his origin must now be referred to the art of 
“making,” all art having been at first divided into these two 
branches. ‘ Creation” is Divine and Human, and each of these 
again is divided according as the thing made is real or only a 
likeness of what is real. A dream, for instance, is a divinely- 
made likeness or illusion. A picture may be called a humanly- 
made dream. Of human likeness-making there are two kinds: 
one where the likeness is real, the other where the likeness is 
only apparent and relative to the individual who sees the like- 
ness. The Sophist’s arguments belong to this more shadowy or 
“phantastic” kind. And here he works not with instruments, 
but with his own person; not with knowledge of the things he 
imitates, namely, justice and virtue, but only having opinion 
respecting them: not innocently thinking that he knows them, 
but hiding a guilty consciousness of charlatanry. By pausing 
here we should include the public speaker, who is the counter- 
feit of the statesman as the Sophist is of-the philosopher. 
He, however, imposes on the public in lengthened addresses, 


liv INTRODUCTION 


whereas the Sophist’s business, as we have already said, is, by 
brief arguments, to compel individuals to contradict themselves. 
(281 c—236 a, 265 a—268.) The name is thus restricted to 
the dialectical as distinguished from the rhetorical aspect of the 
false use of the intellect. This is a distinction which Plato had 
not always observed: and in treating individual Sophists it 
was not easy to do so, for the two characters were often com- 
bined in the same person. Protagoras, for instance, as we learn 
from Plato’s dialogue of that name, professed himself to be 
equally a master of copiousness and brevity. And Socrates ob- 
serves in the Gorgias that Sophists and rhetoricians are mixed 
up together, and know not what to make of one another, nor 
do other men know what to make of them4. But Plato is here 
describing the ideal Sophist: and the function of fallacious 
scientific argument is ideally distinguishable from that of 
speaking so as to influence the feelings. The word 15, how- 
ever, allowed to regain the more extended application in Polit. 
291 b, 303 Ὁ: 

Σοφιστική is here characterized as a method, and is to philo- 
sophy what ἀντιλογική is to διαλεκτική, What disputation is to 
scientific inquiry. It is possible that while restricting the 
application of the term on one side, Plato here extends it on 
another beyond the limits of his own habitual use, so as to 
include some of his own brethren of the Socratic family. He 
perhaps indicates that the Eristic tendency, which was growing 
strong by this time amongst the pupils of Kuclides of Megara, 
was defective in some of the elements of a true philosophy. 
The reason for thinking that he means this is not merely the 
emphatic mention of the art of controversy, which Plato is fond 
of distinguishing from real inquiry®, but the direction of the 
whole dialogue against the extreme of Eleatic doctrine, on 
which we know that the Megarian logic was based. This 
hypothesis also accounts for the Sophist being identified with 
a picture of the cross-examining spirit, which, as Mr. Grote 


4 He tells Callicles afterwards (p. Rep. 5, 454 a—c; Phd. go ἢ, tore; 
520 a) that the Sophist is superior to Theet.164¢; Men.8o0e. In this enu- 
the Rhetor, as the lawgiver is to the meration the description of the young 
judge: i.e. the Sophist furnishes the  dialecticians in Phileb. 15 d 6, should 
Rhetor with ideas and arguments. uot be omitted: with which compare 

© The chief passages in which Plato also Rep. 7, 539 Ὁ. 
censures ἀντιλογική are the following: 














TO THE SOPHIST. ly 


observes, not only resembles Socrates, but resembles no one 
else. For the Megarians followed Socrates in refuting 
opinions: but departed from him by separating the negative 
process from the inductive aim, and, in directing their method 
to the resolution of phenomena, and the establishment by this 
means of an abstract being, or goodness, or thought, returned 
partially to the dogmatism of Zeno. 

There are a few detached points which it will be well to 
notice before we turn from this frame-work of satirical defini- 
tion to the larger and more dialectical portion of the dialogue. 

1. Though the Sophist is of course an artist anda man of 
science (for the definition proceeds through a classification 
of the sciences), yet the science of learning and knowing (76 
μαθηματικὸν---εἶδος ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν Kal TO τῆς γνωρίσεως) is the 
only heading of those introduced at first, viz.; 


(ποιητική----κτητική 








τς πράτ τ - ὙΠ μι 
μαθηματικὴ καὶ χρηματ- ἀγων- θηρευτ- 
γνωριστική LOTLKN LOTUKN ική); 


under which no attempt is made to bring him. This touch 
of satire can hardly be unintentional. 

2. The variety of definitions to which we are led by the 
process of dichotomies when applied to the Sophist, not only 
shews that his nature is difficult to grasp, but also proves the 
method to be one-sided and inadequate. The angler, an artist, 
by the way, who is known to Homer (Od. 4, 369), has easily 
a place assigned him, because the conception of his art, when 
analysed, is not found to contain elements which are imper- 
fectly known. But the activity of the Sophist is complex and 
various ; and when the principle, on which his other traits 
depend, is at last found, this leads the way to difficulties, 
which the process of mere logical distinction is powerless to 
resolve. And this for two reasons: because the difficulty lies 
in that notion of absolute difference on which the method itself 
rests; and because for the solution of the difficulty there is 
required the complementary notion of combination, commu- 
nion, correlation: which division cannot dispense with indeed 
(since the members of each division are unities and general 
forms), but throws into the background. δΔιακριτικὴ needs to 
be supplemented by συγκριτική : the διαλεκτικὸς only knows 


lvi INTRODUCTION 


when and how. Hence it is further necessary to examine how 
the two great categories of sameness and difference, on which 
this double process depends, are related to each other in their 
most abstract form f. 

3. The idea of purification, connected here with the Elen- 
chus, or negative dialectic, and in the Politicus with the banish- 
ment of offending members from the state (this being a political 
as the former was a mental purgation), though in both places 
illustrated from the art of medicine, probably originated in 
the mysteries and was derived by Plato from a Pythagorean 
source. Compare the καθαρμοί of Empedocles, and see pp. 
80-82 of the Phedo. It may be noticed that, in the Phedo, 
the notion of impurity is associated with all that is sensible 
and bodily, as contrasted with the ideal: in these dialogues 
the evils deprecated are falsehood in the mind and wickedness 
in the state, which are only mythically identified with the 
corporeal element, and purification is the separation of the evil 
from the good. 

4. The comprehension under one heading of the processes 
of dialectic, pharmacy, ablution, scouring, sweeping, and even 
clothes-brushing, gives rise to the remark that scientific method 
ignores all those distinctions of worth, respectability, triviality, 
and baseness, which rest on feeling and habit, and looks only 
on those resemblances and differences which are acknowledged 
by Reason. This may be compared with the saying of Parme- 
nides to the youthful Socrates, that when philosophy has taken 
hold of him as it will one day take hold, he will no longer have 
regard to the opinions of men, but will view all things, however 
vulgar or base, in the light of Universal Forms. On this point 
enough has perhaps been said in the notes. But there is some- 
thing extremely characteristic of the spirit of these dialogues, 
in the mixture of scientific calmness and ironical satisfaction 
with which the high things of this world are thus brought to 
the level of the meanest 8. 


is only partially applicable. 
g Compare the treatment of rhetoric 


f See the passage of the Politicus 
(285 d) where the argument from ex- 





ample is vindicated on the ground that 
the highest subjects have no analogies 
which are immediately palpable to 
sense. It is to such as these that 
classification, as a method of definition, 


Υ 


in the Gorgias as coordinate with cook- 
ing, and in the Huthydemus as a de- 
partment of magic (τῆς τῶν ἐπῴδων 
τέχνη"). 





TO THE SOPHIST. lvil 


5. The form of evil from which deliverance is effected by 
refutation deserves a passing notice, although the thought is 
one of the most familiar to readers of Plato: the greatest igno- 
rance, i.e. ignorance which the mind mistakes for knowledge. 
So the false statesmen are said to have the greatest ignorance 
of the greatest of all subjects, in that they are ignorant of 
statecraft, when they think they are most certainly informed 
of this, And in the analysis of the ridiculous, in the Philebus, 
the same bad eminence is given to the conceit of knowledgei. 
(See also Legg. g, 863 ¢.) Yet in the conclusion of this 
dialogue it would seem as though unconscious ignorance were 
the less culpable ; for the Sophist is defined as having a guilty 
suspicion that all is not right within. The inconsistency of 
these two views does not seem to be noticed by Plato, who 
would probably, however, have said, if he had been taxed with 
it, ‘ that he meant by conscious ignorance, the ignorance of one 
desirous to know.’ 

Still, the notion of a state of ignorance acquiesced in, not- 
withstanding a suspicion that it exists, is hardly reconcileable 
with the Socratic principle, which is here made the ground 
of the Socratic cross-examination, that no soul is willingly 
ignorant of anything. 

The more practical view, which is turned to the disadvantage 
of the Sophist as an “ironical mimic,” belongs to the later 
phase of Platonism. See the passage in the ninth book of the 
Laws, already quoted, where an attempt is made to reconcile 
the theory that injustice is never voluntary, with legislation 
for the exemption from punishment of involuntary crime. 

6. Plato’s later manner may also be detected in the grave 
digression, suggested by the logical distinction of the Art of 
Making into Divine and human, in which it is solemnly 
asserted that the world was made by God in accordance with 
Reason, and not by the spontaneous working of Nature or 
Chance. The tune of this passage closely resembles that of 
the tenth book of the Laws: where the persuasive demon- 
stration, the λόγος μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας here spoken of, is 
applied to an imaginary case. The strong reprobation in 
which the opposite view is held, and the moral and religious 
fervour with which the answer of Theztetus is received, are 

h Polit. 302 a. i Phileb. 48 e. k Laws, 861-864. 
i 


ἵν 1] INTRODUCTION 


in keeping with the impressive solemnity and earnestness of 
Plato’s latest writings. (See especially Legg. 10, 889.) 

II, In defining the Sophist as an illusory controversialist, 
we seem to have caught him in our net; but we only seem to 
have caught him: for by his controversial art he will prove 
that our net is non-existent, and as we are allowed no weapons 
but arguments, to be refuted is to fail. However shameless 
it may appear for a controversialist, who is daily detecting 
falsehood, to say that falsehood is impossible, he will use this 
argument in self-defence, and we must meet his logie with a 
higher logic or give up the battle. Our object will not merely 
be to refute him, for that would be after all only a controver- 
sial victory like his, but to throw fresh light upon the whole 
question which his art confuses,—that of the nature and cor- 
relation of the affirmative and negative elements in thought, 
or, according to the more objective mode of conception which 
Plato still preserves, of Being and Not-Being. 

Thus we are led at once to the most abstract form of the 
inquiry, the nature of the negative idea; even the relation of 
this idea to a subject being through the greater part of the 
discussion left out of view. The Sophist 15 accused of making 
a false impression. But to speak of false impressions is to assert 
an existence which is in the same breath denied—to predicate 
reality of the unreal. Is this possible? That depends on the 
meaning of the word not, and of the word eaistence, and their 
relation to each other. This question has a double bearing on 
the Sophist, of whose definition we are in search. If it is 
proved that this combination of existence and non-existence is 
possible, he exists, but his foundation is insecure, for his con- 
troversial art is based on the absolute mutual exclusion of these 
alternatives. If on the other hand his art is sound, he escapes 
refutation, but only by proving his own non-existence. There 
is hardly to be mistaken in the dialogue this twofold refer- 
ence, which is not a little perplexing to the modern reader, 
a reference on the one hand to the problem of the existence 
of phenomena, one of the deepest of all to Plato, and, on the 
other, to the oppositions of false science, that “last decom- 
position of the reason, which consisted in separating everything 
from all things!’ Yet both this error and that difficulty 


1 Soph. 259 e. 








TO THE SOPHIST. lix 


are included in the sweeping generalization of the μὴ ov, and 
both are met by the new formula of the Relativity of Negative 
Expressions. This has also a bearing, as Plato did not fail 
to discover, on the method of logical divisions. Diwresis 
cannot be safely used apart from Synagégée. Classes mutually 
exclusive are still to be viewed in their relations to each other. 
The mind must not be dazzled by difference, so as to overlook 
resemblance, nor by resemblance, so as to neglect true differ- 
ences. By a resuscitation of the Heraclitean principle in the 
world of mind, it is again found that the objects of thought are 
held asunder and together at once (διαφερόμενον ἀεὶ συμφέ- 
pera). And thus the notion of Being is not less modified than 
the notions of Appearance and the Negation of Being. For 
Being can be no longer held as a mere Absolute, but stands 
related to Not-Being, which it differs from, and yet includes. 
Here also it appears to the modern reader as if conceptions, 
which are to him radically distinct, are blended, not to say 
confused. For Being seems to be conceived at once logically, 
as the positive in thought and speech, and metaphysically, as 
an ‘‘hypostatized” idea. 

But in order to enter into Plato’s meaning, it is necessary to 
study his position in this dialogue, as he has in some measure 
enabled us to do, historically. 

The fallacies which we find satirized in the Euthydemus are 
chiefly of two kinds; in one of which all resemblance or analogy 
is supposed to imply identity and to exclude the notion of 
difference, while in the other all difference is conceived as 
absolute difference, exclusive of all resemblance and relation: 
‘If I know one thing, I know all things, for I cannot know 
and not know ;’ ‘If Zeus is my God, he is mine to do what I 
please with him;’ ‘That which is different from the idea of 
beauty cannot be beautiful, and so on. And thus all propo- 
sitions except identical propositions are declared impossible, a 
theory which Aristotle imputes to the followers of Antisthenes. 
Another paradox, which is likewise attributed to the Cynic, 
appears in the same dialogue,— the impossibility of negative 
argument (μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν). The above is a humorous 
picture of the same notions with which Plato deals seriously in 
the present dialogue. That the same cannot be different, nor 
the different the same; that predication is impossible, that is, 

12 


Ix INTRODUCTION 


there can be no relation between different ideas; above all, 
that falsehood cannot be disproved, for that to deny existence, 
while naming existence, involves a contradiction in terms,— 
these are in substance the very theories which Plato here 
undertakes to modify. Now in accounting for these aberra- 
tions of thought, to say that the Organon did not yet exist, is 
to state what, though true and important to remember, does 
not afford a sufficient explanation—daAnlés μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές. 
It is true that in the shape in which they then appeared, 
they could have no strength now. But their strength then 
lay in a mode of thought, which prevailed very extensively 
in that age, and which had exercised a more powerful 
influence over Plato himself than any other except that of 
Socrates; a mode of thought derived in great part uncon- 
sciously from the philosophy of Parmenides and the dialectic 
of Zeno: the same which appears in such assumptions (familiar 
to the student of the Theetetus) as that Socrates ill is a 
different man from Socrates well (Thext. 159 b), and that 
everything must be either known or not known by the mind 
(Ib. 188 a). This may be described as the tendency to view 
every subject in the light of abstract alternatives: to apply 
the language of logic immediately to the sensible world: to 
reject as matter of fact that which cannot at once be formu- 
lated as an idea. This “disease,” as we can imagine him to 
have called it, Plato here traces to its origin in the teaching 
of Parmenides, and thus redeems the promise made by 
Socrates in the Theeetetus, there not fulfilled, to examine the 
deep wisdom of this man: the greatest of those who uphold 
the indissoluble unity of Being. (Thezt. 183 e.) In doing so, 
he not only confutes others who had pushed the tendency in 
question to an extreme, (he rather uses them as a beacon to 
indicate where the truth does not lie,) but, what is of more 
importance, develops further, or at least defines more clearly, 
his own central point of view. or he also had yielded to the 
charm of “the Eleatic Palamedes” and had held Parmenides 
“in reverence and awe:” nor had the dominance of this idea 
been merely logical, but had amounted to a speculative convic- 
tion, may we not even say, a theological belief? 

We cannot tell whether this impression had at all been 
derived from Socrates, whom he has represented as meeting 








TO THE SOPHIST. Ix 


with the philosopher in early youth. Socrates may have 
spoken of Parmenides, as he did of Heraclitus, though his 
own work in philosophy was independent of all influence from 
without. At all events it is quite possible that even during 
the time of his converse with Socrates, Plato may haye been 
attracted towards the Eleatic School. His master’s influence 
was unobtrusive, not hindering the accretion of ideas from all 
sides, and only after his death would be found to “ comprehend 
all other.” It was probably at a still earlier time that Plato’s 
interest and curiosity was excited by the fine discourses and 
immense popularity of Protagoras and Gorgias; and it is 
certain, on the authority of Aristotle, that his first deep draught 
of philosophy had been received from Cratylus, who taught 
him the Heraclitean doctrine that “all was motion.” This 
theory, as then held by the enthusiasts of Ephesus, whom 
Plato has satirized, was the secondary and less noble phase of 
a great thought—that all which abides eternally is a universal 
eyer-active Law of Becoming. Heraclitus was no materialist. 
“‘ Matter” had no existence for him, and he denied the separate 
existence of all “ Form” except the Highest Law, whose Per- 
manence is Perpetual Energy. In the hands of his followers, 
however, the assertion of this universal law seems to have 
degenerated into a mere doctrine of the relativity of particular 
being. And here the Eastern theorists were met by Zeno, 
who in support of the Eleatic faith in One Sole Being, proved 
that all relative existence was self-contradictory and inconceiy- 
able by Reason. Time and Motion, into which the sensible 
universe had already been resolved, were themselves annihi- 
lated. The movement of the intellect, by which this defensive 
negative process was effected, was the first conscious dialectic, 
the germ of much in Plato and of more in Aristotle, and, in 
conjunction with the Socratic Elenchus, the direct parent of 
the method which in this dialogue, and somewhat differently 
in the Parmenides, is turned against the hypothesis of the 
simple absoluteness of Bemg™. But however important logi- 
eally, the philosophy of Zeno, like that of Cratylus, while more 
definite, was also narrower than that of his master. He had 

m The Zenoniau method is “ parri- ἐστιν" ef καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἂν- 


cidally”’ turned against the Eleatic θρώπῳ' εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀνερμήνευτον 
doctrine in the thesis of Gorgias: οὐδέν καὶ ἀδιεξήγητον τοῖς πέλας. 


Ix INTRODUCTION 


descended from metaphysics to logic, and in endeavouring 
to hold the Absolute against all comers had assumed an atti- 
tude which was purely negative, and had adopted a method 
which, though of great significance, was merely abstract, and 
not directly applicable to the solution of any real problem. 

Plato, however, had “ risen to the height of the great argu- 
ment,” and had felt, not only the dialectical might of Zeno, 
but the transcendental sublimity of Parmenides. It is possible 
that he may have derived some of his own most famous 
imagery from the opening lines of the poem on the Nature of 
Things, where the philosophic impulse is represented as a car 
drawn by swift steeds, and the philosopher as the comrade 
of immortal charioteers. Be that as it may, a modern reader 
can hardly imagine the effect which the impressive lines of 
Parmenides must have produced on the mind of Plato, when 
already convinced by Cratylus of the utter changeableness of 
“all that seems.” Something analagous may have been ex- 
perienced by individual students of Spinoza, Kant, or Hegel ; 
but philosophical belief in modern times presents for the most 
part but a faint image of the heaven of contemplation into 
which Plato must have been carried away on hearing reiterated 
with the eloquence of energetic faith, and proved as a neces- 
sary truth of Reason, the absolute Existence of One Being, 
inseparable from thought, equable, unchangeable, without 
beginning and without end, with no past or future, but an 
everlasting Now; however apparently discrete, yet really con- 
tinuous or omnipresent, so that differences of space are done 
away as completely as differences of time; whence phenomenal 
distinctions of all kinds, relation, change, beginning, ending, 
time, space, motion, are thrust out of sight or are seen to 
vanish away. 

This intellectual movement, by which we suppose Plato to 
have been affected, was confirmed, but also gradually modified, 
by his contemplation of the work of Socrates. In reflecting 
on the manner and substance of that wonderful endless talk, 
and on the ruling motive of that unswerving life, he saw the 
elements of all previous speculation brought into antagonism 
and yet into immediate relation with the common thoughts and 
common life of men,—to whose mental and political state the 
issue of that antagonism had given a deep and bitter interest. 





7 


1 








TO THE SOPHIST. Ixiil 


Before the cross-questioning of Socrates, which brought men 
to know the vanity of their own knowledge, the most fixed 
opinions were seen first to waver, and then to disappear. This 
Plato associated with the changeableness of phenomena ac- 
cording to Heraclitus; which viewed subjectively becomes the 
relativeness of sense, according to the doctrines of Protagoras 
and Aristippus: a relativeness which at the touch of negative 
dialectic, such as that of Zeno, is reduced to nothingness. 

But the result of the method of Socrates was not merely 
negative. His aim was to define, that is, to lay bare the one 
conception which belongs universally and unalterably to each 
subject of inquiry. In such a conception, if it were found, his 
mind would gladly rest. This is well expressed by Aristotle, 
who says that Socrates was the first who checked the aimless 
eareer of thought, and fixed the mind on Definition: πρώτου 
περὶ ὁρισμοὺς ἐπιστήσαντος τὴν διάνοιαν. Now there is here 
implied a new and independent assertion of the Absolute; for 
the endeavour of Socrates had no meaning, if the “ Know- 
ledge” which he sought were less than the knowledge of that 
which is always and everywhere true; if the ignorance of which 
he accused himself and convinced others, were ignorance only 
of the relative, the transient, or the phenomenal. But this 
Absolute of Socrates differs from that of Parmenides in two 
important respects. 

1. The Substance or Reality of which he speaks is not 
asserted as if known, but sought for as still unknown. The 
Existence of Being, which Parmenides asserted with so much 
vehemence, is taken for granted, and the mind is called away 
from the absorbing contemplation of this truth to the consi- 
deration of a new problem, which may be thus stated gene- 
rally : “ What is Being? or What is the form of Bemg?” The 
change of mental attitude expressed in these few words,—from 
asserting ‘ Being is” to asking “ What is Being?” is of the 
highest importance; for without the consciousness which is 
here evolved, that knowledge is a synthesis of a less general 
with a more general notion, the growth of science would have 
been arrested. Philosophers would have been contented with 
either assigning universality to some particular thing, or, like 
the Eleatics, excluding the particular from cognition. 

2. Further, he did not ask the question in this merely 


Ixiv INTRODUCTION 


abstract form: he implied an absolute standard of truth and 
good; but, as the word ‘‘ good” reminds us, his inquiries had 
an immediate bearing on the life of men. Hence, instead of 
attempting at once to solve the problem, “ What is Being ?” 
he sought to determine “ What is righteous, what is un- 
righteous, what is a state, what is the true statesman, what 
is government, what is it to be fit to govern?’ The solution 
of these problems was approached by what Bacon would have 
called a process of exclusions, through a series of hypotheses, 
which were successively modified or relinquished when in some 
case not found to apply to the subject of definition. And while 
things commonly confused were thus distinguished, things 
commonly distinguished (e.g. folly and madness) were not less 
unexpectedly combined. 

3. The personal attributes of Socrates enhanced this union of 
the universal with the particular, and of the abstract with the 
concrete, in his method of talk. The eye that was fixed on 
the unchangeableness of truth and right, was the same which 
pierced through and through the follies of his contemporaries ; 
the lofty soul had a cynical exterior, the widest generalizations 
were hidden beneath the meanest instances, the imperturbable, 
urbane, ironical demeanour, helped to bring the dry light of 
reason into continual, immediate contact with the ifinite 
anomalies of opinion and action; the strange being, unlike 
all other men, had a direct, unmistakeable influence on almost 
all. By contrast with him the hollowness of all pretence, espe- 
cially in other teachers, was clearly seen, while his example 
gave the appearance of meanness to those who taught for pay. 
Yet he was the first to admit their individual excellences and 
accomplishments; while in conversation with him their real 
characteristics, their strength as well as their weakness, were 
most truly manifested. 

Thus with Socrates began a philosophic movement which 
in some elements was kindred to the Eleatic, but radically 
different in others ;—kindred, because vindicating by the refu- 
tation of falsehood an ideal truth; different, because inductive 
in method, and practical as well as speculative in ultimate aim 
—identifying truth with good. 

But in continuing and interpreting this movement, Plato at 
first dwelt consciously rather on the former than the latter 














TO THE SOPHIST. Ixv 


aspect of Socratic thought; rather on the absolute contrast 
between the actual state of human opinion and the ideal of 
Knowledge, than on the nature of Knowledge as implying a 
relation of the mind to “ Being,” or of the Universal to the 
Particular. This, as may be gathered indirectly from this dia- 
logue, was partly due to the prevalence of the Eleatic impulse 
—the conviction, namely, of the incommunicable perfection of 
abstract Being, the sole object of Knowledge or true thought: 
but partly also to the general law by which belief always 
precedes criticism. The problem of the post-Socratic philo- 
sophy for those who did not hold with Antisthenes that Defi- 
nition was merely nominal, was, granting the possibility of 
Knowledge and the existence of general forms, 1. What is 
Knowledge? 2. What are the εἴδη And, from the objective 
character of the Greek philosophy, the first of these two ques- 
tions was chiefly, although not wholly, studied in the light of 
the second. In other words, the effort of Socrates was to find 
the εἶδος of man, justice, temperance, &c.; that of his followers 
was to find the nature of the εἶδος generally. But, just as the 
Existence of Being was asserted, before any one thought of 
asking, What is Being? so, in entering on this new stage of 
thought, Plato believes in Knowledge and the Ideas before he 
examines them, and his dialectic is for a time coloured with a 
haze of imagination. He is at first contented with declaring 
that Knowledge is the only real ground of virtue, and that 
accordingly all virtue is essentially one. Presently a question 
rises about the Origin of Knowledge—How can Knowledge 
have a beginning? For how can a man inquire into what he 
does not know? How are we to conceive the transition from 
ignorance to certainty? This question is answered, as Plato 
elsewhere answers questions which are not ripe for solution, 
mythically. We learn by recollection, as appears from the 
lessons of geometry where the teacher leads the pupil to draw 
forth from his own mind what the moment previously he did 
not know. Thus the “ Eristic” objection is removed, that a 
man cannot inquire about either what he knows or what he 
does not know: and the anticipation of poetry and prophecy, 
that we are immortal beings, is confirmed. To learn is to 
awaken slumbering knowledge. ‘The Soul has been every- 
where and has seen all things, and therefore must have known 
k 


Ixvi INTRODUCTION 


all things before coming hither: and if she can recover one 
thing only, there is hope that she may by courageous efforts 
regain the rest.” (Men. 81.) By this hypothesis the true 
objects of knowledge are relegated to another world than this 
and to a previous life. The objects of sense remind us of them 
through a process of association. (Phedo.) These Eternal 
Forms the Soul beheld in her first flight, ere she lost her 
wings, when the impulse of the higher love carried her amongst 
immortal chariots, beyond the visible sphere, into the plain 
of truth, where Beauty, Justice, Temperance, Wisdom, dwell 
eternally, not as they are imagined but as they are known. 
(Pheedr.) 

This is the poetical mode of conceiving of the ideas, in 
which Plato embodied the feelings of wonder and delight with 
which he contemplated the first real inquiry which the world 
had seen. The object and end of that inquiry appeared to 
him surrounded with a mystic halo,—like his own image of 
Beauty, lightening from a transcendent height,—annihilating 
and making worthless the shadows which surround us here. 

But Plato was far from resting in this as a final theory 
of Knowledge. His belief in immortality and pre-existence 
remained, it is true; but did not supersede other inquiries con- 
cerning the ideas, which were wholly independent of such a 
theory, and proceeded simply by experience and reflection. 
Thus in the Republic, the vision of the ideas in their purity, 
without help from sense, is the goal towards which the mind is 
allowed to climb up the ladder of hypotheses, and although we 
hear of an intellectual region, the context shews this language 
to be metaphorical, rather than mythological as in the Phedrus 
and Phedon. The line is still drawn sharply and broadly be- 
tween Being as the object of knowledge and Not-Being as the 
object of ignorance; but, first, an intermediate state, having for 
object the changeable, which is and is not, is crudely imagined, 
and, at a later period of the discussion (bk. vii.), the succes- 
sive steps by which the mind rises from the lowest ignorance - 
to the highest knowledge are supplied. No mention is made 
of recollection, unless we count as such the mythical account of 
Lethe in bk. x.; and immediately after the allegory of the cave, 
in which the sensible has been represented as the copy of the 
ideal world, we have a piece of psychological analysis, in which 














TO THE SOPHIST. Ixvil 


the idea is spoken of as the universal element evolved by 
Reason from the impressions of Sense. ‘ Intelligence is called 
in to determine between the contrarieties of sense. I see two 
fingers, one large the other small. Sight gives me opposite im- 
pressions respecting objects which are alike. But sight cannot 
answer the questions which the mind cannot but ask hereupon. 
Is this puzzling impression one, or two? If two, then each is 
one, and soon. Thus intelligence distinguishes between great 
and small, which in the sensation of vision were confused. 
And then only are we induced to ask the question which 
reason suggests, ‘ What is the nature of greatness and small- 
ness?’ The ideas thus distinguished are objects of Reason, 
the former confused impression was received through sight.” 
(Vil. 524.) 

Such a relation between intelligence and sensation is ac- 
knowledged even in the Phedrus, in the midst of the mythical 
description of the Plain of Truth: Δεῖ yap ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι 
Kar εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἕν λογισμῷ 
ξυναιρούμενον : though it is immediately added, “ Now this is 
recollection of what the mind has seen in a previous state.” 

In both these passages the mind is seen to approach the εἴδη 
through reflection on the experience of sense. The same notion 
is still more clearly expressed in the Theztetus (184, 5): “ We 
speak commonly of seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, 
and so forth: but in truth it is with the mind that we see and 
hear, and feel and taste, and smell. The mind receives these 
particular impressions through the organs of the different senses. 
(Cf. Phileb. 33 ¢c.) But there are some things which the mind 
perceives without any such corporeal aid. These are not par- 
ticular but universal. For instance, the mind receives through 
touch an impression of softness from a soft thing, of hardness 
from a hard thing. But when the mind says this zs hard, a 
new element arises, viz. the Being of the hardness, which is 
perceived, not through any of the senses, but by the mind 
alone, and the Idea of hardness is then first perceived. Fur- 
ther, that hardness and softness are opposed and that the 
opposition between them is real, these and the like thoughts 
the mind herself determines, when she reviews and compares 
the impressions which she has received through the senses.” 
The idea, then, in this, which may be termed the psychological 

ka 


Ixvill INTRODUCTION 


aspect, is that unity which the mind seeks amidst the variety of 
sensible impressions, distinguishing what is confused in sense, 
and uniting scattered phenomena in one conception: the uni- 
versal element, which is latent in the mind’s first impression 
of each object, and is disengaged by reflection to be contem- 
plated by reason. The right performance of this process is 
the secret of method: “to unite and divide in thought accord- 
ing to natural forms, that is, according to the reality of things, 
not mangling the victims like a bad sacrificer.” (Phzedr. 265 e.) 
It is in connection with this logical or dialectical process that 
the word εἶδος is most frequently used by Plato. 

The ideas are now seen as objects of intelligence, which 
remain unchanged, while the sensations through which the 
mind is awakened to perceive them are perpetually giving 
place to new and perhaps opposite impressions. (See Cratyl. 
440.) Each is separated from the phenomena through which 
it was at first recognized, in an isolation hike that of the Eleatic 
Being, as the absolute in which the relative is done away: the 
ἀνυπόθετον, independent of external support; the universal 
absorbing the particular. But here several difficulties arise. 

1. How is the absoluteness of Knowledge reconcileable with 
the possibility of error? For if everything is either known or 
unknown, how can that which is unknown be in any way the 
object of belief? Hence the hypothesis in Rep. bk. ν. of “that 
which is and is not” as the object of opinion, and the elaborate 
ἀπορίαι of the Theztetus, where it is attempted to account for 
error by imagining thought as a process between sensation 
and memory, or between memory and memory. A nearly 
parallel difficulty is put in the Parmenides. If there is no 
relation between the perfect and the imperfect, man cannot 
know the ideas, nor can the divine mind be cognizant of human 
thoughts. 

2. How can the umversal be absolute and yet embrace par- 
ticulars? This or a cognate difficulty is raised in the Thex- 
tetus, where it is found impossible to distinguish the whole 
from the sum of the parts: the same ἀπορία is explicitly stated 
in the Philebus, where it is asked, how can One exist in many 
and yet be One?—and in the Parmenides, through the illus- 
tration of the sail, which covers many men, but covers each 
only by a part of itself. The notion of μέθεξις, which Socrates 








TO THE SOPHIST. 


lx1x 


introduces in the Parmenides, only creates new difficulties, but 
something approaching a rational solution appears in the 
Philebus, where Number is seen to mediate between Unity 
and Infinity. 

3. Granting the existence of abstract ideas of resemblance, 
difference, justice, beauty, good; shall we say that the idea of 
man, or fire, or water, or, still more, of mud, dirt, hair, exist 
absolutely” ? (Parm.) 

4. Must not ideas be related to one another? For is not 
dialectic, and even language, a movement or process between 
ideas? Nay, if the idea is the cause of phenomena, must 
there not be a principle of life or movement inherent in each 
idea? In the Republic, for example, the operations of science 
are conceived as a movement along the chain of true ideas, a 
way upwards and downwards which is the same. And at the 
head of this nexus of εἴδη is the form of Good, which in some 
way unexplained is the cause of Being and of Knowledge. In 
the Philebus also there is imagined a process between the limit 
and the unlimited, the one and the many, and a cause of this 
process is supposed. And in the Timeeus the Creator prepares 
for his work by welding together opposite ideas. ‘Thus the 
Sophist and Parmenides are not the sole response in Plato to 
the challenge of Socrates, “I should admire any man who 
could shew that Resemblance, Difference, Plurality, Unity, 
Motion, Rest, admitted of composition and division (ἐν ἑαυτοῖς 
ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι... τὴν αὐτὴν 
ταύτην ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην ... 
ἐπιδεῖξαι. Parm. 129 e). 

5. If the idea, as Socrates urges when pressed by Par- 
menides (Ib. 132 b), is a conception of the mind, yet that con- 
ception must have an object, and Knowledge is in some way a 
process between subject and object®, in which, if the mind is 
active, the object of Knowledge must be conceived as passive. 
In this way also the Eternal Form is brought back from the 


n When Plato makes Parmenides ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει 





remark on this, “ Philosophy has ποῦ 
yet acquired her final hold on you,” 
he is perhaps covertly satirizing the 
thoroughness of the Megarian logic. 

° See Rep. 6, 490 b. Πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν 


ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου" προσ- 
U \ ~ Ἀπ U Ν \ 

ἥκει δὲ ξυγγενεῖ ᾧ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεὶς 
τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλή- 
θειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ τρέ- 
φοιτο. καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δ᾽ οὔ. 


Ιχχ INTRODUCTION 


fruitless isolation in which it has been placed by the first 
efforts of purely abstract thought; and the reflection rises that 
Perfect Being must include the attributes of consciousness and 
life, and therefore, in a certain sense, of motion. (Soph. 248.) 
The difficulties which attend the hypothesis of the ideas are 
at least as clearly stated by Plato as by Aristotle: and his 
statements have also the advantage of being directed against 
the phase of the doctrine which he knew and to which he had 
been himself inclined, and not to the confused Pythagorean 
fancies of his followers. The question is most clearly enun- 
ciited in the Theztetus from the side of Knowledge, and in 
the Parmenides from the side of Being. But those who re- 
member the various fertility of Plato’s mind will not expect 
the objections raised in different dialogues to be precisely the 
same. He never sought to bind the play of thought in a 
single formula. When it had once occurred to him to criticize 
the theory of ideas, the problem was sure to be seen by him 
in changing lights, although the elements of the question 
remain essentially unaltered. Is each idea one or many, at 
rest or in motion, isolated or related to others, limiting or 
limited; is Being inanimate or endowed with life, exclusive 
of particulars, or how related to them? Is it possible wholly 
to separate Knowledge from sense and opinion? These, if not 
the same question, form a class of questions, of the reality of 
which Plato is conscious in some dialogues, but appears wholly 
unconscious in others (for instance in the Pheedo and Cratylus). 
The dialogues, besides the Sophist and Politicus, in which the 
effect of this movement within Platonism in the mind of its 
founder are most evident, are the Philebus, Timzeus, and Laws. 
In the Philebus, not only is the difficulty stated at the outset, 
in the form of the problem how to reconcile the antithesis 
between the one and many, but the combination and resolu- 
tion of ideas is elaborately exemplified, and a Cause of their 
combination in reality is conceived. The earlier part of the 
Timzeus contains a similar passage, and in both the author has 
laboured to imagine the mode in which the ideal and corporeal 
are conjoined. Both anticipate Aristotle in speaking of matter 
(ἄπειρον, τιθήνη), and of a cause by which form is impressed 
on matter. The Philebus has also a graduated scale of Know- 
ledges, in which the knowledge of the particular and concrete, 








TO THE SOPHIST. Ixxi 


although regarded as “impure,” is deliberately allowed to 
have a place. And in the Laws, while the εἴδη are not heard 
of except as logical forms, and a higher movement (namely 
that of mind) is imagined as the cause both of rest and motion 
(το, 895), Plato is vehement in asserting that mind in ad its 
manifestations is prior to the elements and controls them. 

The object of the preceding remarks has been to shew (1) 
That side by side with the poetical or metaphysical there grew 
up in Plato’s mind a logical mode of conceiving the ideas ; 
(2) That as he viewed them in this two-fold aspect, and saw 
the latter of the two more clearly, he became conscious of the 
difficulties which the theory involved; and (3) That he was 
led, partly through the consideration of these difficulties, to 
alter considerably his theory of Knowledge and Being: pass- 
ing from the bare assertion of an absolute object of Mind, to 
which he had been led by interpreting Socrates through 
Parmenides, towards the Aristotelian conception of logical 
categories and of Being as composed of Matter and Form by 
an efficient Cause. 

Turning now to the Sophist, from which we have been too 
long detained, we find the elaborate treatment of a difficulty, 
which is allowed to have been occasioned by the exclusiveness 
of the Eleatic point of view. This difficulty is not, as in the 
Philebus, how to find a meeting-point between unity and in- 
finity, but one more abstract still, how to explain the possibility 
of combining the positive and negative in thought. Philosophy 
by aspiring to the pure form of Being had become “dark 
from excess of light;” had soared beyond the ken of mortals 
into an unseen heaven; and in “turning away her mind” from 
that which is not—from the unreal, and therefore from nega- 
tion—had deprived herself of the only weapon which could be 
of any avail to her against the spurious counterfeits of herself. 
She must deny as well as affirm, and she cannot deny without 
giving a certain place to Not-Being. It has been already said, 
that the Negative is here viewed in its ultimate abstraction. 
The distinctions of Aristotle, between ψεῦδος, στέρησις, and 
δύναμις or κατὰ συμβεβηκός, which he employed in criticizing 
Plato, are certainly not thought of, but neither were they 
required, at least in the statement of the question. For false- 
hood is the object or correlative of denial, and both are equally 


Ixxil INTRODUCTION 


expressed whenever the word “ not” is uttered: and negation 


> 


“per accidens” must obviously be explained through the 
theory of simple negation. The question is, does this word 
“not” imply such absolute severance between the terms which 
it divides, as to exclude the possibility of any relation between 
them? If A is exclusive of B, is B therefore incapable of all 
communion or combination with A? If so, a counterfeit of 
reality is inconceivable, for it is not reality, and yet partakes 
of reality in so far as it is really a counterfeit. This question 
is raised not with respect to individuals, or infime species, in 
which the coexistence of sameness and difference was an ad- 
mitted fact (Phil. 15 d), but with respect to general ideas, and 
the most universal of these, beginning with the most compre- 
hensive of all ideas, viz. that of Being. The “absolute sever- 
ance,’ which the injunction of Parmenides requires, between 
that which Is, and that which Is Not, was the origin and type 
of the spirit “which would separate each thing from every 
other” (Soph. 259 e); and the correction of this deeply-rooted 
tendency was necessary in order to make inquiry possible. 

After a statement of the perplexities in which the notion of 
Not-Being is involved according to the ordinary conception 
of it as the opposite of Being, shewing that it is inconceivable 
either as a predicate or as a subject, or as the object of refuta- 
tion and denial; the Stranger expresses his intention, in this 
desperate case, of attacking the revered authority of Par- 
menides. This opens the whole question of the Nature of 
Being, and the theories of previous and contemporary philoso- 
phers on the subject. And in the course of the inquiry it is 
found that the notion of Being, according to prevailing views, 
is no less full of contradictions than that of Not-Being. 
Amongst the earlier thinkers, those who hold a fixed plurality 
of Beings must admit that existence is common to all these, 
and hence whatever number they assert must either be in- 
creased, or reduced to one. Those who, with Parmenides, 
believe in the Unity of Being, will find it hard to keep this 
unity inviolate while they use the terms Being, One, Whole, 
each with a distinct meaning, and while they admit, as they 
needs must, that a whole has parts. 

These difficulties are only briefly indicated: the chief criti- 
cism of Parmenides, or rather the modification of his view, 




















TO THE SOPHIST. Ixxitl 


which has been promised above, is made indirectly, and only 
emerges when the contemporary phase of Greek philosophy 
has been examined in its two chief aspects. 

Here no attempt is made to determine the exact number of 
Beings. The battle rages about a different point. Is Being 
corporeal or ideal? Some hold that nothing exists but bodies, 
which they can touch and handle: their opponents break up 
these bodies by dialectic into a flux of change, and assert the 
sole existence of certain bodiless ideas. 

Now the former, if pressed, and if they were capable of 
argument, would admit the existence of a soul, and of virtue 
and vice as attributes of the soul; and, though they might 
contend that the soul is corporeal, they could hardly maintain 
this of justice or wisdom. Hence they may be willing to sub- 
stitute for body as the characteristic of Being, the power of 
acting or of being acted upon. Being is possibility of energy. 

But the idealists will refuse this definition. Acting and 
suffering they say are properties not of Being, but of Becom- 
ing: for Being is exempt from change. Whereupon we ask 
them whether to know is an active, and to be known a passive 
verb; and whether Being therefore, so far as known, is not 
acted upon? And here, apart from logic, the reflection rises, 
that Perfect Being cannot be devoid of life and movement, and 
the power of thought. That which has thought has life, that 
which has life has a soul, and that which has a soul cannot be 
motionless. And yet it is most true that reason could not 
exist nor come into being without uniformity and permanence, 
which imply a principle of rest in the object of reason. Being 
therefore has both Motion and Rest. But Being is neither 
Motion nor Rest. We are in the position of the dualists whom 
we compelled to admit a third principle. Motion and Rest are 
opposites, yet both exist. Being therefore comprehends both, . 
and is different from both, and though essentially partaking 
both of motion and rest, in its own nature neither rests nor 
moves. In solving this apparent contradiction, we stumble on 
the solution of the original problem of the reconciliation of 
Being and Not-Being. As we endeavour to harmonize the dis- 
cords which have arisen within the sphere of Being, we are led 
to modify our notion of the mutual exclusiveness of Being and 
that which had been hitherto regarded as the opposite of Being. 


| 


Ixxiv INTRODUCTION 


Before proceeding with the argument, we may glance at one 
or two points in the interesting passage which has just been 
analyzed. (Soph. 246-250.) 

Under the titles of the Earth-born and the Friends of Ideas 
does Plato allude to any particular schools, and, if so, to which 
of those existing round him ? 

It is difficult to bring either description into exact harmony 
with the tenets of any single school. The γηγενεῖς would 
at first sight appear to be the same who are mentioned in 
the Theztetus as “stubborn and repellent” men, but are 
there emphatically, though somewhat ironically, distinguished 
from the “disciples of Protagoras:” whereas here the ἀλήθεια 
of Protagoras appears to be brought under the general censure. 
It may be remarked, however, that there is a distinction 
amongst the γηγενεῖς also, for some are viewed as more hope- 
lessly irreclaimable than the rest (ot αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτό- 
x9oves). According to this view, Antisthenes may possibly be 
included, but the whole description and the line of argument 
pursued point rather in the direction of a physical school. 
The moral maxims of Democritus, when taken in connexion 
with his general principle, might lay his followers open to the 
criticism here employed. But on the other hand, his analysis 
of the senses makes it improbable that he is alone intended. It 
remains, therefore, most probable that Plato has here idealized, 
if such a paradox may be allowed, the materialistic tendency in 
contemporary thought. In the other description, of the friends 
of motionless forms, there are some marks which answer to 
the Pythagoreans, and others which point rather in the direc- 
tion of Megara. That the Pythagoreans, whose ἀκίνητοι οὐσίαι 
are very similarly criticized by Aristotle, are intended here, is 
an opinion which Proclus? takes for granted, and which has 
been recently advanced, quite independently as it would seem, 
by a French critic, M. Mallet. That the Megarians are meant, 
has been the common belief, since this was somewhat doubt- 
fully asserted by Schleiermacher. The Pythagoreans certainly 


p Comment. in Parmen. p.149 ed. σοφούς. A comparison of Parmenides, 
Pont.: ἦν μὲν γὰρ καὶ mapa τοῖς Πυ- Philolaus, and Empedocles shews that 
θαγορείοις ἣ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν θεωρία καὶ the Hleatic and Pythagorean specula- 
δηλοῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν Σοφιστῇ τῶν εἰδῶν tions were kindred in their origin. 
φίλους προσαγορεύων τοὺς ἐν ᾿Ιταλίᾳ 














TO THE SOPHIST. Ixxv 


believed in purely immaterial forms, and the absence of an 
efficient cause to aid the formal was their weak point. But 
there is no evidence that they brought a subtle dialectic to 
bear on the resolution of phenomena. This trait (κατὰ σμικρὰ 
διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις) belongs rather to the Megarians: 
and so does the sharp opposition between the flux of Becoming 
and the permanence of Being. This is an Eleatic feature. But 
then although we know that Euclides said that the good was 
“one called by many names,” his reaction towards Hleaticism 
would probably, though not certainly, incline him to lay the 
emphasis on “one” rather than on “ many,’ and we have no 
evidence (this passage apart) that he admitted a real diversity 
of forms. This is one of Socher’s grounds for supposing that 
the “‘Sophist” was written by a Megarian and directed against 
Plato, whose theory of ideas he imagines to be here directly 
impugned. We have seen that however much some of Plato’s 
statements (e. g. Crat. 440) may seem to countenance the doc- 
trine here criticized, such was not his final theory of know- 
ledge and being. But the hypothesis of Ueberweg and of 
Mr. Grote, that Plato is here examining a view which he at 
one time held, is well worth considering. 

We shall only make a slight modification of this hypothesis 
in expressing our own opinion that Plato at a late period of 
his course directs this argument against those amongst his 
disciples in the Academy who, resting in their imperfect 
realization of an earlier phase of his own teaching and revert- 
ing to Pythagorean and Eleatic elements, held the doctrine of 
ideas in the form in which it is often controverted by Aristotle. 
That Aristotle should not have observed this divergence be- 
tween the master and the school may be inexplicable, but 
not more so than his silence about the Parmenides. On this 
supposition, the avowal of familiar acquaintance with the men 
(ἐγὼ δὲ tows διὰ συνήθειαν) is not made by the Eleatic Stranger, 
but by Plato himself, whose close relation to the persons indi- 
cated accounts for a peculiar gentleness of tone (6. ο. ἡμερώτεροι 
yap); and the plurality of ideas, their immobility, and the wide 
culf between Being and the changing world, are tenets which 
we clearly know to have been held together by one and the 
same school. 

This interrogation of the philosophers is one of the earliest 

12 


Ixxvi INTRODUCTION 


chapters in the eritical history of philosophy: and approaches 
to the manner in which Anaxagoras and Empedocles are 
handled by Aristotle, when he endeavours to penetrate to their 
meaning or inmost tendency through the haze of their lan- 
guage. There is a similar effort made in the Thestetus, in 
the development of the theory of sense, where Heraclitus and 
Protagoras are shewn to meet in an unconscious harmony, and 
the same appears in the allusion to Parmenides and the twofold 
difficulty of understanding his expressions and his thought (μὴ 
οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λει- 
πώμεθα). But the conception of studying philosophical ideas 
in the light of their history, and almost of the impossibility of 
studying them in any other way, comes more distinctly into 
consciousness in this passage than even in Aristotle. 

There are several points even in these few pages, besides 
the criticism of the εἴδη, which confirm the hypothesis that the 
Sophist is a late dialogue. These are chiefly: 1. The identi- 
fication of the Highest Being with Soul or Mind, which appears 
with equal distinctness only in the Philebus, Timeeus, and Laws. 
2. The abruptness with which this thesis is introduced, not 
suggested directly by the argument but prompted apparently 
by a deep emotional impulse. This is in the manner of the 
Laws. 3. The admission of motion into the intelligible sphere. 
4. The close union of the ideas of Being and Becoming, which 
Plato’s earlier speculations had divorced. This notion is ap- 
plied in one place to the Eleatic Whole (245 d, τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ 
γέγονεν ὅλον), notwithstanding the fact that Parmenides denied 
γένεσις altogether; and in another place, in immediate con- 
nexion with the idea of permanence or stability, it is said that 
this kind is necessary to the production as well as the existence 
of mind (249 ¢, ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾷς ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον ἄν ;). 

We return to the argument. The notion of perfect being 
includes the attributes of motion and rest, yet neither of these 
is the same with Being: Being differs from both, and, qua 
Being, neither rests nor is moved. Yet it would seem as if 
everything must either be at rest or in motion. 

Now these contradictions may be solved, if we admit the 
possibility of a relation or intercommunion between different 
kinds. If Being subsists in its own nature and at the same 
time partakes in one respect of rest and in another of motion, 

















TO THE SOPHIST. Ixxvil 


this perplexity is removed, ‘The same question of the correla- 
tion of ideas or kinds is raised by the simplest instance of pre- 
dication. Every proposition implies a relation between things 
which are not identical. Even this process has been pro- 
nounced impossible by some, who hold that you cannot say 
“Man is Good,’ but only “Man is Man” and “Good is 
Good.” Not to pass over any class of thinkers, however ex- 
travagant, we address these belated scholars in common with 
the rest with the following question. Are all ideas totally 
disparate, as these say, or do all admit of indiscriminate inter- 
mixture, or do some enter into relations with each other while 
others do not? 

If there is no “communion of ideas,” (1) motion and rest 
cannot exist, for neither can partake of Being; and the phi- 
losophy of motion and that of rest are equally undone: and 
so (2) are the philosophies which rest on the union of one and 
many, whether these are viewed as alternating or as being 
always combined, and whether unity or a plurality of elements 
be made the starting-point. But still more sorry (3) is the 
plight of the opponents of predication themselves. For they 
cannot move a step in their own argument without the combi- 
nation of ideas. 

Again, if there is to be commixture of all ideas, motion 
could be predicated of rest, and rest of motion. 

It remains that some ideas admit of union and others do 
not. Just as some letters can be combined in syllables and 
others cannot. And it may be that as the vowels are present 
in all syllables, so there may be a select few amongst the ideas 
whose presence is necessary to every combination. 

But as a science is necessary to determine what combina- 
tions of letters make syllables, and again another science to 
distinguish the proper combinations of musical sounds, so a 
science, namely that of dialectic, is necessary in order to 
determine the true relations of ideas. The dialectician sees 
one form traversing a multitude of scattered objects, and 
several forms embraced in a higher generality: he sees many 
such wholes bound together in one universal notion, and algo 
many that are wholly sundered from one another. 

In looking for the Sophist, we have unexpectedly stumbled 
on the philosopher, and we shall know where to look for him 


Ixxvill INTRODUCTION 


when it is his turn to be defined. The Sophist hides in the 
dark cave of Not-Being, wherein he feels his way by the 
trick of use. We lose the philosopher, “as we lose the lark 
in heaven,” in an abyss of light, where he clings, by the 
effort of pure reason, to the form of Being. Plato does not 
expressly notice, what his argument however implies, that the 
word “Being” is here used in a new sense. The “ Being” 
here spoken of is clearly the object of philosophy, that is of 
dialectic: and the function of dialectic is to determine which 
kinds harmonize and which are mutually exclusive. Hence 
“ Being” can be nothing else than the sum or principle of 
true determinations, whether positive or negative. 

But “Being” was previously reckoned, and is again reckoned 
(inf. 254 d), with rest and motion as one of the several kinds 
amongst which the determinations are made. The first notion 
of Being in the Abstract, on which the Eleatice doctrine was 
founded, remains side by side with that of Truth, as consisting 
in the real agreement and disagreement of ideas. The latter 
seems to be expressed by the word ὄν in the present passage, 
which contains the answer to the question raised in p. 250 a, 
viz. what common quality of opposites is expressed by saying 
that they both exist. Their common quality is (according to 
this) that each is really predicable of some other thing. This 
is almost but not quite expressed inf. 258 Ὁ, ἡ τῆς θατέρου--- 
οὐσία ἐστίν. 

But to proceed. As it is admitted that communion exists 
to a greater or less extent amongst different kinds, some for- 
bidding communion, while some may hold communion with all; 
we proceed to apply the dialectic method which is now come 
into view to the three chiefest kinds, which have been already 
before us: Being, Motion, Rest. The two latter, as was said 
above, have no communion: while Being communes with them 
both. Each of these three is other than the remaining two, 
but the same with itself. Thus emerge two fresh and distinct 
kinds, or categories, holding communion with the three already 
mentioned, but different from them all, the categories of Same 
and Other. They are certainly both distinct from Rest and 
from Motion, for if either of these were identical with that in 
which both participate, they would be obliged to participate — 
in each other, which we have seen to be in the highest degree 














TO THE SOPHIST. Ixxix 


impossible. Nor can Sameness be identified with Being, else 
in asserting that motion and rest exist, we should assert that 
they were both the same. Thus are made out four distinct 
kinds: motion, rest, being, same. The form of Other alone 
remains. Is this a fifth kind, or are Being and Otherness two 
names for the same thing? They are distinct, for this reason, 
that every Other is always relative to an Other, whereas Beings 
are sometimes thought of in themselves and sometimes in rela- 
tion. (Aristotle’s category of Relation is here incidentally 
anticipated.) 

The form of Otherness is therefore a fifth kind; and, to- 
gether with that of Sameness, it 15 found in combination with 
everything, like the vowels in the illustration from letters. 
(These two in fact are the positive and negative aspects, which 
are indissolubly connected in the notion of Being, as defined 
above.) 

In applying this discovery we find that Otherness is more 
simply expressed by the word “not.” Motion is quite other 
than Rest; 1. 6. is not Rest :—is other than Sameness; i. e. is 
not Sameness. Yet Motion 7s, i. 6. exists: and is the same with 
itself through participation in Sameness. In these different 
senses or relations, Motion is and is not the same: partaking 
of Sameness in relation to itself and of Otherness (expressed by 
the word not”) in relation to sameness. So if motion- could 
partake of rest, it might be said, ‘“ Motion is at rest and is not 
Rest.” And it is certainly true that Motion being other than 
the Other, i.e. partaking of Otherness in relation to the 
Other, in the same phrase both is and is not Other. Thus 
Motion is distinct from three of the four kinds, partaking 
of the Other in relation to each: and it is also distinct 
from, and partakes of the Other in relation to, Being. But 
Motion also partakes of Being, and thus both is and is not 
Being. 

Now this applies equally to every kind. All partake of 
Being, for they all exist, but each is distinguished from the 
abstract, or universal, notion of Bemg. They are and are not, 
are existent but are not existence. Being and Not-Being are 
equally predicable of every form. And, if this result is turned 
the other way,—the form of Being is distinguished from 
(partakes of Other in relation to) all other forms. Being 18 in 


Ixxx INTRODUCTION 


itself once for all, but ¢s-not times imfinite, viz. in comparison 
with everything which partakes of being. 

It appears then that Non-Being includes everything except 
the abstract idea of Being; and that the word not expresses 
only otherness or difference, and not necessarily contrariety. 
The not-greater is not necessarily smaller. Now every posi- 
tive conception has a corresponding negative, which is not 
necessarily opposite but only different, and includes a really 
existing kind. Thus the not-beautiful is a kind by itself. The 
word “not” distinguishes between positive existences; and 
the Other has as many branches as science has. 

Tt follows that negative determinations have as much objec- 
tive reality as the positive ones which are summed up in 
Being 4: and they signify when taken severally, not the con- 
tradictory of the corresponding affirmatives, but only some- 
thing not identical with them. Now the sum of these nega- 
tions, or of their objects, is no other than the non-existent or 
unreal, after which the Sophist led us such a dance. 

We have not only established against Parmenides that this 
Non-Being has a real existence, but we have also laid bare the 
nature of it as the sum of negations, or of all which falls on 
the left-hand side in the distinctions of science. 

(Plato here notes a change in the meaning of μὴ ὄν similar 
to that above noticed in the meaning of ὄν. The merely ab- 
stract notion of Nothing seems at first sight contradictory to 
the merely abstract notion of Being. But when Being is re- 
cognized as the complex object of the determinations of thought, 
Not-Being becomes the negative side or aspect of those deter- 
minations, and is thus a part of being. Moreover every such 
negative expression, from the nature of the case, since nega- 
tion is difference and difference always implies relation (70 
ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον), has a positive content.) 

Further, while we have shewn the existence of non-being, 
we have proved that Being in innumerable relations is not, 
i.e. 15 different from, or other than, every existing kind. 

Being and difference (or positive and negative Being") are 
two categories (to use a convenient term of later growth) which 

a ‘ Being” is here used with a third r The ideas of ταὐτὸν and ὄν seem 


variety of meaning=the sum of posi- to run together again, though distin- 
tive determinations. guished for the sake of argument above. 








TO THE SOPHIST. Ixxx1 


traverse all things—even each other, since the Other exists, 
and Being is other than the remaining kinds, which partake 
of Being, and of the Other in relation to each other and to the 
form of Being. 

Here is a nut for the Eristic philosophers to crack. They 
may exhibit contradictions till they are weary, but until they 
can refute the preceding argument, they will labour in vain, 
The dialectician’s is a far nobler task, to follow every argument 
having respect to the relation in which things are compared 
or distinguished. ΤῸ insist without this on the contradiction of 
sameness and difference is mere childishness, as has now been 
shewn. We have swept the ground from under the feet of 
the analytical and controversial gentry, by abolishing the 
absoluteness of distinctions: which indeed was necessary 
if argument, or even language, is to be maintained at all. 
For, as has been already shewn in answer to Antisthenes, 
the nature of proposition rests on the combination of different 
forms. 

But if language were done away, all our toil would have 
left us where we were, so far as the Sophist is concerned. 
For falsity can only be found in propositions, either spoken or 
silent. Opinion is silent proposition. 

There still remains, therefore, a new problem, after it has 
been decided that there is a communion amongst several kinds, 
_and that Non-Being is one of these; viz. Is there communion 
between Non-Being and the proposition? Does that which is 
other than being enter into language? We must answer this 
before we can tell whether the Sophist is to be accused of 
falsehood, and, if the answer is in the negative, we must begin 
the whole inquiry afresh. 

Theeetetus is cast down by the apparition of this new difii- 
culty : but is encouraged to proceed. “ Faint heart never took 
a city. Some progress has been made, and that is more than 
we at one time expected. And after all not much remains.” 
| Speech is then defined as the combination not of nouns with 
nouns or verbs with verbs, but of nouns and verbs (which are 
also defined)—just as vowels and consonants were seen to be 
combined in syllables. 

It is shewn also that every proposition has a subject and 
is of a certain quality; by which is meant, not the formal 
m 


Ixxxil INTRODUCTION 


difference of affirmative or negative, but the material difference 
of truth or falsity. 

The false proposition attaches to its subject a predicate, which 
has a meaning indeed, but a meaning other than that which 
consists with fact (ὄντων----ὄντα ἕτερα, Soph. 263 b); a meaning, 
therefore, which is the proper object of a negative determi- 
nation in thought. False speech is the affirmation of this other 
predicate, which means, not nothing, but a wrong something. 
(It is of course implied that false negation is the wrong affirma- 
tion of non-being.) Now thought is a silent dialogue of the 
mind with herself (cf. Thezet. 189 6): opinion is the positive or 
negative determination of thought: and imagination is opinion 
in contact with sense. Hence whatever is essentially true of 
speech, is also true of thought, opinion and the intellectual 
element in sensation. False opinion is therefore conceivable 
and possible. And the phantastic art, in which we placed the 
Sophist, has more than a chimerical existence. The existence 
of the said “kind” being vindicated, the division of kinds is 
resumed from p. 236 ὁ in the manner already indicated, and 
the dialogue “ grows to a point.” 


In closing this long introduction, it is still necessary, for the 
sake of clearness, to make a few remarks on the discussion of 
which an analysis has been here presented to the reader. 


1. The last step in the argument will be more intelligible 
when put into modern language. 

It has been shewn that Non-Being is merely the object of 
negative determination: the form of Difference, coming in be- 
tween two positive conceptions. Before the existence of false- 
hood can be established, the question remains, Are thought 
and speech themselves ever the proper objects of negative 
determination? Can a proposition as well as a term be denied ? 
Does the Form of Difference enter into thought as the object 
of thought, so as to divide the real (ὄν in the sense of Truth) 
from the unreal (μὴ ¢év=that which is other than the Truth) 
which still has a certain reality as being really distinguished 
from the real? Plato answers this question, as he answers the 
question in the Theztetus, ‘Is true opinion knowledge?” by 
an appeal to fact. The proposition, “ Thezetetus, with whom I — 
now converse, is flying,” is manifestly the legitimate object of — 








TO THE SOPHIST. Ixxxiil 


denial. And thus the existence of falsehood, and of a denial 
of falsehood, as well as that of simple negation, is established. 
It may be asked, why sensation takes the place of dialectic at 
this stage? Might not the Sophist, who can shut his eyes at 
pleasure, profess ignorance, until convinced by rational proof, 
whether Theztetus is sitting or flying? The answer is, first, 
that it was immaterial to the proof whether the fact appealed 
to were one of sensible experience or otherwise. Any propo- 
sition which the mind of the particular hearer instinctively 
rejected would have served the purpose equally well. <A fact 
of sense is chosen, according to the law of parsimony, as being 
the simplest. And, secondly, all the dialectical difficulties had 
been surmounted, and the question of fact alone remained. 
It had been shewn that non-being existed, and that different 
kinds might be combined im thought. The only doubt left was 
whether a combination of non-being with thought and speech 
was possible. All combinations are equally possible or impos- 
sible in the abstract. The existence of any particular combi- 
nation is a question of fact. The combination of rest and motion 
was proved impossible by an appeal to mental experience. That 
of thought with non-being happens to be proved by an appeal 
to an opinion based on sense (φαίνεται δ᾽ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμιξις 
αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης). The example is chosen from φαντασία 
rather than διάνοια or δόξα. But this is an accident which 
does not in the slightest degree affect the validity of the 
argument. 

2, The definition of λόγος as the combination of ὄνομα and 
ῥῆμα, and as a positive or negative determination (φάσιν τε καὶ 
ἀπόφασιν), 15 the earliest clear account of the proposition. It 
was seen in examining the Theztetus (Theeet. Introd. p. Ixxiv.), 
and has been evident in the course of this dialogue, with how 
much difficulty the Greeks formed the conception of the rela- 
tion of subject and predicate. But in this passage not only is 
it asserted that every predicate must have a subject (λόγον 
ἀναγκαῖον τινὸς εἶναι λόγον), but the words expressive of sub- 
ject and predicate (nouns and verbs‘) are for the first time 
accurately distinguished and defined. Now this is in a great 
measure due to the preceding argument, in which Being is 


8 See the instructive excursus of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα in the Cratylus, Ueber 
Benfey on the meaning of the words die Aufgabe des Kratylos, p. 139. 


m 2 


Ιχχχὶν INTRODUCTION 


declared to be the relation of ideas, and to the subversion of 
the extreme view of those who held that a συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν 
was impossible. 

3. The psychological definitions in pp. 263 d—264 b also 
demand a passing notice. They mark a stage in the develop- 
ment of Plato’s psychology more advanced than that in the 
Theeetetus (contrast Thest. 189 e—1go0 a with the brief sum- 
mary 6d£a—6.avolas ἀποτελεύτησις), and nearly corresponding to 
that in the Philebus ; (see especially Phileb. 33-41). The grada- 
tions (αἴσθησις, φαντασία, δόξα, διάνοια, λόγος) are almost in the 
manner of Aristotle; (cf. Met. 1.1, and compare Lege. 892 b, 
Δοξα----καὶ ἐπιμέλεια Kal νοῦς Kal τέχνη Kal νόμος σκληρῶν Kat 
μαλακῶν καὶ βαρέων καὶ κούφων πρότερα ἂν εἴη). Now just as 
the beginning of a sound logic by the definition of the propo- 
sition was impossible so long as Being and Non-Being were 
viewed in their incommunicable abstraction; so the absolute 
severance of knowledge from opinion had been an impediment 
to the growth of an inductive psychology. Both hindrances 
are removed by the preceding argument: and to this may be 
referred the increasing clearness in which logical and psycho- 
logical questions are viewed. 

It remains to say a few words on the general reasoning. — 
The whole energy of the piece is spent on the metaphysical 
question of the possibility of error, or false appearance. ‘The 
arguments by which the Sophist is entrapped in the form of 
non-being are comparatively triflmg: and the refutation of 
particular tenets is obviously left over to another day. The 
form of non-being itself remains the cardinal point of interest 
and difficulty. The solution is obtained through a modification 
of the notions of Being and Negation, which by a process of 
dialectic are brought out of their first naked abstraction, and 
are shewn to be logical determinations, both of which are 
necessarily present in every conception, i.e. in every act of 
thought. It is found impossible to maintain the sole existence 
of a Being which is identical with itself, but has no other rela- 
tions: and true being, as necessarily comprising reason and 
life, is shewn to partake of the opposite elements of perma- 
nence and change. 

“ Being,” at this point, is equivalent to the “sum of all posi- 
tive notions.” But in contemplating the union of being with 





TO THE SOPHIST. Ιχχχν 


permanence and change, two thoughts arise: first, that nega- 
tion in the form of difference pervades all things, separating 
every form from every other; and, secondly, that this sepa- 
ration is not necessarily absolute, and does not exclude the 
possibility of relations between the forms thus separated. The 
separation is as essential to thought as the communion, and 
hence arises a third notion of Being, as the sum of true deter- 
minations, both positive and negative. This new form (by the 
“gliscens intellectus” of dialectic) is again distinguished from 
that which is not Being (which is unreal or false), which how- 
ever, according to the theory, partakes of Being, if in no other 
way, as being the object of true negative determination. 

A close perusal of the dialogue will convince the reader that 
Plato is not here engaged in impugning the axiom of contra- 
diction. That axiom, though not expressly brought forward, 
is tacitly assumed throughout. It is taken for granted that an 
assertion or negation cannot at once be true and not true in the 
same sense and in the same respect; (see especially the words 
in 259d: Kad’ ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τε τις ἕτερον 
ὄν πῃ ταὐτὸν εἶναι φῇ καὶ ὅταν ταὐτὸν ὃν ἕτερον, ἐκείνῃ καὶ κατ᾽ 
ἐκεῖνο ὅ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον). This is not formally 
drawn out: for Plato is engaged rather with thought than 
language, and passes by the formal to grapple with the real ; 
but is nowhere ignored, much less denied. Nor is it quite 
true that negation is merged in affirmation. But what hap- 
pens 15. this. When it is found that Being, though an omni- 
present notion, is inconceivable without the help of others 
from which it is distinguished, it becomes evident that not- 
being is not equivalent to nothingness, but in one sense in- 
cludes the forms which are distinguished from Being; and 
generally that the negation of a term is implicitly the predi- 
cation of all which is not included in that term:—when a 
thing is not-beautiful, it is to be sought for amongst the mis- 
cellaneous class of objects of which beauty cannot be predi- 
eated. All negation therefore is limitation, and in so far deter- 
mination. The meaning of this is evident and important in 
connexion with scientific inquiry. Every exclusion and rejec- 
tion is a step in the direction of discovery. The sum of these 
exclusions is Non-Being. Thirdly, it is shewn that where iden- 
tity is denied, participation may still exist. Things different 


ΙΧΧΧΥῚ INTRODUCTION 


are not necessarily oppositet. The same thing may partake 
of two things which are different from it and from each other. 
This is the communion of kinds. 

Another objection is more plausible, viz.: that Plato is de- 
ceived by language and has confused together three distinct 
notions under the name of Being: namely, Existence, Identity, 
and Participation. We have seen that he passes from the bare 
notion of Existence to that of determination in thought: and 
that under this notion of determination he himself carefully 
distinguishes between participation and identity. How then, 
it may be asked, does he include these different relations under 
the same term ov? For the same reason, it may be answered, 
for which he assigns οὐσία to non-being, viz. that Being has 
come to mean reality, or the sum of true determinations. Par- 
ticipation, as such, is no less real than identity. 


It has been unavoidable, in the preceding sketch, to trans- 
late Plato’s thoughts into language somewhat more subjective 
than is in perfect keepimg with the tenor of ancient philosophy. 
Or rather the distinction of object and subject, imperfectly 
known to Plato, has for the sake of clearness been applied 
throughout. This may perhaps, however, be excused, if his 
real meaning (τί διανοούμενος εἶπε) has been made at all more 
intelligible to the English reader. And if his speculations have 
been rightly interpreted, it may be left to professed meta- 
physicians to determine their value. 


The criticism of Aristotle on the Platonic doctrine of Non- 
Being (Met. N.108g), though in parts irrelevant to this dialogue, 
yet bears to it nearly the same relation which his remarks on 
the Platonic numbers bear to the Philebus. The cosmological 
notion of Non-Being as necessary to production, to which he 
chiefly adverts, may perhaps be traced in the Timeus, but is 
wholly alien to the purpose of the “ Sophist.” Plato or his 
followers may have latterly said that the phenomenal Uni- 
verse would be impossible without an element of falsehood, 
but no such observation occurs, or could occur in the course 
of the discussion which we have reviewed. Yet there are 


τ For Plato’s definition of Opposites, see Phed. 103 b; and cf. Repub. 4, 
436 6. 








TO THE SOPHIST. Ixxxvil 


indications that Aristotle, when writing the passage in ques- 
tion, had this dialogue in his eye. Such are, (1) the language 
in which the quotation from Parmenides is introduced, espe- 
cially the words ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ μὴ Ov δεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστιν. (In the 
next phrase, however, οὕτω---εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, the writer’s 
memory seems for once to have wandered to the Parmenides.) 
(2) The expression ταύτην τὴν φύσιν λέγει τὸ οὐκ ὄν. His recol- 
lection of Plato’s writings is partly derived from and partly 
tinged by the conversations which he has held with younger 
Academicians. Of the arguments which he adduces only two 
are applicable to the “ Sophist :’—That to proceed by a criti- 
cism of Parmenides was in effect to revive the philosophy of 
an earlier age (ἀπορῆσαι ἀρχαϊκῶς) ; and that Being and Not- 
Being have each several meanings, and these are not distin- 
guished by Plato. 

It has been already shewn that the negative side of the 
philosophy of Parmenides was still powerful when Plato wrote, 
and that he was probably right in viewing it as the πρῶτον 
ψεῦδος of the modes of thinking in his own and other schools, 
which interfered with the real progress of inquiry. The 
accusation of an ‘“ old-fashioned” way of putting the question, 
only means that Plato did not take for granted the distinc- 
tions which Aristotle, building on the foundation of his pre- 
decessor, afterwards introduced. These distinctions are, how- 
ever, not strictly relevant to the matter in hand. For, as 
Aristotle himself observes, there are positive and negative 
determinations under all the categories. And although the 
affirmation or negation of quality or quantity is not identical 
with, but only analogous to, that of substance; yet the word 
“analogy” does not explain the relative significance of affir- 
mation and negation generally. With regard to “ falsity,” 
which, it may be presumed, is also to be found under all the 
categories, and which Aristotle conceives to be the principal 
meaning of Plato’s μὴ ὄν, it has been shewn above that the term 
is so extremely abstract as almost to supersede the distinction 
between falsity and denial. That which is falsely predicated 
is truly denied, and vice versd. Falsehood, in Plato’s sense, 
arises when Not-Being is predicable of speech or thought, 
and this happens when Not-Being is affirmed or Being denied. 

The other species of Not-Being to which Aristotle alludes is 


IXXxvill INTRODUCTION 


his own principle of potentiality, which is in one sense but és 
not in another, is potentially, but not actually, existent: the 
same which he also compares with the ἄπειρον of the Philebus, 
and the ἄπειρος δυάς of the Platonists. This, he says, is the 
real “ other” which along with the form enables us to account 
for production. But, as we have said, Plato is not here en- 
gaged in accounting for production; and, to use Aristotle’s 
own language, this δυνάμει ὄν is μὴ ὄν only κατὰ συμβεβηκός. 
And the converse is equally true. In saying “a cloud is not 
a shower,” we are only incidentally interested in the question 
whether a cloud can be converted into a shower. Whether 
this be so or not, the meaning of the negative proposition 
remains the same. That the notions “cloud” and ‘* shower,” 
although separated by the negative particle, may still bear 
to each other a relation such as that of the potential to the 
actual, is a truth which could not easily have won acceptance 
before the “ Sophist” was written. 

This question, like that of the unity of Good, brings into 
strong relief the different genius of the two philosophers, 
universality being Plato’s watchword, and distinctness that of 
Aristotle. 

It may be worth while to see how Aristotle himself answers 
Parmenides in the opening of the lectures on Physics. (Physic. 
Auscult, I. 3.) “ Parmenides did not see that Being has 
several meanings, and that each kind of being, although one 
im meaning, yet in point of continuity is many. For there is 
a difference, which philosophers in those days had not per- 
ceived, between whiteness and that to which whiteness attaches. 
Substance and attribute exist in a different sense (τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον). 
But those who assert the unity of Being, must hold that what- 
ever is said to exist, exists as substance. Otherwise that which 
happens to exist (which partakes of existence) is other than 
Being. And hence there will exist something which has no 
existence. For nothing has existence (ex hypothesi) but the 
form of Being. No particular thing can have existence, unless 
Being is allowed to signify a plurality of things im the sense 
which makes this possible. For if essential Being cannot be 
an attribute, Being may signify that which is not as well as 
that which is. For to speak of a white thing as white is truth, 
i.e. Being; but whiteness is a distinct notion from essence ; 








TO THE SOPHIST. Ixxx1x 


and therefore, ex hypothesi, is not, in the most absolute sense. 
Therefore Being is not; which is absurd, therefore Being must 
signify a plurality. 

“ Again, if essential Being is one, it can have no extension ; 
for there will then be a difference of parts. But the parts 
even of a logical whole exist as essentially as the whole; for 
they are not mere accidents, even of the kind which implies 
the definition of the subject: (as, for instance, the accident of 
snubness implies a nose). ‘The elements of concrete existence 
(matter, form, τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν) have each an indivisible existence : 
and the notion of each is different. The Atomists perceived 
something of this, when they attempted, while admitting that 
if being has one meaning, all must be one, to introduce diver- 
sity by the assertion of the existence of Not-Being, and by 
breaking up the continuity of Being into particles. But even 
if it be granted that Being has one meaning, and the con- 
tradictory of being cannot exist, there may still be Not-Being ; 
Jor this may mean not absolute non-entity, but the negation 
of some particular Being. On the whole, it is most unreason- 
able to say that all things will be one unless there is some- 
thing besides Being. Jor who understands what is meant by 
Being, unless particular substances are meant? But if this be 
so, nothing prevents a plurality of Beings in the sense indi- 
eated above.” 


This dialogue, although not generally thought the most 
attractive of Plato’s writings, has at least twice received signal 
attention from great philosophers. By the Neo-Platonists, 
Plotinus and Proclus, the words of the “ Eleatic Stranger” 
are quoted no less frequently than those of Socrates: and the 
five categories, Being, Motion, Rest, Sameness, Difference, 
are deliberately preferred by them to the ten of Aristotle. 
(Plotin. Ennead. 5, 1-3; 6, 1-3.) More recently, Hegel 
found in the Sophist not only the highest point reached by 
Plato, but an anticipation of his own dialectic; and he enhances 
the resemblance by a curious mistranslation of the passage 
259d: τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα---νεογενής wv. “ Das Schwere und 
Wahrhafte ist dieses, zu zeigen, dasz das, was das Andere ist, 
Dasselbe ist, und, was Dasselbe ist, ein Anderes ist: und zwar 
in derselben Riicksicht, und nach derselben Seite, dasz das 
Hine ihnen geschehen ist, wird auch die andere Bestimmung an 

n 


ΧῸ INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST. 


ihnen aufgezeigt. Dagegen zu zeigen, das Dasselbe auf irgend 
eine Weise ein Anderes, und das Andere aweh Dasselbe, dasz 
das Grosze auch klein” (z. B. Protagoras’ Wirfel), “ und das 
Aenliche auch unihnlich sey, und sein Gefallen daran haben, 
so durch Griinde immer das Entgegengesetzte vorzubringen, 
—diesz ist keine wahrhafte Einsicht (ἔλεγχος), und offenbar das 
Erzeugniss eines Neulings,” im Denken, “ welcher erst das 
Wesen zu berthren anfangt.” (Werke, vol. 14. p. 210. ed. 
1840.) 

Both the ancient and the modern appreciation were in- 
fluenced by preconceptions; and supposed a dogmatic and sys- 
tematic intention which is not to be found in Plato. Whether 
the movement of modern philosophy, from Spinoza through 
Kant to Hegel, is in any respects analogous to that which has 
now been traced from Parmenides through the Plato of the 
Pheedrus to the Plato of the Sophist, is a question which it 
belongs to the historian of philosophy to decide. 





| 


νὴ 
= 
Ε- 
w 
— 
Θ᾽ 
Ξ 
we 











ΣΟΨΙΣΙΗΣ. 





ΠῚ 
4. Steph. 
p. 216. 


TA TOY ATAAOVTOY ΠΡΟΣΩΤΙΔ 


ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΞΈΝΟΣ EAEATHS, 


ΘΕΒΑΙΤΗΤῸΟΣ. 
\ fe 5 
Kata τὴν χθὲς ὁμολογίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥκομεν Prelude. 
True to the 
appoint- 
6 ° t of the 
re Lhe word σοφιστὴς, like inthe Prometheus of Aeschylus, Ἐπ ε : ἐς 
many others in Plato (e.g. where the wise Titan is so  day(Theet. 


λόγος, διάνοια, γένεσις, στοιχεῖον, 
σῶμα), may be observed in 
the act of passing from the 
common or vernacular, to- 
wards a technical and philo- 
sophical use. When Aristo- 
tle defines the Sophist χρημα- 
τιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐκ οὔσης, he gives the name 
a meaning which had no exist- 
ence before Socrates, and which 
became fixed only through the 
present dialogue. In Men. 85 b 
Socrates, addressing the slave, 
employs the word inthe most po- 
pular sense : καλοῦσι δέ ye ταύτην 
διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί. Here the 
geometers are called σοφισταί, 
as the poets were by Pindar, be- 
cause practising a clever thing 
(σοφιζόμενοι τι σόφισμα) beyond 
the reach of ordinary men. That 
the name thus used acquired an 
association of ignorant dislike, 
mingled either with contempt 
or fear, appears from two places 


called by the servile ministers 
of Zeus (]. 62: KP. ἵνα μάθῃ 
σοφιστὴς (contriver) ὧν Διὸς νω- 
θέστερος. 1. 946: “EP. σὲ τὸν σο- 
φιστήν (thou who meddlest with 
deep matters) τὸν πικρῶς ὑπέρπι- 
kpov). It was with something of 
a similar feeling that the con- 
servative Athenian citizen spoke 
of the public teachers of the 
Socratic age. See the words of 
Anytus in the Meno, 91 c, where 
this hatred finds an extreme 
expression. The sentiment 
with which they were regarded 
must have had various phases, 
from this utter abhorrence to 
the eager interest and curiosity 
of Hippocrates (Prot.310), who 
however (Ib. 312 a) would not 
for the world be himself taken 
for a Sophist. There was added 
to the jealousy, fear of an 
influence not understood (Ib. 
316 c), the sort of caste-anti- 
pathy with which the Athenian 


sub. fin.) 
Theodorus 
and Thez- 
tetus meet 
Socrates in 
the same 


2 MAATOQNOZ 


> ’ὔ / ‘ / \ / ΕΣ ᾿, 4 
αὐτοί TE κοσμίως καὶ τόνδε τινὰ ξένον AYOMEV, TO μεν γ. 216. 


gentleman looked on those who 


followed any trade. Cf. also 
Lach. 197 d= mperes .. 2% ° 
. σοφιστῇ μᾶλλον τὰ τοιαῦτα 


κομψεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνδρὶ κ. τ. λ. 
The “ Sophists” in Plato’s time 
were already commonly viewed 
as a separate class. Cf. Tim. 
19 e, Rep. 6, 492 a. Plato— 
who, as we learn from Plutarch 
in his life of Dion, was himself 
called Sophist by the courtiers 
of Syracuse (cf. Polit. 299 ¢, 
where the true philosopher is 
called by the vulgar ἀδολέσχην 
τινὰ σοφιστὴν, and inf. 216 6: 
τοτὲ δὲ copprrai)—endeavours in 
this and the following dialogue 
to limit the application of the 
term, with the odium belong- 
ing to it, to that false or pre- 
tended wisdom which he desires 
to distinguish from the true— 
to the professors of knowledge 
who “had their reward” a- 
mongst his contemporaries. 
And the termination, -ἰστής, 
which might imply affectation 
or pretension, was conducive 
to this purpose. In a similar 
spirit the meaning of the 
word διαλεκτικός was modified 
by Aristotle. The necessity of 
defining the Sophist is asserted 
by Socrates in Protag. 313 6. 
P. 1, 3. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ] Here, as 
in the Parmenides and Timzeus, 
Socrates introduces but does 
not conduct the conversation 
(Tim. 17 Ὁ: TI. οὐδὲ yap ἂν 
εἴη δίκαιον, χθὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ Een- 
σθέντας οἷς ἦν πρέπον ἕενίοις, 
μὴ οὐ προθύμως σὲ τοὺς λοιποὺς 
ἡμῶν ἀντεφεστιᾷν. Ib. 26 6: 59. 
χρὴ λέγειν μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἐμὲ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν 
χθὲς λόγων ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν). But 
although the person of Socrates 


is in the background, the So- 
cratic spirit of inquiry still 
reigns in this and: the follow- 
ing dialogue. There are at 
least four points in which this 
intellectual (as distinguished 
from the personal) influence of 
Socrates may still be traced, 
1. The use of trivial and gro- 
tesque examples to illustrate 
general truths (see Xen. Memo- 
rabilia I. 2. § 23, and compare 
the words of Callicles in the 
Gorgias, 491 ἃ : del σκυτέας τε 
καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων 
καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει), and the 
elevation of this practice into 
a principle of scientific method. 
The angler has a definition no 
less than the highest artist. 
Philosophical elassification re- 
spects not persons, but views 
the military commander and 
the destroyer of vermin as 
equally deserving a place in 
the category of huntsmen. The 
Sophist is a salesman, a magi- 
clan, a sportsman, ἃ scene- 
painter. The image of the 
“herdsman” (compare Xen. 
Mem. 1, c.), used satirically in 


the Theetetus (p. 174 4) and 


in Rep. 1, and with a more 
serious meaning in the Laws 
(4, 713 Ὁ, 6), appears again in 
the Politicus, at first in the hu- 
morous but afterwards in the 
deeper signification. In the 
same dialogue an elaborate pa- 
rallel is drawn between the 
statesman and the weayer, and 
this leads to a vindication of 
the argument from Example. 
Here also the Socratic mode 
of teaching by instances (coin- 
ciding with the Pythagorean 
parable) is not only imitated 


} 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 3 


p. 216. γένος ἐξ ’EAeas, ἑταῖρον 


but is made the object of re- 
flection and study. 2. The con- 
viction, which appears chiefly 
in the Politicus, that all prac- 
tical wisdom may be resolved 
into pure knowledge, and that 
this master-science is one only, 
and stands in close relation to 
all others. 3. The destructive, 
cross-questioning method of 
Socrates is characterised as a 
purgation of the soul (καθαρμός, 
a Pythagorean word) from the 
vapours and obstructions of 
conceit. It is this true puri- 
fication of the mind, the in- 
alienable privilege of the phi- 
losopher, of which the mere 
controversial art of the So- 
phist is a false mimicry. 
In this, however, there is also a 
reference to the negative dialec- 
tic of Zeno. 4. The irony of this 
dialogue (and still more of the 
Politicus) while truly Platonic 
accords well with the charac- 
ter of the Platonic Socrates. 
The position assigned to the 
Sophist, not in the first, nor 
in the second, nor in the third 
portion of imitative art; and 
the discovery of the politicians 
of Greece far down amongst the 
class of servants, are instances 
of this: also the ludicrous de- 
scription of a state in which 
navigation and medicine should 
be regulated by law, of which 
there is perhaps a germ in 
the question of Socrates, Would 
they choose a pilot, or a car- 
-penter, or a flute-player by 
lot? In these and other pas- 
sages there is revived, with 
an increase of bitterness which 
is Plato’s own, the “ pro- 
voking irony and strange in- 


B 


δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ ἸΤαρμενίδην 


sight into the world,” which is 
one of the most marked fea- 
tures of the Platonic, as it was 
probably of the real, Socrates. 

P.1,4. Kara τὴν χθὲς ὁμολογίαν] 
Theet. 210 ὁ. Socrates is 
already at the place of meet- 
ing: according to the Thee- 
tetus a paleestra, possibly the 
Lyceum, or the school of Tau- 
reas. There is, however, no 
reference to the scene of the 
conversation, either in this dia- 
logue or the next. 

ἥκομεν αὐτοί τε καὶ ἄγομεν] 
Rep. 4,427 d: σκόπει---οαὐτός τε 
καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει. 
also Xen. Anab. 111.1, ὃ 44. The 
expression is modified by a re- 
turn to the indicative mood, 
as the sentence grows under 
the author’s hand. 

P. 2,1. κοσμίως) “ Like well- 
behaved people.” ‘“ As in duty 
bound.” 

τ. ἑταῖρον ---- [ἑταίρων ἢ] Se- 
veral MSS. have ἕτερον in the 
first place. (Ficinus, longé vero 
alterum ac dissimilem a Par- 
menide et Zenone suis equa- 
libus.) But the Stranger 
afterwards identifies himself 
with the followers of Parme- 
nides, though he is not a ser- 
vile follower, and Socrates in 
this place alludes to the ἔλεγ- 
xos of Zeno. The corrup- 
tion may be due to some one 
who thought the criticism of 
Parmenides in the sequel incon- 
sistent with the words as they 
stood. The passage is thrice 
quoted by Proclus; Comment. 
in Parmen. p. 42: ᾿Αλλὰ καὶ ὁ 
"EXedtns σοφὸς καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν 
Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα ἑταίρων av- 
τὸς ὧν. Ib. Ρ». 72: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον 


9) 
= 


Ch 


paliestra, 
and bring 
with them 
an Eleatic 
friend, 
whom 


Theodorus 
introduces 
as a true 
philoso- 
pher. 
Socrates is 


awe-struck. 


“What if 
he be some 
God in dis- 
guise, who, 
as poets 


t MAATQNO® 


καὶ Ζήνωνα {Ὁ ἑταίρων Ὁ. 


σοῴον. 


μάλα δὲ 


YQ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν, ὦ Θεύδωρε, οὐ ξένον ἀλλά τινα 


θεὸν ἄγων κατὰ τὸν Ὅμήρου λόγον λέληθας ; ὅς 


ὔ Ν vad > c / / 
sdnow addovs τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁπόσοι μετέ- 


οὕτω προσείρηκεν, τῶν 
ἀμφὶ Il. καὶ Ζ. μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα 
φιλόσοφον. Ib. p. 83: 
τούτων ὑπάρχων. ἑταίρων is pro- 
bably a gloss on τῶν. (Βοά!]. τόν.) 
The word is transposed in one 
MS. (A), which gives ἑταίρων καὶ 
ζήνωνα. It is doubtful whether 
τῶν 18. a partitive genitive or 
governed by éraipov :—‘ A com- 
panion of the number of those” 
or “a companion of those.” 
The former is more idiomatic, 
gives a better emphasis to ἑταῖ- 
pov, and is on the whole more 
consistent with the quotations 
of Proclus. 

For the use of the word 
ἑταῖρος, cf. Thext. 180 ¢: ov 
yap σοι ἑταῖροί εἰσιν. “ This 
stranger is of Eleatic race, an 
adherent of the school of Par- 
menides and Zeno, and he is 
a true philosopher.” 


ἑταῖρον 


ἑταῖρος 


1. μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον] 
Cf. Parm. 126 b: οἵδε----πολῖ- 
ταί poi εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι. For 
the conjunction of the adverb 
and noun, cf. Legg. 1, 639 b: 
ἄλλά τινων σφόδρα γυναικῶν. 

3. οὐ ξένον ἀλλά τινα θεὸν 
The auswer of Theodorus, 
οὐχ οὗτος ὁ Tp. τ. &, shews 
that these words of Socrates 
express an ironical fear lest 
the stranger should bring the 
Zenonian negative dialectic to 
bear on his own (1. 6. Plato’s) 
mode of reasoning. Compare 
Euthyd. 273 6: εἰ δὲ viv ἀλη- 
θῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχε- 
τον, ἵλεῳ εἴητον. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ 
ἔγωγε σφὼ ὥσπερ θεὼ προσαγο- 
ρεύω. 

4. λέληθας] Se. σαυτόν. 
Thezt. 180 6. 

5. ἄλλους τε θεοὺς] Odyss. P. 


483-7: 


Cf. 


‘Avtivo’, ov μὲν Kad’ ἔβαλες δύστηνον ἀλήτην, 


> ‘ > > , i > ΄ , > 
οὐλόμεν᾽, εἰ δή πού τις ἐπουράνιος θεός ἐστιν. 


καί τε θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσιν, 


παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας, 


> / “ A > ΄ > ΄ 
ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες. 


ΠΡ ΤΣ ΟΣ Ἢ: 


A Wy , c , , 
Ζεὺς δ᾽ ἐπιτιμήτωρ ἱκετάων τε ξείνων Te, 

, ἃ , J 3 5 , > “ 
ξείνιος, ὃς ξείνοισιν ἅμ᾽ αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ. 


Both these passages are present 
to the speaker’s mind, but the 
second less distinctly than the 
first: for ξείνοισιν is dropped, 
and αἰδοίοισιν taken actively, = 
respectful or merciful. The 
substitution of θεὸς for Ζεὺς, 
the general for the individual, 
belongs to the later phase of 


xs 
Greek religion. Bodl. ἀλλήλους: 
but the correction is not by the 
first hand. 
Cf. Legg. 5, 730 a: ὁ ξένιος 
ἑκάστων δαίμων καὶ θεὸς τῷ ξενίῳ 
Ib. π 2; 953 ©: 


τιμῶντες Eeviov Δία. 


" she 
συνεπόμενοι Att. 


ἄλλους τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] 
The apodosis of these words is 


ἄνδρα φιλό- p. 216. |: 


b 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 5 


, ΄σ 7 Ν Ν Ν ‘ / > 
5.216. youow αἰδοῦς δικαίας. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἕένιον ov 
: ’ ἢ Xx 


(en) 





oS Ν Ν , -“ Ν 
ἥκιστα θεὸν συνοπαδὸν γιγνόμενον ὕβρεις τε καὶ 


> 7 - > / o 25 53 a Ν 
εὐυνομιὰᾶὰς Τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθορᾷν. TAX OUV GY και 


, - a , / / 
σοί τις οὗτος τῶν κρειττόνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους 


« ΄ + ’ oO / > , ΄ Ν 5 / 
ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποψόμενὸος τε Kal ἐλέγξων, 5 


Ν 7 , 
θεὸς wv τις ἐλεγκτικὸς. 


OEO. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ξένου, 


» Ν ΤᾺ a Ν \ 54 3 , 
ἀλλὰ μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότων. 


, a \ \ eX 5 ΡΞ 53 = ΝΣ 
Kal μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἀνὴρ οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μὴν 


΄ \ SS \ / , 
πάντας yap ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσα- 


γορεύω. 


absorbed in συνοπαδὸν γιγνό- 
μενον. 

I. ὁπόσοι--- δικαίας] Said in 
compliment to Theodorus, who, 
in reward for his modest and 
candid temper (see the Thezete- 
tus), may unawares be enter- 
taining a superior being. Com- 
pare the combination of αἰδὼς 
with δίκη in the Protagoras 
(322 ¢), and in Hesiod. 

4. τῶν κρειττόνων] “ Some 
higher power,” i.e. a God or 
Hero, ef. Lege. 4,718 a: mapa 
θεῶν καὶ ὅσοι κρείττονες ἡμῶν. 
Kuthyd. 291 a: μὴ τις τῶν 
κρειττόνων παρὼν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγξατο; 
Ep. 7, 326 6: ἔοικε μήν τινι τῶν 
κρειττόνων ἀρχὴν βαλέσθαι τῶν νῦν 
γεγονότων πραγμάτων. Compare 
Aesch. Prom. 905: μηδὲ κρεισ- 
covey [θεῶν] ἔρως ἄφυκτον ὄμμα 
προσδράκοι με. 

5. ἐποψόμενος] Referring to 
ἐφορῶντες in the line of Homer. 

7. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος -- τοῦ 
ξένουΠ͵ Cf. Theet. 145 6: οὐχ 
οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου. 

8. μετριώτερος] “ More rea- 
sonable.” Cf. Theat. 161 Ὁ: 


ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. 


τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδα- 
κότων] Cf. Isocrates Soph. 20: 
τῶν περὶ Tas ἔριδας καλινδουμένων. 
And for ἐσπουδακότων inf, p. 259 
b, α : εἴτε ---χαίρει---τοὺς λόγους 
ἕλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς 
ἐσπούδακε. The Stranger is re- 
presented as not contentious, 
that the reader may be pre- 
pared for the modification of 
the Eleatic doctrine in what 
follows, and for the general 
scope of the dialogue, which 
tends to deprecate the arts 
of controversy. 

9. ἁνήρ] In this and similar 
places the MSS. persistently 
give ἀνήρ. This is equally the 
case in tragedy (6. g. Soph. Aj. 
g: ἔνδον yap ἀνήρ), where the 
quantity proves the presence 
of the article. 

θεῖο Cf. Rep. 1, 331 e: 
σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ (ὁ Σι- 
μωνίδης). Phileb. 18 b: εἴτε τις 
θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος. In 
Legg. 1, 626 ο, the address ὦ 
θεῖε occurs — characteristically 
—in the mouth of the Spartan. 

10. τοιούτους] Se. θείους. Cf. 
Theet. 154 e, Phed. 67 a. 


have sung, 
accompa~ 
nies the 
good man’s 
going, and 
comes to 
expose the 
nothing- 
ness of 
Athenian 
wisdom 2” 


THEO. “He 
is not con- 
tentious, 
as some 
are: and 
certainly 


10 no God, 


though I 
must call 
him, as I 
do all pLi- 
losophers, 
divine.” 


ΠΟΘΙ ΑΔ πὰ 
the divine 
philoso- 
pher is also 
rarely dis- 
cerned, and 
often walks 
disguised 
through 
the igno- 
rance of 
other men, 
whose life 
he watches 
fromabove, 
appearing 
to them 


6 MAATQNO2 


Ὁ “ 9 , ΄ ΄, , 
TQ. Καλῶς ye, ὦ φίλε. τοῦτο μέντοι κινδυνεύει p. 216.) 


Ν , > , en « ” > ΄σ 3 
τὸ γένος οὐ πολὺ TL ρᾷον, WS ἔπος εἰπεῖν, εἰναι δια- 


, RY ‘ = an 
κρίνειν ἢ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ" 


΄ \ " e 
πάνυ yap ἄνδρες οὗτοι 


a el ἈΝ Ν ΄“΄ 32,7 » 
παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγνοιαν 


δἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας, οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ᾽ ὄντως 


φιλόσοφοι, καθορῶντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον, 


“ Ν fa) by a Ν , ΕΣ 
καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἰναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι, τοῖς 


I. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ yevos] The 
more remote purpose of the dia- 
logue appears in these words, 
The definition of the Sophist 
is preparatory to that of the 
philosopher. 

3. τὸ Tod θεοῦ] Note the sin- 
cular case with the article, ex- 
pressing a generalized concep- 
tion—as In τοῦ ἀνθρώπου : Thu- 
cyd. 1, 140. 

πάνυ] “ certainly ;” almost 
= ἀτεχνῶς, referring to the words 
of Homer. Compare the use 
of πάνυ ye, πάνυ μὲν οὖν in re- 
plies. 

4. παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι) φαν- 
zat. is substituted for τελέθοντες 
because the philosophers do not 
really change, but appear in 
various disguises through the 
ignorance of men. Compare 
Rep. 2, 381-2, where there 
is a reference to the same pas- 
sage of Homer. See also 
Timeeus 41 a, where the tradi- 
tionary deities are spoken of in 
contradistinction to the hea- 
venly bodies as ὅσοι φαίνονται 
καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοί. 

5. οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ᾽ ὄντως 
φιλόσοφοι] “The real, not the 
would-be philosophers.” ΟἿ 
Theet. 173 ¢: Aéyopev—repi 
τῶν κορυφαίων, Ti γὰρ ἄν τις τούς 
γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλο- 
σοφίᾳ λέγοι. And see the de- 


? 


scription of the “ little bald 
blacksmith” in Rep. 6, 495 e. 
For πλαστῶς, cf. Legg. 1, 642 d: 
ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔ τι πλαστῶς εἰσὶν 
Tb: 6, γ7ὴ ἃ. 

6. καθορῶντες] Echoing καθο- 
ρᾷν supr., but with the addi- 
tional meaning of “ down- 
wards.” For καθ. ὑψόθεν τὸν 
τῶν κάτω βίον, see the digression 
in the Theetetus 173 Ὁ, 175 
c,d. Also Rep..B: ἢ: 

7. τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν---μανικῶς] 
“The true philosopher appears 
to some men nothing worth : 
to others, worth all the world: 
now he presents the semblance 
of a statesman, now of a public 
teacher: and, again, he may 
give to some men the impres- 
sion that he is clean mad.” 
The philosophic spirit is a 
treasure whose value is un- 
known: a pearl of great 
price, for which he who has 
found it will sell all that 
he has : appearing now in the 
practical, now in the specula- 
tive sphere: in both apt to be 
confounded with lower types 
of wisdom by ordinary men, 
who, when they begin to see 
the real issues towards which 
the spirit leads, will brand it 
with the name of foolishness 
or madness. For τοῦ παντὸς, cf. 
Pheedr. 235 6. The article is 


ἀγαθοί. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. vi 


δι 197; a / Ν \ \ Ν ’, 
p. 216. δ᾽ ἄξιοι τοῦ παντός" καὶ τοτὲ μὲν πολιτικοὶ φαντά- 


ἃ Covrat, τοτὲ δὲ σοφισταί. τοτὲ δ᾽ ἔστιν οἷς δοξαν 
3 2 Ὁ 


p- 217. 


, > A - / y lal 
παρασχόοιντ αν WS TWAVTATTACOLV EXOVTES μανικῶς. 


a ΄ὔ / (re e / x / , 
του [LEVTOL &€vov ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἂν πυνθανοίμην, εἰ 


/ > “ / apy? ε Ν N > vad / ¢ a 
φίλον AUTO, τι ταῦθ᾽ οἱ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ τόπον ἡγοῦντο 5 
t 


Ἄν .,.9 ΄ 
KQL ὠνόμαζον. 


ΘΕΌ. Τὰ ποῖα dn; 


LQ. Σοφιστήν, πολιτικόν, φιλόσοφον. 


΄ Ss -/ ΄- 
GEO. Τί δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν 


διαπορηθεὶς ἐρέσθαι διενοήθης ; 


here partly suggested by τοῦ 
μηδενός, which hardly needs 
illustration. 

I. τοτὲ μὲν --- τοτὲ δὲ] Bodl. 
Ῥ. Mm. τότε μὲν----τότε δὲ. 

πολιτικοί] Τὰ. ο. Epimenides, 
Solon, Pythagoras. 

2. σοφισταί] As Socrates in 
the‘Clouds, or Plato at Syracuse. 
The word is used here with- 
out any invidious association, 
like πολιτικοί, merely denoting a 
recognized class. The variation 
of language in τίμιοι ---ἄξιοι 15 
in keeping with the studied 
refinement of this dialogue. 

3. παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς] 
Cf. Pheedr. 249 c, d: Ib. e: ai- 
τίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος : 
and the words of Alcibiades 
in the Symposium 218 b: 


- πάντες yap κεκοινωνήκατε τῆς φι- 


λοσόφου μανίας τε καὶ βακχείας. 
Note the emphatic position of 
μανικῶς. 

4. τοῦ μέντοι ξένου] The double 
μέντοι marks a double transi- 
tion: from the person of the 
Stranger to the nature of philo- 
sophers, and from this to the 
Stranger again,who is addressed 
with an inquiry bearing on the 


subject which has been thus sug- 
gested. “ The philosopher is apt 
tobe confounded with the States- 
man and Sophist, except when 
he is looked upon as mad. Will 
the Stranger clear the confusion 
by defining each of the terms 
in question ?” 

ἡμῖν gives a courteous turn 
to the expression, like μοι 
after a vocative. 

εἰ φίλον αὐτῷ! Cf. Theeet. 
τό Ὁ : ἀλλ᾽ εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, 
σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν. infr. 
222005) 

5. τί ταῦθ᾽ — ὠνόμαζον] “ What 
his countrymen (in Magna 
Grecia) thought of these mat- 
ters, and how they used to 
apply the terms.” The imper- 
fect implies the qualification 
“When he was amongst them.” 
For the adverbial τί, cf. Pheedr. 
2346: τί σοι φαίνεται 6 λόγος ; 

9. Ti δὲ μάλιστα ----διενοήθης] 
The curious formality of this 
address belongs to Plato’s later 
style. (See General Introd.) Cf. 
infr. 226 b: τὸ ποῖον αὐτῶν πέρι 
βουληθεὶς δηλῶσαι, παραδείγματα 
προθεὶς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἤρου : 
2406: πῇ καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι φοβού- 


now as 
Statesman, 
now as 

M Sophist,’ 
despised, 
believed in, 
wondered 
at as mad. 


Sophist, 
Statesman, 
Philoso- 
pher :— 
What has 
our Italian 


Io friend to 


tell us of 
these 
things ? 


Do his 
country- 
men ac- 
count them 
one, or two, 
or three ?” 


The Stran- 
ger had 
been al- 
readyasked 
this ques- 
tion on the 
way. 

He will 
shew that 
each of the 
three terms 
denotes a 
different 
nature, 
though to 
distinguish 
them is by 
no means 
a simple 
task. 


oe) 


ITAATQNO 


πα / , A ΄ “- ᾽ x 
2Q. Τοδε πότερον ἕν πάντα ταῦτα ἐνόμιζον ἢ 


/ δ ΄ ‘ 3. Τῇ ΄ / / 
δυο, ἢ καθάπερ Ta ὀνόματα τρία, τρία καὶ γένη διαι- 


/ , A » « nd 
ρούμενοι Kad’ ἕν ὄνομα γένος ἑκάστῳ προσῆπτον ; 
ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐδείς, ὡς ἐγῴμαι, φθόνος αὐτῷ διελ- 


na > 4 “Δ ΄σ΄ 9S /, 
5θεῖν αὐτά. Ἢ πῶς, ὦ E€ve, λέγωμεν: 


EE. Οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε. φθόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδείς, 


) \ Ἂ > “ “ 7» e lal Led 
οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν OTL ye τρί ἡγοῦντο" καθ᾽ ἕκαστον 


(2. y 
ῥᾷδιον ἐργον. 


\ / “ / > 7 > Χ »ῸΝ 
μὴν διορίσασθαι σαφῶς, τί ποτ᾽ ἐστιν, οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδὲ 


ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, 


/ 3 ΄ / © « a 
λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίων ὧν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς 


a? Σ la las SEEN > / ε \ 
δεῦρ᾽ ἐλθεῖν διερωτῶντες αὑτὸν ἐτυγχάνομεν. ὁ O€ 


> / “ Ν \ a Ων ΄ » | Aes \ 
ταῦτα, ATEP προς σε νυν, καὶ TOTE ἐσκήπτετο προς 


ε a > Ν / / ε lal \ 2 
ἡμᾶς" ἐπεὶ διακηκοέναι ye φησιν ἱκανῶς καὶ οὐκ 


15 ἀμνημονεῖν. 


ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, ἡμῶν τήν γε πρώτην 


μενος οὕτω λέγεις ; Legg.6,752b: 
περὶ τί βλέπων καὶ ποῖ μάλιστα 
αὐτὸ εἴρηκας τὰ νῦν; Ib. 4,705 d: 
εἰς δὴ τί τῶν εἰρημένων βλέψας, 
εἶπες ὃ λέγεις ; “In regard to 
what point, and with a view to 
what difficulty respecting these 
things, did the question occur 
to you?” 

2. τρία καὶ γένη] The Bodleian 
MS., as well as ATi, has καὶ γένη, 
which is manifestly right. ra 
γένη does not suit with διαιρού- 
μενοι. They do not divide the 
classes, but distinguish three. 
“Did they, as the names are 
three, distinguish also three 
kinds, and assign one severally 
to each name 1 

6. pOdvos—eineiv] φθόνος is 
not to be joined with εἰπεῖν. 
“ You are right, Theodorus; I 
have no wish to withhold any- 


thing.” 

7. τρί᾽ ἡγοῦντο] So Bodl. 

II. Adyov— ὧν diepwravres | For 
the apposition of the clause to 
the relative, cf. Thezt. 158 b: 
τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα,---ὃ πολ- 
λάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτών- 
Compare Tim. 20 d: καὶ 
ἔτι πρότερον καθ᾽ ὁδὸν αὖ ταῦτα 


TOV. 


ἐσκοποῦμεν. = 

παραπλησίων ὧν] As παρα- 
πλήσιος is rarely found with the 
genitive, there is probably here 
a double attraction: 1. 6. ὧν = 
ois = τούτοις οὕς. 

12. ὁ δὲ ταὐτά] Heindorf’s 
slight emendation (ταὐτὰ for 
ταῦτα) seems to be required by 
the antithesis πρὸς σὲ viv—rére 
- πρὸς ἡμᾶς. 

τό. Μὴ--- γένῃ] “ Be not so 
cruel as to refuse our first boon 
when we have asked it of you.” 


-- 


) 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


Wee 


πότερον εἴωθας ἥδιον αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ 


μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων τοῦτο, ὃ ἂν ἐνδείξασ-- 
nr ; , er 
Gai τῳ βουληθῇς, ἢ St ἐρωτήσεων, οἷον ποτε καὶ 


Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους 5 


/ Oe AN / vy ’ / “4 δὴ 7 
παρεγενομὴν ἐγὼ νέος ὧν, εκείνου μᾶλα On TOTE 


ΕΒ / 
ὄντος πρεσβύτου: 


lal 7 9 / » ΄ Ν ᾽ [ 
EE. Τῷ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως 


The use of the auxiliary verb 
(see Gen. Introd.) is a feature 
of Plato’s later style: and is 
one of the points in which that 
style approximates to the lan- 
guage of tragedy. 
2. εἴωθας ἥδιον] 
commonly prefer ?” 
3. μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων] 
There is a slight emphasis on 
λέγων. ‘Do you prefer to en- 
large in an extended speech on 
the subject which you desire 
to explain, or to discuss the 
matter (διεξιέναι) by means of 
questions, a practice which I 


“Do you 


remember that Parmenides 
used — ?” 
4. olov — χρωμένῳ] οἷον 15 


cognate or adverbial accus., 
hike ri—nyodvro above. Com- 
pare Theet. 170 Ὁ : ti— ypn- 
σόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, and Lys. 213 ¢: 
οὖν δὴ χρησώμεθα, where 
there is an ellipse of the da- 
tive, τῷ λόγῳ OY τοῖς λόγοις, as 
here. It seems probable that 
the Parmenides had been com- 
posed, or at least planned, when 
this passage and Theet. 184 a 
were written. 

ὃ. Τῷ —ddimas Te Kal 
vies προσδιαλεγομένῳ] ‘“ With a 
respondent who gives no trou- 
ble and is guided easily.” It 


, 
τι 


> 
€un- 


must be acknowledged that 
most of the respondents in 
Plato’s dialectical dialogues 
have this virtue. They an- 
swer in the spirit of the ques- 
tioner, and accept true reason- 
ing when it is placed before 
them. When a sally is per- 
mitted them, this is obviously 
done either for the sake of 
relieving the gravity of the 
argument, or in order that 
they may derive instruction 
from their own mistakes, or 
thirdly, in one or two rare 
cases, that they may shew that 
the highest truths are some- 
times the intuitions of the 
simple mind. Docility in the 
pupil as well as the mens 
divinior in the teacher is re- 
quired for the purposes of dia- 
lectic. This is less obviously 
the case in the Republic and 
Pheedo, where Glaucon and 
Adimantus, Simmias and Cebes, 
are allowed to propound their 
difficulties, thus exhibiting an- 
other aspect of the philosophic 
spirit. Yet Glaucon claims the 
merit of being a more facile 
respondent than some others 
would be. Rep. 5,474 a: ἴσως 
ἂν ἄλλου του ἐμμελέστερον ἀπο- 


κρινοίμην. Cf. Lege.7,797 ἃ. It 


| le choo ΟΝ 
to proceed 
by ques- 
tions, as 
Parmeni- 
des used, 
and accepts 
Thezetetus 
for his re- 
spondent ; 
who, when 
tired, will 
be relieved 
by Soera- 
tes the 
younger. 


10 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


͵7 tn “ Ν ‘ ” > \ 
προσδιαλεγομένῳ paov οὕτω, τὸ πρὸς ἀλλον᾽ εἰ δὲ 


/ Ἂς ᾽ « , 
μὴ, τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτον. 


ΣΩ. "E€eore τοίνυν τῶν παρόντων ὃν ἄν βουληθῇς 


> / A 4 Ν « / / 4 
ἐκλέξασθαι: πάντες yap ὑπακούσονταί σοι πράως. 


/ Ν ’ / al / ‘ © / 
SovpBovA@ μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τινὰ αἱρήσει, 


͵ / “δ Ν ΄σ ΕΣ ” / Ν 
Θεαίτητον τόνδε, ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τίς σοι κατὰ 


νοῦν. 


EE. ᾽Ὦ Σώκρατες, αἰδώς τίς μ᾽ ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον 


/ « ΄σ 3, Ν 3, 
συγγενομενον υὑμιν μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἔπος 7 pos ἔπος 


is curious to observe that the 
Heracliteans of Ephesus (Theeet. 
180) and the extreme mate- 
rialists (Soph. 246) are de- 
spaired of in this respect as 
being incapable of dialectic, rod 
δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. For 
the use of προς in προσδιαλε- 
γομένῳ, compare ΤΠ Θεοῦ. 162 b, 
προσπαλαίειν; 1b. 169 ο, προσανα- 
τριψάμενος ; and for ὑπακούσον- 
ται πράως, paullo infra, ef. Theeet. 
162 a: pan ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο 
ὑπακούειν. The community of 
spirit between those convers- 
ing is also dwelt on in Pheed. 
58 d: καὶ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς 
ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἄλλους 
ἔχεις. The adj. εὐήνιος occurs 
with the ethical meaning = 
obedient, tractable, Legg. 5, 
730 b, 9, 880 a. 

I. τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον ---- τὸ καθ᾽ 
αὑτόν] Se. διεξιέναι τοὺς λόγους. 

4. πράως --οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ 
μαχητικῶς, Theet. 168 b. 

5. τῶν νέων τινά] As being 
free from prepossessions and 
more supple to follow the wind- 
ings of an argument, cf. Parm. 
137 b: 6 νεώτατος ; ἥκιστα yap 
ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἃ οἴεται 


Theeet. 
162 b: μὴ ἕλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνά- 
σιον σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ 


, > Δ > , 
μάλιστ αν αποκρινοιτο. 


νεωτέρῳ καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπα- 
λαίειν. Ib. 146 b. 

8. αἰδώς τίς μ᾽ ἔχει] “A sort of 
modesty comes over me at the 
thought of continuing our in- 
terview not colloquially but by 
spinning a lengthened mono- 
logue by myself, or even ad- 
dressing myself to another at 
length, which would only be a 
kind of display. For the truth 
is, that the word you have 
now given us is not of such 
easy compass as one might ex- 
pect on hearing the question, 
but requires an immense 
amount of discussion.” 

τὸ νῦν] The Vatican MS. (Δ) 
and the Bodleian® and Venetian 
(ΠῚ) first hand have preserved a 
reading τὸν νοῦν, which is partly 
due to the preceding νοῦν, and 
partly to the intelligibleness of 
the phrase αἰδώς μ᾽ ἔχει τὸν νοῦν. 
But πρῶτον could have no mean- 
ing without νῦν, and the article 
is required to mark the limita- 
tion of the preceding clause. 

9. ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος] Cf. Ari- 


® The Bodleian has τὸν νοῦν, with the omicron erased. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΊΗΣ. 


1] 


an \ 7, , / 
Wp. 217. ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνουσίαν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκτείναντα ἀπομηκύ- 
ἢ - 





Ὁ St 7) ᾿ 
OLOV ἐπίδειξιν ποιουμένον 


/ Ν > 9 / 5 Ν \ “ἤ 
ΘΟ VELV Aoyov συχνον KAT ἐμᾶαῦτον. ELTE Καὶ πρὸς ETEPOV, 


A \ » τ τιν pout θὲ 
T@ yap οντί TO VUV ρὴῆσεν 


> oe ea 5 \ > / Ἂ cy “aks 53 7 
οὐχ ὅσον ὧδε ἐρωτηθὲν ἐλπίσειεν ἂν αὑτὸ εἰναί τις, 


5 \ 7 , / a \ \ 53 Ν 
ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει λογου παμμήκους OV. TO δὲ αὖ σοὶ 5 


\ lal yy A ᾿ 
μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ τοῖσδε, ἄλλως τε καὶ σοῦ λέξαντος 


« 5) 57 7 , / Ὁ °, > Ν 
@S ELITES, ἀξενὸν Ul KATAPAlVvET al μοι και ἀγριον. E7TEL 


7 / Ν / 5 / 
Geairnrov ye τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον εἰναι δέχομαι 


, ’ @ > / / / 
παντάπασιν ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς TE πρότερον διείλεγμαι καὶ 


Χ Ν fal / 
σὺ τὰ νῦν μοι διακελεύει. 


stoph. Nub.1379: κἀντεῦθεν μὲν, 
οἷον εἶκος, ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος ἠρειδό- 
μεσθα. And for the construc- 
tion, see note on Theet. 193 ἃ: 
δεξιὰ ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεού- 
σης. 

I. ἐκτείναντα — συχνόν] (ΟἿ, 
Prot. 329 ἃ, Ὁ : ὥσπερ τὰ χαλ- 
κεῖα πληγέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ καὶ 
ἀποτείνει---καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω 
δολιχὸν κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. 
The whole passage should be 
compared, also ib. 335 a, and 
infr. 268 Ὁ. ἐκτείναντα ἀπομη- 
κύνειν is probably a metaphor 
taken from the act of drawing 
out a thread in spinning, “ to 
spin off a long yarn by my- 
self.” 

2. εἴτε --- ποιούμενον] As in 
the conversation of Protagoras 
with Socrates and Hippocrates 
τ᾿ τοῦ 916-278. On the 
other hand, the mythe and ar- 
gument of Protagoras, pp. 320-- 
328, are not addressed to any 
one in particular, and might 
be said to be uttered either εἰς 
TO μέσον OY καθ᾽ ἑαυτόν. 

4. οὐχ ὅσον ὧδε ἐρωτηθὲν φαί- 
νεται] Cf. Theet.147 ἃ : ἹῬάδιον, 


s r a o , 3 
ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν ye οὕτω φαίνεται 


C 


> 
εἰς 


ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾷν οἷον κιτ.λ. 
For the participle, cf. Phileb. 
14 6: ἕν---τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ 
ἕν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν. 

5. λόγου παμμήκους ὄν] “ Re- 
quiring a lengthened argu- 
ment.” Cf. Rep. 3, 414 6: πεῖσαι 
δὲ συχνῆς πείθους. Legg. 5,730: 
πολλῆς εὐλαβείας. 

6. σοῦ λέξαντος ὡς εἶπες] 1. 6. 
so courteously—referring chief- 
ly to the opening words of 
Socrates. Note the studied 
variation of λέξαντος---εἶπες. 

7. ἄξενον] “ Uncivil ;” in- 
consistent with the courtesy 
due to strangers. Cf. Eur. Fr. 
ap. Stob. Fl. 126, 6: ᾿Ανὴρ 
ἕξένοισιν ἄξενος. 

καταφαίνετα)Ἠ A strength- 
ened, perhaps chiefly poetical, 
form of φαίνεται = “ appears dis- 
tinctly.” Cf. Hom. H. Ap. 431, 
and compare καθορᾷν, κατιδεῖν, 
κατακουειν. 

ἐπεὶ] “It were uyngracious: 
for I can make no objection to 
the respondent whom you offer 
to me.” Theztetus had joined 
in the conversation between 
the Stranger and Theodorus on 
the way. 


5 
-- 


Io 


We are 
agreed as 
tothename 


12 


᾽ 


BEAL. ἾΑρα τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, οὕτω καὶ, καθάπερ εἶπε p. 218. |p 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


= / cal / Vv 
Σωκράτης, πᾶσι κεχαρισμένος ETEL; 


cH OR 


‘ \ ΄σ \ A / 
Kuvduvever πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔτι λεκτέον 


3 / 4 Ν a\ \ Ya Ν \ ΄ e 
εἰναι, Θεαίτητε πρὸς δὲ σε ON TO μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς 


»Μ / ’ a‘ « / “Ὁ , ΕΣ lal ’ 
δέοικε, γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὁ Aoyos. ἂν O apa τι τῷ μήκει 


5 5) \ is , “- , 3 ἣν / 
πονῶν axOn, μὴ ἐμὲ αἰτιᾶσθαι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τούσδε 


\ Ν « / 
TOUS σους ETALPOUS. 


OEAT. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οἶμαι μὲν δὴ viv οὕτως οὐκ ἀπερεῖν" 


Ὁ ον lo / Ν / / 
av δ᾽ apa τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται, Kal TOVvde παραληψο- 


7 \ 4 \ «ς / 5 Ν 
ιομεθα Σωκράτη, τὸν Σωκράτους μὲν ὁμώνυμον, ἐμὸν 


\ e If , Ὁ ΄σ » 
δὲ ἡλικιώτην καὶ συγγυμναστήν, ᾧ συνδιαπονεῖν μετ 


lol Χ \ > ΕΣ 
ἐμοῦ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἀηθες. 
53 an \ 
HE. Ed λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν 


os a NG P a ὍΣ ’ 
TpolovTos TOV Λογου KOLVY) OE PET 


I. "Apa rowvv—eoer;| “ Will 
you then in this (in select- 
ing me) be doing also what 
Socrates desired—ministering 
to the gratification of all pre- 
sent?” καὶ is separated from 
πᾶσι κεχ. ἔσει by the insertion 
of the clause καθάπερ εἶπε Σω- 


κράτης. So infr. p. 241 ¢: καὶ, 
καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες, ἀγαπήσεις ; 


Tim. 20 ¢: καὶ μὲν δὴ, καθάπερ 
εἶπε Τίμαιος ὅδε, k.7.A. Theet. 
210 b: καὶ, ναὶ μὰ Δί᾽ ἔγωγε, 
πλείω k.T.A. εἶπε Σ. refers to ἡμῶν 
-- αἰτησάντων χάριν, in which 
words Socrates had included 
all present. 

3. Kwédvveter — ἑταίρου) A 
murmur of assent from the by- 
standers must be supposed to 
follow Theztetus’ words. 

5. τῷ μήκει πονῶν] Stallbaum, 
in his note, has substituted 
πόνων for πονῶν, but the par- 
ticiple is obviously right. For 


idia βουλεύσει 
é 


> ΄ 
ἐμοῦ σοι συσ- 


the dative, 
681: πονῶν 
xm. 

6. μὴ ἐμὲ αἰτιᾶσθαι) Bodl. Vat. 
Ven. Π. pe. The infinitive is 
a softened imperative, cf. Rep. 
5) 473 a; πῆ. 262 δ: ov por 
φράζειν. 

9. ἐὰν δὲ----Σωκράτη] So Pro- 
tarchus relieves Philebus, when 
tired. Phileb. τι €: ἀνάγκη 
δέχεσθαι, Φίληβος yap ἡμῖν 6 
καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν. 

12. τὰ πολλὰ is better taken 
as cognate accusative after 
συνδιαπονεῖν than as adverbial to 
οὐκ ἀηθές. ‘* Who is well used 
in most things to share labours 
with me.” Young Socrates ap- 
pears in the Theztetus as a 
mute personage, and shares 
the credit of the geometrico- 
arithmetical definition of the 
irrational roots. Thezt. 147, 
148. 


cf. Soph. Trach. 


πλευρὰν πικρᾷ γλω- 


-- 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


— 
a. 
ew 


7 4 fal ε > Y a > 4 
0. 218. κεπτέον ἀρχομένῳ πρῶτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ 


“ fal - > / / 
τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ζητοῦντι καὶ ἐμφανίζοντι λόγῳ Ti ποτ᾽ 


” ᾿ς ᾿ \ ’ 4. IN , ΄ "7 
ἔστι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ σύ [τε] κἀγὼ τούτου πέρι τοὔνομα 


/ "7 ΤΣ Ν δὲ 4 Di fo > a 
μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ" TO δὲ ἔργον, Eh ᾧ καλοῦμεν, 


I. νῦν, which is opposed 
to προϊόντος 7.X., and would 
be joined most naturally with 
συσκεπτέον, appears to be dis- 
placed by ἃ conversational 
hyperbaton, perhaps to avoid 
the hiatus φαίνεται--- ἀπὸ, per- 
haps drawn by a sort of at- 
traction to the words which 
indicate the immediate subject 
of discourse. νῦν is again dis- 
placed, apparently for euphony, 
intieeeenc, 251 ΡΒ cf. also 
Legg. 1, 627 b: τὸ δ᾽ ὑπὸ σοῦ 
λεγόμενον μανθάνω νῦν. 

2. ἐμφανίζοντι λόγῳ] “ Mak- 
ing clear by argument.” Dia- 
lectic is at once a process of 
discovery and of proof. ἐμφανί- 
ζοντι of course agrees with σοι 
and not with ἐμοὶ, as Ast seems, 
by some strange oversight, to 
have supposed. λόγῳ is slightly 
emphatic, and is referred to in 
what immediately follows. évo- 
pa =the name, is distinguished 
on the one hand from ἔργον 
or πρᾶγμα, the thing, and on 
the other from λόγος, the de- 
finition or true conception of 
the thing. For the former, cf. 
Cratyl. 413 6: αὐτὸ μηνύει τὸ 
ἔργον τὸ ὄνομα ἡ ἀνρεία, and for 
the latter, Thezt. 202, which 
is closely related to the pre- 
sent passage. The conception 
of λόγος is the same in this 
place as in the conclusion of 
the Theetetus, viz. definition 
through division or the ex- 
pression of the characteristic 
difference. ἔργον and λόγος are 


here correlative, and not op- 
posed, as in the common anti- 
thesis ἔργῳ οὐ λόγῳ. The union 
of both, τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ διὰ λόγων, 
is opposed to the mere name, 
TO ὄνομα μόνον χωρὶς λόγου. ‘The 
variation οἵ ἔργον and πρᾶγμα is 
perhaps due to the same re- 
finement to which that of φῦ- 
λον and γένος is owing. But 
épyov is rather the Sophist’s 
function, πρᾶγμα simply the 
thing meant by the word. Cf. 
also Legg. 9, 864 Ὁ: ἡμῖν δὲ 
= Segue haa Geta } 
Οὐκ εστι τὰ νυν ονοματῶν περι 
δύσερις λόγος. Ib. 10, 895 d: 
ap οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἑκάστου 
τρία νοεῖν,---ὄν μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἕν 
δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον, ἕν δὲ τὸ 
ὄνομα κιτ.λ. Lb. 12, 964 ἃ: σκο- 
πῶμεν τὸν εἰδότα ἱκανῶς περὶ ὧντι- 
νωνοῦν, οἷς ἔστι μὲν ὄνομα, ἔστι δ᾽ 
αὖ καὶ λόγος, πότερον μόνον ἐπίστα- 
σθαι τοὔνομα χρέων ἢ τόν γε ὄντα 
τι καὶ περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων μεγέθει 
καὶ κάλλει πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ayvo- 
εἴν αἰσχρόν. φῦλον, tribe, is a 
more poetical, because a newer, 
metaphor, for the idea of Sort 
or Kind than yévos, race or 
Jamily. The search for the 
Sophist is spoken of as a 
branch of natural history. For 
τὸ ὀνομα---συνωμολογήσασθαι, cf. 
Theet. 164 c: 
ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ὁμολογησά- 
μενοι. 

3. σύ [τε] κἀγώ] The Bodleian 
MS. gives σὺ κἀγώ with the 
rest, except Flor. i. 

4. ef ᾧ καλοῦμεν] Se. τὸ 
ὄνομα. 


πρὸς τὰς τῶν 


* Sophist.” 
Our object 
is to define 
the thing, 
and so to 
bring to 
light the 
conception 


which, it 

may be, we 
have seve- 
rally within 
our minds, 


Great sub- 
jects, it has 
long been 
felt, should 
be ap- 
proached 
through 
easy exam- 
ples. And, 
as the So- 
phist is a 
creature 


difficult to τὸ Κα 


14 


΄ Ἄ £49 Δ > / ᾽ ΄ ΄ο > ΄σ y - 
EKATEPOS ταχ ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐχοιμεν" δεῖ p. 218. |! 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


\ ee.’ Ν / \ o 5 Ἀ lal \ 
δὲ cael παντὸς πέρι TO πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ 


λόγων ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνομολογήσασθαι χωρὶς 


7 Ν \ a A “. , ἊΝ rn > 
λόγου. τὸ de φῦλον, ὃ νῦν ἐπινοοῦμεν ζγεῖν, οὐ 


vA en ΄σ' 7 3,“ « , 
5πάντων ῥᾷστον συλλαβεῖν TL ποτ᾿ ἐστιν, ὁ σοφιστης. 


lod > lal / lal lal ΄σ 
ὅσα δ᾽ αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ 


΄ ,, 7 a Ν ΄ Ν ᾿ς 
τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσι καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον 


5 cal Ν (on ff > \ Lad ἴω Ν 5 
ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥᾷοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾷν, πρὶν ἐν 


> ΄ ΄σ / an 5 53 7 327) 
αὐυτοις Τοῖς PEYLOTOLS. νυν OUI, 5) Θεαίτητε, EYWYE 


4. τὸ δὲ φῦλον -- ὁδόν] “ Now 
the Sophist tribe, which we are at 
present minded to examine, is of 
a nature which is not the easiest 
in the world to comprehend. 
Again, when a great subject is 
to be adequately handled, it 
has long since been the ap- 
proved course in such a case 
to try one’s hand upon the 
question in trivial and easy 
instances, before attempting 
it in the great matter which 
has been undertaken. On 
the present occasion there- 
fore, Thezetetus, I would re- 
commend that you and I, con- 
sidering the Sophist to be of a 
kind which is difficult to cap- 
ture and to chase, should try 
our prentice hand on some 
easier quarry, and make this a 
preparatory study of the way 
to find him, unless you have 
at your command some more 
feasible proposal.” Perhaps in 
τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ there is an 
allusion to the literal mean- 
ing of μετιέναι, ‘to pursue.’ Cf. 
infr. 235 d. 

οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον Cf. inf. 


274. 6. [ἢ ἘΠ Ρ: Ὁ; 10 τ οὐ 


Ν lal -“ὔ / \ , 
ὶ νῷν οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσθήρευτον 


πάντως ῥᾷστον διελθεῖν, πάντων 
should probably be read. 
7. καὶ πάλαι) “ Even from of 


old.” Not only now but long 
ago. Cf. Theet. 202 d: καὶ 
πολλοί. 


τὸ---δεῖν] The article marks 
the infinitive as the subject of 
the verb. περὶ τῶν τοιούτων may 
be construed with δέδοκται, but 
belongs rather to the whole 
sentence. “In dealing with such 
subjects it has long been the 
general opinion that one should 
first exercise inquiry on lesser 
and easier topics.” αὐτὰ is vague, 
resuming τῶν τοιούτων, but in a 
more general sense = theinquiry 
or the method of procedure. 

10. χαλεπὸν---προμελετᾷν]} These 
words are in apposition to οὕτω 
after συμβουλεύω. χαλεπὸν = 
“troublesome.” As if he were 
some animal we were trying to 
lay hold of. Cf. Polit.273 Ὁ: ὅσα 
χαλεπὰ τὰς φύσεις (86. τῶν θηρίων), 
and Rep. 6, 493 b: ὁπότε χαλε- 
πώτατον καὶ πραότατον Kal ἐκ τίνων 
γίγνεται. The metaphor, which 
appears very slightly in τὸ φῦ- 
ov — συλλαβεῖν, 15. more dis- 
tinctly present here, and in 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


« / ny ἊΝ ων ‘a / / » 
Τρ. 218. ηγησαμένοις εἰναι τὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον ἐν 





p. 219. 


LAX δ} Ν 6 ὃ > nan Ἃ lal > Ν 
a ῳ βῴονι ΤῊΨν μέσοοον αὐτοὺυ Τρομε ETAV, ει μὴ OU 


7 


Ε] / yy , lay A « / 
ποθεν εὐπετεστέραν Exes εἰπεῖν ἄλλην οδὸν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔχω. 


/ “ ΄ a 
EE. Βούλει δῆτα περί τινος τῶν φαύλων μετιόντες 


πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 


ΞΕ. Ti δῆτα προταζαίμεθ᾽ 
καὶ σμικρόν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς 


“Ὁ 77 Ν 
ἄν εὐγνωστον μέν 


>’ 7 vy ΄σ- 
ἐλαττονα ἐχον τῶν 


/ © » La ie) > an / / 
μειζόνων $ OLOV ἀσπαλιευτὴς ap OV πᾶσι TE γνω- 


a > 4 ΄σ ἊΝ / 
ριμον καὶ σπουδῆς οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινὸς ἐπάξιον : 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


EE. Μέθοδον μὴν αὐτὸν ἐλπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ 


5 7 Chae » Ἀ a 7 
ἀνεπιτήδειον ἡμῖν ἔχειν πρὸς ὃ βουλομεθα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι. 


the word δυσθήρευτον, which is 
partly suggested by χαλεπὸν 
and partly by οὐ ῥάδιον συλλα- 
Bev, the image of the chase, 
which is continued afterwards, 
is fully brought out. 

2. τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελε- 
rav| “ΤῸ practise beforehand 
the method, which is proper 
to be applied to him.” For the 
genitive αὐτοῦ, see below: μέθο- 
Sov μὴν αὐτὸν ἐλπίζω----ἔχειν. 

For ποθὲν, cf. Polit. 257 d: 
κινδυνεύετον ἄμφω ποθὲν ἐμοὶ συγ- 
γένειαν ἔχειν τινά. 

5. μετιόντες) Used absolutely, 
as in Protag. 350 d: εἰ οὕτω με- 
τιὼν ἔροιό με. It is natural that 
words like μετιέναι and χρῆσθαι 
(supr. 217 6), which recur often 
with the same object (λόγος), 
should sometimes be used 
alone. 

6. παράδειγμα θεῖναι] Cf. Polit. 


277 ὃ sqq., where the nature 
of such examples is explained. 
The “large letters” of the Re- 
public afford an apparent in- 
stance of the converse method. 
But in each case the inquiry 
advances from the less known 
to the more known. 

8. προταξαίμεθ᾽ ἂν] Se. ζητεῖν 
ΟΥ̓ μετιέναι. 

10. οἷον ἀσπαλιευτής) The con- 
struction is absolute. Cf. Theset. 
178 6: οἷον θερμά, ἄρα x.7.d. 
Euthyd. 302 a: οἷον βοῦς καὶ 
πρόβατα, dpa k.t.d. alib. 

II. ov πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινός] 
“ Worth no very great amount 
of interest.” 

15. Καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι] “That is 
well.” Theexpression is slightly 
hypothetical. Theztetus takes 
the Stranger’s word for what 
he himself does not clearly 
see, 


Io 


hs 
on 


catch, it is 
advisable 
to adopt 
this plan 
with him. 


Let the 
angler be ~ 
our ex- 
ample, in 
which to 
practise the 
method of 
definition. 


10 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
EE. Φέρε δή, τῆδε ἀρχώμεθα αὐτοῦ. καί μοι λέγε" p- 219}) 


/ ξ 7 » Ν ΕΣ 3) 32 A 
πότερον WS τεχνίτην αὐτὸν ἢ τινα ἄτεχνον, ἀλλὴν δὲ 
ΕΣ / 
δύναμιν ἔχοντα, θήσομεν ; 
A ad ΄ 7 
ΘΕΑΙ. ἭΚκιστα γε ἄτεχνον. 


> \ ἴω cal ΄- A 
Heisan 5 EH. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τῶν ye τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν 


artist, and Ks 7 

there are εἰδὴ δυο. 

two kinds Ξ 

of art: OEAI. [las ; 


— / \ Ν a Ν XN 6 3 ΄σ 
=i Dip Γεωργία μέν K&L 007) πέρι ΤΟ νῆτον πᾶν 


an 7 7 3 \ Ν 7ὔ \ 
σῶμα θεραπεία, τὸ τε ad περὶ τὸ ξύνθετον καὶ 


- 


/ a \ a 7 A / 
ιοτλαστον, Ὁ δὴ σκεῦος ὠνομάκαμεν, ἣ TE μιμητική, b 


72 “ / > x CEN / δ νῆι 
ξύμπαντα TAVTA OLKALOTAT αν EVL 7 POO AYOPEVOLT αν 


» / 
ονοματι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. [as καὶ τίνι: 


— ΄- «“ “δ Ν , / Ὰ a , 
=E. [lav ὅπερ av μὴ πρότερον τις ov ὕστερον eis 


I. αὐτοῦ is probably neuter. 
Cf. Rep. 2, 369 b: εἰ γιγνομένην 
πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ --- οὐκοῦν 
γενομένου αὐτοῦ. 

2. ἄτεχνον, ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν 
ἔχοντα] For the qualifying 
clause with δὲ, compare Polit. 
277 ¢: τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις διὰ χει- 
ρουργιῶν, et passim; and for 
the etymological use of ἄτεχνον, 
cf. Thezt. 168 a: ἀντὶ----φιλοσό- 
ov μισοῦντας τοῦτο TO πρᾶγμα. 
Legg. 7, 810 ἃ: φιλοσοφοῦντα 
μηδὲ μισοῦντα. Ib. 10, 886 ο: 
Θεογονίαν --- γενόμενοί τε ὡς πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους ὡμίλησαν. 

4. Ἥκιστά γε] γε, though 
omitted by the Bodleian MS., 
with AT, is probably right, and 
expresses assent to the meaning 
of the question. 

8. πᾶν σῶμα] “ All,” col- 
lectively, as in Ar. Eth. Nice. 
1. 13. ὃ 7: ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ πᾶν 
σῶμα. For σκεῦος = ξύνθετον 
καὶ πλαστόν, cf. Rep. 2, 381 ἃ: 


καὶ μὴν καὶ τά γε Evvbera 
πάντα, σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα 
καὶ ἀμφιέσματα. σκεῦος here de- 
notes what is manufactured, 
(compounded or moulded,) as 
distinguished from organized 
bodies; cf. Rep. 10, 596 d. 
σῶμα acquires a still more 
general meaning in Phileb. 29 
d, infr. 246 a. 

11. δικαιότατ᾽ av ἑνὶ] The Bod- 
leian, with a corrector of the 
Coislinian MS., gives ay twice 
over, after δικαιότατα and προσ- 
ayopevotro. 

14. Πᾶν ὅπερ] “ In the case of 
everything, which—.” The ac- 
cusative is placed, as if abso- 
lutely, at the beginning of the 
sentence, and is rather governed 
by φαμὲν than by ἄγοντα. Cf. 
Polit.295 d: πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον Evp- 
βαινον, where the accusative is 
absolute. And infr. τὸ----μαθημα- 
τικὸν---εἶδος. Forthe meaning, cf. 
Theet. 155 Ὁ: ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 17 





p. 219. οὐσίαν ayy, τὸν μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀγόμενον 
ποιεῖσθαί πού φαμεν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθῶς. 
BE. Τὰ δέ ye νῦν δὴ [ἃ] διήλθομεν ἅπαντα εἶχεν 
εἰς τοῦτο τὴν αὑτῶν δύναμιν. 5 
OEAI. Εἶχε yap οὖν. 
SE. Ποιητικὴν τοίνυν αὐτὰ συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι Anes 
προσείπωμεν. : 
6. ΘΈΑΙ. "ἕστω. 


EE. To δὴ μαθηματικὸν αὖ μετὰ τοῦτο εἶδος ὅλον 


_ 


° 


ΝῊ Ν - / , \ Qi Ὁ 
καὶ TO TNS YUMPLOEWS TO TE KPNMATLOTLKOV και AYW- 


ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ “ Well, if we take next to this 
γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον; the whole department of learn- 
Symp. 205 Ὁ: ἡ γάρ ro ek τοῦ ing and of acquiring know- 
μὴ ὄντος eis τὸ ὃν ἰόντι ὁτῳοῦν ledge, with those of money- 
αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι ποίησις. Pro- making,contention and pursuit, 
duction is more fully described since none of these produces, 
in Legg. 10, 894 a: γίγνεται but they are engaged either in 
δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἥνικ᾽ ἂν τί πάθος conquering, or in preventing 
ἢ; δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα ~=men from conquering, that 
αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθη μετά- which already exists and has 
βασιν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλή-ἠἑ been produced,— on account 
σιον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα of all these sections, it will ap- 
αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις. pear most suitable to use the 

4. Ta δέ ye viv δὴ [a] διήλθο- term ‘acquisitive art.” “It 
μεν] “But those things which will indeed wear an appro- 
we just now enumerated.” ais priate look.” Observe that no 
omitted in the Bodleian and attempt is made to look for the 
seven other MSS. The reading Sophist either in the μαθηματι- 
a δέ ye νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, which is κὸν ΟΥ̓γνωριστικὸν εἶδος τῶν τεχ- 
adopted by the Zurich editors, νῶν. The construction of the 
is due to a corrector of the sentence is not determined from 
Coislinian MS. But the read- the beginning, but the accusa- 
ing in the text is preferable tives (which are resumed in 
as being less obvious; and the ταῦτα ξυνάπαντα τὰ μέρη) simply 
inversion (νῦν δὴ ἃ for a viv δὴ) follow the analogy of ποιητικὴν 


is in the manner of these dia- —avra. 
logues. (The old edd. had νῦν μαθηματικὸνἹ So the Bod- 
a δή with BEF.) leian MS. Here, as in Ar. Met. 


For ra—a, cf. Rep.8,585 b: I.1, the MSS. vary between 
τὰ οἷον σίτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου. μαθηματ. and μαθητ. 
10, Τὸ δὴ --- πρέποι γὰρ ἄν] 


D 


18 ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


Ν Ν / > ‘ “ \ sal 
νιστικὸν καὶ OnpevTiKov,—e7reLOn δημιουργεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν Pp. 219. }) 


/ \ \ 7 Ν / ‘ \ ω 
τούτων, τὰ δὲ ὄντα καὶ γεγονότα τὰ μεν χειροῦται 


7 Us \ \ a / > 
λόγοις καὶ πράζεσι, Ta δὲ TOL χειρουμενοις ουκ 


> , 7 ᾽ "7 Ν ad ΄ Ν 
ἐπιτρέπει,----μαλιστ᾽ ἂν που διὰ ταῦτα ξυνάπαντα τα 


’ 7 Ν ΄σ ὃ / 
And an art 5 μέρη τέχνη τις κτητικὴ λεχθεῖσα av διαπρέψειεν. 


of getting. 


The an- 
gler’s is an 
art of get- 
ting. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Nai: πρέποι yap av. 


Lal \ Lal ¢ ral : » ΄ 
HE. Κτητικῆς δὴ καὶ ποιητικῆς ξυμπασῶν οὐσῶν 


a “ ᾽ 7 Χ > , 3 Us 
τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν ποτέρᾳ τὴν ἀσπαλιευτικὴν, ὦ Θεαί- 


TNTE, τιθῶμεν: 


BEAL. Ἔν κτητικῇ που δῆλον. 


2. τὰ μὲν χειροῦται λόγοις] Cf. 
Euthyd. 290b, where geometers 
&c.are classed amongst @npevrat. 

3 ’ ~ > , 

4. ἐπιτρέπει] SC. χειροῦσθαι αὐτά. 

, > ” ΄ 
μάλιστ᾽ ἄν που ---διαπρέψειεν] 
So Bodl. δ. Π| 1. : cett. διαγρά- 
Ψειεν. If we compare the cor- 
responding clause in the pre- 
ceding context, supr. Ὁ, ξύμ- 


mavra ταῦτα --- ὀνόματι, it ap- 
pears that no rendering of 
these words 15 satisfactory 


which separates ταῦτα from 
ξυνάπαντα τὰ peépyn-(e. g. Stallb. 
“maximé propterea has partes 
cunctas—dici decebit :’ which 
is also objectionable because 
of the harshness of the at- 
traction, λεχθεῖσα for λεχθέντα). 
The same objection holds (un- 
less διὰ were omitted) against 
the reading διαγράψειεν, which 
was justly suspected on other 
grounds by Heindorf. Hence 
the preceding  accusatives, 
which are absolute, are re- 
sumed with a new construc- 
tion in ταῦτα ξυνάπαντα τὰ μέρη: 
and the words mean either, as 
above rendered, “an art of ac- 
quisition is the most suitable 
to be named on account of all 


these parts” (cf. Polit. 269 ο: 
πρέψει ῥηθέν. ib. 288 6: τοῦτο 
----Ὗτούτοις ἕν ὄνομα ἅπασιν πρέψει 
προσαγορευθέν), or, by a return 
to poetical usage, suggested by 
the rare verb, διὰ may per- 
haps be construed “through- 
out,” and διαπρέψειεν may re- 
tain something of the original 
meaning of “ looking brightly 
forth.’ “ An art of acquisition 
will, when named, be seen 
clearly to pervade all these 
sections.” Cf. Emped. Fr. vv. 
5,6: τρὶς μὲν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακά- 
ρὼν ἀλαλῆσθαι γεινόμενον παντοῖα 
διὰ χρέω εἴδεα θνητῶν. Hom. 
Hymn to Hermes, vv. 350, 1: 
ὄφρα μὲν οὖν ἐδίωκε διὰ ψαμα- 
θωδέα χῶρον, ῥεῖα μάλ᾽ ἴχνια 
πάντα διέπρεπεν ἐν κονίῃσιν. The 
latter interpretation makes the 
anacoluthon easier, and gives 
a more appropriate meaning 
to the compound verb, but is 
too singular to be asserted with 
confidence. For μάλιστα, ef. infr. 
266a: τὼ δὲ ὑπολοίπω σχεδὸν 
μάλιστ᾽ ἂν λεγοίσθην εἰδωλοποϊκώ. 

6. πρέποι γὰρ av] Se. οὕτω 
λεχθεῖσα. 

το. δῆλον] Se. ὅτι. 





ῃ Ρ. 210. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 19 


HE. Κτητικῆς δὲ ap’ ov δύο εἴδη ; τὸ μὲν ἑκόντων 


\ Cees \ Ἂ , - δ 
προς ἑκόντας μεταβλητικὸν ὃν διά τε δωρεῶν καὶ 


us » 4 \ > ᾽ 
μισθώσεων καὶ ἀγοράσεων ; τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἢ KaT Not by 
ἘΠ A Ἢ , 3 ; \ contract or 
ἐργα ἢ κατὰ λόγους χειρούμενον ξύμπαν χειρωτικὸν — exchange, 
but con- 
Ἂ ” 
QV εἰὴ 3 quest. 
ΘΙΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. 
hn / / ‘ Ἀ 5 — 
SE. Τί δέ; τὴν χειρωτικὴν ap ov διχῇ τμητέον ; 
SEAT. In; 
—) N \ Nancy : 
HE. To μὲν ἀναφανδὸν ὅλον ἀγωνιστικὸν {θέν-ὀ Δυὰ this 
not by 


ἊΝ \ ΄- » tad a , 
τες , To de κρυφαῖον αὐτῆς πᾶν θηρευτικόν. 


CEAI,. Ναί 


HE. Τὴν δέ γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἄλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ 


τέμνειν διχῇ. 

~ GEAI. Λέγε ὅπῃ. 
HE. Τὸ μὲν ἀψύχου 

ἐμψύχου. 


γένους διελομένους, τὸ δ᾽ 


GEAI. Τί μήν ; εἴπερ ἔστον γε ἄμφω. 


σι 


10 force but 


craft. 


‘ “ \ > Μ la . qn Ν 
Gi. ἸΙῶς δὲ οὐκ ἐστον ; καὶ δεῖ ye ἡμᾶς τὸ μὲν Now οἱ 


2. μεταβλητικὸν ὃν---κειρωτικὸν 
av etm] For the independent 
verb in the second of two de- 
pendent clauses, see Theet. 
149 6: δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε----καὶ 
-ο-Οἀμβλίσκουσιν, et passim. 

3. ἢ κατ᾽ ἔργα ἢ κατὰ λόγους] 
Like λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι above. 
Science is here included under 
χειρωτικῆ. Knowledge is like 
the kingdom of heaven, which 


the violent take by force. 


4. χειρούμενον is possibly 
passive, like ἀνασπώμενον, intr. 
221 (where see note), but this 
is less probable with the ac- 
tive χειροῦται preceding, supr. Ὁ. 
See also 220 ὃ: τὸ μὲν -- 
ποιεῖται τὴν θήραν. 225 6, ἀμφι- 
σβητοῦν. 


D 


ξύμπαν) I. 6. while undi- 
vided. So ὅλον, πᾶν, κιτ.λ., In 
what follows. 

9. tdetest] Se. τέμνωμεν. 
θέντας Heind. and Par. E. corr. 
The MS. confirmation is too 
slight to justify the admission 
of a conjecture, which must 
however be regarded as pro- 
bable. Cf. infir. διελομένους. But 
see Polit. 302 d: καὶ ταύτην 
ἡμῖν θετέον ἐστὶ διπλῆν. Πῶς δή ; 
καὶ τίνι διαιροῦντες ταύτην. 

12. ἄλογον] “ Tllogical.” 
I. e. Undiscriminating: the 
function of λόγος being to dis- 
tinguish. Cf. Thezet. sub fin. 

17. εἴπερ ἔστον ye aude] 
I. 6. if there is ἃ θήρα τῶν 
ἀψύχων. 


[2] 
- 


catching by 


craft, one 
kind pur- 
sues in- 
animate 
things, the 
other ani- 
mals, 


And the 
art of ani- 
mal-catch- 


ing pursues 
either land 


or water- 
prey. Of 
aquatic 
creatures, 
some fly, 
some only 
swim ; 
whence 
fowling is 
distin- 
guished 
from fish- 


ing. 


20 


σι ᾽ 7 7 ako 4 ᾽ » “ 
τῶν ἀψύχων, ἀνώνυμον *ov* πλὴν κατ᾽ Evia τῆς Pp. 220. }} 


MAATQNOZ 


“ 3, Ν ~ 3 », 4 
κολυμβητικῆς ἄττα μέρη καὶ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄλλα βραχέα, 


/ 5. Ν ὃ , a » ΄ὔ , 5 θ , 
χαίρειν ἐᾶσαι, TO δέ, τῶν ἐμψύχων ζώων οὖσαν θήραν, 


προσειπεῖν ζωοθηρικήν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. "Eoro. 


EE. Ζωοθηρικῆς δὲ ap οὐ διπλοῦν εἶδος ἂν λέ. 


> / Ν \ “22 Ζ / -“ vy 
yoto ἐν δίκῃ, TO μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοῖς εἴδεσι 


Ν 3 / / / ἈΝ , os 
καὶ ὀνόμασι διῃρημένον, πεζοθηρικόν. τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον 


lod 4 ca. > / 
VEVO TLKOU ζώου παν ενυγροθηρικον 9 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. 


a \ Ν \ \ ΄σ € vad 
SE. Νευστικοῦ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνὸν φῦλον ορώμεν, 


τὸ δὲ ἔνυδρον ; 


OCEAL. Hos & ov; 


a a Χ ,ὔ lal « ΄σ c 
=E. Καὶ tov πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πᾶσα ημῖν ἢ 


I. ἀνώνυμον Ὁ] MSS. ἐᾶν 


(sic Bodl.) ὃν is Heindorf’s 
conjecture. Cf. Polit. 260e: 


ἀνώνυμον ὃν τυγχάνει τὸ γένος. 
The difference of tense (ἐᾷν--- 
ἐᾶσαι) forbids the notion of an 
epexegesis like that in Legg. 
3, 6907 a: τὸ δὲ τριχῇ διελεῖν---- 
πειραθῶμεν διατεμεῖν. Cf., how- 
ever, Parm. Fr. 725 : τὴν μὲν ἐᾷν 
Plat. Lege. 
9, 878 b: ἀνώνυμον ἐᾷν. 

τῆς κολυμβητικῆς ἄττα μέρη] 
E. g. ἡ τῶν σπογγοκολυμβητῶν 


> 
ἀνόητον, ἀνώνυμον. 


θήρα. Υ. Oppian Halieut. V. 
612. 
11. Νευστικοῦ] “οἱ what 


swims.” The article is some- 
times omitted before a generic 
or collective word. Cf. infr. 
221 bh: ξυμπασῆς --τέχνης. Mr. 
Grote remarks on this (Plato, 
&c., vol. ii. p. 401): “ Plato 
considers the air as a fluid 


/ / / / > / 
15 θήρα λέγεταί ποὺ τις ὀρνιθευτικη. 


birds swim.” But 
the νευστικά πτηνά are the 
water-fowl. The expression 
πᾶσα ---ἡ θήρα below probably 
implies that only a part of 
ὀρνιθευτικὴ has been previously 
mentioned. In Legg. 7,824 6 
the ἐνυγροθηρευτὴς is  distin- 
guished from the ὀρνιθευτὴς, 
and is forbidden to exercise 


in which 


his art in harbours, or in 
sacred rivers, marshes, or 
pools. In the present passage 


évvypos is distinguished from 
ἔνυδρος, “in wet” from “ under 
water,’ the former term in- 
cluding the latter. The Eleate 
shews his dialectical skill in 
proving that ‘“ aquatie sport” 
is not an adequate definition 
of the fisherman’s craft. 

14. πᾶσα---ἡ θήρα] 1. 6. not 
only of the νευστικὸν πτηνόν but 
of all that flies. The objection 


b 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 21 


OEAI. Λέγεται yap οὖν. 


HE. Tod δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἁλιευτική. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 


/ / 5 Ν / oh) ’ “Δ \ 
BE. Τί δέ; ταύτην ad τὴν θήραν ap οὐκ av κατὰ 


μέγιστα μέρη δύο διελοίμην ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ ποῖα: 


ἃ δ / ΄ \ 
HE. Kad’ a τὸ μὲν ἕρκεσιν αὐτόθι ποιεῖται τὴν 


θήραν, τὸ δὲ πληγῇ. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις, καὶ πῇ διαιρούμενος ἑκάτερον; 


δ / / “ “ a‘ σ“ / 
ΞΕ. To pev,—ore πᾶν ὅσον av ἕνεκα κωλυσεως 


7 ie “ Ν >’ 7 
εἰργῃ τι περιέχον, EPKOS εἰκὸς ὀνομάζειν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


BE. Κύρτους δὴ καὶ δίκτυα καὶ βρόχους καὶ 


΄ Ν \ a lal + Χ σ΄ 
ποόρκοὺυς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μῶν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἐρκὴ 


χρὴ προσαγορεύειν: 


of Aristot., de Part. Anim. I. 2, 
applies here: προσήκει μὴ δια- 
σπᾷν ἕκαστον γένος, οἷον τοὺς ὄρνι- 
θας τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῆδε τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν 
ἄλλῃ διαιρέσει, καθάστερ ἔχουσιν ai 
γεγραμμέναι διαιρες εἰς. 

7. αὐτόθι] (Par. F. αὐτόθεν). 
Hither (if αὐτόθι is emphatic, 
for which somewhat rare use 
in Attic cf. Lege. 3, 702 0); 
“The one pursues his game 
with enclosures in the very 
haunts of his prey.” But the 
adverb in this case belongs 
rather to the noun than the 
verb. Or, better, referring to 
evvdpov supr., “The one pur- 
sues his game there with en- 
closures, the other by striking.” 
αὐτόθι is then taken equally 
with both clauses, and the sole 
emphasis is laid on ἕρκεσιν as 
opposed to πληγῇ. Plato im- 
plies that the word ἕρκος is to 
be derived from εἴργω. 


10, Τὸ μὲν--τοιοῦτον] The sen- 
tence is interrupted by the 
minor premiss, κύρτους «.7.A., in 
which the general definition of 
ἕρκος is applied, and τὸ μὲν is 
more explicitly resumed in τοῦτο 
μέν. τοῦτο refers to the processes 
connected with creels, nets, 
and the other implements just 
mentioned, amongst which πόρ- 
kos seems to have been rather 
a rush-basket than anet. ‘One 
kind—since all that encloses 
anything to prevent egress 
may naturally be termed an en- 
closure. (Certainly.) Whence 
baskets and casting-nets, and 
nooses and creels, and the like 
must be called enclosures and 
nothing else. (Exactly.) This 
department therefore of the 
sport we shall name ‘fishing 
by enclosure.” 

14. ἄλλο] Bodl. om. 


on 


Of fishing 
there are 
two chief 
parts, one 
working by 
enclosure, 
as with 
baskets, 
creels, and 
nets, the 
10 other by 
striking ; 
and this 
sometimes 
at night, 
by torch- 
light, some- 
times by 
day with 
, barbed 
points. 


These are 
either im- 
pelled from 
above, as 
inspearing, 
or jerked 
up from be- 
neath, with 
canes or 
rods, into 
the head 
or lips of 
the prey. 


5 


OO 
a 


OEAI. Οὐδέν. 


2 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


— yy σ \ y « Ν “ 4 Ν 
ΞῈ..- -Γοῦτο μὲν apa ἑρκοθηρικὸν τῆς ἀγρας τὸ 


/ / Ὑ ~ 
μέρος φήσομεν, ἢ TL τοιοῦτον. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 


5 ΞΕ, Τὸ δὲ ἀγκίστροις καὶ τριόδουσι πληγῇ γιγνό- 


- \ ᾽ / \ / / 
μενον ETEPOV μεν εκείνου, πληκτικὴν δέ τινα θήραν 


tf A va CuK / a Jf “Ὁ / ΕΣ 
ἡμᾶς προσειπεῖν evi λόγῳ νὺν χρεῶν. ἢ TL τις ἂν, 


> 5) ΄ 
[ὦ] Θεαίτητε, εἴποι κάλλιον ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αμελῶμεν τοῦ ὀνόματος" ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ 


τοτοῦτο. 


= Ey TH 7, a \ \ , 5 
μὰ, bs τοίνυν πληκτικὴς TO μὲν νυκτερινον, οἶμαι, 


Ν XN a / « ᾽ » cal lal Ν \ 
πρὸς πυρὸς φῶς γιγνόμενον ὑπ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ THY 


θήραν πυρευτικὴν ῥηθῆναι συμβέβηκεν. 


OEAI. Πάνυ γε. 


/ ec 3 ΄ 3, 
ΞῈ. Τὸ δέ γε μεθημερινόν, ὡς ἐχόντων ἐν ἄκροις 


3, a ΄ / 
ἄγκιστρα καὶ TOV τριοδόντων, πᾶν ἀγκιστρευτικόν. 
/ \ 3 
GEAI. Λέγεται yap οὖν. 


EE. Τοῦ τοίνυν a ἢ τῆς πληκτικῆς τὲ 
μι de OU τοινὺυν AYKLOT PEVTLKOU TNS TANKTLKNS TO 


\ A 5 \ 7 “ \ \ ΄σ / 
μὲν ἄνωθεν εἰς TO κάτω γιγνόμενον διὰ TO τοῖς TPLO- 


, 
κέκληται. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Φασὶ γοῦν τινές. 


ο 7 la , 5 
οδουσιν οὕτω μάλιστα χρῆσθαι τριοδοντία τις, οἶμαι, 


Ν ip ’ὔ aA Μ / e o 
ZE. To δέ ye λοιπὸν ἐστιν ἕν ἔτι μόνον, ὡς εἰπεῖν, 


εἰδος. 

ὃ: [o] ] i. 

12. πρὸς πυρὸς φῶς γιγνόμενον] 
The nocturnal branch of the 
art of striking fish, as it is pur- 
sued by fire-light, has received 
from those who practise it the 
name of ‘ firing.’ 

16. πᾶν ἀγκιστρευτικόν] Se. ἐρ- 
ρήθη from ῥηθῆναι συμβέβηκεν. 

ἀγκιστρευτικόν] This notion 
reappears in Legg. 7, 823 e 
(a curious passage): ὦ φίλοι, 


εἰθ᾽ ὑμᾶς μήτε τὶς ἐπιθυμία μήτ᾽ 
ἔρως τῆς περὶ θάλατταν θήρας ποτὲ 
λάβοι, μηδὲ ἀγκιστρείας" μηδ᾽ ὅλως 
τῆς τῶν ἐνύδρων ζώων, μήτε ἐγρη- 
γορόσι μήτε εὕδουσι κύρτοις (cf. 
supr. b.) ἀργὸν θήραν διαπονουμέ- 
νοις. (Cf. Opp. Halieut. 3, et 
566. : κύρτοις, οἱ κνώσσοντας ἑοὺς 
ηὔφρηναν ἄνακτας.) 

20. οὕτω] Sc. ἄνωθεν εἰς τὸ κάτω. 

χρῆσθαι] Sc. τοὺς περὶ τὴν τέχ- 
νην. Cf. Gorg. 457 ὁ, δύνανται. 





p. 220. |p 
fh 

d 

ee 






Bp. 2.20. 


2 221. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 23 
OEAI. To ποῖον ; 


HE. To τῆς ἐναντίας ταύτῃ πληγῆ:, ἀγκίστρῳ TE 
γιγνόμενον καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οὐχ 7) τις ἂν τύχῃ τοῦ σώ- 
απο; ὥσπερ τοῖς τριόδουσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν 
καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ θηρευθέντος ἑκάστοτε, καὶ κάτωθεν 5 


> 3 / yy e7 Ν / > ΄ὔ 
εἰς τουναντιον aAV@ ῥάβδοις καὶ καλάμοις ἀνασπῶ- 


Ὁ 7 ͵ 53 , rn 27 
μενον οὗ τί φήσομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δεῖν τοὔνομα 
λέγεσθαι: 

OHAI. Δοκῶ μέν, ὅπερ ἄρτι προὐθέμεθα δεῖν 


3 tal ΓΈ) 3 XN a > / 
ἐξευρεῖν, τοῦτ αὐτὸ νῦν ἀποτετελέσθαι. 


ἘΠῚ No yf o » las / / 3 \ 
i. Nouv apa τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικὴς πέρι σὺ TE KAY 


7 » ΄ 27 » \ 
συνωμολογήκαμεν οὐ μονον τοὔνομα, ἀλλὰ 


SIN 
Καὶ TOV 


, Ν SIN 5 5. 7 ε A , 
λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοὔργον εἰλήφαμεν ἱκανῶς. ξυμπά- 


σης γὰρ τέχνης 


\ \ “ ,ὔ Ν 53 
TO μὲν ἡμίσυ μέρος κτητικον ἣν, 


a \ , a \ a 
κτητικοῦ δὲ χειρωτικόν, χειρωτικοῦ δὲ θηρευτικόν, τοῦ 


3. 7 τις ἂν τύχῃ] “ Wherever 
one may chance to hit.” rvy- 
χάνω is here in transition from 
the literal to the metaphorical 
meaning (from “hit” to 
Ὁ chance”). 


9. ὅπερ---ἐξευρεῖν] “ The dis- 
covery of which we set before 
us as a task.” Cf. ri οὖν mpora- 
ξόμεθα supra, and, for the pleo- 
nasm of δεῖν, Rep. 6, 503 ¢: 
ἣν yap διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπ- 


4. ὥσπερ τοῖς τριόδουσιν] Se. ἀρχειν αὐτοῖς. Ib. 7, 535 a: 
γίγνεται ἡ πληγή. δεῖν ἐκλεκτέον. Phil. 50 ἃ. 

6. ἀνασπώμενον] This neuter 12. τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοὖργον] 
participle, like γιγνόμενον, 15 Ρ88- “The definition embracing 
sive, the cognate accusative of closely the thing itself,” vid. 
the active becoming the sub- supr. 218 6. Cf. also Legg. 
ject of the passive verb. See 10, 895 d (already quoted) : 
General Introduction. ‘“ The περὶ ἕκαστον τρία νοεῖν ---- ἕν pee 


kind which is characterized by 
the stroke opposite to this, 
made with a barbed point not 
in any chance part of the body 
as is done with spears, but 
about the head and mouth of 
the prey, and in the opposite 
direction, being effected with 
an upward jerking movement 
by means of rods and canes.” 


τὴν οὐσίαν, ἕν δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τὸν 
λόγον, ἕν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα, with which 
compare Ep. 7, 342. 

13. εἰλήφαμεν] The expression 
is amplified in the second clause 
and a new verb introduced, as 
often in Plato. 

14. τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ μέρος] “ The 
one half’’—the other, ποιητική, 
is passed over here. 


= 


This last 
distinction 
completes 
the defini- 
tion of the 
“Art of 
angling.” 


Of which 
we now 
possess in 
common, 
not the 
namealone, 
but an 
exact con- 
ception ex- 
pressed in 
words. 


24 ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ 


δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζωοθηρικόν, ζωοθηρικοῦ δὲ ἐνυγροθὴη- p. 221. |). 
ρικόν, ἐνυγροθηρικοῦ δὲ τὸ κάτωθεν τμῆμα ὅλον 
ἁλιευτικόν, ἁλιευτικῆς δὲ πληκτικόν, πληκτικῆς δὲ 
ἀγκιστρευτικόν᾽ τούτου δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν ἄνω 
5πληγὴν ἀνασπωμένην, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἀφο- ς 


θὲ yy « lod > r \ G θ lal > / 
JLOLMUEV τουνομᾶ, ἢ νυν GOTTAALEVTLKY) («ἡΤησεισα ἐπι- 


κλὴν γέγονεν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἱκανῶς δεδή.-- 


λωται. 


2. τὸ κάτωθεν] Cf. infr. 266 a. 

4. τὸ περὶ τὴν] “ The class 
which comprised.” Cf. supr. 
τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοὔργον. 

5. ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἀφο- 
μοιωθὲν τοὔνομα] 1.6. it is pro- 
posed to derive ἀσπαλιεύς from 
See also Tim. Lex. 
52: ἀσπαλιεὺς, ἁλιεὺς, ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ἀνασπᾷν τὴν ἄγραν. Hesychius 
has preserved the real deriva- 
tion from ἄσπαλος, an Athama- 

τέχνη 
(ποιητική)- --ἰ-- κτητική 


ἀνασπάω. 


(μεταβλητική) ---ἰ---κειρωτική 


(ἀγωνιστικη) ---ἰ - θηρευτική 


nian word for ‘fish.’ (Passow 
Lexie. 5. v.) 

6. ἡ νῦν ἀσπαλιευτικὴ ζητη- 
θεῖσα] 1.6. ἀσπαλιευτικὴ, ἡ νῦν 
ζητηθεῖσα. Cf. infr. 231 b: ἐν 
τῷ viv λόγῳ παραφανέντι.Ἡ Note 
the apposition of neuter and 
fem. : τὸ mepi—n «.7.d., and of 
the name with the thing: τοῦὔ- 
νομα with ἡ ἀσπαλιευτικήῆ. The 
following is a summary of the 
above divisions : 


(θήρα τῶν ἀψυχῶν)---ἰ--- ζωοθηρική 
(πεζοθηρικη)- -ἰ--- ἐνυγροθηρική 


(ὀρνιθευτικη)----ἰ -ἁλιευτική 


(ἑρκοθηρικη)---ἰ--- πληκτική 


8. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε 
ἱκανῶς δεδήλωται] The method 
of dichotomies has proved ade- 
quate for the definition of an 
art so simp'e and familiar as 
that of the angler. The notion 
of the Sophist, however, is more 
complex, and after several par- 
tial attempts, the definition of 
him is found to be impracti- 
cable, until we lay aside this 


(πυρευτικήη)---ἰ---ἀγκιστρευτική 
(τριοδοντία)- -ἰ--- ἀσπαλιευτική. 


method for a time and review 
some of our fundamental ideas. 
It is difficult to say how far 
the first or tentative part of 
the inquiry is seriously intended 
by Plato as an illustration or 
application of method. There 
is a tinge of satirical humour 
obvious in almost every line. 
This was the motive for the 
choice of the angler as an ex- 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. D5 


— , ῃ \ σι \ ΄ 
ΞΕ, Depe On, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸν 


\ > ΄σ « o vA P yy 
σοφιστὴν ἐπιχειρῶμεν εὑρεῖν, ὃ TL ποτ᾽ ἐστιν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 


μ-- Ν Χ > tas te eh ey \ or ΄ 
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνο y ἣν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον, 


, ’ , SA / 4 7 5 
πότερον ἰδιώτην ἡ τινα τέχνην e€xovTa θετέον εἶναι: 


\ > / 
Tov ἁσπαλιευτην. 


OEAI. Ναί. 


SE. Καὶ viv δὴ τοῦτον ἰδιώτην θήσομεν, ὦ Θεαί- 


Ἃ 7 « λ θ las , δ 
THTE, ἢ πανταπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστὴν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἰδιώτην: μανθάνω γὰρ ὃ λέγεις, ὡς 


%K \ ΕΙΣ va 7 5 i? yy lal yf 
σαντος δεῖ TOLOUTOS ELVQAL TO γε ονομὰ τοῦτο έεέχων. 


7 5 \ Css J « 
EE. ᾿Αλλά τινα τέχνην αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἔχοντα, ὡς 


y lA 
ἔοικε, θετέον. 


ample, this prompts the in- 
clusion of war and tyranny, 
pleading and arguing, under 
θηρευτική, and that of poetry 
and learning amongst the mer- 
chant’s wares, and the defini- 
tion of higgling in the market 
as an inartistic kind of con- 
troversy. A deeper irony un- 
derlies the admission of the 
Sophist’s claim to be considered 
as a purifier of the soul. Yet 
inseparably bound up with this 
tone of sarcasm there is the 
scientific spirit, which seeks for 
general truths and disregards 
common opinion. The defini- 
tion of the tyrant or the war- 
rior as a hunter of men falls 
in with Plato’s satiric fancy, 
but has also an element of 
scientific truth, and belongs 
to the effort to connect things 
apparently diverse under one 
idea. This mixture of satire 
and inquiry finds characteristic 
expression in intr. 2277" Ὁ: 
τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκα νοῦν 


πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ 
μὴ ξυγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη (ἡ 
τῶν λόγων τέχνη) τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο 
ἐξ ἴσου πάσας-- σεμνότερον δέ τι 
τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς 
δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενό- 
μικεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. 

8. Καὶ νῦν δὴ] “So now also.” 
καὶ to be taken closely with νῦν. 

9. ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν] The 
word here approaches the an- 
cient meaning of “ contriver,” 
= clever, one. < skilled prac= 
titioner.” 

11. *zavros* dei] The MSS. 
vary between πάντως and ov 
πάντως, the latter of which has 
grown out of the former. A 
further corruption (II) is τοιοῦ- 
tov—rov—eyovra. The correc- 
tion is due to the Zurich edi- 
tors. For παντὸς dei, cf. Aesch. 
Prom. 961 : 


παντὸς ἐλλείπω. 


πολλοῦ γε καὶ τοῦ 
ib. 1008 : τοῦ 
παντὸς δέω. 

τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχων] “Since 
he bears this name.” Cf. Polit. 
260 ¢: δεσπόζοντά γε. 


Following 
this exam- 
ple let us 
endeayour 
to find the 
nature of 
the Sophist 
also, 


σι 


Ts he an 
artist, as 
the fisher- 
man was 7 
10 His name 
declares 
him to be, 
par excel- 
lence, an 
artist. 


But his 
relation to 
the angler 
does not 
end here. 


They are 


bothsports- 


men; and 
each pur- 

sues a cer- 
tain living 
prey. 


From this 
point their 


26 MAATQNO2 


SEAL. Tiva wor οὖν δὴ ταύτην ; 
EE. Ap’ ὦ πρὸς θεῶν ἠγνοήκαμεν τἀνδρὸς τὸν 
ἄνδρα ὄντα ξυγγενῆ ; 
OEAI. Τίνα τοῦ ; 
5 BE. Τὸν ἀσπαλιευτὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ. 
ΘΕΑῚ In; 
EE. Θηρευτά τινε καταφαίνεσθον ἄμφω μοι. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Tivos θήρας ἅτερος : τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον 
εἴπομεν. 
ιο (ΞΕ. Δίχα ποὺ νῦν διείλομεν τὴν ἄγραν πᾶσαν, νευ-- 
στικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες. 
OEAI. Nai. 
EE. Kai τὸ μὲν διήλθομεν, ὅσον περὶ τὰ νευστικὰ 
τῶν ἐνύδρων" τὸ δὲ πεζὸν εἰάσαμεν ἄσχιστον. εἰπόν- 
15 TES ὅτι πολυειδὲς εἴη. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Tavu γε. 
EE. Μέχρι μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ὃ σοφιστής τε καὶ 
ὁ ἀσπαλιευτὴς ἅμα ἀπὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης πορεύ- 
εσθον. 
20 GEAT. ᾿Βοίκατον γοῦν. 
HE. ᾿Εκτρέπεσθον δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς ζωοθηρικῆς, ὃ 


2. τἀνδρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα! Cf. τὸ δ᾽ αὔξει. Eurip. Hippolyt. 
Rep. 5, 455 d: τὸ γένος τοῦ 233, 4. Theet. 181 ἃ. Legg. 
yevous. 12, 954 d: ἐκτημένος, ὁ δὲ 

10. νῦν διείλομεν] Cf. Theset. ζητῶν, alib. Phileb. 56 d: ἄλλην, 
159 ¢, νῦν διήλθομεν, where τὴν δὲ ἄλλην; Polit. 291 6: 
there is the same variation οἵ τυραννίδι, τὸ δὲ βασιλικῆ. Pheed. 
MSS.; some inserting δὴ, which 105 6. Bodl. and A πεζόν. 


on account of 8 succeeding 21. Ἐκτρέπεσθον] “Their paths 
may very possibly have dropped diverge when they have reach- 
out. ed the art of animal-hunting, 


νευστικοῦ μέρους, TO δὲ πεζοῦ] the one turning to the sea- 
For the omission of τὸ μὲν, ΒΟ shore and to rivers and lakes, 
is present in some MSS., com- [0 angle for the creatures that 
pare Soph. Trach. 117: τρέφει, ave therein.” 


Pp. 2206 |p? 


p. 222 








ΣΟΦΙΣΊΗΣ. 


27 


| Ce eran ΄ ΄ \ N ᾽ 
Np. 222. μὲν ἐπὶ θάλατταν που καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ λίμνας, τὰν 








/ πο , 
τούτοις ζῶα Onpevoopevos. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; 


— c , ᾽ \ A \ ε 
ΞΕ. ‘O δέ γε ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ ποταμοὺς ἑτέρους 


53 / , A / © a 5] / 
αὖ τινὰς, πλουτου καὶ νεότητος οἷον λειμῶνας αφθο- 


/ / / 
vous, τὰν τούτοις θρέμματα χειρωσόμενος. 


OEAI. Πῶς λέγεις ; 


ΞΕ. Τῆς πεζῆς θήρας γίγνεσθον δύο μεγίστω 


τινὲ μέρη. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖον ἑκάτερον : 


I. mov gives the touch of 
conscious indefiniteness in 
which the preciseness of the 
Greek language delights. 

4. Ὃ δέ ye ἐπὶ τὴν ynv—] 
“To very different rivers of 
wealth, and rich meadow-lands 
of generous youth.” Lit. “to 
rivers of wealth, a different 
sort of rivers.” This punctu- 
ation avoids the confusion of 
the two metaphors (river and 
meadow) and preserves the 
appropriateness of each. For 
the former, cf. Alsch. Prom. 
805 : ol χρυσόρρυτον οἰκοῦσιν 
ἀμφὶ νᾶμα Πλούτωνος πόρου, 
where the notion of abundance 
is associated with the image of 
golden sands ; and for the 
latter, Soph. Trach. 143: τὸ 
yap νέαζον ἐν τοιοῖσδε βύσκεται 
χώροισιν αὑτοῦ. 

For the metaphorical use of 
the word ποταμός to denote 
abundance, cf. also Tim. 43 a: 
ai δὲ εἰς ποταμὸν ἐνδεθεῖσαι πο- 
λύν.---νἱχ. the flux of corporeal 
particles in the body. The 
word λειμῶνας is naturally sug- 
gested by the notion of a fer- 
tilizing river with green banks, 


E 


and perhaps partly by a false 
echo from λίμνας preceding. 

8. Ths πεζῆς θήρας κιτ.λ.] The 
description of θηρευτική in Legg. 
7, 823 b should be compared, 
line by line, with this passage : 
θήρα yap παμπολύ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστι, 
περιειλημμένον ὀνόματι νῦν σχεδὸν 
ἑνί. πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἐνύδρων, 
πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτηνῶν, παμπολὺ 
δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεζὰ θηρεύματα, 
οὐ μόνον θηρίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων ἄξιον ἐννοεῖν θήραν, τὴν 
τε κατὰ πόλεμον, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ 7 
κατὰ φιλίαν θηρεύουσα, ἡ μὲν ἔπαι- 
νον, ἡ δὲ ψόγον ἔχει" καὶ κλωπεῖαι, 
καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων στρα- 
τοπέδοις θῆραι. 

γίγνεσθον] Bodl. Vat. Ven. 
II, γιγνέσθω, which might be 
defended from εἴπωμεν follow- 
ing. But the word is explana- 
tory of ἐκτρέπεσθον in what 
precedes, and the v is more 
likely to have been dropped 
than to have been inserted 
wrongly, especially considering 
the ὁμοιοτέλευτον of μεγίστω. 
The θήρα τῶν ἡμέρων is termed 
μέγιστον as including στρατηγία, 
ληστική, δικανική, ἐρωτική, κολα- 
κική, σοφιστική. 


9 
ke 


paths di- 
verge. The 
angler 
seeks the 
rivers, 
lakes, and 
teeming 
seas. The 

5 Sophist 
turns him 
to the land: 
or if to 
rivers they 
are the 
rivers of 
wealth, 
which 
nourish 

: ] teous 
pounteous 


pastures of 


generous 
youth, 


Now land 


animals are 


tame and 
wild ; and, 
if man is a 
tame crea- 
ture, tame 
creatures 
also can 
be made 


a prey. 


ΠΛΑΤΏΩΝΟΣ. 


ΞῈ Τὸ \ cal « 7 Ν δὲ “ ’ / 
pe Ld O μὲν τῶν μερῶν, TO OE Τῶν αγριων. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶτ᾽ ἔστι τις θήρα τῶν ἡμέρων ; 


EE. Εἰ πέρ γέ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἥμερον ζῶον. θὲς 
δὲ σ / 7 δὲ θ Ν “ », LAD 
€ ὅπῃ χαίρεις, εἴτε μηδὲν τιθεὶς ἥμερον, εἴτε ἄλλο 


\ “ / Ν \ 2, ΒΩ + aS 
5 MEV ἥμερον TL, TOV δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἀγριον, εἴτε ἥμερον 


Ν re 5 ‘ 357 θ > 6 / δὲ ὃ / 
μέν eyels αὖυ TOV ἂν βῶτπον, αν ρώπων ε μηοεμιᾶαν 


ἡγεῖ θήραν. τούτων Τὁπότερ᾽ | av ἡγεῖ φίλον εἰρῆσθαί 


rn id ΄σ / 
σοι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν διόρισον. 


2. εἶτα expresses surprise. 
Cf. Thezet. 207 d. 

3. El πέρ γέ ἐστιν ἀνθ. jy. {.} 
This is not always fully ad- 
mitted. See Theet. 174 ἃ: 
δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον καὶ 
ἐπιβουλότερον ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ 
βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς. Lege. 6, 
766 a: ΓΑνθρωπὸς δέ, ὥς φαμεν, 
ἥμερον, ὅμως μὴν παιδείας μὲν 
ὀρθῆς τυχὸν καὶ φύσεως εὐτυχοῦς 
θειότατον ἡμερώτατόν τε ζῶον γίγ- 
νεσθαι φιλεῖ, μὴ ἱκανῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ 
καλῶς τραφὲν ἀγριώτατον ὁπόσα 
φύει γῆ. Cf. Xen. Cyr. 1. 1, κ 2: 
πάσας τοίνυν τὰς ἀγέλας ταύτας 
ἐδοκοῦμεν ὁρᾷν μᾶλλον ἐθελούσας 
πείθεσθαι τοῖς νομεῦσιν ἢ τοὺς 
ἀνθρώπους τοῖς ἄρχουσι. For 
τιθεὶς --- λέγεις, οἵ, supr. 221 ἃ, 
and note. 

7. Ἡόπότερ᾽ Ὑ av ἡγεῖ φίλον ei- 
ρῆσθαί σοι] The plural ὁπότερα, 
with φίλον and τοῦτο following, 
is difficult ; and the word im- 
plies two, whereas there are 
three if not four alternatives. 
Badham’s conjecture, 6 τι περ 
ἂν (cf. infr. 255 a, Lege. 1, 645 
c), is probably right. ἡγεῖ is the 
Bodleian reading ; ἂν is to be 
taken with εἰρῆσθαι φίλον σοι: 
““ Whichever of these alterna- 
tives you think will please 
you when spoken.” Com- 


pare infr. 223 b: τὸ προσῆκον 
ὄνομ᾽ ἂν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτόν. 
There is no objection to the 
repetition of the same word 
ἡγεῖ in a somewhat different 
connexion ; cf. Theet. 148 b: 
οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην---ὥσπερ περὶ--- 
τῆς δυνάμεως. 8110. 

8. τοῦτο ἡμῖν διόρισον] The 
Bodleian and the cognate MSS. 
(including Flor. 1.) have διορι- 
This could only mean, 
“Whichever of these alterna- 
tives you think will please you, 
this we must decide upon.” 
But this reading, though not 
altogether absurd (ef. Polit. 
261 6: καθάπερ διακελεύεις 
ποιητέον), may probably be 
classed amongst those which, 
although occurring in the best 
MSS., are traceable to the 
wrong-headed ingenuity of the 
scribes, like ἐξαίσιοι σοφοί for 
ἑξῆς of σοφοί in Theet. 152 6 
(Bodl.), ἀκριβῶν for ἄκρων, 10. 
148 ὁ. (Bodl. Δ. π.) The impe- 
rative is required by θὲς pre- 
ceding. For τοῦτο ἡμῖν διόρισον, 
οἵ, Gorg. 488 d: τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ 
σαφῶς διόρισον, ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν 
ἐστι τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον 
καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον. Rep. fo, 
5088: "Apa οἷα ἔστιν ἢ οἷα φαί-- 
νεται; τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον. 


΄ 
στεον. 


Pp. 222: [}1} 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 29 





p. 222. OEAI. AAX ἡμᾶς τε ἥμερον, ὦ ἕένε, ἡγοῦμαι 
“ Gov, θήραν τε ἀνθρώπων εἶναι λέγω. 
EE. Διττὴν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἡμεροθηρικὴν εἴπωμεν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Kara τί λέγοντες ; 


ὑστν ἊΝ \ Χ > \ 
BE. Thv μὲν λῃστικὴν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστικὴν καὶ 5. This hap- 
\ \ / \ ͵, A , pens either 
τυραννικὴν καὶ ξύμπασαν THY πολεμικήν, ἕν πάντα through 


, , ε ΄ force or 
βίαιον θηραν ὁρισάμενοι. through 


ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς. persuasion. 
EE. Τὴν δέ ye δικανικὴν καὶ δημηγορικὴν καὶ 


͵ A 5 \ , 7 
προσομιλητικήν, ἕν αὖ τὸ ξύνολον πιθανουργικήν το 


ἃ Twa μίαν τέχνην προσειπόντες. 
GEAI. ᾿Ορθώς. 
ia “ ΑΝ la Χ 7 
HE. Τῆς δὴ πιθανουργικῆς διττὰ λέγωμεν γένη. — And per- 
a suasion 
OEAI. [Iota ; Taye 
— \ \ 9 \ gl / bli 
HE. To μὲν ἕτερον ἰδίᾳ, τὸ δὲ δημοσίᾳ γιγνόμενον. 15 brivate.. 
\ “- = 
OEAI. Γίψνεσθον yap οὖν εἶδος ἑκάτερον. 
an 3, a > a \ 
EE. Οὐκοῦν αὖ τῆς ἰδιοθηρευτικῆς TO μὲν μισθαρ- Persuasion 
ΣΑΣ NEN , in private 
VEUTLKOV ἐστι, TO δὲ δωροφορικὸν ; sometimes 
΄ seeks re- 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μανθάνω. wards, and 
= a a ee , \ = - » sometimes 
ZE. Τῇ τῶν ἐρώντων Opa τὸν νοῦν, ὡς ἐοικας; 20 on the 
", , contrary 
οὔπω προσέσχες. ities 
gifts. 


5. Τὴν μὲν ληστικήν---Ἴ Com-_ der one heading. 
panewateebol, I. 5." Οἵ δὲ ἀπὸ 17. μισθαρνευτικὸν----μισθαρνευ- 
θήρας ζῶσιν, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι τικοῦ] I prefer giving the form 
ἑτέρας, οἷον of μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας, of the word which appears in 
οἱ δ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ἁλιείας---οἱ δ᾽ ἀπ᾿ dpvi- all the MSS. (instead of μι- 
θων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων.---Διὸ καὶ ἡ σθαρνητικ.), though suspected by 
πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἔστα' Heindorf, whose dictum (Quod 
ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, 7 δεῖ ἴῃ Lexicis, auctore nullo, pro- 
χρῆσθαι πρός τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν — fertur verbum μισθαρνεύειν, val- 
ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι dé vereor ne ἃ sermonis ana- 
μὴ θέλουσιν. Ἰοριὰ abhorreat) is open to 

10. προσομιλητικήν =the art question. Why not μισθαρνεύω 
of intercourse. The word 15 from μίσθαρνος, ἃ8 καπηλεύω from 
invented in order to include κάπηλος Still it may be cor- 
loye-making and sophistry un- rupted from ἰδιοθηρευτ. 





Lovers, for 
instance, 
lavish pre- 
sents on 
thosewhom 
they win. 


Of mercen- 
ary persua- 
sion, one 
branch 
allures 
through 
pleasure, 
and, as for 
hire, ex- 
pects no 
more than 
to be fed. 
This is 
called 
flattery. 
Another 
kind pro- 
fesses to 
impart 
virtue, and 
takes a 
money fee, 


What is 


30 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ πέρι ; 


ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


EE. Ὅτι τοῖς θηρευθεῖσι δῶρα προσεπιδιδόασιν. 
ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. 


— TY γ fal \ , > ΄σ / y 3 
= E. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐρωτικῆς TEXYNS ἐστω εἶδος. 


OEAI. avy γε. 


EE. Τοῦ δέ ye μισθαρνευτικοῦ τὸ μὲν προσο- 


- \ ’ὔ 4 ε lal 4 
μιλοῦν διὰ χάριτος Kal παντάπασι δι’ ἡδονῆς τὸ 


/ ’ Ν Ἂν 7 
δέλεαρ πεποιημένον καὶ τὸν μισθὸν πραττόμενον 


\ c r A 7 id » 53 7 
Tpopny εαυτῷ μονον κολακικὴν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πᾶντες p. 223. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 


od x ε / ΄ὔ 5 
10 φαῖμεν αν ηδυντικὴν τινα τεχνὴν εἰναι. 


HE. Τὸ δὲ ἐπαγγελλόμενον μὲν ὡς ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα 


ἊΝ - / / Ν \ , , 
Tas ὁμιλίας ποιούμενον, μισθὸν δὲ νόμισμα πραττό- 


S 5 lal NS 7ὔὕ e / las yy 
μένον, GPa OV τοῦτο TO γένος ETEPD 7 POO ELTTELV ἄξιον 


> / 
15 OVOLATL 5 


OEAI. Πῶς yap οὔ; 


μκαἰ / \ , qn / 
i. Te δὴ τούτῳ ; πειρῶ λέγειν. 


2. προσεπιδιδόασιν] The pre- 
positions imply “in addition to 
all the means employed to win 
them.” (προσέτι δῶρα yp. 5.B.) 

4. ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης --- εἶδος] 
Gen. of apposition. 

6. Τοῦ dé ye μισθαρνευτικού---- 
εἶναι] “ But that sort of hireling 
the object of whose commerce 
is to gratify, and whose lure is 
baited with any kind of plea- 
sure, while the only hire which 
he exacts is sustenance for him- 


self, I presume we should all - 


describe as the flatterer, who is 
one of the sweeteners of life.” 

8. πεποιημένον | pf. passive 
with middle signification. 

Το. ἡδυντικήν τινα τέχνην] “an 
art of sweetening.” These words 
express the function of κολακικὴ 
more precisely. There is no 


need of inserting i) before ἥδυντ. 
with Heindorf and some later 
editors. Cf. Theet. 175 e: μη- 
δὲ ὀψὸν ἡδῦναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους, 
where cookery and flattery 
seem to be included under 
ἡδυντικὴ ; and Gorg. 462-465, 
where however κολακεία is the 
general word, including ὀψο- 
ποιΐα, ῥητορικὴ, and the rest. 
Other instances occur (e. g. 
μεταβλητικὴ Supr. compared with 
infr. 224 6) in which the same 
word has alternately a general 
and specific meaning. 

12. Τὸ δὲ---ὀνόματι] “ But an- 
other sort, professing to make 
virtue the end of his inter- 
course, while exacting his hire 
in the shape of coin,—is it not 
worth while to address this 
kind by a different name ?” 





β. 223. 


b 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗ͂Σ. 


31 


SEAI. Δῆλον 67° τὸν yap σοφιστὴν μοι δοκοῦ- 


᾽ (2 ΠΕ 53 " \ \ an 
μεν ἀνευρηκέναι. TOUT οὖν ἔγωγε εἰπὼν TO προσῆκον 


7 a» ς A ΄ > / 
ὄνομ ἂν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτον. 


Ν cal 3 - 
RE. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν νῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λόγον, ὡς 


4. Κατὰ δὴ ---θήρα] The obser- 
vation of Schleiermacher, that 
there are several redundant 
words in this passage, was mis- 
applied by Heindorf and Stall- 
baum when theyrejected μισθαρ- 
νικῆς as well as κτητικῆς, πεζοθη- 
pias, and ἡμεροθηρικῆς. For the 
science which takes rewards 
includes the flatterer with the 
Sophist, who stands alone how- 
ever in taking his reward in 
money. The word πεζοθηρίας 
can hardly be retained, χερ- 
σαίας being evidently substi- 
tuted for this with reference to 
supr. 222 a: ὁ δέ ye ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν. 
The case of ἡμεροθηρικῆς is 
somewhat different. For there 
might be other tame creatures 
besides man which became the 
objects of the chase (e.g. pheas- 
ants and deer in modern 
times); compare Polit. 262 b. 
The MSS., however, vary as to 
the form of the word. 

χειρωτικῆς, which the edi- 
tors retain after 
has very slight authority (Ven. 


> a 
OLKEL@TLKNS, 


τέχνη 
ποιητική--ἰ-κτητικῆ 
μεταβλητική.-----ἰ - χειρωτική 
ἀγωνιστική.------ἰ---θηρευτική 


Σ᾿ ἈΠῸ Bas, ΠΤ 2. δῦ) Che 
word is not indispensable ; 
for οἰκειωτικῆς might be fairly 
substituted (according to the 
spirit of the present passage) 
for χειρωτικῆς, as a softer word 
—‘“ Convey the wise it call.” 
We may therefore either read 
or omit 
χειρωτικῆς and κτητικῆς, taking 
οἰκειωτικῆς as a substitute for 
both. The Stranger is not 
always quite exact in reca- 
pitulating. Thus, infr. 224 d, 
μεταβλητικὴ 18 substituted for 
ἀλλακτικὴ, and the μεταβλητικὴ of 
the previous argument is omit- 
ted. Hence it is unnecessary, 
with Heindorf and Stallbaum, 
to supply the missing link m- 
θανοθηρίας in the present passage. 
Cf. Polit. 261 e, where such va- 
riation of terms is justified. 

meCoOnpias, if genuine, distin- 
ouishes πεζὰ from πτηνά, χερ- 
galas, πεζὰ from ἐνυδρά, but x. 
should then come first. 

The divisions have been as 
follows : 


κτητικῆς, οἰκειωτικῆς, 


τῶν ἀψύχων----ἰ- - ζωοθηρική 


ae 





πεζοθηρική ---- 





ἐνυγροθηρικὴ 


ὀρνιθευτική ----ἰ- -- ἁλιευτική 


τῶν ἀγρίων-ἰ -ἡμεροθηρική 


βίαιος θήρα--- πιθανουργική 


ἡ δημοσίᾳ γιγνομένη---ἰ-- ἰδιοθηρευτική 


ἑρκοθηρική---ἰ--πληκτική 


πυρευτική---ἰ---ἀγκι στρευτικήὴ 
ὃ , > , 
TpLo οντία---ἰ -- ἀσπαλιευτική 


δωροφορική-----ἰ-----μισθαρνευτικὴ 
κολακική----ἰ- “σοφιστική. 


this artist 
called ? 
We seem 
to have 
found the 
Sophist. 


32 MAATQNOS 


ἔοικεν, ἡ τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς, Ἱκτητικῆς |, θηρευτικῆς, p. 223. } 


ζωοθηρίας, πεζοθηρίας}, χερσαίας, Τὴμεροθηρικῆς , 
ἀνθρωποθηρίας, ἰδιοθηρίας, μισθαρνικῆς, νομισματο- 
πωλικῆς, δοξοπαιδευτικῆς, νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐν- 
5 δόξων γιγνομένη θήρα προσρητέον, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος 
ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, σοφιστική. 

GEAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


Still let us 
look at this 
many-sided 
creature in 


EE. "Ere δὲ καὶ τῇδε ἴδωμεν: ov yap τι φαύλης 


΄ὔ / 5) ΄ὕ \ 5 ς ͵ ᾽ SES. ΄, 
μέτοχον ἐστι τέχνης τὸ νῦν ζητουμενον, GAA εὖ para 


Ν Ν 53 ’ ΄σ / / 
another το ποικίλης. Kal yap οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις 
aspect. 7 » τ ἢ τὰ a hint - sy 
For the φάντασμα παρέχεται, μὴ τοῦτο Ὁ νῦν αὐτὸ ἡμεῖς 
divisions Pep oneal SF 7 
we have φαμέν, ἀλλ᾽ τερον εἶναι TL γένος. 
madeattord 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ δή; 


'ΞῈ. To τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλοῦν ἦν εἶδός 


an opening 
for defining 
him in a 
different 


XN \ ΧΝ / vy Ν Se / 
e 1570U, TO μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχον, TO δὲ ἀλλακτικον. 


4. δοξοπαιδευτικῆς] This refers 


to supr. a: ἐπαγγελλόμενον---- 
ποιούμενον. 
καὶ ἐνδόξω)] Cf. Protag. 


316 b, where Socrates recom- 
mends Hippocrates to the con- 
sideration of Protagoras: ‘In- 
ποκράτης ὅδε ἐστὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιχω- 
ρίων, ᾿Απολλοδώρου υἱός, οἰκίας 
μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος" αὐτὸς 
δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι 
τοῖς ἡλικιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν δέ μοι δο- 
κεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει. 

The use οἵ μέτοχόν ἐστι for 
μετέχει, like that of the par- 
ticiple and auxiliary verb 
noticed above, is in the style 
of these dialogues. Cf. also 
Pheedr. 262 d. 

7. οὖν] “ In accordance with 
this remark,” i. e. consistently 
with the creature’s manifold 
cunning. 

8. τῇδε ἴδωμεν] Bodl. TAATL 


εἰδῶμεν. This might be de- 
fended from Thezt. 202 6: 
But the text pre- 
sents a more lively image, and 
is in better accordance with 
Plato’s usual manner. This 
corruption is frequent. 

ΤΙ. φάντ. apex. |“ He (adro,the 
subject of our inquiry) holds 
forth the appearance ; leads us 
to imagine.” No English word 
exactly corresponds to φάν- 
τασμα here, which retains the 
verbal notion: the German 
Schein is perhaps nearly equi- 
valent. Cf. Thezt.199 ὁ: δει- 
νότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο“ παρα- 
φαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ. AS we re- 
view the previous argument, 
the Sophist shews his face to 
us on the other side of onr 
division-line. 

15. τὸ μὲν Onpevtixov| Here 
again the recapitulation is not 


Ἰστέον δή. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 88 


p.223. ΘΕΑ͂Ι. Ἢν γὰρ οὗν. kind of ac- 

quisition 

~— Lal 3" lanl ,ὔ »" / 
BE. THs τοίνυν ἀλλακτικῆς δύο εἴδη λέ- we found 
to be ex- 
ἊΝ Ν / Ν oS > 

youev, TO μὲν δωρητικόν, TO δὲ ἕτερον ἀγορα- change. 
’ Property is 
OTLKOD ; exchanged 
by gift and 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑϊρήσθω. 5. by sale. 
EE. Kai μὴν αὖ φήσομεν ἀγοραστικὴν διχῇ τέμ- 
νεσθαι. 


ἃ ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ; 


\ a 3 c ’ \ 
SE. Τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαι-ὀ ὙΠ seller 
, \ ie Peele ; x ps is either a 
ρουμένην, τὴν δὲ Ta ἀλλότρια ἔγρα μεταβαλλομένην το manufac- 
, turer or a 
μεταβλητικ nV. merchant. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ ye. 


BE. Τί δέ; τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἡ μὲν κατὰ The mer- 


, ᾽ ΄ ᾿ δε τες τ i a chant 
πολιν adrayn, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἥμισυ μέρος ὃν, καπη- either re- 
alls Or 
\ , 
ALK) προσαγορεύεται: 15 exports, 


CEAI. Nai. 


quite exact: κτητικὴ was divided -- ὅσοι αὐτουργοί τε καὶ ἀπράγμο- 
into μεταβλητικὸν ( = ἀλλακτικὸν)ἠ νες, οὐ πάνυ πολλὰ κεκτημένοι. 

and χειρωτικόν, and χειρωτικὸν 9. διαιρουμένην (passive) an- 
into ἀγωνιστικὸν and θηρευτικόν. swers better to the question πῇ 
Supr. 219. (φήσομεν τέμνεσθαι) than διαι- 


3. τὸ μὲν δωρητικόν] These ρούμενοι, which is read only in 
words are suggested by depo- two MSS. of inferior note, and 
φορικὸν in the previous argu- appears in two others (1B) as 
ment; the new discussion, ἃ5 a correction. 
so often in Plato, taking colour 11. μεταβλητικήν] This name 
from that which precedes. But was previously given to the 
cf. also supr. 219d: μεταβλητι- whole class which is now called 
κὸν ὃν διά τε δωρεῶν καὶ ἀγοράσεων. ἀλλακτική. 

9. Τὴν μὲν --- διαιρουμένην] 13. τῆς μεταβλητικῆς κ.τ.λ.] 
«Those who make what they Cf. Ar. Pol. I. 4 : τῆς δὲ μετα- 
sell being distinguished as βλητικῆς μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία. 

‘ producers.’ ” 14. σχεδὸν---ἥμισυ] And there- 
τῶν avtoupyav| Those who fore fit to form our next diyi- 

manufacture what they sell. sion. 

The word is used etymologi- καπηλικὴ] The notion of retail 

eally. The usual meaning is, business in Rep. 371b,c, ἐν αὐτῇ 

‘one who farms his own land.’ τῇ πόλει x. τ. A. IS More exact 

Cf. 6. ο. Rep. 8, 565 a: δῆμος than here. Bod. p.m. : καὶ πηλική. 





Now the 
export 
trader 
deals in 
food for 
the body 
or in food 
for the 
mind, 


34 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


EE. Τὸ δέ γε ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλατ-- p. 223. |! 


᾿ Lal ’ / 
TOMEVOV ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει ἐμπορικὴ ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ᾽ οὔ: 


ΞΕ. Τῆς δ᾽ ἐμπορικῆς ap οὐκ ἠσθήμεθα ὅτι τὸ 


5 / σ Ν al / / Ν δέ 
spev, ὅσοις τὸ σῶμα τρέφεται ++ κέχρηται, τὸ δέ, 


ὅσοις ἡ ψυχή, πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις ; 


— Ν Ν \ \ STA ΕἸ ΄σ » Ν , 
EE. To περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν wows ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ TO 


4 , , 
YE €TEPOV ποὺ ξυνίεμεν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 


/ , 
EE. Μουσικήν τε τοίνυν ξυνάπασαν λέγωμεν, ἐκ 


Υ. διαλλαττόμενον] Prob. mid- 
dle voice, as μεταβαλλόμενον 
supr., ἀλλάττεται infr. But per- 
haps passive, like ἀνασπώμενον 
and other words noticed above. 
δια signifies ‘transmission,’ as 
in Rep. 1, 328 a: λαμπαδία 
ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ; 

5. κέχρηται] Heindorf changed 
this into καὶ χρῆται without 
giving a reason. Stallbaum, 
who objects to this change, 
gives καὶ κέχρηται, apparently 
taking this to be the MS. read- 
ing. Bekker: “καὶ χρῆται 
Heindorfius : libri κέχρηται. 
And so the Bodleian MS., viz. 
τρέφεται xexpnta. For the 
perfect, cf. Rep. 3, 409 6, Tim. 
65 6. The objection to this 
is that the seller cannot be 
said to use that which he 
sells. Stallbaum’s reading is 
preferable, if κέχρηται be ren- 
dered “ stands in need,” 56. 
αὐτῶν, for which meaning see 
Legg. 4, 717 ¢. There is a 
similar difficulty about the 
reading of Euthyd. 289 a. 

8. ἀγνοοῦμεν---ξυνίεμεν})] The 


first pers. plur. is used with a 
kind of playful condescension, 
as in Theet. 210 b: ἢ οὖν ἔτι 
κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, 
ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν ; 

11. Μουσικήν ----παρασχεῖν] A 
somewhat awkward sentence, 
where, as in supr. 219 b, πᾶν 
ὅπερ k.T.A., the end does not 
seem to have been clearly seen 
from the beginning. The con- 
struction is, however, clear. 
“ Speaking of all music, and 
painting, and juggling, and 
many other things which are 
carried about and sold, some 
for the delectation, and some 
for the serious purposes of the 
mind, let us say that when 
bought in one place and carried 
elsewhere to be sold, they give 
to him who carries and sells 
them, quite equally with the 
sale of food and drink, a just 
title to the name of merchant.” 
Besides the general irregularity 
of the sentence, the concrete 
μουσική — ὠνηθεῖσα is made 
parallel to the abstract σιτίων 
-πρᾶσις. For the use of mape- 


᾿ 
| 
! 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. $5 


, ΦΙΣΟ ᾿ , "7 4 ᾿ lal 
Ρ. 224. πόλεως εκάστοτε εἰς πόλιν ἔνθεν μὲν ὠνηθεῖσαν, 


b 


Cees: \ 3 / Ν / Ν 
ἑτέρωσε δὲ ἀγομένην καὶ πιπρασκομένην, καὶ γραφι- 


\ Ν \ Ν ιν 1. a “ 
κὴν καὶ θαυματοποιικὴν καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τῆς Ψυχῆς, 


\ \ ‘ \ \ \ ia id ’ / 
τὰ μεν παραμυθίας, Ta δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς χαριν ἀχθέντα 


Ἂν / Ν yf Ν “ \ 
καὶ πωλούμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πωλοῦντα μηδὲν 5 


iy an a / “ ’, yA 
ἧττον τῆς τῶν σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν πράσεως ἔμπορον 


ὀρθῶς ἂν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. 


= 3 a x [2 / 
HE. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα Evywvovpevov 


/ » , , ’ / Seas 
πόλιν TE ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταὐτὸν το 


“ 7 
προσερεῖς ὄνομα; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε. 


EE. Τῆς δὴ ψυχεμπορικῆς ταύτης ap οὐ τὸ μὲν 


χειν, οἵ, Pheedr. 238 a: καὶ τούτων 
τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκπρεπὴς ἡ ἂν τυχῇ γενο- 
μένη τὴν αὑτῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ὀνομα- 
ζόμενον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται. In 
the mention of painting and 
juggling there is probably a 
tacit anticipation of pp. 234, 5, 
where the art of the Sophist 
is compared to both. For 
the two genitives ψυχῆς mapa- 
μυθίας χάριν, cf. Rep. 7, 525 6: 
οὐκ ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς 
ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας, 
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς, ῥᾳστώνης 
τε μεταστροφῆς (sc. αὐτῆς) ἐπ᾽ 
ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν. 

9. μαθήματα ξυνων.) I. 6. 
Buying knowledge from all 
quarters. 

10, πόλιν----ἐκ πόλεως] “And 
exchanges them from one city 
to another for money.” The 
former of the two prepositions 
is dropped, as in Asch. Prom. 
682: γῆν πρὸ γῆς ἐλαύνομαι. 
Compare Polit. 289 6: τά τε 
γεωργίας καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν 
ἔργα διακομίζοντες ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους 


καὶ ἀνισοῦντες, οἱ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀγορὰς 
οἱ δὲ πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλάττοντες 
κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ πεζῇ, νόμισμά 
τε πρὸς τάλλα καὶ αὐτὸ πρὸς αὑτὸ 
διαμείβοντες. Heindorf renders 
in both passages, “ exchanging 
one city for another.” But in 
this case π. ε. 7. vou. ἀμ. could 
only mean “ being induced by 
a money payment to change 
their abode,” which is plainly 
not intended here. Hence 
Stallbaum’s objection to vopic- 
ματος. In Apol. 37 d, ἄλλην 
ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ, it 
is observable that the middle 
voice is used; οἵ, however, 
Legg. 760 c. The meaning is 
the same as supr. 223 e: ἐξ 
ἄλλης eis ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλαττό- 
2248: 
ἐκ πόλεως-----οἰς πόλιν----πιπρασκο- 
μένην. For λέγωμεν, οἵ. Thet. 
159 a: λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ 
σὲ καὶ τἄλλ᾽ ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν 
λόγον. 

13. Τῆς δὴ----ἀνάγκη] “Well, of 
this mental merchandize one 


y 
μενον @vn καὶ πράσει. 


Ε 2 


And the 
trade in 
mental 


wares is 


conducted 
either 
through 
eloquent 
display, or 


the com- 
munication 
of points of 5 
learning. 
And the 
learning 
thus bar- 
tered may 
concern the 
arts, or 
virtue. 

The pur- 
veyor of 
arts may 
be called 
an art- 
seller: but 
what name 
is appli- 
cable to the 
seller of 
virtue ? 
The name 
of Sophist 
alone. 


15 


Io 


᾽ \ , 7 ao Ν Ν la ‘ 
ἐπιδεικτικὴ δικαιότατα λέγοιτ᾽ ἄν, TO δὲ γελοῖον μὲν p, 224, I 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


> a a , 5 \ , 5 
οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ πρόσθεν, ὅμως δὲ μαθημάτων οὖσαν 


χ γὴν ἀδελφῷ tl τῇ (ξ \VOMATL 
πρᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἀδελφῷ τινὶ τῆς πράξεως ονοὸμ 


lal 4 
προσειπεῖν UVAYKN 5 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


σ΄ lal Ν ‘ 
EE. Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς μαθηματοπωλικῆς τὸ Mev 


Ν \ a 5) χω / εἰ. Ν δὲ 
περὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μαθήματα ετέρῳ, TO OE 


\ Ν al > a yy / 
περὶ TO τὴς apeTns ἄλλῳ προσρήητεον. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ ov ; 


\ ΄ 53 δ 
EE. Τεχνοπωλικὸν μὴν to γε περὶ τάλλα ἂν 


« / Ν \ ἂν A \ / / 
apwoTTo’ τὸ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα σὺ προθυμηθητι λέγειν 


yy 
ονομα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τις ἂν ἄλλο ὄνομα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν 


/ \ \ ΄σ 7 Sa 5 ἈΝ 
πλημμελοίη πλὴν τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ 


Ν ,ὔ 
σοφιστικὸν γένος ; 
EE. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. 


By ΄ ’ > 7 
ἴθι νυν συναγάγωμεν αυτο.- 


λέγοντες ὡς τὸ κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς, ἀγοραστικῆς, 


kind might be most fairly term- 
ed the art of display : but there 
ig another, which will sound 
no less oddly than the last, but 
yet, as dealing in learned ware, 
it must be called by some 
name which smacks of learn- 
ing.” Heind. and Stallb. think 
that γελοῖον applies to the 
name μαθηματοπωλικὴ as com- 
pared with ψυχεμπορική, and 
suggest γελοίῳ. The interpre- 
tation is probably right, but 
the emendation is unnecessary. 

(13.) ψυχεμπορικῆς} The word 
calls up the same contemptible 
association which is contained 
in puxayoyia. Compare also 
the expression of Soph. Antig. 
1063: ὡς μὴ ἐμπολήσων ἴσθι 
τὴν ἐμὴν φρένα. 

7. ἑτέρῳ --- ἄλλῳ] For the 


variety, cf. Theet. 85 ὦ: ἃ δὲ 
ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνα- 
τον Ot ἄλλης ταῦτ᾽ αἰσθέσθαι. 
alib. 

IO. τὸ περὶ τἄλλα] Cf. τὸ περὶ 
τὴν----πληγὴν, Supr. 221 Ὁ. 

ἂν ἁρμόττοι] προσειπεῖν must 
be repeated in thought. 

14. αὐτὸ εἶναι] Pleonastic re- 
sumption. 

16. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο] Se. εἰπὼν οὐκ 
ἂν πλημμελοίη. In the follow- 
ing recapitulation μεταβλητικὴ is 
again used for ἀλλακτικὴ, and the 
distinction between αὐτοπωλικὴ 
and ἀλλακτικὴ is omitted, al- 
though alluded to in the next 
sentence. 

17. μεταβλητικῆς} Bodl. pera- 
βλητικὸν, which is, however, 
probably taken from a few 
lines below. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 37 





Pp. 224. ἐμπορικῆς, ψυχεμπορικῆς περὶ λόγους καὶ μαθήματα 
: ἀρετῆς πωλητικὸν δεύτερον ἀνεφάνη σοφιστική. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Mada γε. 


53 > > ᾽ A 
HE. Τρίτον δέ γ᾽ οἶμαί σε, κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ The same 
λ ὃ ; ΩΝ τ Σ 7 ᾿ ᾿ « [5 found to 
καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει, τὰ μὲν ὠνούμενος, τὰ δὲ καὶ 5 apply, 
, SUN , R κ᾿ τ pe thirdly, to 
τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸς μαθηματα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα the home 
\ a » , \ a aay, a merchant 
καὶ πωλῶν, ἐκ τούτου TO ζῆν προὐτάξατο, καλεῖν ον manu 
> ” Wg a , facturer 
οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ὕπερ νῦν δή. of learned 
stores, 


» Υ 
OEAI. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλω ; 
Χ lal fo / 
HE. Καὶ τὸ κτητικῆς ἄρα μεταβλητικὸν, wyopa- το 
, N oy > 7 > ,ὕ “ 7 
6 OTLKOY, καπηλικὸν ETE αὐτοπωλικον, ἀμφοτέρως, ὁ τί 


EN 5. \ la \ / 
περ ἂν ἢ περὶ TA τοιαῦτα μαθηματοπωλικὸν γένος, 





ῬῬ. 225. 


PENN \ ta) e / / 
ἀεὶ OV προσερεῖς, ὡς φαίνει, σοφιστικον. 


@EAL. ᾿Ανάγκη" τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ δεῖ συνακολουθεῖν. 


\ > f “ / 
EE. “Ere δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἴ τινι τοιῷδε προσέοικεν 15 


7 χ Ξ , , 
ἄρα TO νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον γένος. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίῳ dy ; 


HE. Τῆς κτητικῆς ἀγωνιστική τι μέρος ἡμῖν ἦν. 


4. κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυ- 
μένος ἐν πόλει] The former de- 
finition included all the greater 
Sophists (including Zeno, see 
1 Ale. 119 a), this applies to 
some lesser lights, such as Anti- 
phon, and Damon the musician, 
perhaps to Antisthenes, though 
it is not certain that he taught 
for pay. Cf. Men. 92 b (Any- 
tus’ speech) : εἴτε τις ξένος ἐπι- 
χειρεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν εἴτε ἀστός. 

5. τὰ δὲ καὶ τεκταινόμενος] 
1.6. αὐτουργὸς ὧν τῶν μαθημάτων. 

6. περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα]! Se. 
τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς: 80 also π. τὰ 
τοιαῦτα infr. 

II. καπηλικὸν εἴτε αὐτοπωλι- 
κόν] This alternative is justi- 
fied by the words ra pev— 


αὐτὸς in the preceding sen- 
tence. Cf. Protag. 313 ¢: 
6 σοφιστὴς ---- ἔμπορύς τις ἢ κά- 
πηλος. The distinction between 
καπηλικὴ and αὐτοπωλικὴ (as a 
part of peraBAnrikn) has been 
taught above, p. 223 d. 

13. ὡς φαίνει] Cf. Rep. 3, 389 
δι: οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον κατὰ τὸν σὸν 
Εἰ σύ, ἔφη, βούλει ἐμὸν 
τιθέναι, οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἀποδεκτέον. 

14. λόγῳ] Bodl. AT. λογικῷ. 
This corruption is no doubt due 
to the frequency of the same 
termination in what precedes. 

18. ἀγωνιστική] Supr. 219 6. 
Distinguished from θηρευτική 
as the violent from the secret 
mode of appropriation without 
contract. 


λόγον. 


Once more, 
dividing 
violent 
conquest, 
which was 
a portion 
of acquisi- 
tive art, 
into emula- 
tion and 
contention: 
we see that 
bodily con- 
tention is 
the art of 
quelling 
by force. 
Logical 
contention, 
on the 
other hand, 
is the art 
of contro- 
versy- 


Contro- 
versy is 
either 
forensic, 
being held 
through 
long 
speeches in 
public on 
questions 
of right, 

or disputa- 
tious, con- 
sisting of 
short ques- 
tions and 
answers in 
private. 


oO 
JIC 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν yap οὖν. 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


ἜΞΗ Οὐ yy / / ’ Ν ὃ “ » \ 
“ὦ. UK απὸ τΤροτποὺ Τοινὺυν €OTL οιαίρειν αὐτὴν 


δίχα. 


SEAI. Καθ᾿ ὁποῖα λέγε. 


Ν « lad 
EE. To μὲν ἁμιλλητικὸν αὐτῆς τιθέντας, τὸ δὲ 


μαχητικόν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν. 


EE. Τῆς τοί ἧς τῷ μὲν σώ ὸ 
ey Hse nS TOLVUY μαχητΤιΚης T@ μεν σώμᾶτι προς 


/ / Ν TEN / » 
σώματα γιγνομένῳ σχεδὸν εἰκὸς καὶ πρέπον ὄνομα 


GEAI. Nai. 


7 a ,ὕ - , 
Io λέγειν Tl TOLOUTOV τιθεμένους OLOV βιαστικον. 


EE. Τῷ δὲ λόγοις πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ὦ Θεαί- 


τητε, ἄλλο εἴπῃ πλὴν ἀμφισβητητικόν ; 


ΘΈΑΙ. Οὐδέν. 


EE. Τὸ δέ γε περὶ τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις θετέον 


διττόν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ; 


aE K θ᾽ “ \ Ν᾽ / 4 , Ν 
Hi. Kal οσον μεν yap γιγνεται μηκεσι τε προς 


3 7, / ΄ Ν aN Χ , Ν y+ 
ἐναντία pnkn λόγων καὶ περὶ Ta δίκαια Kal ἀδικα 


, ͵ 
20 δημοσίᾳ, δικανικον. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 


2. ἅπο] So the Bodleian 
MS. here as in Theet. 143 ¢. 

5. Τὸ μὲν ἁμιλλητικὸν----τὸ δὲ 
μαχητικόν ἢ Perhaps there is 
here the germ of the fine 
thought which is more fully 
expressed in Legg. 5, 731 a: 
φιλονεικείτω δὲ ἡμῖν πᾶς πρὸς 
ἀρετὴν ἀφθόνως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοιοῦτος 
τὰς πόλεις αὔξει, ἁμιλλώμενος μὲν 
αὐτὸς, τοὺς ἄλλους δὲ οὐ κολούων 
διαβολαῖς. Cf. Criti. τορ Ὁ: 
Θεοὶ --- ἅπασαν γῆν --- διελάγχανον, 
οὐ κατ᾽ ἔριν. 


9. γιγνομένῳ] Cf. supr. 220 e. 


10. λέγειν ---- τιθεμένου] A 
periphrasis for τίθεσθαι. “To 
use some such name, assign- 
ing it.” For τίθεσθαι in this 
sense, cf. Theet. 157 ¢: ᾧ--- 
ἄνθρωπον----τίθενται. 

12. λόγοις πρὸς λόγους] Se. 
γιγνομένῳ. 

18. Καθ᾿ ὅσον μὲν γὰρ] γὰρ not 
only answers the question, but, 
in doing so, gives a reason for 
the previous statement. 

19. περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα] 
These words apply also to the 
next division. 


Pp. 225%) 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


99 


— Ν ’ / 3 ΄, 
ΞΕ. Τὸ δ᾽ ἐν ἰδίοις αὖ καὶ κατακεκερματισμένον 


» / ἊΝ ᾽ / fad νὼ cS 
ἐρωτήσεσι πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις μῶν εἰθίσμεθα καλεῖν 


ἄλλο πλὴν ἀντιλογικόν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. 


— a \ - Ν / σ Ν \ 
BE. Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μέν, ὅσον περὶ TAs 


, la) > σὰ \ ΄ 
ξυμβόλαια ἀμφισβητεῖται μέν, εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνως 


Ν / a / \ 5 » / 
περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται, ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἰδος, ἐπείπερ 


πῶς / e “ Ἃ ε ,ὔ x N > 
αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὃν ὁ AOYos, aTap ἐπωνυ- 


Ms “ 2} A a « ᾽ 
μίας οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτυχεν οὔτε νῦν ὑφ 


« a lod 5, 
ἡμῶν τυχεῖν aELOV. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ: κατὰ σμικρὰ γὰρ λίαν καὶ παν- 


τοδαπὰ διήρηται. 


BE. Τὸ δέ γε ἔντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν 


, Ν = A 7 3 a 
καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως ἀμφισβητοῦν, 


3» » » Ν 53 ’ὔ ».7 
ap οὐκ ἐριστικον αὖ λέγειν εἰθισμεθα ; 


I. κατακεκερματισμένον --- ἀπο- 
κρίσει] The construction fol- 
lows μήκεσι πρὸς ἐναντία μήκη 
λόγων, by a sort of zeugma, 
since the dative (of the man- 
ner) is more natural with y- 
γνόμενον than 
μένον. 

5. Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ---διήρη- 
ται] “Νον of controversy that 
which consists of disputes about 
contracts, conducted in a ran- 
dom artless way, must indeed 
be distinguished as a separate 
kind, since our dialectic per- 
ceives in it a determinate cha- 
racter, but, as it has never yet 
been named, so it is not worth 
while for us now to name it.” 
“True; the fragments into 
which it is divided are too 
small and heterogeneous for 
this.” παντοδαπά is not exactly 
in construction with λίαν, but 
is an expansion of σμικρά. 


κατακεκέρματισ = 


ὅσον--- ἀμφισβητεῖται μέν] The 
action of the verb becomes the 
subject of the passive form, 
as In γιγνόμενον, ἀνασπώμενον, 
&e., supra. Compare Soph. 
Trach. 167: τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔφασκε 
πρὸς θεῶν εἱμαρμένα τῶν “Hpa- 
κλείων ἐκτελευτᾶσθαι πόνων. 

6. ἀτέχνως] Bodl. ἀτεχνῶς. 

7. πράττεται is impersonal. 

8. ἐπωνυμίας] Modern poli- 
tical economy has supplied the 
missing term, viz. “higgling 
in the market,” except that the 
word ξυμβόλαια extends to 
other contracts besides those 
of commerce, including every 
private matter of dispute, how- 
ever trifling. 

13. καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ 
ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως] 
Compare Theet. 175 Ὁ : ὅταν---- 
ἐθελήσῃ ---ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ τί ἐγὼ 
σὲ ἀδικῶ ἢ τί σὺ ἐμὲ εἰς σκέψιν 
αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, 


ΟΥ̓ disputa- 
tious con- 
troversy, 
one kind is 
nameless, 
and does 
not deserve 
a name, 
when men 
higgle over 


10 contracts. 


Another 
and more 
systematic 
form of the 


15 same thing 


is when 


men argue 
τ secundem 
artem”’ on 
general 
principles 

of right. 

This is 
Eristic, 

which may 5 
either 
waste the 
talker’s 
substance 
and the 
hearers’ 
patience, 
when it is 
mere loqua- 
city, or 
may make 
a gain of 
disputa- 
tion, in 
which case, 
what is 

its right 
name 2 


μι 
σι 


This won- 
derful So- 
phist has 
turned up 
a fourth 
time. 


40 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ: 


ΞῈ Τοῦ μὴν ἐριστικοῦ τὸ μὲν χρηματοφθορικόν, ἃ 


Ν ‘ Ἃ ΄ 
τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν ὃν τυγχάνει. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασί γε. 


\ > / / A « / Qn qn 
BE. THv ἐπωνυμίαν τοίνυν, ἣν ἑκάτερον δεῖ καλεῖν 


ya a 7 a 
αὑτῶν, πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρή. 


HE. Δοκῶ μὴν τό γε Ov ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ ταῦτα 


διατριβῆς ἀμελὲς τῶν οἰκείων γιγνόμενον, περὶ δὲ 


\ / “ lo ~ / > 
1oTny λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐ μεθ᾽ 


« ΄“ ᾽ “ Ν 
ἡδονῆς ἀκουόμενον, καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν 


» A ὃ λ a 
οὐχ €TEPOV HOOAEO XLKOV. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται yap οὖν οὕτω πως. 


— 7, , ᾽ , 30. IN κα 9 a 
=E. Τούτου τοίνυν τοὐναντίον, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν 


4 ᾿ > ’ὔ \ a ΄ 
ἐρίδων χρηματιζόμενον, εν T@ μέρει GU πειρῶ VUV 


εἰπεῖν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τίς ἂν αὖ εἰπὼν ἕτερον οὐκ ἐξαμάρτοι 


’ Ν Χ 7 > lat “ 5 
πλὴν γε τὸν θαυμαστὸν πάλιν ἐκεῖνον ἥκειν αὖ 


k.t.A. For ὅλως (referring to 
αὐτῶν = in a universal manner, 
opposed to κατὰ σμικρὰ καὶ παν- 
τοδαπά), cf, ib. 174 a: φύσιν 
ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου 
ὅλου. The Sophist’s art is 
now described as bearing the 
semblance of philosophy, and as 
being engaged with the same 
class of questions. 

8. τό ye δι᾿ ἡδονῆς---ἀδολεσχι- 
κοῦ] It is possible that the 
work of Socrates is here ironi- 
cally described as ‘ chremato- 
phthoric,’ whereas that of the 
Sophist is ‘ chrematistic.’ Com- 
pare Polit. 299 ce, where in 
the state which is jealous of 
the laws the ture statesman or 
philosopher is said to be called 


by his fellow-citizens ἀδολεσχής 
τις σοφιστής. 

9. περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν----ἀκουόμε- 
vov| These words are inserted 
in order to indicate the deri- 
vation of ἀδολεσχής, quasi ἀηδὴς 
τῇ λέξει. 

18, πάλιν---ἥκειν] Cf. ΤΉ Θεοῦ. 
196 Ὁ: εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνήκει 
Cf. Legg. 3, 683 a: 
τετάρτη τις ἥκει πόλις κατοικιζο- 
μένη. Cf. 7140: πάλιν ἡμῖν 
ἀμφισβητούμενον ἐλήλυθεν. Hip- 
parch. 232 a: πάλιν τρίτον ἢ 
τέταρτον ἥκει ἡμῖν ὁμολογούμενον. 
The conjecture of Heindorf, καὶ 
τί τις ἄν, although supported by 
the analogy of p. 224 6, καὶ τί 
τις ἂν ἄλλο ὄνομα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν 
πλημμελοίη, to which αὖ clearly 


λόγους. 


Pp. 2255 


σαι». 





| inane 


Neath λυ οὐ,.. ὗν. ἢ 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


φιστήν. 


41 


fo) , \ / « ᾽ ΄ ΄ 
p- 226. νῦν τέταρτον τὸν μεταδιωκόμενον ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν σο- 


\ > x Ν ‘ / « 
mE. Οὐδὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ws 


, ἴω δ an Qn a 
ἔοικεν, ἐριστικῆς ὃν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς 


ἀμφισβητητικῆς, τῆς μαχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς, 5 


“ “ 3 « « ͵7 5 7 =~ fe 
TNS κτητικῆς ἐστιν, ὡς Ο AOyOS αὖ μεμῆνυκε νῦν, ὁ 


σοφιστής. 


ΘΙΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 


a 45) « ἴων ᾽ὔ Ν 
HE. Ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον His wiles 


3 a \ ,ὔ Q Ν , ΕῚ ne ͵ὕ 
ELVAL TOVTO TO θηρίον, Kal TO λεγόμενον ου ΤΊ) ετέρᾳᾷ 10 


, 
ληπτέον : 


OEAI. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοῖν χρή. 


\ \ 5 \ , ἢ 9 
mE. Χρὴ yap οὖν, καὶ κατὰ dvvapiv ye οὕτω 


᾽7ὔ / 7 ΕΣ » a ͵ 
ποιητέον, τοιόνδε TL μεταθέοντας ἴχνος αὐτοῦ. Kal 


refers, is not absolutely ne- 
cessary or certain. 

1. τὸν om. Bodl. Al. The 
omission is probably due to 
the ὁμοιοτέλευτον rather than, 
as Stallbaum imagined, to 
conjecture: although the in- 
telligibleness of the phrase τέ- 
TapTov ἥκει μεταδιωκόμενον May 
have assisted the error. 

3. τὸ χρηματιστικὸν] His ge- 
nealogy is this time traced 
backwards for the sake of va- 
riety. Cf. infr. 268 ¢: ἀρχόμενον 
ἀπὸ τελευτῆς. 

4. ἐριστικῆς ὃν τέχνη] The 
insertion of pleonastic words, 
such as ὃν in this place, be- 
longs to the peculiar style 
which Plato has chosen to 
adopt. 

9. ἀληθῆ λέγεται 7d] Cf. 
Men. 98 Ὁ: καὶ τοῦτό μοι δο- 
κεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Lach. 186a: 
καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις. The 
form ἀληθῆ λέγεις was so fre- 
quent that the plural predicate 


is retained even with a singular 
subject. Cf. x. Ale. 169 ὃς: 
πρὸς ταῦτ᾽ apa—ro δίκαιον. 

ποικίλον] Supr. 223 b, εὖ μάλα 
ποικίλης. 

10. τὸ θηρίον] The image of 
the hunt for the Sophist, which 
was cautiously introduced in 
p- 218 6, is here advanced 
somewhat more boldly. 

ov τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ληπτέον] “ Not 
to be caught with one hand.” 
This very natural expression, 
and indeed the colour of the 
whole passage, is destroyed by 
Stallbaum, who says that οὐ τῇ 
ér. Δ. is a boxing phrase. If it 
were so, there would be an in- 
tolerable confusion of metaphors 
in what follows. 

14. τοιόνδε μεταθέοντας ἴχνος 
αὐτοῦῇΒ We have tried every 
path which we had opened in 
searching for the angler, and 
the Sophist is not yet taken. 
He is not to be caught with 
one hand, we must use both: 


are mani- 
fold, and 
so must 
be our en- 
deavours. 
There is a 
trace of 
him which 
we have 
not yet 
examined. 


Our house- 
hold ser- 
vants talk, 
and so do 
we, of sift- 
ing,rinsing, 
scouring, 
straining, 
wringing : 


Also of 
combing, 
carding, 
warping, 
and the 
like, 


4.2 


7 - > ao » 7 “ y ) 
μοι A€ye’ τῶν OLKETLKOY ὀνομάτων καλοῦμεν ATTA Pp. 226, |’ 


που: 


ITAATQNOZ 


OEAI. Kai πολλά: ἀτὰρ ποῖα δὴ τῶν πολλῶν 


πυνθάνει ; 


EE. Ta τοιάδε, οἷον διηθεῖν τε λέγομεν καὶ διατ- 


τᾷν καὶ βράττειν καὶ Τδιακρίνειν. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Ti μήν; 


=E K Ν / , yf / / 
bey Ls al Wpos Ve Τοῦτοις ETL ξαίνειν, KATAYELV, 


/ Ν 7 ᾽ 5 / y+ an 
κερκίζειν, καὶ μυρία εν ταῖς τέχναις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα 


Dy / 5 4 3 7 
10 €VOVTA ἐπιστάμεθα. ἢ γάρ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον αὐτῶν πέρι βουληθεὶς δηλῶσαι; 


/ a \ / 27) 
παραδείγματα προθεὶς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ρου; 


EE. Διαιρετικά που τὰ λεχθέντα εἴρηται Evp- 


TAVTQ. 


OEAI. Nat. 


\ \ Sa / ~ 
SE. Kara τὸν ἐμὸν τοίνυν λόγον ὡς περὶ ταῦτα 


in other words, we must 
try another and independent 
track. This “new scent,” how- 
ever, is not wholly uncon- 
nected with those previously 
followed. For the notion of 
the Elenchus, which is the 
characteristic now to be set 
up, has been suggested by the 
mention of ἀντιλογική. 

I. τῶν ὀνομάτων 
Throughout these dialogues, 
by an exaggeration of the cy- 
nical irony of Socrates, not 
without a true feeling of the 
universality of science, the 
highest thoughts are illustrated 
by the lowest images. 

τῶν οἰκετικῶν ---που 3] “ There 
are some words in use amongst 
our menials to which we give 
currency, I presume ?” 

5. λέγομεν] Note the intro- 


OLKETLK@V 


duction of a fresh verb, re- 
suming καλοῦμεν. 

6. καὶ Ἰδιακρίνειν ] Unless δια- 
κρίνειν (or διακινεῖν (1), to “shake 
up,” cf. Ar. Nub. 477) was 
used in some special technical 
sense, the word occurs strangely 
here, and awkwardly antici- 
pates what follows. “ Itaque 
ni, quod parum probabile, ab 
aliend manu asserta hee καὶ 
διακρίνειν putentur, in verbo 
διακρίνειν aliud videtur delitu- 
isse, quod felicior aliquando 
conjector reperiet.” Heind. 

16. ὡς---τέχνην! Cf. Phileb. 
18 6: μίαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν 
γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο 
προσειπών. τέχνην is resumed 
by αὐτὴν for the sake of clear- 
ness, as in Theet.155 d: ἀνδρῶν 
—airév. alib. 











ΣΟΦΙΣΊΤΗΣ. 


42 


/ 53 » “ / Cle > / ᾽ 7 
ΟΡ. 226, μιὰν OVOQAV EV ATTACL TEXVIV, ἐνὸς OVOMAaTOS ἀξιώ- 





d 


/ 
σομεν αὐτὴν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Tiva προσειπόντες ; 


BE. Διακριτικήν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω. 


EE. Σκόπει δὴ ταύτης αὖ δύο av πη δυνώμεθα 


κατιδεῖν εἴδη. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις. 


aE K Ν δ y > > / ὃ / \ 
μ᾿ ds Qt μὴν ἐν γε Tals εἰρημεναις ἰ(ἀκρισεσι TO 


\ la » \ / 5 / 3 XN > 
μὲν χεῖρον ἀπὸ βελτίονος ἀποχωρίζειν ἦν, τὸ ὃ 


Ψ s ᾽ € / 
ὅμοιον ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίου. 


ΘΒΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὕτω νῦν λεχθὲν φαίνεται. 


ἜΠῚ TH \ / y ᾽ 2) / Σ 
“i. Ings μὲν τοινυν ονομα οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον 


4. Acaxpitexny] Cf. Pelit. 
282 Ὁ : μεγάλα τινὲ κατὰ πάντα 
ἡμῖν ἤστην τέχνα, ἡ συγκριτική τε 
καὶ διακριτιῆ. There is here 
brought into distinct promi- 
nence the idea of Difference, 
(suggested by that of Contro- 
versy), on which the discussion 
in this dialogue chiefly turns. 

8. ὡς ἐμοὶ] Cf Rep. 536 ¢, 
d: οὔκουν ὥς ay) ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῇ. 
"AAN ὡς ἐμοὶ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. 
Soph. Aj. 395: ἔρεβος ὦ φαεν- 
νότατον, ὡς ἐμοἔ. For the 
meaning of κερκίζειν, which is 
not clearly given in the Lexi- 
cons, see Cratyl. 388 a: kep- 
κίζοντες δὲ Ti δρῶμεν ; ov 
κρόκην καὶ τοὺς στήμονας συγκε- 
χυμένους διακρίνομεν ; It seems 
to have been a process, not 
merely of making fast, but of 
giving a regular appearance 
to the web by means of the 
comb or κερκίς. See Smith’s 
Dictionary of Antiquities, art. 
Tela, p. trot Ὁ. 


\ 
THY 


G 


9. ἔν ye—spotovl] “In the 
separations above named we 
saw included the parting of 
worse from better and of like 
from like.” The past tense 
implies an appeal to experi- 
ence. For the limitation of the 
inference by means of ye, cf. 
Theet. 204 ¢: 
ἀριθμοῦ ἐστι. 

τὸ μὲν] Τὰ. ο΄, διηθεῖν, διατ- 
τᾷν, βράττειν. 

10. τὸ δὲ] E. g. ξαίνειν, κατά- 
γειν, κερκίζειν. 

12. Σχεδὸν----φαίνεται] “ Such 
does appear to be the case now 
you have put it into words.” 
οὕτω is to be joined with φαί- 
For λεχθὲν, cf. the Ho- 
meric ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω. 
Rep. 2; 370 Ὁ : ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ av- 
τὸς εἰπόντος cov. Phileb. 14 ¢: 
θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν. Legg. 2,672 
b: διὰ τὸ κακῶς τοὺς avOparovs 
αὐτὸ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ γνῶναι λεχθέν. 
Phileb. 45 b: νῦν ῥηθὲν φαί- 


νεται. 


᾿" ΄ “ > 
ἔν ye τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ 


νεται. 


“Ὰ 
-- 


All these 
are in 
stances of 
dividing; 
but while 
in those 
last men- 
tioned like 
is divided 
from like, 
in the for- 
mer the 
good 1s 
separated 
from the 
bad. 


ΤῸ do 
this is to 
purify. 
And there 
are two 
sorts of 
purifica- 
tion. 


First of 
bodies, 
whether 
animate or 
inanimate, 
there are 
purgations 
both in- 


44 


> / Ν / Ν ; 
τῆς δὲ καταλειπούσης μὲν TO βέλτιον διακρίσεως, TO p. 226. |) 


ITAATQNOZ 


de χεῖρον ἀποβαλλούσης ἔχω. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε τί. 


΄σ « / 4 . > \ ΄σ 
ZE. Πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις, ὡς ἐγὼ ξυννοῶ, 


/ \ ’ / 
5 λέγεται Tapa πάντων καθαρμος τις. 


OEAI. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν. 


EE. Οὐκοῦν τό ye καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὖ διπλοῦν 


> la “Δ », 
ον πᾶς ἂν ἰδοι; 


GHAI. Nai, κατὰ σχολήν γε ἴσως" οὐ μὴν ἔγωγε 


10 καθορῶ νῦν. 


— ἂν Χ \ ΄ Ν > 
SE. Kat μὴν τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἰδὴ 


΄ εἰς lad / / 
καθαρσεων evi περιλαβεῖν ὀνόματι προσήκει. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα καὶ τίνι: 


I ΄ὔ an / σ » ἊΝ 7, « Ν 
SE. Ta τε τῶν ζώων, ὅσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ 


Ξ 5 an a , , 
ternal and 15 γυμναστικῆς ἰατρικῆς τε ὀρθῶς διακρινόμενα καθαί- 


external. 


ν NN 3 7 > ΄- A a cd 
ρεται καὶ περὶ TAKTOS, εἰπεῖν μεν φαῦλα, ὅσα βαλα- 


4. ὡς ἐγὼ ξυννοῶ] “As I 
perceive on taking a general 
survey : i. 6. by a process of 
auvayoyn. ‘“O yap συνοπτικὸς 
διαλεκτικός. (Rep. 7, 537 ¢.) 

5. καθαρμός τις] The thought 
which is here introduced, that 
philosophy is a purification of 
the soul, has an affinity with 
Pythagorean doctrine, and is 
in harmony with the Pheedo. 
The same idea is applied to the 
science of government in the 
Politicus, 293 d. Cf. also Legg. 
5,735. τις narks the introduc- 
tion of a fresh notion. Cf. Polit. 
299 Ο: εἰς δή τι δικαστήριον. 

II. πολλὰ] Se. ὄντα. 

12. καθάρσεων] ‘ processes of 
cleansing.” For the variation of 
the word, cf. Lege. 9, 868 ¢, d: 
καθάρσεις---καθαρμούς, ib. 735 6. 

14. Ta te τῶν ζώων --- καθαί- 


petal] “IT mean both cleans- 
ings of living bodies, including 
such right separations and pur- 
gations as are effected within.” 

15. διακρινόμενα! Compare 
Phileb. 46 6: τῷ τὰ συγκεκρι- 
μένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα 
συγχεῖν. Ar. Eth. Nic. VII. 14, 
δ6: of δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν 
ἀεὶ δέονται ἰατρείας καὶ τὸ σῶμα 
δακνόμενον διὰ τὴν 
κρᾶσιν, where similar physio- 
logical notions are implied. 

16. περὶ τἀκτός] Se. καθαιρό- 
μενα. The notion of εἴδη is 
not distinctly repeated with 
ὅσα, which is the cognate sub- 
ject (in apposition to the ac- 
tion) of διακρινόμενα καθαίρεται. 
I.e. ὅσαι 6. xk. = 
τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ γίγνονται. 

εἰπεῖν μὲν φαῦλα] Se. εἶδος δὲ 
ἔχοντα ὅμως. 


διατελεῖται 


a , 
ὅσαι διακρίσεις 


Pp. 2272 








τ a a 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 45 


\ / “ > / , τε 
Ρ. 227. νευτικὴ παρέχεται: καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, ὧν 


\ \ 7 \ \ ᾽ 7 
γναφευτικὴ καὶ ξύμπασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν 


/ \ \ Ν Ν vad A 
παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα 


/ ΒΩ 
ὀνόματα ἔσχεν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Mada γε. 


\ 5 5 / ‘ \ 
BE. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἀλλὰ yap 


2. γναφευτικὴ καὶ ξύμπασα κο- 
σμητικὴ It is implied that 
γναφευτικὴ, cloth-dressing, is a 
department of κοσμητική, the art 
of making neat. This is dis- 
tinctly affirmed in Polit. 282 a: 
πολλῆς οὔσης τῆς κοσμητικῆς τοὺν- 
ταῦθα αὐτῆς μύριον εἰκὸς περιλαμ- 
βάνειν ---- κναφευτικῆ. The word 
κοσμητικὴ is not found elsewhere 
in this sense, and Dr. Badham, 
following the analogy of Valck- 
naer’s correction (?) of Hdt.VIT. 
209 (τὰς κεφαλὰς [κυ]σμέονται), 
would prefer σμητικῆ. But it 
should be borne in mind that 
“washing” and “ darning” 
(πλυντικὴ καὶ ἀκεστικὴ, Polit. 1...) 
are included in the art in ques- 
tion. ‘ Renovation” is not 
quite an equivalent, because 
κοσμητικῆ implies dressing or 
“brushing up” the new clothes 
as well as the old. 

τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ 
σμικρὰ] “ Attending to which 
things in a variety of minute 
departments, the processes of 
fuling and other furbishing 
have earned a great number of 
what are thought ridiculous 
names.” 

3. γελοῖα δοκοῦντα] “ Which 
are thought ridiculous,’—since 
no name really is so which con- 
veys a genuine meaning. Cf. 
Rep. 7, 538 Ὁ : οἰκείους δοκοῦν- 
tas. Theet. 153 a: τὸ--- εἶναι 


δοκοῦν. 
δοκοῦσαι. 
7. 199 d: 
δοκοῦντα εἶναι νόμιμα. 

4. ἔσχεν] Cf. Rep. 6, 502d: 
ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μόγις τέλος ἔσχεν. 

6. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν] “There 
can be no doubt of their 
being thought absurd. But 
then, Theeetetus, the spirit of 
method cares neither more 
nor less for sponging than for 
physicking, if it be so that 
the one does us small service 
and the other great in the 
way of purifying. For her 
endeavour is to know what is 
and is not kindred in the whole 
range of the sciences and arts; 
wherefore she pays equal ob- 
servance to them all, and where 
she finds resemblance between 
things, she counts the one no 
whit more ridiculous than the 
other ; nor does she esteem 
him who gives generalship as 
an instance of “ pursuit” at all 
more decorous but as a rule 
rather more affected than one 
who prefers the example of 
vermin-killing.” For the verb 
σπογγίζω, see Dem. de Cor. 313. 
12; Aristoph. Thesm. 247. 
This clause refers to the many 
minute branches of κοσμητική 
of which σπογγιστική is one, 
rather than to the ἐκτὸς καθάρ- 
σεις τῶν ζώων. 


Ibid.176 ἃ : δεινότητες 
And compare Legg. 
πολλὰ καὶ σμικρὰ 


(This occa- 
sions the 
remark 


that sci- 
entific 
method 
ignores the 
common 
standards 
of mean 
and high. 


46 


τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοπο- P- 227.1) 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


͵, Oh - > aA ΄ ΄ 
σίας οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον, εἰ 


τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαῖρον. 


A , A “ A a a ‘ 
TOU κτήσασθαι yap €VEKA VOUY πασῶν τέχνων TO 


5€vyyeves καὶ TO μὴ ξυγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη 


ἴω Ν n » J 7 ἐν / lal 
τίμα πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἰσου TAOCaS, και θάτερα TOV 
ἐ 


« / \ Ν « / \ . Lal / 
ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιότερα, 


σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς 


an Ν \ ’ > c ΧΝ 
δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ 


I. σπογγιστικῆς]͵ “The art 
of cleansing with the sponge.” 
ἀλλὰ γάρ implies, “ But the 
apparent absurdity of the 
names is nothing to us, for,” 
We. 

2. οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον] Cf. Rep. 
1, 339 Ὁ: οὔπω δῆλον οὐδ᾽ εἰ 
μεγάλη. From ἃ humorous 
determination to be strictly 
impartial, it is purposely left 
doubtful which is to be con- 
sidered the more useful art. 
Plato seems to have changed 
his opinion on the subject of 
pharmacy. Compare Rep. 3, 
407 with Tim. 89 ¢, d. 

4. τοῦ κτήσασθαι ἕνεκα νοῦν] 
Compare Polit. 272 ¢: πυνθα- 
νόμενοι παρὰ πάσης φύσεως εἴ 
τινά τις ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἔχουσα 
ἤσθετο τι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων 
εἰς συναγυρμὸν φρονήσεως. 

τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ συγ- 
yeves| Cf. Rep. 7, 531 ¢: ἐὰν μὲν 
ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκη- 
ται καὶ συγγένειαν, καὶ συλλογισθῇ 
ταῦτα ἣ ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα, φέ- 
pe τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ βουλόμεθα τὴν 
στραγματείαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀνόνητα πο- 
νεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνόνητα. 

7. κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα] LI. 6. 
ἡ τοιαῦτά ἐστι. “In respect οἵ 
their resemblance,”—to which 


in the act of generalizing her 
attention is confined. 

8. σεμνότερον] “ More decor- 
ous or refined.” Cf. Theet. 
150a: φεύγουσι καὶ THY προμνη- 
στικὴν ἅτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ μαῖαι, 
Compare Parm. [30 6: ὅτε οὐδὲν 
αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις. Phileb. 58 ¢, 
Phedr. 261 Ὁ. Polit. 266 d: 
6 τι τῇ τοιᾷδε μεθύδῳ τῶν λόγων 
οὔτε σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν 
ἢ μή. It is a true reflection, 
though here ironically applied, 
that science ignores the fasti- 
diousness of the senses and the 
prejudices of a refined taste, 
and, as Lord Bacon says, 
“ que palatia et cloacas in- 
ereditur nec tamen polluitur.” 
Noy. Organ. 1,120. Compare 
also the defiance of ridicule in 
Rep. 5, 452. And see the re- 
marks of Mr.Grote on the pas- 
sage of the Parmenides above 
cited, Plato &ce., vol. 11. p. 268. 

τι ---- οὐδὲν Cf. Pheed. 74a: 
οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. 

9. θηρευτικὴνἢ Plato seems 
to have been fond of the no- 
tion of a science of θηρευτική 
which should include war, ty- 
ranny, the chase, rhetoric, and 
sophistry under one head. Cf. 
supr. p. 222, Eutbyd. 290 Ὁ, 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 47 


Pp. 227. πολὺ χαυνότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἤρου, τί 
προσεροῦμεν ὄνομα ξυμπάσας δυνάμεις, ὅσαι σῶμα 
εἴτε ἔμψυχον εἴτε ἄψυχον {εἰλήφασι καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν 
αὐτῇ διοίσει, ποῖόν τι λεχθὲν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι 


Q 


δόξει: μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων 


σι 


’ “ ‘ 
πάντα ξυνδῆσαν ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει Tov yap 

Ν \ 7 Χ SON “- “΄ » 
περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καθαρμὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικε- 


/ / \ “ / 7 
χείρηκεν ἀφορίσασθαι τὰ viv, εἴ ye ὅπερ βούλεται 


᾽ὔ 
μανθανομεν. 
> A , ἣν lal 7 \ 

OEAI. ᾿Αλλὰ μεμάθηκα, καὶ συγχωρῶ δύο μὲν 10 Secondly, 
ἮΝ θά ἃ δὲ x N \ \ δ 5 there are 
εἴδη καθάρσεως, ev δὲ TO περὶ THY ψυχὴν εἰδος εἶναι, — purifica- 

a MKS A ΝΕ 9. tions of 
τοῦ περὶ TO σωμα χωρὶς ον. ΕΣ ἢ 

μι ΄ ΄ / \ . whereby 

HE. Ilavrwv καλλιστα. Kal fol TO PETA the evil is 

separated 
from the 
Polit. 299 ἃ, Rep. 2, 373 b, certain that εἰλήφασι here ig 8° 


Lege. 7, 823; see also Epin. 


975 0. 

I. ὅπερ ἤρου] Supr. 226 e: 
ποῖα καὶ τίνι. “And so now, 
with respect to the question 


wrong. Cf. Legg. 1, 624 a: 
εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν. Ib. 6,768 d: 
THY πλείστην νομοθεσίαν εἰλήφασι. 
Hdt. III. 71. See also Phileb. 
37 Ὁ, and the Zurich Editors’ 





you have asked, What name is 
to be given to all faculties 
whose province is to cleanse 
animate or inanimate bodies, 
she will not care, what expres- 
sion will sound most seemly.” 
τί mpocep. is explanatory of ὅπερ, 
whose antecedent is in the ac- 
cusative of respect after διοίσει. 
οὐδὲν is adverbial, and the 
subj. of διοίσει is the clause 
ποῖόν τι δόξει. 


3. Τεϊλήφασι 7 So all the 
MSS. except a corrector of Par. 
B., who gives εἰλήχασι (thus, εἰλή- 


φασι). Although it is difficult 
to bring forward another in- 
stance of λαμβάνω used exactly 
in this sense, or followed by 
an infinitive, it is not quite 


preface to the Philebus, p. xiv. 
There is, however, a much 
greater internal probability in 
favour of εἰλήχασι, Cf. Theeet. 
149 b: τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε. 
Tim. 52a: τοῦτο ὃ δὴ νοήσις 
εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν. Lb. 38 d: τὴν 
ἐναντίαν εἰληχὸς αὐτῷ δύναμιν. 

5. ἐχέτω] Se. τὸ λεχθὲν ὄνομα. 
Cf. Β6ρ.7,533: ἔστι δ᾽, ὡς ἐμοὶ 
δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβή- 
τησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις 
ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειτα. Οὐ γὰρ 
οὖν, ἔφη" ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ 
πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ, ἃ λέγει 
ἐν ψυχῇ. 

7. ἐπικεχείρηκεν] Se. ἡ τῶν 
λόγων τέχνη. 

10. δύο --- καθάρσεως] εἶναι 
must be supplied from the 
following clause. 


Io 


Now men- I5 
tal evils 

are of two 
kinds, cor- 
responding 

to disease 
and ugli- 
ness in the 


body : 


48 


al ’ , , 5 
TOUTO ἐπάκουε πειρώμενος GU TO 


4 
τέμνειν. 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


Ν 


OEAI. Καθ᾿ ὁποῖ᾽ ἂν ὑφηγῇ,. πειράσομαί σοι 


’ὔ 
συντεμνειν.- 


EE. Πονηρίαν ἕτερον ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομέν 


Tl y 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς yap ov ; 


=E. Kat μὴν καθαρμὸς ἦν τὸ λιπεῖν μὲν Oare- 


’ WG? ΩΝ 3 / ΄ 
ρον, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἡ πού τι φλαῦρον. 


OEAI. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν. 


ΞΕ. Καὶ ψυχῆς ἄρα καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν εὑρίσκωμεν 


7 » / 7, Ν 9. Ὁ vA > 
κακίας ἀφαίρεσίν τινα, καθαρμὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἐν 


μέλει φθεγξόμεθα. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε. 


\ 3 ¢e 
=E. Avo μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέον. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Iota; 


= \ \ e , » , \ > ἘΣ 
ΞΕ. To μὲν οἷον νοσοὸν ἐν σώματι, To δ᾽ οἷον 


5 3 ,ὔ 
αισχος εγγίιγνομενον. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔμαθον. 


I. ἐπάκουε πειρώμενος] Bad- 
ham elegantly conjectures ἐπα- 
κολούθει : and, less happily, 
πειρωμένῳ: Of. Polit. 261 a: 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπακολουθῶν σύντεμνε. See 
however Legg. goo d: καὶ σφο- 
Spa γε ἐπήκουε. ib. gos d. 

5. ἀρετῆς] Bodl. ἄρ᾽ τῆς. 

8. λιπεῖν]! So all the MSS. 
“To leave once for all what is 
not evil, but continually to 
throw out whatever evil is 
found anywhere.” So the dif- 
ference of tense may be ex- 
pressed. The action of λιπεῖν 
is viewed as final, that of ἐκβάλ- 
Aew as continuous. Heind. conj. 
λείπειν. 


9. mov] “anywhere.” 1. 6. (in 
the present instance) “in any 
region of the soul.” 

11. ψυχῆς] Gen. after κακίας 
ἀφαίρεσιν and καθαρμόν. Cf. 
supr. 224 a and note. 

12. αὐτὸν refers to ἀφαίρεσιν, 
but agrees in gender by at- 
traction with καθαρμόν. 

ἐν μέλε] Cf. Phileb. 28 
b: ἵνα μὴ---παρὰ μέλος φθεγξώ- 
μεθά τὶ. “In tune,” i. 6: con- 
sistently. 

15. Avo μὲν εἴδη κακίας] The 
implied apodosis, which is 
postponed by the explanation 
which follows, is δύο δὲ καθαρμῶν. 

18. ἐγγιγνόμενον] Sc. ἐν ψυχῇ. 


λεχθὲν διχῇ Ρ- 227.4)! 
4 


Ῥ- 228. 











Hp. 228. 





b 


ΣΟΦΙΣΊΤΗΣ. 40 


ΞΕ. Nooov ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταὐτὸν νενό- 
μικας. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδ᾽ αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀπο- 
κρίνασθαι. 

ΞΕ. Πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν 5 
τοῦ φύσει ξυγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν ; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. 

HE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ αἶσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας 
πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ὃν γένος : 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο. 
EE. Τί δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν 


Ιο 


ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα 
τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ἠσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε. 
EE. Zuyyevn γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ξύμπαντα yeé-15 


yovev. 


OEAI. [as yap ov; 


“, ,ὔ Tas a 
SE. Στάσιν apa καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν 


λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθότατα μὲν οὖν. 


20 


— aN “ 7, , 
e ΡΠ. Τί δ᾽; ὅσα κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκο- 


3. Οὐδ᾽ αὖ] Referring to οὐκ 
ἔμαθον supr. 

6. ἔκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν] 
This is the MS. reading: that 
of Cornarius, taken from a 
quotation of this passage by 
Galen, διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν, being 
supported only by a correction 
in Par. F. The object is to 
shew that sedition is a disease ; 
and it is more natural to speak 
of disease as a dissolution or 
decay of kindred elements in 
consequence of some dissen- 
sion amongst them, than as a 


dissension arising from some 
decay. 

11. δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις «.7.d.] Cf. 
Rep. 4, 439; 440. 

12. λόγον λύπαις] Cf. Rep. 3, 
387, 388. 

13. τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων] These 
words are an afterthought, and 
are placed in immediate con- 
struction with ταῦτα (viz. δοξ. 
ἐπ. θυμ. 75. Noy. λυπ.). πονηρία 
appeared above as a general 
word, but is here used with 
a special meaning, as distin- 
guished from ἀμαθία, 


Vice is 
analogous 
to disease, 
and both 
are similar 
to civil 
war. For 
each is a 
corruption 
of kindred 
elements 
arising 
from some 
dissension. 


lonorance 


is a kind of 
deformity, 
and may 
be com- 


pared to 
the bodily 
state, in 
which the 5 
movements 
of different 
members 
are inhar- 
monious 
and fail of 
accom- 
plishing 


their end. 10 


50 MAATOQNO® 


/ / / / ’ὔ 
Tov τινα θέμενα, πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν, καθ᾽ γ. 228. ἢ 


ε , ε \ ΄ὕ > ΞΞ , 
ἑκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνεται καὶ ἀπο- 


’ 
τυγχάνει, 
r Ν 
τὴς προς 
πασχειν: 


ΘΒΕΑΙ. 


/ > \ / c \ if 
πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας 


ΕΣ Δ > / « \ > / ᾽ \ 
αἀλληλὰ ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ 


Δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας. 


\ / > 3, cal 
EE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ψυχὴν ye ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν 


a 3 lal 
παν αἀγνοουσαν. 


OEAI. Σφόδρα γε. 


/ Χ » a > e 
HE. To ye μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ᾿ ἀλήθειαν oppo- 


μένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου ξυνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν 


ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη. 
BEAT. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


τ. πειρώμενα!] The omission 
of this word in the Bodleian 
MS. is probably due to the 
ὁμοιοτέλευτον οἵ θέμενα. 

2. παράφορα αὐτοῦ] Sc. τοῦ 
σκόπου, “swerving from the 
mark.” 

In Tim. 87 e (where the 
word παραφορότης is used) the 
same connexion is noticed be- 
tween irregularity of action 
and disproportion of parts. 

4. αὐτὰ πάσχειν] “ Are thus 
affected.” For the neut. plur., 
ef. Theet. 207 6, and note. 
Compare Ar. Eth. Nic. I. 13: 
ἀτεχνῶς yap καθάπερ τὰ παραλε- 
λυμένα τοῦ σώματος μέρη εἰς τὰ 
δεξιὰ προαιρουμένου κινῆσαι τοὐ- 
ναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέ- 
ρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως" 
ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν 
ἀκρατῶν᾽ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν 
ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ 
τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. But 
what Aristotle thus describes 
approaches more nearly to 


what Plato here ealls στάσις 
τῆς ψυχῆς. 

. ψυχήν γε --- ἀγνοοῦσαν | 
This is emphatically the na- 
ture of “soul” or “ mind”— 
according to the well-known 
Socratic or Platonic principle, 
which remains unaltered in 
the Laws. See Legg. 9, 860 d: 
ως Ol KAKOL παντες ELS TAVTA ELOLVY 
ἄκοντες κακοί. 

II. παραφόρου ξυνέσεως] An 
etymological analysis, in the 
Cratylus vein, of παραφρο- 
Cf. Legg. 6, 775 d: 
παράφορος---ὁ μεθύων. 

παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνο- 
μένης (ψυχῆς) “ And what is 
ignorance, but the aberration of 
a mind which is bent on truth 
but swerves aside from under- 
standing ?” The gen. συνέσεως 
is governed by παραφόρου. 
which agrees with Ψυχῆς. For 
this interpretation we are in- 
debted to the acumen of Hein- 
dorf. 


, 
συνη. 


πον, “- τς 








ZOPISTHY. a 





3, > / ’ \ Ν ᾽ 
Ρ.228. FE. Ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἄμετρον 


θετέον. 

ΘΕΑΙ. "Eorkev. 

3, a a > 

BE. Ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ws φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν 

» ΄ / ‘ / c Ν coat 
αὐτῇ γένη, TO μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν 

an / > “-“ 3, 

πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα Ov. 

OEAI. Ναί. 

BE. Τὸ δέ ye ἀγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ 

SEN a / / 5 / € 
αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμο- 
λογεῖν. 

Ξ ἃ π᾿ \ 

e OEAI. Κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὃ νῦν δὴ λέξαντος 
> 7 ΄ χ , 3 ΄ , » > 
nupeyvonaa σου, TO δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ: 

Ν / \ Ν 3 / SO / , 
καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ξύμπαντα 


3 UZ 7 > «ς lad \ \ ὍΝ ἊΝ \ 
nynTEOV νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, TO δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντο- 





δαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἶσχος θετέον. 


EE. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σώματί γε περὶ δύο παθήματε 


/ , 4 \ ’ , 
τούτω dvo τέχνα τινε ἐγενέσθην ; 


ΘΈΑΙ. Τώε τούτω: 


aE Π ἣν \ 5 f Ν δὲ / 
mut. Liepl μὲν αἰσχος γυμναστικὴ. περι OE νοσον 


΄ 
ἰατρικὴ. 


CEAI. PaivecOov. 


- \ 
EE. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ 


8. καλοῦσιν --- οὐκ ἐθέλουσι] 
Se. οἱ πολλοί from τῶν πολλῶν 
supra. 

9. ev Ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον] 
I. 6. When mental is not com- 
bined with bodily deformity : 
for the converse of which see 
Rep. 3, 402 6: or ἐν ψυχῇ 
μόνον, “only in the soul,” as 
if that was a matter of less 
consequence. Stallb.’s inter- 
pretation, “eam esse eximie 
(μόνον) in animo pravitatem,” 


H 


(cf. Symp. 215 6) requires γί- 
γνεσθαι. For the omission of 
εἶναι, cf. infr. 246 e: τοῦτο δὲ 
ov σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὁμολογοῦσιν. 

13. ξύμπαντα]! Stallb. adds 
ταῦτα from C.F. b,c, unnecessa- 
rily. For πάθος, infr., cf. Theet. 
193 d: τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος. 

16. περὶ δύο παθήματε] Cf. 
Phedr. 261 ὃ: περὶ πάντα τὰ 
λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη. 

22. Οὐκοῦν καὶ] “And in like 
manner.” 


2) 


a 


As gym- 
nastic 

20 counter- 
acts defor- 
mity, and 
medicine 
disease, so 


there is 
chastise- 
ment for 
the cure of 
vice, and 
instruction 
to remedy 
the more 
latent evil. 


_enumerated 


52 


δειλίαν ἡ κολαστικὴ πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ p. 229. 


ΠΛΑΤΌΝΟΣ 


΄ / / 
πασῶν προσήκουσα | OiKnt : 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρω- 


πίνην δόξαν. 


EE. Τί δέ; περὶ ξύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν μῶν ἄλλην 


\ x \ 3 / 7 ” 
τινὰ ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἴποι τις ἀν; 


ΘΈΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν. 


EE. Φέρε δή: διδασκαλικῆς δὲ apa ἕν μόνον 


/ , 3 x 7, ΄ ΄ὔ >, κ 53 
γένος φατέον εἶναι ἢ πλείω, δυο δέ τινε αὐτῆς εἶναι 


/ ,ὔ 
τὸ μέγίστω, OKOTTEL. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Σκοπῶ. 


EE. Καί μοι δοκοῦμεν τῇδε av πῃ τάχιστα εὑρεῖν. 


ΟΠ, ἡἣ κολαστικὴ---- [δίκη ] The 
position of δίκη in the sentence 


-inay be paralleled from many 


similar inversions in this and 
other dialogues. Many of 
Plato’s rhythmical sentences 
end purposely with a dissyl- 
able, which is often sepa- 
rated from the natural con- 
nexion. And δίκη is similarly 
amongst other 
arts, including medicine, in 
Gorg. 478 b, ὁ: Χρηματιστικὴ 
μὲν πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ 
δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ 
ἀδικίας. —— τί οὖν τούτων κάλ- 
λιστόν ἐστιν.--- χρηματιστικῆς, ἰα- 
τρικῆς, δίκης ; πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ 
Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη. ΤΌ. infr.: ἰα- 
τρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη. 
The addition of κολαστικὴ in 
the present passage is, how- 
ever, curious: for it is not 
clear from what other kind of 
justice corrective justice is 
here distinguished. I there- 
fore venture to suggest the 
very slight correction δίκῃ, 
which is in some degree con- 


firmed by the frequency of 
tragic expressions in these 
dialogues. Cf. Soph. Electr. 
70: σοῦ yap ἔρχομαι δίκῃ Kabap- 
τής. Ant. 94: ἐχθρὰ δὲ τῷ θα- 
νόντι πρόσκεισαι δίκη. And see 
Pheedr. 278 6: δίκῃ mov ποιη- 
Polit. 310 a: 
ἐπὶ τούτοις τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τέχνῃ φάρ- 
μακον. Tim. 62 d: οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ 
δόξει τὸ μηδὲν προσῆκον ὄνομα 
Theztetus’ answer, ὡς 


τὴν---προσερεῖς. 


λέγειν. 


b 


γοῦν — δόξαν, is in harmony - 


with this. It is not probable 
that δίκη is a marginal note, 
since, except in the passage of 
the Gorgias above quoted, the 
term is hardly used with the 
precise meaning given to κολα- 
στική here. The word is un- 
accentuated in the Bodl. MS. 
Compare the political appli- 
cation of the idea of καθαρμὸς 
already noticed in Legg. 5, 735 
and Polit. 293. 

9. ἢ πλείω, δύο δὲ] Cf. Rep. 
4, 445 α: ἄπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας 
(εἴδη), τέτταρα δ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἅττα 
ὧν καὶ ἄξιον ἐπιμνησθῆναι. 








[}».220. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Mi; 


μ- Ν » 100 v \ / par 
HE. Τὴν ayvoiay ἰδόντες εἰ πῃ κατὰ μέσον αὑτῆς 


τομὴν ἔχει τινά. διπλῆ γὰρ αὕτη γιγνομένη δῆλον 


“ Ν \ Ν 7 > 75 / yy 
OTL καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν OVO ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν, 


a 3 οὶ \ / “ ᾽ “ c / 
εν ἐφ ενι γένει τῶν AUTNS εἐκᾶάτέρῳ. 


3. τομὴν ἔχει τινὰ] Cf. Lege. 
12, 944 b: σχεδὸν οὖν ἐν 
τοῖς ὀνείδεσιν ἔχει τινὰ τομὴν 7 
ἐπιφορά. 
ῥίψασπις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐν πᾶσιν 
ὀνομάζοιτ᾽ ἂν δικαίως, ἀποβολεὺς 
δὲ ὅπλων. 

διπλῆ γὰρ αὕτη γιγνομένη | 
Cf. Gorg. 464 Ὁ: Δυοῖν ὄντοιν 
τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας 
κιτ.λ. 

The meaning of pp. 226-- 
231 may be thus stated: The 
Sophist professes to be an edu- 
cator ; and the highest form 
of education is that which 
leads men to know them- 
selves, and liberates them from 
the conceit of knowledge: in 
other words, the elenchus, or 
cross-questioning method. This 


, ΄ 
τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων 





is distinguished from the an- 
tiquated mode of correction 
by direct reproof, and also 
from the positive instruction 
which is given to those who 
are consciously ignorant of any 
subject. There is grave doubt 
whether the Sophist deserves 
to be called an educator in this 
highest sense: but the honour 
is yielded to him for the pre- 
sent, with the feeling that he 
will not retain it long. The 
serious thought, that educa- 
tion is the purification of the 
mind through the separation 
of the false from the true, is 
approached ironically through 
the trivial example of house- 
hold processes, and also through 
the following distinctions : 





Separation 
fees 
Of like from like Of good from evil = Purification 
ane 
a 
Corporeal Mental 
(and mental evils are) 
τ- Scar eer ery 
ἘΠ (aos) ΤῊΣ ΠΣ ) 
[ἢ νόσος ὑπ ἀμετρία 
——— 


ἄλλα μέρη ἀμαθίας 
ΒΗ 


A ‘ / 
τὸ μὴ κατειδότα 
ae τις 
τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι. 


Hence instruction is 





= 
δημιουργικαὶ διδασκαλίαι 





= 








- 


παιδεία 


= 
νουθετητικὴ 


ἔλεγχος, 


3ut ignor- 
ance, and 
therefore 
instruction 
also, is two- 
fold: the 
more un- 
manage- 


able kind 
being stu- 
pidity, or 
that ignor- 
ance which 
the mind 
mistakes 
for know- 
ledge. 


54 


MAATOQNOS 


| 
| 


OEAI. Ti οὖν; καταφανές πῇ σοι τὸ viv ζητού- Ρ- 229. 


μενον ; 


EE. ᾿Αγνοίας δ᾽ οὖν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλε- ὁ 


Ν ᾽ ΄, Cas 5 a a ” ΓΤ ΣΝ 
TOV ἀφωρισμένον ὁρᾷν εἰδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς 


/ / 
5 ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσιν. 


ΘΕΙ͂Α. Ποῖον δή: 


ΞῈ. Τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι: de οὗ 


’ fa “ / 
κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοίᾳ σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι 


πᾶσιν. 


10 EAT. ᾿Αλλ. 


Ee K Ν δὴ Ν / 3 {/ ΄σ > / 
yi. αι On και TOUT γε οἰμαι μονῷ τὴς uyvolas 


ἀμαθία τοὔνομα προσρηθῆναι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. avy γε. 


EE. Τί δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ἄρα μέρει τῷ 


A , / 
τ τοῦτο amaAAaTTovTL λεκτέον ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ξένε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημι- 


3. ᾿Αγνοίας δ᾽ οὖν] Badham: 
““᾿Αγνοίας γ᾽ οὖν legendum : est 
enim responsio aliqua ex parte 
assentientis.” So also the old 
editions. The words as they 
stand certainly take no account 
of the question, but continue 
the previous speech. 

5. ἀντίσταθμον]) “ Which may 
be weighed against all the 
other parts of ignorance put 
together.” The word belongs 
to tragedy. Cf. Soph. El. 561: 
ὡς ---- ἀντίσταθμον τοῦ θηρὸς ἐκ- 
θύσειε τὴν αὑτοῦ κόρην. For 
χαλεπὸν = difficult to handle, 
ef. Symp. 204 a: αὐτὸ γὰρ 
τοῦτο χαλεπόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀμαθία. 

7. VO μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν 
εἰδέναι] See, amongst other 
places where the ignorant 
conceit of knowledge is dis- 
tinguished from conscious ig- 


norance, Phil. 48 d,e; Legg. 9, 
860d; 863 ¢; 10,886b; Symp. 
l.e.; Pheedr. 275 b. Ale. 118 a: 
αὕτη ἄρ᾽ ἡ ἄγνοια τῶν κακῶν αἰτία 
καὶ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία. 

δι’ οὗ πάντα----πᾶσιν] Because 
men never act without think- 
ing they know. 

8. πάντα ὅσα σφαλλόμεθα = 
πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα ἡμῖν σφάλ- 
ματα. Cf. supr. 2206 6: éca— 
καθαίρεται, and note. 

11. μόνῳ] Badham conjectures 
μορίῳ, but μόνῳ has more point. 
“This alone earns the title of 
stupidity.” Cf. Symp. 222 a: 
νοῦν ἔχοντας---μόνους τῶν λόγων. 

14. Ti—exréov] Se. ὄνομα. 

16. τὸ μὲν ἀλλο---διδασκαλίας] 
“The part which is separated 
from this includes instruction 
in various handicrafts.” A simi- 
lar division is made in Phileb. 


d 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ: 


Ρ. 229. ουργικὰς διδασκαλίας, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν δι 


ἡμῶν κεκλῆσθαι. 


55 


, 


ΞΕ, Καὶ yap σχεδόν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐν πᾶσιν “EA- 


» \ A c ΄ ΕΣ a fy > 
Anow. ἀλλὰ yap ἡμῖν ETL καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ 


JA 7 > Ν a ΕΣ yA / , / 
ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν, ἢ τινα €XOV διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν 5 


» / 
ἐπωνυμίας. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν. 


EE. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πῃ σχίζεσθαι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ τί: 


EE. Τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλικῆς ἡ μὲν τρα- 


/ vy c Ν 53 Ν so n ,ὔ 
χυτέρα τις ἔοικεν ὁδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον αὐτῆς μό- 


/ 
ριον λειοτερον. 


ΘΕΑΙ. To ποῖον δὴ τούτων ἑκάτερον λέγωμεν; 


μ- \ \ > 7 ΄ @ \ 
HE. To μεν ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον, ᾧ προς 


556: οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ pev — δη- 
μιουργικόν ἐστι τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθή- 
ματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παι- 
δείαν καὶ τροφήν ; Cf. also Protag. 
322 b, where δημιουργικὴ is op- 
posed to πολιτική. 

1. παιδεία") The idea of 
education in the higher sense 
is due to Greek philosophy : 
appearing first in the saying 
attributed to several of the 
early thinkers, πολυμαθίη νόον 
ov διδάσκει. 

δ ἡμῶν] “ By our means.” 
I. 6. The use of the word by 
the Athenians has given it 
currency throughout this part 
of Greece: ‘a nobis (Athe- 
niensibus) nominis hujus auc- 
toribus.”—Heindorf. * 

5. πᾶν] Cf. Parmen. Fr. 61: 
ov mor ἔην οὐδ᾽ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν 
ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν ξυνεχές. 1. 6. 
whether we have reached the 
ἄτμητον εἴδος. 

8. καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πῃ σχίζεσθαι] 


“This, like the rest, admits 
of being divided somewhere.” 
The words καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι are in 
exact keeping with ἤδη πᾶν 
supr. Cf.supr.222¢. Hermann’s 
conjecture, κατὰ τοῦτο, is wn- 
necessary and awkward, be- 
cause anticipating the ques- 
tion, and because τοῦτο has 
no antecedent. 

10. Τῆς ---διδασκαλικῆς] παιδεία 
is assumed to be equivalent to 
ἡ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλική. 

ἡ μὲν --- 650s] Cf. Aristoph. 
Ran. sub. init. 

13. λέγωμεν] Stallb. λέγομεν, 
from Z1.i: perhaps rightly. 

14. Td pev—orehrovrar]| “ The 
one a time-honoured ancestral 
mode, which men used chiefly 
towards their sons, and many 
still do so when they see them 
fallen into some error, either 
speaking roughly to them, or 
else more softly expostulating : 
which varieties may be cor- 


The art 
which 
removes 
this has the 
peculiarly 
Greek 
name of 
Παιδεία---- 
Education. 


Of which 
there are 
two modes 
recognized: 
the old- 
fashioned 
admonitory 
system 

of moral 
training, 
and an- 
other which 
may be 


56 


\ cn , 5 is / τον Ν sf 
TOUS υἱεῖς μάλιστ᾽ ἐχρωντὸ TE καὶ ETL πολλοὶ χρῶνται p. 229) 


\ fal “ ᾽ -“ »" 7 / \ \ 
τὰ VUV, OTAV AUTOLS EEAUAPTAVWOL τι, TA μεν χαλε- p. 230 


ITAATQNOZ 


/ \ \ / / ‘ 
παίνοντες, TA δὲ μαλθακωτέρως παραμυθούμενοι" τὸ 


> 5 7 NP) / 7 δ 
δ᾽ οὖν ξύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθοτατα εἰποι τις ἂν νουθετη- 


‘ 
5 TUK). 


SEAI. Ἔστιν οὕτως. 


EE. Τὸ δέ γε, [ὡς] εἴξασί τινες αὖ λόγον ἑαυτοῖς 


rectly included in the general 
name of admonition.” 

True 

“ Now for the other method. 
It would seem that some had 
reflected with themselves that 
stupidity is always involun- 
tary, and that no one who 
thinks himself wise will ever 
care to be a learner of those 
matters in which he fancies 
himself to be accomplished : 
moreover, that education in 
the form of admonition spends 
a world of labour with but 
small result.” 

“ And they were right.” 

“ Therefore they address 
themselves differently to the 
task of exorcising this con- 
ceit.” 

The two modes of correc- 
tion may be compared with 
the two kinds of legislation 
(with and without explanation 
and persuasion) mentioned in 
the Laws, of which the former 
is there preferred: see esp. 
Legg. 4,720 sqq. So far was 
Plato from reversing his judg- 
ment, as Mr. Grote (vol. iii. p. 
355, note on p. 354) supposes, 
respecting the νουθετητικὸν εἶδος 
τῆς παιδείας, which Protagoras 
advocates, Prot. 325d: καὶ ἐὰν 
μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται, --- εἰ δὲ μή, 
ὥσπερ ξύλον διεστραμμένον καὶ 


καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς 
καὶ πληγαῖς. 

(14.) ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον] 
A tragic expression; οἵ, Aesch. 
Prom. 409: μεγαλοσχήμονα τ᾽ dp- 
χαιοπρεπῆ---τίμαν, where two ad- 
jectives are similarly combined. 

2. ὅταν avrois] Cf. Rep. 1, 
343 a: ὅς ye αὐτῇ οὔτε πρό- 
βατα οὔτε ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις. 

7. Τὸ δέ ye] The Bodleian, 
in common with most of the 
MSS., omits ὡς (before εἴξασι), 
which is not necessary, and if 
inserted will hardly affect 
the sense, for ὡς εἴξασιν ἡγη- 
σασθαι is equivalent to ἡγή- 
σαντο, ὡς εἴξασι. Cf. infr. 263 d: 
ὡς ἔοικε--- γίγνεσθαι, and note. 
The introduction of a sentence 
with τὸ δὲ out of construction, 
or rather in apposition, is very 
frequent in Plato, and scarcely 
needs illustration. Compare, 
however, Polit. 263 ὁ: τὸ δέ 
ye, ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε, τάχ᾽ 
ἂν, εἴ που φρόνιμόν ἐστί τι ζῶον 
ἕτερον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ τῶν γε- 
ράνων, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ ἴσως διονομάζοι. If ὡς 
is retained, which is perhaps 
better on the whole, ὡς εἴξασί 
τινες ἡγήσασθαι κιτ.λ. IS equi- 
valent to ἡγησάμενοί τινες, ὡς 
εἴξασι ---- στέλλονται. 

λόγον ἑαυτοῖς δόντες] “ On re- 


flection.” Cf. Hdt. I. 34: Ὃ & 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 57 


, ¢ , ΡΞ ’ 3 ‘ 
p. 230. δόντες ἡγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ 


a > / “Ὁ Ν sv 53 
μαθεῖν οὐδέν ποτ᾽ ἂν ἐθέλειν τὸν οἰόμενον εἰναι 


\ ΄ Ὁ 7 ΄ Ν ΗΑ \ δὲ 
σοῴον τούτων ὧν οἴοιτο πέρι δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ 


A ΄ \ \ - A / 
πολλοῦ πόνου TO νουθετητικὸν Eidos τῆς παιδείας 


Ν / 
σμικρὸν avureww. 


ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Ορθῶς γε νομίζοντες. 
HE. To τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλῳ 


΄ ip 
τρόπῳ στέλλονται. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Tix δή: 


μ-| “ e x ͵ / ͵ , ’ 
BE. Διερωτῶσιν ὧν ἂν οἰἴηταί τίς τι πέρι λέγειν 


λέγων μηδέν: εἶθ᾽ ἅτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ῥᾳδίως 


35 i4 Ν / ἊΝ lad , > 3 aN 
ἐξετάζουσι, και συνάγοντες δὴ TOL Aoyous εἰς TAUTOV 


/ / \ > ΄ 
τιθέασι παρ᾽ ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν 


3 \ « a “ Ν a > ΄σ Ν \ > Ν 
QUTAS αὐταῖς αμὰ TEpt τῶν αὐτῶν προς TH αὐτὰ 


ἐπειδὴ ἐξηγέρθη καὶ λόγον ἑαυτῷ 
ἔδωκε, κατορρωδήσας τὸν ὄνειρον 
ἄγεται τῷ παιδὶ γυναῖκα. Soph. 
Cid. Rex. 583: Οὐκ, εἰ διδοίης 
γ᾽, ὡς ἐγώ, σαυτῷ λόγον. 

2. οὐδέν mor ἂν ἐθέλειν] So 
Bodl. ΔΠΙ., Stallbaum. Edd. 
Vet. οὐδέποτε. It deserves 
mention that Heindorf had 
at one time been led to con- 
jecture οὐδέν, because of τού- 
tev following, but had after- 
wards contented himself with 
making depend on 
περι. 

3. σοφὸν---δεινὸς] Plato iro- 
nically uses the words as syno- 
nymous. Cf. Theet. 173 b: 
δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ws 
οἴονται. ΤΌ. 177 a: κἂν εἵπωμεν 
ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δει- 
νότητος K.T.A. 

μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου] This 
is the same lesson which 
experience has taught to 
schoolmasters and others with- 


, 
Τούτων 


in our own memory. But few 
of them have found so good 
a substitute for the old- 
fashioned νουθετητικὴ as the 
Socratic elenchus. 

7. Te to] Cf. Thest. 179 
ἃ : τῷ τοι--μᾶλλον σκεπτέον. 

8. στέλλονται] “ Address 
themselves.” Στέλλεσθαι is si- 
milarly used in Legg. το, 892: 
οὐκοῦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ δὴ 
τοῦτο στελλώμεθα ; Lh 893 Ὁ, 
Phileb. 50 e. 

10, Διερωτῶσιν (τι τοὐτωνῚ 
περὶ ὧν ἂν τις οἴηται τι λέγειν. 

II. πλανωμένων ὅδο. τῶν ἀνθρώ- 
πων. Cf. 1 Alcib. 117 a: περὶ 
τῶν δικαίων Kat ἀδίκων----ἀποκρινό- 
μενός φης πλανᾶσθαι ; 
δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι περὶ 
αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾷ; Lys. 
214 a. 

14. περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κιτ.λ.] CF. 
Rep. 4,436 6: ὥς ποτέ τι τὸ 
αὐτὸ ὃν ἅμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ 


> > 
€lTa OV 


> \ > ,ὔ ,ὔ 
αὐτὸ τἀναντία πάθοι. 


on 


10 


thus de- 
scribed. 
Reflecting 
that no 
man wishes 
to be stu- 
pid, and 
that the 
source of 
error lies 
in the con- 
ceit of 
wisdom ; 
observing, 
too, that 
the old me- 
thod was 
laborious 
and had 
small 
result, 
there are 
some who 
address 
themselves 
differently 
to the task 


a ae en I na 


of getting 
rid of this 
conceit. 


Cross-ques- 
tioning 
men on 
points of 
which they 
areassured, 
they drive 
them into 
contradic- 


58 MAATOQNOZ 


\ > \ > / ec ’ . ΄σ id “ \ | 
κατα TAVTA EVAVTLAS. οι ὃ OPWVTES E€AUTOLS μεν p- 230. 


Ν \ \ A e ~ Ν 
χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται, καὶ 


/ \\ ΄σ / ΄- Ν » \ / Ν 
τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ αὐτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ 


la fen 7 a 
σκληρῶν So&av ἀπαλλάττονται πασῶν τε ἀπαλλα- 


γιγνομένην. νομίζοντες γάρ, @ 


1. ὁρῶντες] Se. τὸ ἐπιδεικνύο- 
μενον. 

ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι] Cf. 
Thet. 168 a: 
σονται κιτιλ. 

2. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμ.7 
Cf, Theeet. 210: ἧττον ἔσει βαρὺς 
τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος, σω- 


6. ‘ τὴ , 
εαὐτοὺυς alTla- 


φρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ὃ μὴ 
οἶσθα. 

3. τῶν περὶ αὐτοὺς] “ Which 
encompass them.” The same 
expression might be used of a 
disease, or of unwholesome hu- 
mours. Perhaps αὑτοὺς should 
be read. The Bodl. (ut szepe) 
has no breathing. 

4. σκληρῶν] “ Stiff,’ “un- 
bending,” “unyielding.” Cf. 
Crat. 487 d: τὸ σκληρόν τε καὶ 
ἀμετάστροφον, ὃ δὴ ἄρρατον κα- 
λεῖται. Charm. 175 d: οὕτως 
ἡμῶν εὐηθικῶν τυχοῦσα ἡ ζήτησις 
καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν. Theet. 155 6: 
σκληρούς γε λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους 
ἀνθρώπους. 

πασῶν τε ἀπαλλαγῶν ἀκούειν 
[τε]ἡδίστην] TheVat.alone rejects 
the second re. If this is fol- 
lowed, the displacement of re 
may be defended from Rep. 9, 
572 a, Phedr. 269 6. For the 
cogn. accus., cf. Rep. 6, 496 e. 

5. βεβαιότατα γιγνομένην] Cf. 
Legg. 2, 665 6: καλὸν ἡ ἀλή- 
θεια καὶ μόνιμον. 

6. νομίζοντες γὰρὶ The con- 
struction of this sentence is 
broken off by the introduction 


an > / « 7 Ν lal ’ 7 
5γῶν ἀκούειν [τε] ἡδίστην καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι βεβαιοτατα 


5) 


mat φίλε, οἱ καθαί- 


and application of the simile, 
as in Phileb. 58 ¢: ἢ δ᾽ εἶπον 
—eiropev. Rep. 3, 402 b, 6. 
Thezt. 197 c, alib. The idea 
of νομίζοντες is then resumed in 
the finite verb διενοήθησαν, and 
the apodosis is postponed, or 
rather is absorbed into the sub- 
ordinate clause πρὶν ἄν τις--πλείω 
δὲ μή. By a kind of attraction 
the latter part of the sentence 
follows the analogy of the ὥσπερ 
clause. For ἀκούειν ἡδίστην, cf. 
Apol. 23 ¢: of νέοι---αὐτόματοι 
χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων, The regularity 
of the sentence might be re- 
stored thus: ταὐτὸν διανοηθέντες 
€keiv0l,—kaTagTnoavTes,—e&ehov- 
Tes,— καθαρὸν ἀπέφηναν k.T.D. 
“ For such, dear youth, are the 
thoughts of their purifiers. Just 
as the physicians of the body 
think (νενομίκασι, frequentative 
perfect) that a body cannot 
profit by the food received, until 
the obstructing matters are cast 
forth, in like manner these 
reason about the mind, that it 
will never obtain benefit from 
the learning which it receives, 
until, by cross-examination, 
the person cross-examined be 
put to shame ; and a riddance 
being made of the notions 
which obstruct learning, the 
man is purged, and thinks he 
knows no more than what he 
really knows.” 


ΣΟΦΕΣΤΗΙΣ. 59 


> /, a ΄ \ / » 4 
Pp. 230. ροντες αὐτοὺς, ὠσπέερ OL περὶ τὰ σώματα ιατροὶ 


/ \ / a cal , 
νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τρο- 
“Ὁ > / / a s » \ 3 / 
φῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν av τὰ ἐμποδί- 
ζντα ἐν αὐτῷ κβάλ ITC ὶ ὶ ψυχῆ 
αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς 
/ - \ Α \ “ “-“ 
διενοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἕξειν τῶν 5 
/ ΄ Μἷ Ἂ ᾽ , 
προσφερομένων μαθημάτων ovnow, πρὶν av ἐλέγχων 
Χ 3 ΄, > > / / \ 
τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστησας, τὰς 
- , / / Ν 
τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίους δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν 


» ᾿ A « 7 “ Ss , / 
ἀποφήνῃ Kal ταῦτα ἡγούμενον, ἅπερ οἶδεν, εἰδέναι 


/ / \ / 
μονα, πλείω δὲ μη. 10 


OEAI. Βελτίστη γοῦν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν 
ἢ 
χὰ oS 
ἕξεων αὕτη. 
jm \ = \ ΄, Gun 5 , : N 
SE. Ava ταῦτα δὴ παντα ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, Kai 
\ yx / € + Z 
Tov ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη 
an 7 Ν / 3 
τῶν καθαρσεών ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομι-τ 
/ ΕΝ Ν 7 Χ « / BA \ 
στέον, av Kal τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὃ μέγας ὧν, τὰ 
/ , + , \ \ 
μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὀντα, ἀπαίδευτον τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν 
, - ἃ / 7 
γεγονέναι ταῦτα, a καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον 


ΕΣ Ν x 2:7) > / 3 
ἔπρεπε TOV ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἰναι. 


σιλεὺς εὐδαίμων. 


6. προσφερομένων] The verb 
προσφέρειν is more often applied 


Lys. 209 e: 


> > ΄ 
Πρὸς Atos, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τί ἄρα 6 


to physic than to diet (Thucyd. 
Hee Plato Charm. 157 Ὁ, 
Phedr. 270 b), but is conve- 
nient here as equally applicable 
to food and instruction. Cf. 
Legg. 7,809 6: πότερον εἰς ἀκρί- 
βειαν τοῦ μαθήματος ἰτέον ---ἢ τὸ 
παράπαν οὐδὲ προσοιστέον. 

I3—15. καὶ ---- καὶ | 
only—but.” 

15. τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον] Cf. Apol. 
38 a: ὁ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιω- 
τὸς ἀνθρώπῳ. 

16. ἂν καὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ἢ] 


Compare Theet. 175 ¢: 7 βα- 
if 


“ Not 


μέγας βασιλεύς; κιτ.λ. Euthyd. 
274 ἃ: Μακαρίζω dp’ ὑμᾶς ἔγωγε 
τοῦ κτήματος πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ μέ- 
γαν βασιλέα τῆς ἀρχῆς. And for 
τὰ μέγιστα, in which there is 
perhaps a slight allusion to 
the greater mysteries, cf. Rep. 
6,504 a: ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα 
μέγιστα κιτιλ. Polit. 301 ἃ. 

17. ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν] 
Since it was proved that ἀμα- 
Gia, of which education is the 
remedy, is a kind of αἶσχος. 
Supr. 228 d. 

19. ἔπρεπε] Sc. γεγονέναι. 


2 
~ 


or 


tions ; 
ceiving 
which, the 
men are 
angry with 
themselves 
and less 
disposed 

to be con- 
tentious 
towards 
others. 

In this 
way they 
are most 
surely re- 
lieved by 
an opera- 
tion, which 
it is de- 
lightful 

to witness, 
of the 
stubborn 
tumors of 
self-con- 
ceit. For 
mental, 
like bodily 
food, can 
do no good 
to the sick 
man, until 
the noxious 
obstruc- 
tions of 
vanity are 


removed, 
and a 
wholesome 
state of in- 
tellectual 
humility 
has been 
restored. 
Thus refu- 
tation is 
the great- 
est of all 


purgations: 


and even 
the Great 
King, if he 
has not 
undergone 
this test, is 
uneducated 
and there- 
fore un- 


happy. 


σι 


00 


ΠΛΆΤΩΝΟΣ 


OEAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


am. Te «δέ; 


\ , , -“ 
τους Ταυτῃ χρωμενοῦυς ΤΏ TEXVYN) 


p- 230.}} 


/ / > \ \ \ ΄σ Ἀ 
τίνας φήσομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστας p. 231. 


φάναι. 


ΕΗ ΔΙ Tid): 


\ a > - ΄ J 
aE. Mn μεῖζον αὑτοις προσάπτωμεν γερᾶς. 


/ Ν “ 
ΘΒΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν προσέοικε τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν 


εἰρημένα. 


‘ / 7 « ΄ 
SE. Kat γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ. 


lal lo i 4 Χ « 7 
τοτὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιό- 


> 5 Ν [2 , 
TyTas ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν ὀλισθηρότατον 


6. avrois]| Se. τοῖς σοφι- 
σταῖς. 

7. τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα] 
“The modes of action which 
have been described (e.g. the 
art of controversy) bear some 
resemblance to this purifying 
method of education.” 

9. Καὶ yap κυνὶ λύκος] Mr. 
Grote remarks on this, that 
Plato would have objected to 
the wolf being placed in the 
same genus with the dog. He 
would certainly have objected 
to class them together as ‘tame’ 
or ‘wild.’ But he here recog- 
nizes the likeness between 
them, on which, had it suited 
his purpose, he might have 
dwelt to the exclusion of the 
difference. This illustrates the 
unfixed and provisional nature 
of Plato’s classification, but 
nothing more. Cf. Rep. 5, 
454 b, where it is shewn that 
differences are no less treacher- 
ous than resemblances, except 
to those who are able κατ᾽ εἴδη 
συνάγειν καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι. 


10. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ] The heed- 


ful cautious man—the cha- 
racter described in Soph. Cid. 
Rex. 616 as ὁ εὐλαβούμενος 
πεσεῖν. 

περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητα ]) These 
words recal Euclides’ objection 
to the argument from ana- 
logy. Diog. Laert. II. 107: 
τὸν διὰ παραβολῆς λόγον 
ἀνήρει, λέγων ἤτοι ἐξ ὁμοίων av- 
τὸν ἢ ἐξ ἀνομοίων συνίστασθαι" 
καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ὁμοίων, περὶ αὐτὰ 
δεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς ὁμοῖά ἐστιν ἀνα- 
στρέφεσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνομοίων, παρ- 
έλκειν τὴν παράθεσιν. Cf. Pheedr. 
2062 b,c, 223. Ar. Eth, Nie. 
VI. 3, 2: εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖ- 
σθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοι- 
ότησι. But Euclides dwelt 
merely on the logical weak- 
ness of comparisons: Plato 
here speaks practically of the 
danger which attends their 
use. Compare the consciousness 
of modern times on the same 
point, which some one has ex- 
pressed by saying that Analogy 
is like a broken reed, good to 
point with but not to lean 
upon. 


\ 
Kal 





|p. 231. γὰρ τὸ γένος. 


ZOPISTHS. ΟἹ 


χε \ v » Ν ‘ 
ὅμως δὲ ἐστωσαν' οὐ yap περὶ 


σμικρῶν ὅρων τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἴομαι γενήσεσθαι 


/ « / e lod ΄ 
ΤΟΤΕ OTTOTQAY LKAYWS φυλαττωσιν. 


OEAI. Οὐκοῦν τό γε εἰκός. 


HE. [Ἔστω δὴ διακριτικῆς τέχνης καθαρτική, καθ- 5 


as \ ‘ Ν \ / 3 ΄ / 
αρτικῆς δὲ TO περὶ ψυχὴν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτου 


δὲ διδασκαλική, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτική τῆς δὲ 


an € Ν \ 4 / / 
παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξζοσοφίαν γιγνο- 


yf > a ca , / \ 
μενος ἔλεγχος ev τῷ νῦν oyw παραφανέντι μηδεν 


ϑ, Lat 53 > e / / 
ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφι- 10 


/ 
OTLKY. 


GHAI. Λεγέσθω μέν: ἀπορῶ δὲ ἔγωγε ἤδη διὰ 


τὸ πολλὰ πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτε ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα 


\ or > rn + 3 Ν / 
και διισχυριζόμενον εἰπειν OVT@S ELVAL TOV σοφιστὴν. 


/ \ a 7 3 na 
GE. Eixorws ye ov ἀπορῶν. adda τοι κἀκεῖνον 15 


c a \ an yy i ’ lad “ A 57 
ηγείσθαι χρὴ νῦν non σφοδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτε ἔτι 


I. ἔστωσαν] Se. σοφισταὶ οἱ 
ταύτῃ χρώμενοι τῇ τέχνῃ. ΟἿ. 
Men. 92 d: οὗτοι μὲν γάρ, εἰ 
σὺ βούλει, ἔστωσαν οἱ σοφισταί. 

οὐ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὅρων 
“When they begin thoroughly 
to guard their confines, the 
contest will be for no trifling 
boundary.” I.e. The difference 
is great. The name is granted 
to them provisionally, with the 
warning that they may have to 
defend their title hereafter 
against the rightful owner. Cf. 
Phileb. 56 d: οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος. 
Legg. 11, 916 6: ἢ μείζους ἢ 
ἐλάττους ὅρους ἀεὶ δεῖ διασαφεῖν. 
Note the false echo in φυλακήν 
--- φυλάττωσιν. 

8. δοξοσοφίαν] The word oc- 
curs in Phileb. 49 a, d, and the 
adj. δοξόσοφος in Pheedr. 275 Ὁ. 

9. παραφανέντι] “ which has 


appeared by a side wind, out 
of due course.” This inquiry 
did not arise directly out of 
the preceding: supr. 226, a, b. 
Cf. Theeet. 109 C: δεινότερον 
μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαι 
μοι δοκεῖ. Νῦν is to be taken, 
ὑπερβάτως, with the participle. 

ΤΟ. ἡ γένει γενναία σοφ.] Cf. 
Soph. Cid. Rex. 1469: ἴθ᾽ ὦ 
γονῇ γενναῖε. Compare the tragic 
grandiloquence of Rep.5,454 a: 
ἦ γενναία ἡ δύναμις κιτιλ. It is not 
meant to distinguish the So- 
phist “ of a noble stamp” from 
the “ degenerate variety.” 

13. ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα] “What 
definition of the Sophist one may 
assert with entire confidence.” 

τό. ἀπορεῖν] There is an allu- 
sion to the literal meaning = 
ἄνευ πόρου, “ haying no passage 
for escape.” 


But by 
what name 
shall the 
master of 
this art be 
called ? 
The func- 
tions as- 
signed to 
the Sophist 
bear some 
relation to 
this. And 
yet he 
seems 
scarce 
worthy of 
so high a 
dignity. 
Analogies 
areslippery 
ground, 
The savage 
wolf wears 
some re- 
semblance 
to the gen- 
tle dog. 

et us, 
however, 
grant him 


this pro- 
visionally, 
foreseeing 
that he 
will have 
to fight 
hard here- 
after for 
his claim. 


Weare em- 
barrassed 
with the 
number of 
our defini- 
tions ; the 
only com- 
fort is that 
the So- 
phist’s 
embarrass- 
ment must 
be still 
greater. 
We have 
surrounded 
him : let us 
now close 
in upon 
him. 

have had 
glimpses of 
him as a 


62 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον ὀρθὴ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ τὰς p. 231} 


c / \ eZ 53 / ΄ 2. QA 
ἁπάσας μὴ ῥάᾷδιον εἶναι διαφεύγειν. νῦν οὖν καὶ 


tA > / > a 
μάλιστα επιθετέον αὐτῷ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς λέγεις. 


ΞΕ, Πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἷον ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν, 


Ν \ « qn 5 \ 7 “ ΕῚ / 
καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὑτοὺς διαλογισώμεθα ἅμα ἀναπαυο- 


᾽ὔ e / id 5 « \ 7 lal 
μενοι,--φέρε, ὁπόσα ἡμῖν ὃ σοφιστὴς πέφανται. δοκῶ 


τῇ 7 Ν an c , / 
μὲν yap, TO πρῶτον εὑρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἐμ- 


μισθος θηρευτής. 
OEAI. Ναί 


HE. To δέ γε δεύτερον ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς 


ψυχῆς μαθήματα. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. 


Αι » a , 
=H. Τρίτον δὲ apa ov περὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα κάπηλος 


’ὔ 
15 ἀνεφάνη 5 


OEAI. Nai. καὶ τέταρτόν ye αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ 


μαθήματα ἡμῖν. 


I. τὰς amdoas| Heindorf 
supplies λαβὰς, comparing Phi- 
leb. 13 d: ἀνιέναι ἐς τὰς ὁμοίας. 
But the word διαφεύγειν, and 
the whole context, rather sug- 
gest the metaphor of a chase. 
Some such word as ὅρμας, or 
πείρας, would therefore supply 
the meaning better. 

2. καὶ “ Now therefore is 
the very time of all others to 
set upon him.” καὶ gives an 
emphasis to the clause in op- 
position to the previous doubt. 
Similar idiomatic uses of καὶ 
are Symp. 177 b: τοῦτο μὲν 
ἧττον καὶ θαυμαστόν. Lege. 6, 
752d: τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας καὶ 
βραχύτερον ἔργον. 

5. στάντες) Like men who 
have been stooping and press- 
ing forwards. 


ἐξαναπν.] ἐξ seems to im- 
ply turning aside from the 
pursuit (‘standing out,’ Shak- 
speare) for a breathing while. 
Compare ἐξανιστάναι. 

4. φέρε, ὁπόσα] φέρε, like 
ἀμέλει, has become a sort of 
particle, and is retained in the 
indirect form. Cf. Theet. 
190 Ὁ: ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό 
τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν. Lb. ¢: ὡς παν- 
τάπασιν ἄρα k.T.d. 

δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ] δοκῶ is here 
used parenthetically, like οἴει 
in Theet. 147 a. For μὲν, ef. 
supr. 230 e, alib. 

11. τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα] 
A pleonastic expression, sug- 
gested by the analogy of ἡ τοῦ 
σώματος tpopy. Wid. supr. 
224 a. 

17. ἡμῖν] Heindorf added jv 











p. 231. 
e 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ, 


63 


BE. ᾿Ορθῶς ἐμνημόνευσας. πέμπτον δ᾽ ἐγὼ πει- 


7 
ράσομαι μνημονεύειν" 


τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ 


λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρι- 


σμένος. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν. 


ΞΕ. Τό γε μὴν ἕκτον ἀμφισβητήσιμον μέν, ὅμως 


δ᾽ y, > lal ͵ lal > / 
ἐθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοζῶν ἐμποδίων μα- 


, Ν Ν \ SYoUN 3 
θημασι περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἰναι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


μ--ἰ 5 > ἘΠῚ πὶ y 7, A 
SE. Ap οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν 


/ a \ / / / \ 
φαίνηται, μίας δὲ TEXVNS OVOMATL TT POO AYOPEVIT AL, TO 


from conjecture. But ἡμῖν may 
depend on the verbal meaning 
of αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα. 
“ One who sells us learned 
wares of his own manufac- 
ture.” 

2. τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους 
ἀθλητής] τῆς ay. is partitive; 
and περὶ λόγους is to be joined 
with ἀθλητής. “Under the 
head of contention he appeared 
as a champion in argument.” 

3. ἀφωρισμένος] “ Having ap- 
propriated to himself.” Perf. 
pass. with middle signification. 
Cf. infr. 268 sub fin.: τῆς ποιή- 
σεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ 
θαυματοποιϊκόν μόριον. 

6. Τὸ ἕκτον is nominative 
to ἀμφισβητήσιμον ἦν, but must 
be again supplied as the ad- 
verbial accusative with ἔθεμεν 
—eiva, like τὸ πρῶτον εὑρέθη 
above. “ His sixth character 
was open to dispute, but still 
we so far yielded to his claim 
that we described him, sixthly, 
as a purger of conceits which 
obstruct learning in the region 
of the mind.” 


7. μαθήμασι] The Bodl. MS., 
with A.1., has μάθησιν. 

10. ἾΔρ᾽ οὖν ἐννοεῖς ---προσαγο- 
ρεύει] “ Do you perceive, then, 
that when one who receives 
his name from a single art 
seems to command various pro- 
vinces, this appearance is not 
to be trusted, but whoever 
has such an impression of any 
science is clearly unable to dis- 
cern that point of it wherein 
these various parts of know- 
ledge meet, whence he gives 
many names instead of one to 
the man who knows them.” 

We have had various glimpses 
of the Sophist, but have no- 
where been able to get a clear 
view of him. Why is this? 
Because we have not yet seized 
the leading principle of his art, 
if indeed there be a leading 
principle. When we remem- 
ber that wrreality is afterwards 
proved to be the Sophist’s 
principle, the irony of the 
present passage becomes ma- 
nifest. 

11. τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο] Cf. 


on 


huntsman, 
amerchant, 
a shop- 
keeper, a 
manufac- 
turer, a 
mental 
athlete. 


— 





But we are 
still to seek 
for a clear 
and con- 
sistent 
view. 


lip: 
Transition 

to 11. 
The notion 
of contro- 
versy 
seemed to 
approach 


most nearly 


to him. 
Suppose 
we follow 
him upon 
this track. 


04 ΠΙΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἐσθ᾽ ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς p. 232:}} 


c ’ > Ν / / > / ” 
ὁ πάσχων αὐτὸ πρὸς τινα τέχνην οὐ δύναται κατιδεῖν 


— 


» ΄“ ’ a > A / \ / “ / 
EKELVO αὑτῆς, εἰς ὃ παντα TA μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, b 
\ Ν σ΄: » , > > ΓΑ Ν ΕΣ » Ἁ 
διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς τὸν ἐχοντα αὐτὰ 
δπροσαγορεύει ; 
“- 7 
SEAL. Κινδυνεύει τοῦτο ταύτη πῃ μάλιστα πεφυ- 
κέναι. 
— \ / ς “ “ΩΝ > lad / ΠῚ 
EE. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς γε αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει δι 
» / 7 > > > ’ a “ 
apylav πάσχωμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναλάβωμεν πρῶτον τῶν 
Ν τς A 4 7 
τοπερὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων. EV yap Ti μοι μάλιστα 
A 3 XN a 
Karepavn αὑτὸν μηνῦον. 
Ν ΄ 
OEAI. To ποῖον ; 
Ν οι ΒΩ 9 
HE. ᾿Αντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἐφαμεν εἶναί που. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 
fal 7 A 
=e. Ti δ᾽; ov καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ 


/ 
15 TOUTOU 


διδάσκαλον γίγνεσθαι ; 
GEAI. Τί μήν ; 
EE. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ περὶ τίνος ἄρα καὶ φασὶν οἱ 
A at 3 fd e \ / Cages 3 
τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικούς. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἐξ 


Phileb. 57 6: ἐν τούτοις δὲ ap 
οὔ τέχνην 
φθεγξάμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας 
ὡς μιᾶς, πάλιν ὡς δυοῖν ἐπανερώτᾳ 


τινα ὡς ὁμώνυμον 


τούτοιν αὐτοῖν K.T.A. 

2. 6 πάσχων αὐτὸ πρός τινα] 
Le. ᾧ φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτο περί 
τινος τέχνης. Cf, Ar. Pol. ΤΥ. 7. 

5. προσαγορεύει] Sc. ὁ πάσχων 
αὐτό. 

9. ἀναλάβωμεν πρῶτον] ““ Let 
us begin by reviewing some of 
our results.” The word is used 
absolutely in the same technical 
sense in Thest. 187 ¢: *Ap’ οὖν 
ἔτ᾽ ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν 
πάλιν; Phileb. 60 d: νῦν ὁστι- 
σοῦν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰ- 


mato. Hence it is unnecessary 
to insert ἕν with Heindorf or 
τι with C. et corr. B. πρῶτον 
is used adverbially, ut supra : 
TP@TOV OLOV σταντες. 

18. καὶ gives emphasis to the 
question as raising a fresh point 
in connexion with the pre- 
ceding. They profess to make 
men controversialists. Well, 
on what subject? Cf. Euthyd. 
272 ἃ: ἵνα εἰδῶ, 6 τι καὶ μαθη- 
σόμεθα. 

19. ἐξ ἀρχῆς ---τῇδέ πῃ) “In 
examining this let us take 
a comprehensive survey, and 
begin as follows.” For ἐξ ἀρ- 
xns, cf. Theeet. 180 d. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


65 


Ρ. 232. ἀρχῆς ἔστω τῇδέ πῃ. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θείων, ba" 





Cc 


> fal “- ΄ Gare a Ν a A 
ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ap ἱκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο 


δρᾷν; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται [γ]οῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα. 


A oa a 
HE. Ti δ᾽ ὅσα φανερὰ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ 5 


lal \ ΄ 
τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ; 


OEAI. Ti yap; 


\ N 3, ΄σ , 
BE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ev ye ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, 


« , / ’ Ν » / / \ / 
OTTOTaVY γενέσεως TE και OQUVOLAS πέρι KATA TAVT@V 


/ , 7, ec » 7, > a κ᾿ 
λέγηταί τι, ξύνισμεν ὡς αὐτοί τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ 


΄ὔ y σ ο “ ᾽ Ν 
τοὺς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατούς : 
/ 
SEAI. Παντάπασί ye. 


EE. Ti δ᾽ αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ ξυμπάντων τῶν 


I. περὶ τῶν θείων] Cf. Rep. 
10, 598 6, where the same 
thing is said of the poets: καὶ 
τά ye θεῖα. 

4. youv] The MSS., with 
exception of Flor. i, have οὖν. 

5. ὅσα φανερά] Ar. Eth. Nie. 
VII. 7: ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολλὰ 
θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώ- 
τατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. 
The distinction between the 
visible and invisible in Divine 
things is perhaps the same as in 
Tim. 41 a: πάντες ὅσοι τε περι- 
πολοῦσι φανερῶς καὶ ὅσοι φαίνον- 
ται καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοί. 
Or, possibly, the words ὅσα 
ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς May suggest 
the difference between the or- 
dinary and the scientific per- 
ception of the heavenly mo- 
tions. Cf. Ib. 39 c: τῶν & 


ἄλλων τὰς περιόδους οὐκ ἐννενο- 


ηκότες ἄνθρώποι, πλὴν ὀλίγοι 
τῶν πολλῶν κ.τ.λ. 
γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ] Gen. 


of apposition after ἃ neut. 


K 


plur. adj., like ἄσημα ---- βοῆς 
Soph. Ant. 1209. 

6. τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα! Cf. 
Theet. 145 d: περὶ 
ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας τε 
καὶ λογισμούς. 

7. Τί γάρ ;] “ What, indeed 1 
yap is the usual formula of 
assent, confirming the previous 
question: = “ You may well 
ask.” 

8. ἔν ye ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις 
“In private conversations ” 
—Which are the proper sphere 
of ἀντιλογικὴ as distinguished 
from δικανική, to which refer- 
ence is presently made; ef.supr. 
225 b. For the limitation 
with ye, cf. Theset. 204 d: rav- 
τὸν apa, ἔν ye τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ 
ἐστί, τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν 
καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα. 


καὶ τῶν 


9. περὶ γενέσεως τε καὶ οὐσίας 
-- λέγηταί re] “ When any 
general statement is made re- 
specting the world of tran- 
sitional or of absolute Being.” 


Hedisputes 
and teaches 
others to 
dispute, 
about 
things 
divine, 
mundane, 
metaphy- 
sical, legal, 
political, 
and on the 
subject 
matter of 
every 
branch of 
art. The 
Sophist 
seems to 
have the 
power of 
disputing 
about all 
things. 


66 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


πολιτικῶν, GP οὐχ ὑπισχνοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβητὴ- p. 232. 


/ 
TLKOUS : 


OEAI. Οὐδεὶς yap av αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, 


/ \ a « 7 
διελέγετο μὴ τοῦτο ὑπισχνουμένοις. 


ΠῚ 4p \ \ n \ \ , 
μ᾿. a γε μὴν πέρι πάσῶν TE Και κατα μιᾶν 


« ’ὔ / ἃ Lal N\ iv4 > Ν Ν 
EKAOTHV TEXYNV, α δεῖ TPpOS εκᾶστον AUTOV TOV δημι- 


ουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται 
γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ Πρωταγόρειά μοι φαίνει περί τε πάλης 


Ν ca) yy “ > 4 
το Καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι. 


~ 3 ΄, τ \ 
HE. Kai πολλῶν ye, ὦ μακάριε, ἑτέρων. ἀτὰρ 


\ Ν rn » a / B59 > > / 

δὴ TO τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ap οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ 
’ὔ ΧΝ 9 ΄ ec 

περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἱκανή Tis δύναμις 


Ε ? 5 
εοικ εἰναι: 


I. ποιεῖν dud.| In the sphere 
of law and justice the Sophist’s 
business is rather to enable 
men to dispute than himself 
to hold controversy. 

ἀμφισβητητικούς | 
also the Bodl. MS. 

3. Οὐδεὶς yap ἂν] Cf. Theset. 
178 6: τοῦτό ye σφόδρα ὑπι- 
σχνεῖτο ---- ἢ οὐδείς γ᾽ ἂν αὐτῷ 
διελέγετο. Ib. 161 ἃ. 

5. Τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν] 
With περὶ πασῶν must be sup- 
plied ἃ δεῖ λέγειν from the fol- 
lowing clause, in which the 
expression becomes more de- 
finite. 

6. πρὸς ἕκαστον͵] Probably 
neut.: sc. ἀμφισβήτημα. αὐτὸν 
implies, They dictate even to 
the masters of each craft. 

7. δεδημοσιωμένα----τῷ βουλο- 
μένῳ μαθεῖν] “The mysteries 
of each profession are published 
in manuals for all to learn.” 


50 here 


Compare the imaginary case 
put in the Politicus, 299 6: 
οὐδένα yap ἀγνοεῖν τό τε ἰατρικὸν 
καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κυβερνητικὸν 
καὶ ναυτικόν ἐξεῖναι γὰρ τῷ βου- 
λομένῳ μανθάνειν γεγραμμένα καὶ 
πάτρια ἔθη κείμενα. And for 
καταβέβληται, ef. Ar. Eth. Nie. 
I. 3: καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς 
αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. 

9. Τὰ-- πάλης] Diog. Laert. 
9, 8, 55, mentions the treatise 
of Protagoras on wrestling. 
That on rhetoric is mentioned 
in the Phedrus, 267 ¢: Πρω- 
ταγόρεια δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν 
τοιαῦτα μέντοι atta; ᾿Ορθοέπειά 
γέ τις, ὦ ποεῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ 
καλά. 

12. τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης] 
“ As for the province of the 
controversial art, does it not 
seem,” &e. Cf. Rep. 7, 519 Ὁ: 
τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. Legg. 
3, 683 4: τὸ τοῦ μύθου. 


ΕΣ 











ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 67 





p- 232, OEAI. Φαίνεται γοῦν σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν. 


\ Ἁ Ν cal 3 lal Ν ΄ cal ~ ᾿ 
ΞΕ. Σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ παῖ, δυνατὸν ἡγεῖ τοῦτο; — Is this pos- 
΄ \ Ἂ ε πὶ ‘ ow e , \ Ὁ sible? 
τάχα yap av ὑμεῖς μὲν ὀξύτερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτὸ 
’,ὔ e la sy) / 
βλέποιτε, ἡμεῖς δε ἀμβλύτερον. 
\ a \ / , 7 
Ρ.233.. OEAI. To ποῖον, καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστα λέγεις 35 
> ’ὔ ἴω \ ΄ / 
οὐ γάρ που κατανοῶ TO νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. 
— 7 ee , 7 > 
GE. Et πάντα ἐπίστασθαί τινα ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ  Inother 
7 words, Is 
δυνατον. universal 
, ee rule 5 ; 5 Ἂ knowledge 
OEAI. Μακάριον μέντ᾽ ἂν ἡμῶν, ὦ E€ve, ἦν TO possible 
i, for man ? 
yevos. 10 That were 
= 5 ἘΝ ὃν ΄, ͵ Ν > , happy for 
EE. Πῶς οὖν av ποτέ tis πρός ye Tov ἐπιστά-  yatkind. 
€ αὐτὸς ἀνεπιστή ὧν δύναιτ᾽ ἂν ὑγιέ ἘΠ τ 
μενον αὑτὸς ἀνεπιστήμων ὧν δυναιτ᾽ ἂν ὑγιές TL και 
7 3 ΤΟΥ ledge of 
λέγων αντειπεὶῖν ; a aubieet 
how can 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμώς. 


αὶ / b 5 a‘ / Ν ΄-“ a 
SE. Τί ποτ᾽ οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνα- 1s 


one dispute 
with those 
that know ? 
What then 
can be the 
mystery of 
the So- 

phist’s art ? 


τ 


μεως θαῦμα ; 


in the present passage is con- 
firmed by reference to 235: 
οὐκέτ᾽ ἐκφεύξεται---τὸ μὴ ov τοῦ 
γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν 
τις εἷς. 

6. οὐ γάρ που κατανοῶ] “ For 
I do not think I comprehend 
(I suppose I do not compre- 
hend) the drift of your ques- 
tion.” πῶ is read in a few 
MSS., and is more pointed, but 


3. ὀξύτερον οἱ νέοι] Cf. Rep. 
595 6: ἐπεὶ πολλά τοι ὀξύτερον 
βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὁρῶντες 
πρότερον εἶδον. The young are 
here ironically challenged to 
use their keen eyesight to de- 
termine a difficult question. In 
Legg. 4,715 e, keen mental vi- 
sion is spoken of as the privi- 
lege of age. Nat pa Δί᾽, ὦ ξένε, 
καθ᾽ ἡλικίαν yap ὀξὺ βλέπεις. ΑΘ. 


Νέος μὲν γὰρ ὧν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τὰ 
τοιαῦτα ἀμβλύτατα αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ 
ὁρᾷ, γέρων δὲ ὀξύτατα. For πρὸς 
αὐτὸ, cf. Rep. 7, 515 d, e: πρὸς 
τὸ φῶ-ς---βλέπειν. 

5. Τὸ--- θαῦμα] “ The secret,” 
“mystery,” as of a juggling 
trick. Cf. Legg. 1, 644 ἃ 
645 b,d, where man is spoken 
of as a puppet, or magical 
contrivance, of the gods. 
This rendering of the word 


does not seem to be certainly 
right. The vagueness of που 
consorts well with the puzzled 
tone of Thezetetus. 

4. πάντα ἐπίστασθαι] Cf. Eu- 
thyd. 294 ο, Ar. Met. 1, 2. 

15. Ti ποτε----σοφώτατοι] 

“What then can be the mys- 
tery of the Sophist’s art ?” 

“ Why 2” 

*“ T mean, how can they 
create an impression in the 


K 2 


How does 
he raise the 
baseless 
fabric of a 
belief that 
he is all- 
wise ; with- 
out which 
he could 
not hopefor 
a disciple 
or a fee? 


Ιο 


15 


68 
SEAL. Τοῦ δὴ πέρι ; 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


Ρ. 233:}} 


oO / \ ΄σ 4 
=E. Καθ᾿ ov τινα τρόπον ποτε δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις b 


δό ΄, « OS ΄ ΄, > Ν 
o&av παρασκευαζειν, ως εἰσι TTAVTA TAVTWV αὐτοὶ 


σοφώτατοι. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μήτε ἀντέλεγον ὀρθῶς 


/ » 7 » 7 / 7 > \ FF 
5 MNTE EKELVOLS ἐφαίνοντο, φαινομενοὶ τε εἰ μηδὲν αὖ 


μᾶλλον ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, 
τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, σχολῇ ToT ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα 
διδοὺς ἤθελεν ἂν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητὴς γίγνεσθαι. 

OEAI. Σχολῇ μέντ᾽ av. 

BE. Νῦν δέ γ᾽ ἐθέλουσιν : 

OEAI. Καὶ μάλα. 

EE. Δοκοῦσι γάρ, οἶμαι, πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημόνως 
ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἅπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 


minds of the youth, that they, 
and they alone, are in all ways 
the wisest of all men.” 

I. Τοῦ πέρι;] “ About what 
point?” 1. 6. What is the point 
which a knowledge of his mys- 
tery would make clear ? 

2. Καθ' ὃν τινα] The indirect 
interrogative in a reply, as εἰ 
πάντα εἰδέναι just above. For 
πάντα, cf. Soph. Antig. 721: 
φῦναι τὸν ἄνδρα πάντ᾽ ἐπιστήμης 
πλέον. 

δυνατοὶ] δυνατὸς, like ἄξιος, 
seems sometimes to dispense 
with the verb εἶναι, and the re- 
petition of εἰσὶ is thus avoided 
here. 

3. αὐτοὶ] Cf. Theet. 178 6: 
τοῦτο---ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέ- 
pew αὐτός. ‘The only men.” 

5. μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαίνοντο] For 
the ellipse of the infinitive, 
ἀντιλέγειν ὀρθῶς, compare Rep. 


HE. Δρῶσι δέ ye τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα, φαμέν ; 


4,430 d: κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ φαί- 
νονται οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅντινα τρόπον (sc. 
λέγοντες) καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαῦτα 
ὥσπερ ἴχνη αὐτοῦ λέγεται. Thuc. 
III. τό : ἀνεχώρησαν ---- ἐπειδὴ 
καὶ ἐκείνους εἶδον. 

εἰ μηδὲν] Bodl. εἰ μὴ μηδέν, 
with A and pr. I. 

7. τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο] “To quote 
your own observation.” 

8. τούτων αὐτῶν] Sc. τοῦ ἀντι- 
λέγειν τε καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν περὶ 
πάντων: for which rendering 
cf. supr. 232 Ὁ: αὐτοῦ τούτου 
(se. τοῦ ἀντιλογικὸν εἶναι) διδά- 
σκαλον γίγνεσθαι. αὐτοῖς should 
be repeated with μαθητ. γιγν. 

13. αὐτοὶ] “ They appear (to 
the young man) to be them- 
selves well-informed on the 
points on which they dis- 
pute.” 

15. Δρῶσι τοῦτο] Sc. ἀντιλέ- 
γουσιν. 








Ρ. 233. 


d 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 


09 


EE. Πάντα ἄρα σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν ; 


» yf \ ΄ / , /, 
SE. Οὐκ ὄντες ye’ ἀδύνατον yap τοῦτο ye earn. 


OEAI. Πῶς yap οὐκ ἀδύνατον ; 


=E A & \ yf Ἀ Ν ’ > ’ 
bey Jae οζαστικὴν ἀρὰ τινὰ πέρι πάντων ἐπιστη- 


\ τ ΄σ ᾽ » / 35) > , 
μὴν ὁ σοφιστὴς ἡμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπε- 


φανται. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ 


a ’ > / > Cal 5 ΄“ 
νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι. 


EE. Λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα 


\ , 
πέρι TOUTOV. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή : 


EE. Τόδε. καί 3 προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ 
SH. Lode. καὶ μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τον νοὺν εὖ 


μάλα ἀποκρίνασθαι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


BE. Εἴ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδ᾽ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ 


6. Δοξαστικήν)] “A know- 
ledge which is in appearance 
only.” δόξα is here opposed to 
ἀλήθεια, as appearance to reality. 
Cf. infr. 268 ο: τὸ τῆς δοξαστικῆς 
μιμητικόν. There is, however, an 
allusion to the other (subjec- 
tive) meaning of δόξα ( = opin- 
ion) as opposed to ἐπιστήμη 
(cf. Thet. 207 c, 208 e), just 
as the word ἀλήθεια is probably 
used with reference to the ἀλή- 
θεια (or certainty) of Protago- 
ras. Compare the confusion 
of the two meanings of ἀνόητος, 
noticed by Mr. Grote in Parm. 
132 ὁ, Phed. 80b. Grote’s 
Plato &c., ii. 272, note P. 

τὸ νῦν --- εἰρῆσθαι] Cf. 
Theet. 186 6: καὶ μάλιστά ye 
νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο 


ὃν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη. 

14. προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα] 
“Giving me your very closest 
attention.” For the position of 
εὖ μάλα, cf, Phed. 116 e: δειπνή- 
σαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας εὖ μάλα. 
For καί introducing an impera- 
tive, cf. Theet. 145 d, καί μοι 
λέγε alib.; and compare the 
use of καί μοι λέγε (or ἀναγνῶθι) 
τὸ ψήφισμα &c. by the orators. 

17. λέγειν] Subaudi ἐπίστα- 
σθαι. The same illustration 
which is used here to depre- 
ciate the Sophist is applied 
to the poets in Rep. 10, 596c¢: 
Ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόνδε τίνα καλεῖς 
τὸν δημιοῦργον. Τὸν ποῖον ; Ὃς 
πάντα ποιεῖ, ὅσαπερ εἷς ἕκαστος 
τῶν χειροτεχνῶν κιτιλ. Πάνυ 
θαυμαστὸν ---- λέγεις σοφιστήν. 


This unreal 
appearance 
ofuniversal 
wisdom is 
the phe- 
nomenon 
which we 
have to 

10 consider. 


Imagine 

a parallel 
case. Sup- 
pose one to 
profess, not 
that he 
knows, but 
that he can 
create all 
things : 
men, ani- 
mals, the 
sea, the 
heaven, 
the Gods. 


10 


15 


70 


΄“΄ ΄ ra / > / 
ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾷν μιᾷ τέχνη ξυνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι p. 233} 


πράγματα. 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς πάντα εἶπες ; 


EE. Τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ῥηθέντος σύ γ᾽ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς 


» a \ \ / « 57 > 4 
5 ἀγνοεῖς" τὰ yap ξύμπαντα, ὡς ἔοικας, ov pavOavels. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. 


= 7 , \ CIs a , \ 
SE. Λέγω τοινυν σε και ἐμὲ τῶν πάντων, Και 


πρὸς ἡμῖν τάλλα ζῶα καὶ δένδρα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς λέγεις ; 


/ [? 
ποιήσειν φαίη. 


᾽ Ν \ 5 \ 7 
mE. Ei τις ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τάλλα φυτὰ πάντα 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνα δὴ λέγων τὴν ποίησιν ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ 


γεωργόν γε ἐρεῖς τινά; καὶ γὰρ ζώων αὐτὸν εἶπες Ῥ- 234 


f 
ποιητήν. 


EE. Φημί, καὶ πρός γε θαλάττης | καὶ γῆς ] καὶ 


39 r XQ rn ἈΝ a 2) ’, Ἀ 
οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμπάντων. και 


7 XN i? 5 ΄σ “ i? a 
τοινυν καὶ TAXU TOLYOAS αὐτῶν EKACTA πανυ σμικρου 


, 3 / 
νομίσματος ἀποδίδοται. 


Compare Emped. ΕὟ.154--τ4τ: 
ὡς δ᾽ ὁπόταν ypapées —xkai τε θε- 
ovs δολιχαίωνας τιμῇσι φερίστους. 

I. ξυνάπαντα --- ξύμπαντα] 
Note the variety. 

4. Τὴν ἀρχήν] “The very key 
to my meaning is unknown to 
you. You do not understand 
what I mean by All.” 

7. Λέγω --- τῶν πάντων] CF. 
Rep. 5, 398 ¢: ἐγὼ---κινδυνεύω 
ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι. 

10. καὶ τἄλλα φυτὰ] The no- 
tion οἵ φυτὰ need not include 
ἐμὲ καὶ σέ, according to a well- 
known Platonic use of ἄλλος, 
e.g. Ale. 112 b: τοῖς τε Ἀχαίοις 
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Τρωσίν : with 
which compare Hom. Od. 2, 
43. But the word is probably 


used here in the widest sense 
(= creatures) ; cf. Tim. 90 a: 
ὡς ὄντας ἡμᾶς φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον 
Rep. 6, 491 d: 
παντὸς σπέρματος περὶ ἢ φυτοῦ 
εἴτε τῶν ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων. 
Theag. 121 b. 

12. λέγων] Se. φαίη ἄν. 

15. Φημί] “ Yes.” Cf. Pheedr. 
270 ¢. 

καὶ γῆ] These words oc- 
cur only in two MSS., Ven. 3. 
and Flor. i, which however 
belong to different families. 
They are not absolutely re- 
quired, for the earth as well 
as the sun may be included in 
the expression καὶ θεῶν. But 
οἵ Rep. 10, 596 d: καὶ πρὸς 


, a ‘ > X Ἂν i“ 
TOUTOLS γὴν Kat ουρανον Kal θεούς. 


ἀλλ᾽ οὐράνιον. 


Θ 











"». 234. 


b 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


11 


ΘΙΕΑΙ. Παιδιὰν λέγεις τινά. 


l 7 / Ν lal / od 7 3 Ν 
ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ore πάντα οἶδε καὶ 


a oS x , > / we) > / , 
TQAUTQ ETEPOY ἂν διδάξειεν ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν ολίγῳ χρόνῳ, 


“-“ » \ / 
μῶν οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως που. 


΄-“ \ 3, 3, " 
BE. Παιδιᾶς δὲ ἔχεις ἢ τι τεχνικώτερον ἢ καὶ 


as 5; Ἂ Ν ͵ 
χαριέστερον εἰδος ἢ τὸ μιμητικὸν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς: πάμπολυ γὰρ εἴρηκας εἶδος εἰς 


A , \ KS ΄ 
ἕν πάντα ξυλλαβὼν καὶ σχεδὸν ποικιλώτατον. 


5 


— » a , ΓΤ , \ 3 
ΜΞ Εἰ, Οὐκοῦν τὸν γ᾽ ὑπισχνούμενον δυνατὸν εἶναι το We should 


lal , , “ / / “ σ 
μιᾷ ΤΕΧΡΉ TQAVTQ ποίειν γιγνώσκομεν ποὺ TOUTOY, OTL 


Ἃ « ,ὔ a + , r 
μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος TH 


2. τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος] Sc. τέχνην. 
Compare Coleridge, Friend, 
vol. iii. p. 145: “For the 
ancients, as well as the mod- 
erns, had their machinery for 
the extemporaneous mintage of 
intellects, by means of which, 
off-hand, as it were, the scholar 
was enabled to make a figure 
on any and all subjects, on any 
and all occasions.” 

4. μῶν ov παιδιὰν νομιστέον] 
Cf. Euthyd. 278 ὁ : παιδιὰν δὲ 
λέγω διὰ ταῦτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλά 
τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι, 
τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον 
εἰδείη πῇ ἔχει, προσπαίζειν δὲ οἷός 
T ἂν εἴη τοῖς ἀνθρώπως. Legg. 
2, 667 6: καὶ παιδιάν γε τὴν 
αὐτὴν ταύτην λέγω τότε ὅταν μήτε 
τι βλάπτῃ μήτε ὠφελῇ σπουδῆς ἢ 
λόγου ἄξιον. The contempt for 
the art of painting which is 
here expressed reappears in 
Legg. 6, 769 Ὁ : ἐντριβὴς----οὐ- 
δαμῶς γέγονα τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ. 
— Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἐβλάβης. See 
also Polit. 277 ὁ: γραφῆς δὲ 
καὶ συμπάσης χειρουργίας λέξει 


καὶ λόγῳ δηλοῦν πᾶν ζῶον μᾶλλον 
πρέπει τοῖς δυναμένοις ἕπεσθαι. 

6. τεχνικώτερον --- χαριέστε- 
ρον] ‘ More artful,” and there- 
fore more worthy of the So- 
phist ; “more amusing,” and 
therefore more deserving of 
the name παιδιά. Cf. Polit. 
288 6, where μιμητική is in- 
cluded under παίγνιον. 

8. παμπολὺ] “ Most exten- 


sive.” Lit. “abundant.” Cf. 
infr. 236 b. 
9. ποικιλώτατον [7 “ Most 


various.” Cf. Thext. 146 ἃ : 
ποικίλα ἀνθ᾽ ἁπλοῦ. 

Il. γιγνώσκομέν που τοῦτον] 
τοῦτον, although the reading of 
only two MSS. (Par. H. Flor. 
b), is certainly preferable to 
τοῦτο, because adding point to 
the parallel: and has been 
introduced into the text by 
Stallbaum. The same reading 
had previously been conjec- 
tured by Van Heusde. 

12. ὁμώνυμα] Cf. Parm. 133 
d: ra—rap ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ὁμώνυμα 
ὄντα ἐκείνοις. 


understand 
at once 
that he is 
a painter, 
and that 


his are 
only mimic 
““ crea- 
tions ;’ by 
which, 


however, 
he can im- 
pose from 


a distance 5 


on the less 
intelligent 
amongst 
young 
children. 
There is 
also a 
mimic art 
of reason- 
ing, by 


Io 


72 IMAATQNOZ 


γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατὸς ἔσται τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νέων Ῥ. 234. ' 


παίδων, πόρρωθεν τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύς, λανθά- 


ε “ / δ Ἃ θη ὃ cad ΄σ « ΄ 
νειν, ὡς, Ὁ τί περ ἂν βουληθῃ Pav, TOVTO ἱκανώτατος 


ἃ > “- yy 
ὧν ἀποτελεῖν ἐργῳ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ: 


EE. Τί δὲ δή ; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ap’ οὐ προσδο- 


a 5 , yy U x > 3 
κῶμεν eval τινα ἄλλην τέχνην ; Τὴ ovt δυνατὸν av 


/ Χ ͵ 7] , 5 
τυγχάνειν TOUS νέους καὶ ETL πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων 


τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὦτων τοῖς λόγοις 


/ / 5) , Ν 4 
γοητεύειν, δεικνύντας εἴδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, 


2. πορρωθεν --- ἀφεστῶτας] Cf. 
Legg. 1, 663 Ὁ : σκοτοδινιᾷν δὲ 
τὸ πόρρωθεν ὁρώμενον πᾶσί τε ὡς 
ἔπος εἰπεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ 
παρέχει. The spirit οἵ Prot.314b 
is the same: ἡμεῖς yap ἔτι νέοι, 
ὥστε τοσοῦτο πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι. 
Cf. also Rep. 1, 331 6: ὥσπερ 
ἤδη ἐγγύτερω ὧν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλόν 
τι καθορᾷ αὐτά. 

ἡ. τινα ἄλλην τέχνην] τοιαύτην, 
which Heindorf proposed to 
insert before τέχνην, is found 
in ὁ, ἘΠ Ὁ, and 85 been 
added by a recent hand in 
two other MSS. But with 
τοιαύτη following (infr. 4), the 
common reading is more pro- 
bable. 

+ ovt] The reading of 
most MSS., ἢ ov δυνατὸν αὖ 
τυγχάνειν, is awkward unless 
τοιαύτην is added above. οὐ 
may possibly have arisen from 
αὖ following. The translation 
of Ficinus (qua seductores— 
adolescentulos decipere vale- 
ant) points to Schleiermacher’s 
conjecture, ἢ δυνατὸν αὖ τυγχά- 
νειν, which is also supported 
by a correction of the Coisli- 


nian MS. (ἢ δυνατόν.) (ῆ οὐ 
Π.) For τυγχάνειν with the ad- 
jective, cf. Tim. 61 d, τυγχάνει 
---ταῦτα---- δυνατὰ λεχθῆναι, and 
seven other passages quoted 
by Ast, Lex. 5. v. τυγχάνω. 
And for the infinitive after the 
relative ἡ (subaud. προσδοκῶμεν), 
cf. Parm. 130 6: εἶναι εἴδη ἄττα, 
ὧν τάδε---τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἴσχειν. 

8. τοὺς νεοὺς καὶ ἔτι πόρρω] 
A similar parallel is drawn 
between rhetoric and tragic 
poetry in Gorgias 502 d: Nov 
ἄρα ἡμεῖς εὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν 
τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἷον παί- 
δων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ 
ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, 
ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα, κολακικὴν γὰρ 
αὐτήν (τὴν τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησιν) 
φαμεν εἶναι. See also ib. 458 
e, where the “ omniscience” of 
the rhetor is noticed : περὶ 
πάντων (ῥητορικὸν) ὥστ᾽ ἐν ὄχλῳ 
πιθανὸν εἶναι. Ib. 459 Ὁ : ὁ οὐκ 
εἰδὼς τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι 
πιθανώτερος. Compare Legg. 
2,658 ¢: εἰ μὲν τοίνυν τὰ σμικρὰ 
κρίνοι παιδία, κρινοῦσι τὸν τὰ θαύ- 
ματα ἐπιδεικνύντα. 

10. εἴδωλα λεγόμενα] = τὰ ἐν 














ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 


Ϊ ἣν ω “ vad / Ν Ν / 
p- 234. ὥστε ποιεῖν aAnOn δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι Kai τὸν λέγοντα 


\ / 7 (oA > 53 
δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἅπαντ᾽ εἶναι ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη 


τέχνη 3 


ΞΕ). Τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, [ὦ] Θεαίτητε, τῶν τότε 


» / B's > ’ /, / > / 
ἀκουόντων ἀρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, χρόνου τε ἐπελθόντος 


» - an a - / « / an 5 
αὑτοῖς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προϊούσης λικίας, τοῖς τε οὖσι 


/ > / Ν \ / > 
προσπίπτοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων avayKa- 


/ 3 a 3 / lal 7 7 
ζομένους ἐναργῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μεταβάλ- 


‘ / / / [γέ \ \ 
dew τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὥστε σμικρὰ μὲν 


φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ padi, καὶ πάντα 


VL 9 ’΄ \ 5 a 7 / 
παντῃ ἀνατετραῴθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα 


e Χ a ΄- 7 5) / 
ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τῶις πράξεσιν εργῶν TAPAVEVOLEVOYV 5 


τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα, infr. 6. 
“ Exhibiting fictitious argu- 
ments, as the painter exhi- 
bited fictitious shapes.” There 
is a stress on λεγόμενα as op- 
posed to γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνὺς 
above. Compare Theet. r50e: 
ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος 
ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. For 
the plural δεικνύντας, to which 
objection has been made, οἵ. 
Theet. 172 Ὁ: ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυ- 
ρίζεσθαι. Ib. 167 Ὁ : δοξάζοντας 
συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς, and notes. 

I. ποιεῖν---δοκεῖν] “To make 
them think.” 

5. Τοὺς πολλοὺς ---- παραγενο- 
μένων] “Is it not then, Thez- 
tetus, inevitable, that most of 
the auditors of such lectures 
in process of time, as they get 
older, coming into close con- 
tact with realities, and being 
compelled by sad experience 
to see and feel things as they 
are, will change the opinions 
which were then created, so 


L 


that what seemed great will 
appear small, and what seemed 
easy, difficult; and the ima- 
ginations, awakened by dis- 
course, will be completely 
overturned by the facts which 
encounter them in action.” 

[ὦ] Θεαίτητε] The Bodl. 
omits ὦ with AT. 

8. διὰ παθημάτων] According 
to the ““τριγέρων μῦθος," παθή- 
ματα μαθήματα. 

g. ἐναργῶς} “ΤῸ come into 
unmistakeable contact with re- 
ality.” 

10. σμικρὰ---τὰ peyara] Ee. 
wealth, distinction, &c. 

II. χαλεπὰ---τὰ ῥᾷάδια] E. 
the government of men. 

13. ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν 
ἔργων παραγενομένων] “The reali- 
ties which have encountered 
them in action.” Compare the 
complaint of Adimantus in Rep. 
6, 487 b,c. And cf. Lege. 6, 
769d: προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ 
τῶν δοξάντων ἔργῳ πειρώμενον. 


oO, 
5 


σι 


which 
youth and 
inexperi- 
ence may 
be de- 
ceived, 
though not 
for long. 


Thesetetus 
assents, 
though he 
feels that 
he is still 
one of those 
‘at a dis- 
tance”’ 
from the 
truth of 
things. 
Sar. “It is 
our endea- 
vour to 
anticipate 
experience 
and to 
draw you 
nearer.” 


74 


ΘΕΑΙ. ‘Os γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῷδε ὄντι κρῖναι. οἶμαι p. 234. 


ITAATQNOZ 


δὲ Oe De a "7 , » / 5 
ε καὶ Ee τῶν ETL πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκοτων εἰναι. 


EE. Τοιγαροῦν ἡμεῖς σε οἵδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα 
γὰρ 7} ρ μ 


\ fa) / e > / yA lal / 
καὶ vuv πειρώμεθα ὡς ἐγγύτατα ἄνευ TOY παθημάτων 


Ἢ ΄ Ν 3 3 a a / P< © ἐς 
STpooayev. περὶ δ᾽ οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τοδε μοι λέγε 


/ yf la \ a ΄σ ’, yy 
πότερον ἤδη τοῦτο σαφὲς OTL τῶν γοήτων ἐστι TIS, 


\ a lol 32) Ὁ 7 7) Ν Ν 
μιμητὴς ὧν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ διστάζομεν ἐτι μὴ περὶ 


σ 5 / lat Ἂ 3 Ν / 
ὅσωνπερ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατὸς εἶναι, περὶ τοσού- 


των καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀληθῶς ἔχων τυγχάνει ; 
OEAI. Καὶ πῶς av, ὦ ξένε; ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἤδη 


\ lal 72 vA qn rn an A 
σαφες ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδιᾶς μέτε- 


’ὔ , ἴω 
χόντων ἐστί τις μερῶν. 


Ios τὸ 989 lye ὦ 
εἶ, προιὼν δέ σε 6 χρόνος ποιήσει 
πολλὰ ὧν νῦν δοξάζεις μεταβα- 
λόντα ἐπὶ τἀναντία τίθεσθαι. 

T. ‘Os ἐμοὶ ----κρῖναι = ὡς ἐμοὶ 
κριτῇ. The infinitive is epexe- 
getic. 

3. Τοιγαροῦν ἡμεῖς σε οἵδε] 
Cf. Legg. το, go5¢: ταῦτα εἰ μέν 
σε πείθει Κλεινίας ὅδε καὶ ξύμπασα 
ἡμῶν ἥδε ἡ γερουσία, καλῶς ἄν σοι 
καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ξυλλαμβάνοι. 

ἡμεῖς οἵδε] -- ξενός, Θεόδωρος, 
Σωκράτης. 

4. τῶν παθημάτων] The article 
refers to διὰ παθημάτων above. 

5. δ᾽ οὖν] “ But, to return.” 

7. μὴ expresses that an af- 
firmative answer to the question 
which it introduces is regarded 
as possible. 

12. ἐστί τις μερῶν] Heindorf 
objects to μερῶν on the ground 
that the only way of constru- 
ing the words as they stand is 
to suppose μερῶν tobe go- 
verned by μετεχόντων. “That 
he is one of those who par- 
take of the divisions of child’s- 


παῖ, νέος 


play.” But why may not the 
words be taken more simply !— 
“That he occupies (76. is) one of 
the departments which partake 
of the nature of child’s-play.” 
The confusion of the man and 
his function, the juxtaposition 
of the masculine with the femi- 
nine and neuter, has already 
occurred several times in this 
dialogue, 6. g. 225 a: τὸ χρη- 
ματιστικὸν γένος, ἐριστικῆς ὃν 
σοφιστής. 
The article in τῆς παιδιᾶς re- 
fers to p. 234 a: παιδιὰν --- 
παιδιᾶς. Accordingly, τῶν τῆς 
παιδιᾶς μετεχόντων μερῶν 18 
equivalent to τῶν τῆς μιμητικῆς 
μερῶν. That μιμητικὴ is divided 
into many parts is implied 
supr. 234 b, eis ev πάντα ξυλλα- 
βών, and in the epithet ποικι- 
λώτατον. Cf. also infr. 6: κατὰ 
μέρη τῆς μιμητικῆς. 235 a: τῆς 
μιμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος. 
ib. Ὁ : πολὺ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος κατὰ 
-- μιμητικῆην. The conjecture 
εἷς, adopted by the Zurich edi- 


tors (ἐστί τις μερῶν εἷς. Ténra), 


͵ 5 A e 
TEXYNS, — ΕΟ πο 9, 







Ρ. 235. 





ἢ 





p. 235. 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


75 


RE. Eis γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μιμητὴν apa θετέον 


γ 
TUWQ, 


OEAI. [lds yap ov θετέον ; 
mE. “Aye δή, viv ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἤδη Tov θῆρα But what 


ΣΟΙ ΕῚ a 4 \ ‘ ἀν, τῆς ͵ > 
μηκέτ᾽ ἀνεῖναι: σχεδὸν yap αὐτὸν mepleAnpapev ἐν 5 


5 κ᾿ Q al ’ ΄σ / \ \ 
ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τινὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ 


a > ΄ “ >’ ΟΝ Ὁ / ΓΟ / 
TOLAVTA OPYAVWY, WATE OUKET ἐκφεύξεται TOOE γε. 


CEAI. To ποῖον ; 


aD Teo \ » a / 5 A na 6 
μη ed O μὴ OU TOU γένους ELVaL Τοῦ τῶν σαυματο- 


ποιῶν τις εἷς. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Kapol τοῦτό γε οὕτω περὶ αὐτοῦ ξυνδοκεῖ, 


/ 14 a 
mE. Δέδεικται τοίνυν 6 τι τάχιστα διαιρεῖν τὴν 


though involving only a slight 
change, is unmeaning and gives 
a wrong emphasis. The case is 
different below (235 b: τις εἷς), 
where the point is that he cannot 
escape being some one amongst 
the varieties of the genus jug- 
gler. Here παιδιᾶς is the em- 
phatic word. 

The next words, εἰς γόητα, 
admit of a similar explanation. 
The masculine noun is substi- 
tuted for the neuter of the kind 
or genus. He must be referred 
to the genus sorcerer, and to a 
species of mimic. Cf. Polit. 
281 ©: πότερον οὖν 6 περὶ τῆς 
ὑφαντικῆς λόγος --- ἱκανῶς ἔσται 
διωρισμένος, ἐὰν ἄρ᾽ αὐτὴν τῶν 
ἐπιμελειῶν, ὁπόσαι περὶ τὴν ἐρεᾶν 
ἐσθῆτα, εἰς τὴν καλλίστην καὶ 
μεγίστην πασῶν τιθῶμεν ; where, 
however, the Zurich editors 
have εἰσί, but see note. Lege. 
9, 867 b: εἰς εἰκόνα μὲν ἄμφω 
θεῖναι. Tim. 57 6 : εἰς ἀνωμαλό- 
τητὰα τιθῶμεν. Kor a similar use 
of the concrete for the ab- 


L 


stract, cf. Rep. 382d: Ποιητὴς 
ἄρα ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι. 

1. γόητα! So the art of 
the λογοποιοί is described in 
Euthyd. 289 e: ἔστι---τῆς τῶν 
ἐπῳδῶν τέχνης μόριον σμικρῷ τι 
ἐκείνης ὑποδεεστέρα. 

4. νῦν ἡμέτερον---ἀνεῖναι] The 
near approach made in these 
words to an anapzstic tetra- 
meter can hardly be accidental. 
And there is a tone of bur- 
lesque tragedy in the order of 
the words. 

6. ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τινι] Se. 
ὀργάνῳ, viz. the εἶδος of μιμη- 
τική 1n which we have confined 
him. Cf. Euthyd. 302 b: ἄπο- 
pov twa στροφὴν ἔφευγόν τε καὶ 
ἐστρεφόμην ἤδη, ὥσπερ ἐν δικτύῳ 
εἰλημμένος. 

ΤΟ. τις εἷς] Some one or other 
of those included in the race 
of jugglers. Cf. Soph. Antig. 
262: εἷς γάρ τις ἢν ἕκαστος 
οὐξειργασμένος. 

12. Δέδεικται τοίνυν] Se. δεῖν. 


Cf. Theet. 197 a: 


> 
- 


τούτων τ᾽ 


now of the 
Sophist { 
Is he or is 
he nota 
mimic and 
amagician 
a maker 
of false 
images of 
reality 1 


If so, we 
must take 
the art of 
image- 
making 
and pro- 
ceed with 
our method 
of divi- 
sions. 


76 


> ww \ , x jd ’ > / >\ 
εἰδωλοποιϊκην τέχνην, καὶ καταβάντας εἰς αὐτὴν, EaY Pp. 235.}} 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


\ c σ΄ 5» \ c Ἀ [ἐ ~ 
μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς ὁ σοφιστὴς ὑπομείνῃ, συλλαβεῖν 


DLN \ \ , / c XN a cal 
αὑτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὕπο τοῦ βασιλικοῦ 


/ > / / 3 to Ν a Ξ 
λόγου, κἀκείνῳ παραδόντας ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἄγραν 


5Ν 3. \ / ω al 7 7 
5 ἐὰν δ᾽ ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μιμητικῆς δύηταί πῃ, Evva- 


λουθεῖν αὐτῷ, ὃ υ ἰεὶ τὴν ὑπο 
κολουθειν αὐτῷ, Θιαιρουντας GEL τὴν υὑποθεχομενὴν 


Sines a “ Ων “-“ / yf © 
αὐτὸν μοῖραν, ἕωσπερ av ληφθῇ. πάντως οὗτε οὗτος 


δ A / Ia\ / 5 XN > / 
οὔτε ἄλλο γένος οὐδὲν μὴ ποτε ἐκῴφυγον ἐπεύξηται 


\ ΄- “ / / 4 oS / Ν 
τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετιέναι καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τε καὶ 


SEAN iy 
10 ἐπὶ παντα μέθοδον. 


ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι, and note. 
Tsoer. Nicocl. 36: φημὶ δὴ 
πράττειν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἐπιμελῶς. 
Δέδοκται, the reading of some 
MSS. and of the old editions, 
agrees well with the preced- 
ing context, but not so well 
with the new matter in what 
follows. Compare Rep. 4,432 b: 
νῦν δὴ ἡμᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας 
τινὰς θάμνον περιΐστασθαι, προ- 
σέχοντας τὸν νοῦν μή πῃ διαφύγῃ 
ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀφανισθεῖσα ἄδη- 
Ros γένηται. 
(12.)Δέδεικται----μεθόδον] “Then 
the duty is proved of opening 
with all speed the art of image- 
making, and descending into 
it; where, if we find the So- 
phist immediately awaiting us, 
we must apprehend him in 
the name of Reason, who is 
our royal master, and render 
and declare our capture ; but 
if he lurk in one of the many 
compartments of imitative art, 
we must follow him closely, 
always opening the cell which 
contains him, until he be 
caught. Surely neither he nor 
any other kind shall boast 
of haying eluded the pursuit 


of those who are able thus to 
follow the most minute and 
also the most comprehensive 
inquiry.” 

I. εἰδωλοποιϊκή 15 
mous with μιμητική. 

2. ὑπομείνῃ---δύητα]͵ He is 
imagined as a flying enemy 
who may either turn to bay or 
hide himself in the bush. 

3. ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ λόγου] 
Compare Pindar’s νόμος πάντων 
βασιλεύς. For Custom, as the 
king of men, Plato would sub- 
stitute Reason ; νοῦς for νόμος. 

4. ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἄγραν] See 
the story οἵ Polycrates and the 
fisherman in Herod. III. 42. 

7. πάντως οὐ] Polit. 269: mav- 
τως ov πολλὰ ἐκφεύγεις παιδιὰς ἔτη. 

8. οὐ---μή ποτε ἐκφυγὸν ἐπεύ- 
ξηται] This sounds like an echo 
of Soph. Cid. Col. 1024: ods 
οὐ μή ποτε χώρας φυγόντες τῆσδ᾽ 
ἐπεύξωνται θεοῖς. See οὐκέτ᾽ ἐκ- 
φεύξεται supr., and ef. Legg. 
10, QOO a: οὐ μή ποτε emevénrat 
περιγενέσθαι θεῶν. Ib. 12, 969 
Ὁ: τό ye ἀνδρειότατος εἶναι δο- 
κεῖν---οὐκ ἐκφεύξει ποτέ. 

9. καθ᾽ ἕκαστα---πάντα] Pass- 
ing over no kind and extend- 


synony- 








Ρ. 235- 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. ras 


OEAI. Λέγεις εὖ, καὶ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ποιητέον. 


RE. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τρόπον τῆς διαι- 


/ “ lal / a By 
ἃ ρέσεως ἐγωγέ μοι καὶ viv φαίνομαι δύο καθορᾷν εἰδὴ 


a oe \\ δὲ / ἰδέ ᾽ .« / 
THS μιμητικῆς τὴν OE ζητουμένην LOEAV, εν OTTOTEP@ 


There is a 
real and an 
apparent 
image. 


> ἘΠ σὲ 5 / Co > / 
ποθ μιν ουσὰα τυγχάνει, καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι5 


an an SN S 
δοκῶ νῦν δυνατὸς εἶται. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὲ πρῶτον καὶ δίελε ἡμῖν 


/ Χ / / 
τίνε τῶ Ovo λέγεις. 


=a Mi \ A ᾽ \ « lad > x, A 
wey I. lav μὲν Τὴν ELKAOTLKNV Op@v εν QUT?) 


/ yy 1] “ / c / \ \ 
τέχνην. ἐστι O αὕτη μάλιστα, ὁπόταν κατὰ τὰς TOU 


a 


παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει 


Ν ΄ Ν Χ ΄ a ΄ > \ 
καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ETL χρώματα ἀποδιδοὺς 


Χ / « / \ a / / 
τὰ TPOONKOVTA EKAGTOLS, Τὴν TOV μιμηματος γένεσιν 


ἀπεργαζηται. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ᾽; οὐ πάντες οἱ μιμούμενοί τι τοῦτ᾽ 


ἐπιχειροῦσι δρᾷν : 


3, “ “ 7 4 ’ 
BE. Οὔκουν ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων ποὺ τι πλάτ- 


2, Xx 7 » ἊΝ 3 - \ 
τουσιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν. εἰ yap ἀποδιδοῖεν τὴν 


ing to all : at once special and 
general, individual and univer- 
sal. Compare Pheedr. 265-273. 

7. Σὺ δ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὲ] Cf. Xen. 
Hell. III. 4, 26: Ἀποκρινομένου 
δὲ τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν 
ποιήσειε ταῦτα ἄνευ τῶν οἴκοι 
τελῶν, Σὺ δ᾽ ἀλλὰ, ἕως ἂν πύθῃ 
τὰ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, μεταχώρησον 
ἔφη, ἐς τὴν Φαρναβάζου. 

9. τὴν εἰκαστικὴν] The word 
is used again in Legg. 2, 667 Ὁ: 
ὅσαι τέχναι εἰκαστικαί. Lb. 668 
d: μουσικὴν---πᾶσάν φαμεν εἰκα- 
στικήν τε εἶναι καὶ μιμητικήν. 

9. ὁρῶν] τὼ δύο λέγω is 
understood from the preceding 
sentence. The ace. is governed 
partly by λέγω, partly by ὁρῶν. 

13. THY TOU μιμήματος γένεσιν 


The word γένεσις frequently 
occurs in these dialogues with 
something of a technical mean- 
ing. Here it seems almost 
pleonastic. Cf Legg. 4, 712 
a: τότε πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης 
φύεται γένεσις. Rep. 2,371 d: 
καπήλων — γένεσιν. Compare 
Cratyl. 432 6, where the fur- 
ther distinction is drawn be- 
tween Κρατύλου εἰκὼν and δύο 
Κρατύλοι. 

15. πάντες οἱ μιμούμενοί τι 
“ All who try to imitate any- 
thing.” 

16. ἐπιχειροῦσι δρᾶν almost = 
δρῶσι. Cf. Thezet.196 d, Pheedr, 
265 e, et passim. 

17. mov] “ Anywhere, 
any occasion.” 


» ¢¢ 


on 


The for- 
mer, which 
IO we may 
call a like- 
ness, 15 
that in 
which the 
propor- 
tions and 
colours of 
the original 
are really 
15 preserved. 


The false 
image is 
that, in 
whichthese 
only seem 
to be pre- 
served, be- 
cause of 
the posi- 
tion of the 
spectator, 


78 


τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι σμικρό- p. 235. 


\ a / \ A / \ \ ΄ 
τερα μὲν τοῦ δέοντος τὰ ἄνω, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω p. 236. 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


/ 353. ἃ \ Ν \ \ U \ “hase 7, 
φαίνοιτ᾽ av διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐγγύθεν 


« > ε n c ΄- 3 97 5 > / ‘\ > \ 
vp ἡμῶν ὁρᾶσθαι. ap οὖν ov χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς 


44 . ΄“ \ 327 
SEATAVTES οἱ δημιουργοὶ νῦν οὐ τὰς οὔσας συμμε- 


/ ἈΝ 7 5 \ fad Fi 
Tplas, ἀλλὰ Tas δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις 


ἐναπεργαζονται ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


oS 2 / ΕῚ , yy 
ἕτερον οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκὸς YE OV, 


HE. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα 


> / la 
10 €LKOVA καλεῖν 5 


GEAI. Nai. 
aE. Kat τῆς ye 


A X SN , Ζ 
μιμητικης TO ἐπὶ τουτῷ μέρος 


λ ip σ“ of » “ 7 ra) > / Ν 
ΚλῆτΤεον OTTEP εἴπομεν EV Τῷ 7 POOUEV, ELKAOTLKIY 5 


OEAI. KAnréov. 


EE. Τί δέ; τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ 


I. τῶν καλῶν] Badham conj. 
κώλων, but cf. καλὰς infra, 1. 6. 

5. νῦν] “In point of fact.” 
The position of the word is 
curious. Cf. supr., 218 b: 
ἀρχομένῳ πρῶτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ daive- 
ται, νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ. 

τὰς οὔσας] τῶν καλῶν is pro- 
bably to be supplied in thought. 

8. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν] These words 
are not omitted in the Bod- 
leian MS., as Gaisford asserts. 

9. εἰκός ye ὄν] γε -- ἅτε, as 
above, 221 ¢: τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο 
ἔχων. 

12.70 ἐπὶ τούτῳ] “Whose work 
this is.” Cf. Rep.5,477 d: duvd- 
pews δ᾽ εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω, 
ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τέ ἐστι καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται. 

13. ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν]Ἡ 235 d. 

15. διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ θέαν] 
Heindorf, following Schleier- 
macher, called this reading 
senseless, and thought that οὐκ 
had arisen out of ἐκ. And οὐκ 


is certainly omitted in Coisl. 
Ss. ¥., but Coisl. has ἐκ καλοῦ 
μηδαμῶς. Stallbaum agrees with 
Heindorf, who renders ἐκ κα- 
hov, ex loco opportuno, and 
quotes Aristoph. Thesm. 293 : 
ποῦ, ποῦ καθίζωμ᾽ ἐν καλῷ τῶν 
ῥητόρων wv ἐξακούω. C. F. Her- 
mann conjectures διὰ τὴν dKo- 
λουθίαν, “ because of the con- 
eruity” (it is rather the ap- 
parent congruity) “of the 
proportions.” The difficulty 
arises simply from misappre- 
hension. The point is that 
in addressing persons who are 
at a distance from the truth 
of things (πόρρω τῆς ἀληθείας 
ἀφεστῶτας, supr. 234 6) the 
Sophist is able to give his 
arguments the appearance of 
wisdom. The wnfavowrable 
position in which his hearers 
stand is the cause of their 
delusion, as in the case of the 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


19 


cal / ᾽ VA a ΄σ / \ v7 ’ 
p: 236. καλοῦ θέαν ἐοικέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἴ τις λάβοι 


‘ a ε a Ἐπ δὲ \ go oN δι Ν > 
τὰ τηλικαῦτα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷν, μηδὲ εἰκὸς ᾧ φησὶν ἐοι- 


/ / “ Bu > 5» 3 / / / 
κέναι, TL καλοῦμεν ; ἀρ οὐκ, ἐπείπερ φαίνεται μέν, 


” \ 37 Δ 
ἐοικε δὲ οὔ, φάντασμα ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν ; 


an , \ \ / 
EE. Οὐκοῦν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν 


cal Ν 7 A ’ A 
τοῦτο TO μέρος ἐστὶ Kal κατὰ ξύμπασαν μιμητικήν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς δ᾽ οὖ: 


7 / 
EE. Τὴν δὴ φαντάσματα ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπερ- 


,ὔ ld Lot > \ > / > xX 
γαζομένην τέχνην ap ov φανταστικὴν ὀρθότατ᾽ ἂν 


’ὔ 
προσαγορευοιμεν 5 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πολύ γε. 


BE. Τούτω τοίνυν τὼ δύο ἔλεγον εἴδη τῆς εἰδω- 


Rates = \ 7, 
λοποιϊκῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικὴν. 


apparent proportions of a co- 
lossal statue. The words δύ- 
ναμιν δ᾽ et τις λάβοι τὰ τηλι- 
καῦτα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾶν imply this, 
and require that οὐκ should be 
retained. “That which appears 
to resemble what is fair be- 
cause the spectator is not in a 
fair position.” Cf. Legg. 2, 
663¢: σκοτοδινιᾷν ---- τὸ πόρρω- 
θεν ὁρώμενον ----παρέχει, νομοθέ- 
της δὲ -- τὸ σκότος ἀφελὼν --- 
πείσει --- ὡς ἐσκιαγραφημένα τὰ 
δίκαιά ἐστι καὶ ἄδικα" τὰ μὲν ἄδικα 
τῷ τοῦ δικαίου ἐναντίως φαινόμενα, 
ἐκ μὲν ἀδίκου καὶ κακοῦ ἑαυτοῦ 
θεωρούμενα ἡδέα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια 
ἀηδέστερα, ἐκ δὲ δικαίου πάντα 
τἀναντία πάντῃ πρὸς ἀμφότερα, 
where it is evident from the 
context, as here, (especially 
from the word πόρρωθεν,) that 
ἐκ expresses position or point 
of view: and there is perhaps 
the same allusion as in Ar. 
Eth. Nic. IX. 7: Ἐπίχαρμος 


μὲν οὖν τάχ᾽ ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν 
αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους : 
unless indeed this is to be in- 
terpreted from ejusd. Metaph. 
XII. 9, 17 : χαλεπὸν ἐκ μὴ κα- 
λῶς ἐχόντων λέγειν καλῶς, κατ᾽ 
᾿Ἐπίχαρμον, where ἐκ expresses 
the material or means, as in 
ex τῶνδε σκόπει Pheed. 67 6. 

2. τὰ τηλικαῦτα] “Things of 
such colossal size.” 

ᾧ φησὶν ἐοικέναι] ‘“ Which 
it professes to resemble.” 

3. καλοῦμεν] Future tense. 

φαίνεται μὲν] ἐοικέναι, which 
is added in one or two 
MSS., is easily supplied from 
ἔοικε 8 ov. Cf. supr. 233 b: 
μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαίνοντο, and note. 

4. φαντάσματα] So the Bod- 
leian and Π.: cett. φάντασμα. 
The opposition between the 
one real and the many appa- 
rent likenesses suits the pas- 
sage well. Cf. Rep. 7, 516 b. 

13. τὼ δύο] Supr. 235 d. 


5 


Hence, 
there are 
two kinds 
of image- 
making, 
Likeness- 
making 
and Phan- 
10 tastic, of 
which 
painting is 
a conspicu- 
ous ex- 
ample. 


80 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 

ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿᾽Ορθώς. 
Now in EE. Ὃ δέ ye καὶ τότ᾽ ἠμφεγνόουν, ἐν ποτέρᾳ 
seeking to = ᾿ ; ΕΣ ᾿ 2 
pee a wey σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ viv πω δύναμαι ae 
Sophist in δ ‘ a 
one of σθαι σαφῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὄντως θαυμαστὸς ἁνὴρ Kal κατι- 
these, we x , oe aN Ne etc ΄ 5 \ a 
areen- 5 0€lV παγχάλεπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν pada εὖ καὶ ae 
countered es 5 η ΄ 
by the dif εἰς ἄπορον εἶδος διερευνήσασθαι καταπέφευγεν. 
ficulty 7 
which has OEAT. * Eouxev. 
always 


"»-- cy > 5 oN / , y 
beset the HE. °Ap οὖν αὐτὸ γιγνώσκων ξύμφης, ἢ σε 
subject of 
appear, ance, 


seeming, 
and falsity. 10 GTATATO πρὸς τὸ το 


- /? « ἂν A 7, / a 
TOP TG) IS: WED a) λόγου συνειθισμένον, νῦν ἐπε- 
eee : 
7 “ Sy 
CEAI. Πῶς, καὶ πρὸς 6 τι, τοῦτο εἴρηκας ; 
bom 37 5 ΄ > A > 7 
GE. Ὄντως, ὦ μακάριε, ἐσμὲν ἐν παντάπασι 
ζω vA ἊΝ Ν / lol Ν 
χαλεπῇ σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δο- e 
a) 3 \ , \ Ν , \ 7, » ro 
κεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ TO λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ 
{/ 5 
15 (47), ἐν τῷ 


’ὕ an ’ 3 Ν > / » 
πανῖα TAVTA ἐστι PEOTA αποριᾶς ἀεὶ 


2. καὶ τότ] Supr. 235 d. were now (this time) drawn 


ποτέρᾳ] Bodl. ποτερα. 

6. καταπέφευγεν]ηἠ The same 
imagery occurs in Phileb. 64 
e: νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν 
τὸ ἀγαθόν εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ 
φύσιν. Pheed. 76 6 : εἰς καλὸν 
καταφεύγει 6 λόγος. The order 
of the words is noticeable. 
Διερευνήσασθαι, which is intro- 
duced by an afterthought, de- 
pends immediately on ἄπορον. 

8. "Ap οὖν αὐτὸ---Ἰ “ Do you 
give your assent intelligently, 
or, from the habit of the argu- 
ment, were you now drawn 
on, as by a sort of impetus, 
to assent at once ?”’ 

9. νῦν] This, the reading of 
the Bodleian and ATI., is better 
than συνεπεσπάσατο, which has 
arisen out of the preceding 
verb. “ Being accustomed by 
the argument to assent, you 


on to make a hasty admission.” 

11. Πῶς] “ With what mean- 
ing ?” 

καὶ πρὸς 6 τι] “And with 
reference to what?” “ What 
is the special difficulty, which 
you have in view 2” 

6 tt] The indirect form 
may be accounted for by sup- 
posing an ellipse of λέγε, and 
appears more natural if the 
words καὶ πρὸς ὅτε are viewed 
as an afterthought. Cf. supr. 
233 ἃ : εἶ πάντα --- καθ᾽ ὅντινα 
καιλ. Cf. also Legg. 12, 960 
C: πρὸς ὃ τι δὲ τὸ νῦν ad ῥηθὲν 
εἴρηται, φρᾶζ᾽ ἔτι σαφέστερον. 
Euthyd. 287 Ὁ : τὸ yap οὐχ ἔχω 


ὃ τι χρῶμαι ὃ τι ποτε λέγεις, ὦ 


Διονυσόδωρε; One MS. (Flor. i) 
has τί. 

15. μεστὰ] Om. Bod. 
ΔΙ. The v of ἐστιν was 


p- 236 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


p. 236. πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. 


ψευδὴ λέγειν ἢ δοξαζειν 
φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογίᾳ 


ΕΠ ΑΙ Ti. or; 


8] 


a \ 5 ’ 4 
ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρὴ 
A 93 a 

ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο 


Ἁ / "Z 
μὴ συνέχεσθαι, παντά- 


p. 237. πασιν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χαλεπόν. 


ΞΕ, Τετόλμηκεν 0 λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ 


Ἂ 5 ta) \ Ἂ “ ᾽ μ“ 
ὃν εἶναι" ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ av ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ov. Τ]αρ- 


/ Nis , 9S lod \ Cla irs 5 
μενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὦ παῖ, παισὶν μὲν [ἡμῖν] οὖσιν, 


first confused with the initial 
ph, and then the remaining 
letters εστὰ were lost. 

(15-) ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ 
νῦν] Cf. Theet. 187 ¢: Θράτ- 
τει μέ πως νῦν Te Kal ἄλλοτε δὴ 
πολλάκις, ὥστ᾽ ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ 
πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γε- 
γονέναι, τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ 
πάθος map ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον 
ἐγγιγνόμενον --- τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ 
ψευδῆ. 

I. ὅπως --- χαλεπόν] “ For 
it is most difficult to devise 
an expression by which one 
may say or think that false- 
hoods really exist, and in 
uttering this avoid being in- 
volved in self-contradiction.” 
χαλεπὸν (γνῶναι or λέγειν) ὅπως 
εἰπόντα χρὴ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν 
ψευδῆ εἶναι, καὶ 
φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ συ- 
νέχεσθαι. Heindorf, who is 
followed by Stallbaum, inter- 
prets the words differently : 
“ Difficile enim prorsus est 
dictu, quomodo oporteat ali- 
quem, qui fieri posse dicat 
(εἰπόντα) ut falsa quis dicat 
aut cogitet, dum vel hoe pro- 
nuntiat (καὶ τοῦτο φθεγξάμενον) 
non sibimet ipsum contraria 
proloqui.” ὅπως is here unna- 
turally separated from εἰπόντα: 
χρὴ is too remote from the 


Ξ 
ὄντως τοῦτο 


Μ 


infinitive συνέχεσθαι, and the 
meaning given to καὶ is forced. 
For ὅπως εἰπόντα χρὴ λέγειν, cf. 
Legg. 4, 709 Ὁ: 


a 3 > , ΄ 
ταῦτ εἰπόντα δοκεῖν 


τὸ ὃ ἔστι --- 
πάντα εὖ 
λέγειν. 

3. συνέχεσθαι expresses the 
state of distressing uncertainty 
to which the mind ,15 reduced 
by Eristic. Cf. Thezet. 165 ο: 
ἐν φρέατι συνέχομενος. Ar. Eth. 
Nic. VII. 3: δέδεται yap ἡ διά- 
νοια, ὅταν μένειν μὲν μὴ βούληται 
διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπεραν- 
θὲν, προιέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ 
μὴ λῦσαι ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. 

6. ὃ λόγος οὗτος] Se. ψευδῆ 
ὄντως εἶναι. Of. Rep. 4, 440 ἃ: 
οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφη, ὃ λόγος ση- 
μαίνει κιτ.λ. 

8. παισὶν μὲν [ἡμῖν] οὖσιν, ἀρχό- 
μενος δὲ καὶ διὰ τέλους] ““Τῦ was 
in our boyhood that we heard 
him, but he never ceased to 
inculeate the same _ lesson.” 
The Stranger means to inti- 
mate that although he was 
young when he heard Parme- 
nides he had good reason to 
remember this warning. ἡμῖν, 
omitted in most MSS., is read 
for μέν in ΞΒ ΟἹ: &, with the 
edition of Stephanus, giving 
also ye for δέ. Hence Bekker 
reads παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀρχόμενός 
τε καὶ διὰ τέλους, 


For how 
can we 
affirm the 
existence of 
these, with- 
out contra- 


dicting the 
principle 
which Par- 
menides 
taught us, 
* What is 
not, never 
will be 
found to 
be 2” 


82 


> / \ \ \ / ΄ > / 
ἄρχομενος δὲ καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, Pp. 237. [ 


ΠΛΑΤΏΩΏΝΟΣ 


Gh 58 CLE λέ Ν Ν , ov" 
EQ) TE WOE EKAOTOTE AEY@V καὶ μετὰ HET P 


> ‘ , a9 » r " > <.are Ἔ 
οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε TOUT Τοὐδαμηϊ, φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα 


ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὁδοῦ διζήμενος εἶργε νόημα. 


’ « / x, N Ἃ 
πάντων ὁ λογος avTOS ἂν 


I. τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο] Se. 
μὴ τὸ μὴ ὃν εἶναι. ““ Uttered 


his testimony against this.” 
3. τοῦτ᾽ Τοὐδαμῇ}} The quo- 
tation occurs in the same form 
in the criticism of this passage 
by Aristotle in Met. XIII. 
1089 a (ullo modo, Bessar. 
vers.), with the various read- 
ings δαμῆ E., δυνάμει T., μὴ 
δαμῆ Alex. Heindorf’s conjec- 
ture, δαῆς, has been adopted 
by the Zurich editors, and by 
Mullach (Fragmenta Philoso- 
phorum), who, however, ex- 
presses a doubt. Wagner, in 
Rhein. Museum, suggested λά- 
Ans. The conjecture φανῇ has 
occurred independently to the 
present editor and to Ueber- 
weg, who also suggests δα- 
[Soa Οἱ tr 2γο'α: καθ 
ἅπερ ἂν αὐτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυ- 
δρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον ἄνα- 
φαίνηται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως ἀνα- 
φαίνεσθαι. 258 d (where the 
lines are quoted again) : Ἡμεῖς 
δέ ye οὐ μόνον ws ἔστι τὰ μὴ ὄντα 
ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ 
τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφη- 
νάμεθα. 10. 6: Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς 
εἴπῃ τις ὅτι τοὐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος 
τὸ μὴ ὃν ἀποφαινόμενοι τολμῶ- 
μεν λέγειν ὡς ἔστιν. ΤΌ. ἃ: ἡ 
θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων 
Legg. 7, 818 b: οὐδὲ 
θεὸς ἀνάγκῃ μή ποτε φανῇ μαχό- 
μενος.  Tuep. 7, ΒΡ Θ᾿ μη 


οὖσα. 


3 lal ’, ’ Ἀ 
5παρ᾽ ἐκείνου τε οὖν μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μάλιστα γε δὴ 


δηλώσειε μέτρια βασανι- 


ποτε φανῇ. Karsten, followed 
by Stallbaum, defends the text 
on the ground that Parmeni- 
des is said to have given the 
maxim both in verse and 
prose. But it is puerile to 
imagine that he spoke verse 
and prose in the same breath, 
or that Plato would quote a 
conversational as part of a 
written utterance. It is cer- 
tainly remarkable that the 
same corruption should be 
found in the copies of Plato 
and Aristotle. 

4. SuGjpevos] This is the 
reading of all the MSS. in 
this place. In the later pas- 
sage, 258 d, where the words 
are again quoted, διζήμενος is 
read in Οἱ H. and Corr. B.: 


μενος 


=. has διζήσιος : the rest διζή- 
aus. The latter is probably 
Parmenides’ word ; but it is 
possible that Plato may have 
substituted the more prosaic 
διζήμενος for this, as in Theet. 
173 6, in the quotation from 
Pindar, φέρεται is probably 
substituted for πέτεται. The 
MS. reading is, therefore, re- 
tained in the text. 

6. ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς] οὗτος Bodl. 
ΤΔΗ et pr. B. But see Theet. 
151 a, αὐτοί, and note. The 
variation is probably due to 


ὁ λόγος οὗτος above. ὁ λόγος, 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


σοι διαφέρει. 


85 


/ m9 3 SIN a 4 > ΄ / 
), 237. σθείς. τοῦτ᾽ οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα, εἰ μὴ τί 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπῃ βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ 


/ > / “ » / 
Aoyov, 7 βέλτιστα διέξεισι, σκοπῶν αὐτὸς TE 


ἴθι 


» ‘ A / ‘ ε Ν yf 
καμε KATA ταύτην THY OOOV AYE. 


EE. ᾿Αλλὰ χρὴ δρᾷν ταῦτα. Kai μοι λέγε: 


μηδαμῶς ὃν τολμῶμέν που φθέγγεσθαι ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ οὔ; 


SE. Μὴ τοίνυν ἔριδος ἕνεκα μηδὲ παιδιᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ 


> a / [4 4 > / a 
εἰ σπουδῇ δέοι συννοήσαντά τινα ἀποφήνασθαι τῶν 


3 col a \ 3, ΕῚ ,ὔ a \ \ + 
ἀκροατῶν, ποῖ χρὴ τοὔνομ᾽ ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο TO μὴ OV" 


Viz. τὸ μὴ ὃν εἶναι. For αὐτὸς ἂν 
δηλώσειε, cf. Thexet. 201 a: τάχ᾽ 
ἂν----οαὐτὸ φήνειε τὸ ζητούμενον. 
8. Τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπῃ βούλει] 
Referring to the courteous 
phrase εἰ μή τί σοι διαφέρει. 
Cf. Rep. 4, 432 Ὁ: 
μένῳ χρῆ καὶ τὰ δεικνύμενα δυ- 
ναμένῳ καθορᾷν, πάνυ μετρίως 


χρήσει. And, for διέξεισι, cf. 


27 c 
ἐᾶν μοι ἑπο- 


Rep. 6, 484 ἃ: διὰ μακροῦ τινος. 


“διεξελθόντος λόγου. 

η. φθέγγεσθαι] “ We are not 
afraid to use the expression.” 
Cf. Lege. 2, 655d: τοῦτο--- οὐδ᾽ 
ὅσιον τὸ παράπαν φθέγγεσθαι. 

9. Μὴ τοίνυν --- παιδιᾶς] Cf. 
Theet. 155 a: οὐ δυσκολαίνον-- 
τες ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς 
ἐξετάζοντες. ib. 169 ὁ : καί μοι 
πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή που 
εἶδος τῶν 
λόγων ποιούμενοι. The words 
here are not ironical, but 
mark the real importance of 
the inquiry. The sentence is 
broken by the introduction 
of the supposition, “ Let us 
not put the question in a 
spirit of strife or mockery, 
but suppose one of the hear- 


M 


παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν 


ers of Parmenides had _ seri- 
ously to point out, after re- 
flection, to what this name 
Not-Being must be given, 
to what object or kind of 
objects do we imagine he 
would be able himself to ap- 
ply the term, and to direct the 
questioner to do 80 1) Par- 
menides is conceived as thus 
questioning one of his hearers 
in defence of his thesis. It is 
also possible to make the first 
clause a part of the supposi- 
tion: “Suppose one of the 
hearers were asked, not in a 
spirit of strife or mockery, 
but in good earnest, to give 
his matured opinion.” But the 
sentence when thus rendered, 
though more grammatical, is 
less conversational. Compare 
Phileb. 446: δεῖ δή σε, ὦ Ipa- 
ταρχε, καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις 
τοῖς δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 
Rep. 7, 516 6. 

10. ἀποφήνασθαι] The Bodl., 
with corr. Al and pr. BE, has 
ἀποκρίνασθαι, which is probably 
a corruption arising out of the 
kp in ἀκροατῶν. 


2 


~ 


Let us 
calmly 
consider 
this point, 
by analyz- 
ing the 
assertion— 
« Not- 

10 Being is.” 


ΤΆ Parme- 
nides had 
asked, Of 
what is 


Non-exist- 


ence pre- 
dicable ? 
what 
should we 


reply ? 


Certainly 
not of any 


84 


» κι ry 4 A Sus, 
ἔχειν δοκοῦμεν ἂν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖον αὐτὸν TE κατα- p. 237. 


IMAATQNOZ 


joacbar καὶ τῷ πυνθανομένῳ δεικνύναι ; 
χρῆσασ αἱ και T@ TT UV ανομένῳ εἰκνυναι 5 


ΘΕΑΙ. Χαλεπὸν ἤρου καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οἵῳ γε 


3 Ν / 5, 
E€MOL πτανταπασιν aTropov. 


SE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὖν τοῦτό ye δῆλον, 


v4 a JA 
OTL TOV οντῶν 


ΕΓ» ἐν VAX ᾽ 5 / 
ἐστι TL TO μὴ OV οὐκ οἰστεον.- 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ; 


— > a > / ᾽ x \ \ 
HE. Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ 


ΕΣ x>~ δὼ (δ ‘ 
OV, OVO ἐπὶ TO 


τὶ φέρων ὀρθῶς av τις φέροι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Tas δή; 


μ--ἰ a er 7 ε ἐν Ν 
ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν, ὡς καὶ TO τὶ 


1. ἔχε] The Bodl. and 
Vat. have 7: six other MSS. 


ὅτι : Ven. Π. me ἔχειν : the 
other nine have ἔχειν. Stall- 
baum has adopted the Bod- 
leian reading, and translates : 
“Quid censemus? cuinam rei 
et quali designando eum pu- 
tamus et ipsum illud adhibi- 
turum et quzrenti demon- 
straturum ?” But he has not 
satisfactorily accounted for the 
appearance of ἔχειν, which 
makes perfectly good sense. 
For the emphatic position of 
eis τί, cf. Prot. 318d: Ἱπποκρά- 
της--- βελτίων ἄπεισι γενόμενος Kal 
- ἐπιδώσει εἰς τί, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, 


also Polit. 265 


Kal περὶ τοῦ: 


6: ὁ πολιτικὸς ἄρ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν 
ἔχειν φαίνεται πότερα κ.τ. A. 


The two next clauses present 
equally curious instances of 
inversion. Cf. also Legg. 6, 776 
d: εἰς ἃ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 
βλέψαντας ἡμᾶς τί χρὴ ποιεῖν 
περὶ κτήσεως οἰκετῶν ; 

2. δεικνύναι] Se. 
ἐπιφέρειν. 

5. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὖν τοῦτό γε] Loe. 
to whatever else the term μὴ 


ὡς χρείη 


ὃν may be referred, it cannot 
be to any existing thing. 

τῶν ὄντων ἐπί tt] ‘The 
reading of Ven. II. and seven 
other MSS. The Bodleian 
has enl. 

8. οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ τὶ φέρων] CF. 
for similar examples of ex- 
treme analysis, Parm. 161 a: 
ei δὲ TO ἕν ἐκεῖνο Kal μὴ ἄλλο 


 ὑποκεῖται μὴ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου 


καὶ ἄλλων πόλλων ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ 
μετεῖναι. Thert. 157 Ὁ, 202 a. 
Also Parm. 164 b: τί δέ; τὸ 
ἐκείνου ἢ TO ἐκείνῳ, ἢ TO Ti ἢ TO 

a x A ΄ “Δ 2 a 
τοῦτο ἢ TO τούτου, ἢ ἄλλου ἢ 
ἄλλῳ, ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔ ἢ νῦ 

ω, ἢ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν, 
3 > ΄ Ἂ ΄ x wy a 
ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ 
λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν 
ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν ἔσται; 
which, however, is rather par- 
allel to the next ἀπορία. 

11. Kal τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν] 
“This also is surely plain to 
us.” καὶ refers to τοῦτό ye δῆλον 
above. 

τὸ τὶ τοῦτο ῥῆμα!͵ ‘This 
word “something.” ῥῆμα seems 
to be thrown in by an after- 
thought, for the sake of ex- 
plicitness ; so giving τὶ the 





Ρ. 237. τοῦτο ῥῆμα ἐπ᾽ ὄντι λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε' μόνον γὰρ 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 85 


> Ν / “ Ν / \ 
αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον ἀπὸ 


a ᾿, « / > ᾽ὔ 9) , 
TOV ὄντων ἁπάντων, ἀδύνατον. ἡ Yap ; 


OEAI. ᾿Αδύνατον. 


EE. Ἄρα τῇδε σκοπῶν ξύμφης ὡς ἀνάγκη τόν 


’ a 4 / 
τι λέγοντα ἐν γέ τι λέγειν ; 


ΘΕΑ,ΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


HE. Ἑνὸς γὰρ δὴ τό γε τὶ φήσεις σημεῖον εἶναι, 


Ν \ \ lal XN \ \ “ 
τὸ δὲ τινὲ δυοῖν, τὸ δὲ τινὲς πολλῶν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ οὔ: 


\ ε 
HE. Τὸν δὲ δὴ μή τι λέγοντα ἀναγκαιότατον, ὡς 


μ᾿ ΄ \ / 
EOLKE, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν. 


OEAI. ᾿Αναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν. 


Lara 5) 591 eric > a\ a , \ \ 
=H. “Ap οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν τοι- 


οὔτον λέγειν μέν {τιΐ, λέγειν μέντοι μηδέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ 


λέγειν φατέον, ὅς γ᾽ ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ μὴ ὃν φθέγγεσθαι ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὃ λόγος ἔχοι. 


force of an adjective, as in such 
expressions as ἡ Αἴτωλις αὕτη 
yun. Heindorf conjectures τὸ 
ῥῆμα, which appears in two 
MSS. Stallbaum renders ῥῆμα 
ἐπ᾿ ὄντι “as a predicate of 
being.” 

15. λέγειν [μέν] Fret] τι, which 
appears in all the MSS., is not 
wanted, and, if genuine, is 
used in common parlance (cf. 
Supr. 236 6, λέγειν μὲν ἄττα) 
without reference to the pre- 
ceding argument, just as the 
ordinary sense of εἶναι, δοκεῖν, 
etc., is often found within a 
few lines of the technical use 
of the same words. μέν, which 
the Bodleian (not however Vat. 
A.) omits, is probably right, 
though the omission may be 


defended from Thezt. 160 Ὁ : 
αἰσθανόμενον yap, μηδενὸς δὲ 
10. : γλυκὺ γὰρ, 
μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκύ. 

μηδὲν] I. 6. μηδὲ ἕν. The 
argument from μὴ τοίνυν may 
be thus resumed.—What is 
denoted by μὴ évt No exist- 
ing thing: and therefore not 
something : for every “ some- 
thing” exists: therefore, ὁ μὴ 
τι λέγε. But 
every something is some one 
thing: therefore, ὁ μή τι λέ- 
yov οὐδὲν λέγει. But (6 οὐδὲν 
λέγων) he who says nothing, 
does not say at all: there- 
fore 6 μὴ dv λέγων οὐδὲ λέγει. 
Compare Parm. 144 ο, Theet. 
189 e. 


17. Τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας 6 


9 ,΄ 
αἰσθανόμενον. 


ὃν λέγων οὔ 


σι 


bdo) 


being—nor 
of some- 
thing. For 
“some” 
implies 
being. But 


“not-some” 


is “ none,” 
and to 
speak none 
is not to 
speak, 


There fol- 


lows a 


Se at ee σ5 


graver dif- 
ficulty. If 
Not-Being 
is not pre- 
dicable, 
neither is 
aught pre- 
dicable of 
the non- 
existent. 
And yet 
Not-Being 
cannot be 
uttered 

or even 
thought, 
without 
implying 
predicates, 
such as 
unity or 
plurality, 
which im- 
ply num- 
ber, which 
implies 
being. 


86 


ΞΕ. Μήπω μέγ᾽ εἴπῃς" ἔτι yap, ὦ μακάριε, ἔστι, p. 2538} 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


Ν “ 4 fal ΄“ Ν / 
καὶ ταῦτα γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη καὶ πρώτη. 


\ \ σ΄ Ν 53 / 
περὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὖσα τυγχάνει. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς his; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκνήσῃς. 


Lars) yo \ vy A / > 37 a 
=. To μεν OVTL TOV TPODyEVOIT ἂν TL τῶν 


yA aS 
OVT@V ετέρον. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Πῶς yap ov; 


EE. Μὴ ὄντι δέ τι τῶν ὄντων apa προσγίγνε- 


σθαι φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ; 


OEAI. Καὶ πώς: 


EE. ᾿Αριθμὸν δὴ τὸν ξύμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν. 


OEAI. EZ πέρ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὡς ov. 


EE. Μὴ τοίνυν μηδ᾽ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ μήτε 


to / NA XN SS \ xX 7 
πλῆθος μὴτε TO EV πρὸς TO μὴ ὃν προσφέρειν. 


λόγος ἔχοι] ὁ λόγος, SC. τὸ μὴ 
ὃν εἶναι, aS appears from αὐτοῦ 
(sc. τοῦ λόγου) below. “ The 
saying must surely be thus 
reduced to the last stage of 
difficulty.” 

I. Μήπω μέγ᾽ εἴπῃ) There 
is a tragic tone in the expres- 
sion. Cf. Legg. 1,638 a: ὦ 
ἄριστε, μὴ λέγε ταῦτα. 

ὦ μακάριε] “Mysimple friend !” 
Cf. Crat. 414 ¢: ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ 
οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι k.T.A. 

ἔστι] Sc. ἀπορία, to be sup- 
plied from ἀποριῶν below. 

3. περὶ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν] 
One which affects the very be- 
ginning of the whole matter, 
i. e. enters into the substance of 
the term itself, μὴ ὄν. Cf. 
supr. 233 d: τὴν ἀρχὴν --- τοῦ 
λεχθέντος --- ἀγνοεῖς. The diffi- 
culty is this: the word μὴ ὃν 
or μὴ ὄντα cannot be uttered 
or thought without a contra- 
diction: for μὴ ὃν has num- 


ber, being singular, and μὴ 
ὄντα has also number, being 
plural : and number is exist- 
ence: therefore, in uttering 
or thinking the word μὴ ὃν 
or μὴ ὄντα we attach existence 
to non-existence. In the for- 
mer ἀπορία it was shewn that 
non-existence could not be an 
attribute. Here it is denied 
that non-existence can be the 
subject of any attribute: and 
yet the word cannot be ut- 
tered without implying attri- 
butes, such as unity or plu- 
rality. Cf. Parm. 164 b, quoted 
above, note on p. 84, 1. 8. 

12. Εἴ πέρ ye καὶ ἄλλο τι] 1.6. 
That is most real of which we 
have the most distinct con- 
ception, and our conception 
of number is most distinct. 
This is one of the Pythago- 
rean or later Platonic touches, 
which become more frequent in 
the Politicus. 


b 





p- 238. 





d 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 87 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκουν ἂν ὀρθῶς γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιχει- 


ροῖμεν, ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος. 


BE. Πῶς οὖν ἂν 7 διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγξαιτ᾽ 


y+ Ἃ Ν “- 7 Ν ΄, ΄ \ \ 
av τις ἢ καὶ TH διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ 


2, Ἂ SS VN oN Ν > ~ 
ὄντα ἢ TO μὴ OV χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε, πῇ: 


δ εν \ A / 3 ᾽ “ 
SE. Μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, apa οὐ TAN- 


θος ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν ; 


ἌΝ. "ὃν 53 A 3 
BE. Μὴ ὃν δέ, ἄρα οὐ τὸ ἕν αὖ; 


OEAI. Σαφέστατά γε. 


BE. Καὶ μὴν οὔτε δίκαιόν γε οὔτ᾽ ὀρθόν φαμεν 


ὃν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὄντι προσαρμόττειν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἀληθέστατα. 


EE. Συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν τ5 Not-Being 


> a SE) 9 ΄σ yf lo Ν \ * SN 
ορθῶς ovr εἰπεῖν ovTE διανοηθῆναι TO μὴ ὃν αὐτὸ 


> 5 / > 8 0) > ΄ ῇ Ν aS Ν 
καθ᾽ αὐτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐστιν ἀδιανοητὸν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ 


ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον : 


ΘΈΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


is therefore 
unutter- 
able and 
inconcely- 
able. 


μι 3 » 5 ΄, 5, , XN 
EE. “Ap οὖν ἐψευσάμην ἄρτι λέγων τὴν μεγί- 20 But the 


/ lal 5 a / 
στὴν ἀπορίαν ἐρεῖν αὐτου πέρι» 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δέ; 


y 
EXOLED 5 


yay \ / 
ἔτι μείζω τινὰ λέγειν ἄλλην 


—= / 7 S id > 3 ΄σ » na ΄ 
ΞΕ. Τί δέ, ὦ θαυμάσιε; οὐκ ἐννοεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῖς 


10, μὴ ὃν δὲ] Se. ἐπειδὰν λέ- 
γωμεν. 

15. Συννοεῖς] “ Do you gather 
or collect” (as the sum of the 
preceding remarks). 

16. ὀρθῶ] Cf. ὀρθὸν supr. 
That it can be uttered appears 
from our using the expression. 
Cf. supr. 237 Ὁ: τὸ μηδαμῶς ὃν 
τολμῶμέν που φθέγγεσθαι. 

αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτό] Ι. 6, Not 


to speak of using it as ἃ predi- 
cate or subject. 

17. ἀδιανόητον x.7.r.] “ Un- 
thinkable, unspeakable, unut- 
terable, and indescribable.” 

20. “Ap οὖν} “ Was I then 
wrong in saying just now that 
I would tell you the greatest 
difficulty ?” I.e. A greater is 
behind. 

24. Ti δέ, ὦ θαυμάσιε] 1. 6, 


greatest 
paradox is 
still be- 
hind, 


As Not- 
Being 
cannot be 
asserted or 
receive at- 
tributes, so 
neither can 
Not-Being 
be denied. 
For in say- 
ing “it is 
unspeak- 
able,” &c., 
we attri- 
bute Being 
to it, and 
also unity: 
which this 
very word 
“it” im- 
plies. 


15 


88 


“ [2 Ν Ν » / 
λεχθεῖσιν ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα εἰς ἀπορίαν καθί- p. 238. 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


X \ x» od σ ε / > Ns ’ a 
σΤῆσι TO μὴ OV OUTMS WUTE, OTTOTAVY AUTO ETTLYXELPY) 


3 / » / eK e “ > “ > 
τις ἐλέγχειν, ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ περὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγ- 


κάζεσθαι λέγειν ; 


8. ©EAI. Πῶς φῇς; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον. 


EE. Οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν. 


5 \ \ A c / 3) ἘΌΝ Ε) ΄σ a 
ἐγὼ μὲν yap ὑποθέμενος ovTE ἑνὸς οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν 


Ν \ ΕΝ lo 7 357 Ν ων “ A > Ν 
ΤῸ μὴ ον δεῖν μετέχειν, APTL TE και νυν OUTWS ἐν αὑτὸ 


εἴρηκα" τὸ μὴ ὃν γὰρ φημί. 
10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 


ξυνιεῖς τοι ; 


ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἀφθεγ- 


΄ SN Ν 396: Ν yy yy 53 
KTOV τε αὑτὸ καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄλογον ἐφὴν εἰναι. 


ξυνέπει : 


ΘΕΑΙ. Zuveropuai πως. 


aE Ov la , 53 7 / 
414. Ouxovy To ye εἰναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος 


3 / 5 / » 
ἐναντία τοῖς προσθεν ἐλεγον ; 


“T am surprised that you do 
not see.” 

(24.) αὐτοῖς τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν | 
Either the dative is governed 
by ἐν in ἐννοεῖς, “Do you not 
see that this is implied even in 
what has been said?” cf. supr. 
223 ¢, ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις 
φάντασμα παρέχεται K.T.A. ; OF 
(Heind. Stallb.) αὐτοῖς τοῖς λε- 
χθεῖσιν -- καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεχθέντων. 
Cf. Xen. Cyrop. 8, 1, 37% τοῖς 
προειρημένοις δῆλον. 

I. καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα! “Νού- 
Being reduces its opponent, 
equally with its supporter, 
to the same straits,” i. e. 
can neither be asserted nor 
denied. In the spirit of the 
Parmenides, Plato here points 
out that Not-Being neither is 
nor is not. Compare also 
Theetetus, 183 a, b.. This ar- 


gument has an important bear- 
ing on the whole dialogue. 
The impossibility of criticising 
Not-Being when conceived ab- 
solutely leads to the necessity 
of modifying the conception of 
Negation. 

3. ἐκεῖνο] This pronoun is 
used for the sake of distinct- 
ness to prevent the further 
repetition of αὐτός with refer- 
ence to a different subject. 

8. ἄρτι] Supr. eis ἀπορίαν καθ- 
ἰστησι TO μὴ ὄν. 

νῦν οὕτως] Viz. in the pre- 
vious clause, τὸ μὴ ὃν δεῖν μετέ- 
χειν. 

9. ξυνιεῖς τοι ;| “ You surely 
understand ?” Cf. Thezet.155 ¢: 
ἕπει yap που, ὦ Θ. τί ESYb, 
whence Stallb. τι. Cf Men. 
76 d: ξυνὲς 6 τοι λέγω (Pind.) 

15. τό ye εἶναι] This refers, 





). 230. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ: 


SEAL. Paive. 


89 


BE. Ti δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ws ἑνὶ διελε- 


γόμην ; 
ΘΕΑ,ΑΙ. Nai. 


» / A Ν 
BE. Καὶ μὴν ἄλογόν τε λέγων καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ 5 


3» id Ν a ΝΣ U > / 
ἀφθεγκτον ws ye πρὸς ἐν Tov λόγον ἐποιούμην. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; 


EE. Φαμὲν δέ γε δεῖν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς τις λέζει, 


μήτε ὡς ev μήτε ὡς πολλὰ διορίζειν αὐτό, μηδὲ τὸ 


7 2 XN ae ΟῸΝ Ν 5) Ν \ / 
παράπαν αὐτο καλεῖν" ἐνὸς yap εἴδει καὶ κατὰ TAU- το 


ΩΝ Χ / , 
THY QV Τὴν 7 POG pHnatVv προσαγορεύοιτο. 


not, as Stallbaum says, to the 
preceding predicates generally, 
but to the word εἶναι in the 
previous sentence and ἔστιν 
supra. 

(16.) ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν] 
Supr. 238 a: Μὴ ὄντι δέ τι τῶν 
ὄντων dpa προσγίγνεσθαι φήσομεν 
δυνατὸν εἶναι; Καὶ πῶς ; 

2. τοῦτο προσάπτων] “In the 
act of applying Being to Not- 
Being, I addressed the latter 
as one,” Viz. in using the sin- 
gular verb ἔστιν : supr.c. ἑνὶ 
is governed by διελεγόμην, not, 
as Stallb. says, by προσάπτων 
understood. “ Did I not talk 
with it as one?” διαλέγεσθαι is 
substituted, with a touch of 
liveliness, for προσαγορεύειν. 

9. μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὸ κα- 
λεῖ}] Cf. Theet. 202 a: οὐδὲ 
TO αὐτὸ οὐδὲ TO ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ TO 
ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον οὐδὲ τοῦτο 
προσοιστέον, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοι- 
aura, 

10, ἑνὸς yap εἴδει] So Bod. 
and A, the rest vary between ἔν 
τε yap εἴδει (CTABC, corr. I. 
pr. EF), & re γὰρ εἴδει (ZEYH), 
and ἕν τε γὰρ ἤδη (i? pr. ΠῚ 


edd. vett.), whence Heindorf 
conjectured ἔν τι yap ἤδη, 
which Bekker has adopted. 
This deserves to be considered 
as possibly right: especially 
since the technical appearance 
of εἴδει, when this had once 
crept in, might give rise to 
further corruption. But ὡς 
seems to be required to com- 
plete the sentence as it would 
then stand: and the Bodleian 
reading is therefore here re- 
tained. It is unnecessary to 
add ev with the Zurich editors: 
the expression ἑνὸς εἴδει προσ- 
αγορεύεσθαι = “to be spoken of 
under a form of unity,” is 
analogous to ὀνόματι or λόγῳ 
προσαγορεύεσθα. Cf, Thest. 
148 d: ὥσπερ ταύτας---ἑνὶ εἴδει 
περιέλαβες, οὕτω 
στήμας ἑνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν. 
Ib. 147 ἃ: συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν, 
ὅτῳ προσαγορεύσομεν---τὰς δυνά- 
pecs. Compare also Phileb. 
64 6: εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα idea 
τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι. 

καὶ 


᾿ \ 2 
Kat Τὰς ετι- 


κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πρόύσ- 
ρησιν] Viz. in being called αὐτό. 
This note, like some of the 


But let the 
youthful 
might of 
Theztetus 


90 
ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασί γε. 


ΠΛΑΤΏΩΏΝΟΣ 


Ν \ » / M4 ͵ x / 
BE. Tov μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ ye ere tis ἂν λέγοι; Ὁ 


\ ΄ Ν a « ,ὔ “Δ “ἤ Ν 
καὶ γὰρ πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡττημένον GY εὕροι περὶ 


WV ΄- \ 7 57 
TOV τοῦ μὴ οντος ἐλεγχον. 


“ > y / 
ὥστε ἐν ἐμοιγε λέγοντι; 


΄ 3 \ a \ ᾽ 7 \ 
sKa0amep εἶπον, μὴ σκοπῶμεν THY ὀρθολογίαν περὶ 


Ν Ν yw 3 \ cal / 
TO μὴ OV, GAN εἰα On, viv ἐν σοὶ σκεψώμεθα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φής: 


ἸΞΗ ἢ "16 fol. 7x 3 Ν / “ / 4 “ 
oy lL NUW εὖ και YEVVALWS, ATE νεὸς WY, O TL 


aN ὃ 74 / 10 / 3 / 
μαλιστα OVVATAL DVVTELVAS TIELPAUNTL, [LITE OVOLAV 


preceding, would have been 
unnecessary, but for that of 
Stallbaum, who renders: “Si 
modo nomine aliquo designe- 
tur.” 

2. Tov ἐμὲ] Cf. Theet. 166 a, 
Phileb. 20 b. 

τίς ἂν λέγοι :] ‘Who would 
any longer take account of 
me?” This reading is sup- 
ported by nine MSS. (Bodl. 
ἐμέτετιτίς), and is preferable to 
that of the editions: τί τις ἂν 
λέγοι. But if the latter is ac- 
cepted, it means not “what 
is to be said of me?” but 
“why should any one speak 
of,” or “take account of, me?” 
Cf. supr. 224 a, λέγωμεν, and 
note. 

3. καὶ----πάλαι καὶ τανῦν] CF. 
Theet. 187 d: θράττει μέ πως 
νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε πολλάκις, ὥστε 
ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ 
πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι κ.τ.λ. 

4. ἐν ἔμοιγε λέγοντι---ἔν σοι] 
“Let us not study from my 
mouth the right mode of ex- 
pression about Not-Being, but 
let us make the experiment 
On πος (δ᾽ ἘΙΘΡΡ, ΤΠπ ἃ: 
Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπ᾽ ἐμοῦ λέγειν. 

5. καθάπερ εἶπον] Viz. supr.: 
Οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ 


Perhaps in λέγοντι 
there is a false echo from λέγοι. 

6. εἶα δὴ] So Zi, with the 
old editions. The expression 
is “tragic,” like Μήπω μέγ᾽ εἴπης, 
supr. 238 a; and does not ap- 
pear too strong when compared 
with what immediately follows. 
The reading of most MSS., ἔα 
δὴ, is less spirited, and the con- 
struction ἔα σκεψώμεθα 15 ques- 
tionable. 

8. “Idi—atrov] ‘ You have 
all the noble enthusiasm of 
youth. Come then, endeavour 
with all your might to make 
some right utterance about 
Not-Being, without attaching 
to it either substance or unity 
or plurality.” “I should be 
possessed with a strange eager- 
ness in making the attempt 
were I to try my hand when 
I see you in such extremity.” 

ἅτε νέος ὼν---πειράθητι] For 
a slightly different touch of 
ironical playfulness, (turning 
on the easiness and not, as 
here, on the difficulty of the 
question asked,) cf. Phileb. 65 Ὁ: 
βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν 
καὶ ἡδονὴν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον, 
ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ κ-τ.λ. 

9. μήτε οὐσίαν----αὐτοῦ]! Com- 


σκοπεῖν. 














ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


91 


0. 239. μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε πλῆθος ἀριθμοῦ προστιθεὶς τῷ μὴ 


ὄντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν φθέγξασθαί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ. 


OEAI. Πολλὴ μέντ᾽ ἄν με καὶ ἀτοπος ἔχοι προ- 


/ a / > \ Ay? ¢ a ΄ 
θυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ σε τοιαῦθ᾽ ὁρῶν πασχοντα 


> ‘\ > / 
QuTos ἐεπιίχειροιὴν. 


al \ \ \ / a 
BE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμε χαίρειν ἐῶμεν" 


oo δ᾽ » ὃ 7 ὃ Qn rm of) 5 / 
EWS QV τινι VVALEV Pov TOUT εντυγχάνωμεν, 


μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούρ- 


γως εἰς ἄπορον ὁ σοφιστὴς τόπον καταδέδυκεν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται. 


- BA / 5. Ν 37 
HE. Tovyapovy εἴ τινα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν φαν- 


Χ / e 5 7 io / a 
ταστικὴν TEXVNY, ῥᾳδίως εκ ταυτῆς τῆς χρείας τῶν 


/ >’ / c cr > ᾽ / > 
Aoyov ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν εἰς τουναντιον ἀπο- 


pare Parmen. 161 a: εἰ μέντοι 
μήτε TO ἕν μήτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἔσται, 


ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, 
οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν: εἰ δὲ 
τὸ ἕν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται 
μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων 
πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι. 

2. κατὰ τὸ ὀρθόν] Cf. Thezet. 
171 6: ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέο- 
μεν τὸ ὀρθόν. Several MSS. 
have κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. 

3. προθυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως] 
Lit. ‘‘ forwardness in attempt- 
ing:” gen. of respect. Cf. 
Phaedo 99 Ὁ: πολλὴ ἂν καὶ pa- 
κρὰ ῥᾳθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. 

8. παντὸς μᾶλλον καταδέδυκεν] 
“has with unparalleled cunning 
hid himself in a very trouble- 
some cover.” Cf. Rep. 4, 432 
c: δύσβατός γέ τις 6 τόπος φαί- 
νεται καὶ ἐπίσκιος" ἔστι γοῦν σκο- 
τεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερεύνητος. ἀλλὰ 
γὰρ ὅμως ἰτέον. 

11. Τοιγαροῦν ---- ἀποκρινεῖται | 
“Therefore when we call his 
art phantastic, by this method 
he will easily grapple with us 


N 


and disarm us, asking, when 
we call him an image-maker, 
what we mean by an image 
generally. We must consider, 
then, Thezetetus, what answer 
can be given to this question 
of our sinewy foe.” 

φανταστικὴν τέχνην] The main 
argument is here resumed from 
Ῥ. 236 ο. 

12. ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας] “Α- 
vailing himself of this line of 
argument.”  Viz.: that just 
indicated, by which appearance 
is shewn to rest on Not-Being: 
and Not-Being is proved to be 
inconceivable. ἐκ here ex- 
presses the means. 

13. ἀντιλαμβανόμενος----λόγους] 
“ He will grapple with us and 
retort our argument upon us, 
as it were binding our hands 
behind our backs.” The implied 
metaphor In ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι---- 
used frequently of an objector’s 
arguments—suggests the bolder 
image taken from the common 
expression ἀποστρέψαι τινὸς τὰς 


fo) 


try to in- 
vent some 
more ac- 
curate ex- 
pression. 
Tf this be 


impossible, 
the Sophist 
must be 
allowed to 
have hid 
himself in 
a very 


TO « dark 


tower.” 


For if ac- 
cused of 
“ phantas- 
tic” or of 
image- 


making, 
he will ask 
“What is 


an image?” 


And if we 


answer ‘fa 


reflection, 
mould, or 
picture,” 
he will 
make as if 
he were 
blind, and 
ask for a 
definition 
that does 
not need 
the help of 
visible 
examples. 


92 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 





/ A / “ 5 \ ᾽ Ν ΄σ' 
στρέψει τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιὸν αὐτὸν καλῶ- p. 239. ἢ 
> lal Ν / 5, ᾽’, 
μεν, ἀνερωτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἴδωλον λέγομεν. 
- 3 3 / / / “ , ‘ 
σκοπεῖν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρή; TL τις τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς 
Ν > / lal 
TO ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινεῖται. 
a “ / 7 > lal “ὕ 
5. OEAT. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι 
Ν / 7 “ 27 ἈΝ Ν / Ν x 
καὶ κατόπτροις ELOWAG, ETL καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ TA 


΄ Ν 53 “ re, Lf > 
TeTUT@pEVaA Kal τάλλα, OTH TOU τοιαῦτα εστιν 


ἕτερα; 
EE. Φανερός, ὦ Θεαΐτητε, εἶ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἑω- ὁ 
ιορακώς. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή ; ; 


’, 7 Ὁ / > 27 
ΞΕ. Δόξει σοι μύειν ἢ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν 
δ΄ 
ομματα. 
OEAT. Πως; 
\ / 7 > > 5 Ν 
15 EE. Τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὕτως αὐτῷ διδῷς, ἐὰν 
» / Δ / / ΄ ΄ 
εν κατοπτροῖς ἢ πλάσμασι λέγῃς τι, καταγελάσεται 
σου τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ws βλέποντι λέ αὐτῷ 
ν λόγων, ὅταν ὡς π γῃς Dy 


, 2, 7 57 v4 / 
προσποιούμενος OUTE KATOTTTPQH OUTE ὕδατα γίγνω- 


χεῖρας. Cf. Legg. τ,626 6: πάλιν 
τὸν λόγον ἀναστρέψωμεν. I. 6. 
“ Let us make the converse 
statement.” Theet. τοι c: 
πάντα petaotpepovta λόγον βα- 
σανίζειν. τοὺς λόγους is brought 
in παρὰ προσδοκίαν at the end 
of the sentence. Compare the 
metaphorical use of συμποδίζειν 
and παραποδίζειν. 

1. ὅταν εἰδωλοποιὸν] For the 
double sentence (εἰ----ὅταν), cf. 
Thezt. 199 Ὁ : érav—ére. So 
also immediately below, where 
ὅταν is resumed by ἐάν. 

3. τῷ νεανίᾳ] Not necessarily 
= homo protervus vel insolens 
(Ast.). “This fine fellow.” 
“The young man,” in a playful 
sense. Cf. Rep. 8,549 b: Kat 


ἔστι μὲν----τοιοῦτός τις 6 τιμοκρα- 
Phedr. 257 d: 
Τελοῖόν γ᾽, ὦ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα 
Eur. Ale. 698 : ἢ τοῦ 
καλοῦ σου προὔθανεν νεανίου. 

12. Δόξει σοι μύειν] “ He will 
seem as one who has his eyes 
shut.” δοκεῖν is used here to 
express an appearance volun- 
tarily assumed. For μύειν, ef. 
Thezt. 163 6 : ἢ καὶ μύσας. 

16. ἢ πλάσμασι] Referring to 
Ta γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα 
supra. 

For ἐὰν resuming ὅταν, which 
was doubted by Heindorf, ef. 
Rep. 4, 445 a, Ὁ; Ib. 7, 529 Ὁ, 
c—where there is similar va- 
riation in resuming with ἐάν. 


τικὸς νεανίας. 


λέγεις. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 93 


| ¥y Ἂν δ ΕΣ N 
p. 240. OKELY οὗτε TO παράπαν ὄψιν, TO 


/ / 
ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον. 


ΘΙΕΑΙ. ἸΠοῦον ; 


> / c lol 
ἠξίωσας ἑνὶ προσειπεῖν 


ον lol « A 
OwAov ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἕν 


τοιοῦτον ; 


1. τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν λόγων] In 
this, as in other respects, the 
Sophistic method is the carica- 
ture of that of Socrates. Cf. 
Theet. 146, Meno 79. There 
is a strong likeness between the 
Sophist here described and the 
πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθόφορος ἐν 
λόγοις ἐρόμενος, with whom The- 
ztetus is threatened by So- 
crates in Theet. 165 c-e: and 
there is certainly an analogy 
between the method now satir- 
ized and the ψιλοὶ λόγοι of 
which Theodorus speaks in the 
same dialogue (Theet. 165 a). 
Contrast, however, with this 
dialectical treatment of the 
difficulties attending the con- 
ception of Not-Being, the Hris- 
tic use of the same question 
by Euthydemus (Euthyd. 283 
e—285 a) and the retort of 
Socrates (ib. 286). The expres- 
sion in the text perhaps in- 
dicates a certain reaction from 
the idea of basing knowledge 
on purely abstract definitions. 
Cf. supr. 234 e, and compare 





the Euthydemus, especially 
p- 290. For the use of ἐκ 
(= What may be gathered 





τ \ , \ 
SE. To διὰ πάντων τούτων, ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν 
ὀνόματι, 
+ 
ον. 
\ « lal ἊΝ 3) 
μηδὲν ὑποχωρῶν, τὸν ἀνδρα. 
a 5 3, Ἂ a 3 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δῆτα, ὦ ξένε, εἴδωλον ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι 
’ Ν Ν 9 \ > / a 
πλὴν ye TO πρὸς τάληθινον ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον 


» 3 ΄“ ͵ὔ 
δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν Aoyav 


What is 
that one 
nature, he 
will ask, 
in right 
of which 
these 
various ob- 
jects have 
a common 
name ? 


φθεγξάμενος εἴ- 5 
λέγε οὖν καὶ ἀμύνου, 


Another 
like thing 
fashioned 


from argument), οἵ, Gore. 516 
d: οὐκ ap ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ 
Περικλῆς ἢν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. 
Οὐ σύ γε φής. Μὰ Δί᾽, οὐδέ γε 
σύ, ἐξ ὧν ὡμολόγεις. 

The word is 
here used in the more restricted 
sense of “abstract reasoning.” 


τῶν λόγων] 


4. τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων] 
“That which interpenetrates 
all these.” Cf. infr. 253 d: 
μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκά- 
στου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντῃ δια- 
τεταμένην. 

5. φθεγξάμενος----ν ὄν] The 
common term is not dis- 
tinguished from the common 
nature. 

7. tov ἄνδρα! The accusa- 
tive is probably governed, 
ὑπερβάτως, by ἀμύνου, accord- 
ing to the inverted style 
of these dialogues. Heindorf, 
who connects ὑποχωρῶν τὸν 
ἄνδρα, compares Phileb. 43 a: 
ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμε- 
νον τοῦτον βούλομαι. But the 
parallel is impaired by the 
participle ἐπιφερόμενον. 

9. πρὸς τἀληθινὸν a.] “ Fa- 
shioned to the resemblance of 
what is real.” 


04 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
- \ ΒΕ , τὰ 
after the EE. “Erepov δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ p. 240.1) 
real : 5 
Not likein τίνι TO τοιοῦτον εἶπτες 5 b 


being real? 


ΘΈΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν ye, ἀλλ᾽ ἐοικὸς μέν. 
EE. ἾΑρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὃν λέγων ; 
5 OEAI. Οὕτως. 
EE. Ti δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ap ἐναντίον ἀλη- 
θοῦς ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; 


> 4 pz oN ,ὔ / Ἂν Ἂς , yj 
HE. Οὐκ *ovtas* ov apa λέγεις τὸ ἐοικός, εἴπερ 


A likeness 
is not real, 
and yet it 

has a sort > ἢ Nees τ am aes 
of being. r10@uTo ye μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρεῖς. 


OEAI. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐστί ye μήν Tos. 


1. Ἕτερον---ἀληθινόν] “When 
you say ‘such another, do you 
mean another real thing?” Cf. 
Rep. 1, 333 a: Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέ- 
yels κοινωνήματα, ἤ τι ἄλλο ; 

3. ἐοικὸς μὲν] Subaud. ἀληθι- 
νὸν © ov. Cf. Rep. 5, 475 d: 
τούτους οὖν πάντας φιλοσόφους 
φήσομεν ; Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις. 

6. τὸ μὴ--- ἄρ᾽ ἐναντίον] This 
rests on the conception of Not- 
Being as the opposite of Being, 
which it is one chief object of 
this dialogue to modify. Hence 
probably the emphasis (apa, 
‘surely ?’) with which the ques- 
tion is put and answered (ri 
μήν ; ‘of course’). The phrase 
εἰκὼν ὄντως occurs again in 
Legg. 2, 668 d. 

9. οὐκ *dvras* ὃν] The cor- 
rection of the Zurich editors, 
which is both clearly intelli- 
gible and accounts for the va- 
riety of readings. Bekker, with 
most MSS., gives οὐκ dv; Bodl. 
ΔΙ, οὐκ ὄντων οὐκ ὃν : H, οὐκ 
ὄντως οὐκ ov: Proclus, οὐκ ὄντος 
οὐκ ὃν. The reading οἵ &, 
which Hermann has adopted, 


is too abrupt an inference from 
the preceding lines, and antici- 
pates the point which is made 
afterwards. αὐτὸ is unemphatic, 
and ye is to be taken closely 
with εἴπερ as modifying the 
whole clause. “ You mean 
then by an image what is not 
really existent, if, at least, you 
will speak of it as unreal.” 
Another way of correcting the 
passage is to read ὄντων οὐκ ὃν: 
“An image is of realities, but 
itself unreal.” αὐτὸ would then 
be emphatic. But the former 
mode is simpler, and therefore 
better. 

11. OE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔστι ye μήν πως] 
This arrangement of the speak- 
ers is due to Οὐ. Ε΄, Hermann. 
The other editions and MSS. 
give ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι ye μήν to the 
Stranger. To which Theztetus 
answers mas; but receives no 
direct reply. This awkward- 
ness is avoided by Hermann’s 
arrangement ; and Theztetus 
is led to admit in so many 
words ὅτε ἡ εἰκὼν ἔστιν οὐκ ὃν. 
Thus a point is covertly made 
towards the main argument. 





). 240. 


ο 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


EE. Οὔκουν ἀληθῶς γε, φῇς. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν: πλήν γ᾽ εἰκὼν ὄντως. 


μ- > ΕΝ SYA > ” > Ν "7 Δ 
ΞΕ, Οὐκ OV apa Οὐκ OVT@S EOTLY OVTMS ἢν 


/ / 
λέγομεν εἰκονα 5 


ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλέχθαι συμ- 


N\ \ XN oS n~ Wf Ν , 5) 
πλοκὴν τὸ μὴ OV τῷ OVTL, καὶ μάλα αἀτοπον. 


=E Ila A > yf < « lal a a Ν 
ey Je Ws yap οὐκ aTOTTOV 5 Ορᾷς yovv OTL Και 


a lal > / ε 
νῦν διὰ τῆς ἐπαλλάξεως ταύτης ὁ πολυκέφαλος 


c a ΕΝ « 
σοφιστὴς ἠνάγκακεν ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ ὃν οὐχ ἑκόντας 


ε la οἰ / 
ομολογεῖν εἶναι πως. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ‘Ope καὶ μάλα. 


HE. Τί δὲ δή; τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ τίνα ἀφορί- 


Cn a a ef ͵ 
σαντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συμφωνεῖν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα : 


ΘΕΑΙ. In καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι φοβούμενος οὕτω 


λέγεις ; 


For πως, cf. infr.: ὀμολογεῖν εἶναί 
πως, ἤ πως εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῆ ὄντα, 
εἶναί πως τὰ μὴ ὄντα. 

I. Οὔκουν] Stallbaum reads 
οὐκοῦν, with nine MSS., for the 
vulg. οὐκ ὃν, But the answer 
of Theztetus seems to require 
the negative οὔκουν. 

γε, bys] Bodl. ΔΗ, γ᾽ ἔφην: 
probably from ye μήν supra. 

3. οὐκ ὄν--- ὄντως] Οὐκ ὃν be- 
cause οὐκ ἀληθινὸν, οὐκ ὄντως 


because οὐκ ἀληθῶς, ὄντως be- 
cause εἰκὼν ὄντως. ‘ What we 


call an image is really, without 
having reality, an unreal thing.” 

5. τοιαύτην τινα---συμπλοκήν] 
Cf. Lege. 9, 863 b: τὸ τῆς ἀδι- 
κίας τε καὶ βλάβης διάφορον καὶ 
τὸ τῶν ἑκουσίων τε καὶ ἀκουσίων 
ὡς ἐν τούτοις διαπεποίκιλται. 

7. ὁρᾷς γοῦν ὅτι] The Bodl. 
MS. gives these words only in 
the margin, where Gaisford 


read ὁρᾷς οὖν, but the y, though 
nearly lost, may be traced, 
where the words were blotted 
while the ink was still wet, on 
the opposite leaf. The Stranger 
recals Thetetus from merely 
wondering at the result to ob- 
serve the point of the diffi- 
culty. 

8. διὰ τῆς ἐπαλλάξεως ταύτης] 
“Through this reciprocation of 
opposites.” 

πολυκέφαλον] I, 6. “ whom 
we have already slain in so 
many shapes.” There is of 
course an allusion to the hydra. 
Cf. Euthyd. 297 ὁ: τῆῇ---ὕδρᾳ, 
σοφιστρίᾳ οὔσῃ, καὶ διὰ τὴν σο- 
φίαν ἀνιείσῃ, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν τοῦ 
λόγου τις ἀποτέμοι, πολλὰς ἀντὶ 
τῆς μιᾶς. 

9. ἠνάγκακεν] So Bodl., with 
the nine MSS. mentioned by 
Bekker. Vulg. ἠνάγκασεν. 


It is really 
an unreal- 
ity, though 
not really 
anything. 


5 Thus the 


Sophist 
has forced 
us to ad- 
mit that 
that which 
is not, is. 


How then 
shall we 
15 consis- 


tently de- 
scribe his 
art ? 

Shall we 
say that 
he creates 
a false im- 
pression ; 
that a 
false im- 
pression 
attributes 
being to 
non-exist- 
ence, and 
vice versa ; 


and that a 
false propo- 
sition does 
the same ? 


96 ΠΛΆΤΩΝΟΣ 


oral “ Ν Ν 7 3.5600 , n 
ΞΕ. Ὅταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτὸν ἀπατᾷν p. 240.) 


as \ , 3 > \ > a 
φῶμεν Kal τὴν τέχνην εἰναί τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτοῦ, 
/ / - fe She \ \ e lal “4 
τότε πότερον Ψευδὴ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φη- 
ἘΧῸΝ A ᾽ , / aN / 3.5 a 

σομεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου τέχνης, ἢ TL TOT ἐροῦμεν 5 


5 SEAL. Τοῦτο: τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο εἴπαιμεν ; 


EE. Ψευδὴς δ᾽ αὖ δόξα ἔσται τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι 


δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς: 


ΘΈΑΙ. Ταναντία. 


EE. Λέγεις ἄρα τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδῆ 


10 δόξαν ; 


ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Αναγκη. 


EE. Πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξαζουσαν, ἤ 


5) Ν “ 2 
TOS εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς OVTA ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Eval πως τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ ye, εἴπερ ψεύ- 


/ 2... \ \ , 
15 O€TQAL ποτε TLS TL και KATA βραχυ. 


an icy \ 7 
BE. Ti δ᾽; ov καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι Ta πάντως 


ὄντα δοξάζεται ; 


OEAI. Nai. 


HE. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψεῦδος ; 


20 ΘΆΒΆΑΙ. Kai τοῦτο. 


Sr , 3 \ “ κ > A 
SE. Καὶ λόγος, οἶμαι, ψευδὴς οὕτω κατὰ ταῦτα 


las / i? y 7 \ 5) Ν 
ἱταῦτα] νομισθήσεται Ta τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ 


Ν VY 3 
Ta μη οντα εἰναι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως τοιοῦτος γένοιτο ; 


6. τἀναντία τοῖς οὖσι] These- 
tetus is again made to assert 
the view of Not-Being as the 
opposite of Being, which is pre- 
sently modified. See below, 258 
6: Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς εἴπῃ τις ὅτι TOU- 
ναντίον τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὴ ὃν ἀποφαι- 
νόμενοι τολμῶμεν λέγειν ὡς ἔστιν. 

14. δεῖ ye] Se. λέγειν αὐτὴν 
δοξάζειν. 


19, 20, 21. καὶ----ο-καὶ----καὶ] = 
SPANO. 

21. κατὰ ταὐτὰ [ταῦτα] | ταῦτα 
is omitted in nine MSS. 

24. ἄλλως] Most of the MSS. 
give ἄλλος ; which if received 
would require 6 τά τε ὄντα 
The reading of the 
editions is preferable, as in- 
volving a slighter change. 


λέγων. 





ΠῚ 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 97 


Lara XN ᾽ vad > \ a ‘ ‘ 

1241. 4H. Σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς: ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὁ σοφιστὴς He will 
> ΄ x» , \ a \ - 5 turn upon 
ov dye. ἢ τίς μηχανὴ συγχωρεῖν TWA TOV εὖ us and ask 
ἐφ (vA ΒΩ Ν + Ν yA how we 
φρονούντων, ὅταν ἀφθεγκτα Kai ἄρρητα καὶ ἄλογα dare, after 
\ 5 / ὃ λ ΄ 5 \ \ , what has 
Kal ἀδιανοητα προδιωμολογημένα ἢ TA TPO τούτων γώ said, 
τ , , 5 / ἃ wy 7 RY to utter 
ομολογηθέντα ; μανθάνομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, a *A€yet™ 5 5 the word 

a \ > , “ > , * Not- 

OEAI. Tas yap ov μανθάνομεν, ὅτι τἀναντία yy, 


/ / « lol lod a / a / 
φήσει λέγειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς viv dn, Ψψευδὴ τολμήσαντας 
’ a » ᾽ / \ / “ 
εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐστιν ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους ; τῷ 
\ NRA Nipao\ 7 c a / 
yap μὴ ὄντι TO ὃν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις ἀναγ- 
1 6 ὃ Ν / a δὴ a 9 
κάζεσθαι, διομολογησαμένους νῦν On που τοῦτο εἰναι το 
7 3 / 
πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον. 
> an / a Χ 
ΞΕ. ᾿Ορθῶς ἀπεμνημοόνευσας, ἀλλ᾽ wpa δὴ βου- 
’ , \ - lol a / Ἅ \ 
λευεσθαι τί χρὴ δρᾷν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι τὰς yap 
5 7 \ > 72 +N > Χ an 5 va 
ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διερευνῶμεν ἐν TH 


ports λέγει as the Bodleian 
reading. Unfortunately, this 


2. ἢ τίς μηχανὴ He adopts 
the tone of the Sophist. 











4. προδιωμολογημένα] “ When 
it has been previously granted 
(supr. 238 d) that the very 
terms of the admissions which 
have just been made are un- 
utterable,” &c. Cf. Tim. 78 a: 
προδιομολογησάμενοι. Bodl. ΔΗ, 
προσδιομολογημένα : whence (Ὁ. 
τ, Hermann gives πρὸς διωμο- 
λογημένα. But this reading is 
without point. 

Ta πρὸ τούτων ὁμολογηθέν- 
ta) Heindorf observes that 
Plato uses this periphrasis to 
avoid the repetition of μὴ ὄν. 
The words refer to the discus- 
sion (of the nature of a likeness) 
which precedes the mention of 
δόξα and λόγος, and which bris- 
tles with the forbidden expres- 
sions. P.240b. Compare Phileb. 
5O C: τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα. 

5. ἃ Ἐλέγει ] Bekker, judg- 
ing from Gaisford’s silence, re- 


MS. agrees with all the rest 
except Par. I’. in giving λέγεις. 
But the context leaves no room 
for doubting that λέγει is right. 
The Stranger has been speak- 
ing in the Sophist’s person. 
See φήσει in the next line, and 
compare the defence of Pro- 
tagoras in Theet. 166. For 
μανθάνομεν in the rst pers. plur., 
ef. supr. 223 e, and note, also 
Phileb. 51 d: ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα pavéa- 
νομεν, ἢ πῶς ; ΠΡ. πειρῶμαι μέν, 
ὦ Σώκρατες. 

8. κατὰ λόγου] ‘This use of 
κατὰ confirms the correction κατὰ 
δικαστήρια in Theeet. 201 ἃ. 

13. τί χρὴ δρᾷν] Cf. Legg. 
6,777 ¢: διαπορήσειε τί χρὴ 
δρᾷν περὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων. 

14. ἀντιλήψεις) “Handles for 
objection.” Lit. ‘ Occasions 
for laying hold,” as in wrest- 


ling. Cf. supr. 239 d. 


And this 
is only the 
beginning 
of diffi- 
culties. 


Must 

we, then, 
give up in 
despair ? 


98 MAATQNOZ 


τῶν ψΨευδουργῶν Kal γοήτων τέχνῃ τιθέντες. ὁρᾷς ὡς p. 241. |! 


εὔποροι καὶ πολλαί. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα. 


EE. Μικρὸν μέρος τοίνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, 


» “ [ὦ yy ἴω > 7 
5 OUOWV WS €7TOS εἰπεῖν απτεράντων. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αδύνατον γὰρ [ἄν], ὡς ἔοικεν, [εἴη] τὸν 


Χ « lod » lal -“ ,΄ 
σοφιστὴν ἐλεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως EXEL. 


EE. Τί οὖν ; ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκουν ἔγωγέ φημι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ 


ἊΝ ΟΝ 3 » , 5 7, 5 
τοσμικρὸν οἷοί T ἐπιλαβέσθαι πῃ τἀνδρὸς ἐσμεν. 


d Ky / ΄ la) 5 
HE. “E€es οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες 


, 37 Ν Ν Χ ’ 
ἀγαπήσεις, ἐὰν πῇ καὶ κατὰ βραχυ παρασπασώμεθα 


ο fa) f 
οὕτως ἰσχυροῦ λόγου: 


6. Ἀδύνατον γάρ] The Bod- 
leian has rap (sic), which sug- 
gests the possibility of a read- 
ing τἄρ᾽ ( -- τοι dpa). But yap is 
probably right. Cf Theeet. 
100 6: οὔτε yap ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ 
τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν 
Gorg. 454 4: 
Δῆλον yap αὖ ὅτι ov ταὐτόν 
And Aisch. Ag. 218 : 
ΠΠαυσανέμου yap θυσίας παρθενίου 
θ᾽ αἵματος ὀργῆ περιόργως ἐπιθυ- 
pew θέμις. Hur. Med. 573. 

[av]—[ety] ] The former word 
ism απ meine Cire ΤΠ 
by a later hand in =B, the 
latter in every MS. except =. 
Possibly Ἀδύνατον yap (or rap’), 
ὡς ἔοικ᾽, ἂν εἴη may be the true 
reading. 

11. καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες] Viz. in 
Saying εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρόν κ. τ. Δ. 

12. ἐάν πῃ καὶ] καὶ is pro- 
bably to be taken intensively 
with κατὰ βραχύ: cf. supr. 
240 6: εἴπερ Ψεύσεταί ποτέ Tis 
τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ. “If we 


ἡμῖν οὖσα δόξα. 


ἐστιν. 


should flinch a Little from the 
grasp of such a sturdy ar- 
gument.” The metaphor from 
wrestling is continued through- 
out. Cf. Phileb. 41 b: προσι- 
στώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς 
τοῦτον αὖ τὸν λόγον. 

παρασπασώμεθα] Lit. “ pull 
ourselves aside, draw aside ;” 
i. e. release ourselves from the 
contest. Cf. Soph. El. 732: 
ἔξω παρασπᾷ (sc. τοὺς ἵππους) 
κἀνακωχεύει. The middle voice 
is here directly reflexive, not 
as in Dem. Olynth. 1, 10: μὴ 
παρασπάσηταί TL τῶν ὅλων Tpay- 
μάτων. Compare the use of 
ἀποσπᾶσθαι in Xen. Anab. 1, 5. 
§ 2: πολὺ yap ἀπεσπᾶτο φεύγουσα. 
Those, however, who prefer 
the latter meaning here (read- 
ing ἐάν πή τι, with Badh. conj.), 
may compare Theet. 196 d: 
τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν; 
For the personification, cf. ib. 
148 ©: εἰ -- τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ 
ταχίστου ἡττήθης. 


Cc 














ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 


99 


OEAI. Πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἕξω ; 


A 3, a a 
EE. Tode τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παραιτοῦμαί σε. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


EE. Μή με οἷον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβης γίγνεσθαί 


τινα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή; 


XN a Ν / / ΄σ 
HE. Tov τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον 


" lal / "7 / Ν ’ 7 
ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό 


Δ ἊΝ ε "᾽, ΄ Ν SD 3 ΄ « > 
Uns μῇ OV ὡς EOTL KATH TL καὶ TO OV QU παλιν ως οὐκ 


x 
€OTL 77). 


ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχητέον ἐν Tots 


λόγοις. 


“ \ / ‘ / 
BE. Πῶς yap ov φαίνεται καί, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ 


a a / \ ’ 5 72 / 
τοῦτο, τυφλῷ; τούτων yap pyre ἐλεγχθέντων μήτε 


8. βιάζεσθαι---ὡς] “ΤῸ prove 
by main force that—.” The idea 
is not that of necessary demon- 
stration, but that of establishing 
something against appearances. 
Cf. infr. 246 b: νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ 
ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀλη- 
θινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι. Theet. 153 
6: ἀναγκάζω----ὡς, Symp. 202 ἃ: 
μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε, 6 μὴ καλόν 
ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι. Cf. Lege. 8, 
841 ἃ, where βιάζομαι is used of 
effecting something paradoxical 
and difficult in practice. 

II, ®aiverar —dédyous| The 
Bodl. MS., with A and pr. 
Π., om. διαμαχητέον, which 
C. F. Hermann accordingly 
rejects, with the remaining 
words, retaining only Φαίνεται. 
“ Languidum  additamentum 
totum cireumscripsi.” But it 
may be retorted that, especi- 
ally considering the formal 
style of the dialogue, φαίνεται 
alone in this place is abrupt 


oO 


ΕΓ 


and bare. Cf. also διαμαχόμενοι, 
infr. 256 ἃ. 

13. καὶ To be taken with 
τυφλῷ : the words τὸ λεγόμενον 
δὴ τοῦτο being thrust in between. 
Cf. supr. 218 a, καὶ, καθάπερ 
εἶπε Σωκράτης, πᾶσι x. ε. and 
note. See also Rep. 5, 465 4: 
Δῆλον, ἔφη, καὶ τυφλῷ. 

14. ἐλεγχθέντων] The Bodl., 
with ΔΙ ΒῚ, has μήτε λεχθέντων, 
which is weak ; ἐλεγχθέντων is 
right. ‘“ Unless this refutation 
and this admission is secured.” 
Τ 6. unless the saying of 
Parmenides is refuted and 
the existence of the non-ex- 
istent admitted. Cf. infr. 
242 Ὁ: τὸν ἔλεγχον τοῦτον καὶ 
τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. In Theet. 188 ἃ 
sqq. it is shewn to be 
impossible to think what is 
not, because all thought must 
have a real object. As Mr. 
Grote remarks, this and other 
negative arguments of the 


° 


-- 


5 


I 


ο 


Not if we 
may be 
allowed, 
in self- 
defence, to 
bring the 
revered 
words of 
Parme- 
nides to 
the test, 
and to force 
the con- 
clusion, 
that there 
is a sense 
in which 
Not-Being 
is, and 
Being is 
not. 


Otherwise 
an art of 
phantastie, 
and, in- 

* deed, all 
imitation, 
is incon- 
ceivable. 


100 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


« / ΄“ fel 7 Ν 

ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ ποτέ τις οἷός τε ἔσται περὶ p. 241. 
/ a Ἂ 5, ΄ Yj 

λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδώλων εἴτε © 


" / 72) 7 / > a Δ 
εἰκόνων ELTE μιμημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων, αὐτῶν, ἢ 


Ν Ν “ “ 7 la ’ὔ’ AN 
καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν TOV ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα εἰσι, μὴ κατα- 


λέγειν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα. 


\ A cal : 
EE. Διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ ν. 242. 


aN 53 \ > / > , e “ 
syeAaoTos εἰνᾶν τὰ ἐναντια ἀναγκαζόμενος αὐτῷ 


lol 7 a ΩΝ Ν 4 Ε] vA ΄σ / 
πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ TO παράπαν ἐατέον, εἰ τοῦτο τις 


3 im yx 
τοεἴργει δρᾷν OKVOS. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἡμᾶς τοῦτό γε μηδὲν μηδαμῇ εἴρξη. 


aE ap 7 / yf ,ὔ / 
jemi He PlTOV τοινυν ETL GE σμικρὸν Tl TAPQlT 1) 


TOMA. 


OEAI. Λέγε μόνον. 


3 a \ e Ν Ν 
ΞΕ. Εἰπὸν που νῦν δὴ λέγων ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ 


7 > » ΕΣ 7) 3 \ ἈΝ 7 \ ‘ 
ταῦτ᾽ ἔλεγχον GEL TE ἀπειρηκὼς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ 


N \ an 
και TQ νυν. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Εἶπες. 


Theetetus are not directly re- 
futed in the Sophistes. It is 
rather the negative mode of 
arguing generally which is cri- 
ticized. 

3. αὐτῶν, ἢ Kal περὶ τεχνῶν] 
“themselves, or the arts which 
relate to these.” αὐτῶν refers 
to all the preceding genitives. 
Cf. Rep. 3, 398 a: εἰ ἡμῖν ἀφί- 
κοιτο εἰς τὴν πόλιν αὐτός TE καὶ 
τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδεί- 
ξασθαι. The other rendering, 
according to which αὐτῶν refers 
to φαντασμάτων alone as the very 
subject-matter of the Sophist’s 
art, 15 not so good. 

8. Διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι] “* Ob- 
vious as this truth is, it com- 
pels us—” 


τῷ πατρικῷ Ady@| λόγος 15 
personified, as In τοῦ βασιλικοῦ 
λόγου supYr. 235 ¢, and πατρικὸς 
has the same force as in πατρι- 
kos ikos—“ The theory which 
is invested with the sacred- 
ness of our father’s autho- 
rity.” 

9. τὸ παράπαν ἐατέον] τὸ 
παράπαν is probably adver- 
bial, and the object of ἐατέον 
must be supplied, 6. g. τὸν 
Adyov— We must give up en- 
tirely.” 

11. τοῦτό ye] Se. ὥστε τὸ 
Cf. Polit. 268 ἃ: 
τοῦτο τοίνυν---ἡ μῖν ποιητέον, εἰ μὴ 
μέλλομεν ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει καταισχῦναι 
τὸν λόγον. Ν. Σ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν 
οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε δραστέον. 


, 25 
παραπαν εαν. 





i 
4 
! 


"242. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 101 


FE. Φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μή ποτε διὰ ταῦτά 
σοι μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαυ- 
τὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχειν τὸν 
λόγον ἐπιθησόμεθα, ἐάνπερ ἐλέγχωμεν. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς τοίνυν ἔμοιγε μηδαμῇ δόξων μηδὲν 5 


- Ἂ JEAN Χ A a \ \ » / 
πλημμελεῖν, av ἐπὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀπο- 


δειξιν ἴης, θαρρῶν ἴθι τούτου γε ἕνεκα. 


/ fd EN 
BE. Φέρε 67; τίνα ἀρχὴν tis ἂν ἄρξαιτο παρα- 


n 7 A \ \ ͵ > 3 a 
κινδυνευτικοῦ λογου; δοκῶ μὲν yap τήνδ᾽, ὦ παῖ, 


N « Ν » / - “ 3 / 
τὴν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαιοτατὴν ἡμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίαν δή ; 


EE. Ta δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψα- 


al / / \ 5) 
σθαι πρῶτον, μὴ πῃ τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὦμεν περὶ 


I. Φοβοῦμαι)7 “I tremble, 
then, to think of what I have 
said, lest you should pronounce 
me wild.” For ἀεί re δὴ inter- 
posed, cf. Rep. 2, 367 6: Kai 
ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, det μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν 
τοῦ Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου 
ἠγάμην, arap οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ 
γε ἥσθην : and for the meaning, 
compare supr. 242 Ὁ: καὶ γὰρ 
πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡττημένον ἂν 
εὕροι. Theset. 187 c. 

2. mapa πόδα] “ At the first 
step ; “ateach step ;” “at every 
other step.” The expression is 
used of persons in motion, as 
πὰρ ποδὶ, in Pindar, of persons 
at rest. Thus Soph. Phil. 838 : 
πολὺ παρὰ πόδα κράτος ἄρνυται. 
In the present passage παρὰ 
seems to have the additional 
meaning of alternation, as in 
παρ᾽ ἡμέραν. 

μεταβαλὼν] The tense cor- 
responds to that of δόξω, 
otherwise μεταβάλλων would 
have seemed more natural, 


especially with ἄνω καὶ κάτω. 
Cf. Pheed. 96 b: πολλάκις ἐμαυ- 
τὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον. But 
in the present case sonly one 
change “to and fro” is spoken 
of. 

3. σὴν yap δὴ χάριν] Com- 
pare the language of Socrates 
in the fifth book of the Re- 
public, before advancing his 
theory of communism, 450 e. 
See also ib. 473 6. Such ex- 
pressions of reluctance perhaps 
receive some light from the 
passages in the Epistles, if 
genuine, where it is said that 
the philosopher will not choose 
to fix his thought in writing. 

10. ἀναγκαιοτάτην--- τρέπεσθαι] 
For the inf. after ἀναγκαῖος, ef. 
Gorg. 449 b. 


μάλιστα ἀναγκαῖον. 


ἀναγκαιοτάτην = 
Cf. Phileb. 
63 Ὁ : οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τόδ᾽ 
αὐτὰς ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν. 
13. μή πῃ τεταραγμένοι] “ Lest 
we should have fallen into some 
confusion in regard to these 


With this 
view it 
will be 
necessary 


°to examine 


some ideas 
which are 
thought to 
be clear, 
but may 
prove to be 
confused. 


A. 
Parme- 
nides and 


102 


ταῦτα, ῥᾳδίως δ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὡς εὐκρινῶς P. 243.}} 


Μ 
EXOVTES. 


ITAATQNOS 


OEAI. Λέγε σαφέστερον ὃ λέγεις. 


EE. Ἑυὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχ- 


things, while glibly interchang- 
ing arguments, as if we were 
quite clear on the subject.” 

4. Evxddos| “Complacently ;” 
“with easy confidence ;” “ with 
good-humoured composure ;” 
“in an easy-tempered way.” Cf. 
Theet. 166 a: ὦ ῥᾳθυμότατε 
Σώκρατες. 

Εὐκόλως ---- διειλέχθαι]. Plato 
means what Aristotle expresses 
where he says that Dialectic 
had no place in early philo- 
sophy. οἱ yap πρότεροι διαλεκτι- 
κῆς οὐ μετεῖχον. Ar. Met. A. 
6. 987 b. Compare the lan- 
guage of an article in Fraser’s 
Magazine for February 1865 : 
“In older theology there seems 
(of course with brilliant ex- 
ceptions) to have prevailed this 
general defect —that endless 
controversies, and defences, 
and attacks, have gone round 
and round these sacred terms 
without even asking what they 
mean.” The question of Not- 
Being is relative to that of 
Being: hence, in order to 
solve the difficulties which 
have arisen, it 1s necessary to 
examine this, the most familiar 
and fundamental of all ideas. 
This is done historically, 
through a criticism of the re- 
sults of previous and contem- 
porary thought, involving the 
unwelcome task of putting the 
words of Parmenides to the 
torture. The conjecture of 
Badham, οὐχ ὅλως = ὅλως οὐ, 
for εὐκόλως, is not convincing. 


Cf. Lege. 11, 922 6 : Μαλθακοὶ 
ἔμοιγ᾽, ὦ Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν οἱ 
πάλαι νομοθετοῦντες γεγονέναι καὶ 
ἐπὶ σμικρὸν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων βλέ- 
ποντές τε καὶ διανοούμενοι vopo- 
θετεῖν. 

“J think that Parmenides, 
and all who have hitherto 
arisen to determine the ulti- 
mate number and nature of 
existences, have shewn in their 
conversation with us a sort of 
easy, good-humoured compo- 
sure.” 

“In what way ?” 

“They seem to me to treat 
us like children, and to tell us 
stories, each one for himself; 
one relating that there are 
Beings three, which sometimes 
maintain a desultory warfare, 
but sometimes they make peace 
again, and marry, and bring 
forth children and rear them ; 
another speaks of Two, as Moist 
and Dry, or Hot and Cold, 
which he brings together and 
consorts in marriage. But the 
tribe of the Eleatics from our 
quarter, beginning with Xeno- 
phanes, or even earlier, are the 
authors of a different tale, and 
fable that what we call ‘all 
things’ are One Being. Then 
certain Muses of Jonia, and 
others of later birth in Sicily, 
in taking up the parable have 
seen that it is safer to combine 
both histories and to say that 
Being is Many and also One, 
held together by hate and love. 
For, say the Muses of firmer 





ZOPISTHS. 


103 


Ν tan yy > / “ ΄- Ν 
η. 2452.θαι καὶ πᾶς ὄστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὠὡρμὴῆσε του TA 


y+ / / Ν “8 
ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα TE καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῃ; 


EE. Modov τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι 


Ν 53 Ch im c \ 7 Sof. a 
παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν μιν, O μεν ὡς τρία τὰ OVTA, πολεμεῖ 5 


tone, Being is ever sundered, 
ever combined: while those, 
who prefer a softer melody, 
relax the ‘ever, and say that 
All is sometimes one and 
friendly by Aphrodite’s power, 
but sometimes many and at 
enmity with itself by reason 
of a certain principle of strife.” 

1. ἐπὶ κρίσιν---τοῦ---διορίσα- 
σθαι) Hither “went forth to 
decide the question of deter- 
mining’’—where the pleonasm, 
though somewhat harsh, is not 
inconsistent with the style of 
these dialogues. For κρίσιν in 
this sense, cf. Euthyphr. 7d: 
ἐπί Twa κρίσιν ov δυνάμενοι ἀφι- 
κέσθαι----ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν 
ἐλθεῖν. Or, ‘ entered the arena 
to contend for the honour of 
determining.” Cf. Legg. 12, 
943 ἃ: εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀριστείων 
κρίσιν. Soph. Trach. 266: πρὸς 
τόξου kpiow. Philoct. τορο: 
ὅπου δικαίων κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν 
κρίσις. According to the latter 
rendering, Parmenides and the 
rest are supposed to bring 
their theories for judgment be- 
fore the reason of mankind. 

2. πόσα τε καὶ mota| Some 
interpreters suppose that πόσα 
refers to the earlier and ποῖα 
only to the later theories. (infr. 
245 e, sqq.) But although the 
former asked “ Is Being One or 
how many,’ and the latter, “ Is 
Being corporeal or ideal,” this 
distinction is probably not in- 


tended by these words. And the 
question of ποιότης is already 
involved in theories of hot and 
cold, moist and dry, harmony 
or discord, and the like. 

4. Μῦθόν twa — διηγεῖσθαι] 
Compare Bacon, Noy. Org. I. 
Ax. 44: “Quot philosophiz 
receptz aut inventz sunt, tot 
fabulas productas et actas cen- 
semus, que mundos efficerent 
fictitios et scenicos.” Ib. Ax. 
62: “Atque hujusmodi theatri 
fabulee habent etiam illud quod 
in theatro poetarum usu venit ; 
ut narrationes fictee ad scenam 
narrationibus ex historia veris 
concinniores sint et elegan- 
tiores, et quales quis magis 
vellet.” Ar. Met. I. το, 993 a: 
ψελλιζομένῃ yap ἔοικεν ἡ πρώτη 
φιλοσοφία περὶ πάντων. 

5. παισὶν ὡς οὖσν] The 
position of παισὶν is emphatic. 
Cf. Legg. 1, 645 Ὁ: 
των ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν. Rep. 8,545 
€: ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς. Infr. 
254 6: οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων 


Ν , 
περὶ Gavpa- 


αὐτῶν. 

ὁ μὲν ὡς tpia—exdidwou | 
The few remaining fragments 
of the earliest philosophy do 
not enable us to say what 
thinkers are thus briefly indi- 
cated : probably some belong- 
ing to the earlier Ionic school. 
The metaphorical language 
seems to point to a_pe- 
riod when philosophy still re- 
tained a considerable tinge of 


others who 
have 
sought to 
define the 
number 
and nature 
of exist- 
ence, have 
not been 
careful to 


explain 
their 
meaning, 
but after 
throwing 
out that 
Being is 
three or 
two or one, 
or one and 
many, hot 
and cold, 
at peace 
or war, or 
that it is 
first united 


104 


\ ᾽ / Tr, ’ ΄ yA \ \ Ν / 
de ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἄττα my, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ φίλα p. 242, 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


/ / / \ ΄- 
γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἃ 


> / / / Wigs > 4 « Ν Ν 
ἐκγόνων παρέχεται. Ovo δὲ ἕτερος εἰπῶν, ὑγρὸν καὶ 


Ν » Ν Ν / / + ay") Ν 
ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ 


δἐκδίδωσι. τὸ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ᾿Ελεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ 


— ‘ Ν 5) / > ath, « 
ἐξενοφανους τε καὶ ert πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς 


CAIN 37 a ἤ / “ " 
EVOS OVTOS τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται 


nr / 
τοῖς μύθοις. 


cosmogonical mythology. Thus 
Pherecydes might be said to 
have asserted three principles, 
Zeus, Time, and Earth, as the 
basis of his cosmogony. The 
dualists here mentioned have 
been supposed to include Arche- 
laus, who, according to Diog. 
Laert. 11. τό, 17, ἔλεγε δύο 
αἰτίας εἶναι γενέσεως, θερμὸν καὶ 
ψυχρόν, and who, in describing 
the production of the animals, 
says that they sprang from 
the increasing warmth in the 
lower parts of the Earth, ὅπου 
τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμίσγετο. 
But, as Steinhart observes, (So- 
phist. note 22,) the dualism of 
heat and cold is a theory of the 
Universe probably older than 
Parmenides, who speaks of this 
as the philosophy of opinion. 
There is of course no allusion 
to Parmenides in these words. 
He is included in the ᾿Ελεατικὸν 
ἔθνος mentioned immediately 
afterwards. 

2. γάμους----παρέχεται] “ Are 
found to marry,” We. 

5. τὸ δὲ map ἡμῶν] 1. 6. ἐξ 
᾿Ἐλέας. Heindorf and Stall- 
baum prefer ἡμῖν, which appears 
in C. H. 3, a. Ὁ. c., and in the 
quotations of Eusebius and 
Theodoret. But ἡμῶν is pre- 


᾿Ιάδες δὲ καὶ Σικελαί τινες ὕστερον 


ferable both as the reading of 
the best MSS. and as the less 
obvious reading: “The school 
that came forth from us.” 

ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι 
πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον] ‘ From Xe- 
nophanes downwards, and even 
before Xenophanes.” This is 
conceived in the same spirit as 
the attempt in the Theztetus 
to refer the Heraclitean dogma 
to an unknown antiquity. 
Theet. 179 6: περὶ τούτων τῶν 
ἩΗρακλειτείων, ἢ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις 
Ὃμηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων. 
Steinhart imagines a reference 
tothe Pseudo-Orphic Fragment, 
Ζεὺς ἀρχὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ᾽ ἐκ 
πάντα τελεῖται, which is elsewhere 
quoted by Plato, Legg. 4, 715 e. 

7. ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων] 
The participle, although agree- 
ing in sense with πάντων, follows 
the number of the preceding 
word. Cf. Protag. 329 d: ἑνὸς 
ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς. 

8. τοῖς μύθοις] “ In their tale 
of the Universe ;” referring to 
μῦθόν τινα supr. Cf. Theet. 
156: οὗτος ὁ μῦθος--- viz. the 
theory of Sensation. 

"Iddes—Movoa] The word 
ὕστερον applies to the Σικελαί as 
compared with the ᾿Ιάδες μοῦσαι. 
Empedocles was later than 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


105 


“a / “ / > ’ὔ 
. 242. Μοῦσαι ξυννενοήκασιν ὅτι συμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέστατον 


» / \ / « \ oN / Ge 3 
e ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ὃν πολλὰ TE καὶ EV ἐστιν, 
Ya \ 7 / \ > 
ἐχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ φιλίᾳ συνέχεται’ διαφερόμενον yap ἀεὶ 


/ \ e / lal M oan © 
ξυμφέρεται, φασὶν αι συντονώτεραι TMV ουσῶν" αἱ 


Heraclitus, and his speculation 
is viewed by Plato as that of 
Heraclitus in aless exact form. 
See the speech of Eryximachus 
in the Symposium, who treats 
of Love in the spirit of Empe- 
docles (187 a,b): τὸ ἕν φησιν 
(Ἡράκλειτος) διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ 
αὑτῷ ξυμφέρεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἁρμονίαν 
τόξου τε καὶ λύρας. ἔστι δὲ πολλὴ 
ἀλογία ἁρμονίαν φάναι διαφέρε- 
σθαι ἢ ἐκ διαφερομένων ἔτι εἶναι. 
ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τόδε ἐβούλετο λέγειν, 
ὅτι ἐκ διαφερομένων πρότερον τοῦ 
ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, ἔπειτα ὕστερον 
ὁμολογησάντων γέγονεν ὑπὸ τῆς 
μουσικῆς τέχνης. The words 
πολλὴ ἀλογία in this extract are 
a good comment on ἀσφαλέστα- 
τον in the text. 

1. ξυνενόησαν͵] I. 6. In re- 
flecting on both statements 


perceived. Cf. Soph. Cid. Col. 
452: τοῦτ᾽ ey@da, τῆσδέ τε 


μαντεῖ᾽ ἀκούων ξυννοῶν τε τάἀξ 
ἐμοῦ παλαίφαθ' ἁμοὶ Φοῖβος ἤνυ- 
σέν ποτε. 

ἀσφαλέστατον] “ The most 
irrefragable position.” Cf. supr. 
231 a: τὸν ἀσφαλῆ. Protag. 
351 d, Polit. 262 b. 

3. Stadepspevov—ouph.) Se. 
τὸ ὃν ἢ τὸ πᾶν. Cf. Symp. 1. ce. 

4. συντονώτεραι ---- μαλακώτε- 
pa] These are musical terms, 
as Boeckh has shewn in his 
contribution to Heindorf’s note 
upon this passage: ‘“ Desumpta 
vocabula συντ. et par. a colore 
Ss. χρόᾳ in musicis generibus. 
Etenim ex sex illis coloribus 
unus in enharmonico, duo in 


diatonico, tres in chromatico 
genere sunt. In chromate est 
color ἡμιόλιος, color tovaios et 
μαλακὸς, ς. ἡμιόλιον χρῶμα, τονι- 
aiov ς. σύντονον χρῶμα et χρῶμα 
μαλακόν. In diatono duo colores 
sunt διάτονον σύντονον et διάτονον 
μαλακόν. Illa σύντονα sunt in- 
tentiora, μαλακὰ molliora. Eu- 
clid. Introd, Harmon. p. ro, rr. 
Aristox. Harm. Elem. I. p. 24 
sqq. Gaudent. Harmon. Intr. 
p-17: “ Notandum autem illud 
ἐχάλασαν, quod est in musicis 
in μαλακῇ χρόᾳ." Eucel. p. 11 : 
μαλακὸν δὲ Tov ἐλαχίστου πυκνοῦ 
ὡσαύτως καὶ χρῶμα, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐν 
αὐτῷ πυκνὸν χρῶμα ἀνίεται τε καὶ 
ἐκλύεται.᾽ Cf. also Rep. 3, 398 
€: Τίνες οὖν padaxal—rov ap- 
μονιῶν. "laoti, 7 δὲ ὃς, Καὶ 
λυδιστί, αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦν- 
ται, where the “soft Lydian 
airs” are spoken of with a 
metaphorical meaning. The 
point here is that the union 
of one and many was more 
thorough in Heraclitus than in 
Empedocles. A similar appli- 
cation of these musical ex- 
pressions is made by Aristotle, 


Polit. IV. 3, in drawing a ~ 


parallel between music and 
government, in both of which 
he says the ordinary kinds are 
divergences from the one or 
two best: παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν 
τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας, τὰς 
δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρ- 
χικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ 
δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δ᾽ ἀνειμένας 
καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικάς, 


by love 
and then 
severed by 
hate, have 
gone each 
of them 
his own 
way. 


106 MAATOQNO® 


\ / Ν \ > ΄ , o ~ » / 
δὲ μαλακώτεραι TO μὲν ἀεὶ ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχαλα- 
᾽ / \ \ ἡ 5 ‘ x a) Ν 
σαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἕν εἶναί φασι TO πᾶν καὶ 
͵ Cts / \ \ Ν / 
φίλον ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αφροδίτης, τοτὲ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πολέμιον 
Ya « tal \ Aout ca) \ / Ν 
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ διὰ νεῖκος τι. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἰ μὲν 
> “ * \ / 7 / Ν 
5 ἀληθῶς τις ἢ μὴ τούτων εἴρηκε, χάλεπον, καὶ πλημ- 
\ eA / - Ν “-“ > / 
μελες οὕτω μεγάλα κλεινοῖς καὶ παλαιοῖς ἀνδράσιν 
’ ay ς > “ \ / ce Te 
ἐπιτιμᾷν" ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήνασθαι. 
ἊΝ cal 
OEAI. To ποῖον ; 
— σ“ / an a al td / 
EE. Ὅτι λίαν τῶν πολλῶν ἡμῶν ὑπεριδόντες 
> 7 a 5 \ \ / 3/23) > 
το ὠλιγώρησαν" οὐδὲν yap φροντίσαντες εἴτ᾽ ἐπακολου- 
an > ΄- ,ὔ / / / 
θοῦμεν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν εἴτε ἀπολειπόμεθα, περαίνουσι 
\ 7 3 ἴω aS 
TO σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις ; 


For when EE. Ὅταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγξηται λέγων ws ἐστιν 
they say N ΄, ἮΝ , ον δι , . \ 
“Many,” 15 γέγονεν ἢ γίγνεται πολλὰ ἢ ἕν ἢ δύο, Kat θερμὸν 
One,” 5 A , pw Al ὃ 

: Two," αὖ ψυχρῷ συγκεραννύμενον, ἀλλοθὶ πῃ διακρίσεις 


5. χαλεπὸν] Se. εἰπεῖν, which 
is absorbed in what follows. 

καὶ πλημμελὲς — ἐπιτιμᾷν | 
Compare the structure οὗ 
Theet. 146 b: ᾧ ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς 
ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε 
θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ 
ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. 

6. οὕτω μεγάλα] Cogn. Acc. 
Se. τὸ μὴ ἀληθῶς ταῦτα εἰρηκέναι. 
“To make such grave accu- 
sationus against men of ancient 
renown.” Heind. well compares 
Legg. 10, 886 ὁ: εἰ μὲν eis ἀλ- 
ho τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, οὐ 
ῥάδιον ἐπιτιμᾷν παλαιοῖς οὖσιν. 

4. ἐκεῖνο], “ That former 
thing,” viz. what was implied 
IN εὐκόλως K.T.A. 

g. ὑπεριδόντες] “ Looking over 
our heads.” This was the error 
which Dialectic, or the Socratic 
dialogue, was calculated to re- 


medy. Cf. Phedr. 275 d, e. 

14. Ὅταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγξηται 
“When one of them utters his 
saying, ‘Many, one, two, are, 
have been born, are created,’ 
or speaks of heat interpenetrat- 
ing with cold, while he else- 
where postulates separations 
and combinations, I pray you, 
Theztetus, do you at all then 
understand their meaning?” 
Note the redundant participle, 
as in ἔφη λέγων. 

ὡς — trotibeis] There is 
an emphasis on each of the 
words ἔστιν, γέγονε, γίγνεται, 
πολλά, ἕν, δύο, θερμόν, ψυχρῷ, 
διακρίσεις, συγκρίσεις. 

16. ἄλλοθί wy] Hither, “in 
some other part of his treatise,” 
or “as taking place in some 
other region.” For θερμ. Ψ. 
ovyk., ef. Archelaus ap. Hippol. 


Pp» 242.90. 


Ρ. 243 








fod) 


ΣΟΦΙΣΊΤΗΣ. 


107 


Ν / « / 3 / « / 
243. καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτιθείς, τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἑκα- 


͵ \ a a “ / 41. τὰ 
OTOTE σὺ TL 7 pos θεῶν ξυνιεῖς oO TL λέγουσιν ; έγω 


\ Δ Ὁ ν᾿ ἢ 7, τ ἢ \ a ’ 
μὲν yap OTE μὲν ἢν νεώτερος, τοῦτο τε TO νῦν ἀπο- 


7 « / 7 \ A wy 3 ἴω 7 
ρούμενον ὅποτε τις εἴποι, TO μὴ OV, ἀκριβῶς ῳ μὴν 


ξυνιέναι" 
ἀπορίας. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρῶ. 


A \ Ο ΤῊΣ vo? » \ ᾽ a / a 
νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ἵν ἐσμέν αὐτοῦ πέρι τῆς 5 


ἘΠῚ Ta / "} » Ὁ Ν Ni δῇ 
bey He aKa TOLVVY LOWS Οὐχ TTOV KATH TO OV 


> N a , > , 3 cal “ Ν \ 
ταῦτον τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν TH ψυχῇ περὶ μεν 


a > a \ / « {/ SN 
τοῦτο εὐπορεῖν φαμεν καὶ μανθάνειν ὁπόταν τις αὐτὸ 


φθέγξηται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὔ, πρὸς ἀμφότερα 


« / 3, 
ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. 


OEAI. Ἴσως. 


a 4 \ A 
HE. Kai περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τῶν προειρημένων 


(4S Stes NS a Siu ἘΚ 
new ταυτὸν τοῦτο εἰρησθω. 


OEAI. Ilavv γε. 


a \ [4 Ξ / \ a 
ΚΞ Εἰ. Τῶν μὲν τοίνυν πολλῶν πέρι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο 


σκεψόμεθ᾽, ἂν δόξῃ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ 


Ε] la ’ὔ cal / 
ἀρχήγου TPMTOV VUY σκεπτεον. 


Ref. Her. I. 9: θερμαινομένης 
τῆς γῆς πρῶτων ἐν TO κάτω μέρει, 
ὅπου τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν 
ἐμίσγετο. 

I. τούτων] Neut. 

3. τοῦτό fret] τε is with- 
out correlative: whence Herm. 
conj. ye, which has no meaning, 
Par. H. cov: τότε, which cannot 
be right, but suggests the con]. 
τότε ye. But, as the Bodleian MS. 
omits τό, it seems most likely 
that τὸ was first corrupted into 
τε, and then again inserted. 
Hence τε is to be omitted. 
Otherwise we must suppose 
that the apodosis is absorbed 
in the words τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως 


Ῥ 


οὐχ ἧττον κατὰ τὸ ὄν κιτιλ. For 
which, οἵ. Pheedr. 265 d: εἰς μίαν 
τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν K.T.X. 

5. ἵνα---τῆς ἀπορίας] “ What a 
point we have reached in the 
perplexity about Not-Being.” 
The article is used because the 
difficulty attaching to the no- 
tion of μὴ ὃν is by this time 
familiar. 

14. τῶν ἄλλων τῶν προειρημέ- 
νων] γεγονός, γένεσις, πολλά, ἕν, 
δύο, θερμόν, ψυχρόν, διακρίσεις, 
συγκρίσεις. 

18. τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ] 
“The mightiest and chiefest.” 
Being is spoken of with pro- 
found reverence, as in Rep. 6, 


le) 
22 


mixture of 
heat and 
cold,” 
* are, 
‘have been 
produced,” 
“come into 
being,” or 
when they 
speak of 
the com- 
position 
and divi- 
sion of 
elements, 
do we 
understand 
them ? 


, 


10 Not-Being 


may have 
once ap- 
peared an 
intelligible 
phrase, but 
see where 
it has 
brought 

us now. 


15 Let us 


therefore 
turn and 
examine 
the most 
cardinal of 
all ideas, 
that of 
Being, 


in the 

light of 
existing 
theories. 


We first 


interrogate 


the philo- 
sophers 
who hold 


that ALL is 


resolvable 
into two 
ultimate 
existences. 


When they 


say that 
these two 
exist, what 
do they 
mean ? 

Do they 
postulate 
existence 
as a third 
element, 
or identify 


it with one 


108 


BEAL. Tivos δὴ λέγεις ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι TO ὃν φὴς p. 243 


ΠΛΆΤΩΝΟΣ 


a a / 7 > ΄ , 2 a 
πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι, τί ποθ᾽ οἱ λέγοντες αὑτὸ 


δηλοῦν ἡγοῦνται ; 


EE. Κατὰ πόδα γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες. λέγω 


ἊΝ \ / “ rn Ἁ ΄ ΄ ΄“ - 
syap δὴ ταύτῃ δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον ἡμᾶς, οἷον 


> a > / © , « / 
αὐτῶν παρόντων ἀναπυνθανομένους we’ Φέρε, ὅπο- 


‘\ \ \ " ΄ ΄ \ Pees 
σοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἤ τινε δύο τοιούτω τὰ πᾶντ 


53 / al - / 
εἰναί φατε, τί ποτε ἄρα τοῦτ᾽ ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν φθέγγεσθε, 


Ψ y Ν ei, 53 / Ν 5“ 
λέγοντες ἄμφω καὶ εκατερον εἰναι; TL TO εἰναι 


a ε ΄ὔ ε a , / ‘\ Ν 
ιοτοῦτο ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν ; πότερον τρίτον παρα TA 


7, Vea nN 7 \ m= ᾽ \ \ , “7 > 
Ovo ἐκεῖνα, Kal τρία TO πᾶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ Ovo ἔτι καθ 


« Cal a 5 / a ἴω a 
ὑμᾶς τιθῶμεν 3 οὐ yap που τοῖν ye δυοῖν καλοῦντες 


/ Ἂ > ΄ - / Φ / a ‘ 
θάτερον ov ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἶναι λέγετε: σχεδὸν 


Χ Ἃ > o > > , 5 
γὰρ ἂν ἀμφοτέρως ἕν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δύο εἴτην. 


15 OEAT. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις. 


509 b, ο: οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐ- 
σίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέ- 
χοντος. 

1. Tivos δὴ λέγεις] “ Sie sem- 
per in responsione negligitur 
preegressa prepositio.” Heind. 
—Cf. Rep. 7, 531 d: τοῦ mpoo- 
μίου----ἢ Tivos λέγεις ; 

. 4. Κατὰ πόδα (se. ἑπόμενος) | 
“At the heels.” “ Following 
my footsteps closely.” (Cf. 
Soph. Cid. Col. 197: ἐν---βάσει 
βάσιν ἅρμοσαι.) The plural κατὰ 
πόδας 1s the more usual form ; 
but the sing. occurs again 
Legg. 11, 918 a: κιβδήλοις δ᾽ 
ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἕπεται κατὰ πόδα 
καπηλείας ἐπιτηδεύματα. 

6. αὐτῶ] Probably em- 
phatic, ‘as if the men them- 
ee were personally present 

1ere.” 


ΤΙ. μὴ δύο ἔτι καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς] “And 
no longer two according to 
your theory.” I. 6. either, 
“ must we give up your theory 
and make three principles in- 
stead of two?’ or, “must we 
understand you to assert three 
principles instead of two?” 
The former way of taking the 
words is more pointed, but 
the latter is in better keeping 
with the context, 

14. ἀμφοτέρως] “Both ways.” 
1.6. either, “as Being is identi- 
fied with one only, and as the 
one term Being is predicated of 
both alike” (the latter part of 
this argument loses force when 
the nature of predication is 
clearly understood), or, perhaps 
better, ἀμφοτέρως = “ Whichever 
of the two is identified with 
Being.” 


e 





, 243. 


244. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


EE. ᾿Αλλ' ἄρα τὰ ἄμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν ov ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως. 


> 5 ; f 
EE. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ὦ φίλοι, φήσομεν, κἂν οὕτω τὰ δύο 


/ Ἂ / o 
λέγοιτο av σαφέστατα ἕν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθότατα εἴρηκας. 5 

a 3 \ 7 « a > , ε ᾿Ξ aes 

Bi. “Exedy τοίνυν ἡμεῖς ἡπορήκαμεν, ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ 
e tal 3 / « a , / / 
ἡμῖν ἐμφανίζετε ἱκανῶς, TL ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν 


Ἃ “- € ς a fal 
ὁπόταν ov φθέγγησθε. δῆλον yap ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα 


109 


of the two, 
which is 
tanta- 
mount to 
resolving 
all into 
one? or 
do they 
give to 
both the 
one name 
of Being, 
so making 
both one ? 


’ 7 Ἔ lod \ \ ΄- \ wily a 
πάλαι γιγνώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μεν φομεθα, νῦν 


> > / / 5 a ~ 3 Sp 
δ᾽ ἡπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον TOUT αὐτὸ 10 


ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα 


3 . an \ \ ,ὔ , a » / 
TAP ὑμῶν. TO δὲ TOUVUTOV γιγνῆται πᾶν τουνᾶντιον. 


“ Χ ? / GQ © a ΄ , 
Tatra dn λέγοντές τε καὶ ἀξιοῦντες παρὰ τε τουτων 


XN Χ a yy “ ω ΕΝ / NY 
καὶ mapa τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι πλεῖον evos λέγουσι TO 


κω 53 na 3 “ ’ 
πᾶν εἰναι, μῶν, ὦ παῖ, τι πλημμελήησομεν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. “Hora γε. 


μεσταὶ / ,ὔ A lal A Ν a , 9 3: 5 
GE. Ti δέ; παρὰ τῶν ev τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων ap οὐ 


The same 
arguments 
15 will apply 
to all who 
hold a plu- 
rality of 
natures. 


, ᾽ , , , Ny 
TTEVOTEOY ELS δυναμιν Tl ΤΟΤΕ λέγουσι TO OV 5 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς yap οὔ; 


BE. Τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθωσαν. 


τ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄρα] Stallb.and Herm. 
give ἄρα. Cf. Rep. 2, 374 Ὁ. 
“But perhaps you mean to 
give the name to both toge- 
ther?” The Bodl. MS. gives 
dpa invariably, and is there- 
fore of no use in deciding be- 
tween dpa and dpa. 

6. αὐτὰ] This is the same 
vague use of the neuter of αὐτὸς 
which is common in Thucydides. 
Cf. ταῦτα infr. 1. 8. 

9. φόμεθα] Se. 
Cf. supr. 233 b: εἰ μήτε ἀντέ- 
Neyo ὀρθῶς μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαί- 
ΨΟΡΤΟ. 


γιγνώσκειν. 


Then Jet 
, those who 


a 
Ep TOU 20 assert One 


11. δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μέν] 
μὲν belongs to the two preced- 
ing words taken as one. Cf. 
Theet. 151 Ὁ: μὴ δόξωσί πως. 

12. τὸ δέ] “Whereas really.” 
Cf. Theet. 157 Ὁ: τὸ δ᾽ οὐ δεῖ, 
and note. 

18. εἰς δύναμιν] 1.6. “So far 
as is possible when they are not 
present.” Cf. Thezt.184 a. 

20. Tdde — ἀποκρινέσθωσαν | 
“Let them give an answer 
to the following question.” Cf. 
Legg. 10, 901 ὁ: Nov δὴ δύ᾽ 
ὄντες τρίσιν ἡμῖν οὖσιν ἀποκρι- 
νάσθωσαν. 


Being tell 
us what 
they mean. 


Are Being 
and Unity 
two names 
for the 
same 
thing ? 

Tt will 
puzzle 
them to 
answer 
this, or in- 
deed any 
question. 


For how 
can there 
be two 
names, or 
a name at 
all, when 
there is 
nothing 
beside the 
One Being? 
Unless the 


1το 


110 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


φατε μονον εἰναι ; 


γάρ: 
ΘΕΑ,ΑΙ. Ναί 


Φαμὲν γάρ, φήσουσιν. 


mE. Τί δέ; ὃν καλεῖτέ τι; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 


σι 


ΞῊ I] / “ vA aw ‘al > a ᾽ὔ ᾿ 
bey Lid OTEPOV OTTEP EV, ETL TO αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι ο 


κ᾿ 3 / “Δ lad 
δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς: 


ΘΕΑΙ. Tis οὖν αὐτοῖς ἡ μετὰ τοῦτ᾽, ὦ ἕξένε, 


> / 
αποκρισις 5 


"»-- a 3 / “ lal 7 \ 
ΞΕ. Δῆλον, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταύτην THY 


« 50 « 6 γι \ ον las > θ / ‘ Ν 
ὑποῦεσιν UTTO εμένῳ 7 pos TO νυν EPWTNUEV, Και 7 pos 


y \ ¢ a » ΄ en > / 
ἄλλο δὲ ὁτιοῦν, οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον ἀποκρίνασθαι. 


GEAL,. Πώς: 


/ « ΄σ Ss 
=ZE. To τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι, μηδὲν 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ilas δ᾽ ov; 


/ Ν “ , 
15 θέμενον πλὴν ἐν, καταγελαστον που. 


EE. Καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαι τοῦ λέγον- 


ε yy + 4 , > 3 27 
TOS MS ἐστιν ονομᾶ Tl, Aoyov OUK QV EXov. 


6. ὅπερ ev] Cf. the Aristo- 
telian use of ὅπερ, e.g. Phys. 
Αὐθο. 1. 2. 

II. καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὁτιοῦν] 
“Απᾷ not only so, but im an- 
swer to any other question.” 

12. ov πάντων ῥᾷστον] “ Not 
the easiest thing in the world.” 
Cf. supr. 218 c. I venture to 
think that this is the true 
reading also in Rep. 6, 497 d, 
instead of οὐ πάντως ῥᾷστον. 
πάντως was the reading of Ste- 
phanus (apparently with C E) 
in this place, and of SY in 
2arsren Gh eve: 16 77 ome: 
οὐ πάντων εὐκολώτατον. 

18. λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον] C.F. 
Hermann has reverted to the 
reading of the old edd. doy. 


οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι. But it is unne- 
cessary to alter ἔχον, which is 
the reading of the best MSS. 
The participle corresponds to 
the adjective καταγέλαστον in 
the previous clause: and ἂν is 
more forcible with the parti- 
ciple (“is a thing which can- 
not square with reason”) than 
it would have been here with 
the optative (“would be un- 
reasonable”): ἐστὶ, not εἴη, must 
be supplied. Cf. Theet. 164 a: 
ἐπιστήμων τούτου γέγονεν οὗπερ 
ὁρῶν. Infr. 257 d: τοῦτ᾽ οὖν 
ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἤ TW ἔχον 
ἐπωνυμίαν ; Θ. ἔχον. “This is 
an admission which they can 
never make consistently. For 
if the name is other than the 


ἦ P+ 244: 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ; 


Lid 


HE. Τιθείς re τοὔνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἕτερον δύο 


/ , 
λέγει ποὺ τινε. 


ΘΕΔΙ. Ναί 


= K Ν \ ἊἋ > / » cal On 57 
mi. Kar μὴν ἂν ταῦτον γε avT@ τιθὴ τοὔνομα, 


δ \ + ᾽ , 7 5 > / 
ἢ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται λέγειν" εἰ δέ τινος 


ϑ i} , XN + > / A 
αὐτὸ φήσει, συμβήσεται TO ὄνομα ὀνόματος ὀνομα 


/ 32) \ 3 Ν yy 
μόνον, ἄλλου Oe οὐδενὸς ov ; 


CEAI. Otras. 


μα ἂν Ne, ΡΝ A x , A 
mE. Καὶ τὸ ἐν ye, ἐνὸς [εν] ov μόνον, καὶ τοῦτο 


3 / Ne δὰ A 
ὀνόματος Ταὐτὸ ἕν ὀντ. 


thing, there are two: if the 
same, the name either denotes 
nothing, or itself only. Hence 
if they admit that a name is 
anything, their One Being be- 
comes the name of a name.” 

6. ἢ μηδενὸς --- εἰ δέ τινος] 
Change of construction for ἢ εἴ 
τινος. 

το. Καὶ τὸ ἕν γε] “And (it will 
result) that the One also is 
only one of one, and this ‘ One 
that is’ again (rodro—av τὸ ἕν 
ὄν) (proves to be the name) of 
a name.” 1.6, “Oneness is only 
predicable of The One, and 
this after all is but a name.” 
So, a little differently from 
Heindorf, I would translate the 
words as they stand (reading 
αὖ τὸ). The omission of ἕν after 
ἑνός, aS in nine MSS., hardly af- 
fects the sense. Heindorf ren- 
ders: “ Atque unum, quatenus 
est unius tantum unum, hoc 
quoque nominis rursus unum 
(das Eins eines Namens) esse 
efficietur. Pendet enim etiam 
postremum hoc ὃν a pregresso 
συμβήσεται." The place seems 
to be corrupt: but none of 


the emendations hitherto made 
are satisfactory. The Bod1., 
with Ai, has 
The MSS. give αὐτὸ ἕν ὄν. 
Stallb. : 
αὐτὸ ἕν Ov, 
(This is not dialectic but 
common sense.) 
Herm. : 
τοῦτο ὀνόματος αὖ TO ἕν ὄν. 
Badham: καὶ τὸ ἕν γε, ἑνὸς 
ἕν ὃν μόνον καὶ τοῦτο, ὀνόματος δ᾽ 
οὐ τὸ But how does 
this help to prove that all 
questions are alike unanswer- 
able on the Eleatic principle ? 
Steinhart: καὶ τὸ ὄν ye, ἑνὸς 
ὃν ὄνομα, καὶ τούτου ὄντος ὀνόμα- 


- » 
τοῦ ὀνόματος. 


\ ΕΝ > , 
Kal οὐ που OVOLaTOS 


Go a aL Lh x 
evos εν ovopa ov, Kat 


a 2, 
εν OV, 


τος αὐτὸ ὃν ὄνομα. 

Wagner (in Rhein. Mus. XI. 
1857): καὶ τὸ ὄν ye ἑνὸς ὄνομα ὄν, 
καὶ τοῦτο ὀνόματος αὖ τὸ ὄνομα ὄν. 

The two last mentioned at- 
tempt to resume and complete 
the argument from τίς οὖν --- 
ἀπόκρισις. And it is clear that 
the sentence contains an appli- 
cation of the preceding remark 
to the One Being. 

Perhaps the words 
ἕν ὄν may be the remains of 


east 
αυτό 


σι 


name be 
identified 
with the 
thing, in 
which case 
it is either 
the name 
of nothing 
or the 
name of 
itself, that 
is, of a 
name. 
And Being 
is but the 
name ot 
One, which 
is a name. 


10 Further, 


their One 
Being is 





conceive? 
as Totality. 
But if it 
be a whole, 
“ Like 
every way 
unto a 
rounded 
sphere,” 

it then has 
parts, viz. 
centre and 
circumfer- 
ence. And 
that which 
has parts 
may be 
one as par- 
taking of 
unity, but 
cannot be 
the same 
with unity, 
for unity is 
without 
parts. 


5 


112 
ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αναγκη. 


ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


/ o te fal “ ἃ δ 
HE. Τί δέ: τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος ἕνος ἢ 


a’ / / 
TavTov φήσουσι TOUT® ; 
ἐ 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσουσί τε καὶ φασίν ; 


> o Cc / 
SE. Ei τοίνυν ὅλον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης 


λέγει, 


’ >) ᾽ὔ , , , 32) 
πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον OKO, 


’ " A , A ‘ A »” , “ 
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλες TAVTH TO γὰρ OU TE TL μεῖζον 


” , , , eae) ae, o 
OUST OTE βαιότερον πελέναι χβέον εστι TH ] TY; 


an “Ὁ ἈΠ [ΔᾺΝ , yy ” a 
to TOLOUTOV Ye OV TO OV μέσον TE καὶ εσχατα EXEL, ταυτα 


\ » a > , ’ὔ ΒΩ ἊΝ a 
ε εχὸν TACK αναγκΚῇ μερὴ EXEL. 1) πως 5 


CEAI. Οὕτως. 


EE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τό ye μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν 


a CaN of > lal / tal 3 \ 3 
TOU ἑνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκω- 


SEAL ΤΠ γῆς 


some marginal note (6. g. αὐτοῦ 
τοῦ ἑνὸς, explaining ὀνόματος), 
and Plato may have written 
kat TO ἕν ye ἑνὸς ἕν ὄνομα ὄν, 
καὶ τοῦτο ὀνόματος. “ And (it 
will result) that the One also 
is the one name of One, and 
that of a name.” 1.6. Not 
only is Being not another name 
for Unity, or Unity for Being, 
but Unity is the name only of 
aname.” The drift of the pre- 
ceding argument is the fol- 
lowing : 

“Are ἕν and ὃν two names 
for the same thing ? 

“ Are they even two names ? 
Or can there be both name 
and thing ? 

“Even the one name ἕν 
can only be the name of a 
name.” 


. ὅλον ἐστίν Se. τὸ ὄν. 
e 


, ‘ , \ an ΕΝ ἢ A 5 
15 λύει, καὶ ταὐτῃ δὴ πᾶν τε ὃν καὶ ὅλον ἐν εἶναι. 


So far unity has been attained 
by merging all things in the 
mere name ἕν ὄν. But is not 
τὸ ὅλον still distinct from this ? 

10. μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει] 
Cf. Parm. 145 a: 
ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ Te- 
λεύτην ; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι 


ὅλον οὐ καὶ 


ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων ; K.T.A. 

13. πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔχειν] 
“That which has parts may 
indeed partake of unity in all 
the parts (i.e. may have unity 
impressed on them), and being 
thus an All and a Whole may 
be in this way one.” For the 
distinction of πᾶν and ὅλον, see 
Thezet.204, which passage Plato 
may have thought of here. The 
words πάθος and πάσχειν are 
used in the same sense also in 
Parmen. 147, alib. See Grote’s 
Plato, vol. ii. pp. 303-306. 


p- 244i) 


P- 245: 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


113 


EE. To δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα Gp οὐκ ἀδύνατον αὐτό 


Ν, ἃ SEEN 5 
γε TO ἕν αὐτο εἰναι; 


OEAI. Πώς; 


HE. ᾿Αμερὲς δή που δεῖ παντελῶς TO γε ἀληθῶς 


A \ Ν > \ / 7,4 
ἐν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λογον εἰρῆσθαι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν. 


lal > “~ “ “ J 
BE. To δέ ye τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὃν ov 


/ lal / 
συμφωνήσει τῷ λόγῳ. 


OEAI. Μανθάνω. 


΄ 3, δὰ a Ν 
ΞΕ), Πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχον τὸ *ov* τοῦ ἑνὸς 


v4 a yy NGO, Ἃ , \ / 
οὕτως EV TE ἐσται καὶ OAOY, ἢ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν 


“ 3 NBs, 
ὅλον εἶναι TO OV; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Χαλεπὴν προβέβληκας αἵρεσιν. 
EE. ᾿Αληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθὸς τε γὰρ 


XN oN A 5 7 > PEN δΟ SEN / Ν 
TO OV εν ELVAL πῶς, οὐ TAVTOY ον Τῷ ενι φαίνεται, Και 


7 Ν \ / CaN 32) 
πλέονα On τὰ πάντα ἐνὸς ἔσται. 


SEAI. Nai. 


1. To δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα] 
Compare the language of Parm. 
147 C-148 c: 7 ἕτερον εἶναι 
πέπονθε τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τἄλλα 
ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν 
πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἕν τοῖς ἄλλοις 
καὶ τἄλλα τῷ ἑνί K.T.A, 

2. τὸ ἕν αὐτὸ εἶνα)7η The 
pronoun αὐτὸ is added where 
the subject has been thrown 
back to the beginning of the 
sentence, as in Rep. 5,477 d: 
ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμίν twa 
φὴς εἶναι αὐτήν ; 

10. Πότερον δὴ] [. 6. “Is 
Being one only by participa- 
tion in unity, and a whole in 
this way, or is Being not to 
be thought of as a whole at 
all 2” 

τὸ Τὸν τοῦ ἑνὸς] The MSS. 


agree in giving ὅλον, but ὃν, 
the correction of Schleier- 
macher, is absolutely required. 
The same corruption occurs in 
Prot. 361 b. The Bodleian, 
by giving τῷ ὅλῳ λόγῳ just 
above, betrays the tendency 
which has produced the error. 
Cf. Theet. 149 ¢, ἀτόκοις (Bod. 
ἀτόποις With ἀτοπώτατος above): 
Ib. 158 ¢, ὅτῳ χρὴ (Bodleian 
ὅτῳ χρόνῳ χρὴ, With χρόνου 
below). 

13. Χαλεπὴν ---- αἵρεσιν] Cf. 
Theet. 196 ¢: ἴλπορον αἵρεσιν 
προτίθης, ὦ Σώκρατες. Legg. 9, 
858 a: ΤΓελοίαν, ὦ ξένε, προτιθέ- 
μεθα τὴν αἵρεσιν. 

14. ᾿Αληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις] 
“You are right. It is truly 
difficult.” 


to Is Being 


then one 
only by 
participa- 
tion, or 
shall we 
say that 
Being is 
not a 
whole ? 


15 In the for- 


mer case 
Being is 
distinct 
from Unity 


and there 
arises 

a plurality 
of ele- 
ments. 
And in the 
latter case, 
supposing 
a whole 

to exist, 
there exists 
something 
outside of 
Being: and 
moreover 
there is 
again 


plurality. 


114 


_ Ν \ x97 4 » 3 ‘ 0 A A ; 
EE. Καὶ μὴν ἐάν ye τὸ ὃν ἢ μὴ ὅλον διὰ TO πε- p. 245} 


ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


/ \ es > , , 53 \ ΒΥΡΆ, ‘ “ 
πονθέναι τὸ Um ἐκείνου πάθος, ἡ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, 


> \ APA « ΄σ / 
ἐνδεὲς TO ὃν ἑαυτοῦ ξυμβαίνει. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πανυ γε. 


cal \ Ν / ε al / 
SE. Καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἑαυτοῦ aTEpo- 


» Ὁ y N A 
μένον οὐκ OV EDOTAL TO OV, 


SEAI. Οὕτως. 


μα / 3 / \ ’ / 
SE. Kai ἑνός ye ad πλείω τὰ πάντα γίγνεται, 


“ a Ν σι Ν 507 ξ ΄ / 
TOU TE OVTOS καὶ τοῦ ὁλου χωρὶς ἰδίαν ἑκατέρου φυ- 


/ 
τοσιν εἰληφότος. 


OEAI. Ναί. 


Ν 5) \ , =, 2 We ve 
EE. Μὴ ὄντος δέ ye τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταὐτὰ 


A e , ΄- 7 A ΄- Χ 53 
τε ταῦτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὄντι καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι μηδ᾽ 


Ἃ » ΝΠ  ζ 
ἂν γενέσθαι ποτε ov. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή; 


Ν ’ 
SE. Τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ 


τ. ἢ μὴ ὅλον] The order of 
words is inverted, as so often 
happens in this dialogue, pro- 
bably in order to point the 
antithesis by giving emphasis 
to μή. “If Being is not a whole 
through parcicipating in unity, 
and the nature of the whole 
exists, Being then falls short 
of Being” (does not contain all 
that exists). 

Is Being abstract or con- 
crete? If abstract, Being is 
not a whole, or finite. If con- 
crete, Being is separate from 
abstract Unity. In the latter 
case there are two principles. 
In the former, (a) if a whole 
exists, not only are there two 
principles, but something ex- 
ists apart from being: and 
(8) if a whole does not exist, 
Being could never haye come 


/ σ“ iA a 
γέγονεν ὁλον, ὥστε οὔτε 


to be, for what has come to 
be is completed as a whole. 
This last argument is much in 
the spirit of the Parmenides. 
Compare also Phileb. 15 Ὁ: 
πῶς (Set ὑπολαμβάνειν) μίαν ἑκά- 
στην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε 
γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχο- 
μένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν 
ταύτην. The Eleatic would of 
course reply that he denies 
γένεσις altogether. And so 
Plato would have reasoned at 
an earlier time. 

12. ταὐτά τε ταῦτα ὑπάρχει TO 


” > a > νὰ , 
ὄντι] οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ πλείω 
ἑνός. Compare the language 
of the Parmenides.  Bodl, 


ταῦτά τε ταὐτά. 
16. γέγονεν ὅλον] Cf. Parm. 
153 ¢: Kat μὴν μόριά ye φήσο- 
“ ἘΣ 5 a 
μεν ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι πάντα τἄλλα τοῦ 
[τὸ Χ Θεὸν > A x > Le 
ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο 


c 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


115 


> / »ὔ 7 5 a , Ν 
. 245. οὐσίαν οὔτε γένεσιν ὡς οὖσαν δεῖ προσαγορεύειν Ττὸ 


ἃ » WG? » “-“ 5 \ , 
εν nt TO ὅλον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι μὴ τιθέντα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασιν ἔοικε ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν. 


EE. Καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὁποσονοῦν τι δεῖ τὸ μὴ 


(Cy , \ + « , Ἂ oy A 
εἰναι" TOOOV TL yap OV, OTTOOOV OV No TOO OUTOV 


> a 3 
ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι. 


OEAI. Κομιδῇ γε. 


“ 
oAov 


3, 7 , 
HE. Καὶ τοίνυν ἄλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας 


4 9 Ν χω “- XN oN Sy , \ 3) 
ἕκαστον εἰληφος φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὃν εἴτε δυο τινε ETE 


ἃ , 53 ΄ 
ἐν μόνον εἰναι λέγοντι. 


OEAI. Δηλοῖ σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα" 


Le \ (4 y / 
συνάπτεται yap ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου, μείζω Kal χαλε- 


’ / Ν “ x7 cy ε , 
πωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἀεὶ ῥηθέντων 


πλάνην. 


— Χ \ ? Sy 
SE. Tovs μὲν τοίνυν διακριβολογουμένους ὄντος 


ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἕν τε 
καὶ ὅλον. 1.6. the use of the 
aorist γενόμενον implies that 
an action has been completed. 
Cf. Theet. 155 b, ec. 

I. τὸ ἐν ἢ] These words 
are in all the MSS., but there 
can be little doubt that they 
arise either from a gloss or 
from some corruption of the 
text. Heindorf conjectured 
τὸν τὸ ὅλον, which is probably 
right. 

8. ἄλλα μυρία] “ You know 
that innumerable other points 
will each be found involved in 
endless difficulties.” Cf. Theeet. 
1550, d: καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ 
μυρίοις οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα 
παραδεξόμεθα. For an_illus- 
tration of the truth of this 
Plato would point to the Par- 
menides. 

12. ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου] For the 


Q 


variety, cf. Phileb. 57 b: dpa 
ἔστι τις ἑτέρας ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα 
ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. And for 
περὶ ἔμπροσθεν κ. τ. Xa, 
Theet. 177 ¢: πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιρ- 
ρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς λόγον. 

15.Tovs μὲν τοίνυν κιτ.λ.7“ὙΥ 61] 
then, concerning those who 
treat exactly of Being and 
Not-Being, let so much suffice, 
although the subject is by no 
means exhausted. We must 
now turn and look at others 
who speak less precisely, that 
we may learn from the most 
general survey that Being is 
no less troublesome to com- 
prehend than Not-Being.” 

“Let us approach them, then. 
Proceed.” 

(1 see them, through their 
dispute about the nature of 
Being, engaged in a warfare 


τῶν 


ο 


- 


10 into being, 


But if 
there is no 


“ 
oAov 5 Whole, not 


only must 
there be 
plurality, 
(for then 
Being is 
not One) 
but Being 
cannot 
have come 


still less 
exist, for 
nothing is 
completed 
but as a 
whole. 
Nor can 
Being have 
number, 

'5 for, what- 
ever num- 
ber it has, 
it has this 
as a whole, 
or sum. 





110 
/ ἈΝ ‘ / \ 
τε πέρι καὶ μὴ πανυ μεν 


which resembles that of the 
Giants and the Gods.” 

“What do you mean ?” 

“The one faction would drag 
everything to Earth out of 
the Heaven of the Unseen, 
literally laying their grasp on 
rocks and trees. For they 
fasten upon everything of this 
kind, and contend uncompro- 
misingly that this alone exists 
which affords resistance and is 
sensible to the touch: so they 
define Being and Body to be 
the same. But they utterly 
despise the rest of the world, 
whoever asserts that a bodiless 
thing has being, and, on hear- 
ing this, refuse to listen to 
another word.” 

“They are indeed a fearful 
sort of men. I have encoun- 
tered many of them myself, 
ere now.” 

“Yes, and that is why their 
opponents are so cautious in 
their defence, and fight with 
them from some invisible aéry 
hold, contending in spite of all 
that True Being consists of 
certain bodiless forms, seen 
only by the mind: but the 
bodies to which the others 
cling, and the realities of 
which they speak, these little 
by little in their arguments 
disintegrate and crumble 
down, and describe them as 
not substance but a moving 
flux of change. Between these 
armies from time immemorial 
a battle has been joined, 
which continues with unabated 
fury.” 

(1 5.) διακριβολογουμένου-----ἀλ- 
os λέγοντας] In the former 
class are obyiously contaimed 


MAATQNOZ 


ov διεληλύθαμεν, ὅμως δὲ 


all who have hitherto been 
mentioned—the Ionics, Elea- 
tics, Heraclitus, Empedocles : 
and the word é:axp. probably 
means “ those who have defined 
precisely the number and the 
kinds of being.” Cf.supr. 2424: 
ὅστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὥρμησε 
τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε 
καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν. It is less certain 
who are spoken of as διακρ. 
περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. Perhaps the 
prohibition of Parmenides is 
alone referred to, perhaps 
Leucippus may be also in- 
tended. It does not seem 
probable that Gorgias, Pro- 
tagoras, Antisthenes, or the 
Megarians (as Heindorf sup- 
poses) are included in this ex- 
pression. The contemporaries 
of Socrates seem to be resery- 
ed, with those of Plato, for the 
following section (p. 246). The 
meaning of ἄλλως is best infer- 
red from that of διακριβολογου- 
μένους, to which ἄλλως λέγοντας 
is opposed. “Those who speak 
with less exactness.” “ Those 
who do not seek to determine 
the number or the kinds of 
Being.” The schools which are 
now to be described are in 
truth engaged with a different 
problem: respecting the nature 
of Being or Essence, whether 
this be ideal or corporeal—a 
question with which mathe- 
matical or numerical exactness 
has little to do. For a simi- 
lar use of ἄλλως, ef. Hdt. V. 
8: ἄλλως γῇ κρύψαντες. Crat. 
425 ἃ: ἡμᾶς δὲ δεῖ εἴπερ τεχνι- 
κῶς ἐπιστησόμεθα σκοπεῖσθαι αὐτὰ 
πάντα, οὕτω διελομένους, εἴτε κατὰ 
τρόπον τά τε πρῶτα ὀνόματα κεῖ- 
ται καὶ τὰ ὕστερα, εἴτε μή, οὕτω 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


Τὺ 


245. ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω: τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, 


. 246 


ett hi , lanl “ Ν Ὁ an \ 5᾽ > \ 
ἵν ἐκ πάντων εἰδῶμεν OTL TO OY TOU μὴ ὄντος οὐδεν 


» / ’ lal σ / Se 
εὐπορώτερον ELTTELY O TL TOT εστιν. 


GEAI. Οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους. 


be Ν Ν yx ΄ » > - - 
mE. Καὶ μὴν ἐοικέ ye ἐν αὑτοῖς οἷον γιγαντο- 


θεᾶσθαι. ἄλλως δὲ 
φαῦλον ἢ καὶ οὐ καθ᾽ ὁδόν, ὦ φίλε 
Ἑρμόγενες, where ἄλλως = μὴ 
διελομένους, as here it is = μὴ δια- 
κριβολογουμένους, in both places 
with a touch of blame, which 
is here satirically directed by 
Plato against the philosophers 
who were most nearly con- 
temporary with himself. See 
also Legg. 1, 635 e, where 
all other existing common- 
wealths are distinguished from 
the Spartan and Cretan con- 
stitutions in the words τί δια- 
φέρον ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πολιτείαις 
ἢ ταῖς τῶν εἰκῇ πολιτευομένων 
ἀνευρήσομεν. 

(1.) πάνυ μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν] 
“We most certainly have not 
exhausted —.”” σπσάνυ is ad- 
verbial to the phrase οὐ διελη- 
λύθαμεν. πάντας, which Hein- 
dorf adopted from the quo- 
tation of Eusebius, is less 
forcible. Cf. Prot. 338 Ὁ, 
πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, quoted by 
Stallbaum, who, notwithstand- 
ing, rejects the MS. reading 
here because it is not literally 
true that the early philoso- 
phers had been not at all dis- 
cussed : “ Recensuit enim non- 
nullos quanquam non omnes 
tetigit.”” But διεληλ. implies 
either going through them all, 
or discussing them thoroughly. 
Phileb. 51 ¢: πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ 
εὐθὺς δῆλά ἐστιν. --- πειρατέον 
μήν. See an instructive note 


συνείρειν μὴ 


on οὐ πάνυ in Mr. Cope’s Gor- 
elas. 

2. ἐκ mavrov| As the result 
derived from all, the same 
which has now been derived 
from a part only. Cf. Theset. 
171 ¢, ἐξ ἁπάντων, and note ; 
Ar. Met. VII. 998 a; and vid. 
infr. 251 6: ἵνα τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαν- 
τας ἡμῖν ὃ λόγος 7} K.T.A. 

ὅτε τὸ ὃν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος] 
This notion was advanced with 
some hesitation supr. 242 c¢: 
μή πῃ τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὦμεν. 
243 ¢: Τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως κ.τ.λ., 
and is more decidedly enforced 
infra 250 d. 

5. γιγαντομαχία] Plato notices 
amongst contemporary philo- 
sophers a conflict between ma- 
terialists and idealists, which 
he compares to the war of the 
Giants with the Gows: the 
terrible children of the earth 
are seen hurling blind defi- 
ance at their opponents, who 
fortify themselves securely 
from this rude violence in an 
invisible Heaven. In a similar 
spirit, in the Politicus, p. 291 a, 
the statesmen of the day are 
compared to Centaurs and 
Satyrs and other monstrous 
forms. See Coleridge’s Friend, 
vol. iii, p. 129.—The mate- 
rialist has no way upwards 
His “element is below.” The 
idealist finds his way up, but 
not down again. 


II. Ὁ; 
5 We pro- 
ceed to 


examine a 
clifferent 
order of 
philosophic 
schools, 
somewhat 
less exact 
in their 
announce- 
ments, 
whose end- 
less conflict 
respecting 
the nature 
of essence 
resembles 
that of the 
Giants 
with the 
Gods. 

The advo- 
eates of a 
bodily prin- 
ciple,whose 
touchstone 
is the sense 


118 


μαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς P- 249-4) 


οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


--- e \ , ~ 5 5 cal Ν nn 5 4 
ΞΕ. Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ Tov ἀοράτου 


περιλαμβάνοντες. 


, 0 o lal / ΄ 
δπάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς 


“ Ν “ >’ / 
TOV yap τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι 


΄ -. ce 53 / a / 
TTAVT@V διισχυρίζονται TOUTO E€LVAL μόνον ὁ πάρέχει 


Χ \ > / SFR a QA > / 
προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν τινα, TAVTOY σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν 


«ς / “ \ 3, 3, lal » 
ὁριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων, εἴ τίς φησι μὴ σῶμα ἔχον 


5 a Ν 
το εἰναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ 


y+ Ἢ 
λοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. 


/, aN Iad 3 / 
παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέ- 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἢ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας avdpas’ ἤδη γὰρ καὶ 


3 \ / o 7 
εγὼ TOUT@V συχνοις τροσετυχον. 


I. περὶ τῆς οὐσίας] No longer 
τοῦ ὄντος. ‘This change of ter- 
minology indicates that we are 
entering on a new and more 
abstract phase of philosophy. 

5. ἕλκουσι] “ Drag by main 
force.” The word is often 
used to indicate perversity in 
argument. Cf. infr. ἃ : 
σῶμα πάντα ἑλκόντων βίᾳ. οὐ- 
ρανὸς is elsewhere identified by 
Plato with the visible region, 
e.g. Rep. 6, 509 €: ὁρατοῦ, iva 
μὴ οὐρανὸν εἰπὼν δοκῶ σοι σοφί- 
εσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. Earth 
and Heaven are here opposed, 
as there the visible and intel- 
lectual worlds. 

ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας kal δρῦς περι- 
λαμβάνοντες) C. F. Hermann 
inserts ὡς before πέτρας. This 
is quite unnecessary, and takes 
from the liveliness of the image. 
The metaphor is continued, and 
the materialists are said, like 
the earth-born monsters, to lay 
their grasp on rocks and trees 


τῶν εἰς 


in their warfare. In Hesiod it 
is the hundred-handed sons of 
Heaven and Earth, the allies of 
Zeus, who throw the rocks up- 
on the Titans. Theog.67 5-715. 
But see Hor. Od. III. 4: evulsis- 
que truncis Enceladus jaculator 
audax. πέτρα καὶ δρῦς are also 
in Homer the symbols of in- 
animate nature, as in the line 
quoted by Socrates in his De- 
fence: ov yap ἀπὸ δρύος ἤλυθον 
οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ πέτρης. Cf. Rep. ὃ, 
544 6: ἢ οἴει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ 
πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι ; 

6. ἐφαπτόμενοι] “ Fastening 
upon all such objects” (for the 
purposes of their argument). 

9. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων, εἴ tis φησι] 
“ But, utterly despising all 
others, whosoever says that 
what has not body exists, and 
refusing to hear from them an- 
other word.” Stephanus added 
τι, which is found (after τις) in 
C. H. re. B. 


13. συχνοῖς προσέτυχον] Cf. 


b 





. 246. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 


119 


SE. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες 


7 ’ a / \ 
μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, 


\ A Ν > / BA el \ > 
νοητὰ ATTA καὶ ἀσώματα εἰδὴ βιαζόμενοι THY ἀλη- 


\ > / 53 Ἧ Ν \ > / / Ν \ 
θινὴν οὐσίαν εἰναι" τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα Kal τὴν 


/ Ces). » a / Ν 
λεγομένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ δια- 


/ lal / / > 
Opavovres ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ᾽ οὐσίας φερο- 


΄ Χ ΄ 
μένην τινὰ προσαγορευοῦυσιν. 


> / \ Ν 
ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ 


a yy > , 7 5 / aN 
ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ 


7, 
ξυνέσ TYKEV. 


OEAI. ᾿Αληθῆ. 


5 lal / ΄σ σ΄ 
=H. [lap ἀμφοῖν τοίνυν τοῖν γενοῖν κατὰ μέρος 


ld / - - “ » 
λάβωμεν λόγον ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ ληψόμεθα ; 


Cratyl. 429 d: *Ap’ ὅτι ψευδῆ 
λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, dpa 
σοι τοῦτο δύναται 6 λόγος : συχνοὶ 
γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κρα- 
τύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι. 

(13.) προσέτυχον] So the Zur. 
editors. Heind. and Stallb., 
with some MSS., περιέτυχον. 
“ Encountered” suits the pas- 
sage better than “ lit upon.” 

I. Τοιγαροῦν] Se. ἅτε δεινοὶ 
ὄντες. 

2. μάλα εὐλαβῶς] “ With ex- 
cellent heed.” In fact never 
crossing weapons with their 
opponents. For each denies 
the existence of that by which 
the other holds. 

3. βιαζόμενοι] “« Contending 
vehemently in spite of all diffi- 
culties ;” like ἕλκοντες above. 
Cf. supr. 2416: βιάζεσθαι τό τε 
μὴ ὃν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὃν αὖ 
πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πῃ; 1. 6. “to 
forcethe conclusion evenagainst 
the authority of Parmenides.” 

4. THY λεγομένην ---- ἀλήθειαν] 
“The reality of which they 


speak.” ἀλήθεια, = reality,seems 
to have been a favourite term 
with the opponents of ideal 
philosophy in Greece. Cf. 
Theeet. 152 d and note. 

5. κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν 
τοῖς λόγοις] Cf. Theet. 179 d: 
προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, Kal σκε- 
πτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν 
διακρούοντα, εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν 
φθέγγεται. 

7. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα] 
“ Betwixt these armies on this 
theme is waged an endless 
war.” 

8. ἄπλετος---μάχη---ἀε] Cf. 
Legg. 10, 906 a, of the conflict 
between good and evil: μάχη 
δή, φαμεν, ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ τοι- 
αὕτη. Phileb. 15 6: τοῦτο οὔτε 
μὴ παύσηταί ποτε ovte ἤρξατο 
Tim. 28 a: ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθεν- 
I. 6. ὑπὲρ τῆς 


νῦν. 
ται τῆς οὐσίας. 
οὐσίας, ἣν τίθενται. 
12. λάβωμεν λόγον] Cf. Theset. 
161 Ὁ: λόγον παρ᾽ ἑτέρου σοφοῦ 
λαβεῖν. Meno 70 d: λαμβάνειν 
λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν. Rep.1, 337 Ὁ. 


5 


10 


of touch, 
drag every- 
thing to 
earth out 
of the hea- 
ven of the 
Unseen. 
From 
thence an 
army, 

* lapped 

in proof 
eterne,” 
carefully 
defend 
their aéry 
citadel of 
bodiless 
forms, and 
by their 
arguments 
reduce to 
a flux of 
transitory 
production 


the seem- 
ing reality 
of yonder 
bodily sub- 
stance, 


The prin- 
ciples of 
either 
school are 
called in 
question, 
and Thee- 
tetus en- 
gages to 
impart 

to the 
Stranger 
the tenor 
of their 
replies, 


15 


120 


o > > > 4 / 
BE. Παρὰ μὲν τῶν ev εἴδεσιν αὐτὴν τιθεμένων p. 246.4) 


ΠΙΛΑΤΏΩΏΝΟΣ 


ean ς / / \ \ cal > a“ ΄ 
ῥᾷον" ἡμερώτεροι yap’ παρᾶ δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα 


ε ΄ 5 \ ‘\ 
ἑλκόντων Bia χαλεπώτερον, ἴσως δὲ καὶ σχεδὸν 
é 


ἀδύνατον. 
5 δρᾷν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς: 


ἀλλ᾽ ὧδέ μοι δεῖν δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν 


EE. Μάλιστα μέν, εἴ πῃ δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελ- 


/ > \ “ > \ cal \ > ΄σ / 
Tlovs αὑτοὺς ποιεῖν' εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ, AoY@ 


a « ’ ’ Ε Χ Δ ΄σ 
τοίιῶμὲν,. ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς ἢ νυν 


17 Ἂ / 
ιοέθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. 


τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογηθὲν 


Χ ΄, ΄ x \ \ , 
παρὰ βελτιονων ποὺ Κυριώτερον Ἢ TO παρᾶ χείρο- 


νων᾿ ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τἀληθὲς 


ζητοῦμεν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθότατα. 


HE. Κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας ἀπο- 


“ / Ν XN \ ’ x OA 2 
κρίνασθαι σοι; καὶ τὸ AexOev παρ αὐτῶν adep- 


μήνευε. 


3. χαλεπώτερονἢ͵] The diffi- 
culty of arguing with these 
men is different from that 
found with the Ephesian péov- 
τες, who could not be made to 
dwell on an idea, and arises 
simply from their want of dia- 
lectical refinement. Cf. Theeet. 
155 6: εἰσὶ yap, ὦ παῖ, pad εὖ 
ἄμουσοι. 

9. νομιμώτερον] I. 6. More in 
accordance with the acknow- 
ledged rules of argument. 

10. TO yap ὁμολογηθὲν ---- χει- 
ρόνων] For the serious applica- 
tion of this principle, ef. Legg. 
2, 663 ο: τὴν δ᾽ ἀλήθειαν τῆς 
κρίσεως ποτέραν κυριωτέραν εἶναι 
φῶμεν ; πότερα τὴν τῆς χείρονος 
ψυχῆς ἢ τὴν τῆς βελτίονος ; ᾿Αν- 
aykaidy που τὴν τῆς ἀμείνονος. 

12. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντί- 


Copev] Cf. Pheedo ο1 ο : ἂν ἐμοὶ 
πειθῆσθε, σμικρὰ φροντίσαντες 
Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ 
μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι δοκῶ ἀληθὲς 
λέγειν, ξυνομολογήσετε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, 
παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε. Plato 
sometimes insists on the neces- 
sity of individual conviction, 
as in Protagoras 331 ¢ (οὐδὲν 
yap δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ 
εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἐμέ 
τε καὶ σέ), Gorg. 472 Ὁ, 474 
a, b ; sometimes, as here, on 
consistency of argument alone. 
The former is the Socratic, 
the latter the Platonic, mode 
of asserting the supremacy of 
reason. 

16. παρ᾽ αὐτῶν] The preposi- 
tion is introduced because of the 
verb ἀφερμήνευε. “ Convey from 
them to me the tenour of their 








246. 


247. 


b 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 


ΘΕΑ.ΑΙ. Ταῦτ᾽ ἐσται. 


ΞΕ. Λεγόντων δὴ θνητὸν ζῶον εἰ 


ναί τι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ: 


12] 


ασὶν €i- 
φ 


HE. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὁμολογοῦσιν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. 


ΞΕ. Τιθέντες τι τῶν ὄντων ψυχήν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 


EE. Τί δέ; ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δὲ 


5» ͵ 5 ᾿ \ \ 7 \ \ 
ἀδικὸν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ 


ἄφρονα; 
OEAI. Τί μήν ; 


HE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ 


, ’ a Cee, , Ν “ 5 / 
TOLAUTYNV αὐτῶν EKAO THY γίγνεσθαι, και τῶν EVAYTLOV 


\ ’ , 
THV EVAVTLAV 9 


OEAI. Nai, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμφασιν. 


EE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τό γε δυνατόν τῳ παραγίγνεσθαι 


NYS. / ΄ “3, / ΄ 
και ἀπογίγνεσθαι TAVTMS ELVAL TL φησουσιν. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Φασὶ μὲν οὖν. 


2, 3 7ὔ / 
HE. Οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ 


5 »y » a Ν a 5 , Ν \ Ν lat 
τῆς GAANS ἀρετῆς καὶ TOV ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχῆς 


» - a ’ , 7 ε XN e XN 
ἐν ἡ ταῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἁπτὸν 


Ὁ , / 5. is » 7 x7 
ELVQAL φασί τι αὐτῶν 7) σαντα AOPaTa 9 


ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὐδὲν τούτων γε ὁρατόν. 


reply.” ἀφερμήνευε possibly (like 
ἄλλως supr.) imputes to these 
philosophers a want of clearness 
in expression. At all events, 
on the points in question an 


ΠΟ answer could only be obtained 


from them by way of inference. 
Cf., however, Legg. 2, 660 Ὁ: 
ὡς σὺ κατ᾽ Αἴγυπτον ἀφερμηνεύεις, 
where the word means to 76- 
port from a foreign country. 


R 


13. δικαιοσύνης ἕξει kat Ἱπαρου- 
σίᾳ "] “ The possession and pre- 
sence of justice.” See note on 
Theet.153 Ὁ: ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ 
ἕξις. 

14. τῶν ἐναντίων] Se. ἕξει καὶ 
παρουσίᾳ. The plural suggests 
the conjecture that Plato wrote 
δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ φρονήσεως. 

24. Σχεδὸν----ὁρατὸν] Cf. Lege. 
To, 898 d. 


5 


The corpo- 
realists are 
the more 
difficult, 
because of 
their dia- 
lectical 
rudeness 
and incom- 
petence. 
For the 
sake of ar- 
gument we 
must ima- 
gine them 
capable of 
making a 
wholesome 
answer. 
They ad- 
mit, then, 
the exist- 
ence of a 
mortal liy- 
ing crea- 
ture, which 
is a body 
containing 
a soul. 
Soul, then, 
exists: and 
may be 
either 
righteous 
or un- 
righteous, 
wise or un- 


20 Wise, ac- 


cording as 
the soul has 
righteous- 
ness and 
wisdom, or 
thereverse. 
Righteous- 
ness and 
wisdom 

(i. 6. virtue) 


are thus 
admitted to 
exist. And 
the soul 
and virtue 
are invi- 
sible. And 
of these in- 
visibles, 
though 
they may 
assert that 
the soul is 
in a man- 
ner bodily, 
theycannot 
maintain 
that virtue 
has a cor- 
poreal 
form. 


122 
HE. Ti δέ: 


ἴσχειν ; 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀποκρίνονται 


a > \ \ \ \ TEN “ ͵ πον 
πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μεν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφισι σῶμα 


a 7 =~ 6 
5τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον 


fe; > ΄ > 7, Ν a x \ r 
ὧν ἡρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται TO τολμᾷν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν 


yw 5 Ace - ΩΝ / > 53 / - 
ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντ᾽ εἶναι σώματα διίσχυ- 


ρίζεσθαι. 


HE. Σαφῶς γὰρ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, βελτίους 


, »y > Ν ΄ »Ὸὃἢ}» ἃ A 5 
10 YEYOVATLY ἄνδρες, ἐπεὶ τούτων OVO ἂν ἐν ἐπαισχυν- 


a Ὡ > an / ἐν ᾽ J > \ 
θεῖεν οἵ ye αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε Kal αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ 


τ. τί---ἴσχειν] Join τῶν τοι- 
ούτων τι. 

3. Τοῦτο οὐκέτι) ‘“ They an- 
swer this with a distinction, 
saying that the soul appears 
to them to have a bodily form 
of some kind, but with regard 
to wisdom and the other things 
of which you ask, they have 
not the face either to admit 
that these have no being, or 
any longer to insist that all 
things are bodily.” 

4. τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν]! See De- 
mocr. Fragmenta Physica (Mul- 
lach), esp. ὃ 3. The word 
πάντα does not resume φρόνη- 
σιν x.t.r., but the sentence 
reverts to an independent con- 
struction. Cf. supr. 243 a, aud 
note. 

4. σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι] The 
invisibility of the atoms of 
Leucippus and Democritus is 
no objection to these philo- 
sophers being included here : 
for these words imply the ex- 
istence of an ἀόρατον σῶμα. 

6. τὸ τολμᾷν] The inf. has 
the force of a noun. Cf. οὐδ᾽ 
ἂν ἕν infra. 


7. αὐτὰ] See note on αὐτὸ, 
supr. 245 a. 

II. σπαρτοί] By an accumu- 
lation of similes not unusual 
with him (see Thezt. 169 b, 
Sciron and Anteus), Plato in- 
troduces an allusion to the army 
of Cadmus rising from the dra- 
gon’s teeth, and also to the 
first inhabitants of Attica, who, 
like the Giants, sprang from 
the ground. Cf. Rep. 3, 444 6, 
Φοινικικόν τι, and Soph. did. Col. 
1534, σπαρτῶν an ἀνδρῶν. 

of αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτό- 
χθονε] Plato has obviously 
some men in his eye, probably 
the same to whom he alludes 
in Theet. 155 e. If it is true 
that Archelaus abandoned the 
ideal principle of Anaxagoras, 
and became a purely physical 
philosopher, he is perhaps in- 
cluded, as well as the contem- 
porary followers of Demoeri- 
tus. (See Introduction to Thez- 
tetus, p. xxx sqq.) But there 
appear to be some who, though 
holding a material principle, 
are thought capable of being 
improved into the position 


Cc 


΄“΄ / 5 ΄σ / / 
TOV τοιούτων LOY σῶμά TL λεγουσιν Ῥ-. 247.) 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


02 


Awd 


] 


/ x a A Ν Ν rn 
247. διατείνοιντ ἂν πᾶν, 0 μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ ξυμπιέ- 


, « ,᾽΄ a »>a\ \ , > 
Ce εἰσίν, ὡς apa τοῦτο οὐδὲν TO παράπαν ἐστίν. 


OEAI. Σχεδὸν οἷα διανοοῦνται λέγεις. 


jn A / ἴω / > , 
SE. Πάλιν τοίνυν ἀνερωτῶμεν αὐτούς" εἰ yap τι 


\ ἊΝ 57 “ 5, a > / 
καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώ- 


> a 
ἃ paroy, ἐξαρκεῖ. 


ἣΝ Ν » / / vA Ν 33 
TO yep ἐστὶ TE TOUTOLS AUa Και ETT 


5 , “ y a \ / > ΟΣ / 
EKELVOLS OTH EXEL σωμα ξυμφυὲς yeyovos, εἰς 0 βλέ- 


5) / 53 4 an 5 « 
ποντες ἀμφότερα εἰναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. 


(ues) 53 ͵ EY > 5 ᾽ ᾽ὔ a 
Tax οὖν tows ἂν ἀποροίεν" εἰ δέ τι τοιοῦτον πεπόν - 


, ,ὔ « a 53 » x 
θασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ἡμῶν, ap ἐθέλοιεν ἂν 


, « la Ud 5 3, 
δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιόνδ᾽ εἶναι τὸ ὅν. 


which is assigned them in 
what follows, who by dialec- 
tical pressure can be brought 
to substitute force for body. 
Perhaps the “disciples of Pro- 
tagoras,” who said that “sen- 
sation was knowledge,” are thus 
viewed as a more refined sort 
of materialists. If so, the irony 
with which, in the Theztetus, 
they are opposed to the wnini- 
tiate becomes manifest. Cer- 
tainly the words, τὴν λεγομένην 
ὑπ᾿ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ 
διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν 
ἀντ᾽ οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσ- 
ayopevovow, are an exact de- 
scription of the “ Megarian” 
treatment of Protagoras in the 
Theeetetus, and it may be that 
the notion of making the men 
better for the sake of argu- 
ment is suggested by the deve- 
lopment of the “ sensational 
idealism,” which is attributed 
to him in that dialogue. It 
is equally possible, however, 
that the argument is pointed 
at a supposed inconsistency be- 
tween the physical and ethical 


R 


writings of Democritus. See 
the views on “the soul,” 
“justice,” “wisdom,” in De- 
mocniius Hr. 1,34, 5: 6, 35, 
SO MUD ΠΣ 29) 120, nor 
(Mullach’s edition). 

I. πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ---εἰσί] 
For the “pendent” constr. of 
πᾶν, cf. supr. 219 Ὁ: πᾶν, ὅπερ 
K.T.A.—TOv μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ 
δὲ ἀγόμενον ποιεῖσθαί πουφάμεν. 

ταῖς χερσὶ ovpmiecew] The 
description of the ἀμύητοι in 
Thezet. 155 e is closely parallel, 
οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὗ 
ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν 
λαβέσθαι. Cf. Emped. 1. 356: 
ἡμετέραις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν. ἥπερ 
τε μεγίστη πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν 
ἁμαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει. 

6. ἐπί τε τούτοι]͵ Cf. Theeet. 
185 0) supr. 243 d,e. 

7. ξυμφυὲς γεγονὸς} “ Which 
arises as a common nature.” 

10. προτεινομένων] The word 
προτείνεσθαι in this sense 80- 
quires a technical use in Aristo- 
tle, cf. Topica, p. 164, b. 2: ἔστι 
yap, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὁ διαλεκτι- 
κὸς ὁ προτατικὸς καὶ ἐνστατικός" 


9 


- 


Io 


We sup- 
pose them 
to make 
this ad- 
mission : 
though it 
is far more 
than the 
aboriginal 
* Sons of 
Earth” 
would have 
admitted. 
We then 
ask, If the 
name ‘ ex- 
istent’ ap- 
plies to 
things both 
visible and 
invisible, 
what is the 
common 


nature 
which is 
thus pre- 
dicated of 
both ? 

Lest we 
shouldhave 
to pause 
for a reply, 
we propose 
to them the 
following 
definition 
of Being : 
“ΑἹ that 
is by nature 
capable 
either of 
doing or 
suffering.’ 
Being is 
potency, 


124 


IAATQNOZ 


GEAI. To ποῖον δή ; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα. 


/ \ \ « _ / 7 
ΞῈ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον du- 


Γ ΑΣΖῚ > Ν lal “ἤ « a / 7 > 
νᾶμιν, ELT ELS TO ποίειν ETEPOV OTLOVY πεφυκος, €LT 


> Χ vad Ν / c Ν An /, 
εἰς TO παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπο TOU φαυλοτάτου, 


Ἃ > ΄ " ΄, “- ΄- Ε 5 - / 
5 KQV εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, σαν τοῦτο οντῶς εἰναι τίθεμαι 


\ “ cd / Ἄν τον ε ᾽7 ᾽ yA \ 
yap opov, ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν 


δύναμις. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐπείπερ αὐτοί γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ 


/ / / / / lal 
παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο. 


— K ave 5) Ν oN ’ 7 ΤΣ \ 
mE. Καλῶς" tows yap av εἰσυστερον ἡμίν TE καὶ 


ἔστι δὲ τὸ προτείνεσθαι, ἕν ποιεῖν 
τὰ πλείω (δεῖ γὰρ ἕν ὅλως ληφθῆναι 
πρὸς ὃ ὁ λύγος) τὸ δ᾽ ἐνίστασθαι 
τὸ ἕν πολλά, ἢ γὰρ ἀναιρεῖ ἢ δι- 
αιρει. 

2. Λέγω δὴ] “ Well, here I 
give it you.” λέγω refers to 
λέγε, and δὴ is used, δεικτικῶς, 
as in καὶ δή. 

3. εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ----φαυλοτάτου] 
“ Hither so as to affect another 
thing, or to be affected by the 
least thing in the most trifling 
way.” For this use of ποιεῖν, 
whence the technical word ποι- 
ητικός in later Greek philo- 
sophy, cf. Thezet. 160 a. 

5. κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ] As in 
the production of an individual 
sensation. Cf. Theet. 157 a. 

τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον --- δύναμις 
Badham conjectures τίθεμαι γὰρ 
ὅρον ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν 
δύναμις. Boeckh. conj. ὁρίζων. 
The construction of ὁρίζειν is 
difficult. There is probably 
an ellipse of δεῖν, οἵ, Δέδεικται 
k.7.A. supr. 235 Ὁ. Mr. Grote, 
in his eriticism of this dialogue, 
appears to think that Plato 
intended to allow this defi- 
nition to stand. But does he 


not attach more importance 
than Plato does to what is only 
a step, though an important 
step, in the dialectical progress 
of the argument ? Observe the 
words (247 6), ἴσως yap ἂν εἰσύ- 
στερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις ἕτερον 
ἂν φανείη. For an application of 
the same notion, ef. Pheedr. 
270 d: ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ 
ὁτουοῦν πρῶτον μὲν, 
ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν----ἔπειτα 


φύσεως, 


δὲ, ἐὰν μὲν ἁπλοῦν 7, σκοπεῖν τὴν 
δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέ- 
φυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾷν ἔχον 7 τίνα εἰς 
τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ. 

6. ὡς ἔστιν] Se. τὰ ὄντα. 

9. δέχονται τοῦτο] In ἃ simi- 
lar spirit, in Legg. 10, goo, 
Clinias answers for the ob- 
jectors. Compare also the ima- 
ginary youth in the Phedrus 
(p. 243 6). 

10. Καλῶς] “ They say well.” 
This refers to the modification 
of their assent implied in ἐπεί- 
περ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν K.T.D. 

ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰσύστερον ---- 
gavein] Cf. Legg. 7, 820 6: 
κείσθω μέντοι καθάπερ ἐνέχυρα 
λύσιμα ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας, 
ἐὰν ἤ τοὺς θέντας ἡμᾶς ἢ καὶ τοὺς 





Ρ. 247}: 


e 





ΣΟΦΙΣΊΤΗΣ. 


force, re- 
ceptivity, 
in a word, 
power. 
Supposing 
this to be 
accepted 
for the 
nonce, we 


/ δ 3 ‘ \ 5 , 
247. τούτοις ἕτερον ἂν chavein. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους 
a e “- > a / / 
248. τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα μενέτω ξυνομολογηθέν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Μένει. 
« 3, \ a , ΄- 
HE. Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἑτέρους ἴωμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν 


/ \ \ Veal ani) Ν \ \ / > , 
φίλους" συ δ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευε. 5 





θεμένους ὑμᾶς μηδαμῶς φιλοφρο- 
Rep. 4, 437 a. 

4. Tos τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους] 
The word εἶδος indicates that 
the men here spoken of are 
Socratics, so far at least as 
the allusion is personal at 
all. Now they are certainly 
not Cynics ( Αντισθένειοι καὶ 
οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι), still less 
Cyrenaics, with whom the only 
“ essence” was a succession of 
momentary πάθη. They are 
Soeratics under an Eleatic or 
Pythagorean influence. Pro- 
clus, indeed, (Comment. in 
Parmen. p. 149) takes it for 
granted that Plato here al- 
ludes directly to the Pythago- 
rean school, whom Aristotle 
includes with the Platonists 
amongst the advocates of a 
“motionless essence,” τῶν τὰς 
ἀκινήτους οὐσίας λεγόντων, Met. 
XIV. 4, to91 b. But, besides 
the word εἶδος, the dialectical 
features and the way in which 
γένεσις 18 separated from οὐσία, 
are inconsistent with this. 
Four possible suppositions re- 
main, if we believe the dia- 
logues to be the work of 
Plato. The “friends of forms” 
are either (1) Megarians (since 
Schleiermacher this has been 
the most general impression) ; 
or (2) Plato himself at an 
earlier stage; or (3) Pla- 
tonists who have imperfectly 
understood Plato. The fourth 


νῆται. 


hypothesis combines (2) and 
(3). The theory of Socher, 
who imagined the ‘Sophist’ to 
be a Megarian critique of Plato, 
would make the Megarians, in 
contradiction to the little which 
we know of them, to be the 
advocates of δύναμις, κίνησις and 
γένεσις. In favour of the first 
hypothesis, according to which 
the Megarian philosophers are 
the εἰδῶν φίλοι, it may be urged 
that Plato, before writing these 
dialogues, had stood in a rela- 
tion of close intimacy with 
Euclides and the Megarian 
school, and that this passage is 
a friendly criticism of views 
with which he himself had at 
one time strongly sympathized. 
The name εἶδος, expressing the 
object of definition, was a 
common inheritance of the So- 
cratics, and the tendency of the 
Megarians to rest in sharply 
defined, incommunicable 80- 
stractions, appears not only in 
the Sophisms of Eubulides but 
in the objection of Euclides to 
comparison, of which, as Plato 
hints in what follows, the An- 
tisthenean rejection of predica- 
tion and definition was but the 
caricature. As Zeno refuted 
motion by the movement of 
thought, so they by dialectic 
made logic impossible. But on 
the other hand we have no 
warrant apart from this pas- 
sage for supposing that they 


turn to the 
lovers of 
idealforms. 


Ye distin- 
guish in 
your dia- 
lectic be- 
tween Be- 
coming and 
Being : 
whereof, ye 
say, we 
have bo- 
dily and 
sensible 
partici- 
pation in 
the former, 
but mental 
and ratioci- 
native par- 
ticipation 
with the 
latter 
alone, 
which is 
eternal, 
whereas 
Becoming 
is transi- 
tory and 


JO 


126 


SEAI. Ταῦτ᾽ ἐσται. 


ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


> jf 
EE. Deveow, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρίς που διελόμενοι 


λέγετε; ἢ yap; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 


=E K Ν / \ ς ἴω 7] ὃ 5 ᾽ θή 
mi. αι σώματι μεν ἡμᾶς γενέσει OL αἰσθήσεως 


rn \ ΄ι \ ΄σ XN Ἂν 3) 
κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως 


» jf A Sas \ ’ \ ς 7 ΒΥ / ra 
OUOLAV, Ὧν HEL KATA TAVTA WOAVTWS EXELV φατε, Ve 


\ » 35) 
νεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν. 


cH De 


departed so far from the Ele- 
atics as to admit a plurality of 
εἴδη. Euclides said that Being, 
or the Good, was one, though 
called by many names. And se- 
veral points in the description 
are favourable to the view to 
which we have seen reason 
to incline, which differs but 
slightly from those of Ueber- 
weg and of Mr. Grote: that 
Plato, while developing his 
own theory of knowledge with 
greater clearness, administers 
a gentle reproof to some of 
his own followers, who held 
tenaciously to a conception of 
the εἴδη, based on immature 
statements of his own, and 
mixed with Eleatic and Pytha- 
gorean elements. (See the In- 
troduction to the ‘ Sophist.’) 
The points which make for this 
conclusion are the following: 
—vonta ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη 
(246 b); σώματι---δὲ αἰσθήσεως 
κοινωνεῖν ----διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ 
πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν---ἀεὶ κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν (248 Ὁ) ; 
the words ὦ πάντων ἄριστοι, 
which might well be aimed at 
friends and pupils by Plato (ef. 


y\ \ \ na 3 ΄ y 
O δὲ δὴ κοινώνειν, ὦ TTAVT@V αριστοι, τι 


Thezet. 148 b: Ἄριστα γ᾽ ἀνθρώ- 
Tov, ὦ παῖδες); and ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως 
διὰ συνήθειαν, supposing Plato to 
speak here as if in his own per- 
son : also ἡμερώτεροι supra. 

2. Τένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν] Cf. 
supr. 221 6: νευστικοῦ μέρους, 
τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ, and note. This 
omission of pév, like many 
other idioms which might ap- 
pear to be of late growth, is 
found already full-blown in 
Homer. 

5. σώματι] Dat. of the in- 
strument, answering to Ψυχῆ in 
what follows. 

γενέσει] Dat. after κοινω- 
νεῖν, answering to πρὸς---οὐσίαν. 

7. γένεσιν δὲ] The end of the 
sentence reverts to the begin- 
ning, turning out the obverse 
side of the chief statement, as 
so often in Plato. 

10. To δὲ δὴ kowwvetv] The 
introduction of this word, which 
plays an important part in the 
sequel, should be noticed, as 
the emergence of a fresh ele- 
ment in the evolution of the 
thought. Cf. Gorg. 464 ¢. And 
see Rep. 6, 490 b. 


p. 248. 


b 


ΣΟΦΙΣΊΤΗΣ. 


δὴ Tap ἡμῶν ῥηθέν: 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


12 


nn? ς ΄ > ad ΄σ- pS) , Ν A 
248. τοῦθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἐπ᾿ ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φῶμεν 3 ap οὐ TO νῦν 


ὃ ᾽, Ν 
SE. Παάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυναμεώς τινος ἀπὸ 


τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ξυνιόντων γιγνόμενον. 


Tay οὖν 
X ἢ 


53 / an \ \ A > ͵ \ \ 
ὦ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς TAVTA ATTOKPLOLY OV μεν 


» ΄ 5 ON \ τ \ / 
οὐ KaTakovels, ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως διὰ συνήθειαν. 
ΘΙΕΑΙ. Ti οὖν δὴ λέγουσι λόγον ; 
HE. Οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν πρὸς 


Χ a > 
TOUS γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι. 


GEAI. Τὸ ποῖον : 


==} ε \ y, “ - 57 “ 
GE. Ikavov ἔθεμεν opov που τῶν ὄντων, ὅταν TO 


a e an , a “ Ν Ν \ / 
παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾷν καὶ πρὸς TO σμικρότατον 


δύναμις : 


ΘΙΕΑΙ. Nai. 


Ἂν Χ a / / “ ’ 
HE. ΤΙρὸς δὴ ταῦτα rode λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει 


\ , an 7) Ν σ΄ ᾽ὔ Ἀ 
μὲν μέτεστι TOU TAO KELV και 7TOLELV δυνάμεως, 7 pos 


\ > / ΄ » / \ , td , 
δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἁρμόττειν 


φασίν. 


I. em ἀμφοῖν] Sec. γενέσεως 
καὶ οὐσίας. 

4. ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος---γιγνό- 
μενον] The account of sensation 
in the Theztetus belongs to the 
line of thought which is here 
indicated : only the ‘“ power” 
is not there inferred from the 
act—since agent and patient 
are regarded as having no ex- 
istence except in act. Theeet. 
157 a: οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι 
πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε 
πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι. 

ἡ. διὰ συνήθειαν ἢ If the 
Stranger is speaking in his 
own person, these words may 
naturally enough point to the 
contemporary Eleatics, 1. 6. the 


school of Megara. But if Pla- 
tonists are meant, the author 
must be supposed to speak 


from behind the mask; as 
happens sometimes in the 
Laws. Cf. Rep. 9, 583. 


τό. ὅτι yev.— pair] That Be- 
coming has part in the power 
of doing and suffering, but 
that active and passive are qua- 
lities whose force is wholly 
inapplicable to being.” The 
meaning of δυνάμεως here is 
something between “ power of 
acting” and “the power that 
is inherent in action.” 

18. τὴν δύναμιν.ὺ The word 
appears to be used here in a 
slightly different sense from 


I 


° 


Ik 


full of 
change. 
Well, fair 
sirs, but 
what is this 
common 
nature of 
which ye 
too speak, 
under the 
name of 

‘ participa- 
tion ?’ Shall 
we explain 
this by the 
definition 
which we 
just now 
gave to 
your oppo- 
nents, as 
an active 
or passive 
energy 
arising 
from some 
power ? 
The Stran- 
ger’s prac- 
tised ear 
discerns 
that from 
theirserene 
height they 
reply with 
scorn. Be- 
coming 
may have 
part in 
agency and 
passivity : 
but such 
language 
is inappli- 
cable to 
Being. 


Without 
question- 
ing the 
propriety 
of this, we 
ask a fur- 
ther ques- 
tion: 

* Whether 
the soul 
knows, and 
whether 
Being is 
known ?’ 
On their 
assenting 
to this, we 
persevere : 
‘Is there 
agency, or 
passivity, 
or both, in 
knowing, 
or in being 
known ?’ 
They must 
of course 
say, ‘ Nei- 
ther.’ 
They will, 
however, 


2 SEO (ἢ = ” 
port, meaning. 


128 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι: 
ΞΕ. Πρὸς 6 γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν ὅτι δεόμεθα παρ᾽ 


Ρ. 248, 2 


> ΄σ 57 / / > m 
αὐτῶν ἐτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον, εἰ προσομολογοῦσι ἃ 


‘ \ \ / \ > > / ’, 
τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δ᾽ οὐσίαν γιγνὼώ- 


ς σκεσθαι. 


BEAI. Φασὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε. 


ἘΠ nba δέ: ἈΝ / a ἈΝ 7 θ 
HH. Le ὃεὲ; τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἢ TO γιγνώσκεσθαι 


\ / Ἂ 4 Ὁ > , δ \ \ , 
φατε ποίημα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀμφότερον ; ἢ TO μεν πά- 


A) Ν δὲ fA) 7 ὃ Z 0 / , 
nua, TO ὃε θατερον ; ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδέτερον οὐ- 


͵ i} 7 “ « 3 , 
10 δετέρου τούτων μεταλαμβάνειν ; δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερον 


> / 5 » / \ a “-“ vy / 
οὐδετέρου" τἀναντία yap ἂν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λέγοιεν. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Μανθάνω. 


mE To δὲ ε Ν 7 ΕἸ y lal 
hey Le O O€ ὡς TO γιγνώσκειν ELTTEP EOTAL ποίειν 


δυνάμεως immediately preced- 
ing, and more akin to the 


common one of “nature,” “im- 


Cf. Rep. 
Oy ie Gh 

8. ἢ ἀμφότερον] 1. 6. Are the 
mind and the object of the 
mind each at once active and 
passive in knowledge ? 

Spinoza postulates the acti- 
vity of mind, cf. Eth. IL. Deff. 3. 
Explic.: “ Dico potius concep- 
tum quam perceptionem, quia 
perceptionis nomen indicare 
videtur mentem ab objecto 
pati. At conceptus actionem 
mentis exprimere videtur.” 

13. For τὸ δὲ, or τὸ δέ ye (se. 
φαῖεν ἂν, cl. pare—av—héyouev 
supr.), ef. Legg. 3,676 ὁ : ἀφ᾽ οὗ 
πόλεις T εἰσὶ κιτ.λ., δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε 
κατανοῆσαι χρόνου πλῆθος ὅσον γέ- 
γονεν ; Οὔκουν ῥάδιόν γε οὐδαμῶς. 
Τὸ 8€ γε, ὡς ἄπλετόν τε καὶ ἀμή- 
Ib. 1, 640: τὸ 
μὲν yap — ὡς ὀρθὸν ---- ἄρχοντα 
εἶναι, μανθάνεις. Ib. 5, 735. For 
the continuation of the in- 


3, 
χανον ἂν εἴη. 


direct form, οὗ also Thezt. 
171d: ἢ καὶ ταύτῃ μάλιστα ἵστα- 
σθαι [sc. φῶμεν] τὸν λόγον. 
There is some difficulty 
about the arrangement of the 
speakers. Rejecting the read- 
ing of Stephanus and Hein- 
dorf, ©. δῆλον --- λέγοιεν. ΚΞ. 
Μανθάνω τόδε γε, we have to 
choose between that of the 
Zurich editors, =. δῆλον ---- λέ- 
©. Μανθάνω. Ξ. To δέ 
ye— (or τὸ δὲ), where the 
Stranger answers his own ques- 
tion, as in Legg. 10, 894 a: 
ἡνικ ἂν τί πάθος ἢ : δῆλον ὡς 
κιτιὰλ., and that of Stallbaum, 
©. Δῆλον----λέγοιεν. Z. Μανθάνω" 
τὸ δέ ye—, in which, before 
proceeding further, he accepts 
Theeetetus’ report of the an- 
swer of the εἰδῶν φίλοι. The 
former is more in keeping 
with Plato’s later manner, and 
makes the anacoluthon easier. 
It has, therefore, been retained. 
13. TO γιγνώσκειν — πάσχειν] 
The distinction between the 


yolev. 











ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 120 


Ν / “ 5 / 
248. Tl, TO γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ ξυμβαίνει πά- 


e \ » 7 \ \ Ν / “- / 
σχειν. THY οὐσίαν On κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γιγνώ- 


, « Ν lal / > od / 
σκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, KAO ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, 


\ na lal δὰ Ν ᾽ὔ ἃ / 
κατα τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ TO πάσχειν, ὃ On φαμεν 


3 Dy / \ Ν > va 
οὐκ av γενέσθαι περὶ TO ἠρεμοῦν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς. 


mE. Τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ 
\ N \ \ ͵ Ὦ ὦ 7 ͵ 
ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν 7 ῥᾳδίως πεισθησό- 


“- la) yy δ ΄- \ δ᾿ ἊΝ 
μεθα τῷ παντελῶς OVTL μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῇν αὐτὸ 


δὲ φ ονεῖν. ἀλλὰ. σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον. νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον 
μη ρ 3 2 μ a4 9 Xx 919 tore in this 


/ Ν 5) 
ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἰναι; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Δεινὸν μέντ᾽ ἄν, ὦ ἕένε, λόγον συγχω- 


potpev. 


EE. ᾿Αλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μή, φῶμεν ; 


OEAI. Καὶ πώς; 


\ a \ / 3) fe » a 
EE. ᾿Αλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα evovT αὐτῷ 


λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν 


5 7 
αὐτα: 


active and passive verb, which 
probably appears here for the 
first time in Western litera- 
ture, is used to suggest that 
knowledge is a movement or 
process of some kind. Compare 
the use made of the grammati- 
cal distinction of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα 
below, p. 262, and of the singu- 
lar and plural numbers above, 
p. 238. 

10. σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον ͵]͵ There 
is an allusion to the statues of 
the gods. Cf. Phedr. (of 
paintings): ἕστηκε μὲν ὡς (ζῶντα, 
ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ 
σιγᾷ. Phileb.24,53d. Tim. 30. 
These words are wrongly con- 
nected by some interpreters 
with νοῦν. (e. g. Hegel, Cousin.) 


For the thought, compare a 
striking passage in the Laws, 
967 a-e, where it is said that 
the deepest study of astro- 
nomy, instead of encouraging 
the notion of a blind neces- 
sity, leads directly to the sup- 
position of a celestial mind 
or minds: ὑπωπτεύετο τὸ νῦν 
ὄντως δεδογμένον, ὅσοι τῆς ἀκρι- 
βείας αὐτῶν ἥπτοντο, ὅπως μήποτ᾽ 
ἂν ἄψυχα ὄντα οὕτως εἰς ἀκρί- 
βειαν θαυμαστοῖς λογισμοῖς ἂν 
ἐχρῆτο, νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένα, Where 
the same result is reached 
a posteriori which is here ap- 
proached a priori. 

II. eva] “ Exists,” 
emphatic sense. 


in the 


make 

this hypo- 
thetical ad- 
mission, 
that, if to 
know is 
activity, to 
be known 
must be 
passivity. 
In which 
case, Being, 
in so far as 
it is the 
object of 
knowledge, 
is passive, 
and there- 


respect, is 
not at rest, 
but in mo- 
tion. 

And, the 
instant we 
touch on 
this con- 


τε ception, 


there is 
borne in 
upon us 
the convic- 
tion that 
Perfect 
Being can- 
not be ina 


130. ITAATQNOZ 


> oH δ , 
state of OEAI. Kai τίν᾽ ἂν ἕτερον ἔχοι τρόπον; 
mere nega- 
tive repose, 


EE. ᾿Αλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχήν, 


a sacred ἢ) / Ν ΄ ” ΕΝ « ΄ 
form ἀκίνητον μέντοι TO παράπαν, ἔμψυχον OV, ἑστάναι; 
without ΄ ” κα΄ 5. ἍΒ / 
iieueht, ΘΈΑΙ. Ilavra ἔμοιγε ἄλογα ταῦτ᾽ εἰναι φαίνεται. 
or life, or — SS / \ ae 
soul, or 5. ΚΞ}. Καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρη- 
motion. ΄, cy 
ἘΠΕ ia TEOV WS ὄντα. 
there is no A ” 
thought OEAI. Πῶς δ᾽ OU 5 
ithout ¢ -- ' ov ΟΣ 53 ! ’ , 
Sarees BE. Ξυμβαίνει δ᾽ οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκινήτων τε 
᾿ Thi 5) a \ 5 a 
hat which OvT@V νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ. 
cannot be cy tN 5 
cio 10 OHA. Κομιδῇ μεν οὖν. 

- μααὶ \ aN 5 / x , 
se SE. Kat μὴν ἐὰν αὖ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα 
motion is Ag aR ED a \ , ANE Aa 
πάντ᾽ εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταῦτον 
insepara- Ἷ ᾿ ; (ip 573 7 
ble from Se = Don 

V .Ψ 

thought, Τοῦτο εκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσομεν 
But, on the ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς = 
other hand, ἊΝ i 4 aan ᾧ : 7 

. ε Ν Ν 
ἐποσξαν 8.1. ΠΡ To κατὰ TavTa καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ 
equs δ >, XN lol τι , / 3 yf 
impossible αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι TOT ἂν ; 
without a 5 a 
principle ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμώς. 
of perma- ἘΞ ἢ δὶς y , a ws τ x 
τῶι ῶο ane EE. Τί δ᾽; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾷς ὄντα ἢ 
Fest. 


, x ΄ jin A 
VEVOLEVOV QV και οποῦυουν 9 


1. ἔχοι] “In what other 
way could Being hold them 1 
This sense of ἔχοι is deter- 
mined by ἔχειν preceding and 
the accusatives following. 

3. ἀκίνητον---ἔμψυχον ὄν] The 
cogency of this argument is 
best seen by comparing Pheedr. 
245 Ὁ. Legg. 10, 895 b, Ὁ: 
See also Arist. Eth. Nic. X. 8, 
of the life of the gods: ἀλλὰ 
μὴν ζῇν ye πάντες ὑπειλήφαμεν av- 
τοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν apa’ οὐ γὰρ δὴ 
καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν ᾿Ἐνδυμίωνα. 
Metaph. XI. 1072 b: καὶ ζωὴ δέ 
ye ὑπάρχει’ ἡ yap νοῦ ἐνέργεια 
ζωή. 

5. συγχωρητέον ὡς ὄντα] There 
appears to be a logical inver- 


sion in reasoning from “ Being 
has motion” to “ Motion has 
Being.” This, like many of 
Plato’s arguments, had the 
Organon then existed, would 
have taken a different form. 
But his thoughts would have 
been substantially the same. 

8. δ᾽ ctv] “It follows from 
this, however.” Thetetus is 
warned to face the consequence 
of his admission: and this is 
implied m the adversative δέ. 

12. ταὐτὸν τοῦτο] Se. νοῦν. 

15. Τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ] “ Do you 
think that permanent unity of 
condition and mode and sub- 
ject could ever arise without 
stability ?” 


Ρ- 249} 


b 





249. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ἭΚκιστα. 
HE. Καὶ μὴν πρός γε 


131 


σι κ᾿ , 
τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχε- 


/ a Ἃ > / Ἃ / » a > / 
τέον, OS ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων 


ἰσχυρίζηται περί τινος ὑπηοῦν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε. 


EE. Τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τι- 


Qa a c yf 3 7 \ n / a 
μῶντι πᾶσα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα pNTE τῶν 


aA ΩΝ Ν \ Ν 7 / \ > « bss 
ἐν ἢ καὶ Ta πολλα εἴδὴ λεγόντων TO πᾶν ἑστηκὸς 


» / ca 5 on Ν x , 
ἀποδέχεσθαι, πον 71Ὲ αὖ TAVTAXKY TO ον Κινουντῶν 


\ Ν 4 3 , > Ν \ ἊΝ lol / 
μηδὲ TO παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ THY τῶν παί- 


I. “Hxora] This was one 
clear result of the argument of 
the Theetetus. Cf. also Crat. 
44. ᾿ 

2. πρὸς γε TOVTOV—payeETEOY, 
ὃς av] Cf. Theet. 265 6 : τοῦτο 
(τουτου, Ast. conj.) μὴ ἀποδεχώ- 
μεθα, ὃς ἂν λέγῃ. 

3. ὃς ἂν---ἰσχυρίζητα] Not 
merely because of the value of 
thought and knowledge, but 
because such a person stulti- 
fies himself. This is implied 
in the form of expression. 
“He who putting knowledge 
out of sight yet dogmatizes on 
any point.” See Theet. 161, 
Euthyd. 286, alib. 

ἀφανίζω] Cf. Theet. 151 
ἃ. ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσαι, Aristoph. 
Nub. 972. 

6. Τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳἨ The 
sentence is continued as if the 
verbal notion in φιλοσόφῳ had 
been expressed. Cf. Theet. 
168 b: ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων, μισοῦν- 
τας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα. Legg. 10, 
886 a: θεογονίαν ---- γενόμενοί τε 
ὡς--ὡμΐλησαν. 

η. τῶν ἕν ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη 
λεγόντων] I. 6. The older Elea- 
tics, or their more recent fol- 
lowers, the friends of ideas, 


5 


who have just been described. 

10. κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὔχην] 
This has been variously inter- 
preted. Heindorf, following 
Schleiermacher : “ Secundum 
votum puerorum, ut immobilia 
moveantur, optantium.” Stall- 
baum: “ Videtur respici ad lu- 
sum quendam puerorum in 
quo ludentes dicebant, ὅσα ἀκί- 
νητα, καὶ κεκινημένα εἴη. But 
the words ὅσα --- κεκινημένα 
would then be too abruptly 
introduced. Steinhart, in a 
note to  Miillers German 
translation of Plato, suggests 
a new reading: ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν 
τῶν παίδων εὐχὴν, ξυναμφότερα 
λέγειν τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ὅσα 
ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα. The pas- 
sage admits of being so inter- 
preted, by laying an emphasis 
on ξυναμφότερα, without any 
change in the order of the 
words. ‘ When asked whether 
Being or the All is at rest or 
in motion, we must say, like 
children in their wishes, ‘ Both.’” 
We may suppose an allusion 
either to the vagueness and 
impossibility of the desires of 
children, who “cry for the 
moon” (for εὐχή in this sense, 


9 
= 


Hence the 
philoso- 
pher, with 
whom 
thought is 
the highest 
being, can 
listen 

10 wholly nei- 
ther to the 


advocates 
of rest nor 
of motion, 
but must 
say with 
the chil- 
dren, that 
“both are 


best,” when 5 Plel 


he is de- 
fining the 
nature of 
Being. 


But he 


cannot rest 


there, 


132 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


᾽ ‘ “ Daca, Ν / \ JA Ν 
δων εὐχὴν οσὰα ακινῆτα και κεκινήῆμενα TO OV ΤΕ Και Ρ. 249. ! 


Ν Aa 
TO πᾶν Evvapporepa λέγειν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα. 


EE. Τί οὖν; ap’ οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς ἤδη φαινόμεθα πε- 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


/ a / Ν A 
ληφέναι τῷ λόγῳ TO OV; 


> 3, 5. σ 
EE. Βαβαὶ μέντ᾽ fav} ἄρα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς μοι 


at A 5 A / / Ν » / ΄- 
δοκοῦμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι πέρι τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς 


σκέψεως. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτ᾽ εἴρηκας ; 


— 59) ΄ » > a “ A > \ ᾽ 
BE. ᾿Ὦ μακάριε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι νῦν ἐσμεν ἐν 


3 / “ 


/ Ν > ΄- / / / 
ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείστῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαινόμεθα δέ τι λέ- 


« las > ΄ 
YEW ἡμῖν αὕτοις ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν" ὅπῃ δ᾽ αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως 


57 > 4 , 
τρέχοντες. OV TAVU ξυνίημι. 


οἵ. Rep. 5,540 d: μὴ εὐχὴ δοκῇ 
εἶναι ὁ λόγος) : or perhaps to 
some common form of expres- 
sion in which they desired all 
things in the universe, moye- 
able and immoveable,—or, it 
may be, “sacred and _ pro- 
fane,” κινητὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα, what 
may and what may not be 
touched or stirred. 

2. λέγειν] Bodl. λέγει. 

7. Βαβαὶ μέντ᾽ tavt ἄρα] ἂν 
here is probably corrupt: μέν- 
τοι, which some object to, is 
quite in point. The only way 
in which to make anything of 
ἂν would be to take it, by a 
rather bold hyperbaton, with 
the future infinitive: which is 
out of the question. And it 
is better to reject ἂν than to 
read, as Stallbaum suggests, 
μέντ᾽ av ἄρα. 

Badham conjectures Βαβαί" 


ov μεντάρα ὦ Θεαίτητε' ὥς pot 
δοκοῦμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γενήσεσθαι 
περὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς σκέψεως. 
But for βαβαί---ὡς δοκοῦμεν, cf. 
Rep. 2, 361 d, BaBai— φ. T., 
ὡς ἐρρωμένως κιτιλ. I propose 
merely to omit ἂν, which has 
probably crept in from supra a, 
Δεινὸν μέντ᾽ ἂν, and render, “Ah 
me! on the contrary, Theztetus, 
how I fear that we shall only 
now begin to know the diffi- 
culty of the question about 
Being.” 

10. Πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτ᾽ εἴρηκας] 
The form of this question 
determines the punctuation of 
the more frequent form, πῶς τί 
τοῦτ᾽ εἶπες : not mos; τί τοῦτ᾽ 
εἶπες ; 

14. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν] Sc. φαινόμεθά 
τι λέγειν. 

οὕτως ἔχοντες) Sc. ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ 
τῇ πλείστῃ ὄντες. 


iZ 


. 240. 
0. 250. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 133 


EE. Zkore δὴ σαφέστερον, εἰ ταῦτα viv Evv- 
ομολογοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ἐπερωτηθεῖμεν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ 
τότε ἠρωτῶμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ πᾶν θερμὸν 
καὶ ψυχρόν. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα ; ὑπόμνησόν με. 5 

ΞΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: καὶ πειράσομαί γε δρᾷν 
τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν σὲ καθάπερ ἐκείνους τότε, ἵνα ἅμα τι 
καὶ προΐωμεν. 

ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθώς. 

EE. Elev δή, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἄρ᾽ οὐκ ἐναν- το 
τιώτατα λέγεις ἀλλήλοις : 

ΘΕΑΙ. las γὰρ οὔ: 

EE. Καὶ μὴν eivai γε ὁμοίως φὴς ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ 
καὶ ἑκάτερον ; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. 


53 ΄σ 7ὔ 
BE. ἾΑρα κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφότερα καὶ ἑκάτε- 


ΤῸ 


ρον, ὅταν εἶναι συγχωρῇς: 

ΘΕΑΙ. Ovdapas ; 

EE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἑστάναι σημαίνεις, λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφό- 
τερα εἶναι; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ras ; 


mE ἤν / yf A ΄σ ἈΝ x ΕῚ la a 
we Lh. βριτοὸν apa TL TAaPA TAVTA TO OV EV Τῇ ψυχῇ 


20 


1. Σκόπει-- ψυχρόν] “ Con- ἵνα ἅμα τι καὶ προΐωμεν] 


For this 

definition 
is open to 
the same 


question 
with which 
we assailed 
the dualists 
in our pre- 
vious argu- 
ment. 
Motionand 
rest are 
opposites. 
Yet both 
are, and 
have part 
in Being. 


Being, 
however, 
is distinct 
from both, 
For when 
we say, 
‘Both are,’ 
we do not 
mean that 
both are in 
motion, or 
that both 
are at rest. 
Hence 
Being em- 
braces 
both, and 
both par- 
take of 


sider then more completely 
whether in accepting this con- 
clusion we do not now deserve 
to be troubled with the ques- 
tion which we ourselves asked 
of those who said that the 
Universe was Heat and Cold.” 

6. δρᾷν τοῦτο] Se. ὑπομνῆ- 
oat σε. 

7. τότε] Supr. 243 6: τί τὸ 
εἶναι τοῦτο ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν ; 
πότερον τρίτον K.T.A. 


“That, while I recal this to 
your memory, we may advance 
a step in the argument.” Cf. 
Rep. 1, 346 a: καὶ, ὦ μακάριε, 
μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι 
καὶ περαίνωμεν. 

19. Ἀλλ᾽ ἑστάναι] For this 
use οἵ ἀλλὰ, cf. Rep. 2, 382 6: 
ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύ- 


δοιτο : 
22. ἐν τῇ ψυχῇῇ Cf. Rep. 
6, 484 Cc: μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν 


Being. But 
Being is 
different 
from them 
both, and, 
in virtue of 
her own 
nature, 
neither 
rests nor 
moves. 


134 


7 ε pee ee | 7, , ‘ , 
τιθείς, ὡς UT ἐκείνου τὴν TE στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν p. 250.4) 


ΠΛΆΤΟΝΟΣ 


/ , Ν > Ν > a Ν Ἁ 
περιεχομένην συλλαβὼν, καὶ ἀπιδὼν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν 


a > / / “ 3 “ > ΄ 
ΤῊ" ουσιᾶς KOLVMVIAY, OVUTWS εἰναι 7 POO ELTTES ἀμφο- 


τερα: 


OEAI. Κινδυνεύομεν ὡς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομαν- 


, , \ yd “ , Ν ΄ 9 
τευεσθαί TL TO OV, OTQV κινηῆσιν και στασιν ειναι 


λέγωμεν. 


7 ΄ 
EE. Οὐκ apa κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ ξυναμφό- 


Ἂν ΒΕ. > sO / / 
τερον TO OV, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον On TL τούτων. 


OEAI. Ἔοικεν. 


\ \ « a / 77 Ὧν ἢ, 7 σ 
EE. Κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν apa τὸ ὃν οὔτε ἔστη- 


κεν οὔτε κινεῖται. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν. 


a \ Χ ’ὔ 3, / \ 
SE. Ποῖ δὴ χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔτι τρέπειν τὸν 


τῇ Ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα. 
Theet. 155 Ὁ : ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι 
ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται ἐν τῇ 
ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ. 

I. ὡς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου τήν τε στά- 
σιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην 
συλλαβών] By deleting the 
comma after περιεχομένην the 
syntax is improved; and the 
inverted order of the words is 
in keeping with the style of 
the dialogue. “So then you 
conceived of Being as a third 
and distinct kind, under which, 
as embraced by it, you com- 
prehended motion and rest, and 
fixing your attention on their 
common participation in Being, 
you thus applied the term ‘ex- 
istent’ to them both.” 

5. ἀπομαντεύεσθαι] 1. 6. This 
truth of reflection is implied 
in language. Compare Rep. 
6,505 e: ὃ δὴ διώκει πᾶσα ψυχὴ 
ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι. 


8. Οὐκ ἄρα----τούτων] “ Being, 
then, is not motion and rest 
taken together, but is distinct 
from these.” 

11. Kara—xweiral] In the 
spirit of the Parmenides it is 
shewn that Being, which has 
just been said to include rest 
and motion, in its own nature 
neither rests nor moves. For 
the position of οὐκ, which is 
emphatic, cf. Theet. 161 a: 
ὡς οὐκ av ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα. 

The search for Being seems 
here to be relinquished as 
hopeless. The thread of argu- 
ment is not dropt, however ; 
for it is this absolute sever- 
ance of Being from rest and 
motion, after seeming to in- 
clude them, which suggests 
the fresh inquiry concerning 
the nature of difference or 
negation. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


/ 
βαιώσασθαι ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. ot yap ; 


135 


, 3 “ ΄ ΄σ 
: 250. βουλόμενον ἐναργές τι περὶ αὐτοῦ παρ᾽ ἑαυτῷ βε- 


5 \ / 3, CL > , 
EE. Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμόσε ἔτι ῥᾷδιον. εἰ yap τι 


\ an a > -ἦ ΕΝ Ν a c Ν 
μὴ κινεῖται, πῶς οὐχ ἕστηκεν; ἢ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἑστὸς 5 


an > 3 a ὧν VON cuss na ’ Ν , 
d πῶς Οὐκ QU KLVELTAL : TO δὲ ον ἡμὶν νυν EKTOS TOUT@V 


3 7 3 / 3 Ἀ 5 ~ 
ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπέφανται. ἢ δυνατὸν οὖν τοῦτο ; 


SEAL. Πάντων μὲν οὖν ἀδυνατώτατον. 


BE. Τόδε τοίνυν μνησθῆναι δίκαιον ἐπὶ τούτοις. 


GEAI. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


[4 ἴω Χ 7 / 3, 
ΞΕ. Ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐρωτηθέντες τοὔνομα ἐφ᾽ 


“ 


μέμνησαι ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς γὰρ οὔ; 


— a 5 om 2 , A 9 x » ͵ 
SE. Μῶν οὖν ἐν ἐλαττονί τινι νῦν ἐσμὲν ἀπορίᾳ 15 


ἊΝ \ yf 
περὶ TO OV; 


/ las / ’ , ᾿ / 
ὅ τί ποτε δεῖ φέρειν, πάσῃ συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορίᾳ, 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ ξένε, εἰ δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν 


πλείονι φαινόμεθα. 


SE. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορη- 


? 5 Χ NFS 2 , ΔΟὄ \ XN S\N > 
μένον" ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐξ ἴσου TO TE ὃν Kal TO μὴ ὃν ἀπο- 


I. ἐναργές tu] Cf. ἐναργῶς, 
supr. p. 242 6. 

map ἑαυτῷ] Cf, Thest. 146 
e: λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ, 
and note. 

4. ἀναπέφανται] 
up before us.” 


“Has risen 


Cf. Theset. 


155 b: ἅττα πότ᾽ ἐστι ταῦτα τὰ ~ 


φάσματα ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῆ. 
Supr. 231 Ὁ : ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ 
παραφανέντι. Meno 85 d: ἀνα- 
κεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται. 

II. Ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος] These 
words are in construction with 
μέμνησαι. The thing which is 
“worth taking note of” is not 


this, but the following remark, 
for which this prepares the way. 

12. συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορίᾳ] Supr. 
237-239. Cf. Theet. 165 b, ἐν 
φρέατι συνεχόμενος, where the 
metaphor is more distinctly 
kept in view. 

18. φαινόμεθα]! For the el- 
lipse, cf. Theset. 172 ¢ : Οὐκοῦν 
σχόλην ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες. 5. 
Φαινόμεθα. 

19. διηπορημένον͵]; “A diffi- 
culty clearly stated.” The 
word occurs in Plato in this 
technical sense only in the 
Sophist, Politicus, and Laws. 


Now it is 
hard to 
conceive 
thatathing 
which is 
not at rest 
is not in 
motion, or 
vice versa. 
Here, 
therefore, 
we may 
take note 
that we 


have found 
the defini- 
tion of 
Being not 


10 Jess diffi- 


20 


cult than 
that of 
Not-Being. 
Whence 
we derive 
a sort of 
despairing 
hope, that 
if a ray of 
light is cast 
on the one 
perplexity, 
it may sug- 
gest a solu- 
tion for the 
other. And, 
if the worst 
come to the 
worst, we 
shall try to 


steer the 


bark of our 


discourse 
between 
this Seylla 
and that 
Charybdis 
with as 
little dis- 
grace as 
may be, 


136 


ITAATQNOZ 


, “- ᾽ 3 “ δ 
ρίας μετειλήφατον, νῦν ἐλπὶς ἤδη, καθ᾿ ἅπερ ἂν Pp. 250}: 


> “ ’, 7 ’ / 7 / 
αὐτῶν Oarepov εἰτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον 


᾽ / \ , “ ᾽ / Ξ Ν 
ἀναφαίνηται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι: καὶ 


aay 5 ΄, ΩΝ σ᾿ ΄ὔ \ = , 
ἐὰν αὖ μηδέτερον ἰδεῖν δυνώμεθα, Tov γοῦν λόγον, 


Ψ Ἂ er 3 ’ , ΄ 
5O0TNTEP ἄν οἷοί TE ὦμεν εὐπρεπέστατα, διωσόμεθα 


4 > o 4 
οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἅμα. 


2. εἴτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σα- 
φέστερον] The latter is chiefly 
meant, but the former is in- 
troduced in accordance with 
Plato’s wish to omit no aspect 
of a case. Cf. Rep. 1, 339 b: 
οὔπω δῆλον οὐδ᾽ εἰ μεγάλη. 

5. διωσόμεθα] “We shall 
fend off our argument from 
both:” “Steer clear of them,” 
as between Scylla and Cha- 
rybdis, or the Symplegades. 
(Cf. Hom. Od. 12, 219: ἐκτὸς 
ἔεργε via.) Compare the use 
of διωθεῖσθαι in Herodotus 
and in Democr. Fr. Ethic. 
20: kal οὐκ ὀλίγας κῆρας ἐν τῷ 
βίῳ διώσεαι, φθόνον καὶ ζῆλον καὶ 
dvopevinv. The construction, 
however, is different here, and 
has driven the editors to con- 
jecture — Heindorf διωξόμεθα, 
Stallbaum διασωσόμεθα, C. F. 
Hermann διαθησόμεθα. Of these 
Stallbaum’s correction is the 
best, although not agreeing 
well with etmperéorara. But 
the construction may be de- 
fended, if we take the words 
to mean literally “We shall 
push our argument (vessel) 
through between them both 
(or, so as to avoid both at 
once) with such appearance as 
we may.” The genitive ἀμφοῖν 
is then governed by the διὰ in 
composition. Cf. Polyb. 22. 
11, 17 : διωθ. τὰς σαρίσσας διὰ 
τῶν τρημάτων. 


3adham defends the text on 
slightly different grounds. His 
note deserves insertion here: 
“Juxta difficile esse ostendit, id 
quod est atque id quod non est 
explicare. Hine auguratur, si 
quid lucis utrivis horum 81- 
cunde accedat, fore etiam ut 
alterum discerni possit: sin 
ambo in tenebris maneant, 
quid tum?  Disputationem, 
servabimus, disponemus, per- 
sequemur ? Imo, ita repelle- 
mus, ut si quis ex ejus quod 
non est natura negotium nobis 
facessit, eundem in eo quod 
est haud minus sibi contradi- 
centem efficiamus. Accedit 
quod cum hoe verbo et hae 
sententia εὐπρεπέστατα egregié 
convenit, at non cum con- 
trarid notione, que conjecturis 
supra commemoratis inest : 
parum enim hospitem Eleati- 
cum Sophistis infensum dece- 
ret speciosam disputationem 
promittere.” It may be enough 
in order to defend our interpre- 
tation from this last objection 
to refer the student to Thez- 
tetus 196 e, where the con- 
fession of shamelessness is 


‘immediately followed by an 


avowal of the determination 
to continue the argument, and 
to infr. 254 d, supr. 241 d, 
especially the word βιάζεσθαι. 
The unattainableness of a per- 
fectly; “ reasoned” method is 


Ρ. 251 





ye 251. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Καλῶς. 


Lor 


μ-- 4 o , ΄ 
SE. Λέγωμεν δὴ καθ᾽ ὅν τινά ποτε τρόπον πολ- 


- > / DSN “ « Δ ’ 
λοις ονομασι TAVUTOV τοῦτο εκάστοτε τρροσαγορεῦύομεν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οἷον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ. 


/ 3, ᾽ 
BE. Λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δή που πόλλ᾽ ἀττα ἐπο- 


7. ΄ὔ ͵7ὔ / > “~ Ν \ 
VOMACOVTES, TA TE KPWUATA ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ και τὰ 


, Yj 7 ? > ec 
σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας Kal ἀρετάς, ἐν οἷς 


bod ἈΝ id / Ie » / 57 SAN 
πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὑτὸν 


3 , 5 \ Ν 3 Χ Ἄν Ὅν 37 Ν 
εἰναι φαμέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἄπειρα, καὶ 


Sy \ \ Ν EEN , “ A “ 
τάλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἕν ἕκαστον 


continually rising up before 
Plato. 

2. πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταὐτὸν 
τοῦτο] This recals the saying 
of Euclides, that the good was 
ἕν, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον, 
and in so far confirms the 
impression that the Megarians 
have been under criticism in 
what precedes. In this and 
other expressions they had 
perhaps implied a “commu- 
nion” of unity with variety, 
which was inconsistent with 
their logical principles. Com- 
pare also the saying quoted 
in Republic 6, 505 6, probably 
from the same source, that 
TO ἀγαθὸν 15 φρόνησις ἀγαθοῦ, 
whose authors failed in their 
attempt to isolate the concep- 
tion of good. 

We are now introduced to a 
new sort of philosophers, who 
serve (like the δυσχερεῖς of the 
Philebus) to reduce those just 
mentioned to the point of ab- 
surdity, and by a crucial in- 
stance to bring the question 
to a clear issue. They are the 
same who are ridiculed in the 


Euthydemus, and amongst 
them Antisthenes is most pro- 
bably included, whether or 
not the word ὀψιμαθέσι and 
the phrase ὑπὸ πενίας τ. τ. φ. 
kr. are meant to convey a co- 
vert allusion to him. The 
passage certainly reads like 
personal satire. Compare Phi- 
lebus, pp. 13,14, where a dif- 
ferent aspect of the same “child- 
ish puzzle” is described, and 
contrasted with the dialectical 
One and Many; as also in 
Parm.129 ¢,d. See also Phileb. 
37 6. Cognate difficulties re- 
specting Predication are noticed 
by Aristotle, Phys. I. 2, § 15: 
οἱ μὲν τὸ ἔστιν ἀφεῖλον, ὥσπερ 
Λυκόφρων" οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερ- 
ρύθμιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευ- 
Kos ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λελεύκωται"--να 
μὴ---πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἕν. 
For ἐσπουδακόσιν infra, ef. supr. 
216 b: 
ἐσπουδακότων. 

3. τοῦτο] I. 6. “Anything 
which happens to be in ques- 
tion.” Cf. Theet. 199 a: μὴ 
yap ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου 
οἷόν τε, and note. 


΄ A A »” 
τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας 


II. b. 3. 


) 

Let us now 
examine 
what we 
mean by 
giving 
many 
names to 
one thing : 
as white, 
tall, good, 
bad, to 
man: 
whereby 
we afford 
excellent 
diversion 
το to the wits 

of youth, 


and of cer- 
tain an- 
cient tyros, 
who, from 
their po- 
verty in 
the having 
of wisdom, 
take pride 
in erying 
out upon 
us that we 
have made 
the one 
many and 
the many 
one. They 
will allow 
us to say 
that good 
is good,and 
manisman: 
but not 
that man 
is good. 
Such are 
the refine- 
ments on 
which they 
spend a be- 
lated en- 
thusiasm. 


To omit no 
aspect of 
thought on 
the subject 
of Being, 


7 / > A Ἀ lad » , 
ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ονομασι P. 25}}}} 


λέγομεν. 


OEAI. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις. 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


=B ὍΘ 53 “ ’ ἊΝ “ / 
pe J. EV VE, οιμαι, τοις TE VEOLS Και τῶν YEPOV~ 


a ᾿ 7, 7, ΄ »>n 
5τῶν τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν᾽ evOus 


\ ’ Ἀ la 
yap ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ws ἀδύνατον Ta 


Ἀν ἃ Ν aA \ 95 Ν la / 
τε πολλὰ ἕν Kal TO Ev πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ On που χαΐῖ- 


> In \ ΕἾ κ be 
ρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλα τὸ 


μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. 


» A 7, 5 / e > 5 , 
τιοεντυγχάνεις yap, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ws ἐγῴμαι, πολλάκις 


Ν “ 3 Ν Sus, IZ > 
τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακοσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἂν- 


/ Ν « Ἁ / al ΄ / 
θρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ Ppovnaw κτήσεως 


\ “ / Ἂς U4 Ν ΄ 
Ta τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δὴ TL καὶ πάσσοφον 


/ ~ ? SEN > / 
οἰομένοις TOUT QUTO AVEUPT/KEV AL. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


EB Ἵ , Ν Ω͂ can ε ro 53 
omy Sa Va TOWVY προς ATAVTAaS MW ὁ oyos 7 


\ / Ἂν 3 7] Ν « lal Ἢ 
τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁτιοῦν διαλεχθέντας, 


» δὰ ἊΝ ᾽ὔ Ν Ν Ν + σ 
Εστὼ καὶ προς TOVTOVS KAL προς τοὺς ἄλλους, οσοις 


ἔμπροσθεν διειλέγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἐρωτήσει λεχθη-- 


΄ 


we address 20 σομενᾶ. 


to these, as 
well as to 
the rest, 
the follow- 
ing ques- 
tion: 

Shall we 
conceive 


SEAT. Ta ποῖα δή ; 


ΠῚ Πό ’ Χ 3 , , Ν 4 
ea OTEPOV ITE τὴν ουσιᾶν KLYNOELE Και OTAGEL 


προσάπτωμεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μηδὲν μηδενί, GAN 


12. πενίας ---κτήσεως)] Geni- 
tive of respect: “" Poverty in 
respect of the possession of 
knowledge.” The tautology has 
been objected to, but might 
be paralleled from many pas- 
sages in these dialogues. Some 
passages in the Memorabilia 
and Symposium of Xenophon 
make it probable that these 
words contain a personal allu- 
sion to Antisthenes. 


τῆς περὶ τὴν φρόνησιν κτή- 
σεως] Cf. Polit. 281 6: τῆς 
περὶ τὰ ἀμφιέσματα γενέσεως. 

13. πάσσοφον οἰομένοις] ΟΥ̓ 
Pheedo go 6 : οἴονται σοφώτατοι 
γεγονέναι τε καὶ κατανενοηκέναι 
μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων 
οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὔτε τῶν 
λόγων. 

18. ἔστω] Se. λεγόμενα, from 
τὰ---λεχθησόμενα infra. 


d 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


139 


« 7 7 / / / 
251. ὡς ἄμικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἀλλή- 


252. 


iva > ‘ > rn > c lad / θῶ 3 
λων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς Tap ημῖν λογοῖς τιθώμεν ; 


Ἃ 7 > SiON 7 « \ > 
ἢ πάντα εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυνάγωμεν ws δυνατὰ ἐπικοινω- 


- ᾽ / Ἂ \ / \ \ / / 2 
νεῖν aAAnAos ; ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δὲ μὴ; Τούτων, ᾧ 


/ ΕΝ Ἁ lal , 
Θεαίτητε, τί ποτ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φήσαιμεν ; 5 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Εγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς 


A > ,ὔ / 5 » > A » ΄ 
TQAUTA ἀποκρίνασθαι. Tl OUY OU καθ εν ἀποζκρινο- 


OV AAS 7 \ / 5 / 
μενος ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου Ta ξυμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω ; 


mE. Καλῶς λέγεις, καὶ τιθῶμέν γε αὐτοὺς λέγειν, 


εἰ βούλει, πρῶτον μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν 


27 ΄ i 
EXEL κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν. 


3 a / , 
οὐκοῦν κίνησίς TE καὶ 


’ὔ ΕῚ lal ͵ > / 
στασις οὐδαμῇ μεθέζετον OVOLAS ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. 


Ἐπεὶ / - 27 “ 5 lal 5 / Ἁ 
mE. Τὸ δέ; ἐσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ 


προσκοινωνοῦν : 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔσται. 


= XN XN / a ? 
GE. Ταχὺ δὴ ταύτῃ ye τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα 


I. ἄμικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον 
(sc. ὃν) μεταλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλων] 
The sentence changes to the 
impersonal form. ἀδύνατον Bodl. 
ΔΠ. Οὐδ. ἀδύνατα. 

6. ᾿Εγὼ μὲν ---- Καλῶς λέγεις] 
“Personesic distribuendze: ᾿Εγὼ 
μὲν---ἀποκρίνασθαι : Ti οὖν----ἐσκέ- 
Wo: Καλῶς λέγεις : Καὶ τιθῶμέν 
γ᾽ αὐτοὺς κατιλ. Hic, ut ubique, 
respondentis partes Thezeteto 
tribuuntur: sed fraudem fecit 
librariis initium sermonis καὶ 
τιθῶμέν ye, qui abruptior illis 
visus est, non animadvertenti- 
bus Hospitis verba ex lis que 
supra dixerat continuari.” Bad- 
ham. Perhaps: but καὶ τιθῶ- 
μεν ye x.7.A. seems too abrupt in 
the rejoinder, and in point of 
fact it is the Stranger who now 
proceeds to “give each answer 


at 


in succession.” 

7. τί οὖν ov] “Suppose you 
say Yes to each alternative in 
turn, and see what follows in 
each several case.” 

10. μηδενὶ] Governed by koz- 
yvovids. 

ΤΙ. eis μηδέν] “ For any re- 
sult.” 

14. ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν] “Can 
either of them be, without par- 
ticipating in Being ?” 

17. Ταχὺ δὴ] Compare Theet. 
183 a, where the assertion of 
absolute relativity is similarly 
reduced to nothingness (ro & 
ὡς ἔοικεν, avn, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, 
πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου 
ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ 
οὕτω τ᾽ ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω), 
and ibid. τότ e. 

πάντα 


a 
av τις 
εἶναι, 


ἀνάστατα 


γέγονεν] 


9 
a 


and reason 
of Being, 
Motion, 
Rest, and 
all other 
things asin- 
communi- 
cable with 
each other? 
Or shall we 
bring all 
into com- 
munion 
indiscrimi- 
nately? Or, 
thirdly, 
shall we 
say that 
some have, 
and others 
have not, 
commu- 
nion ? 


If we adopt 
the first 
hypothesis, 
Motionand 
15 Rest are 
non-exist- 
ent, for 
they have 
no commu- 
nion with 
Being. 


Thus hayoe 
is made at 
once of all 
the philoso- 
phieswhich 
attribute 
Being to 
Motion, or 
to Rest, 
whether as 
One or 
Many. 


And all 
theories 

of compo- 
sition or 
division, 
whether 
into an in- 
finite or a 
fixed num- 
ber of ele- 
mental 
forms, whe- 
ther the 
union and 
partition 
are con- 
ceived as 
alternating 
or as ever 
going on 
together, 
are equally 


140 


my / ε "ὕ “ a ‘\ a 
ἀναστατα γέγονεν, WS EOLKEV, GUA TE TOV TO πᾶν Pp. 252 


ΠΛΑΤΏΩΏΝΟΣ 


΄ Ν lad « Δ ΄ / i ἂν > ” 
κινουντῶν και Τῶν WS EV LOTAVT@MVY καὶ OOOL KAT εἴδη 


Ao \ ὌΨΑ, « , "7 Φ / 3. Ἂς 
Τὰ OVTA KATA TAVUTA WOAVTWS εχοντα ειναι φασιν αει 


/ \ @ ,ὔ 5 ΄ cf ‘ 
TTQUVTES γὰρ OUTOL TO γε εἰναι σπροσάσπτοῦυσιν, οι μὲν 


"ὕ ΄σ / e \ 7 e tf 
δόντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως EDTHKOTA 


εἰναι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 


\ \ \ / \ 
SE. Kai μὴν καὶ ὅσοι τοτὲ μὲν ξυντιθέασι τὰ 


7 \ A ΄ ΕΣ > Δ Ν 5 ΓΌΟΝ 
πᾶντα, τοτὲ δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἶἰτε εἰς EV καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς 


3, 2 / yf σι / 
10 ἄπειρα ELTE εἰς περᾶς EXOVTA OTOLXELA διαιρούμενοι 


τς ᾽ fy i? « / \ = > 7 
καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως μὲν ἐαν ἐν μέρει 


a a / « 7 \ Sos ede tf \ 
τοῦτο τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἀεί, κατὰ 


7 7 / Ἂ » / > / y 
πάντα ταῦτα λέγοιεν ἂν οὐδέν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἐστι 


ξύμμιξις. 


15 ΘΒΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς. 


37 / ΕΝ » ’ 
SE. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάντων καταγελαστο- 


δ / € \ an / 
TaTa μετίοιεν τὸν λόγον οἱ μηδὲν ἐῶντες κοινωνίᾳ 


, e 7] 7, 7) 
παθήματος ἑτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν. 


“ All theories are hopelessly 
unsettled,” or “swept away.” 
“The ground is cut away 
from all.” 

I. ἅμα τε τῶν] Qu. an le- 
gend. ra? 

2. ὡς ἕν ἱστάντων] Se. τὸ 
πᾶν. 

kar εἴδη] “In several ab- 
stract forms.” 

8. Kai μὴν] This sentence 
refers wholly to Empedocles 
(cf. ἐν μέρει) and Heraclitus (cf. 
ἀεί), aS Heindorf justly ob- 
serves, unless some of the 
earlier Ionians (6. ο. Anaxime- 
nes) are included in the words 
ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄπειρα. 

12. κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα] These 
words resume the preceding 


clauses εἴτε----συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως 
“Tn all or any of these 
modes their theory is nothing 
worth.” ; 

16. Ἔτι τοίνυν] Cf. Euthyd. 
303 d: καὶ τόδε ad ἕτερον δημο- 
τικόν τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις" 
ὁπόταν φῆτε μήτε καλὸν εἶναι μη- 
δὲν μήτε ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα μήτε k.T.A. 
- τῷ ὄντι ξυρράπτετε τὰ στόματα 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων---ὗτι δὲ οὐ μόνον 
τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ----καὶ τὰ ὑμέ- 
τερα αὐτώ K.T.A. 

αὐτοὶ] The very men who 
deny predication, with whom 
we are now conversing, and on 
whose hypothesis the present 
argument is built. 

17. of μηδὲν ἐῶντες] “ Who 
forbid us to call anything, be- 


See, 
——— (EL. 


ὴ 
“4 


252. 
ο 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; 


141 


— a 5 , ᾽ ΄, 
EE. Τῷ τε εἶναί που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται 


πε Ν “ (el ef Ν “ > 
χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χωρὶς καὶ τῷ ἄλλων καὶ τῷ καθ 


CoN XQ / , Ὁ > na 57 SA 
QUTO Kal μυριοις ἑτέροις, ων AKPATELS OVTES εἴργεσθαι 


QA Ν / > ΄ / > + / 
καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται 5 


lad / Υ Ν / 7 » 
τῶν ἐξελεγξόντων, ἀλλὰ TO λεγόμενον οἴκοθεν τὸν 


΄ὔ Se ate) / By ’ Ν ε 
πολέμιον καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποφθεγ- 


/ eA Ν yx > / / 
γόμενον ὥσπερ Tov atomov KupuxAca, περιφέροντες 


SN he 
QEL TTOPEVOVT AL. 


cause partaking of some affec- 
tion from another thing, by 
the name of that other.” 
παθ. ἑτ. -- κοιν. τοῦ πάσχειν ὑφ᾽ 
ἐτ. Cf. supr. 245 a: πάθος τοῦ 
ἑνὸς ἔχειν. 

(18.) ἑτέρου is governed by πα- 
θήματος. Similar language occurs 
in the passage of the Philebus 
already cited, p. 13 a: ὅτι mpo- 
wayopevets 
ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι. 

2. Τῷ τε εἶναί που] Cf. Theet. 
157 b, 196 e, 202 a. 

3. ἄλλων] Qu. an legend. 
ἀλλήλων ἵ 

4. ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι 
καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις] 
ὧν is governed by εἴργεσθαι, but 
probably also connected by at- 
traction with ἀκρατεῖς. συν- 
ἄπτειν is used absolutely. “ So 
that having no power to re- 
frain from such expressions, or 
to banish connexion from their 
discourse.” 

6. ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον͵] “ But 
they always carry about their 
enemy, who haunts them, as 
the saying is, in their own 
house, and like the wondrous 
EKurycles, has a voice within 
them which mocks every syl- 
lable they utter.” Compare 


κοιν. 


> A 2 , el 
αὐτὰ, avopola ovTa, 


Cratyl. 428 ce, where the ac- 
count of self-deception is like 
that of self-contradiction here : 
ὅταν yap μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀποστατῇ 
ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ παρῇ ὁ ἐξαπατήσων, πῶς 
Cf. also Gorg. 482 
Ὁ: οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, 
ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν 
ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. 

8. τὸν ἄτοπον Ἑὐρυκλέα] (See 
Aristoph. Vesp. 1014.) Eury- 
cles was a ventriloquist pro- 
phet. This passage seems to 
imply that he made his voice 
sound as if from within the 
person consulting him; and 
this is also suggested by the 
Scholiast’s absurd gloss on 
ἄτοπον : Tov μὴ ἑδραῖον ἀλλ᾽ 
ἀεὶ ἐκτοπίζοντα λέγει. The story 
told by the Scholiast, that Eu- 
rycles suffered from having 
given an offensive response to 
some one, is probably a mis- 
taken attempt to explain the 
connexion between ὥσπερ --- 
Εὐρύκλεα and οἰκόθεν τὸν πολέ- 
μιον. 
is that they have their enemy 
and their opponent in their 
own breast, in the shape of a 
voice, which comes from within 
them, like the answer of Eury- 
cles, who used to speak in those 


ov δεινόν ; 


The meaning of course 


undone, if 
all combi- 
nation is 
denied. 


3ut the 
most com- 
plete dis- 
comfiture 
attends the 
enemies of 
predication 
themselves. 
For they 
cannot help 
applying to 
the subject 
of their 


discourse 
such words 
as $£16,1 
“apart,” 
“from 
others,” 
“by itself,” 
and have 
thus an 
adversary 
within, 
who saves 
our labour 
by convict- 
ing them 
of self-con- 
tradiction 
out of 
their own 
mouths. 
But if all 
things are 
allowed to 
have com- 
munion, 
Motion will 
rest and 
Rest will 
move. 

The third 
case alone 
remains : 
that some 
things 
enter into 
combina- 
tion, and 
some do 
not. 


142 ITAATQNO2 


a / “ / “Ὁ ’ 
OEAI. Κομιδῇ λέγεις ὁμοιὸν τε καὶ ἀληθές. 
τὰ ΄ > - , 
EE. Ti δ᾽, av πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐῶμεν δύναμιν 
ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μὲν οἷός τε κἀγὼ διαλύειν. 
5 WE. [Ids ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι κίνησίς τε αὐτὴ παντάπασιν ἵσταιτ᾽ 
Ἂ Ud 3 “ 5 
ἂν καὶ στάσις αὖ πάλιν αὐτὴ κινοῖτο, εἴπερ ἐπιγιγνοί- 
σθὴην ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοιν. 
HE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις 
το ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κίνησίν τε ἵστασθαι καὶ στάσιν 
κινεῖσθαι. 
BEAT. Las γὰρ οὔ: 
\ 
SE. To τρίτον δὴ μόνον λοιπόν. 
ΘΈΑΙ. Ναί. 
— Ν Χ o 7 , > “-“ x ΄ 
6 EH. Καὶ μὴν ἕν γέ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα 
ΩΝ \ x Ν \ 5 / Ν \ Χ ! 
ἢ μηδὲν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλειν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμίγνυσθαι. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Has γὰρ οὔ: 
XN 
HE. Καὶ μὴν τά ye δύο ἀδύνατον εὑρέθη. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 


20 (ΞΕ. Πᾶς ἄρα ὃ βουλόμενος ὀρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι 


Ν 


\ a lal , 
τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 


EE. Ὅτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τοῦτο δρᾷν, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ, 


who came to him. Cf. Rep. 7, 


521 b: οἰκεῖος ὧν καὶ ἔνδον ὁ 


ham conj. ἐπιμιγνύσθην. But οὗ 
Phileb. 37 ¢ : δόξῃ μὲν ἐπιγίγνε- 


τοιοῦτος πόλεμος αὐτούς τε ὄλλυσι 
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν. 

I. ὅμοίον τε καὶ ἀληθές] “Most 
true, your image is a very just 
one.” Cf. Rep. 8,579 d: Παν- 
τάπασιν, ἔφη, ὁμοιότατά τε καὶ 
ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. 

η. ἐπιγιγνοίσθην ἐπ᾿] ἐπιμι- 
γνοίσθην ἐπ᾿, YZ. Hence Bad- 


σθον ψεῦδος τε Kat ἀληθές. 

9. ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις] 
For the plur., compare Rep. 5, 
458d: ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνάγκαις: and 
for the whole expression, Tim. 
87 d: ov καλὸν ὅλον τὸ ζῶον---- 
ἀξύμμετρον γὰρ ταῖς μεγίσταις 
ξυμμετρίαις. 


Pp. 2529) 
ἃ 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


149 


Ἃ - \ / Lg ἃ 7 Ν \ 
253. σχεδὸν OLOV TA γραμματα πεπονθοτ᾽ ἂν εἰῆ. Kal yap 


» U ‘ \ ’ vad Ν ” \ \ 
ἐκείνων TA μέν ἀναρμοστεῖ που πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὰ δε 


/ 
Evvapporre: . 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ ; 


EE. Τὰ δέ γε φωνήεντα διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων 5 


Ὁ Ν \ / / a ” Ν 
OLOV δεσμὸς διὰ TTQAVT@V KEK @PIKEV, @MOTE AVEV τινος 


’ lal > / ε , Ν fas yf Ψ 
αὐτῶν ἀδυνατον ἁρμόττειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον 


δ 
ETEPO. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Kai μάλα ye. 


= an @ 53 « ΄ « / \ 
=E. Πᾶς οὗν οἶδεν ὁποῖα ὁποίοις δυνατὰ κοινω- 


la Ἃ γ al tal ,ὔ κω ε fal > , 
νεῖν, ἢ τέχνης δεῖ TH μέλλοντι δρᾷν ἱκανῶς αὐτὰ ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τέχνης. 


=E. Ποίας; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τῆς γραμματικῆς. 


ΞΕ. Ti δέ; περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων 


> » Ο ε \ \ 
φθόγγους ap οὐχ οὕτως ; ὁ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραννυ- 


1. σχεδὸν οἷον τὰ γράμματα] 
The example of letters is 
used to symbolize the nature 
of the ideas, as in Theet. 202 e 
(where it is shewn that the 
simple is known before the 
complex). Polit. 277, 278 (il- 
lustration of the argument 
from example). Rep. 3, 402 
(education in μουσική). Phileb. 
18 (science determining the 
infinite). In the Theetetus 
and Philebus the parallel il- 
lustration from musical notes 
is also adduced, as here. 

5. Ta δέ ye φωνήεντα---οἷον 
deopds] In this the vowels 
symbolize the highest ideas, or 
eategories, Being, Identity, and 
Difference. Compare Theet. 
107 d: in the image of the 
aviary, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν 
ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας---ὙὙΠΘΓΘ 


the same thing is intimated, 
and equally without explana- 
tion. 

7. apudtrew] Neuter verb. 

10. Πᾶς οὖν οἶδεν] Compare 
Crat. 388 d: πᾶς δὲ τέκτων ἢ ὁ 
τὴν τέχνην ἔχων ; 

11. δρᾷν ἱκανῶς aira] This 
expression has no distinct an- 
tecedent. But cf. Thext. 207 
d (in a similar connexion), 
δρῶντας αὐτά, and note. The 
conjectural emendation, ὁρᾷν, 
is therefore not absolutely re- 
quired ; though, if such were 
the true reading, it may easily 
have been corrupted from δρᾷν 
supr. 252 e. 

τό. ὁ---τέχνην ἔχων γιγνώσκειν 
“Who has the art of discern- 
ing.” For the inf., cf. Theet. 
169 a: ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν 
ἔχεις διαφέρειν. 3 


Just as of 
the letters 
of the al- 
phabet 
some can 
and others 
cannot be 
combined, 
and the 
same is 


true of mu- 
sical notes. 
It is also 
to be ob- 
served, 
that the 
vowels are 
distin- 
guished by 
the power 
which they 
have of 
entering 
into every 
combina- 
tion, and 
being 


15 indispen- 


sable to all. 
And as 
none but 


the gram- 
marian can 
tell which 
letters, and 
none but 
the musi- 
cian which 
notes, may 
or may not 
be com- 
bined, so 
none but 
the dialec- 
tician can 
tell what 
combina- 
tions of 
ideas are 
possible. 


144 


‘ ΄ ᾽ / ' 
μένους τε Kal μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γιγνώσκειν μουσικὸς, P- 253 jj 


« \ ‘\ Ν 37 
ὁ δὲ μὴ ξυνιεὶς ἄμουσος : 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


\ “ 3, Χ a \ > 
SE. Kai κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτε- 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; 


al A c / A 
5 XVLOV Τοιαυτὰ ευρησομεν ETEPA. 


ΞΕ. Ti δ᾽; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα 


\ 5 \ / 27 « / 3? > Ε] 
κατὰ ταῦυτα μίξεως EXELY ὡμολογήκαμεν, OP οὐ μετ 


5 / Ν ΄σ΄ \ ΄σ / ’ 
ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύ- 


\ “-“ ΄σ 
ιοεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποῖα ποίοις συμ- 


σι ΄ ΄- Ν ΄σ 32) 5 / Ν 
φωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται; καὶ 


\ N \ , > , nos 5 , WA 
δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντα Ταῦτ εστιν, WOTE 


/ \ 3 Ἂν ,ὔ 5 r 
συμμίγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι ; καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαι- 


7 > δι “ Ψ “- ,ὔ 3) 
βέσεσιν, ει Οἱ ολων ETEPA TNS διαιρέσεως αιτιᾶ 9 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδόν 


ye ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης ; 


4. τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνιῶν] “Arts 
and defects οἵ art’—which can 
only be determined by refer- 
ence to the standard of the 
corresponding arts. 

For the mode of expression, 
which arises from Plato’s love 
of complete statement, Hein- 
dorf well compares Legg. 2, 
653 6: οὐκ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τῶν 
ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσι τάξεων οὐδὲ ἀτα- 
ξιῶν, οἷς δὴ ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα καὶ 
ἁρμονία. Cf. also infr. 262 ο: 
πρᾶξιν οὐδ᾽ ἀπραξίαν. 

4. τὰ γένη] The word γένος 
is used instead of εἶδος in se- 
veral places of these dialogues, 
and also in the Parmenides, 
Philebus, Timzeus, and Laws. 
This is one of several points in 
which there appears a transi- 
tion in these dialogues towards 
the language of Aristotle. See 


esp. Parm. 135 Ὁ : ὡς ἔστι γένος 
τι ἑκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὗ- 
τήν. Phileb,12e: γένει μέν ἐστι 
πᾶν ἕν, τὰ δὲ μέρη κιτιλ. It will 
be observed that the word oc- 
curs here at the opening of an 
especially Platonic passage. 

8. μίξεως] Gen. of respect. 
Cf. Rep. 5, 456d: πῶς ἔχεις 
δόξης τοῦ τοιοῦδε πέρι. Alib. 

11. καὶ δὴ----εἶναι] “ And also 
whether there are any kinds 
which (like the vowels), being 
all-pervading, bind together 
these and make them capable 
of intermixture.” 

12. ταῦτα] Viz. τὰ συμφωνοῦντα 
τῶν γενῶν. 

14. εἰ δ ὅλων---αἴτια] Antici- 
pating the θατέρου φύσις which 
is presently discovered, διὰ πάν- 
τῶν διεληλυθυΐαν, p. 255. 








252. 


d 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


145 


= 4? S 3 a lal Ss. / 
aH. Ti οὖν αὖ viv προσεροῦμεν, © Θεαίτητε, 


, a Ν ἊΝ > Ἢ > Ν lal , 
TavTnv ; ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευ- 


4 » / ᾽ / / ς 
θέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζη- 


an ἣν \ / > Ν 
Τουνῖτῖες TOV σοφιστὴν 7 POTEPOV ἀνευρηκέναι TOV 


φιλόσοφον ; 
OEAI. Πώς λέγεις ; 


bai \ \ ’ a > 
BE. To κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταὐτὸν 


5 cod ᾿ - ’ 7 -“ AY ἐπ A 
εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μῆτε ἕτερον ὃν ταὐτὸν μῶν 


οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι; 
GEAI. Ναί, φήσομεν. 


EE. Οὐκοῦν 6 γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾷν μίαν ἰδέαν 


A ral ΟΝ CQ / , / 
δια πολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, παντὴ δια- 


’, « a is Ν \ ΘΟ 
τεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλᾶς ἑτέρας 


> , € Ν la yay / Ν / 5 
ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομενας, καὶ μίαν αὖ 


δὲ ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ ξυνημμένην, καὶ πολλὰς 


2. τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων Al- 
though the Stranger was not 
present at the conversation of 
yesterday, he is made to allude 
to the description of the philo- 
sophic life which Socrates had 
then given. Theet. 172, sqq. 
Such a failure of the dramatic 
element could have no place 
in the Charmides, Protagoras, 
or Pheedrus, and is rather in 
the manner of the Laws. 

7. μήτε ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον--- 
ταὐτὸν] This closely corresponds 
with the account of dialectic in 
the Pheedrus, 265 ἃ, e. 

τι. OvKodv —ériotacbar|“Then 
surely he who can do this is 
able clearly to perceive one 
form pervading many indivi- 
duals which lie apart, and many 
forms distinct from one an- 
other, comprehended from with- 
out by one, and again, one form 


U 


pervading many such wholes, 
and knit together in a single 
unity, and many entirely sun- 
dered and apart. And this is 
to have the science of discern- 
ing in each kind wherein things 
admit of communion, and 
wherein they do not.” 

μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν] Com- 
pare Phileb. τό d, e; Legg. 
12, 965 ¢: ἄρ᾽ οὖν ἀκριβεστέρα 
σκέψις θέα τ᾽ ἂν περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὅτῳ- 
οὖν γίγνοιτο ἢ τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν 
ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνομοίων δυνα- 
τὸν εἶναι βλέπειν. 

12. ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρίς] 
Cf. Tim. 83 ὁ : καὶ τὸ μὲν κοινὸν 
ὄνομα πᾶσι τούτοις ἤ τινες τῶν 
ἰατρῶν που χόλον ἐπωνόμασαν ἢ 
καί τις ὧν δυνατὸς εἰς πολλὰ μὲν 
καὶ ἀνόμοια βλέπειν, ὁρᾷν δ᾽ ἐν 
αὐτοῖς ἕν γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυ- 
μίας πᾶσι. Pheedr. 265. 

15. δ ὅλων πολλῶν] These 


ο 


In search- 
ing for the 
Sophist we 
have found 
the philo- 
sopher, the 
“ freeman 
whom the 
truth 
makes 
free.” For 
dialectic 

is his pro- 
vince, that 
is, the art 
by which 
one form is 
seen per- 
vading a 
scattered 
multitude, 
and many 
distinct 
forms as 
contained 
in one, and 
again, one 


15 form com- 


bined from 


many such 
general 
forms, and 
several 
universals, 
by the 
boundaries 
of defini- 
tion wholly 
sundered 
from all 
else. 

This is the 
knowledge 
of the com- 
munionand 
incommu- 
nicableness 
of kinds. 
In this 
sphere the 
philoso- 
pher is to 
be sought 
when 

his turn 
shall come, 
and, like 
theSophist, 
he is not 
easily dis- 


146 


χωρὶς πάντῃ διωρισμένας. 


MAATOQNOS 


a ᾽ 4 e 
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστιν, ἢ TE Ῥ. 253.}}} 


a “ / , a / ὃ / \ e 
KOLY@VELY EKAOTA δύναται και O77) PB), LAK PLVELV κατα 


/ > / 
γένος ἐπίστασθαι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


EE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ 


΄ ε 59, \ “ lal Ν / 
δώσεις, ὡς ἐγῴμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς TE καὶ δικαίως 


φιλοσοφοῦντι. 


- 


ΘΈΑΙ. Πῶς yap av ἄλλῳ δοίη τις ; 


Υ 
EE. Τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ 


Ν la ἃς yf 3 7 xX lal > ΄σ 
Ιοκαὶ νυν και €E7TELTA ἀνευρήσομεν, εαν ζητῶμεν, ἰδεῖν 


Ν a a “ XN / 
μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐναργῶς καὶ τοῦτον, ἕτερον μὴν τρόπον 


“ A an 7 σ ΄ 
ἢ τε τοῦ σοφιστοῦ χαλεπότης ἢ τε TOUTOU. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; 


ἘΠῊϊ ‘O \ ’ ὃ ὃ ’ ΟῚ \ lat \ yf 
pay La. μεν ATTOOLOPADK@V εἰς THY TOV μὴ OVTOS 


7 ΄σ ΄ aS x ἣν 
το σκοτεινοτητα, τριβῇ προσαπτομενος αὑτῆς, διὰ TO 


\ π᾿ ΄ a , 5 , 
OKOTELVOV TOU TOTTOU κατανοῆσαι χαάλεπος. ω) yap 5 


wholes are the ideas just men- 
tioned, each of which extends 
to many individuals. Many 
particulars are comprised in 
one universal, and many such 
universals again unite in one. 

(1 5.) ἐν ἑνὶ] Se. ὅλῳ, or, abso- 
lutely, “in one.” Cf. Thezt. 
157 ἃ: ἐπὶ ἑνός, Legg. 4,718 6: 
ἐν ἑνὶ περιλαβόντα οἷόν τινι τύπῳ. 

6. καθαρῶς] 1.6. Without ad- 
mixture of unphilosophic ele- 
ments ; “one who has risen into 
the region of pure thought.” 
δικαίως, 1.e. neither ἀναξίως (Rep. 
5, 495) hor παρανόμως (Ib. 7, 
538, 9). For καθαρῶς, cf. Pheedo 
65¢, 67a, b, 69 Ὁ. And for 
δικαίως, cf. Pheedo 83 a: of δι- 
καίως φιλομαθεῖς. 

10. καὶ ἔπειτα] Viz. In the 
“ Philosopher,” about the pro- 
duction of which, however, 


some doubt is implied in the 
words ἐὰν (ytGpev. Cf. infr, b: 
ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν 7. From 
which it may perhaps be in- 
ferred that Plato deliberately 
relinquished the task of writ- 
ing the Philosophus dialogue. 

11. ἕτερον μὴν τρόπον] Se. ἐστὶν 
ΟΥ̓ γίγνεται. 

15. τριβῇ] τριβὴ (“ knack,” 
“rule of thumb,”) is several 
times opposed even more 
strongly than ἐμπειρία to 
knowledge and art, and is 
pointedly applied in the Phe- 
drus and Gorgias to the so- 
phistical rhetoric. Phedr. 260 
Θ: οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, GAN ἄτε- 
xvos τριβή. Ib. 270 b. Gorg. 
463 Ὁ: οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμ- 
πειρία καὶ τριβῆ. See also Phi- 
lebus 55 6: τὰς αἰσθήσεις κατα- 
μελετᾷν ἐμπειρίᾳ καί τινι τριβῇ, 


Ρ. 254: 


, 254. 


ΣΘΦΙΣΤΗ͂Σ. 


ἼΠοικεν. 


OEAI. 


147 


EE. Ὃ δέ ye φιλόσοφος, τῇ Tod ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ 


Lo) / > / Ν Ν Ν 53 a 
λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ, διὰ TO λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς 


7 ΕῚ a > \ > ω 
χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετὴς ὀφθηναι" 


τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν 


πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὄμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφο- 


a ff 
ρῶντα ἀδύνατα. 


ΘΙΕΑΙ. Καὶ ταῦτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἧττον ἐκείνων οὕτως 


2, 
eXely δ 


3 ΄ \ 7 / [4 
EE. Οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψό- 


/ ΩΝ 3, 2 tS 3 \ 
μεθα σαφέστερον, av ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ἢ" περὶ δὲ 


lad a lal e > > / Ν ΕΝ 
τοῦ σοφιστοῦ που δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀνετέον, πρὶν ἂν 


ε ro ἌΝ / 
ἱκανῶς αὑτὸν θεασώμεθα. 


ταῖς τῆς στοχαστικῆς προσχρω- 
μένους δυνάμεσιν (which are 
here opposed to the essential 
elements of art). The word 
probably retains in this place 
something of the original sen- 
suous meaning: the Sophist, 
from frequent contact, knows 
how to feel his way in the 
dark cave in which he lurks. 
And perhaps it is further 
hinted that he is the true ma- 
terialist who gropes by the 
touch (τριβῇ προσαπτόμενος), 
and is blind to the light of 
heaven. 

2. διὰ λογισμῶν] “Through 
reasoning.” Opposed to τριβῇ. 
Cf. supr. 248 a. 

3. προσκείμενος] “ Clinging 
to.” Cf. Rep. 6, 490 Ὁ : ἀλλ’ 
ἴοι Kat οὐκ ἀπαμβλύνοιτο οὐδ᾽ ἀπο- 
λήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος K.-T.) Ib. 511}: 
ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ avur οθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν 
τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰὼν, ἁψάμενος 
αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενον τῶν ἐκεί- 
νης ἐχομένων K.T.A. 

4. τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν] 
The image of the cave in the 
Republic will occur to every 


τ 


reader. Cf. esp. Rep. 7, 518: 
διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται 
ἐπιταράξεις (1 ἐπιγιγν. ταρ. 1) ὀμ- 
μάσιν κιτλ. See also the re- 
markable passage in the Laws, 
10, 897 d: μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας 
οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, νύκτα 
ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώ- 
μεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτε 
θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ 
γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς κιτιλ. Com- 
pare with the whole passage 
Bacon, Advancement of Learn- 
ing (Ellis and Spedding’s edi- 
tion), vol. ili. p.286: “Were it 
not better for a man in a fair 
room to set up one great light, 
or branching candlestick of 
lights, than to go about with a 
small watch candle into every 
corner 2” 

9. καὶ τάχ] For τάχα = mox, 
“presently,” cf. Phil. 53e: Τάχα 
S—paddov μαθησόμεθα προελθόν- 
τος τοῦ λόγου : 4110. The sub- 
ject has been already proposed 
by Socrates, and will be ex- 
amined presently, as soon as 
the Sophist and Statesman shall 
have been defined. 


9 
~ 


σι 


μι 


cerned: but 
for a differ- 
ent reason. 
The So- 
phist lurks 
amidst the 
darkness of 
Not-Being, 
of which he 
knows the 
trick. The 
philoso- 
pher clings 
by the force 
of reason to 
the Form 
of Being, 
which is 


° dark only 


with the 
excess of 
light, and 
because of 
the weak- 


ness of 
mortal 
vision. 

But for the 
present we 
must per- 
severe in 
our effort 
to find the 
Sophist. 


Tie: 
Since we 
are agreed 
that some 
kinds ad- 
mit of com- 
bination 
and some 
do not, and 
this in 
various de- 
grees, while 


148 
SEAL. Καλῶς εἶπες. 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


σ ? > \ \ \ fee a” a“ e / 

EE. “Or οὖν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἡμῖν τῶν γενῶν @podo- 

΄ > / / \ \ / Ν Ν 

γηται κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ μη, καὶ τὰ 


΄ A \ Ν Ν 
μὲν ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον, τὰ δ᾽ ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ 


/ > \ / lol lat / Ν 
5 TAVT@V οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοις πᾶάσι κΚεκοινωνῆκεναι, TO 


\ \ a / cr , ηὃ 
δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ξυνεπισπώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τῇδε σκο- 


cal \ 7 al ΄σ- 7 \ 
ποῦντες, μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἵνα μὴ ταρατ- 


΄ὔ la > \ / Len / 
τώμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελόμενοι τῶν μεγίστων 


7 yy lal \ lal v4 , > 
λεγομένων ΑΤΤΟα. TPWTOV μὲν ποιὰ εκᾶστα EOTLY, 


2. "Or οὖν---ὡμολόγηται] Join 
ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν. 

3. καὶ τὰ μὲν----κεκοινωνηκέναι] 
This was not distinctly said, 
but was partly implied in what 
was said of the vowels, supra 
Reha. 

4. er ὀλίγον] “To a small 
extent.” 

ἐπὶ πολλά] “Extending com- 
munication to many things.” 

6. ξυνεπισπώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ] 
The ideas of Being, rest and 
motion, which are now chosen 


for examination, have been 
suggested by the preceding 
argument. 


7. μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν] 
Cf. Spinoz. Eth. II. 1: Transeo 
jam ad explicanda que ex Dei 
sive entis eterni et infiniti 
essentia necessario debuerunt 
sequi: non quidem omnia (in- 
finita enim infinitis modis ex 
ipsa debere sequi We.). 

iva μὴ ταραττώμεθα ἐν πολ- 
λοῖς] A similar reason is ad- 
duced for the use of the argu- 
ment from Example in Polit. 
278 c: ἡ ψυχὴ --- τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν 
apy γέ πῃ τῶν συγκράσεων ὀρθῶς 
δοξάζει, μετατιθέμενα δὲ εἰς τὰς 


yA / 3 4 “ 37 / ad 
10 €TELTA κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἵνα 


τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ 
ῥᾳδίας συλλαβὰς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πά- 
λιν ἀγνοεῖ. The contrast in 
the text, however, is not be- 
tween the simplicity of ideas 
and the complexity of facts, 
but between the few great 
ideas and the multiplicity of 
lesser ones. 

8. προελόμενοι] Cf. Parm, 
143 Ο: ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν 
εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτε- 
ρον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕν εἴτε 
τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. Phileb. 45 6, 
52 6. 

10. δυνάμεως] Gen. of respect, 
like μίξεως supra. “ How they 
stand in respect of capacity of 
intercommunion.” 

ἵνα τό τε ὄν --- ἀπαλλάττειν 
“That, even if we cannot grasp 
with perfect clearness the no- 
tions of Being and Not-Being, 
we may at least exhaust the 
argument respecting them, in 
so far as the method of the 
present inquiry permits, and 
try if in any way we can 
force the point that Not-Being 
is really Not-Being, and take 
no harm.” 


P: 254} 


c 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


149 


/ x Ν ἊΣ, τὰν 3 \ , , , 
254. τὸ τε ὃν καὶ μὴ ὃν εἰ μὴ πάσῃ σαφηνείᾳ δυνάμεθα 


λαβεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν λόγου γε ἐνδεεῖς μηδὲν γιγνώμεθα 


\ SIAN 5 ὦ ε , ’ / rn A 
περὶ αὐτῶν, καθ᾽ ὅσον ὁ τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν 


7 aN » φὰς ’ὔ Ν ν ἊἋ 
σκέψεως, ἐὰν apa ἡμῖν πῃ παρεικαθῃ τὸ μὴ ὃν 


, «ε Ψ Sy \ ὃ ᾽ > 
λέγουσιν ws ἐστιν ὄντως μὴ ov ἀθῴοις ἀπαλ- 5 


i 
λαττειν. 


BEAI. Οὐκοῦν χρή. 


eS} ᾽ὔὕ \ a “ Δ A Ν fn 
BE. Μέγιστα μὴν τῶν γενῶν, ἃ νῦν δὴ διῆμεν, 


, x οὐ ἂν Zz / 
TO τε OV QUTO καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πολύ γε. 


[=| Χ Ν > a > , 
EE. Καὶ μὴν ro ye δύω φαμὲν αὐτοῖν ἀμίκτω 


πρὸς ἀλλήλω. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε. 


Ἂ Ν la \ Ν 
HE. Τὸ δέ ye ὃν μικτὸν ἀμφοῖν: ἐστὸν γὰρ 


ἄμφω που. 


ΘΕΑΙ. [las δ᾽ οὔ: 


ΞΕ). Τρία δὴ γίγνεται ταῦτα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν ; 


— ᾽ An » n oe ΄ \ “-“ oS ’ 
ΞΕ). Οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἐτερὸν 


> ONS > e a > y 
ἐστιν, αὐτὸ δ᾽ ἑαυτῷ ταὐτον. 


ΘΈΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


2. λαβεῖν] “To grasp,’—as 
in λαβεῖν παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ, παρὰ σαυ- 
τῷ, Xe. 

3. καθ᾽ ὅσον---σκέψεως] Thus 
even in the more exact of his 
dialogues Plato ever complains 
of an imperfect method. Cf. 
Rep. 435 d, 506 e, 533 8, Pheedo 
85 ¢, Tim. 29 Ὁ. 

4. παρεικάθῃ] 
κασθῆ. 

8. ἃ νῦν δὴ διῇμεν] The ante- 
cedent is found in the following 
words. ‘The most important 
kinds are those which we have 


Bodl. 


παρει- 


just been considering.” 

14. ἀμφοῖν] Dative. “ Being 
has admixture with both.” Cf. 
Legg. 5, 733 d: τίνες οὖν καὶ 
πόσοι εἰσὶ βίοι, ὧν πέρι δεῖ mpo- 
ελόμενον ---- ἰδόντα ---- ὧν ὡς οἷόν 
τ᾽ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον μακαριώτατα ; 
Parm. 129. 6: τὰ εἴδη, οἷ 
ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ 
πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἕν, καὶ στάσιν καὶ 
κίνησιν. 

19. Οὐκοῦν----ταὐτόν] Compare 
the very similar manipulation 


of ideas in Theet. p. 185. 


οἷον 


it may 

be that 
some enter 
universally 
into com- 
munion 


with all, let 
us examine 
the nature 
of a few 

selected 

kinds, espe- 
cially with 


. regard to 


their power 
of inter- 
commu- 
nion. 

So we may 
at least ex- 
haust the 
argument 
about 
Being and 
Not-Being, 
and per- 
haps find 
out a way 
in which 
Not-Being 
may be 
safely de- 
clared to be 
Not-Being. 
Being, 
Rest, and 
Motion are 


20 the highest 


kinds. Of 
these, Rest 
and Motion 
are mutu- 


ally incom- 
municable, 
while Being 
communi- 

cates with 

them both. 
Thus there 
come to be 


150 


ἘΠ Tl > 5 a “ > ΄ / jee 
me Lu. & ΠΤΟΤ QU VUV OUTWS ELPIKALLEV TO TE TAUVTOV Ῥ. 254 ΐ 


ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ 


ν᾿ la / / / \ » / ΄σ \ 
καὶ θάτερον ; πότερα Ovo γένη τινε αὐτώ, TOV μὲν 


o yy / \ > / F > , 
τριῶν ἄλλω, ξυμμιγνυμένω μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης 


OO / Ν Ν / > > > Ν “ « yy 
ἄει, καὶ περὶ πέντε AAA οὐ ΠΕΡ τριων ὡς οντῶν 


5 
three. And 5 αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἢ τό TE ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον 


each is the 
same with 
itself, but 
other than 


the remain-. 


ing two. 
We have 
thus men- 
tioned two 


ec 
> / 
QUTOUS : 


OEAI. 


Ἴσως. 


ὡς ἐκείνων TL προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς Ρ. 25: 


— > > δ, \ / , Wa fy? 
mE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ov τι μὴν κίνησίς ye καὶ στάσις οὔθ 


more kinds, το ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν ἐστι. 


unless 
Same or 
Other can 
be identi- 
fied with 
Being, or 
Motion, or 
Rest. 

But Same 
and Other 
are predi- 
cable both 
of Rest and 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ios ; 


bs Ὅ , a a / / \ 
= B. TL TEP AV ΚΟινὴ προσείπωμεν KLUNOLW και 


, A a7 ’ rn er 5 
στασιν, Τοῦτο οὐδέτερον QUTOLY οιον TE εἰναι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ti sy; 


΄ ΄ ΄ > 7 
BE. Kivyois τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὖ κινηθη- 


σεται. 


I. Τί ποτ᾽ αὖ--- θάτερον] Com- 
pare the emergence of the ideas 
of σφόδρα, ἡρέμα and ποσὸν, and 
their relation to each other, 
occasioned by the simple words 
καὶ σφόδρα ye, in Phileb. 24 6. 

2. πότερα--- αὐτώ] Se. λεκτέον. 
unemphatic, resuming 
ταὐτὸν and θάτερον. 

4. καὶ περὶ πέντε] Cf. supr. 
2436: 
δύο κιτ.λ. 

ὡς évrov] For the posi- 
tion of ὡς, οἵ. ταὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα 
a few lines below, and παισὶν ὡς 
οὖσιν ἡμῖν supY. 242 d. 

5. ἢ τό τε ταὐτὸν] “Or in 
saying Same and Other, are we 
unconsciously speaking as of 
one of those former ideas ?” 

16. περὶ γὰρ---ἐναντίου] Heind. 
“ Namalterutrum eorum utrum- 
vis (sive motus sive status) 


> ‘\ 
αὐτῶ, 


Ν , \ cal 2 δὲ \ 
καὶ τρία TO πᾶν ἀλλὰ μὴ 


\ \ 3 ΄ ΄ « a 
περὶ yap ἀμῴοτερα θάτερον ὁποτερονοῦν 


quando in utroque inerit (in 
motu vel statu) alterum coget 
in contrarlam rursus suze na- 
turam abire, quoniam hoc alte- 
rum contrarii particeps factum 
est.” This is right, and has been 
wrongly criticised by Badham, 
who does not appear to see 
that the second θάτερον must 
be correlative to the first. But 
Heind. and Stallb. do not seem 
to have observed that the case 
is still general, and is only ap- 
plied to ταὐτὸν and θάτερον in 
the next sentence. The argu- 
ment is this :—Rest and mo- 
tion cannot be identified either 
with Same or Other. For if 
either rest or motion were 
identified with anything which 
is predicable of both, motion 
would rest and rest would 
move: inasmuch as that (whe- 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


151 


255. γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὖ θάτερον 


> > / “ « ΄ / “ " a“ 
b ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως, ATE μετασχὸν τοὺ 


/ 
ἐναντίου. 


OEAI. Κομιδῇ γε. 


Χ 5, ζω / 
HE. Μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου. 


OEAI. Ναί. 


= \ / / , , OS) 3) ON 
HE. My τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησίν γ᾽ εἰναι ταῦτον 


x 6 7 δ᾽ > 4 
ἢ θάτερον, μηδ αὖ στάσιν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ. 


53 ἊΝ Ἃ Xx > ΙΝ; - 
mE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ apa τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν ὡς EV TLIO 


, « nan 
διανοητέον ἡμῖν 5 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως. 


9 > Χ ΄ 
ΞΕ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδὲν διάφορον 


/ / 3 7 7 3 f 
σημαίνετον, κίνησιν av πάλιν Kal στάσιν ἀμῴοτερα 


5 , > ΄ “ ΠΝ 2X ε Ε 
ειναι λέγοντες ἀμφοτερα ουτῶς αὐτὰ TAVTOY ὡς OVTA15 


προσεροῦμεν. 


SEAT, ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον. 


μ-ἰ ; 3) ὍΝ Ν XN ΟΝ A 53 
=H. ᾿Αδύνατον apa ταῦτον καὶ τὸ ὃν ἕν εἰναι. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Σχεδόν. 


Motion, 
and hence 
cannot be 
identified 
with either. 
For being 
identified 
with one 


and then 
predicated 
of the 
other, 
either of 
them, as 
the case 
might be, 
would 
cause Mo- 
tion to be 
predicated 
of Rest, or 
Rest of 
Motion. 
And Being 
and Same- 
ness are 
not one: 
else in say- 
ing Motion 
and Rest 
both are, 
we should 
imply that 
they are 
both the 
same. 
Sameness, 


HE. Τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν εἴδεσιν εἶδος 20 therefore, 


Χ 3 ἊΝ a 
τὸ ταῦτον τιθῶμεν ; 


ther rest or motion) which was 
so identified with the common 
predicable, becoming thus pre- 
dicable of both, will cause the 
other (whether motion or rest) 
to be changed, as thus parti- 
cipating (by the force of predi- 
cation) in the opposite nature. 
But sameness and difference 
are predicable both of motion 
and rest. Therefore neither mo- 
tion nor rest can be identified 
either with sameness or differ- 
ence. 


7. Μὴ τοίνυν] “ Let us not 


therefore identify Same or 
Other with motion, nor yet 
with rest.” Cf. Phedo 103, 4. 

13. ’AAN ei — προσεροῦμεν] 
“ But if the words Being and 
Sameness have no difference of 
meaning, then again in saying 
that motion and rest both are 
we shall speak of them as being 
both the same.” 

20. εἶδος] Omitted in Bodl. 
A. II., but probably genuine. 
The Same is not only separate 
from the remaining kinds, but 
is itself to be recognized as a 


is a fourth 
kind, dis- 
tinct from 
the other 
three. 





Nor can 
Otherness 
be identi- 
fied with 


Being: else 
there would 
be an abso- 
lute Other- 


ness, as 


there is an 


absolute 


Being. But 


the Other 
is always 


relative to 


an Other. 
And so 


the Other τὸ 


is to be 


recognized 


as a fifth 


kind. And 
it is at the 
same time 


perceived 
to extend 
to all the 


kinds. For 15 € 


each of 
them has 
now been 
distin- 
guished 
from the 


152 ITAATONOZ® 


SEAL. [avy μὲν οὖν. 


— / / Ν 3 con / 
ΞΕ, Ti δέ; τὸ θάτερον apa ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμ- 


τ δ ΄σ \ Ν ΕΥ̓ « 7» A > / et ke 
πτον ; ἢ τοῦτο Kal TO OV ὡς OU aTTa ὀνοματα ep 


CoN / 


ἑνὶ γένει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ ; 


ΘΈΑΙ. Tay’ ἄν. 


"καὶ > > 3 lal lad 7 
ΞΕ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οἶμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων 


\ \ > \ > ’ A \ N 7 
τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀεὶ 


λέγεσθαι. 
OEAI. Τί δ᾽ ov; 


EE. To δ᾽ ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον. ἦ yap; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


= 3 327 5) Ν oN Ν Ν 4 \ 4 
=&E. Οὐκ ἂν, εἴ ye τὸ ov Kal τὸ θάτερον μὴ Tap- 


πολυ διεφερέτην᾽ ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε 


a 9 A Ψ Ν 5") 3 y , Ny an 
TOLV εἰδοῖν ὠσπεέερ TO OV, nV QV ΤΟΤΕ TL KAL TOV 


e 


σ 


a “ 7 5 53 
TOUTO O TEP ἐστιν εἶναι. 


distinct kind or form. ἐνάριθμον 
τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἕν (infr. 
258 c). The Bodleian MS. 
errs more often by omission 
than by insertion. The dis- 
tinction between Being and 
Sameness is hardly maintained 
in what follows. 

6. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οἶμαι----ἢ γάρ ;| “ Of 
existences, some are absolute, 
some correlative: other is al- 
ways relative to other.” Here 
absolute and relative are dis- 
tinct εἴδη, but are only alluded 
to in passing. (Cf. Phileb. 
51: ταῦτα yap οὐκ εἶναι πρός τι 
καλὰ- ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ καλὰ kab’ αὑτά.) 

12. Οὐκ ἂν --- εἶναι] “ That 
could not be if Being and Other 
were not widely different. If 


/ “ χ 
TEPWY ETEPOV οὐ 7 pos ἔτερον. 


΄ \ > ΄σ Ὁ ΄ 
νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν 


/ Ἃ wi 53 / > ee Say, 
ὅ τί περ ἂν ἕτερον ἢ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου 


Other had partaken of both 
kinds (absolute and relative), 
as Being does, there would have 
been a time when some one of 
the class of Other things were 
Other otherwise than in rela- 
tion to Other. But in reality 
we find that whatever is Other 
must of necessity be what it is 
in relation to an Other.” For 
the gen. ἑτέρου, ef. Rep. 4, 438 e: 
ὅσα ἐστὶν οἷα εἶναί του, and 439 
a: οὐ τούτων θήσει τῶν τινὸς 
εἶναι ὅπερ ἔστιν. It is ποῦ ob- 
served that ταὐτὸν is also a 
relative term (πρός τι). But 
a thing may be ταὐτὸν in rela- 
tion to itself, and so not mpos 
ἕτερον ΟΥ̓ πρὸς ἄλληλα. Cf. 
Thezt. 185 Ὁ, 





Ρ. 255} 


TAS 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. ] 


ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει. 


HE. Πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν 


lal IO. 53 > - 
6 τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα. 


256. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Ναί. 


Lure! Χ ie \ “-“ 
SE. Καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν 5 


3 a A “ \ “ 5 A 
εἰναι διεληλυθυΐαν᾽ ἐν ἕκαστον yap ἕτερον εἶναι TOV 


77 A \ « a \ 
ἄλλων ov διὰ THY αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ TO μετέχειν 


“ 5. 7 a 7 
τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 


HE. Ὧδε δὴ λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθ᾽ ἕντο 


7 
ἀναλαμβάνοντες. 


ΘΕΑΙ. [las ; 


=D II las \ / e yy ’ 
bey Se POTOV μὲν κινῆσιν, WS EOTL TAVTATTACLW 


oS 7 » las / 
ἕτερον στάσεως. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν ; 


ΘΈΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


΄ 5 , 
mE. Ov στάσις ap ἐστίν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. 


Χ ot 
BE. Ἔστι δέ ye διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν. 


3. ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα] Equi- 
valent to ἃ mpoap. ἐν is re- 
peated by attraction from the 
previous clause. “ Posterius 
in his ἐν tanquam e precedente 
syllaba natum expungerem, ni 
obstaret ejusdem modi exem- 
plum apud Xenoph. de Vectig. 
iv.13: Am αὐτῶν μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, 
ap ὧν μέλλω λέγειν, οὐδέν τι 
ἀξιῶ θαυμάζεσθαι ὡς δυσεύρετόν 
τι ἐξευρηκώς." (Heind.) 

10. ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε] These five 
“chief kinds of Being” are 
adopted by Plotinus, who, in 
forming his complex notion 
of the Highest Truth, prefers 
them, in combination with the 
triple οὐσία of the Philebus, to 


x 


the categories of Aristotle. 
Ennead V, b. 1, VI, b. 2. He 
makes a distinction, which in 
Plato is hardly present, be- 
tween a suwmmum genus and a 
constituent element of absolute 
Being. 

11. ἀναλαμβάνοντες] ““ Resum- 
ing,” a technical word in Pla- 
tonic discussion, cf. Thezt. 
187 c and note. Perhaps here 
used more literally, “ taking 
them up to examine them one 
by one.” 

13. κίνησιν] Se. λέγωμεν. 

16. Οὐ στάσις ἄρ᾽ ἐστίν] Here 
the Other is for the first time 
seen to be identical with Ne- 
gation. 


rest, not by 
reason of 
itself, but 
through 
participa- 
tion in the 
Form of 
Otherness. 
Thus, first 
of all, Mo- 
tion is 
Other than 
Rest : i.e. 


is not Rest. 
Yet Motion 
is, because 
Motion 
partakes 

of Being. 
Again, 
Motion is 
Other than 
the Same: 
is not the 
Same. Yet 
Motion 
partakes 
of Same- 
ness, and 
is the same 
Motion. 
We must 
not quarrel 
with this 
result, that 
Motion is 
the Same 
and not the 


Same, for 
each ex- 
pression is 
true, but 

in a differ- 
entrespect. 
Motion is 

the same 
with itself 5 
through 
participa- 
tion in the 
Form of 
Sameness, 
not the 
Same, 
through 
partaking 
of the 
Other, 
whereby it 
isseparated 
and be- 
comes 
Other than 
the Form 
of the 
Same. 
Indeed, as 
we have 
shewn that 
in the na- 
ture of 
things 
there must 


- 
σι 


154 


EE. Αὖθις δὴ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις ἕτερον ταὐτοῦ P. 256) 


> / 
εστιν. 


OEAI. Σχεδόν. 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


> ‘\ / 
=E. Ov ταὐτὸν apa ἐστίν. 


GEAI. Οὐ yap οὖν. 


\ " 5 9: iN \ Ν / 
BE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν αὕτη γ᾽ ἦν ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μετέ- 


“- 4, " 5 "σ΄ 
Xe αὖ TAVT αὑτοῦ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα. 


eect \ , \ Sa, 5 Ἀ 
ΞΕ. Τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταὐτὸν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ μὴ 


SN € Nh Ν > / 
ιοταῦτὸν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. 


οὐ γὰρ 


“ ΕἸ » \ ΘΙ ΩΝ ἐν Χ > / « / 
ὁταν εἴπωμεν αὐτὴν ταῦτον καὶ μὴ ταῦτον, ομοιως 


See 5 ϑυ τε ΄ \ OY \ Ν 4, 
εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπόταν μὲν ταὐτόν, dia τὴν μέθεξιν 


3. τς Ν ε ᾿Ν oe , “ \ \ » 
TQUTOUV προς εαὐτὴν οὐτῶ λέγομεν, OTQV δὲ μὴ ταὺυ- 


, \ Χ 7 53 Υ 3. δὲ ᾽ 
τὸν, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὖ θατέρου, Ov ἣν ἀποχωριζο- 


vA 5 a , > » a » > “ὕ ov 
μένη ταὐτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο GAA ἐτερον, ὥστε 


᾽ a 3 , , ’ yA 
ὀρθῶς αὖ λέγεται πάλιν ov ταῦτον. 


SEAT. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


» n xX 7 ’ ᾽ Ν 7 
HE. Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἴ πῃ μετελάμβανεν αὐτὴ κίνη- 


I. Αὖθις δὴ πάλιν] “ Again.” 
Τ. 6. To make a new beginning 
from the same point, viz. κί- 
νησις. 

7. αὐτοῦ Se. τοῦ ταὐτοῦ. 
Cf. supr. 254 d, to which ἢν 
refers. πάντα is therefore re- 
stricted to being, rest, and 
motion, as διὰ πάντων---αὐτῶν, 
p- 255 ἃ, to the five “kinds.” 
αὖ marks the opposition be- 
tween the reason now given 
and the words ἡ κίνησις ἕτερον 
ταὐτοῦ ἐστίν. 

10. οὐ δυσχεραντέον] “We must 
not quarrel with this contra- 
diction ;” cf. Theet. 155a: οὐ 
δυσκολαίνοντες. Gorg. 450 6: 
ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσ- 
χεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. 


οὐ γὰρ --- ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν] 
Cf. Rep. 5, 454 Ὁ: ἐπεσκεψά- 
μεθα δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὁπηοῦν τί εἶδος τὸ 
τῆς ἑτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύ- 
σεως καὶ πρὸς τί τεῖνον ὡριζόμεθα 
τότε κιτιλ. 

13. πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὕτω λέγομεν] 
“We call it so (the same) in 
relation to itself.” 

ὅταν --- ταὐτόν] “ But when 
we speak of it as not the Same, 
this is because of the participa- 
tion in the Other, whereby it 
is severed from the Same, and 
has become not that but an 
Other, so that again it is rightly 
spoken of as not the Same.” 

18. αὐτὴ κίνησι5] Here, and 
supr. 252 d, distinguished from 
the πάθημα κινήσεως. It is im- 





) 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 


/ 
T POO AYOPEVELY ; 


155 


OEAI. ᾿Ορθότατά ye, εἴπερ τῶν γενῶν συγχωρη- 


σόμεθα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἐθέλειν μίγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ μή. 


= Ν \ > / \ ,ὔ 7 > / 
GE. Καὶ μὴν ἐπί ye τὴν τούτου πρότερον ἀπό- 5 


ΕΥ a a 7 / ε x \ 
δειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα, ἐλέγχοντες ὡς ἔστι κατὰ 


7 7 
φυσιν ταὐτῃ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Las γὰρ οὔ; 


ie \ 7 
BE. Λέγωμεν δὴ πάλιν" ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἕτερον 


cal if df i? > “-“ > A Ν my 
τοῦ ἑτέρου, καθάπερ ταὐτοῦ τε ἣν ἄλλο καὶ τῆς το 


, 
OTATEDS 5 


GEAI. ᾿Αναγκαῖον. 


= E Οὐ fod EYAL of) 7 OS ὧν 
μ᾿ 1). υχ €TEPOV Ap ἐστι ΤΉ καὶ €TEPOV 


νῦν δὴ λόγον. 
OEAI. ᾿Αληθῆ. 


δι ἘΣ \ x \ 

aE. Ti οὖν δὴ τὸ pera 

a Ψ“ SEN 7, 5 a δὲ 
τριῶν ἕτερον αὐτὴν φήσομεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ 


d μὴ φῶμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες 


\ \ 
Κατὰ TOV 


A 53 la \ 
TOUTO 5 apa TOV μὲν 
4 
τετάρτου 


YN GF , YG 
αὐτὰ EVAL πέντε, πέρι ὧν 


Ny - > , a 
καὶ ἐν οἷς προυθέμεθα σκοπεῖν : 


plied that motion does ποῦ 
partake of rest. Yet there is 
a tendency in this dialogue to 
attribute necessity or perma- 
nence to the idea of motion. 

5. Καὶ μὴν ----ταύτῃ] Supr. 252. 

9. ἕτερον rod ἑτέρου] In this 
argument motion appears 77 
one and the same expression 
as other and not other. Cf. 
Theet. 165 b,c, compared with 
the preceding argument ; and 
for a similar refinement on 
ἕτερον, ib, 189 6, where, how- 
ever, the contradiction is merely 
verbal, as in Euthyd. 301. 

Having made this step, we 
are prepared to understand 


x 


more easily that motion at 
once is and is not. 

14. δή] To be taken, not 
closely with viv, but with the 
whole sentence. 

16. dpa τῶν μὲν] ap αὐτῶν, 
the reading of the best MSS., 
is probably due to αὐτὴν just 
below. dp’ ov, which Bekker 
and the Zurich editors ap- 
prove, is rightly rejected by 
Stallbaum, who reads ἄρα with 
seven MSS. 

18, αὐτὰ] Se. τὰ γένη. 

19. ἐν ois] “ Within the 
sphere of which.” as in 
Theet. 152 c: ey τε θερμοῖς 
καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. 


> 
εν, 


2. 
~ 


, Sat x la 5 / Ho 
256. σις στάσεως, οὐδὲν AV ἄτοπον NY στάσιμον αὐτὴν be acom- 


munion of 
kinds, we 
should not 
be stagger- 
ed by find- 
ing that 
Motion, 
qua Mo- 
tion, was 
stationary, 
if there 
were any 
manner of 
commu- 
nion be- 
tween Mo- 
tion and 
Rest. 

Once more: 
Motion is 
Other than 
the Other, 
and so 
Other and 
not Other 
at once. 


15 


And as we 
have spo- 
ken of five 
kinds, 
there re- 
mains a 
fourth to 





be distin- 
guished 
from Mo- 
tion. Mo- 
tion is not 
Being, but 


partakes of τὸς 


Being, and 


soisandis 5 


not in the 
most abso- 
lute sense. 


Thus there 
is found an 
existence 
of Not- 
Being, oc- 
casioned by 
the nature 
of the 
Other, in 
the case of 
Motion, 
and in that 


of each of 15 


the kinds, 
Being not 
excepted. 

For Being 


156 
OEAI. 


MAATQNO2 


, Ν Ν a “΄“΄ \ / 
ἐλάττω Tov ἀριθμὸν τοῦ viv δὴ φανέντος. 


ἘῊῚ "Ad “- » \ / “ 53 ~ ΨΝ 
bey Hse EWS apa THY κινῆσιν €TEPOV εἰναι του OV- 


διαμαχόμενοι λέγωμεν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αδεέστατα μὲν οὖν. 


— > “ \ lal « A > + 
=E. Οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ OV 


> Ay ὧν > / lal A ’ὔ 
ἐστι Και OV, ἐπείπερ TOV OVTOS μετέχει: 


ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφεστατά γε. 


7 JA 4 Ν \ x 5» / 
HE. Ἔστιν apa ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ov ἐπί TE 


, 5S \ 7, \ / \ / 
το κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη. KATH TAVTO 


Ν ε ’ὔ J Oo 5 ͵ n~ Wy 
yap ἡ θατέρου φύσις €TEPOV ἀπεργαζομένη του OVTOS 
σ 5 Ἂ lal “7 \ Ν Ce 
ἕκαστον οὐκ OV ποιεῖ, καὶ ξύμπαντα δὴ κατα ταῦτα 


“ 5 + 5 ΄σ 3 a x / “ / 
οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, OTL μετέχει 


“σ᾿, 5 / Sy 7 
TOU OVTOS, ELVAL TE και OVTA. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει. 


σ 77 “ “ Χ , 
mE. Περὶ ἕκαστον apa τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι 


ἈΝ 97. + \ ΄ Ν NS 
TO ov, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει TO μὴ OV. 


2. φανέντος] “ Which shewed 
itself.” It is implied that the 
argument has proceeded, as 
usual, without the will of the 
speakers ; 1. 6. has not been 
developed arbitrarily. 

4. Stapaxdpevor] The notion 
of violence, and of a conflict 
with the Sophist, implied in 
βιάζεσθαι and διαμαχητέον, 242 ἃ, 
is continued here. 

9. Ἔστιν ἄρα] 1. 6. What has 
now been said of motion must 
be necessarily true of every- 
thing except the idea of Being. 
Constr. ἔστι---τὸ μὴ ὃν εἶναι, 
“Tt is true that that which 
is not, is,’ “The existence of 
Not-Being is a fact,” “ not 
only in the case of motion, but 
in every kind. For the nature 


of difference, extending to all, 
divides each thing from Being, 
and makes it not-Being, and 
so in this way we shall be 
right in saying that all things 
whatsoever are not-Being, and 
again because they partake in 
Being that they are and have 
being.” 

ΤΙ. ἡ θατέρου φύσις] For the 
expression, cf. Parm. 156 6: 
ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτο- 
πός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινή- 
σεως τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ 
οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ 
ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μετα- 
βάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ 
ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι. 

17. ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὃν] 
The argument is tacitly car- 
ried a step in advance. It 


Kai πῶς : ἀδύνατον yap συγχωρεῖν p. 256..} 





257. 


ἘΘΦΙΞΤΉΗΣ. 157 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. 


μ- » A SoH ys 
HE. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὃν αὐτὸ 


5 7, 
εἰναι λεκτέον. 


OEAT. ᾿Ανάγκη. 


ΩΝ 77 Cain. 7 
SE. Καὶ τὸ ov ap ἡμῖν, ὅσα 


A A » y+ 
Κατὰ TOOQAUTA Οὐκ εστιν. 


> cad 
EKELVA 


a A a 
Tov ἄλλων εἐτερον 


\ 3 Ὁ A \ 
yap Οὐκ OV ἐν HEV 


SCLIN + > / \ Ν » \ 3 ᾽ 
αὐτὸ ἐστιν. ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τάλλα οὐκ 


ΕΣ 5 
E€OTLY AU. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὕτως. 


HE. Οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δυσχεραντέον, ἐπεί- 10 


y / » / e ΄σ a / > 
περ ἐχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἡ τῶν γενῶν φύσις. εἰ 


lal \ - « a cal 3 
δέ τις ταῦτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείσας ἡμῶν τοῦς ἔμπρο- 


ῇ . / \ \ “ 
σθεν λογους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Δικαιότατα εἴρηκας. 


ΞΕ. Ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε. 


ΘΕΑΙ. To ποῖον ; 


— ε , \ Ν᾿ , € y » 
ἘΞ. Ozorav τὸ μὴ ov λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ 


3 / 7 a 5) » Do Ὁ / 
ἐναντίον TL λέγομεν τοῦ οντος, ἀλλ ἐτερον μόνον. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς; 


is assumed that the θατέρου 
φύσις differentiates each thing 
not only from Being in the 
abstract, but from every other 
existing kind except itself: so 
that it is not each in turn. 

. ὅσα πέρ -- οὐκ ἔστιν] CF. 
Theeet. 171 ἃ (where Protagoras 
is put to silence): ὅσῳ πλείους 
ois μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ ois δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ 
μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν. 

10. καὶ ταῦτα] “ We must not 
quarrel with this, any more 
than with the former result.” 
καὶ refers to οὐ δυσχεραντέον in 
Ῥ. 256 a. 

12. meicas—rovs λόγους] The 
arguments are half-personi- 
fied. For the sentiment, com- 


pare Gorg. 472 b; and for 
ἡμῶν τοὺς λόγους, SUPY. 239 C: 
ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν ἀποστρέ- 
ψει τοὺς λόγους. 

13. πειθέτω] Se. ἡμᾶς. 

By the same means, by 
which it is shewn that that- 
which-is-not is, the nature of 
that-which-is-not is made plain. 
Not-Being is not the opposite 
of Being, but only other than 
Being. This is now further 
illustrated. According to the 
preceding argument μὴ ὃν must 
here include the negation of 
Being in the abstract and the 
negation of the several kinds 
of Being. 


/ > \ »” 
πέρ ἐστι Ta adda, 5 


is Other 
than every 
remaining 
kind, and 
as once for 
all itself, 
but 7s not 
times with- 
out num- 
ber. We 
must ac- 
cept these 
apparent 
discrepan- 
cies, since 
we have as- 
serted the 
commu- 
nion of 
kinds. And 
whoever 
will find 
fault with 
us, must 
first refute 
that thesis. 


158 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


Ὁ > \ / a 
BE. Οἷον ὅταν εἴπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλόν P- 257.) 
/ / κι Ν “Ὁ Ἂς 37 ΄' ΄ 
τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ 


Not-Being, 5 


then, or 
negative 
determina- 
tion, is not 
contrary to 


= a > , > 7 ΄- \ “ ’ὔ 
Being, or τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων Cc 
positive \ “ .) ὯΝ / \ > / - ΄“ 
determina- “περὶ αττ ἂν κέηται Ta ἐπιφθεγγομενα ὕστερον τῆς 
tion, but ; τ 
only differ- 10 ἀσοφάσεως ὀνόματα. 
ent in each ΄ ι = 
case froma ΘΈΑΙ. Tavramac: μεν οὖν. 
particular [— , \ a a 
positive EE. Tode δὲ διανοηθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκεῖ. 
determina- \ - 
aor OEAI. To ποῖον ; 


ῥήματι; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πώς; 


— > 37 / “ / ’ὔ 
ΞΕ. Οὐκ ap’, ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται 


7 r A \ / a 
σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι 


a y+ / \ \ Ν \ 327) ») 
τῶν ἄλλων τι μῆνυει TO μὴ καὶ TO OV προτιθέμενα 


2. τῷ ῥήματι] ‘ The expres- 
sion.” The word is used with 
exactness = the predicate: not 
ὀνόματι ΟΥ̓ λόγῳ. 

5. ἀπόφασι)] The word oc- 
curs only in the Soph., Cra- 
tylus, and Apology of Plato; 
and in this place signifies not 
the negative proposition, but 
the negative particle. 


7. τῶν ἄλλων τι μηνύει] 


Compare Kant, Kritik der cyero γένη, ὅμως δ᾽ ἐπισφραγι- 
Reinen Vernunft (Leipzig, σθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναν- | 
1853) page ror. Indefinite τίου γένει, ev ἐφάνη. | 


Judgments :—“ Nun habe ich 
durch den Satz — die Seele 
ist nicht sterblich, zwar der 
logischen form nach wirklich 
bejaht, indem ich die Seele 
in den unbeschrainkten Um- 
fang der nicht Sterblichen 
Wesen setze. Weil nun von 
dem ganzen Umfange mogli- 
cher Wesen das _ Sterbliche 
einen Theil enthilt, das Nicht 
sterbende aber den anderen, 
so ist durch meinen Satz nicht 


anderes gesagt als dass die 
Seele eines von der Unendli- 
chem menge Dinge sei, die 
librig bleiben wenn ich das 
Sterbliche insgesammt weg- 
nehme,” τι. 5. w. 

The difficulty of conceiving 
μὴ ὃν as a γένος is parallel to 
that felt in the Philebus about 
the ἄπειρον, p. 26 d: καί τοι 
πολλά γε Kal TO ἄπειρον παρέ- 


8. ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν 
mpayparev| The genitives are 
governed by τῶν ἄλλων. “The 
prefixes od and μὴ point to 
something different from the 
words which follow them, or 
rather from the things which 
the words uttered after the 
negative import.” 

12. Τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν] “ Let 
us, now, carry our minds 
through this matter.” 








᾿ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


EE. Ἢ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερ- 


257. 
/ , > , 
ματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστημη. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Iles. 
, \ ͵ 
BE. Μία μέν ἐστί που καὶ ἐκείνη, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπί τῳ 
/ a o \ » 
γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπωνυ- 
/ 3, \ ε a »O/ Χ Ν / > 
ἃ μίαν ἰσχει τινὰ ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν: διὸ πολλαὶ τέχναι τ 
εἰσὶ λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. 
ry > 
. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μ 
a la ’ 
HE. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μορια 
a ἂν a 
μιᾶς οὔσης ταὐτὸν πέπονθε τοῦτο. 
΄’ Co ἊΝ 
ΘΕΑΙ. Tay’ ἀν’ ἀλλ᾽ ὅπῃ δὴ λέγωμεν ; 
— ͵ = ~ / / 
HE. “Hore τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτι- 
’ 
θέμενον : 
SEAT. Ἔστιν. 
— 3 τ 5 7, oe 7 ey 9 
EE. Tour’ οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τιν᾽ ἔχον ἐπω- 
/ 
νυμίαν 5 
,ὔ ON \ , 
OEHAI. Ἔχον: ὃ yap μὴ καλὸν ἑκάστοτε φθεγ- 
7 a 3 y X a / > x “-“ 
γόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἕτερον ἐστιν ἢ τῆς 


A aA ᾽ὔ 
τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως. 


EE. Ἴθι νῦν, τόδε μοι λέγε. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


fj ͵ A 
HE. “Addo τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνός ] γένους 


I. κατακεκερματίσθαι] For a 
similar use of this favourite 
word, cf. Parm. 144 b: (τὸ ἐν) 
κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὡς οἷόντε 
σμικρότατα (ἴτ᾽ ἐς σμικρότατα 1) 
καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα. 

4. τὸ δ᾽ ἐπί τῳ γιγνόμενον] 
Cf. Rep. 6, 511 ἃ, 6, for this 
use of ἐπὶ with the dative. 

6. ἑαυτῆς] This is omitted 
in one MS. (Par. E.), but is to 
be retained. The gender is 
πρὸς TO σημαινόμενον, but helped 


by τέχναι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι follow- 
ing. 

10. ταὐτὸν---τοῦτο] ἐπωνυμίαν 
ἰδίαν ἕκαστον ἔχει καὶ πολλά ἐστι. 

11. GAN ὅπη δὴ λέγωμεν;]} “But 
shall we determine how ?” 
The Bodl. has ἀλλοπῃ sin. ace. 

22. ἼΑλλο τι---μὴ καλόν] ἑνὸς, 
which Hermann retains on the 
authority of the Bodleian MS., 
is omitted there as well as in 
All. The reasoning seems to 
require that the words should 


σι 


Io 


Otherness 
or Differ- 
ence has 

as many 
branchesas 
Knowledge 
has: each 
of which is 
expressed 
by putting 
the word 
‘not’ be- 
fore the 
name of 
one of the 
objects of 
knowledge. 


Every such 
expression 


has a real 


significance 


and de- 
notes all 


that is dis- 


tinguished 
from the 
object in 
question. 


160 ITAATOQNOZ 





\ / a 3 5 / 
ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρός τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτε- p. 257}: 


\ o 53 \ / 
Bev οὕτω ξυμβέβηκεν εἶναι TO μὴ καλον 5 


ΘΈΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


EE. “Ovros δὴ πρὸς ὃν [ἡ] ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικ᾽, 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθότατα. 


3 , / Ν Ν / 
5 εἶναί {τι συμβαίνει TO μὴ καλόν. 


3 a \ / 3 “ 
BE. Τί οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον apa μᾶλ- 


\ Ν Ν δ᾽ κα lad yA - \ Ν 
λον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ἧττον δὲ τὸ 


μὴ καλόν; 


be rendered thus: “ Does not 
this constitute the existence of 
the Not-Beautiful?” (ἄλλο τι 
- οὕτω συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ 
καλόν.) “ 1st, that it is parted 
off (ἀφορισθὲν) as belonging to 
a certain kind of existences 
(τινὸς γένους τῶν ὄντων : for the 
gen., cf. Rep. 4, 438 d); 2nd, 
that it is set over against 
something which exists.” A 
simpler rendering of the words 
may possibly be right if suffi- 
cient stress is laid upon εἶναι. 
“The Not-Beautiful, as distin- 
guished from a certain kind of 
existence, and again as op- 
posed to an existing some- 
what, has thus an existence of 
its own.” But the words αὖ 
πάλιν indicate that the τι τῶν 
ὄντων is different from the 
γένος. The former interpreta- 
tion is confirmed by compar- 
ing supra 257 ¢ in the cor- 
responding partition of know- 
ledge: τὸ δ᾽ ἐπί τῳ γιγνόμενον 
μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθέυ---- 
where ἐπί τῳ γιγνόμενον answers 
to the genitive here. Accord- 
ing to this rendering, the read- 
ing ἑνὸς, although omitted in 
the Bodleian MS., is not clearly 
wrong. 


4. “Ovtos δὴ πρὸς ὃν --- μὴ 
καλόν] ἡ is omitted before 
ἀντίθεσις in Bodl. AU, and 
has been rejected by Stall- 
baum and C. F. Hermann: τι 
after εἶναι is omitted only in 
Flor. c, i, but can hardly be 
retained. It was omitted by 
Stephanus. If ἡ and τι are 
retained, the words must be 
construed thus: “Then it re- 
sults that the opposition of 
the Not-Beautiful” (ἡ ἀντίθεσις, 
τὸ μὴ καλὸν, apposition) “is one” 
(lit. “something,” τι) “between 
being and being.” Omitting 
ἡ and τι we should render “ It 
results then that the notion 
of ‘not-beautiful’ is an oppo- 
sition of being to being.” 

In the use of ἀντίθεσις here, 
as of οὐσία below (p. 258 b), 
there is some confusion be- 
tween abstract and concrete. 

ἀντίθεσις --- cupBaiver] The 
Bodl. has ἀντίθεσιν and εἶναί τι. 
If ἀντίθεσιν is right, συμβαίνει 
is impersonal. 

9. μὴ καλόν] Cf. Parm. 160 
b: Ti δ᾽ εἴ τις λέγοι, εἰ μέγεθος 
μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν 
ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρ᾽ ἐφ᾽ 
ἑκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι 


λέγει τὸ μὴ ὄν; 1. 6. that the 





257. 
258. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. 


101 


bh ε , oy \ ‘ , κ᾿ \ ΄ NS 
EE. Ὁμοίως apa τὸ μὴ μέγα καὶ TO μέγα αὐτὸ 


ΩΣ / 
εἰναι λεκτέον ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁμοίως. 


— eats \ x \ ͵, a , \ 
BE. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ 5 


SX , Χχ \ , A 5 , 
ταὐτὰ θετέον πρὸς TO μηδέν TL μᾶλλον εἶναι θάτερον 


θατέρου ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; 


EE. Καὶ τἄλλα δὴ ταύτῃ λέξομεν, ἐπείπερ ἡ θα- 


/ , ’ / a 4 3 » 77 \ ay 
TEPOU φυσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὖσα, ἐκείνης δὲ οὐσης το 


» 7 \ τς κ 7 x A \ @ yy 
avaykn δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἧττον ὄντα 
. 


τιθέναι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς yap ov; 


ΞΕ). Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύ- 


Ν ms a δ Ν 2, 3 / 
σεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ OVTOS πρὸς ἀλληλα αντικειμένων 15 


> J SINNER 3 ΄ 5 a ’ = ey, 
ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἧττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ TOU ὄντος 


thing denied (or negatively 
predicated) in each case is 
different. 

2. Ὁμοίως ἄρα] “Then the 
not-great must be said to exist 
equally with the great.” (αὐτὸ 
τὸ μέγα.) 

5. τῷ δικαίῳ --- θετέονἸ͵ “ Be 
put in the same category with 
the just so far as their equally 
existing is concerned.” For 
the limitation with πρὸς, cf. 
Pheedo 75 a: ταὐτὸν yap ἔστιν, 
ὦ 3., πρός ye ὃ βούλεται δηλῶσαι 
ὁ λόγος. 

14. ἡ---ἀντίθεσι.] The order 
is ἡ ἀντίθεσις μορίου τῆς θατέρου 
φύσεως καὶ (μορίου) τῆς τοῦ ὄντος 


The 


πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων. 


rendering οἵ MHeindorf and 


Stallbaum, “oppositio nature 
partis alicujus,” is objection- 


Y 


able, because the expression 
θατέρου φύσις has been already 
appropriated to the Other in 
general. Besides, the argument 
does not lead here to the con- 
trast of Being and all other 
ideas, but to that between ex- 
isting things and their nega- 
tions. The present is simply 
the generalization of the pre- 
ceding argument. The mean- 
ing is, in other words, that 
negation is, equally with affir- 
mation, a real determination of 
thought. 

τό. εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν]! Another 
expression of the awe in which 
the idea of Being was held 
(on which vid. supra p. 243 ¢) ; 
also marking anew the reluc- 
tance with which the authority 
of Parmenides is impugned. 


Thus each 
of the parts 
of Other 
has a real 
existence, 
and the 
opposition 
between 
the several 
parts of 
Being and 
Other is 
also Being. 


And such 
negative 
determina- 
tions are 
the Not- 
Being, of 
which we 
have been 
so long in 
search, 
Therefore, 
as Being 


includes all 19 EXOV, ὦ 


true deter- 
minations 
of thought, 
Not-Being 
is a kind of 
Being. 


162 


IMTAATOQNOZ 


> / ᾽ / > > 7, > / / > ‘ 
ουσια εστιν, οὐκ εναντίον EKELY® σημαινουσα, ἀλλὰ 


a / a » / 
TOOOUTOV μόνον, €TEPOV εκεινοῦυ. 


OEAI. Σαφέστατά γε. 


Ee ip: 5 Se (Ἃ 7 
ei. 1ἰτἰν οὖν αὐτὴν προσείπωμεν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὃ διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν 


» al > F353 ΄σ 
ἐζητοῦμεν, αὐτὸ ἐστι TOUTO. 


mE II / 3 “ 53 y > Ν rad 
i τὴς OTEPOV OVY, ὥσπερ ELTTES, ἐστιν οὐδενὸς TOV 


» 5 / i} las “ 7 
ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἤδη 


/ v4 Ν Wr) 37 Ν « val / 
λέγειν ὅτι TO μὴ ὃν βεβαίως ἔστι, THY αὑτοῦ φύσιν 


5) “ 


\ 7΄ὕ 5 ,ὕ N Ν Ν 5 Ν 
σπερ TO μέγα ὴν μέγα καὶ TO καλον ἣν καλον 


Ν XN \ / * \ 7 % Ν \ \ Ν ΕἾ \ 
καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα *{ un μέγα] Ἐ καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν “μὴ κα- 
/ Me “ \ N Ν \ x‘ ἊΝ 4: 5 Ν 
λον)“, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἦν τε καὶ 


» Ν + > 7 a rn 57 Ἅ) ee 
ἐστι μὴ OV, ἐναριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων Eldos EV; 


37 yy Ν » ’ 5 Θ / 5 ’ ay 2 
Ἢ τινὰ ETL 7 pos QUTO, ὦ EQITNTE, ATLOTLAV EXOMEV 3 


ΘΈΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν. 


8. οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον) οὐσίας 
is not exactly a genitive of re- 
spect, but depends on ἐλλείπ. 
in the same construction as 
the second genitive in such 
expressions aS κλύω σου φώνης 
—Oavpato σου τῆς διανοίας. 

9. βεβαίως] ““ Incontrover- 
tibly.” 

ἔστι, τὴν] Edd. ἐστὶ τὴν. 
I have changed the accentua- 
tion of ἐστι, which does not 
seem here to be merely an 
auxiliary verb with ἔχον. 

ΤΙ, καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα] The edi- 
tors have followed Boeckh in 
repeating μὴ μέγα and μὴ καλόν. 
This is possibly right, but not 
necessary, for the sense is 
easily completed by supplying 
ἦν, Which is the emphatic word. 

12. ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι] He passes 
from the ἢν of reference (“ We 
found it to be so”) to that of 


certainty (“It proves to be 


so”). ἔστι is introduced as 
more plainly contradicting 
Parmenides. 


13. ἐνάριθμον --- εἶδος ἕν] CF. 
Parm. 160 ¢. 

It is to be noticed here that 
while the notion of Not-Being 
is modified, there is a transi- 
tion also in that of Being. 
Through communion with Not- 
Being, i. e. with the Other or 
Difference, both in general and 
particular, Beg has become 
concrete instead of merely ab- 
stract, logical instead of purely 
ideal. Being is the sum of 
all positive existences, at the 
same time having an existence 
separate from them (Other 
than their’s). Socher observed 
this, but had not perceived the 
dialectical progress by which 
this result is approached. 


p- 258 


c 


258. 


d 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


109 


ΞΕ. Οἷσθ᾽ οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδῃ μακροτέρως τῆς We have 


ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν ; 


OEAI. Τί δή; 


-- “- \ 3 “- 3 va vas e “ > X 
mE. Τ] λεῖον ἢ ᾽κεῖνος ἀπεῖπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς TO 


f 6 3) ᾧ / 5 ὃ / > an 
7 poo εν ETL QNTNOQAVTES ATE εἰξαμεν αὐτῷ. 


OEAI. [as ; 


σ 
EE. Ὅτι ὁ μέν πού φησιν, 


3 A ’ (πὸ υ) ᾿ la) ™ A at? 
ov γὰρ Ky ποτε TOUT tovdaunt εἰναι μή εοντα, 


ἀλλὰ σὺ THO ἀφ᾽ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. 


μ-ἰ ε lal / » Ud yx \ NGS 97; 
mE. Ἥμεϊς δέ ye ov μόνον ws ἔστι τὰ μὴ ὄντα 


not only 
disobeyed 
Parmeni- 
des, but 
have de- 
fined the 
Nature of 


5 that which 


he forbade 
us to name, 
Theessence 
of Not- 
Being is 
the nega- 
tive rela- 
tion be- 
tween each 
existing 
kind and 
that which 
is Other 


9 l& \ SD ἃ ΄ 5) SS NTE 
ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ Kal TO εἰδος ὃ τυγχάνει OV TOU μὴ *hanit. 


ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα: τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδεί- 


QL N 7, 5 ΄ 
ἕαντες ουσαν TE Και κατακεκερματισμέενηὴν ἐπὶ σαντα 


Ἂ » δ 27 Ν XN Non σ“ 7 
τὰ οντὰα πρὸς aAAANAG, τὸ πρὸς TO OV ἐεκαστον μοριον 15 


» “- ΕῚ /, 9 7 » “ «ες 5 \ 
αὑτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτο 


a fr» 4 \ Y 
TOUTO ἐστιν OVTMS TO fy OV. 


GEAI. Kal παντάπασί ye, ὦ Eve, ἀληθέστατά 


a ’ 
μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι. 


= N 7 "Ge 3) “ » , an 
HE. My τοίνυν ἡμᾶς εἴπῃ τις ὅτι τοὐναντίον TOU 20 


I. μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως] 
I. 6. ἢ ἀπεῖπεν ἡμῖν. 

2. ἠπιστήκαμεν͵] The use of 
this word immediately after 
ἀπιστία, in a different sense, 
deserves to be noted. “We 
have carried our disobedience 
to Parmenides beyond the let- 
ter of his prohibition.” 

8. Τοὐδαμῃ 7] I propose to 
read τοῦτο φανῇ here, as above, 
Ῥ- 237 ἃ, 9. v. διζήμενος occurs 
here also as a various reading, 
but it does not seem impos- 
sible that Plato should choose 


Y 


to quote the words of Parme- 
nides more exactly in one 
place than in another. 

14. κατακεκερματισμένην | Plato 
is fond of this word. For a 
parallel use, cf. Parm. 144 ¢. 

15. τὸ πρὸς --- ἀντιτιθέμενον | 
Join τὸ ὃν ἕκαστον, for which 
ef Rep. 5, 480: αὐτὸ ἕκαστον τὸ 
ὄν. Cratyl. 389 ὁ: εἰς τὸ ἔργον 
ἕκαστον. Compare also τῶν 
ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου in Theet. 
174 ἃ. 

20. Μὴ---οὐκ ἔστιν] ‘“ Let no 
man, then, say of us that we 


9) 
a 


104 


ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ 


»” \ ‘\ Ἃ » / ΄σ / « ; 
ὄντος TO μὴ ὃν ἀποφαινόμενοι τολμῶμεν Eye ὡς p. 458: 


ΕΒ ¢ lal \ Ν \ > / \ > ~ / 
ἐστιν. NMELS γὰρ πέρι μεν EVAVTLOV τινος αὐτῷ χαι- 


’ / Vat ἊΨ "7 / , 5 Ἂ 
pew πάλαι λέγομεν, εἰτ᾽ ἐστιν εἰτε μὴ, λόγον EXOV ἢ 


Ὗ ΄ oy] A \ cal Sh σῷ 39. \ 
καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον. ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἰναι TO 


XN SA Δ iy € > an / 5 [2 
5μὴ OV, ἢ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας, 


Ἂ , Ἃ 7) lal Ἀ / X= / θά 
7) μέχρι TEp αν a VVAT)), EKTEOV και EKELV@D Ka απτερ 


ἡμεῖς λεγομεν, ὅτι συμμίγνυταί τε ἀλλήλοις τὰ γένῃ 


δ \ / / 
καὶ TO τε OV καὶ θάτερον διὰ πάντων καὶ δὲ ἀλλή - 


/ XN \ -“ \ lal yy 
λων διεληλυθότα τὸ μεν ETEPOY μετασχὸν TOU OVTOS 


yy A \\ / Ν / > ‘\ 5 oe oh 
IO€GTL μὲν OLA ταυτὴν τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν EKELVO YE 


-“ » 5 Sac, “ \ a WS wy 4 
οὗ μετέσχεν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον, ἔτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος OV, ἐστι 


΄ὕ 5 9 7 5 \ yx. κ ἌΣ > 
σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ov’ τὸ δὲ ὃν αὖ 


declare Not-Being the contrary 
of Being, and dare to affirm 
that it exists. We have long 
ago shaken hands with the 
question of an opposite to 
being, whether one exists or 
not, and whether this be 
capable or wholly incapable of 
definition. But for our pre- 
sent account of Not-Being, let 
a man either refute us and 
persuade us that we are in 
error, or, so long as he cannot, 
he too must say as we Say, 
that there is an inter-commu- 
nion of the kinds, and that 
Being and Difference traverse 
all things, and mutually inter- 
penetrate, so that the other 
partakes of being, and by rea- 
son of such participation 1s, 
yet is not that of which it 
partakes, but an Other: and 
being Other than Being, it is 
clearly the case, of necessity, 
that it is not-Being. While 
Being, through partaking of 
the Other, must be other than 
the remaining kinds, and as 


other than all, 7s not each one 
of them, and is not all the rest, 
but itself only ; so that there 
are infinite cases in which 
Being again is not, and in like 
manner the remaining kinds, 
whether taken severally or all 
together, in many respects are, 
and in many respects are not.” 
Cf. Legg. το, 899 ¢: Ἤ διδά- 
σκειν ἡμᾶς -- ἢ ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι. 
Being is therefore distinguished 
from the sum of positive de- 
terminations. Compare the 
attempt towards the close of 
the Theztetus to distinguish 
the ἰδέα τῆς συλλαβῆς from the 
στοιχεῖα. 

2. περὶ μὲν ἐναντίου τινὸς] 
As often happens in sentences 
begun with περὶ, the syntax is 
not quite exact. “ As for an 
opposite of Being, we have 
long said good-bye to that in- 
quiry.” 

11. ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
εἶνα] These words are re- 
peated from 256d. τὸ ἕτερον 
is the subject of εἶναι, and (τὸ 


P- 259 


250. 
b 




















ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


, \ od ΄ » Ἃὃ SA ΄σ 

θατέρου μετειληφος ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἂν εἴη γενῶν, 
7 > 7 4 ἋΟ » 37) a 

ἕτερον δ᾽ ἐκείνων ἁπάντων OV οὐκ ἐστιν ἕκαστον 

> an » \ / \ 27 \ > / d Ν 

αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύμπαντα τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν αὐτὸ, ὥστε τὸ 
ey 5 / 3 7 3. Δ / > v 

ov ἀναμφισβητήτως αὐ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἐστι, 

5 \ “ σ Ν , 
καὶ τάλλα On καθ᾽ ἕκαστον οὕτω Kal ξύμπαντα TOA- 5 


nan \ 57 Lal 327) 
λαχῇ μὲν ἐστι, πολλαχῇ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐστιν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ. 


| ΤΛ Ν , \ a 9 7, 7 > 
BE. Kai ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἴτε ἀπι- 


an / > a Ν 7 7 iy τῷ 
στεῖ τις, σκεπτέον αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιον τι τῶν 


a ᾽ὔ ͵ Ἷ δ Ἂν Ἂν 
νῦν εἰρημένων" εἶτε ὡς τι χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκῶς 


\ \ 7 » 7 \ 
χαίρει τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δ᾽ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς 


ty) » 3, ‘a “ » / 
λόγους ἕλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδα- 


«ε ec a / 7 a \ \ SYA ΄ 
κεν, ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασι. τοῦτο μέν γὰρ οὐ τέ τι 


Χ Ν Tat 5 ΄σ δ Ν 
κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν, ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ ἡδὴ καὶ χαλε- 


Ν a Ν 7 
TOV ἅμα καὶ καλον. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον :; 


a / 57 Ν a 7 
mE. Ὃ καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα 


e \ a / er 3.516 2° 
ως δυνατὰ Τοις λεγομένοις οιον Τ εἰναι καθ εκαστον 


ἕτερον) εἶναι μὴ ὄν οἵ ἔστιν. The 
words ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος ὅν are ἴῃ 
agreement with τὸ ἕτερον. 

8. Kai—qaci] “If this ap- 
parent contradiction awaken 
doubt, let doubt lead to in- 
quiry. But if made the occa- 
sion of logomachy by men who 
delight in working out and 
bringing into relief the oppo- 
site sides of such antinomies, let 
such men learn from the above 
argument that it is childish to 
mistake the different for the 
incompatible.” Mr. Grote ob- 
serves that this would be no 
unfair description of Plato’s 
own procedure in the Parme- 
nides. To which it may be 
rejoined that, as Mr. Grote 


himself points out, the diffi- 
culties of the Parmenides are 
regarded by their author as a 
preparatory exercise, stimu- 
lating the mind to further 
study, whereas in the case 
here supposed the difficulties 
are raised for their own sake. 

II. τοὺς λόγους ἕλκων] The 
picture of men tearing an 
argument ‘‘to tatters, to very 
rags,’ is one which frequently 
occurs. Cf. Phileb. 57 d: τοῖς 
δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὁλκήν. 

14. καὶ χαλεπὸν ἅμα καὶ καλόν] 
According to Plato’s favourite 
proverb, ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά. 

18. ὡς δυνατά} Either “as 
easily managed” (cf. οὐ χαλεπὸν 
supra), or “as possible to be” 


Our argu- 
ment has 
shewn the 
worthless- 
10 ness of that 
easy and 
childish 
logic which 
relies on 
the expo- 
sure of con- 
tradictions, 
when com- 
pared with 
15 that which 
is at once 
difficult 
and valu- 
able, the 
real criti- 
cism of 


arguments 
according 
to their 
genuine 
meaning. 
That ana- 
lysis which 
makes ab- 
solute se- 
verance 
between 
different 
forms is at 
the oppo- 
site pole 
from true 
philosophy: 


for without I 


166 


ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


»Ὰ 7 » » σ΄ “ / ig 3, 
ἐλέγχοντ ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν TE τις ἕτερον OV πῇ p. 259}. 


δυι 53 ΄-“ \ ao 8' Ἃἃ “Ὁ a > , 
TavTov εἰναι φῇ καὶ ὅταν ταῦτον ὧν ETEpOY, ἐκείνῃ ἃ 


Ν bdo) ad [χά / / / Ἀ 
καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ὃ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον, TO 


\ 3. ἂν “ > 7, Cain 7 κ᾿ \ ΄ 
δὲ ταῦτον ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ καὶ TO θά- 


San Ν / \ Ν σ 
ὅτερον ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον 


5 ΄ / [4 » / Bs / 
ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω TavavTia ἀεὶ προφέροντα 


> “- / By , ΕΣ @ > Χ 
ἐν τοῖς λογοις, οὐ τέ τις ἐλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινος 


y+ “ 7 \ > / a 
ἄρτι TE τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογε- 


Ν + 
νὴς ὧν. 


ΘΒΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 


—the latter is more probable. 
“Tetting these contradictions 
alone, as not inconsistent with 
the nature of things.” (οὐκ 
ἀδύνατα, Par. Εἰ. marg.) In sup- 
port of the former (which, 
however, is hardly Greek), ef. 
Phileb. 14 ἃ : μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοι- 
οὕτων ἅπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ 
ῥάδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμ- 
πόδια. The word is suspici- 
ous, and Badham conj. ἀνήνυτα. 
It is more likely that a few 
letters have dropt out, e. g. 
ταῦτα ἐάσαντα. ὡς δυνατὸν μά- 
λιστία. 

(18.) οἷον τ᾽ εἶναι ---- πότερον] 
“To be able to apply his rea- 
son to each particular point in 
a discussion, and to bring any 
man to the test who says that 
what is other in some respect 
is the same, or what is the 
same is other, by reasoning 
with him on that ground and 
of that particular relation, in 
which he says that either of 
these predicates is applicable.” 

I. ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν] Cf. 
Rep. 7, 534 6: ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ 
πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιὼν----ἐν πᾶσι 
τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπο- 
ρεΐηται. 


3. κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ὅ -- κ. ε. καθ᾽ 6] 
The want of this power is 
again noted as the defect of 
ἀντιλογική ἴῃ Rep. 5, 454 6. 

This passage has been curi- 
ously mistranslated by Hegel: 
Geschichte der Phil. p. 210. 
See Introduction to Sophist, 
sub finem. 

7. οὔ τέ τις ---- νεογενὴς ὧν] 
“ This is no real exercise of 
reason, but on the face of it 
the childish offspring of one 
who has but a recent ac- 
quaintance with the true ob- 
jects of thought.” Cf. Rep. 7, 
539 b: of μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ 
πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ 
αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντι- 
λογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι 
τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους 
ἐξελέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυ- 
λάκια τῷ ἕλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν 
τὸν πλήσιον ἀεί. 

8. veoyevns| Cf. Thezt. 160 
€: τοῦτο φῶμεν σὸν εἶναι οἷον 
νεογενὲς παίδιον. Perhaps veo- 
γενὴς has here the meaning 
(which Hegel gives it) = νέου 
γέννημα. (Cf. Shakspeare’s 
“the baby of a girl”) See 
the unusual meaning given to 
νυμφευτὴς in Polit. 268 a. 


. 250. 


. 260, 











ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


107 


μ--ὶ ΄ 5 7 t - Ὧν ἮΝ ν 
SE. Καὶ γάρ, ὦ ᾽γαθέ, τὸ γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς 


᾽ ων » / 57 » 3 \ Ν δὴ 
ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲες καὶ δὴ 


Ν ’ > / Ν Ne / 
καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμουσοῦυ τινος και ἀφιλοσοφου. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή; 


* commu; 
nion of 
kinds” 
there can 
be no dis- 
course, 


i ΄, ,ὕ , ’ N ’ , Ν 
HE. Τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφανισις τὸ 5 


΄ “ \ , \ Ν Χ > ( 
διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ παντων᾽ διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων 


an ΕἸ lal \ e / / « an 
τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὃ λόγος γέγονεν ημίν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ. 


Lor! , / e ᾽ ta a \ a 
HE. Σκόπει τοίνυν ὡς ἐν καιρῷ νῦν On τοῖς τοι- 


/ 7 4& rc Ὡ“ 
οὕτοις διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκαζομεν ἐᾷν ἕτερον 


πα / 
ἑτέρῳ μίγνυσθαι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πρὸς δὴ τί; 


\ \ \ ΄ SS “ 27 a 
mE. Πρὸς τὸ τὸν Aoyov ἡμῖν τῶν ὀντων ἕν τι 


a 53 / \ / Ν Ν ’ 
γενῶν εἰναι. τούτου γὰρ στερηθέντες τὸ μέν μεγι- 


2. ἐπιχειρεῖν] “To go about 
to separate.’ The word is 
redundant, as often in Plato: 


ewes supra 2395 e.  Pheedr. 
265 e. 
3. ἀμούσου τινός] Because 


μουσική is conversant with λό- 
you. Cf. Theet. 156 a. 

5. Τελεωτάτη---πάντων] This 
truth is the key to the present 
dialogue,and gives unity to what 
seems unconnected. The chief 
characteristic of the Sophist is 
ἀντιλογική, an art of negation ; 
and even the Elenchus, as pro- 
fessed by him, has the defect 
of being purely negative, and 
is valuable only in clearing the 
way for positive speculation. 
It is by means of this contro- 
versial or negative dialectic 
that the Sophist eludes us 
when we try to fix upon him 
the reproach of being a pre- 
tender. And Parmenides has 
given occasion for this kind of 


reasoning, by drawing the line 
so sharply between being and 
not-being. Of the same nature 
was the difficulty we encoun- 
tered in considering the ex- 
clusive antithesis of rest and 
motion. This whole class of 
difficulties is solved when we 
perceive that positive and ne- 
gative are indissolubly united 
in the nature of things: and 
in particular we are enabled to 
transfix the Sophist by proving 
to him that negation is applic- 
able to thought and speech. 

9. τοῖς τοιούτοις] Se. 
μηδὲν ἐῶσιν κοινωνίᾳ παθήματος 
ἑτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν, 
P. 252 ¢. 

14. τούτου yap στερηθέντες] 
“ For if compelled to relinquish 
this, the greatest evil would be 
that we must give up philo- 
sophy ; but besides this, at 
this moment we are required 
to agree upon a definition of 


τοῖς 


Ιο 


IML Gb 


And at the 
present 
juncture 
we find the 


conveni- 
ence of 
having es- 
tablished 
this com- 
munion, for 
our next 
business 


168 


IAATONOS 


ΕΥ rn , , , r y 
στον φιλοσοφίας av στερηθεῖμεν, ἔτι δ᾽ ἐν τῷ πα- p. 26ς 


ὄντι δεῖν Adyou ἡπιβουδιομολογήσασ ας ἘΣ 
ρ VTL O€L Oyov μας (ομο ογῆσασ αι Tl TOT €OTLY, 


> \ > /, ᾽ \ > 53 Ν ΄ 5Ὸλ 
εἰ δε ἀφηρέθημεν αὐτὸ μηδ᾽ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, οὐδὲν 


xX 7 7 “Δ... > 5 » / > JA 
av ἐτι Tov λέγειν οἷοι T ἦμεν. ἀφῃρέθημεν δ᾽ ἂν, 


is to define 5 εἰ συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μίξιν μηδενὶ πρὸς 


Discourse, 
whereas if 
forms were 
incommu- 
nicable, we 
should not 
have been 
able to 
discourse 
at all. 

The reason 
why this 

is neces- 
sary is that 
the Sophist 
has yet an- 
other hold 
onus. He 
may assert 
that Not- 
Being can- 
not enter 
into Dis- 
course. 


μηδέν. 


OEAI. Ὀρθῶς τοῦτό γε. λόγον δὲ OC ὅ τι νῦν 


διομολογητέον οὐκ ἔμαθον. 


5 a Gt en AN ΄ 
EE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἴσως τῇδ᾽ ἑπόμενος ῥᾷστ᾽ ἂν μάθοις. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ: 


SE. To μὲν δὴ μὴ ὃν ἡμῖν ἕν τι τῶν ἄλλων γένος 


“δ > , \ De ἊΣ / 
ov ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον. 


SEAI. Οὕτως. 


καὶ > a \ \ a / , 
=H. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ δοξῃ τε 
ι 


Ν / / 
15 Kal λογῳ μίγνυται. 


OEAI. Ti dy: 


ἘΠῚ Μὴ / \ > “ 4 5 r 
i. Min μιγνυμένου μὲν αὑτοῦ TOUTOLS ἀναγκαῖον 


ἀληθῆ πάντ᾽ εἶναι, μιγνυμένου δὲ δόξα τε ψευδὴς 


[ Ν ΄ : \ \ A Ness, ΄ Xx 
γίγνεται καὶ Aoyos’ τὸ yap Ta μὴ οντὰ δοξάζειν ἢ 


λόγοις γιγνόμενον. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


΄ σ᾽ ὦ Ὁ , \ A > , N 
20 λέγειν, TOUT ἐστί που TO ψεῦδος, ἐν διανοίᾳ TE καὶ 


EE. Ὄντος δέ γε ψεύδους ἐστιν ἀπάτη. 


Discourse, whereas, if the very 
existence of discourse were 
utterly taken from us, I pre- 
sume we could not then dis- 
course at all” (much less dis- 
course upon Discourse). 

11. To μὲν δὴ----ἀνεφάνη] Viz. 
The application of the notion 
of Other to those things from 
which Being, or any part of 
Being, is distinguished. 

12. διεσπαρμένον] Supr. 255 


ewan ac: 

14. εἰ----μίγνυται)] The way 
is now prepared for the con- 
tinuation of the argument 
which was dropped p. 236 e. 

18. δόξα τε ψευδὴς γίγνεται καὶ 
λόγος] See, in addition to 
passages elsewhere cited, Cra- 
tyl. 385-387, 429, 436. 

20. ἐν διανοίᾳ ---- γιγνόμενον] 
“ Which thus arises in the re- 
gion of thought and speech.” 


— 


J 





16) 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 169 


In other 
words : 
Negation 
is possible, 
but False- 
hood is not. 


260. OEAI. Ναί 


μ-ὶ \ ᾽ Ses. 
BE. Kat μὴν ἀπάτης οὔσης εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκό- 
7 4 7 XN 3 
vov ἤδη Kal φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἶναι. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ov; 


EE. Τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ἔφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ που τῷ 


σι 


Ld / / yy, δὲ / \ 
ἃ τόπῳ καταπεφευγέναι μέν, ἔξαρνον δὲ γεγονέναι τὸ 
,ὔ > 3 aA \ A Δ ἢ 27 
παράπαν μηδ᾽ εἶναι ψεῦδος" τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὃν οὔτε δια- 
“ ’ δ [4 = > 7 Ν 5 \ 5 lad 
νοείσθαί τινα οὔτε λέγειν᾽ οὐσίας yap οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ 
\ XN oN / 
_ Τὸ μὴ ὃν μετέχειν. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἢν ταῦτα. 1ο 
= a / a \ 7 , ny 
&E. Nov δέ ye τοῦτο μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὄντος, 
od / \ 7 2 ἊΟ , 32) ᾽’ὔ 5.ϑ ἃ 
ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἂν μάχοιτο ETL’ τάχα O ἂν 
/ fad “ Ν \ / a Ἂς »S \ 
φαίη τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τὰ δ᾽ 
yf Ν / \ Ν , 53 a » 77 
οὔ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων. 


fod X\ 9 wo N Q / 3 ὩΣ \ 
ὥστε τὴν εἰδωλοποιίκην καὶ φανταστικὴν, εν ἢ φαμεν 


" 
σι 


SEN 5) ᾽ὔ 4. τον ? e , > 
αὑτὸν εἶναι, διαμάχοιτ av πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ 
yf 3 Χ “ νΝ lA 5 a lal NiO 
ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ δόξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ μὴ OV- 
Ε A \ A ΄ > 5 , τ 
τος Ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μὴ 
Hence 


Ξ ς γ - , ΄ Pa there arises 
πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὅ τί 20 the neces- 


if > / \ a? 3 7, 
συνισταμένης τῆς κοινωνίας. Ola ταῦτ οὖν λόγον 


ΟΣ ὍΣ o ΄, Noy fate , a sity of ex- 
TOT €OTLY, LWA φανέντων και Τὴν KOLV@VLAVY QAUT@Y = amining 
a Ni oy ὃ 56 δὲ ᾿ 58 x speech, 
τῷ μὴ OVTL κατίδωμεν, KATLOOVTES OE TO ev OS OV opinion, 





3. πάντα---μεστὰ εἶναι] Cf. 
Thest. 170 ὁ: καὶ πάντα που 
μεστὰ τἀνθρώπινα ζητούντων δι- 
δασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας αὑτῶν 
ἘΝ (ὑπῆν: 411 Ὁ, 

6. ἔξαρνον δὲ γεγονέναι] ῬΡ. 
239-241. 

ΤΡ. φανταστικήν] Distinguish- 
ed from εἰκαστική, the other 
species of εἰδωλοποιϊκή, supr. 
p- 236 c. 

τό. πάλιν] I.e. As before in 
the case of μὴ ὄν. 

18. μὴ συνισταμένης | 


The 


communion is said to unite, 
instead of the elements unit- 
ing in communion, just as 7 
μάχη συνίσταται is put for οἱ 
μαχόμενοι συνίστανται εἰς μάχην. 

20. δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν] This 
distinction is in advance of the 
psychology of the Theztetus. 

21. tva—xaridoper] “ That 
when we have found them, we 
may also observe their com- 
munion with Not-Being.” 

22. τὸ Ψεῦδος dv] “ That 
falsehood exists.” 


and imagi- 
nation, that 
we may see 
whether 

or no they 
partake of 
Not-Being. 
The So- 
phist ap- 
pears likely 
to prove 

a very 
Sphinx, 
proposing 
to us one 
riddle after 
another. 
But we 
must not 
lose heart ; 
and, after 
all, his 
chief for- 
tress is 
already 
taken. 


170 


ἀποδεΐξωμεν, ἀποδείξαντες δὲ Tov σοφιστὴν εἰς αὐτὸ p. 261} 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


> ’ y+ ” / > ΕΝ Ce) / > 
ἐνδήσωμεν, εἴπερ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες EV 


ἄλλῳ γένει ζητῶμεν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ δέ γε, ὦ ξένε, ἔοικεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι 


Ἂν Ν Ν \ 51,3 Ν / vA / 
5TO περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς λεχθέν, OTL δυσθη- 


ΕΜ Ν 4 ‘ 3 ΄ 
ρευτον εἰὴ TO γενος. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων 


/ Ὁ ’ὔ’ 7, a / 
γέμειν. ὧν ἐπειδάν TL προβάλῃ, τοῦτο πρότερον ava- 


a / \ »., 5 ἄν 3. 8A > 7, 
γκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀφικέσθαι. 


A \ / \ Ν Ἂ, Ὁ « Ε 32) \ 
νῦν yap μόγις μὲν TO μὴ ὃν ὡς οὐκ ἐστι προβληθεν 


το διιπεράσαμεν, ἕτερον δὲ προβέβληται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ ψεῦ- 


2 / ΄ 
δος ὡς ἔστι καὶ περὶ λόγον καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδεῖξαι, 


Ν \ SA σ΄ Ἂς: 9.59. SY Lear - Ε 
καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο LOWS ETEPOV, Καὶ ET ἀλλο μετ EKELVO 


Ν / « yy 5 \ / / 
Kal πέρας, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεται ποτε. 


΄ 5 A 
ΣΏ. Θαρρεῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ Tov καὶ σμικρὸν τι 


’, ς \ , Ch oN of 4 \ “ Ἢ 
15 δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ προϊέναι. τί γὰρ ὃ Y 


5 a 3 7 ΕΝ 5 y x \ 3 
ἀθυμῶν ἐν τούτοις δρασειεν ἂν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδὲν ἐν 


5 7 » / X Ν ’ 3 27 5 / 
ἐκείνοις ἀνύτων ἢ Kal πάλιν εἰς τούπισθεν ἀπωσθεὶς ; 


rn Ν A \ 7 σ “- 
σχολῇ που, τὸ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν λεγόμενον, ὃ γε 


I. αὐτὸ] τὸ ψεῦδος. 

2. εἴπερ ἔνοχός ἐστιν] “If he 
is liable to be held therein.” 
The word, without losing the 
legal association, recovers the 
original metaphorical — sense. 
Cf. πρόχειρον, Theet. τοῦ ἃ, 
and note. The same remark 
applies to ἀπολύσαντες, “ freeing 
him” (at once acquitting and 
liberating). 

5. kar ἀρχὰς] 218 0, 223 Ὁ, 
226 a. 

6. προβλημάτων γέμει"] Cf. 
Theet. 161 a: οἴει pe λόγων 
τινα εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥᾳδίως 
ἐξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει 
οὕτω ταῦτα. 

7. προβάλῃ!β͵Ἵ Referring to 
προβλημάτων, Which partly re- 


tains the etymological sense. 
προβάλλειν is here to throw in 
front as a screen or defence. 
Cf. Polit. 279 d. 

8. διαμάχεσθαι) “To fight 
through.” διὰ retaining the 
original meaning. 

10. προβέβληται] The perf. 
pass. is perhaps used here with 
middle signification, = “ has 
thrown before him ;” but the 
word is more probably to be 
taken passively: = “ Another 
problem is set.” 

12. ἴσως ἕτερον] Se. δεήσει 
προβληθὲν διαπερᾶσαι. 

16. ἐν τούτοις] Se. ἐν οἷς πρό- 
εἰσιν. 

ἐν ἐκείνοι] Se. τοῖς ἄλλοις. 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 171 


. 26ιτ. τοιοῦτος av ποτε ἕλοι πόλιν. νῦν δ᾽ ἐπεί, ὦ yale, 

© χρῦτο ὃ λέγεις διαπεπέρανται, τό τοι μέγιστον ἡμῖν 

τεῖχος ἡρημένον ἂν εἴη, τὰ O ἄλλα ἤδη paw καὶ 
σμικρότερα. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς εἶπες. 5 

ΣῈ. Λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δύξαν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη 

νῦν δή, λάβωμεν, ἵν ἐναργέστερον ξἀπολογισώμεθαξ, 

πότερον αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὃν ἢ παντάπασιν 

ἀληθῆ μέν ἐστιν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδέ- 





> 7 
ποτε οὐδέτερον. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθώς. 


Io 


, , \ a a N a 
HE. Φέρε δή, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ TOV oe Ee 
»ὲ : i : step mus 
γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν be to ask 
the same 
, / , ΄ 7, : 
ὡσαύτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα. φαίνεται yap πῃ ταύτῃ question 
\ ᾿ , about 
TO νῦν ζητούμενον. 15 words 
\ Ξ 3 \ Ae eg) , c which we 
GEAI. To ποῖον οὖν dn περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπα- have al- 
/ ready an- 
KOUVOTEOYV 5 swered 
, , , , yo about the 
ΣΕ. Hire πάντα ἀλλήλοις ξυναρμόττει εἴτε μη- letters of 
Sas εἶ Ne ἫΝ 9 ΄, εν the alpha- 
ey’ εἶτε τὰ μέν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μη. ΤΡ ΕΠ τς 
a cyl? 7 \ \ nf \ 4 kinds of 
GEAI. Δῆλον τοῦτο ye, ὅτι τὰ μεν ἔθελει, τὰ δ᾽ OV. 20 Being ; 


3. ἡρημένον] This use of the 
pf pass. of αἱρέω sufficiently 
confirms the MS. reading ἡρῆ- 
σθαι in Phileb. 66 "ἢ. The 
metaphor is suggested by 
σχολῇ----ἔλοι πόλιν above. 

7. νῦν δή] So also the Bodl. 
MS. (not δέ). 

*darrohoyto@peba*| MSS. ἀπο- 
λογησώμεθα. If the MS. read- 
ing were right, the following 
clauses would depend on λάβω- 
μεν, and there would be a con- 
tinuation of the metaphor from 
supr. 254 d: ἀθῴοις ἀπαλλάτ- 
τειν. Cf. Lege. το, 886 e. But 
the correction of Heindorf, 


received by Bekker and suc- 
ceeding editors, appears so 
exactly suited to the context, 
that it is here retained. “ That 
we may reckon or infer more 
clearly.” “That we may have 
better data for determining.” 
ἀπο aS ἴῃ ἀπεικάζειν, ἀπομαντεύ- 
εσθαι. 

14. φαίνεται γάρ πῃ ταύτῃ] 
Because words are the ele- 
ments of speech, as letters 
are of syllables, and ideas of 
thought. 

τό. Τὸ ποῖον --- ὑπακουστέον] 
“What question must I an- 
swer about names ?” 


Z 2 


To what 
extent do 
they admit 
ofcombina- 
tion ? 
Some com- 
binations 
of words 
are signifi- 
cant, and 
some are 
not. 

For, as 
there are 
two chief 
parts of 
speech : 
the verb, 
which sig- 
nifies ac- 
tion, and 
the noun, 
which de- 
notes the 
agent, 
neither 
verbs with- 
out nouns 
nor nouns 
without 
verbs can 
be strung 


together so 


as to mean 
anything. 


172 


ITAATQNOZ 





FE. To τοιόνδε λέγεις ἴσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφεξῆς p. 261. 


, ΄ / / \ \ “Ὁ 
λεγόμενα καὶ δηλοῦντά τι ξυναρμόττει, τὰ δὲ THe 


συνεχείᾳ μηδὲν σημαίνοντα ἀναρμοστεῖ. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτ᾽ εἶπες ; 

EE. Ὅπερ φήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολο- 
γεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν που τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐ- 
σίαν δηλωμάτων διττὸν γένος. 


OEAI. Ilas; 


EE. To μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰπὲ ἑκάτερον. 


EE. Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ov δήλωμα ῥῆμά 


που λέγομεν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 


Χ ΄ 5 5 a Picasa 
HE. To δέ γ᾽ er αὖ τοῖς ἐκεῖνα πράττουσι on- 


/ 57 \ / > 5 
λεγομένων οὐκ ἐστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ᾽ αὖ 


15 μεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 


= > aA > 3 ΄ \ , 
BE. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων 


συνεχῶς 


ῥημάτων 


χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων. 
OEAI. Ταῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἔμαθον. 


H&E. Δῆλον γὰρ ὡς πρὸς ἕτερόν τι βλέπων ἄρτι 


9. Τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥή- 
ματα κληθέν]ἠ The distinction 
of noun and verb is here in- 
troduced as something wholly 
new. Note that ὄνομα is used 
first Im a generic and after- 
wards in a specific meaning: 
first for “ word” (supr. d) and 
then for “ noun.” 

II. TO pev—dvopa] “ The 
one, which is an expression 
standing for actions, we call a 
verb : the other, which is an ar- 
ticulate mark set on those who 
do the actions, we call a noun.” 


14. ἐκεῖνα]. The Bodl. MS. 
has ἐκείνας (sc. ras πράξεις). 

18. ῥημάτων͵]ἢ The genitive 
is governed by ἐξ in the pre- 
ceding line. 

21. Δῆλον γὰρ] “ You must 
surely have had something 
different in your eye when you 
agreed with me. For this is 
the very thing I meant in say- 
ing that these things (nouns 
or verbs) merely strung to- 
gether in this way do not 
make language.” 





p- 2628 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


178 


/ A Ν , - “ 
. 262. ξυνωμολόγεις" ἐπεὶ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι 


A τ / a > 3) 7, 
συνεχως ὧδε λεγόμενα ταῦτα οὐκ ἐστι λογος. 


OEAI. [las ; 


RE. Οἷον, βαδίζει τρέχει καθεύδει, καὶ τάλλα ὅσα 


᾽ὔ 7 «" A 4 3 la)  » 
πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, κἂν πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὖτ 
’ iz a 7 
εἴπη, λόγον οὐδέν TL μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ; 


SE. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται, λέων ἔλα- 


σ Ψ » [, a A ΄ὕ 3 
bos “T7TOS, OOH TE OVOULATA τῶν TAS πράξεις av 


7 > 7 \ \ ’ XN ἈΝ 
πραττόντων ὠνομάσθη, καὶ κατὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν 


7 > / 4 / s > 7 \ 
συνέχειαν οὐδείς πω ζυνέστη λόγος" οὐδεμίαν yap 
yf 2 sy? 5 / ΄σ In? > / > \ 
οὔτε οὕτως OUT ἐκείνως πρᾶξιν οὐδ᾽ ampakiav οὐδὲ 
yy? 5 5. Χ Χ y+ o \ 7 
οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ Ta φωνηθέντα, 
3, lod 4 A CL 7 
πρὶν av τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ᾽ τότε 
3 χὰ ΄ Ν ΄ 5 / 3 \ «ς Δ 
δ᾽ ἡρμοσέ τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμ- 
7 XN an , a 
πλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτος καὶ σμικρό- 


Τατος. 


2. ταῦτα] Sc. ὀνόματα καὶ 
ῥήματα. 

5. avr] So the Bodl. MS., 
with ATI. cett. αὖτ᾽. 

6. ἀπεργάζεται͵)]͵ The subject 
is not τις, but τὰ ῥήματα. 

9. ὀνόματα----ὠνομάσθη] Here 
also the cogn. accus. becomes 
the nominative to the passive 
verb. 

10. καὶ κατὰ ταύτην --- λόγος] 
“No sentence is constructed 
by this concatenation any more 
that by the former one.” 

13. οὐσίαν---μὴ ὄντος] It has 
been above shewn that this is 
the meaning of every negative 
proposition. 

15. ἥρμοσε] Se. τὰ φωνηθέντα. 
“The elements of speech com- 
bine.” The verb is used in a 
neuter sense, as below. 


ἥρμασέ τε καὶ --- ἐγένετο] For 
the aorists cf. Theet. 156 e, 
and note. And for the whole 
expression, cf. Phileb.47d: μίξις 
μία λύπης τε Kal ἡδονῆς ξυμπίπτει 
γενομένη. 

ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή! “ The 
simplest combination.” In 
Theet. 202 it was suggested 
that words taken singly had 
no signification, but only when 
combined. Here the condi- 
tions necessary to this combi- 
nation are further shewn. It 
seems to be implied here that 
falsity is only in propositions, 
TO ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεὶ, as 
Aristotle says (de An. IIT. 6, 
§ 2). This was not seen in 
Crat. 385 d: Ἔστιν ἄρα ὄνομα 
ψεῦδος καὶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, εἴπερ 
καὶ λόγον. 


- 


Ὁ 


The most 
elementary 
sentence 
must con- 
TO tain at 
least one 
of each 
kind. And 
the sim- 
plest com- 
bination of 
a noun and 
verb, such 
as “ Man 
15 Jearns,” is 
at once sig- 
nificant, 
and this 


174 ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


A 7 @ 

may be ΘΕΑΙ. Ilos ap ὧδε λέγεις ἢ 

taken as a pa ΡῈ 5 or , y 

type of lan- BE. Ὅταν εἴπῃ τις ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει, λόγον 
guage In 3 \ an / / ~ 

the most εἰναι Sys τοῦτον ἐλάχιστον TE καὶ πρῶτον ; 

rudimen- τ 

tary form. OEAI. Eyoye. 

It is there- ἘΞ “νὸν ” , Ἢ a eh > 
fore true 5 &E. Δηλοῖ yap ἤδὴ που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ 
that of , 5! , x , Ν » > 
words,as γίγνομενων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ OVO- 
of letters ΄ , 5». ΄ / ΄ὔ ᾿Εν 
andsounds, μάζέι μόνον, ἀλλά τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ρήματα 
only cer- ma DL \ ,ὕ nm 9 4 > 
taincom. Τοῖς ὀνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν TE αὑτὸν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μόνον OVO- 
binations ΄ " \ δὲ \ a , , κ᾿ 
ἐπα προ τις μάζειν εἴπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῷ TO 
sible. 


Every such 1° 


ὄνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον. 


ene OEAI. ᾿Ορθώς. 
a \ ΄ κ , κ 
Me HE. Οὕτω δὴ καθάπερ Ta πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλ- 
, 4 \ ᾽ yf \ Ν \ a “ 53 
λήλοις ἥρμοττε, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὖ 
΄σ \ \ / A \\ , lal 
σημεῖα τὰ μὲν οὐχ ἄρμόττει, TA δὲ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτῶν 
“2 
15 λόγον ἀπειργάσατο. 
Sono ae: 
OEAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 
Y , 
Moreover, BE. Ἔτι δὴ σμικρὸν τοδε. 
every - 
proposi- ΘΕΑΙ. To ποῖον ; 
tion, even ; Ε a x = 
the sim- EE. Λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν περ ἢ; Twos εἶναι 
plest, has x , 
asubject, 20AOyOV, μὴ δέ τινος ἀδύνατον. 
and is of a Ἂ 
certain ΘΈΑΙ. Οὕτως. 
quality. 


> rn Ν NN 3 a 
EE. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιὸν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ ; 


1. ὧδε The adverb is used, 
instead of τοῦτο, by a sort of 
attraction from πῶς. 

4. ἀλλά τι περαίνει)]ξ. “ But 
effects or determines some- 
thing.” Cf. Thet. 180a: πε- 
paveis δὲ οὐδέ ποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς 
οὐδένα αὐτῶν. 

9. τῷ πλέγματι] The same 
metaphor is applied in the 
Politicus to the practical com- 
binations of the Statesman. 

13. τὰ τῆς φωνῆς σημεῖα] “The 
vocal marks on things,” i. 6. 


words. περὶ -- “ἴῃ the region 
of,” 1. 6. “ amongst.” 

17. σμικρὸν τόδε] Se. ἴδωμεν or 
λάβωμεν. Cf. Polit. 300 a: τί 
δὲ τόδε: Compare the similar 
ellipse with ὧδε in Τ Θεοῦ. 191 ¢: 
ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε. 

19. τινὸς εἶναι λόγον] “ Must 
have a subject.” Cf. Thezt. 
160 a: ᾿Ανάγκη δέ ye ἐμέ τε τινὸς 
γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γί- 
γνωμαι. αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς 
δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι" 
ἐκεῖνό τε τινὶ γίγνεσθαι K.T.A. 


p- 264}; 


. 2626 





b 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


BEAT Προς δ᾽ οὗ; 


y \ \ an (yr ΄ 
BE. Προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. 


ΘΕΙΑΙ. Δεῖ γοῦν. 


/ 5 
BE. Λέξω τοίνυν σοι λόγον, συνθεὶς πρᾶγμα 


Le δὲ ὁ , WOW ἐ oe δ᾽ x 5 Xo 
πράξει OL OVOMATOS καὶ ρηματος᾽ OTOV av o Aoyos 5 


ἢ, σύ μοι φράζειν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ᾽ ἔσται κατὰ δύναμιν. 


HE. Θεαίτητος κάθηται. μῶν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος. 


ΞΕ. Σὸν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ιο 


o 
OTOU. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε Kal ἐμός. 


ΞΕ. Ti δὲ ὅδ᾽ αὖ: 


OEAI. Ποῦς ; 


Ὄ fa) \ , 7 
HE. Θεαίτητος, ᾧ viv ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτον οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἄλλως εἴποι πλὴν 


gt ἡ » 95 Ν S 2 a 
€MOV Τ ELVAL Και περι ἐμου. 


ἊΝ / / vad 9 
HE. Ποιὸν δέ ye τινά φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἕκαστον 


53 an 7 
εἰναι τῶν λογων. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 


eS y? Ν al /p “- 
H&E. Τούτων δὴ ποῖον τινα ἑκάτερον φατέον εἶναι: 


2. Προσέχωμεν --- αὐτοῖς] Cf. 
supra 233 d: καί μοι προσέχων 
τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα ἀποκρίνου. 

4. πρᾶγμα --- ῥήματος]. The 
ὄνομα standing for the πρᾶγμα 
and the ῥῆμα for the πρᾶξις, 
ut supra. 

21. ποῖόν τινα] “Since the 
time of Aristotle, the quality 
of a proposition has been 
understood to designate its 
being either affirmative or ne- 
gative: that being formal, or 
belonging to its form only. 
Whether affirmative or nega- 


tive, it may be true or false, 
and this is doubtless a quality, 
but belonging to its matter, 
not its form. Plato seems to 
have taken no account of the 
formal distinction, negative or 
affirmative.” Grote’s Plato, vol. 
il. p. 448 note. See, however, 
supr. 262 ¢, πρᾶξιν οὐδ᾽ ἀπραξίαν, 
οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος. Infr. 
265 6: φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν. 
The possibility of negation has 
been already proved: the ques- 
tion now is, whether speech or 
thought can properly be made 


For exam- 
ple: “ The- 
zetetus is 
sitting” is 
a proposl- 
tion, of 
which The- 
zetetus is 
the subject. 


15 “ Theete- 


tus here is 
flying,” is 
another, of 
which the 
subject is 
the same. 
But they 
differ in 
quality. 


20 For the one 


is mani- 
festly false, 


the other 
true. 

The true 
proposition 
determines 
in accord- 
ance with 
reality. 
The false 
proposition 
also deter- 
mines 
something, 
as if real, 
but that 
something 
is different 
from the 
reality. 
Therefore, 
in the se- 
cond of the 
two in- 
stances just 
given, The- 
zetetus is 
made the 
subject of 
an unreal 
determina- 
tion, and 
of another 
predicate, 
which is 
treated 

as if it were 
the same 


176 


ITAATQNOZ 


ΘΕΑΙ. Tov μὲν ψευδῆ που, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ. 


/ \ FeLi « \ 
BE. Λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα ws 


A Ν cal 
€OTL TEPl σου. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ti pny ; 


ZE. Ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων. 


GCEAI. Nai. 


— \ \ / 3, 3, 
HE. Τὰ μὴ ὄντ᾽ ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Σχεδόν. 


μ»-- 35) 4, + nw 
EE. Ὄντων δέ ye ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. πολλὰ 


\ > yf 
δὲ οὐκ OVTA. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 


\ \ y+ 7 OQ. 53 / A 
lo μὲν γὰρ εφαμεν OVTA περὶ ἐκαστον εἰναί που, TOAAG 


= ἃ “ Χ , a 
HE. “Ov ὕστερον δὴ λόγον εἴρηκα περὶ σοῦ, 


- ,ὕ 3 Ὁ ec , 7 9. 51 , 
πρωτον μεν», ἐξ ων ὡρισάμεθα τί ποτ εστι Aoyos, 


3 / 5 Ν “ ΄-“ 7 2 
τ ἀναγκαιότατον αὑτὸν Eva τῶν βραχυτάτων εἰναι. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Nov δὴ γοῦν ταύτῃ ξυνωμολογήσαμεν. 


7 
SE. Ἔπειτα δέ γε τινός. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


\ Χ la 
HE. Ei δὲ μὴ ἔστι σός, οὐκ ἄλλου ye οὐδενός. 


the object of negation, and de- 
scribed as false. In the Phile- 
bus also (37 e) by the quality 
of an opinion is meant truth 
or falsity: καὶ ἐγένετο od μόνον 
δόξα διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά τις 
ἑκατέρα. 

9. Ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα πέρι 
σοῦ] “Really being different 
from what really is concerning 
you: for we said that in re- 
gard to each thing there ex- 
ists much that is and much 
that is not.” I. 6. the propo- 
sition has a real significance, 
though a significance which is 
different from the true one. 

Io. mov is to be construed 


ὑπερβάτως with ἔφαμεν. N. B. 
It is possible that in the phrase 
οὔκουν ὅσοι ye τῶν μεγάλων πού 
τι κιτιλ., SUPY. 235 6, που ought 
to have been taken ὑπερβάτως 
with the whole sentence: = “I 
presume you know.” 

15. eva τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι] 
Because a subject and a pre- 
dicate are essential to every 
sentence. 

Ig. Ei δὲ py—ovdevds] The 


p- 265] 


object of these words, and of © 


ᾧ νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι supra a, is 
to bring out the falsity of the 
proposition, by making it per- 
fectly clear that Theztetus is 
the subject of whom “flying” 








ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ; 


177 


HE. Μηδενὸς δὲ ὧν οὐδ᾽ av λόγος εἴη TO πα- 


(2 Ξ > / \ σ “ 3 ΄ 53 ΄ 
pamav’ ἀπεφῆήναμεν yap ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἣν λόγον 


” \ 5 , 
ὄντα μηδενὸς εἶναι Aoyov. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθότατα. 


ΞΕ. Περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ 


\ 


SON Ν \ 5, ε BA , ec yy 
αὐτὰ Και μὴ OVTH WS OVTA, TTAVTATTACLY WS EOLKEV 


c / / 3) e / 7 
ἢ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἐκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ 


5 7, yA Ν 5 la / / 
ονομάτων ὄντως TE Kal ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λογος 


ψευδής. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα μὲν οὖν. 


BE. Τί δὲ 67; διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, 


is predicated. If the propo- 
sition had no subject, it would 
not be a proposition, for it 
was shewn that every propo- 
sition has a subject: but it 
belongs to no subject except 
Theeetetus. Therefore Theze- 
tetus is the subject. This 
conclusion is resumed in the 
words περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα. 

Mr. Grote objects that here 
and in Theet. 201, Plato, who 
decries the “ facts of sense,” 
selects an example of which 
sense alone can judge. It may 
be replied that, in choosing the 
simplest examples, he naturally 
lights on what is obvious to the 
senses. But, first, even in this 
case the truth or falsehood is not 
given by sense, but by reason- 
ing upon sense ; and, secondly, 
Plato would have said that 
these “sensible analogies” (ai- 
σθηταὶ ὁμοιότητες, Polit. 285 6) 
were only symbols of the higher 
truths of which he spoke. 

3. ἦν] The past tense is 
used not only because of the 


aorist ἀπεφήναμεν, but also to 
express that which is unalter- 
able. 

6. Περὶ δὴ σοῦ] Compare 
the similar “ad hominem” il- 
lustration at the end of the 
Theetetus, p. 209 Ὁ: θὲς γάρ 
pe διανοούμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος 
Θεαίτητος κιτ.λ. 

Περὶ δὴ ---- μέντοι θάτερα | 
The position of μέντοι has 
caused suspicion as to the 
soundness of the text, but may 
be accounted for by the em- 
phasis on σοῦ, Cf. που supr. b, 
and note. 

λεγόμενα----σύνθεσι.] For the 
constr. cf. Pheedo 69 ὁ : χωριζό- 
μενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα 
ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ 
ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή K.T.A. 

7. ὡς ἔοικεν----γίγνεσθαι] The 
main verb is attracted into the 
relative clause, as in Soph. 
Trach. 1238: ἀνὴρ ὅδ᾽, ὡς ἔοι- 
κεν, οὐ νέμειν ἐμοὶ φθίνοντι μοῖ- 
ραν. Cf. Euthyd. 280d: Δεῖν 
ἄρα ὡς ἔοικεν. Phileb. 54 d: οὐκ- 
οὖν, ὅπερ ἔλεγον----χάριν ἔχειν δεῖν, 


Aa 


which be- 
longs to 
him. And 
such a 
combina- 
tionofnoun 
and verb 
amounts 


5 really and 


truly to 
falsehood 
in speech. 
But if 
speech may 
be false, 

so may 
thought, 
opinion, 
and ima- 
gining. For 
thought 
and speech 
are the 





same, ex- 
cept that 
thought is 
inward and 
silent, 
while 
speech 
gives voice 
to thought. 
Now in 
speech 
there is 
affirmation 
and denial: 
and the 
correspond- 
ing deter- 
mination 
when tak- 
ing place 
in thought, 
is called 
Opinion. 
And Opin- 
ion, when 
arising in 
a medium 
of sensa- χε 
tion, is 

called Ima- 
gining. 


178 


OEAT. Πώς: 


ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


“ » ΕΣ “ ει A \ / -“ 4 
μῶν οὐκ 76n δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ γένη ψευδῆ TE καὶ p. 263. 


ἀληθὴ πάνθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται ; 


ie 5, en x “ ΄ / » 
EE. SOS εἴσει ῥᾷον, ἂν πρῶτον λάβῃς, τί ποτ 


ΘΈΑΙ. Δίδου μόνον. 


y , 7 9 > , 
βέστι καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστ᾽ ἀλλήλων. 


—_ > - , \ ‘ ͵ >, \ 
ΜΞ πὰς Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ Aoyos ταὐτον᾽ πλὴν 


7 
10 διάνοια; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


« Ἁ 5" \ na a Ν ς \ / 32) 

ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς Ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ 
a / ΄ 3 EN econ > ΄ 

φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, 


\ ea \ an / 
GE. To δέ γ᾽ am’ ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος 


ΘΕΑΙ͂. ᾿Αληθῆ. 


ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος. 


\ / DING ΤῊΝ y+ 
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ev λογοις αὐτὸ iopev ov. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον : 


ἘΠῚ, Φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν. 


4. λάβῃς, τί] αὐτὰ, which 
some editors insert between 
these two words, is omitted by 
the Bodleian, with most other 
MSS. 

6. Δίδου μόνον] The meta- 
phor implied in λάβης is con- 
tinued. 

7. Οὐκοῦν----ταὐτόν] Cf. Theet. 
189 6: τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ap 
ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς ; Τί καλῶν ; Ad- 
γον, ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ 
διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῆ. 
In the present passage, as also 
in Phileb. 38 d, (in the ac- 
count of 6déa,) the distinction, 
as well as the likeness, between 
inward and outward language, 
is marked out. 

12. Τὸ δέ γ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα] 
Cf. Theet. 206 d: τὴν δόξαν 


> ’ 5» \ 4 “ , 
εκτυπουμενον ELS τὴν διὰ του στο- 


"Apa λέγεις 


ματος ponv. Phileb. 1. 6. : τά 
τε πρὸς αὑτὸν ῥήματα ἐντείνας 
εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ 
ταῦτ᾽ ἂν πάλιν φθέγξαιτο, καὶ 
λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε 
δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν. 

15. αὐτὸ] For αὐτὸ, antici- 
pating the correlative word, 
though less distinctly than 
here, cf. Theet. 207 d: εἶτα 
ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων 
μαθήσει Kar ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ 
τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτά: Θ. 
K7.A, Σ. Ταῦτα 
λέγω. Herm. unnecessarily 
conj. αὐτοί: Wagner αὖ τόδ᾽. 
See also supr. 243 a, ἐκεῖνο, 
and 256d, where the antece- 
dent of αὐτὰ had not been 
distinctly expressed; and ef. 
Polit. 262 a: τοῦτό ye—NE. Τὸ 
ποῖον 5 








p- 263. 
p: 264. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


ΘΕΙ͂ΑΙ. Ἴσμεν. 


179 


“ > a a \ ΄, 
HE. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν 


ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅ τι προσ- 


7 » ͵ 
εἰπῃς QUTO ; 


GHAI. Kai πώς; 


BE. Ti δ᾽ ὅταν μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἀλλὰ δι αἰσθή- 


a \ ‘\ a 3 ΄ 3 » er 
OES 7apy) Tlvtl TO TOLOUTOY AU πάθος, ap OLOV TE 


> “- > la) oS / \ 7 
ορθῶς εἰπεῖν ἐτερὸν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν ; 


OEAI. Οὐδέν. 


HE. Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ wev-10 Thought 


, , » 7 / \ De \ « \ 
Ons, τούτων δ᾽ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν 


ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, 


ἃ , > 
b φαίνεται δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ 


δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ ξυγγενῶν 


yy an ᾽ n yf Ne a9) 07 5 
OVT@V ψευδὴ τε αὐτῶν ἐνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἰναι. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Πώς δ᾽ ov ; 


EE. Κατανοεῖς οὖν ὅτι πρότερον εὑρέθη ψευδὴς 


2. Ὅταν----αὐτὸ] The passage 
of the Philebus just quoted is 
exactly parallel. 

6. μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν] Se. τῇ ψυχῇ. 
The distinction here brought 
out underlies much of the later 
portion of the Thetetus. The 
imagination of an absent ob- 
ject, which is omitted here, is 
described in Phileb. 38. 

4. αὖ] This word is to be 
taken by an hyperbaton with 
the whole clause. 

πάθος] Cf. Theet. 193 d: 
τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος. 

11. τούτων] Viz. the mental 
processes. 

12. δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύ- 
tnots| This is vividly expressed 
in the passage of the Thesetetus 
above quoted, p. 190 a: ὅταν 


δὲ (ἡ ψυχὴ) dpicaca, εἴτε Bpadv- 
τερον, εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἑπαίξασα, 
τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, 
δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. 

13. φαίνεται δὲ ὃ λέγομεν 
“What we speak of as Imagin- 
ing.” The same form of ex- 
pression occurs in Theet. 164 
b: τὸ δέ ye οὐχ ὁρᾷ οὐκ ἐπίσταται 
ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾷ ἐπίσταται. 

14. τῷ λύγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων] 
This has been shewn in the 
preceding sentences. αὐτῶν is 
pleonastic. It is probably im- 
plied that mere αἴσθησις is nei- 
ther true nor false. 

15. wevd7 — εἶναι], This is 
shewn by an independent proof 
in the case of δόξα in the pas- 
sage of the Philebus above 
quoted (38 d). 


Aa 2 


σι 


then being 
mental self- 
colloquy, 
Opinion the 
completion 
of thought, 
and Ima- 
gining the 
meeting- 
point of 
Opinion 
and Sense, 
since 
speech may 


be false, so 
also may 
these con- 
geners’ of 
speech. 
The search 
for false- 
hood has 
ended 
sooner 
than we 
expected : 
and we 
may return 
with better 
courage to 
what re- 
mains of 
our origi- 
nal task. 


15 


180 


δόξα Kat λόγος ἢ κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἣν ἐφοβή- P- 264. ἢ" 


ITAATQNOZ 


y Ἁ VA /, 57 » 
θημεν ἄρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήνυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλ-- 


“ “ 
λοίμεθα ζητοῦντες αὐτό: 


GCEAI. Κατανοώ. 


’ \ ‘ cal 
5. EE. Μὴ τοίνυν μηδ᾽ εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυμώῶμεν. 


>’ 4 an ΄- 3) > 
ἐπειδὴ yap πέφανται ταῦτα, TOY ἔμπροσθεν ἀναμνη- 


σθῶμεν κατ᾽ εἴδη διαιρέσεων. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίων δή ; 


EE. Διειλόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιϊκῆς εἴδη δύο, τὴν 


OEAI. Nai. 


\ 5 Χ \ 72 
τομέν εἰκαστικὴν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικὴν. 


A \ 3) ΄- ΕἸ 
EE. Καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἴπομεν ὡς ἀποροῖμεν εἰς 


« / i? 
ὁποτέραν θήσομεν. 


ΘΈΑΙ. Ἦν ταῦτα. 


n ΄σ 7 / 
EE. Kai τοῦθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἔτι μείζων 


΄ / A n / a ΄ 
κατεχύθη σκοτοδινία, φανέντος τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πᾶσιν 


qn \ 7 / 27 
ἀμφισβητοῦντος ὡς οὔτε εἰκὼν οὔτε εἰδωλον οὔτε 


, 57 ἊΝ ’ xQr \ Ν la 
φάντασμα εἴη TO παράπαν οὐδὲν διὰ TO μηδαμῶς 


μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι. 


1. ἣν ἐφοβήθημεν] This cog- 
nate accusative of the relative 
occurs several times in Plato, 
e.g. in Rep. 4,434: viv δ᾽ ἐκ- 
τελέσωμεν THY σκέψιν ἣν φήθημεν, 
εἰ---ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν θεάσασθαι, ῥᾷον 
ἂν ---- κατιδεῖν, Ib. 443 Ὁ: Τέ- 
λεον ἄρα ἡμῖν τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὃ ἔφαμεν 
ὑποπτεῦσαι κιτιλ. Lege. 2, 666 
Ὁ: παιδιᾶν, ἣν ---- τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 
ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἶνον φάρμακον. 

2. ἀρτ ἘΣ 2 Ona), ΡΣ 

ἐπιβαλλοίμεθα] “ Were im- 
posing on ourselves.” Cf. Tim. 
48 d: ὡς ὀρθῶς ἐπιχειροῖμ᾽ ἂν 
τοσοῦτον ἐπιβαλλόμενος ἔργον. 

6. τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ---διαιρέσεωνἾ 
The thread of argument is now 


completely resumed from supr. 
236. 

16. κατεχύθη] Cf. Polit. 302 ¢: 
τοῦ νῦν ἐπικεχυμένου λόγου κατ᾽ 
ἀρχάς, Legg. 7, 793 b. The 
image here seems to be that 
of a cloud or mist. Compare 
Hom. 1]. Y. 321: αὐτίκα τῷ μὲν 
ἔπειτα Kat ὀφθαλμῶν χέεν ἄχλυν. 
Ib. I. 344: κατὰ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμῶν 
κέχυτ᾽ ἀχλύς. 

φανέντος] Cf. ΤΠοεῦ. 199 c: 
δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παρα- 
φαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ. 

πᾶσιν] Se. τοῖς λεγομένοις. 
1. 6. objecting equally to φαν- 
ταστικὴ, εἰκαστική, and εἰδωλο- 
ποιϊκή. 


t= 


». 264. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤῊΣ. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ. 


ΞΕ. Νῦν δέ γ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγος, πέ- 

x) 5 ΄ 7, κων , 
φανται δ᾽ οὖσα δόξα ψευδὴς, ἐγχωρεῖ δὴ μιμήματα 
a 5 / “ 
τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίγνεσθαι τῆς 


181 


7, 
διαθέσεως ἀπατητικήν, 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿ἜΠγγχχωρεῖ. 


\ 3 \ , , 
EE. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γ᾽ ἦν ὁ σοφιστὴς τούτων πό- 
Om A ͵ 53 
τερον, διωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 


ἴω “ Χ 
HE. Πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ 10 


\ 7, , \ aN \ EEN 
προτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ 


ων ᾽ὔ Sy I, a >) An 

μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος, ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ 
, a XN > a \ Ν , / 

κοινωνίας, EWS ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, 


XN 5 iM 4 if > iy 7 \ 
τὴν οἰκείαν λιπόντες φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα μὲν 


Gila 3 a 527 A \ a 7) , a 
ἡμῖν αὑτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς 


τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς. 


4. ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως] Se. 
Ψευδοῦς δόξης. 

7. τούτων πότερον] “ One or 
other of these two things.” 
Hither εἰκαστικός or φανταστικός. 

10. Πάλιν τοίνυν ͵] “ Let us 
therefore go to work again, 
and dividing in half each kind 
that is set before us, advance, 
taking always the right side 
of that which has been bisected 
last, and clinging fast to that 
which holds the Sophist, until, 
having peeled off all that is 
common to him with others, 
we leave only his proper na- 
ture, and declare this, first and 
chiefly to ourselves, but also to 
those besides whose genius is 
most near of kin to this sort 
of method.” For κατὰ τοὐπὶ 
δεξιὰ, cf. Pheedr, 266 a: ὥσπερ 


δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἑνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ 
ὁμώνυμα πέφυκε, τὰ μὲν σκαιά, τὰ 
δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα k.T.A. 

12. ἐχόμενοι----κοινωνίας} I. 6. 
Making the participation of 
the Sophist in each kind our 
test and clue. The notion of 
κοινωνία, when once established, 
is well used. Cf. Thezt. 209 ὁ, 
μνημεῖον, and note. 

15. τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει] Cf, 
Soph. Ant. 174: γένους κατ᾽ ἀγ- 
χιστεῖα : and for the meaning, 
Phedr. 266 Ὁ: τούτων --- αὐ- 
τός τε ἐραστής---τῶν διαιρέσεων 
καὶ συναγωγῶν----ἐάν τέ τιν᾽ ἄλλον 
ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἕν καὶ ἐπὶ 
πολλὰ πεφυκὸς ὁρᾷν, τοῦτον διώκω 
κατόπισθε μετ᾽ ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. 
For ἐπιδείξωμεν, cf. supr. 235 ¢ 
(where the same thing is spoken 
of): ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἄγραν. 


Conclu- 
sion of I. 
After dis- 
tinguishing 
likeness- 
making 
into lmage- 
making 
and phan- 
tastic, we 
doubted in 
which com- 
partment 
to place the 
Sophist, 
when there 
arose the 
more im- 
portant 
1 doubt, 

which we 
have just 
resolved, 


\ > a / > / 7 , 
5KQL ἐμπορίικῃ και τισιν ἐν TOLOUTOLS εἴδεσιν ἐφαντά- 


We are 
now at li- 
berty to 
continue 
our series 
of divisions, 
which be- 
gan with 
the distine- 
~ tion of cre- 
ative and 
acquisitive 
art. Our 
previous 
definitions 
were ob- 
tained by 
following 
thesections 
of acquisi- 
tive art. 
But as he 
now ap- 
pears as an 
imitator, 
we must 
divide crea- 2° 
tive art, of 
which the 
making of 
imitations 

is obviously 

a branch. 


1Ιο 


15 


182 IMAATQNOS 


μ-ὶ > ~ , \ > ͵ 
HE. Οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἠρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ Ρ-. 265: 
\ 
κτητικὴν τέχνην διαιρούμενοι ; 


OEAI. Ναί. 


— a Ν “-“ ~ » lal 
EH. Καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς ἐν θηρευτικῇ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ 


CeO” ἡμῖν ; 
ΘΈΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
HE. Νῦν δέ γ᾽ ἐπειδὴ μιμητικὴ περιείληφεν αὐτὸν 
7 > ε 
τέχνη; δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητικὴν δίχα διαιρετέον 
7 « “ > 
πρώτην. ἡ γὰρ που μίμησις ποίησίς Tis ἐστιν, 
εἰδώλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων. ἢ 
7 
γάρ; 
ΘΈΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 
EE. ΠΠοιητικῆς δὴ πρῶτον δύο ἔστω μέρη. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Molo ; 
HE. To μὲν θεῖον, τὸ δ᾽ ἀνθρώπινον. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔπω μεμάθηκα. 
Lara “4 57 “ \ > > a\ 
SE. ΤΠοιητικὴν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα Ta Kar apyas 
λεχθέντα, πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥ τις ἂν αἰτία 
γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι. 
CEAI. Μεμνήμεθα. 
HE. Zaa δὴ πάντα θνητὰ καὶ φυτά, ὅσα τ᾽ ἐπὶ 
rn ’ ΄ Ae > 7 Ge y 
γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται Kal ὅσα ἀψυχα 
I. ἠρχόμεθα---διαιρ. “We be- 
gan by dividing.” 
5. ἐφαντάζεθ᾽ ἡμῖν] Sic Bodl. 
“ We had glimpses of him.” 


9. δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητι- 
κὴν] “The very art of mak- 


11. αὐτῶν ἑκάστων] That this 
phrase is vernacular and ποῦ 
technical appears from Aesch. 
Prom. 952: ἀλλ᾽ αὐθ᾽ ἕκαστ᾽ ἐκ- 
φράζε. Compare also Aristotle’s 
αὐθέκαστός τις. Eth. N.IV.7, § 4. 


ing,’ of which image-making 
is a part. We have here an 
example of the mental initia- 
tive by which the one idea is 
found which is afterwards divi- 
ded, according to Phileb. 16 e. 


18. κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς] P. 219 Ὁ: πᾶν 
ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερόν τις ὃν ὕστερον 
εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγῃ. 

22. φυτά, ὅσα τ’ ----τηκτα] The 
notion οἵ φυτὰ is expanded by 
an afterthought. 


, 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


189 


3 Lal / / \ yy “~ 
Ῥ- 265. ἐν yn ξυνίσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μῶν 


d 





ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον 


6 / > Ε ΗΑ ΝΟ la a NAG 
γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν 


δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι ; 


ΘΕΑΙ, Ποίῳ: 


--- nn; \ 7 Oo AY A 4 λων 9. 7 
=H. Te τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾷν ἀπὸ τινος αἰτίας 


τ ΄ NC, , , x Ν ΄ 
QUT OLATNS και QVEV διανοίας φυουσης" 1) μετα λογου 


τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης ; 
ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Εγὼ μὲν ἴσως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκις 


ἀμφότερα μεταδοξαζω: νῦν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ το 


€ , 3, / / Ν ϑ ΩΝ , 
ὑπολαμβάνων οἰεσθαὶ σε κατὰ ye θεὸν αὑτὰ yiyve- 


/ Ν > N , 
σθαι, ΤαυτΉ καὶ GUTOS νενομικα. 


Creative 
art is, 1st, 
divine and 
human. 
For to God, 
working by 
reason, and 
not to any 
mere spon- 
taneity of 
nature, is 
to be re- 
ferred the 
origin of 
animals, 
vegetables 
and mine- 
rals. 


ΓΞ: a 5 , ΄ ΄ 
HE. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε. καὶ εἰ μὲν γέ σε Theetetus, 


e , a ᾽ Ν ΒΥ / 2) 
ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἐπεῖτα χρόνον ἄλλως πως 


although 
young, is 
inclined to 


δοξαζόντων εἶναι, viv av τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς 15 this opin- 
9 t γᾳ μ 5 this OF 


3 ’, » a r e Fe 5 \ a7 
ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν Opodoyelv’ ἐπειδὴ δὲ 


/ XN / oS Ν y+ a " 
σοὺ καταμανθανω ΤῊΡ φύσιν, OTL Καὶ QYVEV τῶν Tap 


- > i SEN , 3. 5 Ge a “ 
ἡμῶν λογων αὑτὴ πρόσεισιν eh ἅπερ νῦν ἕλκεσθαι 


I. τὴἠκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα] 1.6. Me- 
tals and other minerals. 

4. χρώμενοι] Se. φήσομεν 
γίγνεσθαι. 

The following passage con- 
tains the same religious spirit 
which is more fully expressed 


in the Timeeus and in tbe toth 


book of the Laws; cf. esp. 
Legg. 10, 889-892. Also Phi- 
leb. 28 d, e. 

II. κατά ye θεόν] ““ At least in 
accordance with the nature of 
God.” 

13. Καλῶς ye, ὦ Θεαίτητε. 
With similar warmth in Theet. 
185 e there is welcomed the 
assertion of the independent 
activity of the mind: Καλὸς 
yap εἶ, ὦ ©.,—6 yap καλῶς λέγων, 


καλός τε κἀγαθός. 

15. δοξαζόντων] “Of that class 
of persons who in later life 
think otherwise.” The present 
participle has almost become a 
noun, and has lost the tempo- 
ral meaning. 

μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας] This 
“ demonstrative persuasion ” 
is advanced in the roth book 
of the Laws, where it is 
shewn that Mind is prior to 
the elements of Nature, and 
that the best mind rules. Cf. 
esp. pp. 888 e sqq., 891 ¢, 
892 b, 896 c, 897 ¢. See also 
ibst2,9O7.G: | fam. “Gye: 

πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας] “ The per- 
suasion of demonstration.” 


ion, and 

the Stran- 
ger, consi- 
dering the 
nobility of 
his nature, 





184 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


5 f , ἢ , \ a 7 ᾽ Ε 
thinks it bys, ἐάσω χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοιτ᾽ ἀν. P. 265) | 
unneces- 5 κ᾿ , \ \ » 7 κι ᾿ ] 
sary, by ἀλλὰ θήσω τὰ μεν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ 


further 
argument, 


/ \ > » 7 «9 > 7 / 
TEXVN), Τα, ὃ €K TOUT@Y VT ἀνθρώπων ξννιστάμενα 
to antici- 


> / ΩΝ \ lal \ Ν / [4 
pate the ἀνθρωπίνῃ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιη- 
effect of a 7 Ν \ > / 9 Ν \ rn 
time. 5 τικῆς γένη, TO μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, TO δὲ θεῖον. 


ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿᾽Ορθώς. 
EE. Τέμνε δὴ δυοῖν οὔσαιν δίχα ἑκατέραν αὖθις. 
OEAI. Πώς: 


= EB Oi. / \ ἈΝ , / Ἀ 
1, (λον tore μὲν κατὰ πλᾶτος τέμνων τὴν ποι- 


But, 2ndly, 
divine and 
human art 
are each 
divided 
into an art 


of making τὸ LK . a cs δ \ a 
ee epee ts TO) RCCL TOG, YS mn δὲ αὖ κατὰ μῆκος. 
OEAI. Τετμησθω. 


and an art 

of likeness- 
fest ‘4 \ DA “ \ 7 , 
=i. Terrapa μὴν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη 


making. 
/ / \ \ XN «ε 4 > fe / > 
γίγνεται, Ovo μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο ὃ 
Ss \ AN a an 
av Ta πρὸς θεῶν, θεῖα. 
13 ΘΒΑΙ. Ναί 
μι N 7.33) ee 7 5 ΄ , nN 
GE. Ta d€ y ws ἑτέρως αὖ διῃρημένα, μέρος μὲν 
A 5 ’ « iA “ 7] >’ / \ 3 
ev ad ἑκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικὸν, To ὃ 
΄ ͵ XN , xX 
ὑπολοίπω σχεδὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν λεγοίσθην εἰδωλο- 
oe 7 ςς A lal \ , e Χ an 
TOUKO. καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα On πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ διχῇ 


20 διαιρεῖται. 


OEAI. Λέγε ὅπῃ ἑκατέρα αὖθις. 


T. χρόνος yap ἐκ περιττοῦ γί- 
yor av] “For to do other- 
wise would be to supersede 
the work of Time.” 

2. ta—gpice] Hither φύσει 
has almost the force of an adj., 
as in Rep. 6, 501 b (τὸ φύσει 
δίκαιον x.7.A.); and λεγόμενα is 
added pleonastically, like the 
participle in δεινότητες Soxod- 
oa, Theet. 176 d: or, per- 
haps better, the infinitive ποι- 
εἶσθαι is to be repeated with 
λεγόμενα. 

9. κατὰ πλάτος ----κατὰ μῆκος] 


Compare Pheedr. 266 a, already 
quoted. 

13. πρὸς ἡμῶν --- πρὸς θεῶν] 
“On our side, on the side of 
the Gods.” 

16. Ta δέ γ᾽ ὡς ἑτέρως] “ Then 
as to the divisions which were 
made in the other way.” ὡς 
is pleonastic, as in ὡς ἀληθῶς. 

17. αὐτοποιητικόν] The art of 
making the things themselves. 

21. Λέγε--- αὖθις] “Tell me 
once more how each (ποιητική 
θεία, ἀνθρωπίνη) is divided (διαι- 
peira).” 





/ 


| 
| 


aa 


p. 266. 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


185 


— I “ 3 ~ Ὁ 
EE. Ἡμεῖς μέν που καὶ τάλλα ζῶα καὶ ἐξ ὧν τὰ 


(2) hee) / A 9 \ / , 
πεφυκοτ᾽ ἐστί, πῦρ Kal ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφά, 


a / 7 ΕἾ) > \ / 
θεοῦ γεννήματα πάντα ἴσμεν αὐτὰ ἀπειργασμένα 


a a “- 
εκαστα ἢ TOS ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. 


— / 3 
ΞΕ, Τούτων δέ γε ἑκάστων εἴδωλα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 


3 ’ / / a al 
αὐτά, παρέπεται, δαιμονίᾳ καὶ ταῦτα μηχανῇ yeyo- 


, 
VOTQ. 


OEAI. Ποῖα; 


—= / o σ a) τῷ / 
eE..Ta re ev τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ ὅσα μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν 


φανταάσ. ara αὐτοφυῆ λέγεται σκιὰ μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ 
μ ἢ λέγεται, σκιὰ μ τῷ 


Ν / 3 , a \ εἰ γὼ» Ἃ a 
πυρὶ σκότος ἐγγίγνηται, διπλοῦν δὲ ἡνίκ ἂν φώς 


> aT Neues / Ν \ N Ν a > 
οἰκεῖον TE καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ AapTTPA καὶ λεῖα εἰς 


1. ἐξ ὧν ta] The same use 
of the article occurs in a simi- 
lar connexion in Protag. 320 6: 
καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ Kal γῇ κεράν- 
Ψνυται. 

8. αὐτὰ---ἕκαστα] Ut supra: 
opposed to ἐκάστων εἴδωλα 
infra. 

4. mapemera.—infr. ¢, παρα- 
κολουθοῦν] So παρακολουθεῖ in 
Theet. 158 c, of dreams an- 
swering to realities. 

11. φαντάσματα αὐτοφυῆ] Na- 
tural images, opposed to arti- 
ficial ones, such as those of 
the painter. 

σκιὰ μὲν---διπλοῦν δέ] The 
latter word is not forthcoming 
in Rep. 6, 510 a: λέγω δὲ τὰς 
εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, 
ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντά- 
σματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε 
καὶ λεῖα καὶ hava συνέστηκε. For 
other observations on optical 
reflexion, cf. Thezt.193 c, Tim. 
43- 

12. The words φῶς οἰκεῖον καὶ 


ἀλλότριον----εἰς Ev συνελθόν (“the 
light belonging to things bright 
and smooth meeting in one 
upon their surface with the 
light from another object”) 
may be illustrated by compar- 
ing Tim. 46 a: ἐκ yap τῆς ἐκτὸς 
ἐντός τε τοῦ πυρὸς ἑκατέρου κοινω- 
νίας, ἐνός τε αὖ περὶ τὴν λειότητα 
γενομένου. Objects 
which give a perfect reflection, 
such as smooth water, polished 
metal, &¢., were supposed to 
have in them a luminous prin- 
ciple which met on the smooth 
surface with the light from the 
reflected object, just as the fire 
in the eye encountered the ex- 
ternal fire in the act of vision. 
It appears from the same pas- 
sage compared with Theeet. l.c., 
that the words τῆς ἔμπροσθεν 
εἰωθυίας ὄψεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν 
refer to the transposition of 
right and left in the reflected 
image. 


ἑκάστοτε 


Bb 


10 Divinely 


made like- 
nesses are, 
for in- 
stance, 
thosewhich 
appear in 
dreams, 


and, in the 
day-time, 
shadows 
and reflec- 
tions, 


And, as a 
house is a 
humanly- 
made real- 
ity, so the 
picture of 
a house is 
a sort of 
humanly- 
created 
waking 
dream. 


5 


Io 


186 


ὃ “ 3, > / 
ev ξυνελθὸν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν εἰωθυίας ὄψεως ἐναντίαν p. 266}). 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


” 4 3 > 76% 
αἰσθησιν παρέχον εἰδος ἀπεργάζηται. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα θείας ἔργα 


/ > / Ν Ν “- 7 
ποιήσεως, αὐτὸ TE καὶ TO παρακολουθοῦν εἰδωλον 


« / 
EKACTO. 


A e / / oh) 5 2 ἈΝ 
HE. Τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην ; ap οὐκ αὑτὴν 


> “ ΄σ “ / 
μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δέ 


- A > / > ΄ > 
TW ἑτέραν, οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγρηγορόσιν ἀπειρ- 


γασμένην ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


΄ 5 δ \ / \ f 
EE. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλλα οὕτω κατὰ Ovo διττὰ ἔργα 


a c 3 ἴω 7 Ἂ, \ f 
TNS ἡμετέρας αὖ ποιητικὴς πράξεως, τὸ μὲν αὐτό, 


/ SS \ "7 οι ΟΝ 
φαμέν, αὐτουργική, τὸ δὲ εἴδωλον εἰδωλοποιϊκη. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν μᾶλλον ἔμαθον, καὶ τίθημι δύο διχῇ 


τ ποιητικῆς εἴδη" θεία μὲν καὶ Τανθρωπίνη κατὰ 


᾽ὔ a ΝΥ \ U7 XN A 5 los 35) Χ 
θάτερον τμῆμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ον, τὸ 


Woe [2 na , 
δὲ ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα. 


6. ἡμετέραν] 1. 6. ἀνθρωπίνην. 
φήσομεν is to be. supplied from 
what follows. 

av’tny — oixiav] “A real 
house.” Not the ideal house, 
as in Rep. το, 597 6: αὐτὴν---- 
ὃ ἔστι κλίνη. 

8. ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον] I. 6. As 
dreams are a kind of divine 
pictures, so a picture may be 
described as a human dream. 

ἐγρηγορόσιν] “ For those who 
are awake.” 

11. κατὰ δύο] Like καθ᾽ ἕν, 
κατ᾽ ὄλιγον. “ By twos.” “In 
pairs.” Cf. Thezet. 156 Ὁ. 

12. τὸ-- αὐτὸ] “The thing 
itself.” The grammar seems to 
require αὐτουργικῆ-----οἰδωλοποι- 
uns. But there may be a 
change of construction from 
ἔργα (ἐστι) τῆς ποιητικῆς to av- 


τουργική (ἐστι ποιοῦσα) τὸ αὐτό. 
Compare the transition imme- 
diately below, from ποιητικὴ to 
γέννημα, from the art to the 
work. 

14. δύο διχῇ] “Two in two 
ways :” i.e. (a) divine, human ; 
(6) reality, shadow. 

15. Teiat μὲν καὶ Τἀνθρωπίνη 1] 
Probably θείαν μ. κ. ἀνθρωπίνην, 
as Heind. observes. 

τό. αὐτῶν] “ Of things them- 
selves.” Although the fourfold 
division, in Rep. 6 sub fin, 
of the intelligible and visible is 
different and has a different 
object, it is prompted by a 
fancy very similar to that 
which rules in the present 
passage. 

17. γέννημα] For this use of 
the neuter word where the 


). 266. 


Db. 207. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 


187 


ΞΕ. Τῆς τοίνυν εἰδωλουργικῆς ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὅτι 


ὯΝ \ > f? Ν \ A + 3 
TO μεν εἰκαστικον, τὸ δὲ φανταστικὸν ἐμελλεν εἰναι 


7 > δι a 57 ἋΟ An Ν a ΕΣ 
γένος, εἰ τὸ ψεῦδος ὀντως ὃν ψεῦδος καὶ τῶν ὄντων 


oa / i 
ἐν TL φανείη πεφυκὸς. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν. 


ΞΕ, Οὐκοῦν ἐφάνη τε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καταρι- 


θμήσομεν αὐτὼ νῦν ἀναμφισβητήτως εἴδη δύο ; 


ΘΕΑ,ΑΙ. Ναί. 


ΞΕ. To τοίνυν φανταστικὸν αὖθις διορίζωμεν 


δίχα. 
GEAI. Πη; 


τισὶ \ \ > 3 2p , εν \ > A 
HH. To μὲν dv ὀργάνων yryvopevov, To δὲ αὐτοῦ 


, ε Ν ay a a Ν ΄ 
TAPEKXOVTOS E€AUTOV Opyavov TOU ποίουντος TO φαν- 


τασμα. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φής: 


ἘΠῚ] 9 3 Ν Ν rn , an e = 
BE. Ὅταν, οἶμαι, τὸ σὸν σχῆμα τις τῷ EAVTOU 


7 / / Ἃ \ a / 
χρώμενος σώματι προσομοιον ἢ φωνὴν φωνῇ patve- 
σθαι ποιῇ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα 


/ / 
κέκληται που. 


OEAI. Ναί. 


=A M \ δὴ cot See eS , 3 
ΕΞ... ἐμήητικον OF) TOUTO αὐτὴς προσείποντες αἀπο- 


feminine was rather to be ex- 
pected, cf. infr. 267 ¢, μίμημα, 
Polit. 289 Ὁ, θρέμμας As the 
act sometimes becomes the ob- 
ject of the verb (in the con- 
struction known . as cognate 
accusative), so the noun ex- 
pressive of the object is some- 
times put for the act. See 
General Introduction. 

2. ἔμελλεν] P. 236 ἃ, 6. 

7. αὐτὼ] Se. εἰκαστικὴ καὶ 
φανταστική. 

τό. Ὅταν---ποῦ] In this sen- 
tence προσόμοιον φαίνεσθαι ποιῇ 


is equivalent to ἀφομοιῶται : 
cf. φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν below. 
“When any one represents or 
nearly represents your appear- 
ance by means of his own 
body, or your voice by his 
voice, imitation is the name 
for this branch of the phan- 
tastic art.” 

17. φωνῇ] Governed by χρώ- 
μενος. 

21. ἀπονειμώμεθα] “ Part off 
for our own share.” Cf, Pheedr. 
206 Ὁ, τεμνόμενος. 


Bb 2 


Next fol- 
lows the 
distinction, 
which was 
before pro- 
visionally 
made, be- 
tween 
Image- 
making 
and. Phan- 
tastic ; the 
creation of 
a real and 
an appa- 
rent like- 
ness of a 
thing. Of 


10 these,phan- 


tastic may 
be again 
divided. 
And one 
kind is 
called 
impersona- 
tion or 


ys mimicry. 


Mimicry is 
sometimes 


with know- 


ledge, 


188 MAATOQNOZ 


νειμώμεθα" 


7, ε ΄σ Δ Ν / 
καὶ παρέντες ἑτέρῳ συναγαγεῖν τε εἰς Ev καὶ πρέπου- Ὁ 


τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν μαλακισθέντες p. 267. 


> / > “-“ / > > “ 
σᾶν ἐπωνυμιὰν ἀποδοῦναί τιν aUT®. 


OEFAI. 


Νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω. 


΄ ‘ A 54 ca) 3 , 
SE. Kai μὴν καὶ τοῦτο ere διπλοῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, 


ἄξιον ἡγεῖσθαι: δι ἃ δέ, σκόπει. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε. 


A / ε \ / a “ 
ZE. Tov μιμουμένων οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὃ μιμοῦνται 


a 7 ε 3 > »ὼ ἢ" 
τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ εἰδότες. 


/ / 
και TOL TWA 


sometimes τὸ μείζω διαίρεσιν ἀγνωσίας τε Kal γνώσεως θή- 


without. 


There are 
those, for 


COMED 5 


OEAI. Θύδεμίαν. 


SE. Οὐκοῦν τό γε ἄρτι τ εἰδότων ἦν μί- 


papa. 


15 μιμήσαιτο. 


GEAI. [las δ᾽ ov; 


τὸ γὰρ σὸν σχῆμα καὶ σὲ γιγνώσκων ἂν τις 


EE. Τί δὲ δικαιοσύνης τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλης ξυλ- 


λήβδην ἀρετῆς ; ap οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες μέν, δοξάζοντες 


δέ πῃ, σφόδρα ἐπιχειροῦσι πολλοὶ τὸ δοκοῦν σφίσι 


a e CSS >’ r r VA r 
20TOUTO ὡς ἐνὸν αὐτοῖς προθυμεῖσθαι φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν, 


7 7 y+ Ν f / 
ὁ τι μάλιστα Epyols TE καὶ AOYOLS μιμουμενοι 5 


ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πάνυ γε πολλοί. 


EE. Μῶν οὖν πάντες 


I. μαλακισθέντες] ““ Shrink- 
ing from further effort.” Cf. 
supY. 241 €: ἀποστησόμεθα viv 
μαλθακισθέντες : 

9. τοῦτο πράττουσιν ]Ὶ Se. 
μιμοῦνται. 

13. μίμημα] The result is 
again substituted for the act, 
as In γέννημα supra 267 a. 

17.70 σχῆμα] Governed by pu- 
μοῦνται implied in what follows. 

18. dp’ οὐκ----μιμούμενοι ;] “Is 


- an ΄-“ 
ἀποτυγχάνουσι τοῦ δοκεῖν 


it not notorious that many, 
who have no knowledge but 
an opinion of some kind about 
these things, use all their might 
to make it appear that they 
have in them that which an- 
swers to their own opinion, 
impersonating this in actions 
and words as far as they can ?” 
Cf. Rep. 2, 365 ¢: πρόθυρα μὲν 
καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν 
σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον. 


.. 267. 


ᾳ 





ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 189 


53 tal 7 ΕΝ / lad > 
εἶναι δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς ὄντες ; ἢ τούτου πᾶν TOU- 
/ 
ναντίον ; 
OEAI. Πᾶν. 
A oS / / 
SE. Μιμητὴν δὴ τοῦτόν ye ἕτερον ἐκείνου λεκτέον 
3 Ν lal a / 
οἶμαι, TOY ἀγνοοῦντα TOU γιγνώσκοντος. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 
/ 3 7 ε , las / 
HE. Πόθεν οὖν ὄνομα ἑκατέρῳ τις αὐτῶν λήψεται 
7 ἊἋ “ \ δ A ΄ la a 
πρέπον ; ἢ δῆλον On χαλεπὸν ov, διότι τῆς τῶν 
ἴω > ’ὔ’ 327 
γενῶν Kar εἴδη διαιρέσεως παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, 
/ la 3, / a v > 
αἰτία τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσύννους παρῆν, ὥστε μηδ 
> tal 7 a Ν \ cal > ’ 
ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαι" καθὸ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων 
ρος \ , 3 a “ ΄, Ἃ > 
ἀνάγκη μὴ σφόδρα εὐπορεῖν. ὅμως δέ, Kay εἰ τολμη- 
a 9 XN \ A 
porepov εἰρῆσθαι, διαγνώσεως ἕνεκα THY μὲν μετὰ 
/ / \ 7 Χ \ 
δόξης μίμησιν δοξομιμητικὴν προσείπωμεν, τὴν δὲ 


μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικήν τινα μίμησιν. 


OEAI. Ἔστω. 


ἘΠῚ Θ / U / 5 ε Ν \ 
peony ατέρῳῷ τοινυν XPYTTEOV O yap σοφιστὴς 


39 » n WEA 5 > > 3 an , 
οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδοσιν ἦν, GAN ἐν τοῖς μιμουμέ- 


νοις δή. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα. 


ΞΕ. Τὸν δοξομιμητὴν δὴ σκοπώμεθα ὥσπερ 


I. μηδαμῶς ὄντες] An under- 
current of strong feeling is per- 
ceptible here and in σφόδρα 
supra, as in Rep. 7, 531 6: ov 
yap που δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ταῦτα δεινοὶ 
διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι. 
ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μάλα γέ τινες ὄλιγοι οἷς 
ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα. 

9. παλαιά----παρῆν] Ancient, 
and therefore hard to discover 
—void of reflection, or com- 
prehensive thought, and there- 
fore without principles. Com- 
pare Bacon’s complaint of the 
vagueness of common language 


> \ A "> 
Οὐ pa τὸν Al, 


about physical qualities. 

10. ἀσύννου] Cf. Legg. 7, 
799 6: καθάπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τότε 
περὶ κιθαρῳδίαν οὕτω πως, ὡς ἔοι- 
κεν, ὠνόμασαν, ὥστε τάχ᾽ ἂν οὐδ᾽ 
ἐκεῖνοι παντάπασί γ᾽ ἀφεστῶτες 
εἶεν τοῦ νῦν λεγομένου, Kab” ὕπνον 
δὲ οἷόν πού τις ἢ καὶ ὕπαρ ἐγρη- 
γορὼς ὠνείρωξε μαντευόμενος αὐτό. 

18. οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἦν] Ῥ. 
233 d. 

ἀλλ᾽ ἐν----δὴ] ‘But he does 
appear amongst the class of 
imitators.” 


instance, 
who per- 
sonatetheir 
own notion 
of justice, 
without 
knowing 
what jus- 


5 tice really 


is. For 

this branch 
of nimicry, 
through 

the remiss- 
ness of the 
first name- 
givers, it is 


difficult 


10 to find a 


name. 

** Notion- 
mimicry 15 
the nearest 
we can 
find. This 
also may 
be either 
innocent, 
when the 
mimic is 
unconsci- 
ous of his 
ignorance, 
or dissem- 
bling. Of 
the dissem- 
bling no- 
tion-mimic 
there are 
two kinds : 
one, which 


dissembles 
before a 
multitude ; 
the other, 
which 
makes a 
false im- 
pression on 
individuals 
by means 
of Eristie 
argument ; 
in other 
words, 

the clap- 
trap orator, 
and—the 
Sophist : 


x7 > A 7 "Ὁ 7 cal a ΄ 
5 εὐήθης αὐτῶν ἐστίν, οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἃ δοξάζει" p. 268 


190 


/ 7 « ‘ ΕΣ / y> Ww , > . . 
σίδηρον, εἴτε ὑγιὴς εἴτε διπλόην eT ἔχων τινα ἐστιν p. 46} 


» c ΄- 
εν €AUTO. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Σκοπῶμεν. 


7 / / 
BE. "Ἔχει τοίνυν καὶ μάλα συχνήν. 


ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ 


ὁ μὲν γὰρ 


Ν \ a \ > ΄σ΄ 
τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίν- 


5, «ε / € ~ 
Onow ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον ws ἀγνοεῖ 


fal aA \ \ yy c xa ΧΝ 5» , 
ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδως ἐσχηματισται. 


7 3 3, ς 2 
OEHAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἑκατέρου γένους ὧν 


το εἴρηκας. 


15 


EH O > A \ \ « A 7, Ν δὲ 
1. Οὐκοῦν τὸν pev ἁπλοῦν μιμητὴν τινα, TOY OE 


εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θήσομεν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν. 


EE. Τούτου δ᾽ αὖ τὸ γένος ἕν ἢ δύο φῶμεν ; 


ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρα σύ. 


EE. Σκοπῶ, καί μοι διττὼ καταφαίνεσθόν τινε’ 


τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλήθη 


Ν , a N \ 
δυνατὸν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε, καὶ 


1. εἴτε διπλόην ͵]ὴ Various 
figures are employed to give 
greater vividness to the notion 
of division. Cf. supr. 229 b. 
Polit. 259 d: ἂν ἄρα ἐν αὐτῇ 
Tb. 
260: θεατέον εἴ πὴ διέστηκε. Ib. 
φότ: εἴ τινα τομὴν ἔτι ἔχομεν ὑπ- 
είκουσαν ἐν τούτῳ. Pheedr. 268 a: 
εἰ ἄρα καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διεστηκὸς 
αὐτῶν τὸ ἠτρίον ὥσπερ ἐμοί. 

5. αὐτῶν] τῶν δοξομιμητῶν. 

6. τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα---ἐσχη- 
μάτισται] ‘ But it is part of 
the form in which the other 
appears that from the constant 
practice of discussion he cannot 
but suspect and fear that he 
is ignorant of the things which 


4 A , 
τινὰ διαφυὴν κατανοήσωμεν. 


he wears the appearance before 
other men of knowing.” “There 
is in his attitude an unmis- 
takeable air of misgiving and 
fear.” 

κυλίνδησιν] Cf. Thest. 172 ¢: 
οἱ ev δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιού- 
τοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι. 

9. ἔστιν ---- εἴρηκας 1 “ There 
certainly is a character belong- 
ing to each of the two kinds 
you have described.” Or 6 
δοξομιμ. ἔστιν ἑκατέρου γένους. 

12. εἰρωνικὸν] “ Hollow, in- 
sincere, designing.” εἰρωνικὸς 
occurs again (and again in a 
bad sense) in Legg. ro, 90ὃ e. 

18. ἰδίᾳ re] Se. εἰρωνεύεσθαι 
δυνατόν. 


ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 101 





ip. 268. βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον 
ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ. 
OEAI. Λέγεις ὀρθότατα. 


EE. Τίνα οὖν ἀποφαινώμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον 


3 “ ἊΝ ΕΣ 7 
εἰναι ; πότερα πολιτικὸν ἢ δημολογικὸν : 5 


GEAI. Δημολογικόν. 


EE. Τί δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐροῦμεν ; σοφὸν ἢ σοφι- 


[4 
στικον : 


ΘΕΑΙ. *To* μέν που σοφὸν ἀδύνατον, ἐπείπερ οὐκ 


εἰδότα αὐτὸν ἔθεμεν: μιμητὴς δ᾽ ὧν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον 


σ 7 > A 
OTL TWAPMVULLOV AUTOV TL 


ὔὕ o ~ x 
μεμαθηκα ore τοῦτον δεῖ 


λήψεται, καὶ σχεδὸν ἤδη 


vad ’ ad SON 
προσειπεῖν ἀληθῶς αὑτὸν 


» a Ν i 57 ’ 
εκεινον τὸν πανταῖτασιν OVTWS σοφιστὴν. 


a / lal , 32, 
SE. Οὐκοῦν συνδήσομεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἔμπρο- 


EA / » XN “ ΜΝ 
σθεν, τοὔνομα συμπλέξαντες amo τελευτῆς ἐπ 


ἀρχήν ; 


2. ἐναντιολογεῖν] It now ap- 
pears how much of the claim 
advanced in Ὁ. 231 a is granted 
to the Sophist. He is allowed 
to possess that portion of the 
Eristic art which is not based 
on knowledge, but on the prac- 
tice of argument. Cf. also 
Ῥ. 225 ἃ, 6. 

9. *To*] MSS. τόν. Ste- 
phanus, followed by the other 
editors, corrected this into τὸ, 
with great probability. 

11. παρωνύμιον] The vague- 
ness of this derivation renders 
it more correct than Hegel’s 
from the imaginary σοφίζειν, 
“to make wise,” or Bentham’s, 
who took σοφιστὴς for a super- 
lative. 

12. μεμάθηκα] “I now clearly 
understand that this is he whom 
I must address as the very man 


of whom we are in search, the 
unmistakeably real and genuine 
Sophist.” 

αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον [7 ‘There is 
again a transition from the 
name to the thing. 

14. καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν] P.226 
a. For ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν, 
cf. Lege. 1, 768 6: τὴν ἀρχὴν 
νῦν τελευτῇ προσάψας. 

By the process of division 
the Sophist is thrust down into 
the lowest sphere of imitative 
(i.e. unreal) art, much in the 
same way in which pleasure 
finds the lowest place in the 
Philebus ; and poetry, in Rep. 
1o, is thrice removed from 
truth (597 e), where there is 
also the same division of di- 
vine and human art. So the 
actual Politicians are found 
low down amongst the class of 


_ 


μι 


ο 


192 


IMAATQNOS ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ. 
SEAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


ΞΕ. Tov δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ 


/ “ lal / “ “ 
μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικόν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ 


/ > lad " “.“.“- » ΄σ » > 
γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποιϊκῆς ov θεῖον ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρω- 


Ν a , > / > / ‘ 
5πικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν Aoyols TO θαυ- 


“ὯΝ 7, , “ “ Ν a 
ματοποίικον [LOPLOV, TAUTNS TIS γενεᾶς TE Και αιματος 


& x a \ vy \ 3 > / e 
os av φῇ Tov ὀντως σοφιστὴν εἶναι, τἀληθέστατα, ὡς 


yy > ΄σ 
EOLKEV, ἐρει. 


ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


servants (Polit. 289 4), and in 
the series of transmigrations 
given in the Phedrus, 248 6, 
the eighth place (between the 
artificer and the tyrant) is as- 
signed to the life of the So- 
phist or the public man. 

2. Tov δὴ] I have ven- 
tured to retain τὸν against 
Schleiermacher, who reads τό, 
and to give ἀφωρισμένον a 
middle signification. “ The 
artist of the contradiction-caus- 
ing, conscious section of un- 
knowing mimicry, who has 
taken for his own the word- 
juggling portion of human, not 
divine, creation, in the phan- 
tastic species of likeness-mak- 
ing, such undeniably is the 
lineage of the true Sophist.” 
Cf. supr. 267 b, ἀπονειμώμεθα. 


4. ἀνθρωπικόν, though hardly 
occurring elsewhere in Plato, 
may be regarded as probably 
genuine, because of the affec- 
tation of variety and novelty 
of diction which pervades the 
dialogue. 

5. The Bodl. MS. has θαυμα- 
στοποιηκὸν, not θαυματοποιητικὸν, 
as Gaisford asserts. 

6. ταύτης tis—aiparos]| The 
words of Glaucus. Il. Z. 211: 
ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε Kal αἵματος 
εὔχομαι εἶνα. The derivation 
of kind from kind by διαίρεσις 
is compared to a genealogy. 
Compare the modern idea of 
the genealogical derivation of 
species from a single type, and 
cf. Rep. 8, 547 a: ταύτης τοι 


na \ ΄ =) , 
γενεᾶς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν. 


Ρ. 268. 


d 











TOAITIKOS. 








INTRODUCTION TO THE STATESMAN, 





THE contrast between the Sophist and the Philosopher is 
paralleled by that between the ideal and actual Statesman. 
The one of these is the philosopher under a different aspect, 
surveying from above and yet guiding the life of states: the 
other, in Plato’s view, is the most sophistical of all sophists 
(τὸν πάντων σοφιστῶν μέγιστον γόητα Kal ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἐμ- 
πειρότατον). But in the present inquiry, although this thought 
may be detected from the first (see 258 b and note, compared 
with 292 b), it is ironically kept back, and instead of starting 
from the known characteristics of a class of persons, the speakers 
begin by forming an a priori conception of what the States- 
man ought to be. In fact, this dialogue, in a different subject- 
matter, combines the problem of the Sophistes with that of the 
Philosophus, and seeks to determine, not only an existing coun- 
terfeit, but an ideal reality. At the same time it is shewn that 
the true Statesman and Governor cannot be defined without 
reference to the actual, mixed conditions of human things. The 
whole is intended by the author to be a study in scientific 
method. 

Further remarks on the dialogue will be better understood 
if they are prefaced with a brief outline of the dialogue itself. 

§ 1. It is assumed that the Statesman is master of a science : 
and that not a mere handicraft in which the thought cannot 
be separated from the work, but a theory, which however, as 
a theory of government, has an immediate reference to prac- 
tice. This theory must be essentially the same whether applied 
to a state or a household, and whether he who holds it be 
invested with authority or not. Further, the commands of the 


Statesman are not derivative, but issue from himself. These 
beg 


ly INTRODUCTION 


commands aim at controlling a work which affects living erea- 
tures in the aggregate. But what living creatures? The 
respondent inclines to say “man” at once. But he is warned 
to be cautious, lest he be making “a distinction without a 
difference.” For what ground is there for supposing that the 
distinction between man and the brutes is more rational than 
that between Greek and Barbarian, or that man has more 
right than any other thinking animal, such as the crane, to 
set himself over against all other creatures? By gradual sub- 
divisions, much as in the game called “ Animal, vegetable, and 
mineral,” the human race is at last determined to be the sphere 
of statesmanship: mankind being in the last place distinguished 
by a merely mathematical and physical difference from the 
pig, or, as bipes implume, from the κουφονόων φῦλα ὀρνίθων. 
(258 b—267 c.) 

§ 2. The King, then, has been defined as the herdsman, 
the nurturer or nourisher of men. But there now appears 
this difference between the king and other herdsmen, that, while 
the cowherd is everything to his own cattle, there are many 
others who, equally with the king, may claim to be the shep- 
herds of the human flock. The merchant, husbandman, baker, 
gymnast, physician, have all a share in their nurture. In order 
to perceive the reason of this difference we must call to our 
assistance an ancient tale. 

There has been, and will be again, a time when the king is 
the shepherd of his people, but not in the present cycle of the 
world’s life. For there are alternate cycles, during one of which 
the universe is guided by the Divine hand, and then again, 
through many ages, the vast round fabric is left to revolve 
alone. Of the former time we have a dim tradition in the 
fables of the golden age and of the earth-born seed: and in 
the latter we and our fathers have been living. Of this “ re- 
verse of doom” a trace remains in the story that Zeus once 
made the sun and the stars to return from their setting to 
their rising. The gifts of Triptolemus and Deméter, Prome- 
theus, Hephestus and Athéne, were rendered necessary by 
the naked and helpless state of man, when first left, with the 
whole universe, to his own guidance. For in that former state 
he lived under the care of a Divine shepherd, who was all- 
sufficient for his flock: happy if they used their golden hours 











TO THE STATESMAN. γ 


in the improvement of their reason: otherwise, less happy 
than we may be. How great, then, was our error, when we 
mistook the Statesman, who is a man of like nurture and 
education with his citizens, for the Deity who ruled and tended 
mankind under the perfect conditions of that former cycle, 
when all things, including man himself, sprang of themselves 
from the Earth, and hence there was no property nor any 
possession of wives and children. And there is another error 
of less moment which the tale makes clear. Our definition is 
at once too wide and too narrow: too wide, because including 
more than the Statesman; too narrow, because not including 
him at all. He is not the feeder of his people, though he 
has the care of them. The word “care” would have included 
him also. But the general name “care of herds” must be 
divided until the King or Statesman is separated from all 
rivals and left quite alone. 

First, he is distinguished from the shepherd of the theo- 
eracy ; next, from the tyrant, who rules by force. The King 
or Statesman has the care of willing bipeds. (267 c—276 e.) 

§ 3. Still, even with the help of our tale, which grew upon 
our hands, we have made an unfinished work. This descrip- 
tion is a mere colourless sketch, which must be filled up by 
further argument. And for this purpose we must have 
recourse to an example. For as children in learning to read 
are taught to recognize the letters of words which they know 
not, by being shewn the same letters in words which they 
know, so the mind is taught the principles of things, which 
having seen in one form she fails to recognise in others more 
strange and complicated. This will be illustrated by the 
example which is now to be chosen. 

The art of weaving woollen cloth is one of the simplest we 
could name. Yet we might describe it by a long series of 
divisions, distinguishing it from the making of other fabrics 
and coverings, without, after all, separating it from those arts 
to which it is most nearly related. For suppose we had thus 
defined it as “the art of working in wool.” Is there not the 
process of carding, which is the opposite of weaving together, 
and those of spinning and fulling and of darning, all of which 
answer to the definition but are none of them included in the 
weaver’s art’ Then there is the making of the loom and 


vi INTRODUCTION 


shuttle and other implements of weaving, which are adminicular 
to the art but different from the art itself. 

We distinguish, then, arts instrumental from arts operative. 
And of arts operative in wool-working there is a further dis- 
tinction, also depending on a universal division of the arts 
into combining and discriminating. Discriminating processes 
in wool-working are carding and one part of the use of the 
comb. But wool is combined, (1) By twisting: either hard 
with the spindle, to make the warp, or softly with the hand, 
to make the woof. (2) By the crossing and intertexture of 
the warp and woof, which is weaving. (277 a—283 a.) 

δ 3b. Now it may be said that “this is too long;” and 
that we might have arrived at the definition without the 
intermediate steps. 

This leads us into a digression on Excess and Defect. For 
want of dialectic, men are apt to confuse that which is more 
with that which is too much. Whereas there are two ways 
of measuring size and number; one, simply by comparison of 
greater and less, the other, by reference to the standard of 
what is meet or proper. Without such a standard there could 
be no art or science. This is the real meaning of the saying 
that the science of measurement embraces all things. 

So lamentable are the results of an unphilosophic method. 
And this suggests the further reflection, that as each reading 
lesson is learnt, not for its own sake, but for the sake of learn- 
ing to read, so our present inquiry is not so much on account 
of the Statesman as for our improvement in dialectic and in 
the alphabet of the ideal world. 

From all which we gather that the length of our discussion 
is to be judged, not by comparison, but by its meetness or 
fitness: and this not with a view to pleasure, nor chiefly to the 
ease or rapidity with which the object of search is found, but 
by its meetness or fitness to improve men in dialectic and 
awaken in them the faculty of invention. (283 b—287 a.) 

§ 3c. We now endeavour to apply our example to the dis- 
covery of the King. His art is to be separated from those, 
adminicular and operative, which, like his own, are necessary 
to the life of the city. 

The productions of these are divided into seven kinds, viz. 
instruments, vessels, seats, shelters, sports, nourishments, and 

















ΤῸ THE STATESMAN. vil 


materials: in none of which is the king’s work discoverable. 
Next in the order of possessions come tame animals of every 
kind, the art of herding which, including men, has been 
already distinguished from that of the king. Lastly, there is 
the class of slaves and other servants, amongst whom, strangely, 
appears the first glimpse of a character rivalling the king. 
Not amongst the slaves, of course, nor amongst tradesmen 
(though there is a political science of trade), nor heralds and 
other ministers of state. But first the prophet, herald of the 
Gods, and the priest who mediates between earth and heaven, 
have a kingly air. In Egypt the king must be a priest, and 
the Archon-Basileus at Athens performs sacred rites. 

At last our eye has caught the stragglers of a tumultuous 
throng, who presently sweep into full view—the actual rivals 
of the King. (287 b—290 6.) 

§ 4. A motley crew, and monstrous to the philosopher’s eye. 
Some fierce and cruel as centaurs, some weak but cunning. 
These greatest impostors of all sophists do the business of the 
state: but, though hard the task, they must be separated 
from the true Statesman and King. For of the three forms 
of government ordinarily recognized, Monarchy, Democracy, 
Oligarchy, with the additional branches of Tyranny and Aristo- 
eracy, can it be said that any one is determined by Reason? 
How can the difference of many, few or one, of poor or rich, 
or even that which we have recognized between persuasion 
and force, distinguish the knowing from the ignorant ruler? 
True, many cannot have this knowledge, nor can that rude 
multitude who call themselves the wealthy or the few. Those 
who are indeed the few, whether poor or rich, whether they 
rule by force or by persuasion, whether with or without law, 
and by whatever means, so long as they rule with knowledge 
for the good of the state, are the true rulers, and theirs is the 
true form of government. Those forms to which the name is 
given are imitations, better or worse, of this one form. (291 a 
—293 6.) 

ὁ 4b. The Greek mind is shocked by the suggestion that 
the true government may be without law. But the sove- 
reignty of law is not a perfect substitute for that of a wise 
and living will. For general rules, which are in their na- 
ture simple, cannot embrace every contingency which may 


vill INTRODUCTION 


arise in the infinite complexity of human things. The law, 
like Creon, 


A - “ “ ( SAAT a -“ 
ἐν ἦθος μοῦνον ἐν αὑτῷ φορεῖ 
ὥς φησιν αὐτός, κοὐδὲν ἄλλο, τοῦτ᾽ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν. 


Laws are necessary (like rules in the gymnasium), because 
the ruler is not able at every moment to be prescribing for 
individual cases: and also because the lawgiver will not always 
be with his people. But suppose a physician going into a far 
country, and writing memoranda for his patients to observe 
until his return: should he come back and find that from 
some change of climate his prescriptions are no longer suitable, 
must he be bound by what he has once written? And if the 
true legislator, or one like him, were to come again on earth, 
must he be bound by the letter of the old precepts? It is 
commonly said, ‘ Let a man persuade his city, and so let him 
improve the laws.’ But and if he forces a better law upon his 
countrymen, will he be any the less a good lawgiver? The truth 
is, that, whether poor or rich, whether with or without law, 
whether by persuasion or force, the true statesman is he who 
governs wisely, who does what is expedient, and preserves and 
makes better those committed to his care. (293 e—297 b.) 

§ 46. It was said above, that of the imitations of the true 
government some were better, others worse. Here the distine- 
tion finds place which we before rejected, between the obser- 
vation and neglect of law. In the absence of the true soyve- 
reign, it is best for every state to preserve its laws, which 
it may be presumed that the first lawgiver made after his 
conception of the ideal pattern. This is illustrated by an 
imaginary case (with evident allusion to Athens). Suppose 
that men, from their experience of the wickedness of physi- 
cians and pilots, determined to bind them by edicts, which 
they passed in their assembly or in their senate, at the sug- 
gestion of any unprofessional adviser who chose to speak, and 
regulated thereby the use of drugs and surgical instruments 
and the build and navigation of ships in peace and war. Sup- 
pose these edicts engraved on lasting marble, and on the no 
less lasting monuments of custom and tradition. Suppose, 
further, that our medical practitioners and naval captains were 
chosen annually in the same assembly, and were lable to be 








TO THE STATESMAN. ix 


indicted publicly by any citizen so soon as their annual term 
expired. A further sanction would be necessary. Were any 
found searching into the truth of navigation and medicine 
beyond what was written, he must first be set down by public 
opinion as a babbling, star-gazing sophist, and then accused in 
court of corrupting the youth: and if convicted of persuading 
any man to sail or to be healed contrary to the customs, he 
must suffer the last penalty: seeing that no man must be 
wiser than the laws, which he who runs may read. 

The result would be the hopeless extinction of these arts, 
and of any others to which this plan should be applied. Yet 
is a worse case conceivable: if, when the laws of any art had 
been thus laid down, those elected by suffrage or by lot were 
to despise the laws and act in defiance of them, not from the 
knowledge of any principle, but for the sake of gain or favour. 
For though the arts were destroyed, there was in the former 
ease a certain ground of experience or probability, which is 
thus annihilated. 

Hence in the absence of the true lawgiver, the best course 
(though only a second best) is to maintain the laws. 

This distinction, between constitutional and unconstitutional 
government, was previously applied to monarchy and oligarchy, 
and is now extended to democracy. Whence there are now 
seven so-called forms of government, of which one only de- 
serves the name :—scientific monarchy, constitutional mon- 
archy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, constitutional demo- 
cracy, unconstitutional democracy. When we contemplate the 
six last named, the wonder is that cities should exist at all. 
Constitutional monarchy is better than aristocracy, and this is 
better than constitutional democracy. Of the remaining three, 
unconstitutional democracy, or anarchy, is the least bad, and 
tyranny is the worst of all. 

But all are to be rejected, as not answering to the object of 
our search. The heads of these false governments are not 
statesmen but partisans; they are mere phantasms, like the 
constitutions which they administer; the most egregious imita- 
tors, impostors, and sophists. (297 c—303 b.) 

§ 5. The actual statesmen being thus disposed of, the way 
is still further cleared towards the unveiling of the true king. 


Yet all that we have hitherto gained is negative, except that 
τῷ 


x INTRODUCTION 


he rules men wisely, according to true principles. Like refiners 
of gold, we have purged away baser minerals, but haye not 
yet eliminated those precious metals which have the strongest 
affinity for the gold. In other words, our definition would 
apply equally to the general, the judge, the wise and eloquent 
orator, as to the king. 

But the art of statecraft has this distinguishing note, that it 
directs the functions of the rest, and has a universal working. 
The orator knows how to persuade, the judge how incor- 
ruptibly to administer the law, the general how to conduct 
war successfully: but none except the king or statesman can 
determine where persuasion is to be used instead of force, 
what the law ought to be, whether war is to be leyied, or 
peace preserved. Thus statecraft is, as was before anticipated, 
the commanding science, not herself acting, but directing those 
who have the power to act. And while each of the rest has 
a particular sphere, the office of the king embraces every func- 
tion of the common life. (303 c—305 6.) 

We have now separated the king or statesman from all who 
were likely to be confounded with him. It remains, in accord- 
ance with our example, to describe the manner of his work. 
What are the warp and woof of the royal fabric? and how is 
it woven ? 

First, we must note that there are two opposite qualities 
which merit praise, courage and gentleness, or, in other words, 
quickness and slowness: which, however, if they remain apart 
run to excess, and equally become blameable and even de- 
structive. Next, that every art of combination, even the 
humblest, seeks to bring together elements which have first 
been separated from what is worthless. Hence as the art 
of carding ministered to weaving, so the kingly art makes use 
of education and other tests for purging the good from the bad. 
The worst are cast forth by exile or death. The mean and 
ignorant are enslaved. Of the rest, the brave and gentle, that 
is the hard warp and soft woof, are combined: the eternal part 
being compacted with a divine, the mortal with a human, bond. 
The divine bond is right opinion confirmed by reason, and this 
is implanted in the mind—the divine particula awre—thus 
imparting gentleness to the rugged and prudence to the smooth 
and yielding nature. 








TO THE STATESMAN. x] 


This is the most important and difficult branch of the ruling 
science. The human bonds are easily imposed where the di- 
vine exist. They are the regulations concerning marriage, 
whereby the brave and gentle races are physically as well 
as mentally crossed and interwoven: though flesh and blood 
may find this saying hard. 

This having been effected, the offices of state are to be 
distributed amongst both kinds: the two natures being in 
each case either united in a single person, or equally repre- 
sented where more than one officer is required: that the state 
may act at once with energy and discretion. 

And so there is wrought the perfect web, whereby the true 
Statesman holds the whole city together in concord and amity, 
and secures for his subjects the happiest life which is possible 
for a society of men. (305 e—3TI.) 


REMARKS. 
I. Dialectical Aspects. Relation to the Sophist. 


Amongst many differences of treatment which might be 
expected from the change of subject and the fertility of Plato’s 
invention, the thoughts on method and the nature of know- 
ledge, which were thrown out in the Sophist, are not forgotten, 
but indirectly receive further development. 

a. The process of divisions has acquired new significance. 
The problem is explained to be, “ to distinguish one kind of art 
from all others, and by stamping these with a single negative 
form, learn to conceive of all science under two heads, namely, 
statecraft, and that science which is not statecraft.”’ (258 c.) 
This is clearly an application of the view of Not-Being which 
had just been given. But it soon appears that the mere 
abstract notion of Difference may be capriciously applied. To 
distinguish man from other animals, for example, or Greek 
from Barbarian, is a merely arbitrary procedure, unless we 
have found a rational ground for the distinction, which can 
only be done by a method of successive exclusions, each of 
which implies a certain knowledge of that which is excluded, 
as well as of that which is retained. Even so meagre a defi- 
nition of man as that he is a featherless biped implies the 

ἘῸ ὦ 


x INTRODUCTION 


knowledge of at least two positive qualities of the class of 
birds. This thought is not worked out further at the time, 
but in the later stages of the argument the complexity of all 
real knowledge, implied already in the “ communion of ideas,” 
is more fully recognised than elsewhere in Plato. The defi- 
nition of the Sun which Socrates on the previous day had 
thought sufficient, “that he is the brightest orb that rolls in 
Heaven about the earth,’ ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ 
τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν (Thest. 208 4), would not now 
satisfy the requirements of the Stranger. “It is not enough 
to describe wool-weaving as the greatest and fairest of all 
ministries that wait on the working of wool: the other 
attendant arts must be carefully stripped from round it.” 
(281 c.) That is, each of these must be so far defined as to 
exclude weaving. The boundary line must be clearly drawn 
from either side. And thus the definition of the Statesman 
involves a certain account of the general, the judge, the orator, 
as well as a description of the no-constitutions of existing states. 
Here is an approach, though a very partial one, to the ideal 
of science which is made a test of the happiness or misery 
of the children of earth in Saturn’s reign: “learning from 
every nature, what each by its proper faculty had perceived 
differently from others and could contribute to the treasury 
of knowledge.” (272 c.) 

So much has been gained from perceiving the correlation 
of the positive and negative elements of knowledge. Closely 
akin to this was the reaction, which the “‘ Sophist” justified®, 
from a merely negative and analytical method of knowledge. 
This also is continued in the Statesman. In their zeal for 
the method of divisions, the Stranger and his respondent fall 
into a natural error. In seeking to be definite they forget to 
be comprehensive, and omit a needful generalization. They 
divide the science of feeding; whereas the king in this pre- 
sent cycle is not a feeder, although he has the care of a 
flock. This error is duly exposed and rectified; and it is 
further shewn that the distinctions hitherto made have only 
brought out a colourless outline of the King. It is from this 
point that the more serious portion of the inquiry begins. 


ἃ Τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαχωρίζειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων. 
Soph. 259 6. 











TO THE STATESMAN. xill 


b. The generalizing or combining process», the defect of 
which had been just noticed, here resumes its proper import- 
ance. The ideas on which the definition of the Statesman mainly 
turns are drawn from the not very obvious example of cloth- 
weaying; and an example is explained to mean the illustra- 
tion of some great or unfamiliar truth by the exhibition of the 
leading principles of that truth in a simple and familiar case. 
We are again reminded of the complexity of the world of 
which philosophy speaks to us, and how combinations which 
in the abstract are sufficiently understood, become lost when 
we endeavour to follow the concrete development of things. 
(278 c,d.) We are told that it is only by dialectic (not by 
any sensible mean) that the similitude of the highest truths 
can be displayed. And as the definition of the weaver is 
symbolical of that of the Statesman; so the chief value of this 
whole discussion is to shadow forth still higher truths than 
those with which it is concerned. (285 d, e.) 

What then are the principles suggested by the present 
example? First, we are taught the inadequacy of the method 
of dichotomies as hitherto pursued. If the view of this 
method already stated* is correct, we can easily imagine that 
Young Socrates, or let us rather say a pupil of the Academy 
at this time, was not prepared for the elaborateness of the 
discussion. In fact we have seen him beguiled by the Stranger 
into thinking that the journey was ended, when it was not yet 
well begun. (265 b.) Plato here shews that the real work of 
distinction and comparison, which deserves the name of dialec- 
tic, is a more subtle process and goes deeper than the boyish 
exercise with which he had as it were broken ground for the 
inquiry : though even through this many valuable hints had 
been conveyed, seria mista jocis. The difference in this 
respect between the earlier and later portions of the dialogue 
will be evident to any one who compares the abstract notion 
of statesmanship as a commanding theory in p. 260 a, with 
the view given in pp. 305, 306 of the relation of the kingly 
art to those of the orator, judge, and field-officer. Those 


θ᾽ συναγωγή. Cf. 278 ο, ταὐτὸν ἐν pare Bacon’s saying, ‘‘ The strength of 
ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ, δοξαζόμενον ὀρθῶς all sciences is, as the strength of the 
καὶ συναχθέν. old man’s faggot, in the bond.” 

© See General Introduction. Com- 


XLV INTRODUCTION 


who make this comparison will not think that the author of 
this dialogue believed his definition of bipes implume to be a 
serious contribution to the science of human nature. As the 
dialogue proceeds the earlier divisions seem to be forgotten, 
or to be neglected as a mere scaffolding’, else the analogy 
just noticed between p. 260 a and 305 d (οὐκ αὐτὴν δεῖ πράτ- 
τειν, GAN ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν) could hardly have 
been overlooked by the speakers themselves. 

The imperfection of mere external classifications being thus 
recognized, there follows the remark, already quoted, on the 
necessity of finding the mutual boundary between the object of 
search and all kindred species. (281 c.) 

In applymg this to weaving we obtain two fresh thoughts, 
which are found valuable for the main argument: the distine- 
tion of αἴτια and ξυναίτια, of operative and adminicular arts ; 
and the universality of the two great sciences of composition 
and division. 

The former affords the hint for the elimination from the 
work of the king of various arts, without which civil life could 
not proceed: the latter is the key-note of the final passage, in 
which the last touches are given to the image of the King. 
For by help of our example we are enabled to proceed fur- 
ther, even after all possible distinctions have been drawn: and 
when all rival arts have been stripped away we see in the 
royal function the twofold process of division and composition : 
division, by which, practically, good citizens are selected, 
and theoretically the brave and gentle elements are distin- 
guished: composition, by which the diverse materials thus 
cleansed and prepared are combined in a smooth and perfect 
web. ‘These two are the counterpart of the twofold process of 
dialectic, by which the objects of thought are distinguished 
and combined according to truth. This process is incidentally 
described in a passage of the Politicus already quoted (285 
a, b), in which the complex determinations of real knowledge 
are contrasted with the off-hand generalizations and distine- 
tions of sciolism; and which is in fact an application and 
development of the conception of scientific method expressed 


in Soph. 259 d. 


ἃ Cf. Pheedr. 265 d: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι. 


cr ... 

















TO THE STATESMAN. XV 


6. These are the chief points of that instruction in dialectic, 
which is commended to us by the Eleatie Stranger as the most 
valuable result of the dialogue. We may gather from them 
that Plato was at this time striving after a philosophy of the 
concrete, and endeavouring to substitute real and fruitful in- 
quiry for the barren logical exercitations, the sweeping gene- 
ralizations and verbal distinctions of his contemporaries, per- 
haps of his own scholars. The aim constantly held before the 
mind is the attainment of greater definiteness and fulness, 
“This is true, but not explicit or complete ” (ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐ μὴν 
σαφές ye οὐδὲ τέλεον) is the repeated complaint. Since it has 
been proved in the Sophist that different ideas may have com- 
munion or correlation with each other, it becomes the task of 
philosophy to discern the threads which connect them. And 
nowhere, except in the Philebus and Parmenides, has Plato 
buckled to this task more earnestly. In the latter part of the 
Pheedrus indeed there is a conception of an art of rhetoric, 
which should be based on a complete science of psychology, 
the realization of which would far exceed in definiteness and 
completeness this somewhat desultory sketch. But it is one 
thing to imagine a science, and quite another thing to attempt, 
however imperfectly, to work it out. The “splendid ideal” 
of the Phedrus, like other intuitions of that dialogue, is an 
anticipation rather than an embodiment of method : not neces- 
sarily an early anticipation, for if wildness of imagination 
marks a jugendschrift, what is to be said of the mythus in the 
Statesman? In the sixth book of the Republic there is ex- 
pressed a more general conception of the ladder of hypotheses 
by which science climbs to the ideal world, whence she de- 
scends without the aid of the ladder by the chain of ideas. 
But this notion, though implying a connexion of ideas, is still 
vague, and gives less promise of the reality of science than the 
method employed in the Politicus. 

The Republic professes to be intelligible rather than exact, 
and to proceed by popular methods. Even the order of the 
sciences 15 not worked out as a dialectical problem, though the 
seventh book contains passages of great subtilty and depth. 
What is wanting in demonstration is “evened o’er” by the 
abundance of imagination. But Socrates hints more than once 
to Glaucon that there is a “longer way,” which the dialectical 


ΧΥΪ INTRODUCTION 


student must learn to tread. It is possible that we have a 
sample of this in the present dialogue, which contains an ela- 
borate defence of lengthened argument, and in which Young 
Socrates is taken further afield than he had any thought of 
going. 

This struggle towards definiteness and reality is pro tanto an 
approach on Plato’s part to the later philosophy of Aristotle. 
But there still remains between them an ineffaceable difference 
of character. Plato when most concrete retains an undimin- 
ished hold of the universal: οὐρανῷ ἐστήρικτο κάρη καὶ ἐπὶ 
χθονὶ βαίνει. The idealizing spirit may be exorcised, “ tamen 
usque recurrit.”’ Gliscit intellectus altior. The true king, when 
adapting himself to the particular circumstances of his state» 
inflicting exile or death on some; uniting others in marriage, 
is still the perfectly wise philosopher with his eye fixed on the 
pattern in the heavens. Contemplation and action are not 
sundered: the knowledge of the universal truth is not sup- 
posed to hinder the individual application®. 


11. Socratic and Pythagorean Elements. 


a. Continuance of the Socratic Spirit. The question here 
treated by the Stranger, after being proposed by Socrates, is 
almost identical with some of those with which, according to 
Xenophon, the real Socrates was most engaged: τί πόλις ; τί 
πολιτικός ; τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων ; τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων; And 
though his method of search on these topics, as recorded in 
the Memorabilia, is much simpler than that here used, it is 
evident that Plato has im many instances only followed up the 
hints given by his master. 

There is, first, the postulate on which the whole dialogue 
proceeds, that statesmanship is a science, that knowledge 
ought to govern. You would not doubt, says Socrates, whe- 
ther to place a skilful or unskilful pilot at the helm (1. 1, 9): 
nor would you choose a pilot, or a carpenter, or a flute-player, 
as you do your rulers, by casting lots (I. 2,9). (Cf. Polit. 258 
Ὁ, 290 e, 292 Ὁ, 298.) 


e “And therefore the speculation that all things by a scale did ascend to 
was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, Unity.’”—Bacon. 
though in them only a speculation, 











TO THE STATESMAN. 


Xvil 


2. The image of a herdsman, under which the king is at 
first conceived, common enough certainly in poetry, was one 
which Socrates delighted to use. “It is a bad herdsman 
(βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεύς) who makes the number of the cattle less,” 
was his well-known censure of the thirty tyrants (I. 2, 32). 
The coincidence of language here is enough to justify the sup- 
position that there is some connexion of thought: although 
Plato evidently thinks that there are cases where taking the 
heads of citizens may be a purgation of the common weal. 
(261 ἃ alib., 293 ἃ.) 

3. The distinction of the king and tyrant in Mem. IV. 6, 
12‘, is nearly the same with that which Plato accepts pro- 
visionally at one stage of the dialogue (277 d); and the same 
passage of Xenophon’ expresses what Plato speaks of as the 
commonly received mode of characterizing the several forms 
of government (291 6). The thought however is here so ob- 
vious that it would not be safe to lay much stress on this 
coincidence, if taken alone. 

4. The general and the judge (στρατηγικός, δικαστικός) are 
named by Socrates as next in dignity to the statesman (πολιτι- 
Mem. II. 6, 38. Cf. Polit. 305. 

But the chief traces of the historical Socrates in this dia- 
logue, as in the Sophistes, are the method of definition by 
exclusions, and the use of common examples to suggest hypo- 
theses: both much extended, and if not systematized, yet 
made the objects of reflection and theory; but in their en- 
larged features bearing unmistakeably the marks of their first 
origin. (See Sophist. sub. init., note on Σωκράτης.) 

Turning from the Socrates of Xenophon to the Platonic 
Socrates, we find a passage of the Euthydemus, in which the 


KOS). 





£ Βασιλείαν δὲ καὶ τυραννίδα ἀρχὰς 
μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἡγεῖτο εἶναι, διαφέρειν 
δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἑκόν- 
των τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους 
τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν, βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο" 
τὴν δὲ ἀκόντων καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, 
ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως 6 ἄρχων βούλοιτο, τυραν- 
νίδα. 

& Καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα 
ἐπιτελούντων αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, 
ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν 


ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι ὅπου δ᾽ ἐκ τιμημάτων, 
πλουτοκρατίαν᾽ ὅπου δ᾽ ἐκ πάντων δη- 
μοκρατίαν. 

h Mem. I. 2,37: ᾿Αλλὰ τῶνδέ τοι 
σε ἀπέχεσθαι ὦ Σώκρατες, δεήσει, τῶν 
σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν 
χαλκέων: καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ἤδη 
κατατετρίῖφθαι διαθρυλλουμένους ὑπὸ 
σοῦ ΝΣ καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε. Cf. 
Gorg. 401 a, Sympos, 221 6. 


“id 


XVill INTRODUCTION 


question here solved by the Stranger is raised, but, Socratico 
more, is left unanswered. Some of the elements of the inquiry 
are, however, the same as here, and the passage has nearly 
the same relation to this dialogue which the opening chapters 
of the Protagoras have to the Sophist. (Kuthyd. 289-291.) 

« An art is required which can both make and enable us to 
use rightly what is made. The art of speech-making is not 
this, because the speech-maker is often different from the 
speaker. Nor generalship, for that is a kind of hunting: and 
the huntsman often does not use what he catches, but delivers 
them to others, and so the general yields up his prey to the 
statesman. Let us try then the art of the statesman, or the 
king. Here we fall into a labyrinth of inquiry (ὥσπερ εἰς 
λαβύρινθον ἐμπεσόντες, οἰόμενοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περικάμ- 
ψαντες πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ζητήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες, καὶ 
τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι, ὅσουπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν). Tor 
when it is admitted that all the other arts yield over their 
productions to the political or royal art (which are the same), 
and that this art, by determining the use of everything, is the 
pilot and saviour of the state, the question rises, what is her 
peculiar work ? 

“According to a previous agreement, this must be knowledge 
of some kind, and this excludes wealth, freedom, peace, and 
the like. Say, then, she makes the citizens wise. In what 
knowledge does she make them wise, and what use will they 
make of their wisdom? ‘Thus the original question returns 
in a new form.” 

The thing sought for here is the same which the Politicus 
professes to find, an absolute principle of life: a speculative 
truth which is also the consummation of practical good: a 
commanding theory. It was this which Socrates spent his 
life in seeking: of which he confessed his ignorance, while he 
declared life to be intolerable if it were not known. The 
political problem is only a particular instance of the eternal 
question, what is true and good? 

There is also considerable likeness in the manner of search. 
And here it may be remarked that the specializing or indi- 
vidualizing effort described in the previous section is a genuine 
continuation of the work of Socrates, whose pertinacity in 
sticking like a gad-fly to his respondent is most conspicuous, 




















TO THE STATESMAN. XIX 


where he forces men by a fresh question from some generality 
in which they would gladly rest (dpyovoa—rl ἀπεργάζεται ; 
—riva δὴ ἐπιστήμην ; ἣ τί χρησόμεθα :) 

The chief difference is that the Eleatic Stranger works out 
an answer to the question, which Socrates asked of Kuthyde- 
mus and his brother in vain: not however to the final question, 
which Socrates, if true to his vocation, would have still pressed 
upon the Stranger, though the problem in the present case 
was more limited than in the former. But this difficulty, like 
that about the nature of virtue, is evaded rather than solved 
by the more complex notion of the state, whose members 
have not all the same office. 

As im the Republic there is found a place for a virtue in 
harmony with reason although lower than reason, so here a 
place is found for political happiness (καθ᾽ ὅσον εὐδαίμονι 
πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι πόλει). All free citizens are to be trained 
so as to think correctly of what is noble, just, and good, and 
to give a reason of their opinion (μετὰ βεβαιώσεως). But with 
the rulers or law-givers alone exists that perfect consciousness 
which is the fountain of right action for the state, and whose 
will determines in accordance with reason the use to be made 
of all possessions (ὅσα ἔχεται κτήσεως). Other parallels might 
be drawn (e.g. from Gorg. 517), shewing that the spirit of 
Socrates is still working under the Eleatic mask: and if the 
Socratic humour no longer makes perpetual skirmishes, it 
lurks in ambush to take the reader by surprise, and is occa- 
sionally transformed by the intensity of Plato’s mood into an 
almost savage irony. The writer knew well how laughable 
was his picture of all things growing backwards in the golden 
age; nor could Swift have wished for more than to demonstrate 
the close relationship between mankind and the pig. 

There is the very genius of satire in the picture of the self- 
exaltation of the crane, who looks on man as an inferior 
animal; and in the lofty scorn with which the philosopher 
professes ignorance of the motley throng of satyrs and centaurs, 
who are in fact no other than the princes and potentates of 
this world. 

Briefly, the object which Socrates set before himself and 
others, Plato, when he wrote this dialogue, believed himself 
partially to have attained—the science of truth and good: to 

Gl ὦ 


ΧΧ INTRODUCTION 


Socrates an ideal only, dwarfing to nothing all actual know- 
ledge; to Plato an ideal ever in process of realization through 
the activity of reason, when awakened by dialectic to perceive 
the existence and follow the relations of ideas. 

b. Pythagorean influence. Wherever Plato, especially in 
his later dialogues, affirms anything respecting the order of 
nature, the destiny of the soul, or the fabric of the state, 
there is reason to suspect the influence, more or less controlled 
by dialectic, of Pythagorean notions. To a great extent he 
used these merely as forms of imagination through which he 
could give more lively expression to his thoughts, but there 
can be no doubt that this scientific mysticism had an increas- 
ine charm for his mind, and had a still greater ascendancy 
over his immediate followers. It is less generally admitted 
that his dialectic also had a Pythagorean element, and yet it 
seems far from improbable that, as he strengthened his belief 
in the flux of phenomena by the study of Heraclitus and 
Protagoras, and learnt from Parmenides to trust in the fixity 
of ideas, so in the “struggle towards the concrete,” of which 
the argument of the Politicus is an important step, he may 
have been assisted by reading in Philolaus of the eternal 
Harmony, whereby the Limit was impressed on the Unlimited, 
to the production of a beautiful world. It was seen, in com- 
menting on the Thezetetus (p. 201), that the philosophers who 
said there was no knowledge of the Simple, but only of the 
Complex, were probably Pythagorean. The word κοινωνία, 
by which the correlation of ideas is expressed in the Sophist, 
occurs in a place of the Gorgias where the Pythagorean 
colouring is evident (Gorg. 507 e—508 a). The μεθέξις of 
the Parmenides is the μίμασις of the Pythagoreans. And in 
the Philebus the κόσμος τις ἀσώματος (πέρας, ἄπειρον, μικτόν, 
αἰτία, μέτρον), which forms the spring and framework of the 
dialogue, is of a no less unmistakeable character. 

In the present dialogue there occurs a direct criticism of 
Pythagorean doctrine which affords a good illustration of 
Plato’s manner of dealing with the philosophies which most 
influenced him. The Stranger is led incidentally to defend 
the tediousness of the “longer way,” whose object is not to 
give pleasure, or to obtain a speedy result, but to enlighten 
the reason. He does so by distinguishing that which is too 





τω 





ee 








TO THE STATESMAN. xxi 
much from that which is more; a distinction which had 
escaped even those philosophers who ayerred that the science 
of measurement embraces all things. They led the way to 
a great truth, which for want of dialectic they could not 
work out. It is true that without measure all arts would be 
destroyed, but there are two kinds of measure, one simply 
relative, another, which is the secret of production, having 
reference to the standard of what is meet. Here the Pytha- 
gorean doctrine of numbers is brought into contact with the 
Socratic ethical idea‘. Aristotle would have said that certain 
thinkers acknowledged the formal, but ignored the final cause. 
In this passage, as perhaps in the Philebus, 44 ὁ, the Pytha- 
goreans are employed as “ diviners” to point the way to the 
spring which Plato himself must open. 

We pass from this manifest allusion to some less certain 
Andications that Plato was at this time playing with the 
weapons of this school. There need hardly be mentioned the 
ludicrous mathematical definition of man as a biped; or the 
doctrine of metempsychosis, or the astronomy passing into 
cosmology. We may confine our attention to points less 
obvious than these. 

The Pythagoreans were the only pre-Socratic school who 
set themselves to raise human life towards an ideal standard*. 
It can hardly be doubted that they had moral and political 
doctrines in the fourth century B.C. But the few fragments 
of Philolaus which remain are of a metaphysical and cosmical 
turn. We know from Herodotus and Xenophanes that Pytha- 
goras taught the immortality and transmigration of the soul; 
from Plato that his followers observed a certain rule of life; 
and the language of Philolaus, always full of religious fervour, 
appears to recognize the Unity of the Supreme Being!. The 
Pythagorean fragments even of the age immediately succeed- 
ing Plato are of doubtful authority, and are so tinged with 
Platonism, that, even if genuine, their value is diminished for 

i Compare a saying of Socrates him- 
self in the Memorabilia advising μετρι- 


érys in the study of λογισμοί, and cf. 
Legg. 4, 719 6, σοὶ δ᾽ οὐχ οὕτω ῥητέον 


two points, which both appear in this 
dialogue—in the mode of teaching by 
parable (δι᾽ ὁμοιωμάτων) and in religious 
mysticism. 


ὡς νῦν εἶπες τὸ μέτριον εἰπών. ἀλλὰ τί 1 ἐντὶ γὰρ 6 ἁγεμὼν καὶ ἄρχων ἅπάν- 





τὸ μέτριον καὶ ὁπόσον ἡητέον. 
k They coincided with Socrates in 


τῶν θεὸς εἷς ἀεὶ ἐών, μόνιμος, ἀκίνατος, 
αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁμοῖος, ἅτερος τῶν ἄλλων. 


ΧΧῚῚ INTRODUCTION 


our present purpose. But it seems probable on the whole 
that the school at the earlier period of which we speak 
combined a ceremonial asceticism with a noble and elevating 
morality. 
We know that such was the ethical teaching of Empedocles, 
who was a Pythagorean in this respect, and who at one time 
erles, 
Οὐ πέλεται τοῖς μὲν θεμιτὸν τόδε, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀθέμιστον" 
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ᾽ εὐρυμέδοντος 
αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται, διά τ’ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς, 

and presently, with still greater vehemence, 


Δειλοί, πανδειλοί, κυάμων ἄπο χεῖρας ἔχεσθεϊα ! 


1. The idea of an infinite past, and of great cycles of time, 
which took such hold of Plato’s imagination, and which he 
himself refers to an Egyptian source, was probably common 
to him with the Pythagoreans, and if not derived from them, 
must have been strengthened by their teaching. According 
to Porphyry (V. Pyth. 19), “ Pythagoras” taught that all 
events took place in cycles and there was nothing new: ὅτι 
κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰ γιγνόμενά ποτε πάλιν γίγνεται, νέον δ᾽ 
οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστι. The bearing of this on the “ great mythe” 
is sufficiently evident. 

2. Plato also held in common with them, and may have 
partly received from them, a strong sense of the inevitable 
prevalence of evil in the world. It is not likely that he 
derived this from Socrates, who complained not of evil but of 
ignorance, and who refrained from cosmical speculation: and 
this vein of reflection is deepest in his latest works. 

Theophrastus (Met. 9. Ritter and Preller, 110) speaks of 
Plato and the Pythagoreans as being at one on this subject. 
“The nature of the whole, they say, would be impossible 
without the existence of an absolute formlessness and indefi- 
niteness and disorder (cf. Polit. 273 d, εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος 
ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον δύῃ), which they oppose to the combination 
of the indefinite dyad and the One. This disorder has as it 


m Tt is perhaps worth notice that ποιουμένους ἐκείνου μαθητὰς εἶναι μᾶλ - 
the σιωπὴ of the Pythagoreans was in λον σιγῶντας θαυμάζουσιν ἢ τοὺς ἐπὶ 
some shape contemporary with Plato. τῷ λέγειν μεγίστην δόξαν ἔχοντα. 

See Isocrates Busir. 29, τοὺς προσ- 








TO THE STATESMAN. XXxlil 


were an equal share with the other nature, or even exceeds it. 
Hence even God cannot be supposed able to bring all things to 
perfection ; but, if he be the cause of things, this is only so far 
as nature admits. And perhaps he would not choose to do 
so, since there must follow an annihilation of Being, which is 
composed of opposites.” 

This passage, although probably describing at second-hand 
a theory not clearly understood, sufficiently proves that the 
prevalence of imperfection was a difficulty much discussed by 
the semi-Pythagoreans of the Academy ; and it is this difficulty 
which suggests to Plato’s imagination the occasional dereliction 
of the world by God. He modifies Pythagorean optimism, 
by bringing into prominence another side of their theory. 
The disorder out of which the whole was brought into the 
present order, the breaking out again of this disorder so as 
almost to bring Chaos back again, the fear that but for Divine 
interposition the world might founder in the “ infinite abyss 
of dissimilitude,” are touches vividly recalling this doctrine. 

The Politicus contains another trace of this ἄμορφος φύσις, 
which it would appear trifling to notice, did not the dialogue 
itself warn us that the commonest things may be examples of 
great ideas. This is the mention of raw material amongst the 
seven kinds of possessions (288, 9), with the remarkable 
appellation τὸ mpwroyevés εἶδος : (compare the πρωτογένεια of 
the Orphic Hymns). This, and the well-known passage of the 
Timeus, are the chief anticipations in Plato of the Aristotelian 
material cause. 

3. The doctrine of transmigration was naturally connected 
with the prohibition of animal food and a higher than the 
ordinary estimate of the relation of the lower animals to man. 
In the passage of Porphyry already quoted, it is said that 
“ Pythagoras taught” that all animal life is kindred: ὅτι 
πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα ἔμψυχα ὁμογενῆ δεῖ νομίζειν. It is true 
that every later testimony on this subject, when philosophy 
had been leavened by the direct influence of Egypt and the 
East, must be received with caution®; but if this doctrine 


1 The often-quoted lines of Xeno- _ still nearer (364,5): ἐνθ᾽ ἦσαν κτίλα 
phanes, about Pythagoras and the dog, πάντα καὶ ἀνθρώποισι προσηνῆ φῆρές 
shew, however, something of a similar 7° οἰωνοί τε, φιλοφροσύνη τε δεδήει. 
tendency. And Empedocles comes 


XXIV INTRODUCTION 


existed, Plato has used it (1) to point his irony, by telling us 
not hastily to distinguish man from the beasts, some of whom 
perhaps regard him with the same contempt with which he 
looks on them; and (2) to adorn his tale by the circumstance 
of man confabulating with the other creatures, when “ there 
was nothing wild.” 

That abstinence from the flesh of animals was not unknown 
in Greece, at least in the way of tradition and theory, is cer- 
tain from a remark of Plato’s on the “ Orphic” way of life 
(Lege. 6, 782 6), and from the lines in which Empedocles vehe- 
mently condemns the opposite practice, on the ground that so 
men are devouring their own fiesh and blood®. (Compare 
Aristoph. Ran. 1032”.) And it is probable that Plato alludes 
to this when he says that the creatures did not eat each other 
in the golden age (οὐκ ἣν ἄγριον οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἀλλήλων ἐδωδαί). 
Another prohibition, having evidently the same origin, and 
ascribed by Herodotus to the Pythagoreans in common with 
the Orphic mystics and the Egyptians, was that against bury- 
ing in wool. 

Closely allied to these Orphic notions is the idea of purifica- 
tion (καθαρμὸς), of which there are several applications in this 
dialogue and in the Sophist. (Soph. 226 d; Polit. 293 d, 303 
d, 308 c,d. Compare the Pheedo.) Thus the idea of division 
or separation as well as that of combination (διάκρισις as well 
as σύγκρισις) had a root in the speculations of this school. 

4. It remains to notice the most important, but unfortu- 
nately the most doubtful, of the points at which this dialogue 
touches on Pythagoreanism. The fancies hitherto mentioned 
belong to morals and religion. Must not a school which 
aimed at influencing states have had a political theory, how- 
ever simple? 


© Μορφὴν δ᾽ ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον υἱὸν ἀείρας 
σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος, μέγα νήπιος᾽ ὃς δὲ πορεῦται 
λισσόμενος θύοντ᾽" 68 ἀνηκούστησεν ὅὁμοκλέων 
σφάξας δ᾽ ἐν μεγάροισι κακὴν ἀλεγύνατο δαῖτα. 
ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως πατέρ᾽ υἱὸς ἑλὼν καὶ μητέρα παῖδες, 
θυμὸν ἀπορραίσαντε, φίλας κατὰ σάρκας ἔδουσιν" 
Οὐ παύσεσθε φόνου δυσηχέος ; οὖκ ἐσορᾶτε 
᾿Αλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείησι νόοιο ;—Hmp. Καθαρμοί. 


P Ορφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ᾽ ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων T ἀπέχεσθαι. 











TO THE STATESMAN. XXV 


Stobzeus has preserved three fragments from a work 
Kephantus of Syracuse on Royalty (περὶ βασιλείας) containing 
an ideal picture of the true king. Very similar fragments 
are quoted by him from works on the same subject by Dioto- 
genes the Pythagorean and Sthenidas the Locrian. These 
are all later than Plato, and betray the influence of his teach- 
ing; but they display with great consistency a phase of 
Pythagoreanism which is at least interesting in connexion 
with the present dialogue. The true king is pictured as a 
kind of God on earth: having the same relation to his sub- 
jects which the Supreme Being has to the Cosmos, surveying 
them from above with an eye of wisdom (cf. Soph. 216 d), 
having for them the same affection which a father has towards 
his son, or a shepherd towards his flock, and being revered 
by them as the law is revered by those who use it. The city 
“imitates” the world and the king imitates the ruler of the 
world. 


Ἔχει δὲ ὡς θεὸς ποτὶ κόσμον βασιλεὺς ποτὶ πόλιν, καὶ ὡς πόλις 
μ ’ 
ποτὶ κόσμον βασιλεὺς ποτὶ θεόν. “A μὲν γὰρ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν Kal 
διαφερόντων συναρμοσθεῖσα κόσμω σύνταξιν καὶ ἁρμονίαν μεμί- 
ie Ν Ἂν 2) SS Υ̓ 5 - \ SEN δ ’ὔ 
μαται, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀρχὰν ἔχων ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ αὐτὸς ὧν νόμος 
Bs \ 3 5 ὔ , , , > 
ἔμψυχος, θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις παρεσχημάτισται. ---- Θεόμιμόν ἐντι 
πρᾶγμα βασιλεία. (Diotog. περὶ βασιλείας. Mullach. Fragm. 
PP- 534-5-) 
Χρὴ τὸν βασιλέα σοφὸν ἣμεν' οὕτω γὰρ ἐσεῖται ἀντίἴτιμος καὶ 
N “ / an Ὁ Ν Ν 4, " Ν \ ° 
ζηλωτὰς TO πράτω θεῶ. Οὗτος yap Kal φύσι ἐντὶ καὶ πρᾶτος 
βασιλεύς τε καὶ δυνάστας, ὁ δὲ γενέσι καὶ μιμάσι; καὶ 6 μὲν ἐν 
2 \ Δ δ᾽ ε SN c \ ε Ν SEN S f 
τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ γᾶς, Kal ὁ μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα διοι- 
Cay Ν ’ IEEN 3 Ca / Ν c 379 
κεῖ Te Kal ζώει αὐτὸς ἐν αὑτῷ κεκταμένος τὴν σοφίαν, ὃ δ᾽ ἐν 
χρόνῳ ἐπιστάμαν". (Sthenidas Locrus, περὶ βασιλείας. Ibid. 
Ρ. 536.) os) ἢ , ἱ : 
Ἔκ τούτων κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν εὐαρμοστία τις καὶ τῶν πολλῶν 
fal , 
ὁμοφωνία μετὰ πειθοῦς συναδοίσας. Ὃ κατ᾽ ἀρετὰν ἐξάρχων καλέ- 
7 ἊΝ ΝΟ ’, ν λίι Ν ’,ὔ 
εταί τε βασιλεὺς καὶ ἔντι, ταύταν ἔχων φιλίαν τε καὶ κοινωνίαν 
ποτὶ τὼς ὑπ᾽ αὔταυτον, ἅνπερ 6 θεὸς ποτί τε τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν 
/ a 
αὐτῷ: “Oday δὲ τὰν εὔνοιαν χρὴ παρασκευάζεσθαι πρᾶτον μὲν 
- / 7 rn 
παρὰ TO βασιλέως ἐς τὼς βασιλευομένως, δεύτερον δὲ Tapa τῶνδε 


a Compare with this the θεῖος λόγος of the Phiedo, 85 d: also the Parmenides, 
134 ¢. 


2 


ΧΡ 


XXV1 INTRODUCTION 


, Ἂν / ε ’ὔ \ εἰ \ ἈΝ 
ἐς τὸν βασιλέα, ὁποία γεννάτορος ποτὶ υἱέα καὶ ποτὶ ποίμναν 
/ \ , \ / .} fad Ἃ ᾿ \ 
νομέως Kal νόμω ποτὶ χρωμένως αὐτῷ. (Kephantus, περὶ βασι- 
; 
λείας. Ibid. p. 537.) 
r Ν Μ > / 
X6 μὲν θεὸς οὔτε διακόνως ἔχων οὔτε ὑπαρέτας οὔτ᾽ αὖ προστάξι 
Ν “ BE) ‘ / A 
τινὶ χρώμενος οὐδὲ στεφανῶν ἢ ἀναγορεύων τὼς πειθομένως ἢ 
5 / ΩΝ “» / wv 5 > “" 7ὔ ny fy 
ἀτιμάζων τὼς ἀπειθέοντας-----ἄρχει----ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι παρέχων ἀξιομί- 
- - lel con € “ 
ματον ἑωυτὸν ζᾶλον ἐντίθητι πᾶσι τῆς αὑτῷ φύσιος.... Ὁ ὃ 
. a n f 
ἐπίγῃος Tap ἁμῖν βασιλεὺς πῶς οὐχ ὁμοίως αὐταρκής ; ἀπεικάζων 
Ν ε δ “ / Ν 
τε γὰρ αὑτόν, ἑνὶ ἂν ἀπεικάσειε τῷ κρατίστῳ, καὶ πάντες ἑαυτὼς 
na 5 9? ὁ 
πειρώμενοι τούτῳ ὁμοιοῦν βασιλικοὶ ἔσονται" τὰ δ᾽ ὅσα βίας καὶ 
ἀνάγκας ἐντὶ τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, ἐνίοτε ἑκάστῳ τὰν περὶ τὰν 
μίμασιν προθυμίαν ἀφαιρέεται: χωρὶς εὐνοίας γὰρ ἀμάχανον ἐξο- 
ἴω ΄ c 
μοιωθῆναι, ἃ μάλιστα πάντων ἀφανίζει τὸ φοβερόν. “Qs εἴθε ἣν 
fad 5» 7 7 \ b) Ν \ Ν a 
τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας φύσιος δυνατὸν ἀφελὲν τὸ καὶ πειθοῦς τινας 
δέεσθαι. .. . . ἐπειδήπερ πειθὼ ἔργον τί ἐντι παροικέον ἀνάγκᾳ" 
, Ν oy Te eon ISEN / / 5) / , 
πράτα yap ad αὑτᾶς αὐτὰ κατεργάζεται τάπερ ἐκείναν διέφυγαν. 
/ ’ na “ lat lo ΄σ 
“Ὅσα δ᾽ αὐτοφυῶς τῷ καλῷ χρῆται, τούτοις οὐδεμία πειθοῦς αἰδώς" 
t μ 
ἐπειδήπερ οὐδὲ φόβος ἀνάγκας. ᾿Βνεργάσαιτο δ᾽ ἂν μόνος 6 
βασιλεὺς ἀνθρώπω φύσει καὶ τόδε τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὡς διὰ μίμασιν 
αὐτῶ τῷ κρέσσονος ποτὶ τὸ δέον ἕπεσθαι. (Ibid. p. 538.) There 
is much more to the same purport. 


Now are we to suppose that this somewhat crude represen- 
tation of what ought to be (resembling perhaps suspiciously 
in some features the Stoical wise man) is merely a caricature 
of Plato’s philosopher-king, or had both pictures an ante- 
cedent in Pythagorean teaching ? However this may be, there 
is no mistaking the strong lhkeness between the ideal herein 
absolutely set forth, and that which Plato in the Politicus, 
according to his manner of treating contemporary views, first 
states, then gently sets aside, and in the sequel utilizes in a 
modified form. ‘‘ In speaking of the king as the shepherd of 
his people, we borrowed the image of majesty from a theo- 
cratic time. Yet the true statesman is he who rules with 
knowledge, and harmonizes the state, bringing together 
the diverse elements of good, and rejecting the bad. He 
who does this not merely imitates but reproduces the divine 
image.” 

On the above data, imperfect as they are, I hazard the 
following conjecture: That the idea of the rightful sovereignty 





TO THE STATESMAN. XXVI 


of wisdom existed in the Pythagorean school before Plato. 
That Plato’s Republic, partly inspired by this, had given a 
fresh impulse to the same line of thought amongst the Pytha- 
gorizing students of the Academy; and that Plato, having 
in the Sophistes criticized the speculative idealism of these 
friends of his, being himself perhaps somewhat désillusionné, 
proceeds to call in question their equally premature idealism 
in politics: shewing, first, that a ‘paternal government ” 
does not secure happiness unless it rouse intelligence; and, 
secondly, that you must “first catch” your ideal king before 
you can apply your theory to practice. 

Even if this conjecture should prove baseless, it will hardly 
be questioned that the analogy which is more than hinted 
between the Cosmos and the State (6 ξυμμιμούμενοι καὶ συνε- 
πόμενοι K.T.\.—274 4), the “ purification” of the body politic, 
and the harmony of divers elements in the web of social life, 
are notions having a near affinity to Pythagorean teaching. 
Nor would it be rash to affirm the same of the theory of 
opposite virtues, which is certainly not Socratic, and is in- 
troduced as an unusual saying (οὐκ εἰωθότα λόγον οὐδαμῶς--- 
306 b). 

Speaking generally, the most obvious affinities to Pytha- 
goreanism in Plato’s later writings are, 1. An increasingly 
religious spirit. 2. Intense interest in all scientific inquiries, 
to which the name φιλοσοφία" is now applied. 3. The treat- 
ment of ethical questions (as in the Philebus) from a cosmical 
point of view. 4. The prevalence of the ideas of harmony, 
rhythm, and the like, especially in their application to morals 
and politics. 

But the Socratic spirit, or rather the mind of Plato 
awakened long since by Socrates, shines through the cloud 
of Pythagorean fancies (not that these were without intelli- 
gence), and reduces them to just proportions by the dry light 
of reason, while his imagination turns all that it touches into 
gold. If we could compare the Politicus with an entire 
writing of Philolaus, Eudoxus, or Speusippus, the probability 
is that we should find the difference immense: νοῦν ἔχοντας 
ἔνδον τούτους μόνους εὑρήσεις TOV λόγων. 

τ Tim. 88 ὁ : μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ. Theeet.143 d: γεωμετρικὴν ἥ τινα 
ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν. 

ἐδ ὦ 


XXVIIl INTRODUCTION 


We now turn from these preliminaries to examine Plato’s 
thoughts as they are presented to us in this dialogue. And 
here there are three topics which chiefly call for remark: the 
fable of Cronos; the description of existing constitutions, and, 
in connexion with this, the theory of legislation. 


Ill. The Myth. 


This is not the place for discussing, except incidentally, the 
nature of Plato’s myths as a general feature of his writings. 
But the solution of several questions which are suggested by 
this particular tale may perhaps throw some light on the wider 
problem. 

(1) What is the motive for interrupting the argument with 
this narrative? (2) In how far, or in what sense, does Plato 
believe in the truth of his own story? (3) Is there any humour 
mingled with the apparent solemnity of tone? (4) What are 
the precise ideas to whose working this imaginative creation 
is due? (5) Can these ideas be reconciled with those which 
Plato has elsewhere expressed ? (6) What effect has the 
narration in determining the course of argument which is 
pursued in the remainder of the dialogue? 

(1.) The chief motive of the fable is to recal the mind from 
resting in a merely abstract ideal. “ We are not living in the 
golden age :” that is, in forming our conception of true states- 
manship we must take account of the imperfect conditions of 
the actual world. In order to impress this lesson, the simple 
notion of one who should feed his flock like a shepherd is 
drawn out at length, embodied in a tale, and associated with 
a state of innocence and ease, before man eat bread by the 
sweat of his brow, when all creatures lived in harmony. And 
still further to point the contrast between the ideal and actual, 
the gates of this Eden are closed by the story of a change or 
fall, not caused by any antecedent sin or curse, but by the 
necessity inherent in created things. An air of probability 
and even of historic truth is given to this strange fiction, by 
finding in it an explanation of several fragments of early 
mythological tradition. 

The Stranger admits that he has allowed himself to ex- 
tend his fable beyond what was necessary for the argu- 











TO THE STATESMAN. ΧΧΙΧ 


ment. Hence there is no reason why every detail should be 
made to square with the main design. lato, as is his wont, 
passes at once from the immediate question to the more 
general one, of which it is a part; from the imperfect con- 
ditions of human government to the origin and necessity of 
evil; so that the cosmical features of the myth grow out of 
proportion to the political. But the language with which 
the myth is introduced and the after-comment leave no doubt 
as to the purpose for which it is inserted. ‘ The king, unlike 
other herdsmen, has many rivals, who likewise feed the flock.” 
“The reason of this difficulty is that our definition confounds 
the king with the Divine shepherd, whereas the statesman of 
our age cannot in any sense be a nourisher of his people.” 

As the tale proceeds, there is developed a further lesson: 
namely, that the simple ideal of a state of innocence is not 
only impracticable but incomplete; that a βίος τέλειος, a life 
under perfect conditions, is not necessarily the happiest life. 
The question is how the life is used: the philosophic spirit 
is the one essential of true happiness: even one whose choice 
of a life has been restricted, may, if he use opportunity with 
all his might, have a tolerable existence (καὶ τελευταίῳ ἐπιόντι, 
ξὺν νῷ ἑλομένῳ, συντόνως ζῶντι κεῖται Bios ἀγαπητός, οὐ KaKds— 
Rep. 10, 619 Ὁ) : though if the children of Cronos used their 
golden time rightly, no doubt they were far happier than we 
can be. (Cf. Rep. 6, 497 a: ᾿Αλλά τοι, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, od τὰ ἐλάχιστα 
ἂν διαπραξάμενος ἀπαλλάττοιτο. Οὐδέ γέ, εἶπον, τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ 
τυχὼν πολιτείας προσηκούσης" ἐν γὰρ τῇ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε 
μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.) 

Plato has shewn in two other passages that an ideal formed 
by abstracting from existing evils is no sufficient help towards 
the conception of political or moral excellence; that virtue is 
not to be sought in the unconscious innocence of childhood ;— 
once in describing the simple or primitive state in the Republic, 
Glaucon’s “city of pigs,’ where ‘man’s life is cheap as 
beast’s,” and again in the endeavour to conceive the origin of 
society at the opening of the third book of the Laws. But 
in the former description man needs defence against the in- 
clemency of winter, is not exempt from work, and answers to 
the definition of a cooking animal, though his cooking is of the 
simplest. In the latter the mountain shepherds whom the 


XXX INTRODUCTION 


flood of Deucalion spared to be a sort of germ of future 
humanity, living peacefully together because they had few 
companions and there was enough for all, when there were 
neither poor nor rich, nor insolence, nor injustice, nor envy, 
but simplicity and good faith, are not set forth as an ideal, 
though they are said to be better than men after them, but 
are pictured in order to assist the conception of the origin of 
law, by imagining a previous state of “patriarchal” govern- 
ment in which the habits and traditions of each family were 
supreme. Legislation became necessary when these clashed 
in the early life of cities’. 

Here, on the other hand, Plato has given his fancy free scope 
to revel in the details of a spontaneous universal life: where 
there is no unsatisfied longing, no effort, no pangs of birth, 
no crying of the infant “that he is come to this great stage 
of fools',’ no old age, no flesh that sees corruption: the more 
unlike his picture is to present realities, the better he attains 
his end, by enforcing the necessity (however unwelcome, Legg. 
803 Ὁ, ἔστι δὴ τοίνυν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν 
σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν σπουδάζειν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ 
εὐτυχές) of adapting inquiry as well as practical effort to the 
actual lot of man. And by adding a few extravagant or even 
grotesque touches, he gives play to his humour, and gently 
ridicules those who were content to rest in the simple unap- 
plied conception of a paternal king. 

The substance of the myth is therefore very similar to the 
remark in the Lysis: “ Supposing evil to be done away, 
would there be no more hunger or thirst or anything of the 
kind ; or would there be hunger, as inseparable from animal 
life, but no longer hurtful; and thirst and other desires, but 
without bringing harm; or is it absurd to ask what would 
happen or not happen then, for who can tell? But one thing 
we know, that, in our present state, hunger and other desires 
are sometimes productive of evil, but may sometimes be a 
means of good.” 

(2.) A recent writer on the Myths of Plato" says not only 


s A nearer parallel from the Laws Κλαῦσά τε kal κώκυσα, ἰδὼν ἀσυνη- 
will be quoted presently. θέα χῶρον. 

* Compare with this of Shakspeare u Mr. Westcott in the Contemporary 
the fragment of Empedocles, 1. 13, Review for June, 1866. 














ΤῸ THE STATESMAN. XXX1 


that “ Plato claims that his myths are above all true in 
spirit ;’ and that “the central idea of the myth is affirmed 
absolutely ;” but also that “in some cases the whole story is 
distinctly asserted to be historical’.’ “He” (Plato) “ dis- 
claims in fact the title Myth in a disparaging sense for the 
stories to which we now apply it. They are,” he says, “ real 
narratives (λόγοι) and not myths*, and where he does use the 
word, he still maintains the existence of a substantial basis of 
fact for such myths as admit of an historical test’.” The 
same writer adduces in proof of this the care with which 
Plato in the Republic apologizes for his “ Pheenician lie.” Mr. 
Grote in a somewhat different tone, but to the same effect, 
says of the Critias, ‘“‘ Plato wishes us to believe that the trans- 
action is historical. As to particular narratives the line 
between truth and fiction was obscurely drawn in his mind.” 
These remarks are quoted merely to shew that it is not an 
idle question to ask, How far did Plato believe in the literal 
truth of the present narration ? 

The answer may partly be deduced from two places of the 
Republic in which Plato’s own conception of the nature of a 
myth is expressed. 

a. “ There are two kinds of oral instruction, one false, one 
true; and the false must precede the true. For a fable is a 
falsehood containing truths.’ He then lays down the rule 
for instructive fictions, that they must convey true and just 
notions about Divine things and about human life. (Rep. 2, 
377°) 

b. And one of these true notions about Divine things is, 
that God cannot lie: amongst other reasons, because he has 
perfect knowledge, and need not have recourse to fables which 
he knows to be false, in order to gain an approximate concep- 
tion of antiquity, as men are compelled to do (ἐν ταῖς μυθολογίαις 
διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἀφομοιοῦντες 
τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν. Rep. 
ΡΟΣ ἢ); 

A myth therefore, in the Platonic sense, is a fictitious narra- 
tive, (a) conveying true ideas, and (6) in reference to occurrences 

v “‘See Timeeus, 20 d, 21 a,d, 26 c. x “Gorgias, 523 a. Compare pp. 


x 
And so Critias invokes Memory to help 526d, 527 a; Meno, 81 d, e.” 
him in relating the whole story.” y “ Politicus, 268 e, 269 a, b.” 


XXXil INTRODUCTION 


beyond the range of actual knowledge, supplying imagined 
probabilites for ascertained facts. The latter is Plato’s version 
of the ordinary function of mythology (Critias, p. 110 a, μυθο- 
λογία yap ἀναζήτησίς te τῶν παλαιῶν μετὰ σχολῆς ἅμ᾽ ἐπὶ τὰς 
πόλεις ἔρχεσθον) : the former is the special condition or limit 
which he imposes on its use. 

In practice this conception of the myth is further modified, 
by the dramatic and poetic form in which Plato’s philosophy 
is cast. The myth in the Protagoras, for example, though 
closely parallel in some of the details to that in the Politicus, 
is meant to convey an idea which Socrates combats and which 
Plato evidently does not fully accept. So also the elaborate 
myth of Aristophanes in the Symposium contains a phase of 
thought about the origin of Love, which is afterwards glanced 
at as an hypothesis of little value (Symp. 205 e). And as the 
myth is coloured to suit the particular speaker, so it partakes 
of the peculiar spirit of the particular dialogue. We hear 
nothing in the Pheedrus about the judgment of the dead, nor 
in the Republic about the wings of the soul, nor in the Sym- 
posium about her previous existence and future life; nor in 
the Gorgias about the edict of Lachesis. And if there is not 
perfect consistency in these greater matters, there is of course 
still more variety in the minor incidents with which Plato’s 
fertile imagination when once set to work gives all the distinet- 
ness of reality (ἐνάργειαν) to each separate picture. The 
harmonist of Piato’s myths would have a task only less 
difficult than the rationalist of the old mythology (ἅτε ἀγροικῷ 
τινι σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει). 

But Plato, like every poet, delights in making his fiction 
as like life as possible, and amongst other artifices is the 
asseveration of the truth of what is said. When Critias calls 
Mnemosyne to his aid, or when Socrates in the boldest part 
of the Phedrus says, “ We must speak the truth, especially 
since truth is our theme?,” is it possible not to detect a covert 
smile? And when the speaker in the Timeus so carefully 
traces every link in the chain of tradition by which the tale 
of Atlantis had come through Egypt to Solon, and from Solon 
to the aged Critias, are we not at once reminded of the words 


2 It is of this part that Socrates is somewhat abated, ἔοικε... τὰ μὲν 
says afterwards, when his fine frenzy ἄλλα παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι. 











TO THE STATESMAN. XXXII 


of Phdrus (which by the way have reference to an equally 
circumstantial tale), “Ὁ Socrates, you can make Kgyptian 
stories or any others with equal ease” ? The words of Socrates 
to Callicles, “You will call this a story, but I call it a true 
account,” must be interpreted by the remark which follows : 
“You will despise this as an old wives’ fable, and indeed it 
would be natural to despise my words, if we could find any- 
thing better or truer, but in all our inquiries this one principle 
remains firm, that we must fly from doing more than from 
suffering wrong :” where Socrates insists on the truth, not of 
the myth itself, but of the lesson which the myth conveys. 

It is probably from the same artistic instinct and with the 
same purpose of giving an air of probability to his inventions, 
that he founds them, as it is indeed natural he should do, 
upon the traditions already familiar to his countrymen. These 
formed the common medium through which he could communi- 
cate his ideas. He moulds them, indeed, with great ingenuity 
to his purposes. Poets had always dealt freely with mythology. 
But by appealing to the story of Atreus, or Deucalion, or 
Prometheus, for confirmation of some part of his recital, he 
seemed to bridge the gulf between the known and unknown. 

This practice, as well as the groundwork of Pythagorean 
beliefs, with which Plato had, no doubt, strong personal sym- 
pathy, gives a degree of consistency to the body of the Platonic 
myths which they would not have otherwise. And he assumes 
Such an air of simple truthfulness in telling his story, that by this 
art concealing art, a certain probability is given to the wildest 
imaginations. “ Uncertainties now crown themselves assured.” 

It is chiefly in the latest dialogues that the myth is seriously 
applied by Plato to the second of the two purposes which he 
acknowledges in the Republic, the reproduction of prehistoric 
events. There seems to be a transition, or growth, on the 
imaginative side of his philosophy corresponding to that 
already noticed on the dialectical side: from the abstract to 
the concrete, from vague fancies instinct with speculative ideas, 
like the procession in the Pheedrus, to supposed facts, like the 
war of Athens with Atlantis. He seeks to apply his meta- 
physical philosophy, which by this time acknowledged a prin- 
ciple of change and production, to the interpretation of the 
actual world, and he supplies the defects of experience and 

oie 


XXX1V INTRODUCTION 


observation by the help of imagination. And he claims for 
his tales the same degree of truth which he assigns to poetry 
(Lege. 3, 682 a): θεῖον yap οὖν δὴ Kal τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνθεαστικὸν 
dv γένος ὑπνῳδοῦν πολλῶν τῶν κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων ξύν τισι 
Χάρισι καὶ Μούσαις ἐφάπτεται ἑκάστοτε. This tendency may 
be illustrated by comparing the Republic, Timeeus, and Laws, 
of which the order of sequence is undoubted. The city 
founded in the Republic has no local habitation on earth, 
unless in some unknown and distant land, “ far enough out of 
our ken,” though perhaps such a state may have existed at 
some period in the infinite succession of past time. In the 
Timeeus and Critias this state is discovered, not far away 
in place, but remote in time, the Athens of a forgotten age 
contending successfully against a nation who were all that 
historical Athens desired to be. The state for which the 
Athenian Stranger legislates in the Laws, is a new Cretan 
settlement, imaginary of course, but imagined under the 
conditions of Plato’s own time. 

To return now to the Statesman and to apply some of the 
preceding remarks to the myth before us. The main incident, 
the change on which all other change depends, is mentioned 
nowhere else by Plato. The artistic completeness and unity 
of the Great Myth is very striking. Though it differs from 
other Platonic myths, it may be said to comprehend them 
from a greater imaginative height. He speaks in the Timzeus 
of periodic destructions of life upon the earth by earthquake, 
fire or flood, and in the Laws the same thing is assumed. But 
the reverse movement of the whole universe, the relinguish- 
ment of the helm of the great vessel, and the consequent 
gradual deterioration of all things, is a conception occurring 
nowhere else. Jt is adopted for the occasion, for the enforce- 
ment of a particular lesson. The old fable of the autochthones 
is one which Plato delights in using. It appears in the Prota- 
goras, Symposium, Republic, Sophist, Timeeus, Critias, and 
elsewhere. But it is nowhere else imagined that men coming 
fullgrown from the earth, go backwards through the stages 
of manhood, boyhood, infancy, and so pass away. ‘There is 
a picture of a theocracy, founded on the reign of Cronos, in 
the Critias and Laws as well as here. But here only the 
other animals are placed under Divine superintendence as well 














TO THE STATESMAN. XXXV 


as man, and a reason is given for the cessation of this form 
of government. Again, while here and in the Laws the 
Divine guidance is immediate, in the Critias, Hephaestus and 
Athena act by creating good men as legislators. These dis- 
erepancies are not greater than those previously mentioned, 
and therefore cause no suspicion of spuriousness, but they 
suffice to shew how little wisdom there would be in taking 
Plato’s meaning literally ; or in attributing the care which is 
taken to provide a channel through which the tradition may 
have been preserved, or the solemn air with which disbelief 
is deprecated, to anything but the anxiety of a Defoe or 
Swift to make the illusion as complete as possible. 

(3.) This leads us to the third question proposed above—Is 
there an element of humour in the fable or in the manner of 
telling it? If on other grounds we believe Plato to be the 
author of the Politicus, we can hardly doubt that there is. 
He must have felt the humorousness of making the respondent 
answer so promptly to the first statement of the astounding 
fact, “‘ All that you say seems extremely probable ;” and he 
must have shared the amusement of his reader in contem- 
plating the dwindling forms of the earth-born race: just as 
Empedocles (however firmly he believed it) must have smiled, 
if he had any humour, at his own invention of the κόρσαι 
ἀναύχενες, the βραχίονες εὔνιδες ὥμων, the βουγενῆ avdpo- 
πρωρα, and ἀνδροφυῆ βούκρανα. Having again alluded to this 
singular passage (Polit. 270 d, e). it may be well to take the 
opportunity of explaining the motives which seem to have 
suggested the addition of this peculiar feature. It has the 
twofold effect of giving greater consistency and completeness 
to the story, and of pointing the contrast between the two 
alternate cycles. A link was needed to combine the change 
in the heavenly motion with the production of mankind from 
earth, which Plato chose, for a purpose of his own, to associate 
with the spontaneous generation of all things in the reign of 
Saturn. A hint for this appeared in the description of 
Hesiod: “They had no old age: their death was like a 
sleep.” Now if, like the heroes of Cadmus, they rose full- 
grown from the ground, and saw not grey hairs, since their age 
could not stand still, it must go backwards. And this would 
be only in accordance with the change in the universal motion, 

ie 


ΧΧΧΥῚ INTRODUCTION 

But the 
more naturally the result follows from the premises, the more 
effectively it strikes the imagination with the greatness of the 
supposed revolution. Hence it is put in the foreground of 
the picture, μέγιστον δὲ πόδε κι τ. λ. And here there peeps out 
a deeper vein of ironical humour from beneath the matter-of- 
course gravity of the narration. “ If ever there is a beneficent 
paternal government on earth,’ Plato seems to say, “ it will 
be when iron swims and rivers run back to their fountains*.” 
But it need not be assumed that he has no sympathy with the 
ideal at which he smiles, as being εὐηθέστερον τοῦ δέοντος: 
Compare Thezt. 200 Ὁ, γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν, Rep. 7, 536 Ὁ, 
γελοῖον δ᾽ ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἔοικα παθεῖν, where Plato 
openly laughs at his own enthusiasm. 

(4.) But if the myth is poetry and not history, and is even 
tinged with humour, what are the serious thoughts which this 
strange medium is chosen to convey? There is, first, the main 
purpose which has been already described, to lift the imagi- 
nation to the conception of a theocracy, and so to remove by 
a sort of “ homceopathic” remedy the crudities of a shallow 
optimism. Very similar means are used in the Laws to shew 
that unlimited monarchy is unsuitable for the present state of 
man. But when this principal thought is once admitted, other 
reflections crowd in. They are such as the following. 

In our present state, evil is inextricably mixed with good: 
and is indeed so predominant, that God would seem to have 
left the world to itself. For in all that is created, evil is the 
necessary consequence of freedom. ‘The practical lesson for 
man is that he too is made the guardian of his own life, and 
in conjunction with necessity, the builder of his own destiny. 
And as the universe and the animal kingdom follow, so far as 
they can recall it, the pattern of the Divine cycle, so man 
should track out everywhere the vestiges of the Divine wisdom 
which still remain»: believing, that although the Creator has 


a change of κίνησις followed by a change of γένεσις. 


a The notion of “a life which is a σῶμα ἀφομοιούμενα." For the child is 





gradual disrobing of the spirit from its 
earthly dress,’ which one interpreter 
finds here, is well imagined, but is 
surely inconsistent with the words, 
“ εἰς τὴν τοῦ νεογενοῦς παιδὸς φύσιν 
ἄπήει, κατά τε τὴν Ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ 


not Plato’s type of the unclouded 
reason, the “best philosopher, seer 
blest”’ of Wordsworth. 

b ὅσον ev ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἔνεστι, 
τούτῳ πειθομένους. Lege. 4, 713 6. 








TO THE STATESMAN. ΧΧΧΥῚΙ 


entered on His Sabbath of contemplation‘, His eye is still upon 
the world and all things in it, and that, being good, He will 
not forsake the work of His hands, but will restore His creature 
to the fulness of life and immortality in due time. 

Meanwhile we may be consoled by the reflection, that a life 
under perfect conditions is not a happy life, unless it is spent 
in philosophy, and that the philosophic spirit in whatever con- 
ditions is the earnest of happiness here and hereafter. 

Subordinate to this main argument are several incidental 
thoughts :—1. God is not the author of evil. He cannot con- 
tradict His own nature. 2. By parity of reasoning, there 
cannot be opposite Divine Powers of evil and good. (Is there 
here an allusion to Zoroastrianism’) 3. God permits evil, as 
the inevitable concomitant of a bodily nature. 4. God is the 
only source of life and immortality. 5. In a theocracy there 
would be no laws but the Divine Will, no marrying or giving 
in marriage, for each new being would be the immediate work 
of the Divine Hand. 6. Philosophy is the interrogation of 
all natures. 7. Man in his primitive state is weak and de- 
fenceless: he receives from Heaven only such gifts and such 
instruction as are- indispensable in order that he may improve 
these by the exercise of his own invention under the stimulus 
of necessity. 8. The idea of transmigration and of the soul 
forgetting every thing at birth is assumed as a matter of 
course. It need hardly be said that all these thoughts are 
“plastic” here; i.e. they are not first thought out and then 
figuratively expressed, but emerge together with their symbols 
in the united play of reason and imagination. 

(5.) Several difficulties occur, even on the above shewing, in 
comparing the myth with other utterances of Plato. (a) Can 
this picture of the permission of evil be reconciled with the 
goodness of the Creator as represented in the Timeus? (ὁ) Is 
the relegation of the principle of communism to the golden 
age consistent with the fifth book of the Republic, or the dis- 
paragement of the education of perfect circumstances with the 
ideal of μουσικὴ in the second book ? The answer must be that 
these views are not perfectly consistent, but that a probable 
reason can be given for each discrepancy. 


> ε ~ \ 5 7) 
© εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη. 


XXXVI INTRODUCTION 


a. The Deity of the Timzeus effects all without moving from 
his place, and when his commands are given ‘ continues in the 
same stay’? The Deity of the Politicus is said in a figure 
to leave the helm of the universe and retire to his speculative 
height. The Deity of the Timzeus confers an absolute immor- 
tality on the stars; the Deity of the Politicus suffers the 
whole visible universe to totter on the verge of dissolution. 
The universe in the Timeeus, though not exempt from evils, 
as a whole is “very good.” The universe in the Politicus 
copies the pattern of the Divine movement so clumsily that at 
length the good is almost overwhelmed by the evil. That the 
same writer could be possessed at different times with views 
so divergent, is a fact which may be classed with other “ con- 
trasts of prophecy.” It may be partly explained by the pecu- 
liar bitterness with which the author, at the time of writing 
this dialozue, seems to have looked upon the world. But 
there are other reasons. The motive of the piece is m the 
one case cosmological, in the other ethical: that is, the Uni- 
verse is held up as a mirror to exhibit on a large scale the 
condition of man. In the Timeeus therefore the ills which 
flesh is heir to have a subordinate place, in the Politicus they 
are seen in the greatest prominence; and while in the one 
account human action is determined by physical constitution®, 
in the other, man, with the Universe, is left to the guidance 
of his own will. Further, the direct object of this fable is to 
contrast the actual with the ideal, whereas the purpose of the 
Timeeus is to exhibit the production of the Cosmos in accord- 
ance with the idea of good. 

The music of the Timeus is more highly strung’, for there 
the movements of the Same and Other are combined in the 
formation of the mundane soul, whereas here the opposite 
movements take place alternately. This difference is like that 
which Plato notices between Heraclitus and Empedocles; of 
whom the latter resolved the movements which the former 
united. (Symp.187 a, Soph. 242 e.) At least equally discordant 
with the Timzeus is the assumption in the Laws that there are 
two kinds of soul, one essentially evil, the other good: and 


4 Tim. 42e. Compare the fine saying © Tim. 87 sqq. 
of Xenophanes, ἄλλ᾽ ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο ! συντονωτέρα. 
νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. 














TO THE STATESMAN. XXXIX 


the distance between man and God is even more emphatically 
stated in many passages of this, Plato’s latest writing. 

Having noticed the difference, it is right to point out the 
resemblance between the two myths. In both, God brings 
the Universe in the beginning out of disorder into order, so far 
as this is possible for a being which has a bodily frame, though 
animated by a soul, both in the form of reason and desire. 
He is the father, the composer, the artificer, the source of 
immortality, the author of all excellence and beauty in His 
creature. And because He is good, He will not see the disso- 
lution of that which He has made. Yet constrained by neces- 
sity, he permits periodical destructions of living creatures from 
the face of the world. 

b. The children of Cronos, like the guardians in the Republic, 
have no possession of wives and children. Here is a point of 
coincidence, and yet of discrepancy: for that which in the 
Republic is planned as a scheme possible though difficult, is 
here removed into cloud-land. In the Laws also it is reiterated 
that the community of wives and children is the condition of 
the perfect state; but in that dialogue the laws of marriage 
are similar to those sketched out at the conclusion of this, 
providing for the intermixture as far as possible of courageous 
and gentle breeds. On this point I can only suggest a con- 
jecture. Is it possible that Plato had once hoped to see 
something like his ideal polity realized, and that his hopes 
(by the fall of Dion or otherwise) had been frustrated? This 
would account not only for the difference in this particular, 
but also for the contrast between the hopefulness of the 
Republic and the almost despair of human nature visible in 
the Statesman. But this is a speculation to which we shall 
have occasion to return. A reason which may be assigned 
with greater safety (while not inconsistent with the foregoing) 
is the more vivid realization in this dialogue of the actual con- 
ditions of human things: and this will also account for the 
remaining discrepancy, viz. that while in the Republic great 
virtue is assigned to the “surroundings” of childhood and 
youth as a means of education, it is left doubtful here whether 
the children of the golden age profited by their opportunities 
or not. It is true that the two passages do not directly con- 
flict with each other, but the one shews a higher estimate of 


xl INTRODUCTION 


the value of ideal circumstances than the other. (Note espe- 
cially the words ἵν᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ οἰκοῦντες οἱ νέοι ἀπὸ 
παντὸς ὠφελῶνται, ὁπόθεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἢ πρὸς 
ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς ἀκοήν τι προσβάλῃ, ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρη- 
στῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε 
καὶ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα---- 60. 3, 401 ο.) 

(6.) Plato often allows a theory which he has formally re- 
jected to influence the after-course of the discussion. Thus 
in commenting on the Theetetus it was observed that the 
theory of “impressions” although discarded is afterwards 
applied (209 ¢, πρὶν ἂν ἣ σιμότης αὕτη διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον 
παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη κατάθηται): and in the Republic the 
ideal of a simple life, which Socrates rejects in order to humour 
Glaucon, and to account for the existence of a warrior caste, 
insensibly returns. It might be thought that when the tale 
was ended, and the error of “ too great simplicity” corrected, 
we had done with the Divine Shepherd. But the idealizing 
impulse is too strong. We have turned our faces resolutely 
to look for the Statesman amongst mankind. But the light 
which accompanies the search is from a higher world. And 
when in comparison with the vision which our eyes have seen, 
the actual statesmen of the earth appear contemptible or 
monstrous, there still rises before us, in addition to the six 
forms of government which experience recognizes, a seventh 
form, which is no other than the Divme image». The scenery 
of the myth, the alternate cycles, the periodic destructions 
from physical causes, the earth-born race, are as though they 
had not been, but the ideal of true sovereignty still flits before 
the eye of the mindi. This ideal, however, is now connected 
with the postulate, that Statesmanship is a science, with which 
the dialogue began: and it is sought to realize this with some 
reference to the existing conditions of human society. 

First, the actual forms of government are shewn not to be 
based on any principle of reason; yet it is assumed that, so 
far as they are constitutional, they are unconsciously imitating, 


8 εὐηθέστερα τοῦ δέοντος. Polit.276e.  cipit se dormire, timet excitari, blan- 
h Compare Descartes, Meditatio 1, disque illusionibus lente connivet, sic 
sub fin. “Nec aliter quam captivus, sponte labor in veteres opiniones.” 
qui forte imaginaria libertate fruebatur i Compare the middle and end of 
in somniis, quum posted suspicari in- the Pheedrus. 








TO THE STATESMAN. xl 


though with decreasing accuracy (here the influence of the 
myth appears againk), that Divine pattern of which the 
sovereignty of knowledge would be a conscious and perfect 
imitation. Now a perfect imitation is no longer an imitation, 
but the thing itself: and thus we return to our ideal image. 
But this ideal is no longer merely abstract. The king as a 
commanding artist is seen purging the community of incurably 
bad elements, subduing the refractory, and ordering aright 
the diversities of excellence which exist amongst his noblest 
subjects. His function is defined relatively to that of the 
general, the judge, the orator; and the result of his rule is 
not described as perfect happiness, but such happiness as is 
possible for a community. The separation of Divine and 
human which the myth suggests, is for the first time carried 
out consistently in the Laws!, where the acknowledgement 
reluctantly muttered out in the Politicus is fully made, namely, 
that a paternal despotism has only once been realized, viz., 
in the golden age when man lived under a theocracy; but 
that human nature under existing conditions is too weak to 
bear the temptations incident to absolute power. 


IV. The Seven Forms of Government. 


The subject of political constitutions is treated differently by 
Plato in the Republic and the Laws. In the Republic the 
ordinary threefold distinction of oligarchy, democracy, and 
despotism is put into the mouth of Thrasymachus, who argues 
from this that the strongest govern for their own ends. Plato 
himself appends to his picture of the perfect state an ideal 
picture of four successive forms of gradual deterioration from 
this type, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny ; each 
lower than the former, and arising out of it through a natural 
development of evil. The ruling principle of the first is 
honour, of the second wealth, of the third individual freedom, 
of the last passion. This arrangement is no doubt partly 
determined by the analogy of the individual, which, in accord- 
ance with the plan of the dialogue, is throughout kept promi- 


K Polit. 273 Ὁ, τελευτῶν δὲ ἀμβλύ- pressed in the Laws is the religious 
τερον. counterpart of the severance of the 

1 4,713. The sense of the distance ideal from the actual which is so 
of man from God so frequently ex- strongly felt in the Politicus. 


Χ 
8 


ΧΙ INTRODUCTION 


nently in view. In the timocracy, which nearly corresponds 
to the Laconian ideal, the spirited element gains predominance, 
and is emancipated from the control of the reason. In the 
other three forms, Desire, first, of wealth, secondly, of unre- 
strained action, thirdly, of gratifying the ruling passion, has 
the upper hand. 

Three distinct arrangements are adopted in different places 
of the Laws, all different from that just mentioned :— 


1. The order of historical development. Legg. 3, 676-683. 
a. Single families, without written laws. Θεμιστεύει δὲ 
ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων οὐδ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν. 
Ὁ. Patriarchal Government. Βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιο- 
τάατην. 


a 


. The early life of cities, in which opposite customs are 
harmonized by legislation. 

ἃ, Maritime cities are built ; the beginning of commerce, 
war, sedition. 

. Return of the Heraclids. Laconian and Cretan con- 
stitutions. 


ic) 


2. Two prime forms, democracy and monarchy, representing 
the tendencies of the West and East. The best constitution 
must have an admixture of both, so as to secure order and 
liberty. The Laconian and Cretan settlements had this good 
fortune. Legg. 3, 691. 


3. For the above-named reason, these alone of existing 
governments deserve the name of πολιτεία. The four com- 
monly named, royalty, aristocracy, democracy, and tyranny, 
are not constitutions, but factious coteries (στασιωτεῖαι), which 
govern, not for the interest of the state, but, as Thrasymachus 
said, for the maintenance of the existing authority. The only 
true constitution is that in which, instead of one part of the 
city being in subjection to another part, all are together 
subject to the rule of reason in the form of law. 


In the Politicus we have first an enumeration of the forms 
of government according to common notions: then a criticism 
of these, followed by a fresh enumeration. 

Common opinion is said to acknowledge five forms instead 
of the three vaunted by Thrasymachus in Rep. bk. 1. Instead 











ΤῸ THE STATESMAN, xl 


of his “tyranny” we have the higher generalization of mon- 
archy (the word μοναρχία occurs only in the Politicus and the 
Laws). This is subdivided into royalty and tyranny, according 
as the subjects are willing or unwilling. Instead of his 
“aristocracy”? we have the more general ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων 
δυναστεία, (cf. Lege. 710 e, ὀλιγαρχία τὴν τοῦ τοιούτου, 1. 6. τοῦ 
νομοθετοῦ, γένεσιν χαλεπώτατα δύναιτ᾽ ἂν προσδέξασθαι: πλεῖστοι 
γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάσται γίγνονται) : which is divided, according to 
the principle of wealth on the one hand, and constitutionalism 
on the other, into oligarchy and aristocracy “of fair name” 
(τὴν εὐώνυμον). The fifth is democracy, which, whether ruling 
by gentleness or violence, and whether constitutional or not, 
has the same name. 

But when tried by the standard of scientific government, 
not one of these is found to be based on principle: they are 
seen not to be forms of government at all (od πολιτεῖαι), but 
only imitations more or less remote of the one true form; 
and the men who head them are not statesmen, but partisans, 
the phantom-guardians of phantom-states. 

Of the imitations however, some are better, some are worse. 
And here a principle is admitted which had no place in the 
perfect state. The better or worse of the bad states are 
distinguished by the observance or defiance of law. All else 
is accident, except the original wisdom of the Laws, and the 
degree in which they are obeyed. Hence the original classi- 
fication is thus modified. First, the scientific state is alone 
allowed the name, so that the five are swallowed up in one 
(τὰ πέντε ὀνόματα τῶν νῦν λεγομένων πολιτειῶν ἕν μόνον γέγονεν). 
But of the false states there are now 


I. Monarchy with law, 2. Monarchy without law, 
called βασιλεία. Tupavvls. 


3. The dynasty of a few 4. The dynasty of a few 


observing the laws = defying the laws= 
ἀριστοκρατία. ὀλιγαρχία. 
5. Democracy with law. 6. Democracy without law. 


The true state being kept apart, ὥσπερ θεὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, 
the following is the order of excellence, or rather of com- 


parative badness amongst the other six :— 
ἕω g 2, 


xliy INTRODUCTION 


1. βασιλεία (τ). 

. ἀριστοκρατία (3). 2 
. δημοκρατία μετὰ νόμων (5). 
. δημοκρατία ἄνευ νόμων (6). 
. ὀλιγαρχία (4). 

. τυραννίς (2). 


Am Af © ὦ 


Now this order differs at the first glance in two important 

respects from that given in the eighth and ninth books of the 
tepublic. These are, first, the addition of βασιλεία as one 

of the lower forms, and, secondly, the depression of ὀλιγαρχία 
below δημοκρατία. ᾿Αριστοκρατία may be allowed to correspond 
to the τιμοκρατία of the Republic. But it so happens that on 
both these points there is a corresponding difference between 
the Republic and the Laws. For in that dialogue, as we have 
seen, βασιλεία (a sort of eastern monarchy is probably intended) 
is one of the four forms commonly received to which the Athe- 
nian Stranger denies the name of constitution. And demo- 
cracy, as one of the two “mother polities” of which monarchy 
is the other, is throughout placed before oligarchy, against 
which Plato seems latterly to have conceived an increased 
enmity. (Hven in the Republic he calls it συχνῶν γέμουσα 
κακῶν πολιτεία.) 

When we add to these two ροϊηΐβ the coincidences of 
language above mentioned (μοναρχία, δυναστεία), a presump- 
tion is raised that the doctrine of the Politicus on this subject 
is nearer to the Laws than to the Republic. 

And on coming a little closer, we see that in the Republic 
these distinctions are thought to depend on essential differences 
of form (4, 445 ἃ, εἴδη ἔχοντες: 8, 544d, ἣ τις καὶ ἐν εἴδει 
διαφανεῖ τινι κεῖται), and to have a natural order of sequence 
of which a reason can be given. But in the Politicus they 
are seen to be distinguished by no principle, the only real 
difference between states being first enlightenment or igno- 
rance in the ruler, and next the maintenance or the neglect 
of law. And not far removed from this view, though more 
adapted to a legislative treatise, is the assertion in the Laws 
that the constitutions commonly so called are not constitutions 
at all, and that the only true state is that where reason rules 
in the form of law. Once more, when in the Politicus the 














TO THE STATESMAN. xlv 


statesmen of existing states are said to be not what they pro- 
fess, but partisans (οὐ πολιτικοὶ ἀλλὰ στασιαστικοί), this comes 
very near the remark in the Laws that the radical vice of all 
the received forms of government except the Spartan and 
Cretan is that one part rules the rest for its own advantage. 
They are not constitutions but coteries (οὐ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ 
στασιωτεῖαι). 


V. Theory of Legislation. 


The presumption thus raised is further confirmed when we 
examine the very curious piece of mingled satire and inquiry in 
which the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional 
government is illustrated. “If the true sovereign and law- 
giver, or a second like him, were on earth,” we are told, “ he 
would be above law; which is only an imperfect substitute 
for the universal and immediate superintendence of the Per- 
feet Will.” The physician is not bound to follow his old pre- 
scriptions under altered circumstances. But now he is “ gone 
into a far country,” or, as the myth would say, Providence 
has left us to ourselves: and men have despaired of finding 
their natural ruler, whom, when once found, they would follow 
like a swarm of bees. Therefore there is nothing left to them 
but to preserve their country’s laws, which, it may be pre- 
sumed, were made at first after the Divine pattern, so far as 
those who framed them knew. What a poor business this is 
at best is shewn by the case of an imaginary state, in which 
the arts of navigation and medicine or any others should be 
practised according to ancient laws enacted in popular or 
oligarchical assemblies at the advice of chance persons. But 
when the wretchedness of such a condition has been fully 
exhibited, a lower deep is opened, by imagining a state, 
whether democratical, oligarchical, or tyrannical, in which 
such laws, however imperfect, should be over-borne, not by 
higher knowledge, but by private gain or favour. Hence 
it is concluded that in the absence of a philosophic ruler, the 
best course possible (as a δεύτερος πλοῦς) is a strict observance 
of the laws. Now in the Republic, the sanguine founders of 
that city in the heavens deliberately dispense with a minute 


xlvi INTRODUCTION 


code of laws. These are thought unnecessary because in the 
greatest thing, viz. education, the whole community will be 
spontaneously obedient to the philosopher-king, and in little 
things those who have been thus educated will be a law to 
themselves; or in any case will be only what education 
makes them. The pages in which this thought is expressed 
(4, 423 e—427 a), had they not been found in an earlier 
writing, might have been taken for a criticism of the Leges. 
It is indeed granted, in words which should acquit Plato of 
Utopianism (5, 472 b—473 b), that practice can never attain 
to the perfection of theory, but the idea of lowering the sails 
of theory, in order to try a second course, when the first 
is hopeless, does not occur to Socrates, and certainly would be 
very far from acceptable to the impetuous Glaucon. 

The necessity of this humbler course is somewhat sadly 
admitted by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws. He prefaces 
the introduction of the very class of regulations (those which 
are over and above the rules for nurture and education), 
against which Socrates protests in the passage above quoted 
(9, 875 a), with the remark that laws are necessary, because 
no human being has at once the wisdom to see, and also the 
power and the will to do, at every moment what is for the 
universal interest, and to make his own interest always 
secondary. ‘‘Could one be found theoretically convinced that 
whatever was for the public good was on the whole good 
for him, yet, if placed in a position of absolute and irrespon- 
sible authority, he would be too weak to apply his theory 
consistently through a long life. His mortal nature shrinking 
from pain and desiring pleasure would darken his judgment 
of what is just and good. But if Providence were to send on 
earth such a nonpareil, whose nature was suflicient for this 
work, he would not need to place himself under the control 
of law. (Compare Polit. 295 Ὁ, σχολῇ ἂν ἑαυτῷ θεῖτ᾽ ἐμποδίσ- 
ματα γράφων τοὺς λεχθέντας τούτους νόμους.) It is because 
Nature has been so niggardly in this particular (νῦν 6¢—od 
γὰρ ἔστιν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ βραχύ) that we are 
forced to adopt a course which is only second-best, in enacting 
laws, whose application is general only, not universal.” 

The reflection which prompts these words, viz. that prac- 
tical rules must be accommodated to our experience of human 








ΤῸ THE STATESMAN. xlvii 


weakness, pervades the whole dialogue, and should always be 
present to the reader of the Laws. It does not follow that 
Plato has relinquished his ideal of life, because in recommend- 
ing a second-best polity to those who have refused his best, 
he admits some details which he had once rejected with 
seorn™. The feeling with which he does so could not be more 
clearly expressed than in the words with which he defends 
the admission within certain limits of election by lot: τὸ yap 
ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ξύγγνωμον τοῦ τελέου Kal ἀκριβοῦς παρὰ δίκην τὴν 
ὀρθήν ἐστι παρατεθραυμένον, ὅταν γίγνηται ". 

This procedure follows naturally as a practical result from 
the reasoning in the Politicus. If, seeing that the philosopher- 
king cannot always be with his people, the only wise course for 
states is to maintain their laws, which have an imperfect and 
remote reflection of principles of divine government: suppose 
an occasion to arise for founding a new state, or some rare 
opportunity for remodelling an old one®, what are the laws 
which, as the best possible substitute for the continual presence 
of an enlightened will, the true law-giver would actually 
impose? and what are their reasons and their sanctions? 
This is the problem which the Stranger in the Politicus im- 
plicitly suggests, but apparently despairs of answering: for 
the sketch with which the dialogue ends represents the highest 
statesmanship working without the instrumentality of law, 
though in a more practical way than in the Republic. 


m See esp. Lege. 5, 739 Ὁ: τὸ δ᾽ states builf on foundations which 





ἔστιν ὀρθότατα, εἰπεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀρίστην 
πολιτείαν καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην, δοῦ- 
ναι δὲ εἰπόντα αἵρεσιν ἑκάστῳ τῷ TiS 
συνοικήσεως" κυρίῳ. 

n Another admission to which he 
confesses himself almost driven (4, 
708 e) is, that ‘‘constitutions are not 
made, but grow” (as οὐδείς ποτε 
ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ 
καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτουσαι παν- 
τοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν). Α 
noticeable passage, in which human 
art occupies only the third place with 
Providence and chance. There is an 
approach to a similar feeling in Polit. 
302 a, where the longevity of many 


yeason pronounces ruinous, provokes 
the reflection “‘what strength and 
tenacity there is in the very nature of 
a state” (ὡς ἰσχυρόν τι πόλις ἐστὶ 
φύσει). 

° This in the Laws is not the rise 
of a philosopher-king, but the con- 
currence of a well-disposed and intelli- 
gent despot with a wise law-giver. It 
should be observed that a provision is 
made in Legg. 6, 769, 770 (cf. 12, 
951), though by no means an adequate 
provision, for the constitutional amend- 
ment of the law. This is a step in 
advance of the political doctrine of the 
Statesman. 


xlvill INTRODUCTION 


An instructive parallel to the teaching of the Politicus 
on this subject appears in the Critias, in which three phases 
of political life are described, which nearly exemplify the 
Eleatic Stranger’s theory. First the people of pre-historic 
Athens, whose autochthon founders, created by Hephestus 
and Athena, had been inspired by them to order their state? 
(as we learn from the opening of the Timzeus) in accordance 
with the provisions of the Republic. Next the kings of the 
race of Poseidon, each of whom had power of life and death 
in his own city, but was bound in his intercourse with the 
rest to obey the injunctions of their progenitor, as these had 
been recorded by the first of their race. These had remained 
unaltered as they were written in the beginning on a tablet 
of orichalcum? (a now fabulous metal which abounded in that 
realm). On this tablet was added a great curse pronounced 
on those who disobeyed: and a great oath, confirmed by the 
blood of a bull poured over the tablet, was renewed every five 
years: at which time also, in solemn nocturnal conclave, they 
condemned those who were convicted of ruling contrary to 
the laws. For many generations, so long as they observed 
these laws, and while the heroic blood remained in them, 


they lived happily enough, and perceiving that virtue is ὅπ. 


true road even to earthly welfare, they bore up against the 
load of their material prosperity. But a time came when 
the human element prevailed and they were overcome by 
ambition and the pride of power. Then they seemed out- 
wardly most fortunate, but presented a pitiable spectacle to 
those who had an eye for deformity of soul. The fragment 
of the Critias ends with the resolve of Zeus to chasten them, 
but had the tale proceeded, we should have had placed 


before us the third companion picture, that of the misery of 


a state which, in the absence of a philosophic ruler, has a 
code of laws but is disobedient to them. ‘These three con- 
ditions, set forth in the Critias, correspond nearly to the forms 
which the Politicus recognizes as alone essential: the Republic 
is ignorant of the distinction between the second and third: 
which, again, are brought into almost exclusive prominence 
in the Laws. 


P Critias, 109 d. 4 Compare the κύρβεις of Polit. 1. ο. 











TO THE STATESMAN. xlix 


VI. Relation of the Politicus to the Leges. 


τ. The description of the “Royal web” in the concluding 
passage of this dialogue is a mere outline; yet if the sketch 
is anywhere finished this is not done in the Republic, but in 
the Laws. These both contain the idea of binding together 
and harmonizing the gentle and fierce elements in human 
nature: and the presence of this thought in the Politicus is, 
in so far, only a reason for grouping it with these two great 
works rather than with the Protagoras or any of the more 
Socratic dialogues, in which all virtue is simply referred to 
knowledge. But a more definite hypothesis is justified by 
a closer inspection. For, while the “divine bond” of know- 
ledge is a description so vague as to be equally applicable to 
either of the two imaginary schemes of education, the provisions 
respecting marriage which constitute the “ human bonds” 
have no counterpart in the Republic, while they are re- 
peated almost without modification in the Laws. They 
imply in fact an accommodation to the existing condition of 
mankind which is more in accordance with the spirit of the 
latter than of the former dialogue. For what need was 
there of uniting by mutual pledges those who never spoke of 
“JT” or “mine,” and who felt every grief of every member 
of the state with an individual sorrow? What need of 
qualifying opposite tendencies by intermarriage, when each 
individual, according to the principle on which he was selected 
and trained, had by nature and education the harmony of 
gentleness and courage within his own breast? This ideal 
polity is still acknowledged by the speaker in the Laws to be 
the one and only pattern. His object is to propound a second 
polity, i.e. a polity only once removed from the former, the 
closest imitation of the perfect government that is likely to be 
maintained without the presence of a succession of Divine 
kings. And his procedure, with the reasons for it, has several 
striking points of resemblance to that suggested at the con- 
clusion of the present dialogue. 

He observes that the purpose of the early legislators was 
not war, but peace as the reward of virtue: that in the early 

2 Jo: 


| INTRODUCTION 


life of cities it became necessary to bring together the opposite 
qualities of gentleness and fierceness, which, during the patri- 
archal period, had become embodied in the traditions of the 
different clans. (3, 681 Ὁ, κοσμιωτέρων μὲν κοσμιώτερα, καὶ 
ἀνδρικῶν ἀνδρικώτερα. Cf. ib. 6g1 6, of the Spartan constitu- 
tion. Compare Polit. 310 6.) And in beginning his own 
legislation he compares the work he has to do (almost in the 
words of our dialogue) to a web composed of a warp and woof, 
of which the warp is stronger and so far better, having a 
certain firmness of disposition, but the woof is softer and has 
“a certain temperance which gives it smoothness.” (Cf. 
Polit. 282 e, 309 b. In the Laws the highest rule is given 
to the stronger element.) But there is an earlier process to 
be gone through before this is begun. The state must be 
purged of all bad elements. Plato thinks worse of human 
nature than when he hoped that all children under ten years old 
with a few exceptions would receive the print of the new laws. 
(Rep. 7, sub. fin.) The purgation of the flock from tainted 
members must precede all else. If the legislator have supreme 
power, human kindness need not prevent him from taking the 
nearest way. Otherwise he may have recourse to the more 
“euphemious” plan of emigration. (5, 735. Compare with 
this Polit. 293 d, e, 308 b—d.) 

Once more, in applying the ideal which annihilates indi- 
vidual choice to the matter of marriage, this exhortation is 
made to precede the law. ‘The man must choose a partner 
not superior to himself in wealth: and, moreover, he who is 
conscious of a quick and forward spirit (ἰταμώτερον ἅμα καὶ 
θᾶττον τοῦ δέοντος πρὸς πάσας τὰς πράξεις φερόμενον) should 
seek alliance with a family of gentle blood (κοσμίων πατέρων 
γίγνεσθαι κηδεστήν): and he of the opposite temper should 
take the opposite course. For each should choose that 
marriage, not which is most pleasant to him, but which is 
most expedient for the common weal. Now natural inclination 
carries men to mate with their likes: the result of which is 
to accumulate differences both of fortune and character, to 
the manifest harm of cities. The motive of our injunction is 
that the state may be like a well-attempered bowl, in which 
the wine sparkles with maddening heat, but is chastened. into 
smooth mellowness by the sober influence of a different power.” 














TO THE STATESMAN. li 


(6, 773.) It would be superfluous to draw out at length the 
many close resemblances between this passage and p. 310 of 
the Politicus. 

2. The affinities of thought and doctrine, as well as of 
language, which we have found existing between this dialogue 
and the Laws, make it probable that the times of their com- 
position were not very far apart: and Socher’s objection, that 
the Politicus agrees neither with the Republic nor with earlier 
dialogues, is met by the hypothesis that this dialogue is inter- 
mediate between the Republic and the Laws. To this, how- 
ever, it may be again objected, that while the Politicus and its 
immediate predecessor, the Sophistes, are amongst the most 
dialectical of the whole series, the very notion of dialectic in 
the Platonic sense is absent from the work on which the last 
years of Plato’s life were spent. Nor is this peculiarity of his 
latest dialogue wholly to be accounted for by the nature of 
the subject. Although the method of the Republic is less 
exact than that of the Sophist or Philebus, yet the ideal 
theory which it contains is professedly made the groundwork 
of the political fabric, and Dialectic, as the science of ideas, 
and as the roof and crown of the sciences, which are them- 
selves viewed in their ideal aspect, is described as the in- 
dispensable completion of the education of the ruler. Nor yet 
will this further explanation suffice, that the Laws profess to 
take a lower ground and starting-point, and to provide only 
for what is second-best: and that hence, in the education of 
the νομοφύλακες, the principles of the highest method are 
economically withheld. For no one can read the tenth book 
or the latter part of the seventh book of the Laws without 
perceiving that here at least the law-giver is enunciating what 
he conceives to be the highest truths. Yet, while much is 
said of geometry and astronomy, and of the supremacy of 
mind, no hint is given, either here or in the previous reference 
to the Republic and the communion of goods, of any ‘“ doctrine 
of ideas.” Notions of astronomy and psychology, more or 
less definite, asserted with religious warmth, appear to have 
taken the place of metaphysical inquiry. The exoteric form 
of the discussion, implying a wish to reconcile philosophy to 
Greek feeling, is inseparable from the phase of thought which 
prompted this desire. 

Nw) 


li INTRODUCTION 


But while nothing is said of the ideas as objects of know- 
ledge, there remain frequent traces of the method of division 
and combination (διαίρεσις, συναγωγή) as pursued in these dia- 
logues. The duty of dividing according to the natural kinds 
is enforeed in the following, amongst other passages: 2, 658 a, 
μὴ ταχὺ TO τοιοῦτον κρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ διαιροῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ μέρη 
σκοπώμεθα: 6, 751 ἃ, δύο εἴδη ταῦτα περὶ πολιτείας κόσμον 
γιγνόμενα τυγχάνει: 7, 814 6, δύο μὲν αὐτῆς εἴδη χρὴ νομίζειν 
elvat.... καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύο καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου δύο 
ἕτερα: 10, 895 d, ἔστι που δίχα διαιρούμενον ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ 
ἐν ἀριθμῷ: 12, 944 Ὁ, σχεδὸν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ὀνείδεσιν ἔχει τινὰ 
τομὴν ἣ τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπιφορά, where the phraseology 
of the Sophistes is repeated. Instances of the converse process, 
by which things apparently diverse are brought under one 
conception, are 7, 824 a, the description of the various kinds 
of θηρευτική, which has several points of resemblance to these 
dialogues; 8, 841 ὁ, ἕν γένος ὄν, περιλαβὸν τὰ τρία γένη: 
10, 894 b, ὡς ἐν εἴδεσι λαβεῖν : 12, 944 6, καιροὶ λύσεως νέως ἢ 
ζῴου τινος, ods ἐντόνους TE καὶ ὑποζώματα καὶ νεύρων ἐπιτόνους, 
μίαν οὖσαν φύσιν διεσπαρμένην, πολλαχοῦ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι προσ- 
ayopevovow. Much also of the terminology which arose out of 
the definitions of these dialogues is assumed in various places 
of the Laws, as has been sufficiently shewn in the General 
Introduction. 

The anomaly which we are considering will appear less 
wonderful, if we review the course which dialectical inquiry 
has taken in our two dialogues. The chief result of the 
Sophistes was the transition from a somewhat fanciful onto- 
logy to a true psychology, from a transcendental to a logical 
conception of Being; first as the sum of positive determina- 
tions, then as the sum or ideal of true determinations, 
whether affirmative or negative. We have seen that this 
conception finds legitimate development in the Politicus in 
more complex views of knowledge and of the objects of know- 
ledge, which must be seen in various aspects and relations 
before they are fully known. The true affinities and discre- 
pancies of things are perceived by the higher faculty of the 
mind, not after a cursory glance at phenomena, but through 
a laborious process only made possible after long training. 
Science is the comprehension of these deeper resemblances 








TO THE STATESMAN. ΠῚ] 


and differences: and scientific inquiry is the interrogation of 
all nature in order to discover what each kind can contribute 
to the store of universal knowledge. The only passages which 
remind us of the ontological or transcendental theory of the 
ideas are the μετρίου φύσις in p.284, and the contrast between 
sensible and logical analogies in p. 286 ἃ. Now the former of 
these is the exact expression of the philosophy which seeks to 
combine the absolute with the relative, as Plato seeks to com- 
bine these in the Philebus; and the latter belongs to the 
antithesis between the things of mind and of sense, which is 
nowhere more strongly asserted than in the tenth book of the 
Laws. Even the ideal standard of τὸ μέτριον is hardly con- 
ceived as existing apart from production (284 d, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ 
μετρίου γένεσιν). Indeed, throughout the dialogue (see also 
Soph. 245 d) the Eleatic opposition between Being and Be- 
coming, and also between Knowledge and Opinion, appears to 
be softened, and even here and there obliterated. 

There is a sense, therefore, in which it may be truly said 
that, in these dialogues, metaphysical inquiry has been en- 
gaged in “getting rid of metaphysics,” 1. 6. of transcendental 
ontology. The idea of scientific method takes the place of 
the mere enthusiastic exaltation of the ideas. That method is 
still held to be the privilege of a mind fitted by nature and 
training to discern ideas; to discern them, however, not merely 
in themselves, but amidst the manifold complexities of the real 
world. 

Hence we need not wonder that in a dialogue later than the 
Politicus, the notion of an intellectual region, wholly separated 
from that of appearance and opinion, which stands out so 
prominently in the Republic, does not reappear. 

It is true that the chief interest in the Politicus is dialectical, 
in the Laws ethical and religious. But this, at all events, may 
be traced partly to the difference between a speculative and a 
practical treatise. As Plato himself says of his ideal state, 
φύσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἧττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι. There is 
an analogous contrast between the Phedrus and the Republic. 
In the infancy of the sciences, the development of a perfect 
method, and its application to a particular subject-matter, were 
achievements equally impossible. Practice and theory could 
not go hand in hand. As the method was necessarily immature 


liv INTRODUCTION 


(though rich in anticipative insight), so it was destined -to 
remain unrealized. Plato often betrays his consciousness of 
this. He fails to seize “waking” the form which he had 
pursued “in a dream.” At the same time it is not contended 
that the Politicus may not have been produced many years 
before the Leges were begun. In that last dialogue the 
method of inquiry which, theoretically at least, still rules in 
the Statesman and Sophist, has given place to what is virtually 
a method of exposition; and the author’s mind seems in both 
cases to be wholly possessed by the impulse which is dominant 
for the time. It is hardly credible that two such different 
modes of handling the same subject should have reigned 
simultaneously, and therefore it is best to suppose an interval. 
But this supposition does not weaken the force of the cumu- 
lative arguments by which it has been now sought to deter- 
mine approximately the relative position of this dialogue 
amongst the writings of Plato. And in the occasional 
abruptness and absence of connexion in the Politicus there are 
not wanting symptoms of the approaching loss of dialectical 
as well as of artistic freshness and power. 


VII. References to the Politicus in Aristotle. 


That Aristotle was acquainted with this dialogue appears 
from many coincidences of thought and expression. Several 
instances, chiefly from the Politics, will occur in the notes. 
(See especially, besides the passage mentioned below, Ar. Pol. 
I, 1, ὅσοι pév.... μικρὰν πόλιν (cf. Polit. 259 a—c): ibid., 
ἀγελαίου ζώου : ibid. 2 sub fin., 7 δὲ κτητικὴ . -. «- θηρευτική: 
ΠῚ ΠΣ Οἷον ean) τ ὁμοίως ἔχειν (cf. Polit. 298): ibid. 7, 
TO μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτογνώμονας, ἐπισφαλές: 
III, 2, "Eore yap ἀρχὴ Seomoriy ..... διακονικὰς πράξεις (cf. 
Polit. 259 c—260 6, 304): ibid. 6, ἰατρὸς δ᾽... . τοῖς εἰδόσιν 
(cf. Polit. 259 a): ibid. 8, ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις (οἴ. 
Polit. 303 b): ibid. 10, δοκεῖ δὴ τοῖς νομίζουσι - - - « - - ἄρχειν 
ἠλίθιον : IV, 12, ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας, ὅσαις ἀποδέδοται βουλεύ- 
σασθαι τε περί τινων καὶ κρῖναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο, 
τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν (cf. Polit. 260a): VII, 13, εἰ 





TO THE STATESMAN. ly 


μὲν tolvuy..... ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι (ef. Polit. 301 4). It is 
true that, considering the common atmosphere of philosophical 
debate which surrounded both writers, these resemblances do 
not amount to proof; but they render it probable that Ari- 
stotle had read the dialogue and was familiar with some of its 
contents. Hence it is the more strange that in the one place 
in which he appears to refer directly to the Politicus, he not 
only omits the author’s name (this would be no new pheno- 
menon), but gives him the vague designation τις τῶν πρότερον, 
“one of those who have preceded me.” The passage occurs 
in the second chapter of Book IV, where the question is 
raised, which of the declensions (παρεκβάσεις) from the true 
forms of government is the least bad? and is as follows: 
μετριωτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο Kal 
τῶν πρότερον οὕτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ βλέψας ἡμῖν" ἐκεῖνος μὲν 
γὰρ ἔκρινε, πασῶν μὲν οὐσῶν ἐπιεικῶν, οἷον ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστῆς 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, φαύλων δὲ ἀρίστην. The 
superficial relevancy of this to Polit. 303 a, Ὁ is sufficiently 
obvious. We may notice, however, that, as usual with him in 
quoting Plato, Aristotle has forgotten the connexion. Plato 
condemns as strongly as Aristotle all the forms of government 
here mentioned. With him also it is a question not of good 
and bad, but of degrees of badness: τίς ---τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολι- 
TELOY τούτων ἥκιστα χαλεπὴ συζῆν, πασῶν χαλεπῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ 
τίς βαρυτάτη ;—and it may be that Aristotle’s three “right 
forms” would have fared no better at his hands. The word 
ἐπιεικῶν, which Aristotle attributes to him, is not used at all ; 
the nearest approach to such an expression is κοσμίων, which 
is explained by νομίμων, and is probably used, as μετριωτάτην 
is used by Aristotle, in order to avoid a word implying posi- 
tive excellence. For when monarchy is said to be ἀρίστη τῶν 
ἕξ, and democracy παρανόμων βελτίστη, this is only in the 
same relative sense in which Aristotle uses the words φαύλων 
ἀρίστην. Indeed, were Aristotle’s representation true, the 
two philosophers would be more nearly at accord: for demo- 
eracy would then be described by Plato as the least bad of 
three bad forms, each of which is (in this case) the declen- 
sion from a species of right government. This kind of inac- 
curacy is too common to afford any ground for the con- 
jecture that Aristotle is not referring to the Politicus, but 


Ιν] INTRODUCTION 


to some other writing or utterance of a previous thinker4, 
but it lessens the wonder which is naturally excited by the 
earcless vagueness of the expression ‘some one in former 
time.” 

When we consider how much more Aristotle seems to have 
relied on the living tradition of Plato’s school than on his 
writings for the opinions of Plato; how lax he is in quotation 
generally, attributing to Circe the words of Ulysses to his 
pilot, and the like; how impersonal he is; how seldom he 
names Plato, though often alluding to him; when we re- 
member that in all his writings there is no distinct reference 
to such a noticeable work as the Parmenides, we need hardly 
be surprised if, at the moment of writing these lines, he was 
not clearly aware which of all the previous speculators on the 
subject of politics had pronounced this opinion. It would be 
easy to indulge in further conjecture, but it is needless. The 
anomaly remains. The fact is singular, though not unaccount- 
able. But, if what has been said in these pages has any force, 
this would indeed be slender evidence on which to question the 
genuineness of the Statesman. This dialogue is fastened by 
too many threads of contrast, as well as of resemblance, to the 
place which has been now assigned it in the Platonic canon, 
to be dropped from thence by the mere negligence of Plato’s 
younger contemporary’. 


VIII. The “ Philosopher” dialogue. 


The “Statesman” contains a sketch of the real as well of 
the counterfeit ruler. The “ Sophist”? was mainly occupied in 
proving the existence of a counterfeit of the philosopher. The 
last and (according to the “ geometrical” proportion indicated 
in Polit. sub. init.) by far the greatest part of the Stranger’s 


q This view is, however, worth con- 
sidering, and is somewhat favoured by 
the expression tis τῶν προτέρων. In 
this case, Plato might be included in 
ἡμῖν, and Aristotle might, as in so 
many other instances, be merely repeat- 
ing a doctrine of his master’s, 


τ T cannot think that Ueberweg has 
made out the theory which he advances 
in connexion with this question, viz., 
that when in a quotation of Plato 
Aristotle uses the past tense he always 
alludes to a spoken utterance. 


= ee “Νὰ υ μΩ ὐτὰπν 











TO THE STATESMAN. Lyi 


task remains: viz. the definition of the true philosopher. 
That Plato intended to complete this series with a dialogue 
in which the Eleatic Stranger and Thestetus should be the 
interlocutors and Soerates the listener appears from the 
opening sentences of the “Statesman” compared with Soph. 
2147 a, 231 a(?), 253 6, 254 b: although in the two last-named 
passages it is possible after the fact to detect a tone of hesita- 
tion (ἐὰν ξητῶμεν, dv ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ἢ). No such dialogue, 
however, and no mention of such a dialogue is extant, and it 
is next to impossible that a picture of the ideal philosopher, 
drawn by Plato’s hand, should never have received a passing 
notice in all literature. But it has been supposed that 
although not literally fulfilled, the intention here expressed 
may have been carried out by Plato in a different way. It 
was the opinion of Schleiermacher that in the Symposium and 
Phedo the promised portrait of the philosopher is given to 
us in the person of Socrates. It is unnecessary to refute 
at length a supposition so gratuitous. The reader of the 
preceding pages will perhaps be satisfied with the remark, 
that even were the withdrawal of the person of Socrates of no 
significance, and could the artistic freshness of Plato’s literary 
prime be recalled at will, we cannot suppose that after writing 
the Sophistes, he would have returned to the phase of the 
ideal theory which is implied in Symp. 211 ¢, ἃ, or in Pheedo 
75,100. More plausible but not less baseless is the opinion 
of Stallbaum, who finds the missing dialogue in the Parme- 
nides. If it were necessary to make the hypothesis at all, 
there is no dialogue which could more fitly be drawn into 
this group. It contains a criticism and modification of Eleatic 
doctrine which presents many analogies to the Sophistes, 
and if, as the Politicus teaches, human things are only worth 
studying for the sake of dialectical improvement, no better 
training than that given in the Parmenides could be desired. 
Yet this is regarded by the speaker as a preparatory exercise, 
and the result is negative merely. The Parmenides is de- 
structive in the same sense in which the Theetetus is destruc- 
tive. Now it is very improbable that after giving a definition 
of the Sophist and the Statesman with which the speakers 
appear satisfied, Plato would have added to these a sceptical 


solution of the problem, “ What is the philosopher?” Some 
aa 


ἵν] INTRODUCTION 


glimpses of a positive answer to this question are in fact 
afforded us in Soph. 230, 253-4. I am inclined to think, 
as has been hinted in the Introduction to the Sophist, that 
the most natural place for the Parmenides is between the 
Thestetus and the Sophistes: and, at all events, that the 
difficulties respecting the coexistence of the ideas with phe- 
nomena, of the One with the Many, probably preceded the 
solutions of these and cognate difficulties in the Philebus and 
Sophist. 

It may therefore be concluded that Plato’s ““ Philosopher,” 
like Bacon’s sixth book of his Instauratio, was never written. 
It is idle to conjecture what, if written, it would have con- 
tained. But we may be sure that a truer conception of its 
intended scope may be gathered from the few brief hints given 
in these dialogues than from the Symposium, Phedo, or 
Parmenides. 

The chief problem which these hints suggest to us is the 
nature of Being, conceived as the true combination and 
separation of ideas (Soph. 254). Plato perhaps intended to 
draw out at length the notion of dialectic, as he has briefly 
sketched this in Soph. 253 d, 259 0, 4, Polit. 285 a-c. He 
clearly implies that it would be necessary in order to this 
end to establish an idea of order or fitness (τὸ μέτριον). And 
other metaphysical conceptions would doubtless have emerged 
in the attempt to determine that, which Plato felt to have 
so often escaped him, a perfect method (πρὸς τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ 
τἀκριβὲς emiderEiv—Polit. 254 ὁ). That this endeavour would 
have occupied the main portion of the dialogue there can 
be little doubt, and perhaps as little that the arid wastes 
of abstract discussion would have been relieved by passages 
of luxuriant beauty, in which the glory of the Philosopher 
(now finally distinguished from the Sophist and Statesman, in 
whose likeness he had often appeared) would have been fully 
declared, and the life which surveys from on high the lives 
of men (Soph. 216), conversing with every creature to learn 
what each has to tell of wisdom (Polit. 272 ὁ), would have 
been stripped of all ironical disguise and revealed in true 
proportions to the discerning spirit. 

Eyen these scanty indications of the intended scope of the 
Philosopher perhaps betray one cause why such a dialogue was 





TO THE STATESMAN. lix 


never written. ΤῸ elaborate a perfect method of knowledge 
in the infancy of science was impossible, and it may be that 
Plato felt it to be impossible’. Nor does it seem as if in any 
age the mind of Plato could have found completeness or repose. 
The ideal of science 
. “is an arch, wherethro’ 
Gleams the untravelled world, whose margin fades 
For ever.” 


And if our hypothesis of the comparatively late origin of 
these dialogues is correct, the non-appearance of the Philo- 
sopher coincides with and renders more significant the aban- 
donment of metaphysical inquiry in the Laws. 


s “Res et suprd vires et ultr’y spes nostras collocata.”—Bacon. 














ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 


TA ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ͂ TIPOXOITA 


ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΌΔΩΡΟΣ, ΞΈΝΟΣ, 


ΣΩΚΡΑΤῊΣ O 


Ἢ πολλὴν χάριν ὀφείλω σοι τῆς Θεαιτήτου γνωρί- ς 


ΝΕΩΤΈΡΟΣ. 


5, / ῳ Α fad ~ 7 
σεως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἅμα καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου. 


ΘΕΟ. Τάχα δέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀφειλήσεις ταύ- 


/ » \ ’ Ν 5 ’ὔ 
της τριπλασίαν, ἐπειδὰν τὸν τε πολιτικὸν ἀπεργά- 


XN / 
σωνταί σοι καὶ TOV φιλοσοφον. 


ΣΏ. Εἴεν: οὕτω τοῦτο, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, φήσομεν 


3 i? 9 an Χ \ 
AKNKOOTES εἰναι TOU περὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ γεωμε- 


\ r 
TPLKa KPATLOTOV 5 


5. Ἦ-- - ξένου] “I owe you a 
thousand thanks, Theodorus, 
both for the acquaintance I 
have made with Theetetus and 
with the Stranger,” τῆς Θεαιτή- 
του ἅμα καὶ τῆς τοῦ ξένου. Cf. 
Theet. 145 6, d, Soph. 216. 
γνωρίζω does not occur in Plato 
in the causative sense. Hence 
the noun probably does not 
mean “ your making me ac- 
quainted.” 

4. Taxa δέ ye] “ And pre- 
sently you will owe me three 
thousand.” The argument of 
the Theetetus is not taken 


into the calculation. This helps 
to confirm the hypothesis that 
there was a considerable inter- 
yal between the composition of 
the Thezetetus and that of the 
Sophist. But perhaps it is 
only natural that the speakers 
should not refer immediately 
to the conversation of the pre- 
vious day. Cf. infr. 258 a. 

11. ἀκηκοότες εἶναι] The more 
frequent use of the auxiliary 
verb has been already noticed 
as a peculiarity of Plato’s later 
style. 


* RB 


Only a 
third part 
of our task 
is done: 
nay, not a 
third, for 


10 the States- 


man rises 
above the 
Sophist in 
value and 


the Philo- 
sopher 
above the 
Statesman 
in more 
than a geo- 
metrical 
ratio. 


ο 


2 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


SEO. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες ; 
ρου Ν AAG we pp Uae , 
SQ. Τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἕκαστον Ἐθέντος τῆς ἴσης ἀξίας, 


A a vad 7 > ) ΄ > cal Ὁ \ Ἁ 
οἱ τῇ τιμῇ πλέον ἰἀλληλων) ἀφεστᾶσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν 


ἀναλογίαν τὴν τῆς ὑμετέρας τέχνης. 
5 Ν ε / 5 / 
GEO. Ed ye νὴ τὸν ἡμέτερον θεὸν, ὦ Σώκρατες, 


Roy κ᾿ 7 ‘ ΄ \ > 
τὸν Ἄμμωνα, καὶ δικαίως, καὶ πάνυ μεν οὖν μνημονι-- 


aA 5 / ’ \ Ν \ \ ΄ / 
KOS ἐπέπληξάς μοι τὸ περὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς apap- 


τημα. 


Ν \ \ » Ν / > - {2 ᾿ ‘ 
καὶ σὲ μὲν ἀντὶ τούτων εἰσαῦθις μέτειμι TU 


δ᾽ ἡμῖν, ὦ ξένε, μηδαμῶς ἀποκάμῃς χαριζόμενος, ἀλλ᾽ 


Can 5 Ν ἣν 2, if 3, bs 
ἑξῆς, €LTE TOV πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα 77 POTEPOV €lTE TOV 


φιλόσοφον mpoatpel, προελόμενος dieEedOe. 
a 5 7 
EE. Ταῦτ᾽, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ποιητέον: ἐπείπερ omak 


7 / Ν » 2 caeN 
γε ἐγκεχειρήκαμεν, οὐκ ἀποστατέον πρὶν ἂν αὐτῶν 


2. Τῶν ἀνδρῶν] Cf. Soph. 
221 d: ἠγνοήκαμεν τἀνδρὸς τὸν 
ἄνδρα ὄντα ξυγγενῆ. The ideal 
Sophist, Statesman, Philoso- 
pher, are treated with fami- 
larity, as persons with whom 
a transaction is being held. 

2. *6évros*} All the MSS. 
have θέντες, but the correction 
of Heindorf is unquestionably 
right. The corruption is pro- 
bably due to ἀκηκοότες preced- 
ing. 

Note the variety of expres- 
sion in ἀξίας ----τιμῇ. 

3. πλέον --- ἀφεστᾶσιν] Cf. 
Legg. 4, 722 Ὁ: οὐ διπλῷ θά- 
τερα τῶν ἑτέρων διάφορα μόνον 
εἰς ἀρετὴν τῆς χρείας. ἀλλήλων 
om. Bodl. AT. 

4. τὴν τῆς ὑμετέρας τέχνης] 
Se. τὴν γεωμετρικήν. 

5. τὸν ἡμέτερον θεὸν ---τὸν Ax. | 
The reader is thus reminded 
that Theodorus is from Cy- 
rene. 

6. καὶ πάνυ μὲν οὖν μνημονι- 
kos] “ And most certainly 


with praiseworthy recollection.” 
Theodorus commends Socrates 
as his pupil for remembering 
the principle of geometrical 
proportion. 

8. καὶ σὲ μὲν] “ Well, I must 
seek some other opportunity 
for my revenge.” 

9. χαριζόμενος] The word re- 
cals the politeness of the first 
interview, Soph. 217 ¢: τήν ye 
πρώτην αἰτησάντων χάριν. Ib. ἃ: 
τὸ δ᾽ αὖ σοὶ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ 
τοῖσδε. 

ἀλλ᾽ ἑξῆς, εἴτε] For the in- 
terruption of the sentence with 
etre, οἵ, Theeet. 156 6 : λευκὸν, 
εἴτε ξύλον, εἴτε λίθος κ.τ.λ. 

12. ποιητέον---ἀποστατέον] For 
the apposition, οἵ. Protag. 348 
ὃ: τοὺς τοιούτους μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι 
μιμεῖσθαι ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμέ- 
νους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι᾿ ἡμῶν 
αὐτῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι. The 
inferior MSS. insert καὶ before 
οὐκ, probably from conjecture. 

13. αὐτῶν] “ The matters in 
hand.” Compare the frequent 














57: 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 9 


πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἔλθωμεν. 
τοῦδε τί χρὴ δρᾶν με; 
ΘΕΟ. Τοῦ πέρι ; 


ἀλλὰ γὰρ περὶ Θεαιτήτου 


— , δὶ 7 ’ A 
SE. Διαναπαύσωμεν αὐτὸν μεταλαβόντες αὐτοῦ 


Ν Χ / / Ἃ la 
Tov συγγυμναστὴν Tovde Σωκράτη ; ἢ πῶς συμβου- 5 


/ 
Aevels 5 


GEO. Καθάπερ εἶπες, μεταλάμβανε: 


/ \ 
veo yap 


7 en } / 7 > , 
OVTE poov οἷσ ετὸν TAVTA TOVOY AVATTAVOMEV®. 


LQ. Kat μὴν κινδυνεύετον, ὦ ξένε, ἄμφω ποθὲν 


> Ν , a4 , 
EOL ξυγγένειαν εἐχέιν τινα. 


It is time 
that The- 
zetetus 
should be 
relieved : 
and his 
compa- 
nion, the 
younger 
Socrates, 
who has 
hitherto 


TOV μέν YE οὖν ὑμεῖς 10 been a 


\ \ a 7 , 
κατὰ THY τοῦ προσώπου φύσιν ὅμοιον ἐμοὶ φαίνεσθαί 


an « Lal e ἴω «ες , 3 e 
φατε, τοῦ δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἡ κλῆσις ὁμώνυμος οὖσα καὶ ἡ 


a 7ὔ / /, 
. πρόσρησις παρέχεταί τινα οἰκειότητα. 


δεῖ δὴ τούς 


γε ξυγγενεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ προθύμως διὰ λόγων ἀναγνω- 


use of αὐτὰ without a distinct 
antecedent in Thucydides. 

4. Διαναπαύσωμεν αὐτὸν] “Shall 
we relieve him for awhile, by 
taking his comrade Socrates 
here instead?” Either Thex- 
tetus was to be the respondent 
in the “ Philosophus,” which 
is probable enough, or δια here 
receives something of the mean- 
ing which it has in διαδέχομαι, 
“in turn.” 

5. συγγυμναστὴν] Theeet. 144 
6: ἄν δ᾽ ἄρα τι τοιοῦτον γένηται 
(sc. τῷ μήκει πονῶν ἄχθωμαι) καὶ 
τόνδε παραληψόμεθα Σωκράτη, τὸν 
Σωκράτους μὲν ὁμώνυμον, ἐμὸν δὲ 
ἡλικιωτὴν καὶ συγγυμναστήν, ᾧ 
συνδιαπονεῖν μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ τὰ πολλὰ 
οὐκ ἀήθες. The word here, like 
πάντα πόνον below, implies men- 
tal as well as bodily labour. 
Cf. Rep. 6, 498 | Ὁ : προϊούσης 
δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐν ἡ ἡ ψυχὴ τελει- 
οὔσθαι ἃ ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκεί- 
νῆς γυμνάσια. 


* BR 


7. νέω yap ὄντε] We per- 
ceive in Theodorus something 
of the consciousness of the 
contrast between youth and 
age, which appears also in the 
Eleate and in the Athenian 
Stranger in the Laws. Cf. 
Theeet. 146 b, 162 b. 

9. ποθὲν] “ From some cause 
or other,” “in some respect.” 

Το. τὸν μέν ye — οἰκειότητα] 
There is a sort of humour in 
the conscious technicality of 
the language, (φύσιν----φαίνεσθαι 
---κλῆσις---ὁμώνυμος ---πρόσρησις 
—oixeidrnra,)which also reminds 
us that we are engaged in dia- 
lectic. 

11. ὅμοιον ἐμοὶ] ΤΊ Θεοῦ. 143 6. 

12. ἡμῖν) The plural gives 
a more courteous turn to the 
expression. The dative, al- 
though governed by ὁμώνυμο----- 
οἰκειότητα, has something of an 
ethical force. Cf. Soph. 216 e. 

4. διὰ λόγων] “ By means of 


9 
~ 


silent lis- 
tener, is 
now encou- 
raged by 
his elder 
namesake 
to converse 
with the 
Stranger. 


The latter 
at once re- 
sumes the 
leadership 
of the dis- 
cussion,and 
prescribes 
the States- 
man rather 
than the 
Philoso- 
pher for 
the next 
subject of 
definition,‘ 


The States- 
man, also, 
like the 
Sophist, is 
aman of 
art, and the 
arts and 
sciences 
must be 
again di- 
vided. 


+ MAATOQNOZ 


picew. 


\ / Ν cal ae. / , 
διὰ λόγων καὶ νῦν ἀκήκοα ἀποκριναμένου, Σωκράτους 


δὲ οὐδέτερα" δεῖ δὲ σκέψασθαι καὶ τοῦτον. 


> Ν \ 
ἐμοὶ [LEV 


5, 3 —) \ \ a ’ / 
οὖν εἰσαῦθις, σοὶ δὲ νῦν ἀποκρινέσθω. 


SE. Ταῦτ᾽ ἐσται. 
7 
Σωκράτους ; 


ΝΕΟΣ ΣΏΩ. Nai. 


Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀκούεις δὴ 


EE. Συγχωρεῖς οὖν οἷς λέγει ; 
NE. ΣΏ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


ΞΕ, Οὐ τὰ σὰ κωλύειν φαίνεται, δεῖ δὲ ἴσως ἔτι 


Ὁ STEN , 
ἥττον Tapa διακωλύειν. 


ἀλλὰ δὴ μετὰ τὸν σοφι- 


\ 3 “ ε 3 Ν 7 Χ Xr Ν 
στὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, Tov πολιτικὸν 


ἄνδρα διαζητεῖν νῷν. 


/ / y lal 
Kai μοι λέγε, πότερον τῶν 


/ SC XV las , x lad 
ETLOTHMOVOY TW ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτον θετέον, ἢ πῶς ; 


NE. ΣΏ. Οὕτως. 


N a 
EE. Tas ἐπιστήμας apa διαληπτέον, ὥσπερ ἡνίκα 


\ a > a 
TOV 7 POTEPOV EDKOTTOVHEV : 


NE. ΣΩ. Τάχ ἄν. 


\ Ν \ [4 3 / 
HE. Ov μὲν δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ye, ὦ Σώκρατες, 


: / / an 
20 φαίνεται μοι τμῆμα. 


argument,” i.e. as to their men- 
tal qualities. Cf. Thezet. 145. 
Socrates here shews the same 
urbanity as in the opening of 
the Theztetus and Sophist. 
Compare with the structure of 
the sentence and the introduc- 
tion of the minor premiss with 
δή (δεῖ 67) Theet. 143 d: ool 
δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι πλησιάζουσι---- 
εἰ δὴ οὖν----δδέως ἂν πυθοίμην. 
And for ye, resuming what has 
been already said, cf. infr. 260 ¢, 
δεσπόζοντά γε. 

12. τὸν πολιτικὸν] Bodl. A, pr. 
II, πολιτικὸν τὸν. This illustrates 
a frequent source of corrup- 


tion in MSS., the inversion of 
the order of words. 

14. The requirement that the 
king shall be ἐπιστήμων τινὸς, 
the possessor of ἃ perfect 
science, is upheld throughout 
the dialogue, and hence the 
definition of the king excludes 
all the actual rulers of existing 
communities. The question in 
the text is asked not without 
ironical allusion to this “ crowd 
of satyrs and centaurs” (infr. 
303 6), whose art, like that of 
the Sophist, proves to be a 
mere sham. 


καὶ τοῦτον͵] “As well as 


Θ ; ἐν οὖν αὐτός Te συνέμιξα χθὲς : 
εαἰτήτῳ μὲν οὖν αὐτός μιξα χθὲς p. 25 








MOAITIKO®. 5 


NE. 
cA DE 
NE. 


cH OF 


SO. Tan: 
Kar’ ἄλλο. 
ΣΏΩ. "Eoue ye. 


, lol \ > ‘ > a Ν Ν » / 
pyoe; δεῖ yap αὐτὴν ἀνευρεῖν, καὶ χωρὶς ἀφελοντας 5 


\ 53 \ ’ \ ip. 3 
Thv οὖν πολιτικὴν ἀτραπὸν πῇ τις avev- 


> a 50 7 ° » 
ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδέαν αὐτῇ μίαν ἐπισφραγίσασθαι, 


a x oN JA 5 ᾽ 
καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐκτροπαῖς ἐν ἄλλο Eidos ἐπισημηνα- 


/ , \ ᾽ / ¢e 5 / / 
μένους πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὡς οὔσας δύο εἴδη δια- 


νοηθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ποιῆσαι. 


NE. ΣΏ. Τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη σόν, οἶμαι, τὸ ἔργον, ὦ ξένε, 


3 ᾽ » > Ἂς / 
aAA οὐκ ἐμὸν γίγνεται. 


- ᾽ Ky / > Ns 5 ΄ 
mE. Δεῖ γε μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ σον, 


σ » \ Gay ͵7ὔ 
ὅταν ἐμῴφανες ἡμῖν γένηται. 


the angler (Soph. 210 a) and 
the Sophist (Ib. 221 ¢).” 

1. Ti μὴν] “What then?” 
This less frequent signification 
of τί μὴν probably contains the 
explanation of the general use 
to signify assent. “ What else ?” 
=“surely.” Cf. Parm. 139 d: 
Ὅτε οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν γένηταί 
τῷ τι, ἕν γίγνεται. ᾿Αλλὰ τί μήν; 
κιτιλ. Theet. 142 a: ποῦ μήν; 

4. ἀτραπὸν͵]) The Stranger 
recurs to the metaphor which 
he employed in Soph. 222 a. 
This appears clearly from the 
word exrporais, which recals ἐκ- 
τρέπεσθον (1. 5.) Compare Pheedo 
65 b: Κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπός 
τις ἡμᾶς ἐκφέρειν ἐν τῇ σκέψει, ὅτι 
κιτιλ. The art is identified with 
the method of finding the art. 

ἡ. ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐκτροπαῖς --- 
ποιῆσαι) This is an applica- 
tion of the lesson learnt in 
the previous dialogue, that for 
every positive conception there 
is a corresponding negative 
expression not signifying the 


opposite, but including all that 
is other than the positive no- 
tion. See esp. Soph. 257 6: 
ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς γένους 
ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρός τι τῶν ὄντων 
πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὕτω συμβαίνει 
εἶναί τι τὸ μὴ καλόν; The mind 
is here viewed as giving her 
impress to objects, and not as 
receiving impressions from 
them (contrast with this the 
image of the waxen block in 
the Thezetetus). Similar lan- 
guage occurs in Phedo 75 d: 
περὶ ἁπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζό- 
μεθα τοῦτο ὃ ἔστιν. Cf. also 
Soph. 253 d. 

8. ὡς οὔσας δύο εἴδη] As 
constituting two classes or 
kinds. 

12. καὶ σὸν] I.e. You must 
make the distinction your 
own, go through the process 
for yourself. In his more 
systematic dialogues Plato still 
insists on the importance of the 
learner’s following every step 
of an inquiry. 


By what 
path, then, 
does the 
Statesman 
diverge 
from the 
beaten way 
of know- 
ledge in 
general ? 
It is the 
duty alike 


IO of ques- 


tioner and 
respondent 
to deter- 
mine this, 
while part- 
ing off all 
other by- 
ways, and 


stamping 
them with 
a single 
negative 
form. 

The theory 
of numbers 
is an e€x- 


ample of a 5 


class of 
sciences, 
in which 
knowledge 
is wholly 
separable 
from ac- 
tion. 
Whereas in 
carpentry 
and other 
handi- 
crafts, 
knowledge 
is bound 
up with 


6 MAATOQNOZ 


NE. >Q. Καλῶς εἶπες. 


=H. 


a) " 5 > - > 6 \ \ ld - 
p οὖν οὐκ ἀριθμητικὴ μεν Kal τινες ἐτεραι 


, ω / Ν “ ΄ / > ἈΝ 
TQUT)) OVYYEVELS τέχναι ψιλαὶ TOV πράξεών εἰσι, TO 


\ “ / / 
δὲ γνῶναι παρέσχοντο μόνον ; 


NE. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὕτως. 


=E Ai δέ Ν Χ 3 Ν , 
pj Le l O€ γε Ζέερι TEKTOVLKHY αὖ Και συμπασαν 


d rn / A yf 
χειρουργίαν WOOTTEP ἐν ταις πράξεσιν ἐνοῦσαν συμφυ- 


Ν 3 [4 / “ Ν 
TOV τὴν ἐπιστήμην κέκτηνται, καὶ συναποτελοῦσι τὰ 


/ « > 3 a / / > + 
γίγνομενᾶ UIT αὐτῶν σωμᾶτα, προτέρον οὐκ οντα. 


NE. ΣΩ. Ti phy; 


= Eh ΠῚ , 7 , 5 [4 ὃ / 
μι 1. QUT) τοινυν συμπασας ETLOTH MAS LALPEL, 


\ \ \ / Χ \ / 
THY μὲν πρακτικὴν προσειπῶν, THY δὲ μόνον γνω- 


/ 
στικην. 


2. ἀριθμητικὴ μὲν --- μόνον] 
This in modern language is the 
distinction between science and 
art. Cf. Phileb. 56, 57. 

3. ψιλαὶ τῶν πράξεων] “ Dis- 
engaged from practice,” i. e. 
abstract. The same word is 
used, infr. 299 e, to distinguish 
“pure arithmetic” from geo- 
metry and astronomy. ἀριθμη- 
τικὴ (the theory of numbers, 
not arithmetic in the medern 
sense, which more nearly an- 
swers to λογιστικὴ,) is always 
spoken of by Greek philosophers 
as the most abstract of the ma- 
thematical sciences. EH. g. Ar. 
Met. 1. 2: ai ἐξ ἐλαττόνων----τῶν 
ἐκ προσθέσεως, ὥσπερ ἀριθμητικὴ 
γεωμετρίας. Again, in Theet. 
165 a Dialectics are opposed, 
as Ψιλοὶ λόγοι, “mere abstrac- 


tion,’ to mathematics gene- 
rally. 
4. παρέσχοντο] For this 


‘poetical’ use of the aorist, 
ef. Theset. 156 d: ἐγένετο ---- 
περιεπλήσθη, and note. 


6. At δέ γε----κέκτηνται] “ But 
in the case of carpentry and 
the sister arts, and of every 
handicraft, the knowledge is 
as it were merged or inherent 
in the operations; and they 
assist in perfecting the struc- 
tures which result from them.” 
Note the expression ai (τέχναι) 
ἐπιστήμην κέκτηνται. By a fu- 
sion of abstract and concrete 
common in these dialogues, 
the attributes of the artist 
are attached to the art. Cf. 
Phileb. 44 6: εἰ τὸ BovAnua— 
βούλεται. 

8. συναποτελοῦσι)] Se. σὺν 
ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, SC. τῶν 
πράξεων. 

9. γιγνόμενα --- πρότερον οὐκ 
ὄντα! Whereas the objects of 
the abstract sciences are never 
produced, but exist always. 

12. τὴν μὲν] Se. ἐπιστήμην, 
1. 86. τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἶδος. This 
helps the transition to the 
singular ἐπιστήμης in what fol- 
lows. 











259. 


MOAITIKOS. 7 


NE. ΣΩ. “Eorw σοι ταῦθ᾽ ὡς μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης 


τῆς ὅλης εἴδη δύο. 


μα , > \ ΄ 
SE. Πότερον οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλέα καὶ 


, ν wv? / / « A ΄ 
δεσπότην καὶ eT οἰκονόμον θήσομεν ὡς ἕν πάντα 
A / x / ᾽ὔὕ Sa “ἃ 
ταῦυτα 7 POD AYOPEVOVTES, ἢ τοσαῦτας τέχνας QUTGAS 5 


εἶναι φῶμεν, ὅσαπερ ὀνόματα ἐρρήθη; Μᾶλλον δέ 


cal ied 
μοι δεῦρο ἐπου. 


NE. ΣΩ. πῇ; 


μ-- “ ΕΣ / A , , ΄ 
EE. Tyde. εἴ τῷ τις τῶν δημοσιευοντων ἰατρῶν 


« \ ΄ > / 5. ἘῚ CP 5 > 5» 
ἱκανὸς ξυμβουλεύειν ἰδιωτεύων αὐτός, ap οὐκ ἀνα- τὸ 


a > lal [é 3, ων 4 
γκαῖον αὐτῷ προσαγορεύεσθαι τοὔνομα τῆς τέχνης 


ON “ ὩΣ , 
ταῦτον ὅπερ ᾧ συμβουλεύει ; 


ΣΟ Nai. 
ane Ti δ᾽: 


3. Πύτερον οὖν x.7.d.] This 
question is closely connected 
with the one in hand If 
government is an _ abstract 
science, then the conditions 
under which it is exercised 
and the number of the persons 
to be governed cannot alter 
the principles of government : 
and, conversely, if the prin- 
ciples are thus altered, it is 
not an abstract science. 

4. καὶ ἔτ᾽ οἰκονόμον] ἔτι 
marks that this is an extreme 
step. 

θήσομεν --- προσαγορεύοντες | 
The participle, although re- 
quired to balance the clause 
after the introduction of πάντα 
ταῦτα, is redundant, as in ἔφη 
λέγων. 

ἕν πάντα ταῦτα!ὐ Cf. Phileb. 
25 d, 4110. 

6. Μᾶλλον δέ μοι δεῦρο ἕπου] 
This is a natural touch. The 
Stranger feels that the ques- 


o , , > N 
ὅστις βασιλεύοντι χώρας ἀνδρὶ πα- 


tion has been put too ab- 
strusely for his young re- 
spondent. 

9. δημοσιευόντων] “ Practis- 
ing physicians.” The δημιο- 
epyés is opposed to the ἰδιωτής 
(ot δημιοεργοὶ ἔασιν, μάντιν ἢ 
ἰητῆρα κακῶν). Cf. Ar. Pol. II. 
6: Ἰατρὸς δ᾽ ὅτε δημιουργὸς καὶ 
6 ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος 6 πε- 
παιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην. 

10. ἄρ᾽ οὐκ] “Is it not in- 
evitable that he should have 
the same professional designa- 
tion with the man whom he 
advises?” τοὔνομα τῆς τέχνης 
(cogn. accus. after προσαγορεύ- 
εσθαι) is added for the sake of 
ereater precision. It appears 
from the Gorgias, p. 455 b, 
compared with Xen. Mem. IV. 
2,5, that certain public medi- 
cal officers were appointed by 
the ecclesia of Athens. Stall- 
baum thinks that these are 
meant by the δημοσιεύοντες 


and imme 
diately as 
sists pro- 
duction. 
Science, 
then, is 
either prac- 
tical or 
theoretical. 
To which 
branch 
does the 
Statesman 
belong ? 
Or, let us 
first ask, 
Are States- 
man, King, 
Master, 
House- 
holder, the 
same or 
different in 
respect of 
science ? 
One who is 
competent 


to advise a 
physician 
deserves 
the name of 
Physician, 
whether he 
practises or 
not. So one 
who can 
advise 

a king, 
though he 
may hold 
a private 
station, is 
a king in 
knowledge. 
Hence the 
Statesman 
is a king. 


8 ITAATQNOS 


a ἈΝ > / Δ > / 9 2 3 / »“ 
ραινεῖν δεινὸς ἰδιώτης ὧν αὐτός, ap οὗ φήσομεν ἔχειν Pp. 2 


, \ \ > / a Wi Ν + > Ν 
αὐτὸν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣν ἐδει τὸν ἄρχοντα αὐτὸν κεκ- 


τῆσθαι ; 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φήσομεν. 


RE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ἣ γε ἀληθινοῦ βασιλέως βασι- 


λική: 
NE. 30. Nai. 


ἘΠῚ ἽΝ / δὲ e 4 ᾽ 3) ay y+ 
μι. αὐτὴν O€ O ΚεΚΤΉμενος OUK, AV TE AaPX@Ov αν 


> ΄ EY ΄ ΄, U4 \ / 
T ἰδιώτης ὧν τυγχάνῃ, πάντως κατὰ γε THY τέχνην 


ιοαὐτὴν βασιλικὸς ὀρθῶς προσρηθήσεται ; 


NE. ΣΏ. Δίκαιον γοῦν. 


πὴ ἢ Κ Q ἈΝ ’ y A ὃ , DS ROS, 
pe Se αι μὴν OLKOVOLOS YE Καὶ OEOTIOTYNS TAUTOV. 


NE. ΣΩ. Ti μήν; 


EE. Ti δέ; μεγάλης σχῆμα οἰκήσεως ἢ σμικρᾶς 


ἰατροί, but it seems more 
probable that the distinction 
meant here and in Gorg. 514 
d is simply that between one 
who practises and one who 
does not practise as a phy- 
sician — the professional and 
the amateur. This is quite 
sufficient for the requirements 
of the argument. For the form 
of expression, cf. Gorg. 474 ¢: 
τί δὲ δὴ αἴσχιον 3 πότερον K.T.A. 

5. Hye] Se. ἐπιστήμη. 

8. Ταύτην δὲ ὁ κεκτημένος] 
Note the emphatic position of 
ταύτην. 

9. τυγχάνῃ is emphatic: 
“Whether it be his fortune to 
rule or to enjoy a private sta- 
tion.” 

κατά γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτὴν] 
Compare the distinction in 
Republic B. I, between the 
ruler so-called, and the essen- 
tial ruler: esp. 1, 345 6. 


5 , + A \ » \ 7, 
τε αὖ πόλεως ὄγκος μῶν τι πρὸς ἀρχὴν διοίσετον ; 


10. βασιλικός] “ Fit for so- 
vereignty,” whether actually 
sovereign or not. 

14. μεγάλης ---διοίσετον] The 
Politics of Aristotle (I. 1.) open 
with a criticism of this saying, 
in which it may be observed 
that the limitation expressed 
in the words πρὸς ἀρχὴν is, 
overlooked. The difference of 
view, however, is real and 
characteristic. As in defining 
the Good in the Republic; 
Plato refers all to a single 
principle, while Aristotle holds 
that the idea of Good is dif- 
erent in different things; so 
in the present case, while Plato 
asserts that the idea of Go- 
vernment must be the same 
in the case of a house and 
a city, Aristotle contends that 
a house is essentially different 
from a city, because composed 
of different elements (the in- 


— 


) 








ΠΟΛΙΓΙΚΟΣ. 9 


NE. ΣΏ. Οὐδέν. 


EE. Οὐκοῦν, ὃ νῦν δὴ διεσκοπούμεθα, φανερὸν ὡς 


3 / ΄ 3. ΝᾺ ca) / \ 7 
ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα. ταύτην δὲ εἶτε 


Ν ΕΣ \ 7 > , ᾽ 
βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικὴν TLS ὀνο- 


μάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερώμεθα. 


NE. ΣΩ. Τί γάρ; 


mE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τόδε γε δῆλον, ὡς βασιλεὺς ἅπας 


\ Ν / lal 72 , ’ ay, > \ 
χέρσι και ξύμπαντι T@ σωμαᾶτι σμικρ ATTA εἰς TO 


/ XN > Ν / Ν \ lal a 
κατέχειν τὴν ἀρχὴν δύναται πρὸς THY τῆς Ψυχῆς 


/ C4 
σύνεσιν καὶ ῥώμην. 


NE. 30. Δῆλον. 


BE. Τῆς δὴ γνωστικῆς μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς χειροτεχνι- 


lal Υ, cat Χ ΄σ 
κῆς καὶ ὅλως πρακτικῆς βούλει τὸν βασιλέα φῶμεν 


y Ὁ 
οἰκειότερον εἶναι ; 


dividual being the unit of the 
family, and the family of the 
state), and hence the science of 
the management of each must 
be different also. They may 
be compared analogically, but 
must be carefully distinguished. 
The point is illustrative of the 
difference between the Plato- 
nic and the Aristotelian οὐσία, 
—the former tending towards 
an abstract unity, the latter 
towards concrete definiteness 
and reality. Cf. Ar. Pol. ITI. 
9. The Platonic view had a 
germ in Socrates. See Xen. 
Mem. III. 4, 12: ἡ yap τῶν 
ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον δια- 
φέρει τῆς τῶν κοίνων. Cf. Lege. 
3, 681: 
μεγάλην ἀποτελοῦντες. Ib. 1, 626 
6, 690 a; [Erast. 138 ὁ ;] Meno 
73a; Rep. 9, 578 d. 

(14.) σχῆμα] The word sug- 
gests the imposing appearance 
of a stately mansion. Cf. 


, Ly 
μίαν οἰκίαν κοίνην καὶ 


Eurip. Ale. 911 (of the palace 
of Admetus): ὦ σχῆμα δόμων, 
πῶς εἰσέλθω ; 

(15.) πόλεως ὄγκος] So, with 
a different shade of meaning, 
Rep. 2, 373 Ὁ: (ἡ πόλις) ὄγκου 
ἐμπληστέα καὶ πλήθους. 

2. ὃ νῦν δὴ διεσκοπούμεθα]) 
δὴ is omitted in one MS., Ven. 
=, and & in another, Par. F. 

6. Ti γάρ: “ Why should 
we ?” 

. ὡς βασιλεὺς amas] Cf. 
Ar. Pol. VII. 3: ταύτην δὲ τὴν 
περὶ τἀναγκαῖα λεγόμενα ποιεῖν 
ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντα οὐκ ἀν- 
αγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον" 
θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. 

12. μᾶλλον---οἰκειότερον͵] Cf. 
Rep. 1, 331 ¢: ἕν ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς οὐκ 
ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε 
τοῦτο πλοῦτον χρησιμωτάτην εἶναι 
—where the measure of compa- 
rison is at some distance from 
the adjective, as here. 


x» > 
αν εις 


θείην 


ἐς 
ee 


I 


° 


And he 
who rules 
his own 
house well 
has the 
same art of 
govern- 
ment which 
the States- 
man has. 
Therefore 
these forms 
of art or 
science 
differ only 
in name. 
And it is 
clear, at all 
events, that 
the royal 
function is 
a work of 
mind, 
Kingeraft, 
or State- 
craft, then, 
is a theo- 
retical 
science, 


10 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 
NE. ΣΟ Τὴν: 


\ 2 \ ‘ 
SE. "Τὴν ἄρα πολιτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ βασι- 


\ \ > Ν « A ΄ cal 
λικὴν καὶ βασιλικὸν εἰς ταὐτὸν ὡς EV πάντα ταῦτα 


la 

ξυνθήσομεν ; 

5 ΝΕ. &Q. δῆλον. 
Now =E. Οὐκοῦν πορευοίμεθ᾽ ἂν ἑξῆς, εἰ μετὰ ταῦτα 
theoretical ᾿ rae ais P ; ip oT, ᾿ 
scienceis τὴν γνωστικὴν διοριζοιμεθα : 
not one Leif ] »; P ( ᾿ ἷ 
entire and NE. 2Q. ITavu ye. 
perfect — / \ \ “- Ἃ yy > ΒΤ," \ 
chrysolite, mE. ΤΙρόσεχε δὴ τὸν νοῦν, ἂν apa ἐν αὑτῇ τινὰ 


but divides < Σ 

into Οὐ] τὸ διαφυὴν κατανοήσωμεν. 

cal an 

Command- NE. 20. Φραζε ποίαν. 
ine. , , la 53 / 

3 HE. Τοιάνδε. λογιστική πού τις ἡμῖν ἦν τέχνη. 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ναί. 
EE. Té 3 i 
bey ae QV γνωστικῶν YE, OlUAl, TAVTATAGL TE- 


15 χνῶν. 


2. Τὴν ἄρα---ξυνθήσομεν] Be- logical distinctions. Cf. Soph. 
cause kingcraft depends en- 229 Ὁ, τομὴν: ib. 268 6, δι- 
tirely on knowledge (supra πλοήν. The present image cor- 
6, ἀλλὰ μὴν — ῥώμην), and, responds with the language of 
in point of the knowledge Phedr. 265 e: τέμνειν --- κατ᾽ 
required, these arts have been ἄρθρα «.r.X. See also ibid. 
shewn to be the same, supra 268 a: εἰ καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διε- 
a,b. There is a slight inex- στηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ nrpiov, ὥσπερ 
actness in πάντα ταῦτα being ἐμοί. Most MSS. have δια- 
used for two things (πολι- φυγήν. 
τικὴ and βασιλική). This 15 12. ἦν] The past tense 
perhaps due to the same implies no reference to any 
phrase having occurred above, former passage, but is only 
where more than two arts the common form of allu- 
were enumerated, p. 258 e. sion to a familiar fact. λο- 

10. διαφυὴν] “Any natural γιστικὴ is instanced instead of 
parting or cleft.’ The word ἀριθμητικὴ for the sake of va- 
is used literally in Phedo 98 ὁ riety. The distinction here 
for the ligaments between the introduced by Plato is applied 
bones of the human body: τὰ in Ar. Eth. VI. το, ὃ 2, where 
ὀστᾶ ἔχει διαφυὰς χωρὶς ἀπ᾿ ἀλλη- wisdom is distinguished from 
λων. Every conceivable image intelligence: 7 μὲν γὰρ φρό- 
is employed to express the νησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ σύν- 
“lines and veins” of naturé, εσις κριτικὴ μόνον. 
which are the ground of true 


Ρ. 259 


e€ 





259. 


| 260. 





IIOAITIKOS. 
NE, >Q. [lds δ᾽ ov; 


/ a \ > cal ᾽ “ 
SE. Τνούσῃ δὲ λογιστικῇ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς 


11 


διαφορὰν μῶν τι πλέον ἔργον δώσομεν ἢ τὰ γνω- 
σθέντα κρῖναι ; 

NE. 2Q. Τί μήν ; 

EE. Καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργα- 
τικός, ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων. 

NE. ΣΩ. Nai. 

EE. Παρεχόμενός γέ που γνῶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ov χει- 


ρουργίαν. 
NE. 2Q. Οὕτως. 


HE. Δικαίως δὴ μετέχειν ἂν λέγοιτο τῆς γνωστι- 
κῆς ἐπιστήμης. 

NE. ΣΏ. Πάνυ γε. 

HE. Τούτῳ δέ γε, οἶμαι, προσήκει κρίναντι μὴ 
τέλος ἔχειν μηδ᾽ ἀπηλλάχθαι, καθάπερ ὁ λογιστὴς 
ἀπήλλακτο, προστάττειν δὲ ἑκάστοις τῶν ἐργατῶν 
τό γε πρύσφορον, ἕως ἂν ἀπεργάσωνται τὸ προ- 
σταχθέν. 


2. Τνούσῃ δὲ λογιστικῇ]} “ But 
when arithmetic has discerned 
the differences amongst num- 
bers, shall we give her any 
further office than to judge of 
that which she has discerned ?”’ 
Ans. “ How should we?” (ri 
μήν 5) 

6. Kal yap ἀρχιτέκτων ye πᾶς 
kK.T.A.] τί μήν expresses surprise 
that the question should have 
been asked. An example which 
justifies the question is, there- 
fore, introduced with γάρ. 
“ T asked because there are 
branches of theoretical know- 
ledge which do not end in 


classing the master-carpenter 
under γνωστική, when carpen- 
try has been placed amongst 
the practical sciences. But 
this helps to shew that the 
“commanding sciences,”  al- 
though independent of prac- 
tice, yet have an immediate 
relation to the practical. 

18. τό ye πρόσφορον] He is 
not wholly engaged in directing 
his workmen, nor does he im- 
part all his knowledge to each 
of them, but he must direct 
each in so far as is required 
for the particular work ap- 
pointed them. This limitation 


theory.” There may seem δῦ is expressed by ye. 
first sight to be a confusion in 
ΤῸΝ 


Io 


Arith- 
metic, for 
instance, is 
purely cri- 
tical: the 
Master 
Builder, on 
the other 
hand, while 
his busi- 
ness is 
theory and 
not prac- 
tice, must 
superin- 
tend the 
application 
of his 
theory. 


12 MAATOQNO® 
NE. 2Q. ᾿Ορθώς. 


— > a Ἀ \ “ lal / 
=E. Οὐκοῦν γνωστικαὶ μὲν αἵ τε τοιαῦται ξύμ- 
Nee τ , a a , 
πασαι καὶ ὁπόσαι ξυνέπονται τῇ λογιστικῇ, κρίσει 
\ Ν ΄ 7 > 7, J \ 
δὲ Kal ἐπιτάξει διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν τούτω τῷ 
7 
5 VEVEE ; 
/ 
NE. SQ. Φαίνεσθον. 
=E. Ap οὗ 4 ἢ ns εἰ τὸ μὲν 
HE. “Ap οὖν συμπάσης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ μ 
ἊΝ 7 ΝΥ \ ἊΝ / 
ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, TO δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι προ- 
/ 5 an “Δ. rn qn 
σείποιμεν, ἐμμελῶς av φαῖμεν διῃρῆσθαι ; 


ιο NE. 2Q. Κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν. 


τος τς EE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τοῖς γε κοινῇ τι πράττουσιν ἀγα- 
inction aN: 2 

being ad- πῆτον ομονοειν. 

mitted, it τῇ pe sae 

is easy to NE. 2Q. [los ὃ OU 5 

see that ee , ᾿ , ἊΝ oD 

the King =H. Tovrov τοίνυν μέχριπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ κοινω- 
15 ποῦ ἃ 


mere spec- 15 νῶμεν, 
tator of the 


> f? f 
€aTEOV TA YE 


TOV 


ἄλλων δοξάσματα 


/ 
life of the χαιρειν. 
city, but ΔΝ 
that his NE, 20. Te pov; 
science, a Om Ν 
while theo- HE. Φέρε On, ταύταιν ταῖν τέχναιν ἡμῖν τὸν Ba- 


retical, is 
also com- 
manding.§ 


XN 3 7, 7 yo 9 fa lod »» 
σιλικὸν ἐν ποτέρᾳ θετέον ; ap ἐν τῇ κριτικῇ, καθα- 


5. yevee] The open form 
is probably retained to distin- 
guish the dual from the plural 
γένη. 

4. τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, 
τὸ δὲ κριτικόν] Ar. Pol. IV. 12: 
Μάλιστα δὲ, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, 
ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας, ὅσοις ἀπο- 
δέδοται βουλεύσασθαί τε περὶ τι- 
νῶν καὶ κρῖναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι" καὶ 
μάλιστα τοῦτο, τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν 
ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν. Ib. VII. 5: 
ἄρχοντος δ᾽ ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις 
ἐστίν. 

II. Ἀλλὰ μὴν---καίρειν] The 
maxim is appropriately bor- 
rowed from political science 
(for ὁμόνοια is πολιτικὴ φιλία) 


in order to assert the indepen- 
dence of the dialectical reason. 
The same thing is meant as in 
Gorgias 472 b, Protag. 331 ¢, 
348 a. 

19. καθάπερ τινὰ θεατήν] Plato 
recurs to the image of the 
theatre, which he employed in 
Theeet. 173 ¢: οὐδὲ θεατὴς, ὥσ- 
περ ποιηταῖς. 

The notion οἵ ἐπιτακτικὴ 
may be compared with Kant’s 
imperative of the reason: an 
ideal which has immediate re- 
ference to life. In Socrates, 
philosophy becomes practical 
without losing anything of the 
speculative impulse. 





ΠΟΛΙΤΊΙΚΟΣ. 15 


: 260. me τινὰ θεατήν ; ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ἐπιτακτικῆς ὡς ὄντα 
αὐτὸν τέχνης θήσομεν, δεσπόζοντά γε: 
NE. ΣΏ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον ; 
» , 3 ” 
SE. Τὴν ἐπιτακτικὴν δὴ τέχνην πάλιν ἂν εἴη 
θεατέον εἴ πη διέ f δοκεῖ τῇδέ θά 
εατέον εἰ πῃ διέστηκε. καί μοι δοκεῖ τῇδέ πῃ; καθά- ς 
περ ἡ τῶν καπήλων τέχνη τῆς τῶν αὐτοπωλῶν διώ- 


’ Ν Ν XN / x aS 
ἃ ρισται τέχνης, Kai τὸ βασιλικὸν γένος ἔοικεν ἀπὸ 








lad a / », 5 / 
τοῦ τῶν κηρύκων γένους apwpio Oa. 


NE. 2Q. Tas ; 


EE. Πωληθέντα που πρότερον ἔργα ἀλλότρια 


παραδεχόμενοι δεύτερον πωλοῦσι πάλιν οἱ κάπηλοι. 
NE. ΣΏ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


> an Ν Ν a 
EE. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ κηρυκικὸν φῦλον ἐπιταχθέντ᾽ 


3 / / , ἐλὴν ΤᾺΝ / > 
aAAOT pia νοήματα παραδεχόμενον αὐτὸ δεύτερον ἐπι- 


7 7 «ς / 
TATTEL πάλιν ETEPOLS. 


NE. 30. ᾿Αληθέστατα. 


ὍΝ S / \ 
HEH. Τί οὖν ; εἰς ταὐτὸν μίξομεν βασιλικὴν ἑρμη- 


νευτικῇ, κελευστικῇς, μαντικῇ, κηρυκικῇ καὶ πολλαῖς 


2. δεσπόζοντά ye] As the 
word ruler implies. Cf. Soph. 
221 ἃ : ὡς παντὸς δεῖ τοιοῦτον 
εἶναι τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχων. 

5. τῇδέ πῃ} Se. διεστηκέναι. 
The clause καθάπερ---ἀφωρίσθαι 
is in apposition with (or ex- 
plains) τῇδέ πῃ διεστηκέναι, and 
the notion οἵ δοκεῖ is resumed 
in ἔοικεν. 

6. αὐτοπωλῶν] g MSS. have 
αὐτοπώλων. 

13. Οὐκοῦν — ἑτέροι.] The 
change from ἐπιταχθὲν τἀλλότρια 
to ἐπιταχθέντ᾽ ἀλλότρια iS 80 
slight and so necessary as 
hardly to deserve notice were 
not the former received by 
Bekker and defended by Stall- 


baum. The plural ἐπιταχθέντα 
and the absence of the article 
are both required by the paral- 
lelism to πωληθέντα-- ἀλλότρια 
in the previous sentence. 
is not pleonastic but emphatic. 
“The heralds themselves give 
orders in their turn.” 

17. μίξομεν]! Bodl. Am. F. 
Bekk. Tur. μίξωμεν. The other 
MSS. and edd. have μίξομεν. 
The point can hardly be deter- 
mined, and the change either 
way is extremely slight. With 
Stallbaum, I am inclined to 
prefer μίξομεν, as more dis- 
tinctly pointing to a negative 
answer. 


Sie 28 
αὐυτοι 


10 But com- 
manding 
science is 
distin- 
guished 
into origi- 
nal and 
derived, 
much as 
the manu- 

15 facturer 
is distin- 
guished 
from the re- 
tail dealer. 
This sepa- 
rates the 


king from 
the herald, 
the inter- 
preter, the 
prophet, 
and others 
whose duty 
it may 
often be to 
issue com- 
mands. 


14 ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


ε ἢ , , 7 a , / 
ETEPQAls TOUTO@V τέχναις συγγενεσιν, αι συμπᾶσαι TO Pp. 26 


5 ἃ , "7 x , ΄ Ἴ: 
γ᾽ ἐπιτάττειν ἔχουσιν ; ἢ βούλει, καθάπερ εἰκάζομεν 


΄-“ / Ν SYA , > Ἀ Ν Ν 
νῦν On, καὶ τοὔνομα παρεικάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχεδὸν 


3 / Ἃ £ Ν ἴω » ΄“- / 
QYV@VVUEOV OV τυγχάνει TO τῶν αὐτεπιτακτῶων γενος, 


Ν / ἴω / Ν \ lal / 
δκαὶ ταύτῃ ταῦτα διελώμεθα, TO μεν τῶν βασιλέων 


/ ᾽ ἃ > Χ / lal \ » 
γένος εἰς τὴν αὐτεπιτακτικὴν θέντες, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου 


XN / BA a ΄σ 
παντὸς ἀμελήσαντες, ὄνομα ἕτερον αὐτοῖς παραχω- 


i? 7 7 An \ 27 “ « lol 
ρήσαντες θέσθαι τινὰ ; τοῦ yap ἄρχοντος EVEKA ἡμιν 


«ε 7 5 > > a 
ἡ μέθοδος ἣν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. 


NE. 2Q. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


"Τὰ Οὐ a 5 δὴ lal 7 » hy ye! 
ΚΞ Ὡς Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μετρίως ἀφέστηκεν ἀπ᾽ 


5 / 5 / \ XN > / 
ἐκείνων, ἀλλοτριοτητι διορισθὲν προς οἰκειοτΉΤα, 


an SIN 7 53 lo 3 ΧΩ 7 
τοῦτο αὑτὸ πάλιν αὖ διαιρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τινα 


Χ y yf e / 9 ’, 
ΤΟμὴν ETL EXOMEV υπεικουσᾶν EV TOUT® 5 


NE. =O. Πάνυ ye. 


I. τούτων τέχναις συγγενέσιν 
The order is τέχναις συγγενέσιν 
τούτων. Many other instances 
of inversion might have been 
noticed. 

τὸ y ἐπιτάττειν] 1. 6. by 
whatever further characteristic 
they may be distinguished. 

2. καθάπερ εἰκάζομεν ---- παρει- 
κάσωμεν] ‘Shall we form the 
name analogically, inaccordance 
with the comparison which we 
made just now’—viz. between 
the king and the αὐτοπωλής 4 

ἡ. ἕτερον---τινα] Lit. “ Step- 
ping aside for some other to 
give them a name.” ‘The ac- 
cusative before θέσθαι is pre- 
ferred to the dative after 
παραχωρήσαντες to avoid the 
collision of two datives (ἑτέρῳ 
αὐτοῖς). There is a slight irony 
in παραχωρήσαντες, “ yielding 
the merit to another.” Cf. 
Soph. 267 b, Prot. 336 ¢ 


11. Οὐκοῦν---οἰκειότητα] Since 
then this kind has been dis- 
tinguished from the rest with 
tolerable clearness, being de- 
fined by contrasting what 
comes from others with that 
which originates with oneself. 

13. εἴ Either “to divide, 
if we can find a line of sec- 
tion :” or, perhaps better, “ to 
divide, and see whether we can 
find a line of section.” 

Twa τομὴν --- ἔχομεν] This 
phraseology reappears in Lege. 
11, 944 Ὁ: ἔχει τινα τομὴν 7 
τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπιφορά. 

14. τομὴν] Cf. supr. p. 259 
d, διαφυὴν, and note. 

ὑπείκουσαν] “ Yielding” to 
the sharp instrument of di- 
vision, the “ dividing edge” 
of thought. Cf Tim. 62 b: 
σκληρὰ δέ, ὅσοις ἂν ἡμῶν ἡ σὰρξ 
ὑπείκῃ. 


Ρ. 261, 





f 
, 








261. 


IIOAITIKO2. 


EE. Καὶ μὴν φαινόμεθα eye" ἀλλ᾽ ἐπακολουθῶν 


/ 
συντεμνε. 


NE. ΣΩ. Πῇ; 


ΞΕ. Πάντας ὁπόσους ἂν ἄρχοντας διανοηθῶμεν 


15 


, , 5 ἘΠ ἢ ΄ / 
ἐπιτάξει προσχρωμένους, Up οὐχ εὑρήσομεν γενέσεώς 5 


-“ 4 
τινος EVEKA προσταττοντᾶς 9 


NE. 2Q. Πώς δ᾽ οὔ; 


ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε γιγνόμενα πάντα δίχα δια- 


lal 7 / 
λαβεῖν ov παντάπασι χαλεπόν. 


NE. ΣΩ. πῇ; 


\ \ a , 
EE. Ta μὲν ἄψυχα αὐτῶν ἐστί που ξυμπάντων, 


τὰ δ᾽ ἔμψυχα. 
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Nai. 


ἘΠῚ a / δέ 5 lol Ν “ an / 
μι. OUTOLS OE YE AUTOLS TO TOV γνώστικου μέρος 


5 \ 32) 57) 7 /, lol 
ἐπιτακτίκον OV, εἴπερ βουλόμεθα τέμνειν, τεμοῦμεν. 


NE. ΣΏ. Κατὰ τί: 


aE To \ aN a a > , / > 
pe I. O μέν ἔπι TALS τῶν ἀψύχων γενέσεσιν αυὖυ" 


Aa , \ SR SEN rn “- ’ 7 φ᾽ an 
τοῦ τάσσοντες, TO δ᾽ ἐπὶ ταῖς TOV ἐμψύχων. Kal πᾶν 


οὕτως ἤδη διαιρήσεται δίχα. 


NE. ΣΏ. Παντάπασί γε. 


= \ \ / Sas , Ν 
ΞΕ. To μὲν τοίνυν αὐτῶν παραλίπωμεν, τὸ 


δ᾽ 


γι , 7 5) 7 Ni 
ἀναλάβωμεν, ἀναλαβόντες δὲ μερισώμεθα εἰς Ovo TO 


4 
συμπαν. 


I. ἐπακολουθῶν σύντεμνε | 
“ Follow and divide with me.” 
Cf. Soph. 228 c. 

5. γενέσεώς τινος ἕνεκα] “ For 
the sake of some production.” 
The word γένεσις in Plato’s 
later dialogues acquires a wide 
generality of meaning. Com- 
pare the following passages : 
Soph. 235 e; Polit. 282 d, 
283 d, 294 Ὁ: Phileb. 26 d, 
ease lim 29d. ers) 10, 
889 a, 892 ὁ, II, 920 6. 


14. Τούτοις ---οΟὐτοῖς)] Se. τῷ 
ἀψύχῳ τε καὶ ἐμψύχῳ. Cf. supr. 
260a: κρίσει----καὶ ἐπιτάξει. infr. 
264 6: τῷ πτηνῷ τε καὶ πεζῷ. 

17. Τὸ μὲν----αὐτοῦ] “The one 
segment of it” (rod τῆς γνω- 
στικῆς μέρους ἐπιτακτικοῦ). 

18. ταῖς τῶν ἐμψύχων] Se. γε- 
“The processes which 
affect living creatures.” 

22. τὸ σύμπαν Epexegetic 
in apposition with τὸ δέ. 


νέσεσι. 


10 


15 


20 


There isa 
further dis- 
tinction. 


All com- 
mands is- 
sued by a 
sovereign 
intend the 
doing or 
making of 
something. 


Now the 
objects of 
all produc- 
tion, and 
therefore of 
works com- 
manded, 
are inani- 
mate, like 
those of 
the master 
builder, or 
animate, 
as are the 
subjects of 
the king. 


But the 
production 
and nur- 
ture of ani- 
mals may 
be cared 
for either 
singly or 
in herds. 
The States- 
man is not 
a groom, 
but aherds- 
man. And 
whether we 
give to this 
latter 
branch of 
animal- 
tending 
the name 
of herding, 
or οἵ feed- 
ing in 
flocks, it 
matters 
little. 

W ord- 
catching 

is not the 
way to get 
rich in 
thoughts. 


16 MAATOQNOZ 


NE. ΣΩΏ. Λέγεις δ᾽ αὐτοῖν ἀναληπτέον εἶναι πό- p.2 


τερον ; 


-— , Ν Ν \ Gea 5 / 
mE. [lavrws που τὸ περὶ Ta (oa ἐπιτακτικον. 


> \ \ , “ lad > / > / 
ov yap δὴ τὸ ye τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐπιστημὴς ἐστι ποτε 


σ΄ > ΄ » a - > , > \ 
5 TOV ἀψύχων ἐπιστατοῦν, οἷον ἀρχιτεκτονικον, ἄλλα 


/ > lal / Ν Ν Ε \ a \ 
YVEVVQALOTEPOV, EV τοις ζώοις και πέρι αὐτὰ TAVTA ΤῊΡ 


/ / 
δύναμιν ἀεὶ κεκτημένον. 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς. 


HE. Τήν γε μὴν τῶν ζώων γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν 


\ ΄ of ! 5 \ \ \ 
IoTHY μέν τις ἂν ἴδοι μονοτροφίαν οὖσαν, THY δὲ κοινὴν 


ἴω 3 lad 5 7 7 . / 
τῶν ev ταῖς ἀγέλαις θρεμμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν. 


NE. ΣΏ. Ὀρθῶς. 


HE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ μὴν τόν γε πολιτικὸν εὑρήσομεν 


7 “ ’ +S € Ἢ 
ἰδιοτρόφον, ὥσπερ βοηλάτην ἢ τινα ἱπποκόμον, ἀλλ᾽ 


15 ἱπποφορβῷ τε καὶ βουφορβῷ μᾶλλον προσεοικότα. 


NE. 30. Φαίνεταί γε δὴ ῥηθὲν νῦν. 
EE. Πότερον οὖν τῆς ζωοτροφίας τὴν τῶν ξυμ- 


πόλλων κοινὴν τροφὴν ἀγελαιοτροφίαν ἢ κοινοτροφι- 


΄ 5 / 
κήν τινα ὀνομάζωμεν ; 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ‘Ozorepov ἂν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συμβαίνῃ. 


ΞΕ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες" κἂν διαφυλάξῃς τὸ 


ἣν ,’ὔ Py 4 ΕῚ / vA 3 Ἂς 
μὴ σπουδάζειν ἔτι TOLS ονομᾶσι, πλουσιώτερος €lS TO 


9. γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν] The 
ambiguity οἵ the word γένεσις 
helps to conceal the error of 
confusing the king with the 
shepherd, which affords so 
much matter for discussion in 
what follows. 

14. βοηλάτην] One who drives 
an ox: as, for instance, in 
ploughing. 

τό. Φαίνεται----ῥ(ηθὲν viv] Cf. 
Soph. 226 ἃ: Σχεδὸν οὕτω viv 
λεχθὲν φαίνεται, Rep. 7, 525 d, 
ἐννοῶ ῥηθέντος κιτ.λ., and com- 


pare the Homeric ῥεχθὲν δέ τε 
νήπιος ἔγνω. 

21. τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς 
ὀνόμασι 1 Plato frequently 
dwells on the danger of being 
imposed on in philosophy by 
words; and alludes to the viti- 
ating effect which a love of ver- 
bal distinction had on his con- 
temporaries. Cf. e. g. Theet. 
166 Ὁ, 177 8, 184 ¢3.- Soph. 
218 c; Rep. 5, 454 a. 


22. πλουσιώτερος εἰς TO γῆρας] 


Unlike the ὀψιμαθεῖς of Soph. 


| 














261. 


ITOAITIKO®. 17 


a , ΄σ \ ~ 
γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως. viv δὲ τοῦτο μέν, 
’ ’ , \ \ , 
καθαπερ διακελεύει, ποιητέον᾽ τὴν δὲ ἀγελαιοτροφι- 
\ Lob yaa} al tal / > / Ἀ 7 
κὴν ap ἐννοεῖς πῇ τις δίδυμον ἀποφήνας τὸ ζητούμε- 
\ - “ , / 
νον ev διπλασίοισι τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε 
7 < lal 
ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι ; 5 
’ val a \ 
NE. 2Q. Προθυμήσομαι. καί μοι δοκεῖ τῶν μὲν 
> , Ἐπ 5 σι \ 5 , ” 
ἀνθρώπων ἑτέρα τις εἶναι, τῶν δὲ αὖ θηρίων addy 
7 
τροφὴ. 


/ 
SE. Παντάπασί ye προθυμότατα καὶ ἀνδρειότατα 


/ Χ la / > fal \ / 
Ompnoa. μὴ μέντοι TovTO ye εἰσαῦθις κατὰ δύναμιν το 


πάσχωμεν. 

NE. 2Q. Τὸ ποῖον ; 

SE. Μὴ σμικρὸν μόριον ἕν πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ 
πολλὰ ἀφαιρῶμεν, μηδὲ εἴδους χωρίς: ἀλλὰ τὸ μέ. 


But how 
shall we 
divide the 
herdsman’s 
art? Shall 
we say at 
once that 
there is one 
kind that 
deals with 
men, and 
another 
with 
brutes ? 
This is to 
assume too 
much. For 
what is the 
ground of 
our distine- 
tion be- 
tween men 
and brutes? 
We must 
proceed 
more gra- 


dually : 


Ww 3) ᾽ὔ , \ \ a . 4s 
pos ἅμα «idos ἐχέτω. κάλλιστον μὲν yap ἀπὸ τῶν 15 ‘ividing 


ἄλλων εὐθὺς διαχωρίζειν τὸ ζητούμενον, ἂν ὀρθῶς 


251 b, who are perhaps thought 
of here. Cf. Phedr. sub. fin.: 
πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν. 

2. ἀγελαιοτροφικὴν] He again 
varies the word in accordance 
with the preceding remark. 
“Do you perceive a way in 
which, by shewing the art of 
herding to be twofold, one 
may cause what is now sought 
amongst twice the number of 
things to be then sought 
amongst half that number ?” 
τοῖς mp. the half, i.e. of the 
double number. 

4. διπλασίοισι] So H. Most 
MSS. have διπλασίοις ἡ (Bodl.7). 
The Ionic form of the dative 
plural (which occurs again infr. 
304 6) is one of the many co- 
incidences in point of language 
between this dialogue and the 
Laws. 


I4. TO μέρος ἅμα εἶδος ἐχέτω] 
The spirit of this passage may 
be compared with Phedr. 265 
Θὲ: κατ᾽ εἴδη τέμνειν,----καὶ μὴ ἐπι- 
χειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδὲν : 
Phileb. 14 6: τὰ μέλη τε καὶ 
ἅμα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ. Rep. 
4, 445 d: ὅσοι---πολιτειῶν τρό-- 
ποι εἰσὶν εἴδη ἔχοντες. The true 
dialectician is he who hits 
upon the real divisions of 
things : and the real divisions 
are those which a true dialec- 
tician would make. It is diffi- 
cult to say in how far the 
“form” here spoken of is ob- 
jective, and how far subjective. 
As we should say, “do not 
divide without a principle of 
division.” 

τό. ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ] “If your 
division proves to be the right 
one.” Young Socrates is allowed 


=p 


each kind 
as nearly 


as we can 
in half, and 
making 
sure that 
we can 
assign a 
rational 
principle 
for each 
distinction. 


Thus 

our coun- 
trymen 
make a 
great as- 
sumption 
when they 


18 


7 / x, ἡ ‘ / > Ν ᾿᾽) Ἁ 
ἐχῃ: καθάπερ ὀλίγον σὺ πρότερον οἰηθεὶς ἐχειν τὴν p. 2063 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


/ > / Ν ΄ > Ν es) > / 
ιαίρεσιν ἐπέσπευσας TOV λόγον, ἰδὼν ἐπ᾿ ἀνθρώπους 


/ 
πορευόμενον. 


3 ΄σ΄ > 
ἀλλὰ yap, ὦ ire, λεπτουργεῖν οὐκ 


/ / 
ἀσφαλές, διὰ μέσων δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον ἰέναι τέμνον- 


™~ > 4 ΄ an 
5τας, Kal μᾶλλον ἰδέαις av τις προστυγχάνοι. τοῦτο 


δὲ διαφέρει τὸ πᾶν πρὸς τὰς ζητήσεις. 
NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις τοῦτο ; 


ΞῈ. Πειρατέον ἔτι σαφέστερον φράζειν εὐνοίᾳ 


“ a , 5) Σ / > “ \ 53 ~ 
τῆς ons φύσεως, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐν τῷ μεν οὖν παρε- 


/ \ na a 
IOGTHKOTL TH νῦν δηλῶσαι 


μηδὲν ἐνδεῶς ἀδύνατον" 


/ / lal / Che val 
ἐπιχειρητέον δέ TL καὶ σμικρῷ πλέον αὐτὸ προαγαγεῖν 


’ Ν / / oS 
εἰς TO πρόσθεν σαφηνείας ένεκα. 


NE. ΣΏ. Ποῖον οὖν δὴ es διαιρουμένους 


ἡμᾶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄρτι δρᾷν ; 


to fall into a natural error, 
for the sake of illustrating the 
difference between the right 
and the wrong method. 

1. καθάπερ---ἔχειν] Se. ὀρθῶς. 

2. ἐπέσπευσας ---- πορευόμενον] 
“You hastened the steps of the 
inquiry when you saw them 
directed towards mankind.” 
“The Argument” is still per- 
sonified. 

ἐπέσπευσας τὸν λόγον] Cf. 
Legg. 2, 658 ἃ: μὴ ταχὺ τὸ 
τοιοῦτον κρινώμεθα, ἀλλὰ διαι- 
ροῦντες κατὰ μέρη σκοπώμεθα. 

3. λεπτουργεῖν] ‘To make 
short work.” “To cut off too 
small a piece.” 

5. τοῦτο δὲ διαφέρει τὸ πᾶν] 
Here, as in the latter part of 
the Pheedrus, the Idea is the 
true form, not separated from 
the matter, but discerned by 
dialectic amongst particulars : 
the objective element in each 
determination of thought. 

8. εὐνοίᾳ τῆς ons φύσεως, ὦ 


Σώκρατες] Cf. Thet. 185 ; 
Soph. 266 ; Parm. 130: where 
the capacity of the hearer is 
likewise made the measure of 
the enunciation of some great 
truth. In Rep. 7, 529 e, on 
the contrary, “dear Glaucon” 
is not thought capable of fol- 
lowing the most abstract ac- 


count of dialectic. In the 
present passage also Plato 
breaks off abruptly: “It is 


impossible to explain it per- 
fectly at this present juncture.” 
ἐν τῷ παρεστηκότι Ta νῦν. Per- 
haps all such discussions were 
reserved for the “ Philosophus ;” 
and this may be one reason 
why that dialogue was never 
written. 

Il. προαγαγεῖν] Cf. Ar. Pol. 
TIT. 7: καλῶς δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ νῦν 
ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν. 

13. Ποῖον] Governed by οὐκ 
ὁρθως ---- δρᾷν, “ What mistake 
do you say we have just made 
in our divisions ?” 





ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 19 





ἕ ec 3 7 > , Le 

262. wa. Τοιόνδε, οἷον εἴ τις τἀνθρώπινον ἐπιχειρήσας divide 

/ / , A , Σ τῆ mankin« 

d δίχα διελέσθαι γένος διαιροῖ καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν _ into Greek 
» ΄ , \ \ ε Ν 4 A Ae ant Barba- 
ἐνθάδε διανέμουσι, TO μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν ὡς ἐν ἀπὸ rian, and 

so would 


, 3 a / / \ o a 
πάντων ἀφαιροῦντες χωρίς, σύμπασι δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις any one 





, > , 5 ν > , Ὗ > , who divi- 
yeveoly, απειροις ουσι και ἀμικτοῖς και ἀσυμφώνοις 5 ded num- 
\ “ON ἮΝ β ΄, β - r , , bers into 

7 pos a Uj] a, ap apov Le K NOEL 7 POO ELTTOVTES ten thou- 
oars A , \ / A N , A ὀνας sand and 
αὐτο, διὰ ταύτην THY μίαν κλῆσιν καὶ γένος EV AUTO all besides 
5 A ΕΣ Ν ᾽ / 5 , ten thou- 
εἶναι προσδοκῶσιν. ἢ Tov ἀριθμὸν τις αὖ νομίζοι Eo Te: 


Ἄν / a ΄ > , ὃ: “ἢ would be 
Kar εἰδὴ δύο διαιρεῖν μυριάδα ἀποτεμνόμενος ἀπὸ — more scien- 
» « ἃ 5 » / \ lad a Ν tifie to dis- 
ὁ πάντων, ὡς ἕν εἶδος ἀποχωρίζων, Kal τῷ λοιπῷ δὴ το tinguish 
N , EN ok x \ “ 53 \ ~_» number 
παντὶ θέμενος ev ὄνομα, διὰ τὴν κλῆσιν αὖ καὶ TOUT — into odd 


’ a , Se? Ne A , ΄ and even, 
ἀξιοῖ γένος ἐκείνου χωρὶς ETEPOY EV γίγνεσθαι. KaA- πᾶ man- 


aes, FS ᾿ =» kindint 
λιον δέ που καὶ μᾶλλον κατ᾽ εἴδη καὶ δίχα διαιροῖτ τς and 


female, and 
not to in- 


ἄν, εἰ τὸν μὲν ἀριθμὸν ἀρτίῳ Kal περιττῷ τις τέμνοι, 

3. ἐνθάδε] Se. κατὰ τὴν ‘EX- nor understanding one an- 
hada. other’s speech.” 

τὸ μὲν ----προσδοκῶσι)]͵ These 8. νομίζοι] “Should use,” 
words are explanatory of diave- “be wont,” “adopt the custom 
μουσι. Hence, as elsewhere of.” Cf. Legg. 10, 908 6: τὸ 
explained, the absence of a θεοὺς νόμιζον ἀμελεῖν εἶδος. 
connecting particle, or relative. 9. ἀποτεμνόμενος ] For the 
Or perhaps it is better to sup- middle voice, cf. Soph, 287 a, 
pose a return from the par-  Pheedr. 266 a. 
ticiple to the indicative in 13. μᾶλλον---δίχα] Compare 
προσδοκῶσι. the stress which is laid on 

5. yeveow—npocerrovres αὐτό] the bisection, if possible, of 
There is a change of construc- each kind, in Phileb. 16 d: 
tion: that at first intended μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκο- 
being βάρβαρον ἕν ὄνομα θέμενοι, πεῖν. Cf. supr. 262 a: τὸ (η- 
or something of the kind. τούμενον ἐν διπλασίοισι τανῦν ἐν 
αὐτὸ, Which resumes συμπ. τ. a. τοῖς ἡμισέσιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει 
γεν.; is suggested by the accu- ζητεῖσθαι : an injunction which 
sative βάρβαρον. The grammar suggested the rule which the 
may, of course, be saved by answer has violated. There 
omitting αὐτός But this is is here the same love of pro- 
unnecessary: πάλαι γὰρ ἐσμὲν portion and equality which 
ἀνάπλεῳ τῶν τοιούτων. appears in Aristotle’s account 

ἀμίκτοις καὶ ἀσυμφώνοις] ““Nei- of Justice. See especially his 
ther holding any intercourse (or etymology of δικαστὴς, quasi 
intermarrying, vid. inf. 265 6) διχαστής. 

D2 


kK 
aS 


troduce 
such acci- 
dental dif- 
ferences as 
Lydian or 
Phrygian 
(not to say 
Greek), 
until he 
were ata 
loss for a 
distinction 
which had 
a rational 
ground. 
But, it may 
be asked, 
how can we 
tell when a 
division is 
accidental 
and when 
real? This 
question is 
reserved : 
and we re- 
turn to the 
distinction 
of young 
Socrates, 
between 
man and 
the brutes. 
Which is 
just as if 
that ra- 
tional and 
politic ani- 
mal the 


5 


20 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


\ \ 5 a > , , » \ , 
τὸ δὲ ad τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἄρρενι καὶ θήλει, p. 26 


\ Ὁ 5, « Ν a 
Λυδοὺς δὲ ἢ Φρύγας ἢ Twas ἑτέρους πρὸς ἅπαντας 


΄ > 16 / ff) ’ ω 7 [γι Ν 
TATTOV ἀποσχίζοι ΤΟΤΕ, ἡνίκα απττόροι yevos αμα και 


/ c / « 7 - / 
μέρος EUPLOKELV EKATEPOV τῶν σχισθέντων. 


NE. 2Q. ᾿Ορθότατα. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτό, ὦ 


“- 


/ a 57 ΄ » / ! 
ξένε, πῶς ἂν τις γένος καὶ μέρος ἐναργέστερον yvowN, 


ε 5 / 3 oO > / 
ὡς av ταὐτὸν ἐστον GAN ἕτερον ἀλλήλοιν ; 
5 an an if 
EE. Ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, οὐ φαῦλον προστάττεις, 


4 «ε “-“ \ Ν “ / lal 4 
Σώκρατες. ἡμεῖς μὲν καὶ νῦν μακροτέραν τοῦ δέοντος 


’ « ἴω / ἴω 
πλέον ἡμᾶς κελεύεις πλανηθῆναι. 


> ἊΝ lo / 7 “2 ἊΝ 9 WS. 
ιοάπὸ τοῦ προτεθέντος λόγου πεπλανήμεθα, σὺ δ᾽ ETL 


A \ 3 “ 
νυν μεν οὖν, ὥσπερ 


3 / > 7 3 a \ ᾽ σ΄ \ 
ELKOS, ἐπανίωμεν πάλιν ταῦτα δὲ εἰσαῦθις κατα TXO- 


Ἂ / θ 7 9 7ὔ i 
NV, καθαπερ LXVEVOVTES, μέτιμεν. 


Ἂν; \ a / 
ov μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο 


3 ΄ > a , 
ye ad παντάπασι φύλαξαι, μή ποτε Tap ἐμοῦ δόξῃς 


NE. ΣΏ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


SN ΄σ / » / 
τ αὐτὸ ἐναργῶς διωρισμένον ἀκηκοέναι. 


5.7 o , 3 
HH. Eidos τε καὶ μέρος ἕτερον ἀλλήλων εἶναι. 


NE. ΣΩ. Τί μήν; 


"ἘΞ Ὥ is \ “ 5 Ν ͵7ὔ SLEN 
fy ds. 5 €lOOS μὲν OTQAV 7) TOU, Καὶ μέρος QUTO 


2. Δυδοὺς δὲ ἢ Φρύγας ἤ τινας 
ἑτέρου] There is deep irony 
in the substitution of these 
despised names (Eur. Alc. 675: 
ὦ παῖ, τίν᾽ αὐχεῖς, πότερα Λυδὸν 
ἢ Φρύγα κακοῖς ἐλαύνειν ἀργυρώ- 
νητον σέθεν) for that of Ἕλληνες 
as opposed to Βάρβαροι: and 
the same view is continued 
presently, where, to shew the 
nature of the distinction be- 
tween men and beasts, cranes 
are put in the place of men, 
whom they are supposed in 
turn to include amongst the 
beasts. 


> - 9S a ΄, “ a 3) 
"οἀναγκαίον εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος ὅτουπερ ἂν εἰδος 


5. τοῦτο αὐτό] Se. λέγε or 
page imphed in the question. 

13. καθάπερ ixvevovres | Cf. 
Theet. 187 6 : οὐκ ἀπὸ καιροῦ 
πάλιν ὥσπερ ἴχνος μετελθεῖν. 

14. μή ποτε---δόξῃης αὐτὸ] αὐτὸ 
is again used with a more dis- 
tinct reference to what follows 
than to what precedes. 

17. érepov] By attraction 
for ἕτερα. 

19. ‘Qs εἶδος μὲν--- ἀνάγκη] Cf. 
Prot. 350 6, where the non- 
convertibility of a universal 
affirmative is similarly noticed 
as a new thought. See also 








1263. λέγηται: μέρος δὲ εἶδος οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη. ταύτῃ με 


NE. >Q. Tair ἔσται. 


NE. 52. Ποῦ: 


NE. 30, ᾿Αληθῆ: 


καλέσας. 


ib. 329d: πότερον---ὥσπερ προσ- 
ὦπου τὰ μόρια ---- στόμα τε καὶ 
ῥὶς κιτιλ. ἢ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ 
“μόρια κ.τ.λ. 

1. μέρος δὲ εἶδος οὐδεμία ἀν- 
ayxn| At whatever point divi- 
sion is made, that which is cut 
off is equally a part. But each 
εἶδος, besides being part of a 
whole, has a natural unity and 
a character distinct from that 
of every other part. 

6. ὁπόθεν---ἤγαγεν] Cf. Rep. 
ὃ, 5643 6: πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετρα- 
πόμεθα: 

7. ὅθεν] By attraction for 
ἐκεῖθεν ov. 

8. μάλα mpodvpas] Supra 
262 a: Προθυμότατα διήρησαι. 

12. τότ Bodl. ἍΠῚ Τοῦτ: 
which would seem plausible 
but for the absence of the 





ἊἋ al 5 > / / 
ἢ Kelvyn μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ φάθι λέγειν. 
7 / Ν ἣ ~ 
¢ BE. Φρασον δή μοι TO μετὰ τοῦτο. 


΄-΄- f 2 i 7 ς Cal ~ > 

ΞΕ. To τῆς ἀποπλανήσεως ὅποθεν ἡμᾶς δεῦρ 

5 3 \ \ ΄ “ > Ν Ν 

ηγαγεν. οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ μάλιστα, ὅθεν ἐρωτηθεὶς ov 

\ > , a / 9 / 

τὴν ἀγελαιοτροφίαν ὅπῃ διαιρετέον εἶπες μάλα προ- 
/ [Δ] 53 7 7 Ν \ 3 7, oS 

θύμως Ov’ εἶναι Gov γένη, TO μὲν ἀνθρώπινον, ἕτε- 


\ Κ᾿ γι 
ρον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμπάντων θηρίων ἕν. 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 21 


crane were 
to put 
cranes in 
one cate- 
gory, and 
the other 
animals, 
including 
5 men, in 
another, 
with, it 
may be, the 
same name 
of * brutes.’ 
Such crude 


logic must 
be avoided 
here. 


yy XN , 7 ΄σ 
HE. Καὶ ἔμοιγε δὴ τότ᾽ ἐφάνης μέρος ἀφαιρῶν 

e ΄σ σ΄ \ Ν 5 7 / ἵν 
ἡγεῖσθαι καταλιπεῖν τὸ λοίπὸν αὖ πάντων γένος ἕν, 


“ a 5. Ν > ΄ "7 x / 
OTL πᾶσι TAUTOV ἐπονομάζειν εσχέρς ονόμα, θηρία 


d NE. SQ. ἪΝν καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως. 


/ 53 7 ? 
SE. To δέ ye, ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε, τάχ᾽ av, 


article. μέρος is used empha- 
tically as opp. to γένος : a part, 
but not necessarily a kind. 

13. καταλιπεῖν τὸ λοιπὸν av 
πάντων γένος ἕν] “That you 
had left in what remained, one 
class including all.” 

14. ἐπονομάζειν — καλέσας] 
Note the redundancy. 

17. To δέ ye] ‘‘ Whereas in 
truth.” Cf. (amongst many 
instances) Legg. 1, 630d: τὸ 
δὲ πῶς χρῆν ἡμᾶς λέγειν 5 

ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε 
also Legg. 10, 905 6. 

This passage has a real, 
though remote, bearing on 
two questions which have been 
associated also in recent in- 
quiry— the reality of species, 
and the relation of man to 
the lower animals. Plato, 


So 


22 ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


"ἢ ’ , ΕῚ / ~ lod - fal Ἀ 
εἴ που φρόνιμόν ἐστί τι ζῶον ἕτερον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ p. 26 


a ΄, yA a yA A E Hoe Sa / 
τῶν γεράνων, ἢ TL τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, * κατὰ ταῦτα ἴσως 


while believing firmly ἴῃ the 
existence of lines of demarca- 
tion in Nature corresponding 
to the distinctions of science 
(not to those of common lan- 
guage and opinion), appears, 
so far as he has a serious 
meaning under the mask of 
irony, to recognize the possi- 
bility of a closer relationship 
between the human _ species 
and other animal forms than 
is readily acknowledged by 
man. The object of the whole 
passage, however, from p. 262 
a, is, probably, to correct a 
misapprehension to which the 
reasoning of the Sophist might 
give rise. The antithesis of 
Being and Not-Being is in the 
abstract exhaustive, and the 
purely abstract notion of τὸ μὴ 
év is perfectly definite. But 
in particular inquiries, such as 
the present, it is not enough 
to distinguish logically, a pri- 
ori, between “this” and “all 
that is not this.” My con- 
ception of “this” gains no- 
thing from being opposed to 
a wholly indefinite idea in 
which there is no unity, and 
which is therefore not an 
idea. If the process of divi- 
sion is to add anything to 
knowledge, the conceptions 
which exclude each other 
must both be clearly seen, and 
so must the boundary which 
divides them. In other words, 
there must be a reasonable 
and clearly understood ground 
or principle for each dicho- 
tomy. The positive as well 
as the negative element of the 
conception which is rejected 


-hended. For 


must be recognized, in order 
that the negative as well as 
the positive content of the 
selected notion may be appre- 
instance, the 
comparative study of Natural 
History, Anatomy, and Physi- 
ology gives a far more com- 
plete notion of man’s physical 
nature than is arrived at 
through the observation of man 
himself, or through the mere 
distinction at first hand be- 
tween man and the brutes. 

1. φρόνιμον----τὸ τῶν γεράνων 
The migratory habits of the 
crane gave him an important 
place in ancient fable. (Hom. 
Il. r. 3-7.) Aristotle suggests 
the following reasons for sup- 
posing the existence of reason 
in the crane. De Anim. H. ix. 
11: Φρόνιμα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ 
τῶν γεράνων δοκεῖ συμβαίνειν. 
ἐκτοπίζουσι γὰρ μακράν, καὶ εἰς 
bos πέτονται πρὸς τὸ καθορᾷν τὰ 
πόρρω καὶ ἐὰν ἴδωσι νέφη καὶ 
χειμέρια, καταπτᾶσαι ἡσυχάζου- 
σιν. “Ere δὲ τὸ ἔχειν ἡγεμόνα τε 
καὶ τοὺς ἐπισυρίττοντας ἐν τοῖς 
ἐσχάτοις, ὥστε κατακούεσθαι τὴν 
φωνήν. Ὅταν δὲ καθέζωντιιι, ai 
μὲν ἄλλαι ὑπὸ τῇ πτερύγι τὴν 
κεφαλὴν ἔχουσαι καθεύδουσιν ἐπὶ 
ἑνὸς ποδὸς ἐναλλάξ, ὁ δὲ ἡγεμὼν 
γυμνὴν ἔχων τὴν κεφαλὴν mpoopa, 
καὶ ὅταν αἴσθηταί τι σημαίνει 
βοῶν. 

τὸ τῶν γεράνων] Se. γένος, 
infr. Or simply -- οἱ γέρανοι. 
Cf. supr.: τὸ τῆς ἀποπλανήσεως. 

2. * κατὰ ταὐτὰ] MSS. ὃ κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ, ὃ, which the Zurich 
editors reject and Bekker and 
Hermann include in brackets, 
is indefensible because inter- 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


23 


{ 6 , , N , , \ A / 
263. διονομαζοι, καθάπερ Kai σύ, yepavovs μὲν ἕν γένος 


> \ ἴω » / Ν a SLAIN « a 
ἀντιτιθεν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ σεμνυνον αὐτὸ EAUTO, 


\ \ - > δ > Sia 
Ta δὲ ἄλλα μετὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ξυλλιιβὸν εἰς ταὐτὸ 


OX 7 Ἁ 7 / / fal 
οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν tows θηρία προσείποι. πειραθῶμεν 


Ly Ὁ ἴω Lal / / lal 
οὖν ἡμεῖς ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι πάνθ᾽ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα. 


NE. ΣΩ. Πῶώς; 


\ a Χ ζω /, Υ / ἡ 
EE. Μὴ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ζώων γένος διαιρούμενοι, ἵνα 


ἧττον αὐτὰ πάσχωμεν. 
NE. 
cH DR 
NE. 50. Τί δή: 


EE. 


Sv Sy 


γάρ: 


rupting the sense between ἂν 
and διονομάζοι, where the opt. is 
required by προσείποι infr. διο- 
νομάζοι = distinguish in words. 
Note the return to the more 
direct constr. in προσείποι. 

2. σεμνῦνον --- éavtd] Cf. 
Phileb. 28 d: of σοφοί, ἑαυτοὺς 
ὄντως σεμνύνοντες. 

4. προσείποι] There is a re- 
turn from the participial to the 
more direct construction. 

5. ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι ---- τοιαῦτα | 
“ Keep ourselves quite free 
from any such error.” 

Where the use of compounds 
is so frequent, it is unsafe to 
lay too much stress on the 
meaning of prefixes. Hence 
in Soph. 231 ¢ (where see note) 
perhaps ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν means 
simply “to recover breath,” as 
in Pheedr. 254 ©. 

7. Μὴ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ζώων διαιρ.] 
“ By not making the whole 
animal kingdom the object of 


DQ. Οὐδὲν yap δεῖ. 


\ 3 ΄ ε , , 
Kai yap οὖν Kai τότε ἡμαρτάνετο TAUTN. 


΄-“ a 7 ἈΝ Gain 7 
Τῆς γνωστικῆς ὅσον ἐπιτακτικὸν ἡμῖν μέρος, 


a a ’ὕ » / Ν as 
ν που TOU ζωοτροφικοῦ γένους, ἀγελαίων μὴν ζώων. 


our (final) division.” 1. 6. By 
first subdividing it so as to 
deal with a part only. 

8. αὐτὰ] Cf. Theet. 207 d: 
δρῶντας αὐτά. 

9. Οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ] Either “ In- 
deed we must ποῦ :” or, if οὐδὲν 
refers to ἧττον, “We must avoid 
it altogether—he (not less liable 
but) not at all liable to this 
mistake.’’ The former is more 
idiomatic. 

Το. καὶ τότε] Also in a former 
division: viz. 261 d, where 
we distinguished ἡ τῶν ἀγελαίων 
ζώων ἐπιτακτικη. All animals, 
whether gregarious or other- 
wise, should have been first dis- 
inguished into wild and tame. 

12. ὅσον --- μέρος] Sub. ἦν 
from next clause. 

13. ἀγελαίων μὴν ζώων] Cf. 
Legg. 3, 694 6 (Cyrus is spoken 
of): ὁ δέ ye πατὴρ αὐτοῖς αὖ 
ποίμνια μὲν καὶ πρόβατα καὶ ἀγέλας 
ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν πολ- 


Io We had 


already 
erred in the 
same direc- 
tion when 
we spoke of 
our “* com- 
manding 
science” as 
concerned 
with herd- 
ed animals, 


For there 
is a pre- 
vious divi- 
sion of ani- 
mals into 
wild and 
tame, and 
this we 
passed 
over. Let 
us be more 
guarded, 
now that 
we have 
felt the 
truth of the 
proverb, 

«* More 
haste, 
worse 
speed.” 
We may 
thus arrive 
at the same 
result, but 
it will be 
worked out 
for us in a 
more satis- 
factory 
way. 


5 


10 


15 


24 
NE. 2Q. Nai. 


ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


/ ” Ν / / Ν 
EE. Διήρητο τοίνυν ἤδη καὶ τότε ξύμπαν τὸ 


ζῶον τῷ τιθασῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ. 
ἐ [ [ 


\ \ \ “ἢ 
τὰ μὲν yap ἐχοντα 


/ , “ , \ \ \ 
τιθασεύεσθαι φύσιν ἥμερα προσείρηται, τὰ δὲ μὴ 


ἔχοντα ἄγρια. 
NE. 2Q. Καλώς. 
HOR 
ἡμέροις 
ᾧητητέα θρέμμασιν. 
NE. 20. Nai. 
cA OF 


“ 
ATTAVTA 


\\ / 6 Ν a r 5 
TAXU YVEYOMEVA Προς Τῇ TOALTLKY). 


e na 


“Hv δέ ye θηρεύομεν 


/ ,’ ΄σ 
ἐπιστήμην, ἐν τοῖς 


53 Ν 4 τ a > , ‘ 
ἣν TE καὶ ἐστιν, ETL τοῖς ἀγελαίοις μεν 


\ / , y y 
Μὴ τοίνυν διαιρώμεθα ὥσπερ τότε, πρὸς 
ἀποβλέψαντες, μηδὲ σπεύσαντες, ἵνα δὴ 


πεποίηκε γὰρ 


A a Ν Ν \ ‘ iv 
ἡμᾶς Kal νῦν παθεῖν τὸ κατὰ THY παροιμίαν παθος. 


NE. 2Q. [Ποῖον ; 


HE. Οὐχ ἡσύχους εὖ διαιροῦντας ἠνυκέναι Bpadv- 


τερον. 


NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ ξένε, πεποίηκεν. 


ZE. Ταῦτ᾽ ἔστω. 


πάλιν 6 οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς 


Χ A / Co) 3) \ 
20THY κοινοτροφικὴν πειρώμεθα διαιρεῖν: tows yap 


καὶ τοῦτο, 
Ib. 5, 735: πᾶσαν 
ἀγέλην ποιμὴν καὶ BovKodos Tpo- 
φεύς τε οὐκ ἄλλως μήποτε ἐπιχει- 
ρήσῃ θεραπεύειν. 

3. ἔχοντα--φύσι»ν)] “ Whose 
nature admitted οἵ domestica- 
tion.” 

8. ἦν] Cf. 263 e. 

μὲν introduces a qualifica- 
tion, which would be expressed 
in English by an emphasis on 
the adjective. 

12. ἵνα δὴ] Cf. Theet. 183 a: 
iva δὴ---ὀρθὴ φανῇ. 

τύ, Οὐχ ἡσύχους---βραδύτερο»] 


λὰς ἐκτᾶτο. 


ἃ XN a / ε 
Ὁ σὺ προθυμεῖ, διαπεραινόμενος ὁ 


The proverb (- “ More haste, 
worse speed”) seems to be given 
verbatim, except that διαιροῦν- 
τας is substituted for some more 
general word. 

εὖ] “ Carefully.” 

18. Kal καλῶς ye] Le. “ We 
have reason to be glad of the 
delay.” 

21. τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὃ σὺ mpobupei] 
1. 6. the definition of man, as 
the object of the statesman’s 
art. Supr. 262 Ὁ: ἰδὼν ἐπ᾽ ἀν- 
θρώπους πορευόμενον. 

διαπεραινόμενος--μηνύσει}] Cf. 


Ῥ. 26 





Ῥ. 26, 


b 


ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. Q5 


264. λόγος αὐτός κάλλιον μηνύσει. καί 


φράζε. 
NE. ΣΏ. Ποῖον δή ; 


μααὶ 4 ν᾽ ΄ > 
mE. Tode, εἰ τινων πολλάκις τ δια κη κοῖς: οὐ 


σοι 


Gregarious 
tame ani- 


e yap δὴ προστυχής ye αὐτὸς οἷδ᾽ ὅτι γέγονας ταῖς ἐν 5. mals in- 


clude 
τῷ Νείλῳ τιθασείαις τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς 


shoals of 

A , > \ \ ΄ le tye fish and 
βασιλικαῖς λίμναις. ἐν μὲν yap κρῆναις TAX ἂν flocks of 
geese and 


5 7 ’ / 
ἴσως εἴης noOnpevos. Crimean 
witness the 
fishponds 
of Egypt 
and Baby- 
lon and the 
plains of 
Thessaly. 


NE. ΣΏ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ταῦτα τεθέαμαι κἀ- 
κεῖνα πολλῶν ἀκήκοα. 10 


SE. Kal μὴν ynvoBwrias ye καὶ yepavoBwrias, 


Legs. 7, 799 6: κἂν ἡ διέξ- 
odos αὕτη ὅλη σχοῦσα τέλος ἱκα- 
νῶς ἂν μηνύσειε καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπο- 
ρούμενον. Arist. Pol. IIT.3: αὐτὸ 
yap φανὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆλον. 


τῶν ἐν ταῖς β. λίμναι] Se. 
ἰχθύων. As if the former phrase 
had been ταῖς τῶν ἐν τῷ N. 
ἰχθύων τιθασείαις. “I know you 
have never had an opportunity 





I. avros—pnvioe| Cf. Thest. 
200 6: τάχ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸ φήνειε τὸ 
(nrovpevov. Phileb.20: προϊὸν δ᾽ 
ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει. 

4. Τόδε, εἴ τινων] “ This, 
whether you have perhaps 
heard of it.” Cf. Theeet. 158 c: 
τὸ ποῖον ; Ὃ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι 
διακηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων κιτιλ. It 
does not seem certain whether 
πολλάκις is here “ perhaps” (cf. 
Laches 194 a, Protag. 361 ὁ, 
Polit. infr. 283 b) or “often :” 
ef. πολλῶν infr.c. But the for- 
mer is more probable. 

5- mpooruxns | This word oc- 
curs again in the Laws and 
Epinomis, and nowhere else 
in Plato, or indeed in Greek. 

6. τιθασείαι.] This word, an 
abstract noun formed from 
τιθασεύω, occurs nowhere else 
in classical Greek. The plural 
of the abstract noun is used to 
express the concrete. 


of seeing how tame fish are 
kept in the Nile and in the 
ponds of the Great King.” 

II. yepavoBwrias| The flocks 
of cranes are probably sug- 
gested by the previous mention 
of the crane. The crane is 
classed with man by Aristotle 
as not only ἀγελαῖον but πολιτι- 
κὸν ζῶον, the form of his con- 
stitution being a monarchy. 
De Anim. Hist. I. 1. § 11: 
λιτικὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὧν & τι καὶ κοινὸν 
γίγνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον, ὅπερ οὐ 
πάντα ποιεῖ τὰ ἀγελαῖα. Ἔστι δὲ 
τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπος, μέλιττα, σφὴξ, 
μυρμὴξ, γέρανος. 
μὲν ὑφ᾽ ἡγεμόνα ἐστί, τὰ δ᾽ ἄναρχα, 
οἷον γέρανος μὲν καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιτ- 
τῶν γένος ὑφ᾽ ἡγεμόνα, μυρμήκες 


T7O- 


, 
καὶ τούτων τὰ 


δὲ καὶ μυρία ἄλλα ἄναρχα. Com- 
pare Plat. Pheedo 82 b: πολι- 


τικόν τε Kal ἥμερον γένος, ἢ που 
΄“ x ~ x LA 

μελιττῶν, ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων---- 

x 

ἢ TO ἀνθρώπινον. 


26 IAATOQNOZ 


> Ν \ /, Ν \ ἈΝ ͵ 
Hence the εἰ καὶ μὴ πεπλάνησαι περὶ τὰ Θετταλικὰ πεδία, p. 264 
art of herd- 
ing may be 
divided 


΄, A , 5 
πέπυσαι γοῦν καὶ πιστεύεις εἶναι. 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μήν: 


into sub- 
aqueousand ms = , ᾿ Soha? a ; 
terrene. SE. Τοῦδ᾽ ἕνεκά τοι πάντα ἠρώτησα ταῦτα, διότι ἃ 
And of the a = ’ ; ee eS ἐξ 
terrene ὃὅτῆς τῶν ἀγελαίων τροφῆς ἐστι μὲν ἔνυδρον, ἔστι δὲ 
creatures, \ ΄ 
onde Kal ξηροβατικόν. 
are fledged. 3 \ 5 
Statecraft NE, 2Q. Ἔστι yap οὖν. 
is ied 9 > > a , om 
Sian τὰ δὰ HE. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκεῖ ταύτῃ δεῖν διχα- 

dno \ \ , > 7 7, 
ΠΗ Cw τὴν κοινοτροφικὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐφ ἑκατέρῳ τού- 
animals: \ , > 05 5 ΄, cu, \ Ἢ 
ali. τῶν TO μέρος αὑτῆς ἐπινέμοντας ἑκάτερον, TO μὲν 
dividing “ ς \ > ΄ Go ἐν be 
these, rea- ετέρον ὑγροτροφικὸν ον ομάζον Tas, TO ὃ ετέρον Enpo 
son points (0) ὃ 
outalonger ΤΡ οφικον 2 
anda short- NE. ΣΩ. "Epocye. 
er way. 

. = Ν \ Ν X\ S 7 > ? 

peared BE. Kat μὴν καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν οὕτως ov ζητή- 


accordance 15 σομεν ὁποτέρας ἐστὶ τῆς τέχνης" δῆλον γὰρ δὴ ε 
with the 


principles παντί. 

tem ND), MBO δ᾽ οἷ: 

but, as we Ἢ n 

have lei- HE. Πᾶς μὲν δὴ τό γε ξηροτροφικὸν τῆς aye- 
sure, we 3 « 

may try. λαιοτροφίας διέλοιτ᾽ ἂν φῦλον. 

oth—o a 

course in 20 NE. 2Q. Πῶς 5 

turn: tak- a z a 

ing the =E. Τῷ πτηνῷ τε καὶ πεζῷ διορισάμενος. 

longer 

way first, NE. 30. ᾿Αληθέστατα. 

whilst we ΓΞ} , , Q Ὁ μος Sean ς Ἄ 
are fresh. SE. Ti δέ; τὸ πολιτικὸν “ὼς περὶ τὸ πεζὸν 


4. Τοῦδ᾽ ἕνεκά τοι] Cf. Theeet. 
185 d: τοῦδέ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι 
διακριβοῦμαι. 

5. (ξηροβωτικόν i) The words 
ἐνυδρὸν and ξηροβατικὸν are ap- 
plied to birds by Aristotle, in 
the only other place where the 
latter word occurs in classical 
Greek.7 ΕΠ Al vi-g2 ments (ui 
vulgd ξηροβιωτικόν). 

14. Kat μὴν καὶ---παντί] “ If 
we divide thus, we shall also 


be saved the trouble of asking 
to which art the kingly func- 
tion belongs: for this will be 
evident to all.” 
ποιήσαντες. 

23. *as περὶ τὸ πεζὸν] Stall- 
baum is wrong in saying that 
Bekker took his reading εἰ περὶ 
from the majority of MSS. 
The following are the varia- 
tions, as quoted by him :—e 


" 
εἴπερ 


περὶ; ὥσπερ EL; ἢ ὥσπερ C et 


“ ΄ 
ουτῶς = TOUTO 








ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 27 


εἰπεῖν δοξάζειν οὕτως ; 


NE. SQ. "Eyoye. 


. 264. ζητητέον ; ἢ οὐκ οἴει καὶ TOV ἀφῤρονεστατον ὡς ἔπος 


ΞΕ. Τὴν δὲ πεζονομικήν, καθάπερ ἄρτιον ἀρι- 


θμόν, δεῖ τεμνομένην δίχα ἀποφαίνειν. 


NE. ΣΏ. Δῆλον. 


bomen Ν σ , ad CLA ε 

SE. Καὶ μὴν ἐφ᾽ ὁ γε μέρος ὥρμηκεν ἡμῖν ὁ 

7 99 » lal / \ al « \ , 
λόγος, ἐπ᾿ ἐκεῖνο δύο τινὲ καθορᾷν ὁδὼ TeTapeva 


φαίνεται, τὴν μὲν θάττω, πρὸς μέγα μέρος σμικρὸν 


’, Χ Ψ. > “- / A We 
διαιρουμένην, τὴν δέ, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, 


σ -“ o « ΄ And) aS, “ 
ὅτι δεῖ μεσοτομεῖν ὡς μάλιστα, TOUT εχουσαν μαλ- 


265. λον, μακροτέραν γε μήν. 


y, 3 « / a 
ἔξεστιν OUY, οποτέερᾶν ἂν 


βουληθῶμεν, ταύτην πορευθῆναι. 


re ἘΠ; ἢ ὥσπερ H; ὥσπερ ἃ ς 

i.e. the rest with Stephanus’ 
ed.) Bekker’s reading, εἰ περὶ 
τ. π., ζητητέον, would be more 
plausible if καὶ μὴν---οὐ ζητή- 
σομεν were immediately pre- 
ceding. Heindorf’s, ἢ περὶ τ. 
π. ᾧ,, is not improbable in itself, 
but has weak MS. confirma- 
tion. 

If ὡς περὶ is right, this had 
probably been corrupted into 
ὡσπερεὶ, and hence, through 
transposition, the variety. This 
reading inyolves ἃ consider- 
able ellipse, viz. of ἢ καὶ τοῦτο 
δῆλον ; or the like words. Cf. 
Soph. 248 d: To δὲ, ὡς, κιτιλ., 
and note. 

4. καθάπερ ἄρτιον ἀριθμόν | 
Stallb. has adopted Ast’s conj., 
καθάπερ ἄρτι τὸν a., but such a 
reference would be superfluous 
and without point. The Stran- 
ger, as presently appears more 
clearly, does not forget the stu- 
dies in which young Socrates 


has been imbued by Theodorus, 
and uses ‘even number’ as a 
familiar example of that which 
can be halved: the object being 
still to divide each class as 
nearly as possible in the middle 
(μεσοτομεῖν infr., ἐν ἡμίσεσι --- 
ζητεῖσθαι supr.). Comp. Legg. 
10, 895 6, cited by the Zurich 
editors, who are curiously mis- 
understood by Stallbaum. The 
definition of even number is 
there said to be ὁ δίχα διαιρού- 
pevos. There is probably no 
distinct allusion to the former 
mention of ἄρτιον καὶ περιτ- 
τόν. 

7. ὥρμηκεν] Cf. supr. 262 Ὁ: 
ἐπ᾿ ἀνθρώπους πορευόμενον. 

8. καθορᾷν----ῴφαίνεται) Se. 6 
λόγος, still personified. 

II. μεσοτομεῖν] The same love 
of ‘measure’ appears as an 
ethical notion in Legg. 7, 793 
&: τὸν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς akpa- 
τον βίον φεύγειν δεῖν πάντας, 
μέσον δέ τινα τέμνειν ἀεί. 


Ἐπ 2 


28 MAATQNOZ ; 


NE. ΣΩ. Ti δέ; ἀμφοτέρας ἀδύνατον ; 
ΞΕ. Ἅμα γ᾽, ὦ θαυμαστέ: ἐν μέρει γε μὴν 


Ρ. 265. 


δῆλον ὅτι δυνατόν. 

NE. ΣΩ. Ἔν μέρει τοίνυν ἔγωγε ἀμφοτέρας αἱ- b 
5 ροῦμαι. 

EE. Ῥάδιον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ λοιπὸν βραχύ. κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς 


\ \ A oA a / \ x 5 ᾿ 
μὴν καὶ μεσοῦσιν ἅμα τῆς πορείας χαλεπὸν av ἣν Ι 


a 


ε a XN / Fy a > > \ lal / Χ 
ἡμῖν τὸ προσταγμα᾽ νῦν δ᾽, ἐπειδὴ δοκεῖ ταύτῃ, τὴν 
/ / 57 / \ y+ 
μακροτέραν πρότερον Ἰωμεν᾽ νεαλέστεροι yap ὄντες 
ea 3. ΕΝ ΄ \ \ SS 7, σ 
ιοβᾷον αὐτὴν πορευσόμεθα. τὴν δὲ δὴ διαίρεσιν Opa. 


NE. 2Q. Λέγε. 


Gregarious BE. Ta πεζὰ ἡμῖν τῶν ἡμέρων, ὅσαπερ ἀγελαῖα, 
ἜΣ ΝΣ διῃρημένα ἐστὶ φύσει δίχα. 

δ οι, ἈΠ, XO, None 

eee ΞΕ: Τῷ τῶν μὲν τὴν γένεσιν ἄκερων εἶναι, τῶν 
Thisdis δὲ κερασφύρον. 8 
τ το ον NE. 3Q. Φαννεται. 

eee EE. Τὴν δὴ πεζονομικὴν διελὼν ἀπόδος ἑκατέρῳ 
vee σῷ μέρει, λόγῳ χρώμενος. ἂν γὰρ ὀνομάζειν αὐτὰ 


2. βουληθῇς, ἔσται σοι περιπεπλεγμένον μᾶλλον τοῦ 
΄ 
δέοντος. 





2. ὦ θαυμαστέ] “ What a 
thing to ask!” This expres- 
sion throws some light on the 
common use of ὦ θαυμάσιε. 

4. ἀμφοτέρας] πορευθῆναι is 
probably to be supplied. 

6. ἐπειδὴ---βραχύ] The poor 
youth is deceived into thinking 
that he is near the end of his 
journey : τὸ δ᾽ ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, 
προοίμιον. 

κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς) This is one of 
the expressions which occur 
frequently in the Politicus and 
Laws. 

9. νεαλέστεροι] ‘ While still 


fresh.” See Passow or Liddell 
and Scott sub. v. 

15. τὴν γένεσιν] “ Theirgrowth 
or mode of existence.” γένεσις 
here almost = φύσις. “In that 
some are produced without 
horns and others with them.” 

18. ἀπόδος] Sc. τὸ προσῆκον, 
or τὴν πρόσρησιν, which would 
be generally ὄνομα, but here 
λόγον. Compare Antisthenes’ 
sneer, that definition is only a 
roundabout way of naming. 

20. περιπεπλεγμένον͵] EH. g. 
κεροφορονομευτικὴ, κολοβοκερατο- 
νομικῆ. “ Using description, 





, 265. 


d 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


29 


NE. 2Q. Πῶς οὖν χρὴ λέγειν ; 
ΞΕ. Ὧδε: τῆς πεζονομικῆς ἐπιστήμης δίχα διαι- 


72 Ν / / 3 ΄' 
ρεθείσης τὸ μόριον θάτερον ἐπὶ τῷ κεροφύρῳ μέρει 


ῶ a > ΩΝ > , 6 Ν δὲ “ἤ πρὸς al “- 
TE TNS αγελῇς ETLTETAYX al, TO O€ ETEPOV ἐπι T@ TS 


4 
ἀκεράτου. 


NE. ΣΏ. Ταῦτ᾽ ἔστω ταύτῃ λεχθέντα' πάντως 


γὰρ ἱκανῶς δεδήλωται. 


μ- Ν \ “ \ ἘΠ “Ὁ 3 
mE. Καὶ μὴν ὃ γε βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν αὖ κατα- 


\ σ XN 5 / A 4 
φανὴς ὅτι κολοβὸν ἀγέλην τινὰ κεράτων vo- 


/ 
EVEL. 


NE. 2Q. Πῶς yap ov δῆλος ; 


=E aN / / θ / Ν 7 
me 1}. αὐτὴν τοινὺν κατασραυσάᾶντες, TO γιγνο- 


> “ / 3 ~ 
μενον αὑτῷ πειρώμεθα ἀποδοῦναι. 
2 


NE. ΣΏ. Πάνυ γε. 


EE. Πότερον οὖν βούλει τῷ σχιστῷ τε καὶ τῷ: 


/ / ΄- 41 Ὁ Ἃ a 7 
καλουμένῳ μώνυχι διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ κοινογονίᾳ τε 


Ν ἰὃ / 5 θ 7 7 
και LOLOYOVLA 5 μᾶν QVELS γὰρ που. 


NE. >Q. Τὸ ποῖον ; 

HE. Ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν 
ἐξ ἀλλήλων γεννᾷν. 

NE. ΣΟ: Nai. 


for should you attempt to name 
them, the result would be too 
complicated.” The Gaution 
would apply still more point- 
edly to what follows. 

4. τῷ τῆς akepdrov| Se. μέρει. 
The genitive of apposition is 
used (instead of τῷ ἀκεράτῳ) by 
attraction from ἀγέλης prece- 
ding. 

9. κολοβὸν ---- κεράτων] “A 
polled herd.” The gen. after 
a privative adj., like ἄχαλκος 
ἀσπίδων. 

12. τὸ yeyvopevov] “ That 
which falls to him.” Cf. Legg.11, 


cd Ν + , 
ἱππὼν καὶ OVOV πέφυκεν 


920 6: ἰδεῖν λῆμμά τε καὶ ἀνά- 
λωμα τί ποτε τῷ καπήλῳ κέρδος 
ποιεῖ τὸ μέτριον γράψαντας δὲ, 
θεῖναι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀνάλωμα καὶ 
λῆμμα καὶ φυλάττειν. Ib. 12, 
949 d: τὸ δὲ νόμισμα γίγνεσθαι 
τῇ πόλει. Thue. V. 49: ὁ τῷ 
θεῷ γίγνεται αὐτοὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων 
nity 

ἐκτίσειν. 

15. τῷ καλουμένῳ μώνυχι] This 
expression indicates the fact 
that μῶνυξ was a rare word out 
of Homer. The characteristic 
of having solid hoofs is found 
to be coincident with that of 
making hybrids. 


5 


The king 
is the 

keeper of 
a horuless 


Toberd. But 


σι 


20 


hornless 
cattle are 
again di- 
vided by a 
double dis- 
tinction : 
into those 
which mix 
the breed 
and divide 
not the 
hoof, and 
thosewhich 
divide the 
foot and do 
not mix 
their breed. 


The latter 
description 
includes 
only two 
kinds. 

For dogs, 
though so- 
ciable, are 
not grega- 
rious. The 
ground of 
distinction 
between 
these two 
should be 
obvious to 
a friend of 
Theztetus 
and a geo- 
metrician. 
Man walks 
by a power 
of two feet: 
theremain- 
ing kind is 
potentially 
represent- 
ed by the 


Io 


30 ITAATQNOZ 


HE. To δέ ye λοιπὸν ἔτι τῆς λείας ἀγέλης τῶν 
ἡμέρων ἀμιγὲς γένει πρὸς ἄλληλα. 
NE. 2Q. Τιὸς δ᾽ ov; 


μ--ἰ Ν y > ᾽ ,ὔ 7 
ΞΕ. Τί δ᾽; ὁ πολιτικὸς ap ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν 
/ / “ 7 la 

sbaiverar πότερα Kowoyevovs φύσεως ἢ τινος ἰδιο- 


γενοῦς ; 

NE. ΣΏ. Δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀμίκτου. 

EE. Ταύτην δὴ δεῖ καθάπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, ὡς 
ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς δίχα διαστέλλειν. 

NE. 2Q. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν. 

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ζῶον, ὅσον 7, i ἀγε- 

; ; ἥμερον καὶ aye 

λαῖον, σχεδὸν πλὴν γενοῖν δυοῖν πᾶν ἤδη κατακεκερ- 


’ 
ματισται. 


N \ a a > 5 7 
TO γὰρ Τῶν κυνῶν OUK ἐπάξιον Κατ- 


“ 7 ε 3 3 , i 
αριθμεῖν γένος ws ev ἀγελαίοις θρέμμασιν. 


5 ΝΕ. 20. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. 


διαιροῦμεν ; 


\ \ Ἂν 
ἀλλὰ τίνι δὴ τὼ δύο 


@ ul 4 \ 
HE. Ὥιπερ καὶ δίκαιόν ye Θεαίτητον τε καὶ σὲ 


, χ ᾿ , “ 
διανέμειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ γεωμετρίας ἅπτεσθον. 


NE. ΣΩ. Τῷ; 


ΞΕ. Τῇ διαμέτρῳ δήπου καὶ 


μέτρου διαμέτρῳ. 


Lament When the horse 
and ass are taken from the 
hornless cattle. 

λείας I. 6. κολοβοκεράτου. 

2. ἀμιγὲς γένει] “ Do not mix 
their breed.” Dat. of the mode, 
like φύσει. 

4. ὁ πολιτικὸς ap | For the 
late position of the interroga- 
tive πότερα in the sentence, 
compare Soph. 237 ¢: ἔχειν do- 
κοῦμεν ἂν eis τί, and note. Supr. 
261 c: Λέγεις δὲ---πότερον. Rep. 
9,571 6: Λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας ; 

17. δίκαιον] “ It is to be ex- 


πάλιν τῇ τῆς δια- 


pected of you.” Cf Meno 85 6: 
δίκαιος yap εἶ εἰδέναι. 

20. Τῇ διαμέτρῳ δήπου] The 
diameter of the unit square was 
the subject of some of the ear- 
liest lessons in that geometrical 
arithmetic through which alone 
numbers had hitherto been stu- 
died: and it had been observed 
that this diameter is equal to 
the square-root of two. Hence, 
a foot being always the unit, 
this line was known both as 7 
διάμετρος and as ἡ διάμετρος 7 
δυνάμει δίπους : and it is the 


Ῥ. 265, 


p. 26 














266. 
ΤΡ 


MOAITIKOX. 


NE. >. Πῶς εἶπες ; 


/ aA Ν 7 c “ nA 
BE. Ἢ φύσις, ἣν τὸ γένος ἡμῶν τῶν 


91 


» / 
ἀνθρώπων 


/ a 37 , Ν / / Δ 
κέκτηται, μῶν ἄλλως πως εἰς τὴν πορείαν πέφυκεν ἢ 


καθάπερ ἡ διάμετρος ἡ δυνάμει δίπους ; 


NE. SQ. Οὐκ ἄλλως. 


μι \ “ a qn / 7 > 
ΜΞ Εἰ. Kai μὴν ἢ ye τοῦ λοιποῦ γένους πάλιν ἐστὶ 


abbreviated form of the latter 
expression, viz. δίπους δύναμις, 
which gives occasion to the 
Stranger’s somewhat laborious 
pleasantry. 

The incommensurability of 
this diameter with the side of 
the square (of ,/2 with 1) was 
one of the most familiar lessons 
of this early geometry. Hence, 
possibly ὃ, the omission of 2 
amongst the προμήκεις ἀριθμοὶ 
in the demonstration of Theo- 
dorus (Theet. 147 d: τῆς τε τρί. 
modos πέρι kal πεντέποδος k.T.d.), 
it being taken for granted, 
without proof, that the δίπους 
δύναμις Was μήκει ov Evpperpos 
τῇ ποδιαίᾳ. 

While these were still recent 
discoveries, philosophers were 
led to see fanciful analogies to 
them in other departments of 
knowledge. Plato here satir- 
izes a tendency from which he 
was not at this time himself 
wholly free. The smile is al- 
ready on his face which pre- 
sently breaks into a laugh. 

Our view has been restricted 
to tame gregarious animals : 
to tame animals that tread the 
ground, that cannot fly, that 
have no horns, that divide the 
foot: thus oxen, horses, asses 
are excluded; dogs are not gre- 
garious. What remain? What 
but swine and men? Human 


progression is measured by the 
power of two feet, that of 
swine, the only remaining ani- 
mal, by the power of four. This 
interpretation has been well 
supported by Dr. Badham in 
the ‘ Epistola’ prefixed to his 
edition of the Euthydemus and 
Laches. 

I. Πῶς εἶπες :)] “ What did 
you say?” Expressing a not 
very unnatural surprise. 

6. ἐστὶ κατὰ δύναμιν αὖ τῆς 
ἡμετέρας δυνάμεως διάμετρος] “Is 
again potentially expressed by 
the diameter of our diameter,” 
i.e. the diameter of the square of 
which our diameter, ,/ 2, is the 
side. As the diameter of the 
unit square is 4/2, so the dia- 
meter of the square of ,/2 is 
/4. This appears, without 
the help of arithmetic, from 
the following diagram : 





ab 1 square foot; ed dia- 
meter of αὖ, and side of 2 ft. 
square dee; de diameter of 
2 ft. square; df square on 
de:= 4 square feet. 


a As suggested by a favourable critic in the National Review. 


diameter 
of the 
human 


power 2 Or 


in other 
words, 

walks by 
a power of 


5 four feet. 


32 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


A 
Thus man 
is differen- 


\ / 3 “ « 7 ΄ / 
κατὰ δύναμιν αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας δυνάμεως διάμετρος, p. 266. 


tiated from εἴπερ δυοῖν γέ ἐστι ποδοῖν δὶς πεφυκυῖα. 

ΔΕ; NE. ΣΩΏ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι; καὶ δὴ καὶ σχεδὸν ! 
ὃ βούλει δηλοῦν μανθάνω. 

This is 5 (ΞΕ. Πρὸς δὴ τούτοις ἕτερον αὖ τι τῶν πρὸς 

enough. γέλωτα εὐδοκιμησάντων av, ὦ Σώκρατες, apa καθο- 

ΠΝ ρῶμεν ἡμῖν γεγονὸς ἐν τοῖς διῃρημένοις ; ο 

that this NE. 2Q. To ποῖον ; | 

aaa EE. TavOpdmwov ἡμῶν ἅμα γένος EvveAnyos 

creature 


Ν / an an 7 ΄΄ 
should be τὸ καὶ ξυνδεδραμηκὸς γένει τῷ TOV ὄντων γενναιοτάτῳ 
eft as 


ἈΝ 3 ΄ὕ 
και Apa EUXEPEOTATO. 


5. ἕτερον av] Those who 
have found in these words a 
new division, and would intro- 
duce here some fresh kind,— 
as geese or other domestic fowls 
(Ast, Stallbaum), which were 
cut off, supr. 264 e, or apes 
(Winkelmann), which as tame 
animals are hardly ἀγελαῖα θρέμ- 
para, unless M. Winkelmann 
can find the prototype of Bea- 
trice and her apes in classic 
story,—were right in supposing 
that a distinct step in the ar- 
gument must be here indi- 
cated. Man has been distin- 
guished in terms of mathema- 
tical progression from the only 
remaining quadruped, the pig. 
But it remains to be shewn of 
which kind the king is herds- 
man. It has been determined 
what two kinds are still in 
competition. But the result of 
their competition remains to 
be decided. 

τῶν πρὸς γέλωτα εὐδοκιμησάν- 
“Which might have 
become celebrated as a joke.” 
“<Might have won us a fellow- 
ship in a ery’ of humourists.” 


32 
τῶν ay 


πρὸς γέλωτα lit. “In respect 
of the purpose of creating 
laughter.” 

9. ἡμῶν] Qu. an leg. ἡμῖν, 
cf. Soph. 217 6, where the same 
doubt occurs. ‘ That it should 
be the lot of our human family 
to run a heat with the grandest, 
and at the same time the least 
fastidious, of all creatures.” 

ξυνειληχὸς] “ Having been 
appointed by lot to run with.” 
Cf. Hdt. V. 22: συνεξέπιπτε τῷ 
πρώτῳ, and Schw. Lex. Hdt. 
S.V. συνεκπίπτειν. 

10. γενναιοτάτῳ is ironical. Cf. 
Rep. 7, 529 b: οὐκ ἀγεννῶς μοι 
δοκεῖς---τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν 
λαμβάνειν παρὰ σαυτῷ ἣ ἐστι. 
But there is perhaps a humor- 
ous allusion (as Badham sup- 
poses) to the unwieldy bulk 
of the creature. 

II. εὐχερεστάτῳ, Whereas 
man, as it was said in the 
Theetetus, is δύσκολον καὶ ἐπί- 
βουλον ζῶον.  Schleiermacher 
well quotes Rep. 7, 535 6: εὖ- 
χερῶς, ὥσπερ θήριον ὕειον .---ἐν 
ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνηται. The conjec- 
ture γενναιότατον is quite un- 














ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 99 


NE. 2Q. Καθορῶ καὶ μάλ᾽ ἀτόπως ξυμβαῖνον. 


ΞΕ. Ti δ᾽ . οὐκ εἰκὸς ὕστατα ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὰ 


βραδύτατα: 


NE. ΣΩ. Nai, τοῦτό γε. 


μπααὶ , » σ "7 ΄ 
HE. Tode δὲ οὐκ ἐννοοῦμεν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερος 5 


ὁ βασιλεὺς φαίνεται μετὰ τῆς ἀγέλης ξυνδιαθέων 


/ “ lal > ΄- 5 Ν 
καὶ ξύνδρομα πεπορευμένος τῷ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αὖ πρὸς 


Ν A 
TOV εὐχερῆ βίον ἄριστα γεγυμνασμένῳ ; 
NE. 3Q. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


— a “ [3 / rae 7 
mE. Nov yap, © Σώκρατες, ἐκεῖνο ἐστι κατα- 


\ an ὡς « \ Lh Se oS) “ \ Ν \ 
haves μᾶλλον To pyOev Tor ἐν TH περὶ TOY σοφιστὴν 


ᾧγτήσει. 


called for. There is no real 
difficulty in the codrdination of 
γενναιοτάτῳ with εὐχερεστάτῳ, 
and the echo in γένει γενν. is 
clearly intentional, as in 7) γένει 
γενναία coduorixn. The two are 
thrown together by lot; they 
run a race together : which is 
left behind ? Clearly the slower 
animal, the pig. But the race 
between men and pigs involved 
a still more ridiculous race be- 
tween two sorts of men, the 
king and the swineherd. Thus 
his majesty is found contending 
for sovereignty with one of his 
flock (a phenomenon which will 
be repeated presently, cf. 267 e), 
and with one who has been most 
perfectly trained to lead a life 
of careless ease: Ulysses with 
that ὄρχαμος ἀνδρῶν Eumeeus. 

6. μετὰ τῆς ἀγέλης] 1. 6. τῶν 
ἀγελαίων τινίἔ. Cf. Hipp. Maj. 
288 d: οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφε- 
tos. Infr. 268 a: οὐ μόνον ἀγε- 
λαίων ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν 
ἀρχόντων αὐτῶν. 

That man should be the con- 
gener of the pig is in keeping 


with the humour of Theet. 
161 Cc: ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέ- 
τρον ἐστιν ὗς κιτιλ. And the 
race between the king and the 
swineherd recals another touch 
of satire in the same dialogue, 
(174 4): βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον 
—oiov συβώτην. 

7. αὖ] 1.6. As the pig was 
εὐχερέστατον τῶν θηρίων. 

mp. τ. €. β. γεγυμ. 1S an οὐνγ- 
moron. For γεγυμνασμένῳ πρὸς, 
cf. Lege. 1,626 Ὁ : καλῶς γε ὦ 
ξένε, φαίνει μοι γεγυμνάσθαι πρὸς 
τὸ διειδέναι τὰ Κρητῶν νόμιμα. 

Compare with the preceding 
classification the fourfold divi- 
sion of living creatures accord- 
ing to the four elements in Tim. 
40 a: pia μὲν οὐρανίων θεῶν 
γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτηνὸν καὶ depo- 
πόρον, τρίτη δὲ ἐνυδρὸν εἶδος, 
πεζὸν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τέταρτον. 

το. Νῦν γάρ] A collateral in- 
ference is sometimes stated as 
a cause, e.g. Gorg. 454 d: Aj- 
λον yap αὖ ὅτι ov ταὐτόν ἐστιν. 
Badham would read ye ἄρα in 
all such cases. 

11. ev τῇ --- ζητήσει] Soph. 


x FE 


competitor 
in the race. 


Man wins 
the run- 
ning-match, 
of course. 
But this 
strange 
race be- 
tween men 
and pigs 

is acconl- 
panied by 
one more 
absurd, be- 
tween the 


10 king and 


the swine- 
herd, who, 
of all his 

subjects is 


934 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


most com- NE. SQ. To ποῖον ; 
pletely 3 ΩΣ = 7 "ὔ 
ΠΡ ΡΠ το EE. Ὅτι τῇ τοιᾷδε μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὔτε 
a& ΠῚΘ ὁ 

/ a 3X / / / 
careless σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμελησεν ἢ μῆ; TOV TE σμικρο- 


ease. 


~ . Ia\ > Ν a ya \ > 
Certainly, τερον οὐδὲν ἠτίμακε προ TOV μείζονος, ἀεὶ δὲ καθ 


as was said 


A ce Ν / 5 / 
this morn- 5 αὑτὴν περαίνει τἀληθέστατον. 


ing, Dialee- 
tic prefers NE. yO: Ἔοικεν. 


truth to 


a ΄' εξ ty “ 3 
dignity. EE. Οὐκοῦν pera τοῦτο, ἵνα μή pe φθῆς ἐρω- 


τήσας τὴν βραχυτέραν ὁδὸν 


" , 53 >, N Ν ἴον 
ἥτις τότε ἦν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ 


/ [χὰ > / / 37 
βασιλέως ὅρον, αὐτός σοι πρότερον ἔλθω ; 


10 ΝΕ, ΣΩ, Σῴφοδρα γε. 
HE. Λέγω δὴ δεῖν τότε 
πρὸς [τὸ] τετράπουν γένος 
τἀνθρώπινον ἔτι μόνῳ τῷ 


/ /, ΄ὔ n 
Now for δίποδα ἀγέλην πάλιν τῷ 
the shorter a ΄ , \ 
way. ι5 φυεῖ τέμνειν, τμηθείσης δὲ 


εὐθὺς τὸ πεζὸν τῷ δίποδι 
a ΄ \ 
διανεῖμαι, κατιδόντα OE 
΄ XN \ 
πτηνῷ EvverAnxos THY 
ψιλῷ Kal τῷ πτερο- 
t l 


5 lal Ν 2) 27 “ 
αὐτῆς Kal TOT ἤδη τῆς 


ἀνθρωπονομικῆς δηλωθείσης τέχνης, φέροντα τὸν 


227 Ὁ, where the spirit of scien- 
tific method and that of satire 
interpenetrate as they do here, 
so that it can be hardly known 
which of them is made the 
vehicle of the other. 

3. ἢ μή] Se. σεμνοτέρου. 

11. τότε εὐθὺς τὸ πεζὸν] It is 
impossible to explain this pas- 
sage so as to acquit the Stran- 
ger of inexactness. Hither he 
has forgotten that the class of 
winged creatures was cut off 
(264 e), or he purposely begins 
the shorter path from an earlier 
point than where he gave no- 
tice of the existence of the two 
ways. Perhaps the words τότε 
εὐθὺς may imply this (ef. supr. 
263 6). In any case the word 
πεζὸν is used in a different sense 
from that in which it occurs 
above, where it was opposed to 


the same πτηνὰ which it here 
includes. πεζόν is therefore = 
ξηροβατικὸν, and opposed to 
ἔνυδρον, “on land,” not’ on the 
ground,” by an ambiguity like 
that which belongs to the 
same word when applied to 
an armament. Cf. infr. 267 b: 
πεζονομικόν. This ambiguity 
probably gives rise to the in- 
exact reference. Compare Rep. 
1, 354: ἐμπεσόντος αὖ ὕστερον 
Adyou—where the theory spo- 
ken of, although discussed later, 
had been introduced before the 
other. Soph. 223 d, 224 Ὁ: 
μεταβλητικήῆ. Such slight inac- 
curacies perhaps do not arise 
from mere neglect: they are 
caused by Plato’s instinctive 
avoidance of an over-exactness, 
which would be unnatural in 
conversation. 


Ρ. 266) 


Ne 


¢ 


J 


Ι 








ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 35 


\ , - « > wy 
, 266. πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν, οἷον ἡνίοχον εἰς αὐτὴν 






267. 


/ a A “ / « / « 
ἐνστήσαντα, παραδοῦναι τὰς τῆς πόλεως ἡνίας, ὡς 


> / Ν » al / 3) a > / 
οἰκείας καὶ αὐτῷ ταύτης οὔσης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. 

χω Ν / > 7 ΄ 

NE. ΣΏ. Καλῶς καὶ καθαπερεὶ χρέος ἀπέδωκας 


\ ΄ \ > \ @ 7 
μοι τὸν λόγον, προσθεὶς τὴν ἐκτροπὴν οἷον τόκον καὶ ς 


» 7 » / 
ἀναπληρώσας auTov. 


EE. Φέρε δή, καὶ ξυνείρωμεν ἐπανελθόντες ἐπὶ 


Ν 


\ 5 Χ ’ὔ a “- ἫΝ ΄ ΄ » , 
τὴν ἀρχὴν μέχρι THs τελευτῆς Tov λογον τοῦ oOVO- 


ματος τῆς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ τέχνης. 


NE. 3Q. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


ZE. Τῇ ἧς τοίνυν ἐπιστήμης ἡμῖν ἢ 
4H. ins γνωστικῆς τοίνυν emioTnuns ἡμῖν ἣν 


De 3. \ ᾽ὔ 3 Les / \ » \ 
KAT apxas μερος ETLTAKTLKOVY” TOUTOU δὲ ἀπεικασθεν 


I. οἷον----ἐνστήσαντα] For the 
two participles, cf. Protag. 328 
ὁ: ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας, ὅσου 
ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, 
τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν. 

2. παραδοῦναι --- ἐπιστήμης] 
“To give into his hands the 
reins of the state, believing 
that they are his, and that this 
art belongs to him.” (ταύτης 
SC. τῆς ἀνθρωπονομικῆς.) 

5. προσθεὶς τὴν ἐκτροπήν] ΟἿ. 
Lege.3, 685 a: νῦν οὖν δὴ τοσοῦ- 
Tov πλεονεκτοῦμεν τῇ πλάνῃ τοῦ 
λόγου. 

οἷον τόκον] “ΒΥ way of in- 
terest.” Cf. Rep.6, 507 ἃ: βου- 
λοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι 
ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, 
ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους 
μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον 
τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 
κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε μέντοι, μή 
πῃ ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς, κίβδηλον ἀπο- 
διδοὺς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου. ava- 
πληρώσας αὐτόν 80. τὸν λόγον. 
“Having given the tale in 
full.” Cf. Symp. 188 6: εἴ τι 
ἐξέλιπον, ἀναπληρῶσαι. The 


“shorter path” might have 
seemed too bare if given 
alone. 

7. Φέρε δὴ καὶ Evveipoper] 
“ Come, now let us proceed to 
link together.” Cf. Soph. 224 
d: ἴθι viv συναγάγωμεν αὐτό. 
For the idiomatic καὶ, cf. Soph. 
Aj. 803: εἴ τῳ καὶ λογίζεσθαι 
σχολή. 

8. τὸν λόγον τοῦ ὀνόματος | 
“ The definition of the name.” 
The words are emphatically 
repeated in order to fami- 
liarize the distinction between 
λόγος and ὄνομα. Cf. Soph. 218 
c: det δὲ det παντὸς πέρι τὸ 
πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων 
ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνομολογή- 
σασθαι χωρὶς λόγου. 

12. ἀπεικασθὲν] “ Having been 
illustrated by an analogy :” viz. 
that of the αὐτοπώλεις. Supr. 
260 6: ἢ βούλει, καθάπερ εἰκά- 
Copev νῦν δή, καὶ τοὔνομα παρεικά- 
Cf. Soph. 221 b: ἀπ’ 
αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἀφομοιωθὲν 
τοὔνομα. 


σωμεν. 


ΕΣ 2 


Land-ani- 
malsshould 
have been 


first divided 
into biped 
and quad- 
ruped : 
then bipeds 


into fledged 
and naked. 
And, when 
man had 
been thus 
distin- 
guished as 
the bipes 
implume, 
the States- 
man, as the 
man-herd, 
should have 
been en- 
trusted 


with the 
reins of 
govern- 
ment. 
The argu- 
ment, hav- 
ing been 
amplified 
by this 
addition, 
is recapi- 
tulated. 


90 


Ν / > ‘ > ’, 
τὸ μοριον αὐὑτεπιτακτικὸν ἐρρηθη. 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ζωοτροφικὴ δὲ 


7 > “ » Ν / “ “ 
παλιν αὐτεπιτακτιΚὴς οὐ TO σμικρότατον τῶν γενῶν 


> - 5 ͵ 
ἀπεσχίζετο᾽ καὶ ζωοτροφικῆς εἶδος ἀγελαιοτροφικόν, 


> tal > 3 ς / al Ν 
ἀγελαιοτροφικοῦ δ᾽ αὖ πεζονομικόν. τοῦ δὲ πεζονο- 


fol , > / a / / 
5MLKOU μάλιστα ἀπετέμνετο τέχνη τῆς ἀκεράτου φυ- 


΄, ΄ > 3 x / > 35 
σεως θ ΕἸΤΙΚΉ. ΤτΤαυτῆς ὃ aU τὸ μεροὸς Οὐκ ἐλαττον 
yy 1 jee 


“ / > lal Δ » vA L PN 
τριπλοῦν συμπλέκειν ἀναγκαῖον, ἂν εἰς ἐν τις AUTO 


yy va) “ / “" 3 / 
ὄνομα ξυναγαγεῖν βουληθῇ, γενέσεως *apixTov vopev- 


Week 5 / / 
TIKYY™ ἐπιστήμην προσαγορεύων. 


ἈΝ > ’ ἈΝ / 
TO δ᾽ ἀπὸ τούτου 


πο “ sea / Ol: ὃ 7 » θ Ἀ ΕΣ 
τμὴμα, ἐπὶ ποιμνῃ ὀίποὸι μερος ἀνθρωπονομικον ETL 


\ / a 3 5 3, “ 
λειφθὲν μόνον, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτό ἐστιν ἤδη τὸ ζητηθέν, ἅμα 
\ BIN \ N , 
βασιλικὸν Tavto κληθεν καὶ πολιτικον. 
NE. ΣΏΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


EE. ἾΑρά γ᾽, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς ἡμῖν τοῦτο, 


4. ἀγελαιοτροφικοῦ δ᾽ αὖ 
πεζονομικόν] Vid. supr. 264 6. 
The gregarious were first di- 
vided into land and water ani- 
mals, and then land animals 
into fledged and unfledged, to 
which latter the word πεζὸν 
was applied. These two steps 
are here remembered as one 
only: the second of the two 
distinctions being dropped, and 
the word πεζὸν being under- 
stood to mean “on land.” This 
confirms what has been said 
above in the note on p. 
266 d. 

6. οὐκ ἕλαττον τριπλοῦν] This 
is the reading of ten MSS., 
including the best, and is re- 
presented in the version of 
Ficinus, who probably joimed 
TO μέρος οὐκ ἔλαττον (ὄν) (“ par- 
tem nequaquam minorem.” Cf. 
supr. ov τὸ σμικρότατον τῶν γε- 
νῶν), which, however, is in- 
consistent with the context, 


and hardly grammatical. It 
seems most probable that we 
have here an unusual construc- 
tion, of which another instance 
occurs in Legg. 12, 956 e: 
ὑφὴν δὲ μὴ πλέον ἔργον γυναικὸς 
μιᾶς ἔμμηνον, where there is no 
difference of reading. Cf. supr. 
265 c. -Three MSS, 22%, 
have τριπλοῦ, which Stallbaum 
adopts. 

8. For γενέσεως, οἵ. supr. 
261 d, infr. 271 a. 

MSS. μικτοῦ νομευτικῆς. The 
correction is due to Boeckh 
and Heindorf. 

10. ἐπὶ ποίμνῃ δίποδι] This 
is the point where the two 
ways meet. “ The art of man- 
herding being the only portion 
left which has to do with 
bipeds.” 

II. ἅμα---πολιτικόν] Accord- 
ing to what was said at first : 


259 6. 




















ΠΟΛΙΡΙΚΟΣ. 


Le 
γμενον ; 


NE. >Q. To ποῖον δή ; 


or 
oO ( 


| 7 \ an 7 “ > \ \ 
267. καθαπερ συ νυν εἰρηκᾶας, Οὐτῶς EOTL καὶ πέτρα- 


Ν , « a a ‘ 
SE. To παντάπασιν ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι τὸ mpo- 


But it is 
not really 


at an end. 


/ Ἂ a \ / ε / 
τεθέν. ἢ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ Kal μάλιστα ἡ ζήτησις ἐλλείπει, 5 


Ν \ / > va) / > \ 7 
To Tov λόγον εἰρῆσθαι μέν πως, οὐ μὴν παντάπασί 


5 / 
ye τελεως ἀπειργάσθαι ; 


NE. >Q. [Ids εἶπες ; 


μ- 5 \ cr ΄, na?) Da n 
BE. Eyo νῷν πειράσομαι τοῦτ᾽ αὐτο, ὃ διανοοῦ - 


a 7 a A 
μαι νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλῶσαι. 


NE. ΣΏ. Λέγοις av. 


EE. Οὐκοῦν τῶν νομευτικῶν ἡμῖν πολλῶν φανει- 


a 1) a / 3 « Ν cal 
σῶν ἄρτι τεχνῶν μία τις ἣν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ μιᾶς 


δ > / 5 / 
τινος ἀγέλης επιμέλεια ; 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Nai. 


ΞΕ). Ταύτην δέ ye διώριζεν ὁ λόγος οὐχ ἵππων 


75) 3, ΄ 
εἶναι τροφὸν οὐδ᾽ ἄλλων θηρίων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνθρώπων 


Ν 
κοινοτροφικὴν ἐπιστήμην. 


NE. 2Q. Οὕτως. 


I. καθάπερ σὺ νῦν εἴρηκας} Se. 
παντάπασι. Cf. Soph. 218 a. 
“ Have we really (καὶ) done as 
you say ?” 

4. τὸ προτεθὲν) Cf. Soph. 218 
e: τί δῆτα προταξαίμεθ᾽ ἄν. 

5. ἢ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ---ἀπειργάσθαι] 
“Or is it in this very respect 
that our inquiry is especially 
defective, that the definition 
has in a way been given, but 
still has not entirely received 
final completion?” Cf. infr. 
277 Ὁ : ἀτεχνῶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν 
ὥσπερ ζῶον---τὴν----ἐνάργειαν οὐκ 
ἀπειληφέναι πω. 

9. νῷν] Dialectic makes 
the subject of inquiry clearer 


to both the minds which are 
engaged. 

πειράσομαι τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ “1 
will endeavour to do this very 
thing, to make my meaning 
at this moment clearer for us 
both.” 1.6. I will endeavour to 
give my present thought, what 
I desiderate for the main argu- 
ment, a complete expression. 

7: οὐδ᾽ ἄλλων θηρίων] He 
falls back into the common 
parlance for want of a col- 
lective word to express “ ani- 
mals other than man.” There 
is less danger in this, now 
that the requisite distinctions 
have been made. 


10 


For, when 
the king is 
designated 
as the Man- 
herd, it 
must not 
be forgot- 
ten that he 


is unlike 
other 
herdsmen 
in this, that 
he is not 
alone in 
feeding or 
in tending 
his flock, 
but has 
many com- 
petitors, 
such as the 
merchant, 
husband- 
man, baker, 
gymnast, 
physician. 


38 


— 


τῶν βασιλέων θεασώμεθα. 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


EE. Εἴ τις τῶν ἄλλων τῳ, τέχνης ἄλλης ὄνομα 


yy ‘al “ aes, 4“. a Ν Ν 
δέχων, Kown τῆς ἀγέλης ξύντροφος εἰναι φησὶ καὶ 


προσποιεῖται. 


NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς φής; 


πη ἢ Οἱ ε ᾿, Ν Ν Ν Ν 
μ-... (ον οἱ ἐμπόοροι Και γεώργοι Και σιτουργοι 


’ὔ ἣν Ἂς 7 Ν a 
πάντες, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γυμνασταὶ καὶ TO TOV 


oy a 7 a ΕῚ “ ΄σ Ν \ [} / 
ιοἰατρῶν γένος, oia@ oT τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα 


a By ‘ > / / 
νομεῦσιν, ovs πολιτικοὺς ἐκαλέσαμεν, παντάπασι 


a λό ὃ 7 5 ΕΝ - , « ΄σ 26 
τῷ λόγῳ OlapuaxowT ἂν οὗτοι συμπαντες, WS σφεῖς Ρ. 268 


I. Τὸ δὴ τῶν νυμέων] It has 
been assumed that the king is 
a herdsman of men, but it is 
now found necessary to distin- 
guish the king from the herds- 
man. In this curious form the 
imperfect conditions of human 
government are indicated. 

πάντων] 1.6. All beside the 
king. 

4. Et tis τῶν ἄλλων τῳ] This 
reading, which has been pre- 
served in three or four MSS, 
(τῷ B, τῷ AFH, τῷ corr. I), 
and would have been extremely 
probable if due only to conjec- 
ture, has been unaccountably 
overlooked. τὸ ἄλλης τέχνης 
ὄνομα, if not ἃ solecism, is 
very harsh Greek, while τὸ τῆς 
ἄλλης τ. (SY), repeating the 
article, has no meaning. Stall- 
baum translates: “ Num quis 
reliquorum alius artis nomen 
gerens communiter gregis so- 
cium sese esse et dicat et si- 
mulat,” and adds, that the 
meaning of this ought to be 
plain to all from what follows. 


He probably means that the 
king, unlike other artists (it 
should be “‘ herdsmen”), is not 
distinguishable im some re- 
spects when thus defined from 
individuals amongst his flock 
(the physician, gymnast, etc.). 
He runs a race with them, as 
he did with the swine-herd. 
But this is an extremely 
vague way of putting what is 
presently explained. Whereas 
the above reading makes all 
clear, “I mean, whether in 
the case of any of the other 
herdsmen there be any one, 
bearing the name of a differ- 
ent art, who professes and pre- 
tends to share in common with 
him the tending of the herd.” 

5. ξύντροφος is to be taken 
actively, as appears from τῆς 
τροφῆς ἐπιμελοῦντας below, and 
συννομῆς infr. 268 6. Cf. Legg. 
8, 845 d: οὔτε yap γῆν οὔτε 
ἥλιον οὔτε πνεύματα, τοῖς ὕδασι 
σύντροφα τῶν ἐκ γῆς ἀναβλασταν- 
OVT@Y. 


rn ΄ , 3k 
12. τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχοιντ᾽ ἂν] 


e 


i 


\ \ σε , 4 ‘ 
EE. To δὴ τῶν νομέων πάντων διάφορον καὶ τὸ p. 267 


io λυ, ἐν τυ εν...  . 











ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 


oY 


268. τῆς τροφῆς ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης, οὐ μόνον 





b 


> / 3 / > \ \ a a > / 
ἀγελαίων ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων 


ty lal 
αὑτῶν 5 


NE. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιεν ; 


EE. Ἴσως. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐπισκεψόμεθα, 


"ὔ σ , , Ν 
ἰσμεν, ὅτι βουκόλῳ γε οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσει περὶ 


/ , lad Χ « 
τούτων οὐδενός, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς τῆς ἀγέλης τροφὸς ὁ 


’ SIN > , Cy ss - \ Ν 
βουῴορβος, αὐτὸς ἰατρός, αὐτὸς οἷον νυμφευτης καὶ 


Χ an ᾽ / / 
περὶ TOUS τῶν γιγνομένων τόκους Kal λοχείας μόνος 


» 7, “ lol 
ἐπιστήμων τῆς [LALEVTLKNS. 


γ᾽ / ~ Ν. 
ἔτι τοίνυν παιδιᾶς καὶ 


“ DUG ᾽ a A / , 7, 
μουσικὴς εφ σον αὐτοῦ τὰ θρέμματα φύσει perel- 


ληφεν, οὐκ ἄλλος κρείττων παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ κηλῶν 


fy 7 3 , φ' Qn na / \ 
TPQAVVELV, META TE οργανων και ψιλῷ τῷ στόματι Τὴν 


“ cal 32) ΄ 7 
τῆς αὑτοῦ ποίμνης ἄριστα μεταχειριζόμενος μουσικήν. 


Ν ἊΝ Ν a 2) / , € TN / 
καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πέρι νομέων ὃ αὕτος τρόπος. 


7 γάρ: 


“Would contend in argument.” 
Cf. Theet. 160 e and note; and 
see λέγοιεν infra. 

(12.) οὗτοι σύμπαντες] Pleo- 
nastic resumption. 

2. ἀγελαίων] Cf. supr. 260 ¢. 

6. βουκόλῳ] So also Bodl., 
omitting τῷ. For aités—airis, 
ef. Rep. 2, 383 d. 

9. τῶν γιγνομένων] “ The off- 
spring from time to time.” 
Cf. Thezet. 160 6: μὴ λάθη ἡμᾶς 
οὐκ ἄξιον ὃν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον. 

10. ἔτι τοίνυν] “ Nay, even 
beyond the sphere of the arts 
which were mentioned as com- 
peting with the king.” 

παιδιᾶς καὶ povoixns| Music 
and the arts generally are iro- 
nically spoken of as a kind of 
child’s-play. Cf. Soph. 224 a, 
234 a,b. The genitives are 
suggested by ἐπιστήμων, but as 


the sentence proceeds are un- 
derstood to be governed by 
μετείληφε. 

11. αὐτοῦ τὰ θρέμματα] “ The 
objects of his care.” θρέμματα 
has the common meaning of 
“creatures” with an etymo- 
logical association from the 
verbal meaning, as the cattle 
are viewed in relation to the 
herdsman. 

13. μετά τε ὀργάνων καὶ ψιλῷ 
τῷ στόματι) The meaning οἵ 
ψιλὸς depends on that to which 
it is opposed or correlative. In 
Legg. 2, 669 d, instrumental 
music without the voice is 
spoken of as WAH καθαρίσει τε 
καὶ αὐλήσει, and is strongly ob- 
jected to: while λόγοι ψιλοί in 
the same passage are words 
without metre, or prose. 

15. τῶν ἄλλων πέρι νομέων] 


τόδε δὲ 5 Notso the 


ox-herd, 
who is suf- 
ficient in 
all things 
for his 
cattle, to 
supply 
their wants, 
to heal 


ΤΟ their sick- 


nesses, to 
attend 
them in the 
hour of 
marriage 
and of 
childbirth. 
He pro- 
vides also 


15 for their 


amusement 
by rustic 
melodies, 


4.0 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


sung or NE . ΣΩ. ᾿Ορθότατα. 
wl istled, a 3 Clas ε lad 
Pree t ΞΕ, Πῶς οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὀρθὸς φανεῖται καὶ 


pered to ΓΗ͂Ν ε Ν a ΄, “ ah / Ν 
the oaten ἀκέραιος 0 TTEPt TOU βασιλέως, οταν αὐτὸν νομεα και 
flute.” And ‘ 5, Ὁ ’ , a , » ἢ 

thus do all TPopov ἀγέλης ἀνθρωπίνης θῶμεν μόνον ἐκκρίνοντες 
herdsmen 
except the 


5. μυρίων ἄλλων ἀμφισβητούντων ; 


king of > A 
men: who NE. 20. Οὐδαμώς. 

eae EE. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἐφοβήθη - 
be ade- 


« / \ / / tf 
quately de- μεν UTOTTTEVOQAVTES μὴ λέγοντες μεν τι τυγχάνοιμεν 


fined until 
we have 


parted off τοῦδ g , > , Ψ Ἀ \ 7 
Ἐδὼ ΠΩ δι ἀκριβείας TOV πολιτικον, EWS GV τοὺς περικέχυ 


this crowd μέψρυς αὐτῷ καὶ τῆς συννομῆς αὐτῷ ἀντιποιουμένους 
of rivals, t ω 


and set περιελόντες καὶ χωρίσαντες ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων καθαρὸν 
him forth 


alone and μόνον αὐτὸν ἀποφήνωμεν ; 
clear. For ᾿ 


a / > \ > 7 “ΠΑ 
σχῆμα βασιλικον, οὐ μην ἀπειργασμένοι γε εἰμὲν πῶ 


Either περὶ is pleonastic (ut p. 452 ἃ, of the physician, the 
seepe) or the genitive is to be gymnast, and the moneymaker 
repeated with τρόπος. disputing the claim of the 
3. ἀκέραιος] “ Perfect, with- rhetor to be the agent of the 
out a flaw.” “ How is our greatest good for man. ὅτι σοι 
definition not impaired by the αὐτίκ᾽ ἂν παρασταῖεν κιτιλ. Also 
circumstance, —%” Cf. Rep. ib. 456. A still nearer parallel 
I, 342 Ὁ: ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀκέραιός occurs in the sixth book of 
ἐστιν ὀρθὴ οὖσα (ἡ τέχνη). the Republic, where the true 
4. μόνον ἐκκρίνοντες] Cf. infr. philosophers are with difficulty 
303 b: πασῶν yap ἐκείνην ye ἐκ- separated from the pretenders 
κριτέον. to philosophy. Cf. esp. Rep. 
7. ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν] 207 ο,. 6,488 c: αὐτοὺς δὲ ἀεὶ τῷ vav- 
ἐφοβήθημεν ὑποπτεύσαντες] Cf. κλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι δεομένους 
Soph. 264 b. «tA. And see Ar. Pol. IV. 
9. σχῆμα βασιλικὸν----δ ἀκρι- 12: Ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο διορίσαι 
βείας τὸν πολιτικόν] “The form ῥάδιον, ποίας δεῖ καλεῖν ἀρχάς" ποὰλ- 
we described was indeed royal, λῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοι- 
but did not accurately corre- νωνία δεῖται. 
spond with that of the States- 11. τῆς συννομῆς αὐτῷ ἀντιποι- 
man.” It appears presently ουμένους] αὐτῷ is partly the 
that we have been imagining ethical dative, and partly go- 
the Divine Shepherd of the verned by σὺν : “claiming to 
people as he existed in the share with him the task of 
golden age. tending the herd.” 
10. περικεχυμένους] “ Crowd- 12. καθαρὸν---μόνον] “ Alone 
ing in upon him.” Compare and clear.’ Cf. infr. 303 ἃ, 6, 
the description in the Gorgias, 304 a. 











ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


41] 


NE. ΣΏ. ᾿Ορθότατα μὲν οὖν. 


Leng) fa) / 53 ff See / > 
HE. Τοῦτο τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμῖν ποιητέον, εἰ 


ἡ μέλλ πὶ τῷ TEX υ ὃν λό 
μὴ μέλλοιμεν ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει καταισχῦναι τὸν λογον. 


NE. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε δραστέον. 


EE. Πάλιν τοίνυν ἐξ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς δεῖ καθ᾽ ἑτέραν ς 


«ε Ν - 7 
ὁδὸν πορευθηναί τινα. 


ΝΕ. >Q. Ποίαν δή: 


ΞΕ, Σχεδὸν παιδιὰν ἐγκερασαμένους" συχνῷ γὰρ 


μέρει δεῖ μεγάλου μύθου προσχρήσασθαι, καὶ τὸ 


Ni / , > va / / ΣΌΣ My 
λοιπὸν On, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, μέρος ἀεὶ μέρους 


» / $) Δ) yy > lal Ν / 
ἀφαιρουμένους ἐπ᾿ ἄκρον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον. 


᾽ a / 
OUKOVY χρὴ: 


NE. 2Q. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


2. εἰ μὴ μέλλοιμεν] “ Un- 
less we were to—as we feared 
we should if we neglected this.” 
The optative may be defended 
by supposing an attraction from 
the preceding optatives: the 
past tense being continued in 
thought. But it is equally pos- 
sible that this attraction (from 
τυγχάνοιμεν) may have influ- 
enced the scribes. Ast and 
Stallb. conj. μέλλομεν. 

5. ἐξ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς----καθ᾽ ἕτέ- 
ραν ὁδόν] “ From a fresh start- 
ing-point, and by another road,” 
i.e. approaching the subject 
from a different side. The 
myth which follows, like the 
digression in the Theztetus, 
affords a rest after the thorny 
path which has been trodden, 
and also presents a deeper and 
more religious aspect of the 
question. Cf. Prot. 317 e: ἡ 
αὐτή μοι ἀρχή ἐστιν---ἥπερ ἄρτι. 
Arist. Eth: Nic. VII. 1, § 1: 
ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν. 

8. συχνῷ γὰρ μέρει δεῖ μεγάλου 


μύθου προσχρ.] “ We must call 
in aid a large portion of a great 
cycle of mythology.” The fables 
quoted are viewed as fragments 
of a larger whole, some part of 
which is narrated, and part of 
what is narrated is applied to 
the purpose of the dialogue. 
Cf. Legg. 4,713 a: "Ap οὖν 
μύθῳ σμικρά γ᾽ ἔτι προσχρηστέον, 
εἰ μέλλομεν ἐμμελῶς πως δηλῶ- 
σαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον ; 

το. μέρος---(ητούμενον͵] Com- 
pare Bacon, Nov. Org. II. 16: 
“Tum vero post rejectionem 
et exclusivam debitis modis 
factam, secundo loco, tanquam 
in fundo, manebit—forma affir- 
mativa, solida, et vera, et bene 
terminata.” 

11. em ἄκρον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ ¢.] 
“To arrive at the object of our 
search, as it were to the sum- 
mit of a steep ascent.” Cf. 
Rep. 7,515 6: διὰ τραχείας τῆς 
ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους. Tue 
mountain-path (ἀτραπός) is kept 
with difficulty. 


G 


this pur- 
pose we 
must begin 
atresh, and 
travel by 

a different 
way: piec- 
ing our dis- 
cussion 
with an an- 
cient tale, 
before we 
resume our 
series of 
divisions, 
and con- 
tinue them 
until we 
reach the 
desired 
summit, 


Think 
yourself, 
then, a 
child again 
(youare not 
long past 
childhood), 
and listen 
to my tale. 
In the time 
of Atreus 
there hap- 
pened a 
strange 
portent, 
which shall 
happen 
again, 


4.2 MAATQNOZ 


EE. ᾿Αλλὰ δὴ τῷ μύθῳ μου πάνυ πρόσεχε Tov p. 268 a) 


a / ε ΄ ΄ » ον» / 
νοῦν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες" πάντως ov πολλα εκφεύγεις 


\ yA 
παιδιὰς ἐτη. 


NE. 20. 


Λέγοις av. 


4 
τῶν πολλα 


53 3, Va ΄ ’ / 
s SE. Ἦν τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι ἔσται τῶν πάλαι λεχθέν-- 


γ7. \ Ν \ ‘ 
τε ἄλλα καὶ On καὶ TO περὶ τὴν 


a x Vc 
"Atpews τε Kal Θυέστου λεχθεῖσαν ἔριν φάσμα. 


/ 7 / +f / 
ἀκήκοας yap που Kal ἀπομημονεύεις ὃ φασι γενέ- 


σθαι τότε. 


1. ᾿Αλλὰ δὴ τῷ μύθῳ----καθάπερ 
οἱ παῖδε] Cf. Soph. 224 d: 
μῦθον---παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν. So 
the myth in the Pheedrus is said 
παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι. Pheedr. 265 d. 

2. πάντως---ἔτη)]ἡ ‘‘ You are 
not many years escaped from 
play.” Cf. supr. ἃ, παιδιάν. Ste- 
phanus (anticipated by a few 
MSS.) raised a doubt about 
the accent, and read παιδίας : 
in defence of which, ef. Legg. 
9, 864 d: ἢ radia χρώμενος, 
οὐδέ πω τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρων. 
He has been followed by some 
editors, who translate παιδίας 
ἔτη “years of childhood.” 
Stallbaum justly replies that 
“years of child’s-play” would 
only be a more graceful way 
of saying the same thing. 
But he errs with the rest in 
joining παιδιᾶς with ἔτη, al- 
though he sees that with this 
rendering πολὺ is required 
instead of πολλά. The present 
is only one of numberless in- 
stances of hyperbaton which 
occur in these dialogues. Cf. 
Soph. 235 a: ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδιᾶς 
μετεχόντων ἐστί τις μερῶν. The 
genitive in the MS. reading, 
παιδιᾶς, 15, however, ambiguous, 
and I have ventured to intro- 


duce the plural παιδιὰς, which 
exactly suits the context, and 
occurs several times in the 
Laws. Cf. Ar. Pol. VIII. 2: 
Ata τοῦτο δεῖ παιδιὰς εἰσάγεσθαι 
καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρῆσιν, ὡς 
προσάγοντας φαρμακείας χάριν" 
ἄνεσις γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς 
ψυχῆς, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνά- 
παυσις. The word (in common 
with many others) has no ac- 
cent in the Bodleian MS. 

. Ἦν τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι ἔσται 
Cf. Thucyd. 1.22 : τῶν γενομένων 
---καὶ----μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις ἔσ- 
εσθαι. “ There really happened, 
and shall hereafter happen 
again, like many other things 
of which ancient tradition has 
preserved the record, the por- 
tent which appeared in con- 
nexion with the legendary 
strife of Atreus with Thyestes.” 
The word ἦν, like “once upon 
a time,” marks the beginning 
of a tale. (Phedr. 237 a.) Cf. 
Tim. p. 22 ¢: πολλαὶ καὶ κατὰ 
πολλὰ φθοραὶ γεγόνασιν καὶ ἔτι 
εσονται. 

7. φάσμα] “A sudden, un- 
expected sight.” Soph. Trach. 
508: τετραόρου φάσμα ταύρου. 
Cf. Theet. 155 a: τί mor ἐστὶ 
ταῦτα Ta φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν. 


LC ΄  ΄΄΄ρ.σπΠ1..........ο-..--΄ ................΄ ».ὄὕ........΄΄΄ὖὃὖΘ-... ............... a 








, 268. 


IIOAITIKOS. 


43 


NE, 2Q. To περὶ τῆς χρυσῆς ἀρνὸς ἴσως on- 


μεῖον paces. 


I. σημεῖον ἢ The form of 
the story to which Plato al- 
ludes appears to be the same 
which is given in one of the 
scholia on Eurip. Or. 988 : 
“ Hermes revenged the death 
of Myrtilus, his son, upon the 
Pelopidee, by causing a golden- 
fleeced lamb to be born amongst 
the flocks of Atreus. When 
his claim to the succession was 
disputed, Atreus promised to 
display the prodigy in proof 
that the gods favoured his 
right. Thyestes persuaded 
Aerope, the wife of Atreus, to 
give him the lamb: whence 
Atreus was in danger of losing 
the kingdom, had not Zeus, 
who upheld his claim, made 
the sun and the Pleiads to 
return from their setting to- 
wards their rising.” It is clear 
from this in what sense the 
lamb is called a “sign” or 
“token” (σημεῖον): and how 
the greater portent was given 
by the god “in bearing witness 
to Atreus” (μαρτυρήσας ὁ θεὸς 
Ἀτρεῖ). The notion that “the 
sun in horror turned his face 
from the scene” (also men- 
tioned in the Scholia to Eurip- 
ides, and frequently alluded to 
in the tragedies of Seneca : 
see also Hygin. Fab. 88, 258), 
although the most commonly 
received, appears to be one of 
several rationalizing interpre- 
tations of the fable. The lines 
of Euripides should be quoted 
here :— 

ὅθεν δόμοισι τοῖς ἐμοῖς 

MAO’ ἀρὰ πολύστονος 

Μαιάδος τόκου, 

τὸ χρυσόμαλλον ἀρνὸς ὅποτ᾽ 


ἐγένετο τέρας ὀλοὸν ὀλοὸν 
λόχευμα ποιμνίοισιν 
*Arpéos ἱπποβότα᾽ 

ὅθεν ἔρις τό τε πτερωτὸν 

ἁλίου μετέβαλεν ἅρμα 

τὰν πρὸς ἑσπέραν κέλευθον 

οὐρανοῦ μεθαρμόσασα 

μονόπωλον ἐς ἀῶ, 

ἑπταπόρου τε δρόμημα Πλειάδος 

εἰς ὁδὸν ἄλλαν Ζεὺς μεταβάλλει. 
See also ejusd. El. 734, where 
the truth of the same legend 
is questioned. The “ golden 
lamb” seems to have been 
known, with variations, to the 
author of the cyclic poem 
Alemeeonis and to Pherecydes 
(Schol. in Eur. loc. cit.), but 
it is difficult not to connect 
the other portent, as well as 
the revolution imagined by 
Plato, with the tale told to 
Herodotus by the Egyptian 
priests, “that in the course 
of the 11,340 years during 
which Egypt had been a 
monarchy, there had been 
no god in human shape ; but 
the sun had reversed his 
course four times, and that 
without any convulsions of na- 
ture in the land of Egypt. 
To which they added, that 
before the 11,340 years gods 
had ruled in Egypt, one of 
whom had been at each time 
supreme : of whom Orus, the 
son of Osiris, was the last.” 
Hdt. ΤΙ. ce. 142, 144. There 
is no ground, however, for sup- 
posing, as Boeckh (Philol. p. 
118) at one time imagined, that 
the Egyptians had anticipated 
(through the study of their 
own monuments) the scientific 
theory of the precession of 


2 (LD 


T do not 
mean the 
token of 
the golden 
lamb, but 
the return 
of the sun 
and stars 
from their 
setting to- 
wards their 
rising, 
whereby 
Zeus bore 
witness to 
the right of 
the king. 


You have 
heard also 
of the 

“ Saturnia 
regna :” 


5 


Io 


ΕΠ 


ZE. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς δύ- p. 469}} 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


᾽ὔ Ν » lal « / A a » A 
σεώς TE καὶ ἀνατολῆς ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων GaOTPOV, 


« Ἵ, “ \ > / “-“ > - ΄ ᾿, 
ὡς apa ὅθεν μεν ἀνατέλλει νῦν, εἰς τοῦτον TOTE TOV 


/ / 7 ™ ὟΝ / / A Ν 
τόπον ἐδύετο, ἀνέτελλε δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τότε δὲ δὴ 


/ yy c \ > - / > Ν “ιν γιὰ 
μαρτυρῆσας ἄρα ὁ θεὸς Ατρεῖ μετέβαλεν αὑτὸ emt TO 


νῦν σχῆμα. 


ΝΕ. ΣΏ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο. 


EE. Καὶ μὴν αὖ καὶ τήν γε βασιλείαν ἣν ἦρξε 


Κρόνος πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν. 


NE. ΣΩ. Πλείστων μὲν οὖν. 
ΞῈ. Τί δὲ; τὸ τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν φύεσθαι γηγενεῖς 


καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γεννᾶσθαι ; 


the equinoxes. The reason 
advanced by Plato himself may 
possibly have given rise to the 
fancy in the first instance. 
«ς All that is visible must suffer 
change.” Compare Seneca, Ep. 
71. § 11: “Quid enim muta- 
tionis periculo exceptum ? Non 
terra, non ccelum, non totus 
hic rerum omnium contextus, 
quamvis Deo agente ducatur. 
Non semper tenebit hune or- 
dinem, sed illum ex hoc cursu 
aliquis dies dejiciet.” 

(2.) φράζει] “ Your words 
import, perchance, the token 
which depended on the golden 
lamb.” 

2. τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων] The 
Pleiades are mentioned in the 
story. 

3. ὡς ἄρα---τὸ νῦν σχῆμα) 
Plato here improves upon the 
original legend, in which the 
sun only changed his course 
for a single day. 

5. αὐτὸ] The rising and set- 
ting of the sun and stars con- 
sidered as one phenomenon. 

8. Καὶ μὴν αὖ As in the 


Theetetus three different 
theories, so here three distinct 
fables are woven together. 

ἣν ἦρξε Kpovos] Familiar 
to the Greek mind from the 
poem of Hesiod, perhaps also 
from the Orphic hymns, and 
celebrated in the festival of the 
Kpoua. The linesfrom the‘ W orks 
and Days’ seem to have been 
present to Plato’s mind, r11- 
122: of μὲν ἐπὶ Κρόνου ἦσαν, ὅτ᾽ 
οὐρανῷ ἐμβασίλευεν" [ ὡς δὲ θεοὶ 
ζώεσκον, ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες, | 
νόσφιν ἄτερ τε πόνων καὶ οἰζύος" 
οὐδέ τι δειλὸν | γῆρας ἐπῆν, αἰεὶ δὲ 
πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὁμοῖοι | τέρποντ᾽ 
ἐν θαλίῃσι, κακῶν ἔκτοσθεν ἁπάν- 
tov’ | θνῆσκον δ᾽ ὡς ὕπνῳ δεδμη- 
μένοι: ἐσθλὰ δὲ πάντα | τοῖσιν ἔην" 
κάρπον δ᾽ ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα | 
αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον" 
οἱ δ᾽ ἐθελημοὶ ἥσυχοι ἔργα νέ- 
μοντο σὺν ἐσθλοῖσιν πολέεσσιν" | 
αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ 
γαῖα κάλυψεν, τοὶ μὲν δαίμονές 
εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλὰς, | 
ἐσθλοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνη- 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 

ΤΙ, τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν φύεσθαι γη- 


| 


NE eee 


269. 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἕν τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων. 


ΞῈ an / » \ , > > ΄σ 
ΜΞ Εἰ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐστι μεν ξύμπαντα εκ TAUTOU 


i Χ / “ / \ / yy 
πάθους, καὶ σρρὸος TOUVTOLS ETEPA μυριὰ και TOUTWV ETL 


6 / ὃ Ν δὲ / AnO \ Ν » ω 
αυμαστοτερα, OLA δὲ χρόνου πληθος τὰ μεν αὐτῶν 


> id \ \ / 5) Ν “ 
ἀπέσβηκε, τὰ δὲ διεσπαρμένα εἴρηται χωρὶς ἕκαστα ξ 


> / ἃ a / 7 Ἀ Ψ 
ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων. ὃ δ᾽ ἐστὶ πᾶσι τούτοις αἴτιον τὸ παά- 


5] a \ Ν ᾽ Χ “ 
θος, οὐδεὶς εἴρηκε, νῦν δὲ δὴ λεκτέον" εἰς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ 


βασιλέως ἀπόδειξιν πρέψει ῥηθέν. 
NE. ΣΏ. Καλλιστ᾽ εἶπες, καὶ λέγε μηδὲν ἐλλεί- 


σῶν. 


μα > 7 »y XN \ a / \ \ SiN 
mE. “Akovois av. τὸ yap πᾶν TOOE TOTE μὲν AUTOS 


ε \ πὸ 1 ςς a ΚΣ 
ὁ θεὸς ξυμποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ, τοτὲ ὃ 


yeveis| “ That the earlier race of 
men had their generation from 
Earth.” Plato is fond of this no- 
tion, which, as usual, he colours 
variously with his own imagina- 
tion. Cf.Symp.190b, r91¢; Rep. 
3,414 ; Soph. 248 c; Prot.320¢; 
Tim. 23 e; Critias toge. The 
fable spoke simply of earth-born 
men. Plato finds in this a hint 
for his “ Phoenician” tale of an 
earlier and more perfect mode 
of generation. He seems to 
blend together Hesiod’s children 
of the earth and the army of 
Cadmus. See also Ar. Pol. 1.5: 
τοὺς πρώτους, εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν, 
εἴτε ἐκ φθορᾶς τινὸς ἐσώθησαν. 

2. ἐκ ταὐτοῦ πάθους] “ These 
all arise out of one and the same 
occurrence” (viz. the reversal 
of the motion of the Cosmos). 

4. διὰ δὲ χρόνου πλῆθος] Com- 
pare the way in which proba- 
bility is given to the myth of 
Atlantis in Tim. 21 d: διὰ δὲ 
χρόνον καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ἐργασαμέ- 
νων οὐ διήρκεσε δεῦρο ὁ λόγος. 

5. διεσπαρμένα! As in the 
case of the three or four fables 


to which allusion is made. 

6. τὸ πάθος] The article is 
used because of ταὐτοῦ πάθους 
preceding. 

8. πρέψει ῥηθέν] “The tell- 
ing will be finely suited to our 
object of displaying the nature 
of the king.” 

11. τὸ --- πᾶν τόδε] “ This 
universe.” As in Tim. 29 6: 
γένεσιν kal τὸ πᾶν τόδε. 

αὐτὸς ὁ θεό] The mono- 
theism of this passage. 15 more 
express than that of the Ti- 
meus. (Cf. infr. 271 ἃ.) Or 
the article may be accounted 
for by supposing the Timzeus 
already written. 

12. ξυμποδηγεῖι | The word 
ποδηγῶ (to guide) occurs only 
here and in Legg. το, 899 a 
(of the spirit which determines 
the motion of the sun). ξυμ- 
ποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ 
= “assists with his guidance as 
it moves and helps to roll the 
circling sphere.” The universe 
has an independent principle 
of motion, which, however, 
during the better cycle, is di- 


10 


and, once 
more, how 
there were 
giants in 
old days, 
the off- 
spring of 
the Earth. 


These scat- 
tered frag- 
ments of 
tradition 
arise from 
one and 
the same 
circum- 
stance. 
The uni- 
verse is at 
one time 
turned by 


God, but 
at certain 
periods is 
relinquish- 
ed by him, 
and turns 
itself in the 
opposite 
direction. 


For none 
but the 
most Divine 
things are 
without 
change. 
But the 
universe, 
being vi- 
sible, is of 
a lower 


40 ΠΛΑΤΏΩΏΝΟΣ 


39 A “ ΄ ,ὔ ΄- / > “ f 
ἀνῆκεν, ὅταν αἱ περίοδοι τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτῷ μέ- P- 264), 


J / A / Ν \ ΄ > / 
τρον εἰληήφωσιν ἤδη χρόνου, TO δὲ πάλιν αὐτόματον 


᾽ > / ΄ σι » Ν ΄ ᾿ 
εἰς TAVAVTLA περιαγεται, ζῶον ὃν καὶ φρονησιν εἰλη- 


Ν > 4 ΄ ite. 9. Δ x lal \ 
χοὸς εκ του συναρμοσᾶντος AUTO KAT αρχᾶς. TOUTO δὲ 


/ 
γέγονεν. 


» “ Ν » , ἊἋ SOF, ὃ \ iO ’ , ΄ JA 
5 AUTO, TO QGVATTAALVY LEVAL, OLA TO ἐξ αναγκὴς ἐμφυτον 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Διὰ τὸ ποῖον δή: 


—_ \ \ SIN \ ε , y 3. νᾶ . 
ΞΕ. To κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχειν ἀεὶ καὶ 


θυ Ἂν 5 ἴω ΄ 7 / ΄ 
TQUTOV εἰναι TOLS TTAVTWV θειοτάτοις TPOONKEL μονοῖς, 


Lk \ / > / “ 7 A A > 
ιοσώματος δὲ φύσις ov ταύτης τῆς τάξεως. ὃν δὲ οὐ- 


ἈΝ Ν / ’ ΄ ΄σ \ 
pavov Kal κόσμον ἐπωνομάκαμεν, πολλῶν μὲν καὶ 


U Ν a / / XN 
μακαρίων παρὰ τοῦ γεννήσαντος μετείληφεν, ἀτὰρ 


3 On 7 / Ν ΄ 06 DS 
ουν ἡ KEKOLYMV7)KE γε και σωμάτος. OUVEV αὐτῷ με 


rected and impelled by God. 
Cf. the interpretation of Hera- 
clitus by Ain. Gaz. (quoted by 
Lassalle, I. 124) : ᾿Επεὶ κάματος 
αὐτῇ (τῇ ψυχῇ) τῷ δημιουργῷ 
συνέπεσθαι καὶ ἄνω μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ 
τόδε τὸ πᾶν συμπεριπολεῖν καὶ ὑπ᾽ 
ἐκείνου τετάχθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, διὰ 
τοῦτο τῇ τοῦ ἠρεμεῖν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ 
ἀρχῆς ἐλπίδι κάτω φησὶ τὴν Ψυχὴν 
φέρεσθαι. 

1. ἀνῆκεν] The poetical aor- 
ist, used because a point of 
time is spoken of. Cf. Theeet. 
150 C: μαιεύεσθαι pe ὁ θεὸς 
ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾷν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. 

ὅταν ---- χρόνου] “ When the 
number of revolutions which 
make up the time appointed 
for the world have now reached 
their consummation.” Note 
the hyperbaton of χρόνου, and 
compare the “number of the 
state” in Rep. 8, 546, esp. the 
words ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἑκάστοις 
κύκλων περιφορὰς ξυνάπτωσι. 

2. τὸ de] Se. τὸ πᾶν τόδε. 

3. ζῶον ὃν) This is added 


to explain αὐτόματον. Compare 
Tim. 30 b: νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῆ, 
ψυχὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι ξυνιστὰς τὸ 
πᾶν ξυνετεκταίνετο — οὕτως οὖν 
δὴ --- δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον 
ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀλη- 
θείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι 
πρόνοιαν. 

καὶ φρόνησιν | Cf. Soph.248 6: 
μηδὲ ὧῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν ; 

10. οὐ---τάξεως] “Is of ἃ dif- 
ferent order.” Cf. Phileb. 49 ec: 
ἡ δὲ ἀσθενὴς (ἄγνοια) ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν 
γελοίων ἡμῖν εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ 
φύσιν. 

οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον] Cf. Pheedr. 
2456: πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν 
τε γένεσιν. 

12. παρὰ τοῦ γεννήσαντος) Cf. 
Tim. 37 6: 6 γεννήσας πατήρ. 

ἀτὰρ οὖν---σώματος)])͵ In the 
Timeus also the body is the 
source of all imperfection, 86 b: 
τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν (νυσήματα) διὰ 
σώματος ἕξιν τοιάδε. 

13. καὶ σώματος] Cf. Tim. 
32 €: σωματοειδὲς δὲ δὴ---δεῖ τὸ 
γενόμενον εἶναι. 


| 








ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 47 





> , \ \ , ‘ = 
69. ταβολῆς ἀμοίρῳ γίγνεσθαι διὰ παντὸς ἀδύνατον, κατὰ grade. Yet 
py ; act = Ε priest (ae β , « it has the 
δυναμίν γε μὴν 0 τι μάλιστα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ ταὐτὰ least possi 
e change 
, \ m \ ‘ , y “ 5 
μίαν φορὰν κινεῖται" διὸ τὴν ἀνακύκλησιν εἴληχεν, ὃ of motion, 
, a A , , when t 1e€ 
τι σμικροτάτην τῆς Ταὑτοῦ κινήσεως παράλλαξιν. direction 
Ὁ ΟΝ VRE \ , ann \ 3 4 . of Its rota- 
αὐτὸ δὲ ἑαυτὸ στρέφειν ἀεὶ σχεδὸν οὐδενὶ δυνατὸν 5 tion is το- 
\ a = , 5 , ε , versed. 
πλὴν TO TOV κινούμενων αὖ πάντων ἡγουμένῳ. Kl-  Nowitcan- 
ye τῷ ! ΐ 


I. κατὰ δύναμίν γε μὴν---κινεῖ- 
ται] Compare Laws 7, 821 ¢, d, 
where it is said to be impious 
to attribute an inconstant mo- 
tion to the sun, moon, and 
planets. So in the Timzus 
(p. 37) Time is created in 
order to bring the creature 
as near as possible to the Eter- 
nal archetype. 

3. διὸ ---- παράλλαξιν͵] Only 
the most Divine things can 
be always alike. The Uni- 
verse, having a body, must 
suffer change. It moves as 
nearly as possible always in the 
same way (but cannot attain 
perfectly even to this): “ Where- 
fore it hath allotted to it a 
reverse revolution, as the least 
possible alteration of its mo- 
tion.” The reasoning would be 
more complete if for αὑτοῦ we 
might read ταὐτοῦ. Cf. Tim. 36 
d, 39b,¢. ἀνακύκλησιν = τὸ ἀνάπα- 
λιν ἰέναι supr. This meaning is 
required by the context here 
and in Rep. το, 617 b, ἐπανακυ- 
κλούμενον : Tim. 40 ὁ, ἐπανακυ- 
κλήσεις : Lb. 37 a, ἀνακυκλουμένη, 
in all which places a retrograde 
motion isin question. The force 
of the preposition seems to have 
been lost in the use of the word 
by later writers. A homely il- 
lustration of Plato’s meaning 
may be taken from the game 
of cup and ball: in which, in 
order to ensure a steady mo- 


tion, the ball is spun from 
right to left, and the player 
waits until it has begun to re- 
volye in the opposite direc- 
tion. The resilience of the 
string, which is the cause of 
this, would correspond to the 
blind impulse (ξύμφυτος ἐπι- 
θυμία) which makes the uni- 
verse rebound. 

6. τῶν κινουμένων αὖ πάντων 
ἡγουμένῳ] The language of 
Plato respecting the relation 
of the individual to the uni- 
versal soul is not consistent. 
In the Timeeus the former is 
a “particle” taken from the 
latter. In the Republic and 
Phedrus, and less clearly in 
the Pheedo, the individual per- 
sonality of each soul is re- 
cognized. Yet in the passage 
of the Pheedrus there are some 
expressions in which the na- 
ture of the soul is generalized. 
Cf. also Legg. 10, 894 6: τῶν 
δὴ δέκα μάλιστα ἡμῖν κινήσεων 
τίν ἂν προκρίναιμεν ὀρθότατα 
πασῶν ἐρρωμενεστάτην τε εἶναι 
καὶ πρακτικὴν διαφερόντως ; Μυ- 
ρίῳ ἀνάγκη που διαφέρειν τὴν 
αὐτὴν αὑτὴν δυναμένην κινεῖν. Ib. 
12, 966e: ὃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἐλέγομεν, ὡς πρεσβύτατον τε καὶ 
θείοτατόν ἐστι πάντων ὧν κίνησις 
γένεσιν παραλαβοῦσα ἀέναον οὐ- 
σίαν ἐπόρισεν. 

αὖ implies a contrast be- 
tween the divinest of all things 


not move 
itself al- 
ways: for 
that is the 
privilege 
of mind. 
Nor can 
mind ori- 
ginate 
opposite 
move- 
ments. 
Hence the 
universe is 
not always 


48 


- \ , \ \ ΕΣ 3 Shas , > “ 
νεῖν δὲ τούτῳ τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλως, αὖθις δὲ ἐναντίως οὐ Ρ. 2 


ITAATQNOZ 


/ > / \ / ‘\ U 4 92% 
θέμις. ἐκ πάντων δὴ τούτων τὸν KOT LOY μήτε αὐτὸν 


\ , 7 ε Ν Des, Nes 9 ὦ 9 ey Et Ν 
χρὴ φάναι στρέφειν ἑαυτὸν ἀεί, μήτ᾽ αὖ ὅλον ἀεὶ ὑπο 


a / \ , / 
θεοῦ στρέφεσθαι διττὰς καὶ ἐναντίας περιαγωγάς, μήτ᾽ 


> , \ \ ~ ε nee) , / 
sav Ovo τινὲ θεὼ φρονοῦντε ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντία στρέφειν 


> / > ᾽ “ ᾽7 > / Ν / / \ 
auTov, ἀλλ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐρρήθη καὶ μόνον λοιπὸν, TOTE 


μὲν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλης συμποδηγεῖσθαι θείας αἰτίας, τὸ ζῇν 


΄ 5 , Ν ΄ > / > 
πάλιν ἐπικτώμενον καὶ λαμβάνοντα ἀθανασίαν ἐπι- 


and the leader of all that is 
in motion. As the former 
alone can remain always the 
same, so the latter alone can 
revolve spontaneously for ever. 

The phraseology _ recals 
Pheedr. 245 6, where there is 
a similar appearance of demon- 
stration. See esp. the words 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται 
τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. 

A comparison of the above 
passages leaves little doubt that 
by the Leader of Motion 
here is meant Pure Soul in 
general, of which the Deity, 
who sustains the universe, is 
a particular example. ‘The 
doctrine of the multiplicity 
of independent souls (Rep. το, 
611 a) is here left out of view. 
The argument may be thus 
stated. All that is bodily 
must suffer change. The Uni- 
verse suffers the least possible 
change (or “ diverges least from 
the motion of the same”) in 
revolving on an axis in one 
plane opposite ways alter- 
nately. But the Universe can- 
not always be the cause of its 
own motion: only Pure Soul 
moves spontaneously for ever. 
Nor can Soul be the cause of 
diverse and opposite motions. 
Hence the mighty fabric is not 


self-moved always, nor always 
moved by God: nor by two 
Gods alternately, for, as before 
stated, spirit cannot be op- 
posed to spirit. There re- 
mains only the case which has 
been given. 

7. τὸ ζῆν πάλιν ἐπικτώμενον 
“ Receiving a new influx of 
life.” 

8. λαμβάνοντα ἀθανασίαν ἐπι- 
σκευαστὴν | The world re- 
news her immortality, which 
she receives afresh from her 
Creator’s hand. ἐπισκευαστὴν 
= repaired, refitted. The 
word is omitted in Ast’s Lexi- 
con (edition of 1835). Cf. 
Legg. 5, 738 Ὁ: ot? ἂν καινὴν 
ἐξ ἀρχῆς τις ποιῇ οὔτ᾽ ἂν παλαιὰν 
διεφθαρμένην ἐπισκευάζηται (πό- 
λιν). The World grown old, 
like Milton’s hermit-soul, now 

«« Prunes her feathers and lets go 

her wings,” 
which, in following her own 
blind will, 

«Were all-to ruffled and some- 

times impaired.” 

ἀθανασίαν) Not merely ex- 
emption from death, but good- 
ness, the one immortal thing. 
Cf. Legg. 4, 713 €: dco ev 
ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἔνεστι, τούτῳ πει- 
θομένους. 


> AE ‘ »" 
ἀθανασίαν ---- παρὰ τοῦ δημι- 














ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 49 


| A \ a : -~ < Bs 
270. σκευαστὴν παρὰ TOV δημιουργοῦ, τοτε 0, νεθῇ, 


> e Ν Ci ON 7 \ Ν > / ΄ δ 
Ot ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν ἰέναι, κατὰ καιρὸν ἀφεθέντα τοιοῦτον - 


“ δὰ κι , \ / 
ὥστε ἀνάπαλιν πορεύεσθαι πολλὰς περιόδων μυρι- 


id \ Ν 7 Ἃ Ν > / SELLS 
adas διὰ TO μέγιστον ὃν καὶ ἰσορροπώτατον ἐπὶ 


7 lad δ " 
σμικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἰέναι. 


ουργοῦ] Here, as in Tim. 41 a, 
the universe is entirely de- 
pendent upon the Creator for 
immortality. The word δημι- 
ουργός in Plato is equivalent to 
6 ξυνιστὰς, ὁ Evvappdoas, ὁ γεν- 
νήσας, and has only the faintest 
trace of the mystic solemnity 
with which it was afterwards 
invested. 

2. dv ἑαυτὸν! Eusebius has 
ἑαυτοῦ, and the reading of the 
Bodleian (with Δ ΠῚ), δι éavrov 
eavtov (sic Bod].), perhaps indi- 
cates some confusion. But δι᾽ 
ἑαυτὸν, signifying that the world 
at such a time is the ultimate 
cause of his own motion, is not 
certainly wrong. Cf. Legg. ro, 
903 6: μεταβάλλει---δι᾿ ἑαυτὴν ἢ 
δι ἑτέραν ψυχήν. 

κατὰ καιρὸν ἀφεθέντα τοιοῦ- 
τον] “Being let go at sucha 
favourable moment.” It is 
true that supposing the mo- 
tion equable, every moment 
would be, mechanically speak- 
ing, alike. But then other 
causes, besides those merely 
mechanical, are imagined. The 
σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία is not a me- 
chanical cause. Compare the 
“opposite powers” of motion 
attributed in the Timzeus (38 d) 
to the circle of Mercury and 
Venus and that of the Sun. 
Two conditions, then, contri- 
bute to make possible the 
length of the succeeding period 
—the state of the innate im- 
pulse at the time at which the 


“engine is reversed,” and the 
shape and position of the 
whole mass. The redundant 
form of the sentence in which 
both these conditions are ex- 
pressed is characteristic of the 
later manner of Plato. Stall- 
baum has not chosen to ex- 
plain his objection to this way 
of taking the words. 

3. πολλὰς περιόδων μυριάδας] 
“ Many times ten thousand re- 
volutions,” 1. 6. days, since the 
diurnal revolution is the one 
most naturally attributed to 
the whole Heaven. Cf. Theset. 
153 C: ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περίφορὰ 
ἢ κινουμένη καὶ 6 ἥλιος. ‘Tim. 
39 c: νὺξ μὲν οὖν ἡμέρα τε γέ- 
γονεν---ἡἧ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ φρονιμω- 
τάτης κυκλήσεως περίοδος. 

4. ἰσορροπώτατον] Because it 
is the most perfect sphere. 

ἐπὶ σμικροτάτου βαῖνον πο- 
dds] Moving on the smallest 
pivot—in fact, a mathemati- 
cal point—in modern lan- 
guage, the celestial south pole. 
Like the Indian tortoise, the 
Universe has no surface on 
which to rest. The image of 
the top, used for another pur- 
pose in Rep. 4, 436 d (ὅταν ἐν 
τῷ αὐτῷ πήξαντες τὸ κέντρον 
περιφέρωνται), has probably sug- 
gested this expression. The Uni- 
verse is like a great humming- 
top when “sleeping.” Cf. 
Legg. 10, 893 d: καὶ τότε μὲν 
ἔστιν ὅτε βάσιν ἑνὸς κεκτημένα 
τινὸς κέντρου. 


*H 


self-moved: 
nor moved 
opposite 
ways, 
either by 
one Deity 
or more 
than one, 


5 for mind 


cannot be 

opposed to 
mind, But, 
which 


alone re- 
mains, it is 
at one time 
guided by 
its Divine 
Author, 
and re- 
ceives from 
him a re- 
newal of 
life and im- 
mortality. 
And again, 
* being let 
go at the 
most au- 
spicious 
moment, 

it makes 
countless 
revolutions 


50 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Φαίνεταί γ᾽ οὖν δὴ καὶ μάλα εἰκότως p. 276 


εἰρῆσθαι πάνθ᾽ ὅσα διελήλυθας. 


ΞῈ. Λογισάμενοι δὴ ξυννοήσωμεν τὸ πάθος ἐκ 


σι A ΄ ἃ / ” 3 “ 
τῶν νῦν λεχθέντων, ὃ πάντων ἔφαμεν εἶναι τῶν θαυ- 


NE. =Q. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


an 5») yA \ 5 \ ~ ? > / 
5 μαστῶν αἴτιον. ἐστι yap οὖν δὴ TOUT αὐτο. 


\ “ \ \ \ > A an 
EE. To τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν τοτὲ μὲν ἐφ ἃ νῦν 


“ \ / 
κυκλεῖται φέρεσθαι, τοτὲ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τἀναντία. 


NE. ΣΏ. Πῶς δή; 


EE. Ταύτην τὴν μεταβολὴν ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν περὶ 


Ν » Ν 7 A a 3 
TOV OUPQVOV γιγνομένων τρόπων TIAGO WV εἰναι με- 


/ / “2 
γίστην καὶ τελεωτάτην τροπὴν. 


NE. ΣΩ. Ἔοικε γοῦν. 


I. μάλα εἰκότως] The Stranger 
has indeed spoken with an ap- 
pearance of artless simplicity 
well*calculated to impose on 
the imagination of youth. 

3. ΔΛογισάμενοι δὴ] “ Let us, 
reasoning on what has now 
been said, try to comprehend, 
in all its bearings, the fact 
which we described as the 
cause of all the phenomena 
that have excited our wonder.” 

7. φορὰν --- φέρεσθαι) CF. 
Theet. 153 d: ἡ περιφορὰ 7 
κινουμένη. Lege. 10, 906 b: αἱ 
--- ᾳφῆμαί φασιν. 

9. Πῶς 67;] Badh. “ Hee 
omnia adeo lucida explicata 
sunt, ut mireris cur Socrates 
etiamnum heereat, et per illa 
πῶς δὴ Yrespondeat. Neque 
vero Hospes dubitantem do- 
cere dignatur, sed  ulterius 
pergit.” One point, however, 
was not made clear, namely, 
how the change of the direc- 
tion of revolution was the 
cause of the other two tradi- 


tions : and it is this which the 
Stranger (though beginning ἄν- 
wbéy ποθεν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς) proceeds 
to explain. 

10. τῶν περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν γιγνο- 
μένων τροπῶν] The τροπὴ ἡλίου, 
or solstice, is the change in 
the apparent motion of the 
sun’s place on the horizon at 
rising and setting. Hom. Od. 
0, 404 ; Plat. Lege. 12, 945 d. 
The word τροπὴ is here gene- 
ralized and extended so as to 
include every cardinal change 
in the celestial motions: in 
the same lofty spirit in which 
the Great Year (τέλεος ἐνιαυτὸς) 
is spoken of in the Timeeus, 
or as we speak of the year of 
Saturn or Uranus. The word 
seems to be used in the same 
general sense in Tim. 39 d: 
τῶν ἄστρων ὅσα bt οὐρανοῦ πο- 
ρευόμενα ἔσχε τροπάς. Compare 
also Ar. de Ceelo II. 14, § 1, 
who says that if the Earth has 
a double motion there must be 
τροπαὶ also of the fixed stars. 


b 


y’ 
*| 





| 270, 


IIOAITIKOS. 


51 


HE. Μεγίστας τοίνυν καὶ μεταβολὰς χρὴ νομίζειν 


/ / o vad a a 
γίγνεσθαι τότε τοῖς ἐντὸς ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. 
Ξ ͵ 
NE. 2Q. Καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εἰκός. 


HE. Μεταβολὰς δὲ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς καὶ παν- 


/ / my) 7 \ val / 
Tolas συμφερομένας ap οὐκ ἴσμεν THY τῶν ζώων 


/ “ a ’ / 
φύσιν ὅτι χαλεπῶς ἀνέχεται 5 


NE. ΣΩ. Πώς δ᾽ ov; 


fn U / / 
HE. Φθοραὶ τοίνυν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τότε μέγισται 


, a 5, \ Ν a 
ξυμβαίνουσι τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων, καὶ δὴ Kal TO TOV 


> ,ὕ ΄ὔ a ἢ ΄, \ \ , 
ἀνθρώπων γένος ὀλίγον τι περιλείπεται. περὶ δὲ τού- 


Ε / \ \ 
τους ἄλλα τε παθήματα πολλὰ Kai θαυμαστὰ καὶ 


\ / ΄ \ / ἈΝ ἐξ 
καινὰ ξυμπίπτει, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε καὶ ξυνεπόμενον 


lal a Ν ᾽ 7 7 “ e a 2. 
TH τοῦ παντὸς ἀνειλίζει, τότε ὅταν ἡ τῆς νῦν καθε- 


/ / Ie 
στηκυίας ἐναντία γίγνηται τροπή. 


NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


2. τοῖς ἐντὸς ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν 
avrov| ‘This is one of the in- 
versions or alternations of 
words with which these dia- 
logues abound. 

5. συμφερομένας] “ Coming 
on together,’ as in_ hostile 
array. Cf. Theet.152e: συμ- 
φερέσθων. Ib. 153 a: τοσοῦτον 
στρατόπεδον. “When sorrows 
come, they come not single 
spies, but in battalions.” 

9. τῶν τε ἄλλων --- περιλεί- 
metal] The sentence returns 
to the indicative mood al- 
though redundant, because the 
last clause contains the prin- 
cipal statement. Cf. Thuc. 
VI. 32: ἐλέχθησαν τοιοίδε λόγοι 
ἀπό τε ἄλλων ---καὶ “Ἑρμοκράτης 
ὁ Ἕρμωνος- ἔλεγε τοιάδε. 

ΤΟ. τούτους] Sc. τοὺς τῶν ἀν- 
θρώπων περιλειπομένους. γένος 
om. pr. I. 


11. ἀλλά τε παθήματα---μέγι- 
στον δὲ τόδε] Cf. Tim. 20 a: 
Τίμαιός τε---- Κριτίαν 5¢—, alib. 

12. ξυμπίπτει] “ Coincide.” 
The meaning of év is promi- 
nent, as in ξυμφερομένους. 

Evverdpevov| Following the 
analogy of the world’s un- 
twisting. Consentaneous with 
the rebound and reverse mo- 
tion of the Great Whole. 

13. ὅταν ἡ τῆς νῦν--- τροπή] 
τῆς νῦν καθεστηκυίας, 50. τροπῆς, 
which, like the plural τροπαῖς 
below, 271 6, signifies not only 
the “turn,” but the cycle of 
movement which follows. The 
double meaning of the English 
word “revolution” nearly cor- 
responds to this ambiguity of 
τροπή. ‘* When there occurs 
the transition to the cycle 
opposite to that in which we 
live.” 


En Ὁ 


I 


ο 


by itself, 
like a huge 
and per- 
fectly-ba- 
lanced top, 
revolving 
on the 
finest peg. 
This 
change is, 
as it were, 
the solstice 
of the great 
year. And 
this crown- 
ing change 
involves 
many lesser 
changes, 
destructive 
to the 
animal 
economy. 
Hence 
many crea- 
tures per- 
ish, and of 
mankind 
also but 


few are 
left. And 
on these 
few there 
passes a 
mighty 
change. 
As the 
movement 
of the 
world, so 


52 ITAATQNO2 


A ε , δ, 3 5 / 
EE. “Hv ἡλικίαν ἕκαστον εἶχε τῶν ζώων, αὕτη p. 270}: 


A \ ” ΄ / “ὦ 3 
πρῶτον μεν €0T?) πάντων, καὶ ἐπαύσατο σαν OOOV nV 


Ν Ἀ > ΄ / / 
θνητὸν ἐπὶ TO γεραίτερον ἰδεῖν πορευόμενον, μεταβαλ- 


\ ΄ / - 4 Ν . 
λον δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον οἷον νεώτερον καὶ ἅπα- 


/ / “-“ \ / ΄ 
δλώτερον ἐφύετο. καὶ τῶν μὲν πρεσβυτέρων αἱ λευκαὶ 


7 ἴω > 3 / ΄ Ν 
τρίχες ἐμελαίνοντο, τῶν δ᾽ αὖ γενειώντων αἱ παρειαὶ 


τ. ἡλικίαν ͵]Ὶ͵ ““ Condition, or 
appearance, in respect of youth 
or age.” Cf. Euthyd. 271 b: 
μάλα πολὺ — ἐπιδεδωκέναι μοι 
ἔδοξε kal—ov πολύ τι τὴν ἡλικίαν 
διαφέρειν Κριτοβούλου. This use 
of the word affords a point of 
transition to the meaning of 
‘Ssize or “stature.” Cf. Hdt. 
AUB Ὁ; AVE Seite 

2. ἐπαύσατο --- πορευόμενον | 
* All that is mortal ceases at 
such a time to advance towards 
amore ancient look.” τὸ yepai- 
τερον ἰδεῖν, “ that which is more 
aged to look upon.” Cf. Pheedr. 
253 d: λευκὸς ἰδεῖν. Tim. 52 ἃ: 
παντοδαπὴν ---ἰδεῖν. Soph. Aid. 
Col. 327: δυσμορ᾽ ὁρᾷν. 

4. οἷον νεώτερον] “ Younger 
to all appearance.” 

Badham conj. ἰόν, which is 


free from objection. But οἷον 
νεώτερον exactly expresses 
“younger in appearance, 


though not in years,’ and 
corresponds with γεραίτερον 
ἰδεῖν supr. The instance of 
οἷον with an adj., given by 
Passow, ai οἷον συνεχεῖς κινή- 
σεις, is from a late authority 
(Schol. Ap. Rh. 3, 1018). But 
the use is so closely analogous 
to other uses as hardly to 
need defence. Cf. infr. 277 ¢: 
τὴν--οἷον τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ 
συγκράσει τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνάρ- 
γειαν. 

5. ἐφύετο] He proceeds as 


if he were narrating what hap- 
pened on one of these oceasions 
in former time—say at the be- 
ginning of the cycle preceding 
ours. Cf. εἶχε supr. ἃ. 

6. yeverovrov| The form 
γενειάω is less distinctly incep- 
tive than γενειάσκω, which oc- 
curs, Symp. 180 dee the 
cheeks of bearded men grew 
smooth, and restored each man 
to his former bloom ; and the 
youth’s ‘ crescent nature’ grow- 
ing smooth, and dwindling day 
by day and night by night, 
returned, both in mind and 
body, to the character and 
likeness of infancy, and then 
began to vanish away, and 
presently was no more seen.” 
This process, which in any 
case seems to have been rapid, 
only occupied a few days 
where life had been  sud- 
denly and violently extin- 
guished. These cases seem to 
be thought different from 
those of natural death: pro- 
bably because, in the latter, 
dissolution was imagined, as 
it had been more gradual, to 
be more complete; so that 
earth could at once be mixed 
with kindred earth. That 
Plato is fully aware of the lu- 
dicrous aspect of all this will be 
obvious to any one who com- 
pares the speech of Aristophanes 
in the Sympos., 190-193. The 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


53 


/ ΄ὔ \ a “ Ὁ 
270. λεαινομεναι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν παρελθοῦσαν ὠραν ἐκα- 


1771. 





/ a \ « Pa \ / 
στον καθίστασαν, τῶν δὲ ἡβώντων Ta σώματα λεαι- 


“ Ν > « / Ν , 
νομενὰα και σμικροτεέρα καθ ἡμερᾶαν και VUKTQ €K- 


7 , / ἈΝ a A Ν 
στην γιγνόμενα πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ νεογενοῦς παιδὸς 


͵ > , ΄ \ \ ζ \ \ a 
φύσιν ἀπῇει, κατά TE THY ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ TO σῶμα 5 


> / N > > a yA / 
ἀφομοιούμενα᾽ τὸ δ᾽ ἐντεῦθεν On μαραινόμενα κο- 


΄σ Ν ’ὔ lal iy 
μιδῇ τὸ πάμπαν ἐξηφανίζετο. τῶν δ᾽ ad βιαίως 
/ > ΄σ ΄ / Ἂν A ΄ ἴω 
τελευτώντων ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ τὸ τοῦ νεκροῦ σῶμα), 
3 \ a 7 , \ 7, 57 > 
ταῦτα ταῦτα πάσχον παθήματα διὰ τάχους, ἀδηλον ἐν 
, / e / 
ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις διεφθείρετο. 


NE. 2Q. Γένεσις δὲ δὴ τίς ror’ ἦν, ὦ ξένε, Gov; 


Ν / / Δ ἴω 
καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἐγεννῶντο ; 


a 53 / “ N \ > 
EE. Δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι TO μὲν ἐξ ἀλλήλων 


> 3 3 fa , / /, Ν \ \ 
οὐκ ἣν ἐν TH τότε φύσει γεννώμενον, TO δὲ δὴ γηγε- 


\ 5 , ΄ὔ ,ὕ 79 93 \ Mic 
ves εἶναι ποτε γένος λεχθέν, TOUT ἣν TO κατ ἐκεῖνον 


φθορὰ, which follows the great 
τροπὴ, has now been described, 
and we are next informed as 
to the mode in which the 
Earth replenishes herself. The 
existing generation being thus 
“compounded with dust,” the 
Earth, which had previously 
lain fallow, began to produce 
her crop of heroes. 

6. ἀφομοιούμενα] Badham 
ingeniously conjectures ἀπο- 
pecovmeva. But the ellipse is 
easily borne. 

ἡ. τῶν τελευτώντων ---τὸ τοῦ 
νεκροῦ [σῶμα]}] For the redun- 
dant genitive with the change 
of number, cf. Phedo 62 a: 
οὐδέ ποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ 
--ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς, Where much 
needless difficulty has arisen. 
The notion of the backward 
eurrent being communicated 
to the process of animal life 
illustrates the ancient concep- 


tion of motion as including 
change. σῶμα om. Bodl. ΔΗ. 

13. TO—e£ ἀλλήλων ---γεννώ- 
μενον] Sc. γένος, or perhaps, 
as sometimes happens, the ac- 
tion of the verb is made the 
subject of the passive voice. 
For this, cf. Soph. 221 a: τὸ 
—dvacrewpevov. In that case 
the concrete is put for the ab- 
stract — τὸ γεννώμενον for τὸ 
γεννᾶσθαι. 

14. ἐν τῇ τότε φύσει] “ Had 
no place in the course οὗ na- 
ture which then obtained.” 
For a similar use of φύσις, cf. 
Pheedo 103 b: τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. 

τὸ - γηγενὲς εἶναί ποτε γενος 
λεχθὲν] “The earth-born race, 
of whose former existence we 
have heard.” 

15. τοῦτ᾽ ἦν] “ Was this, was 
that which we have just hinted 
at and are now to describe.” 1.6. 
τὸ ἐν τῇ τότε φύσει γεννώμενον. 


the order 
of the ages 
of man, is 
reversed. 
And, at 
the time 
when the 
world re- 
turns under 
the Divine 
care, old 
age is done 
away, and 
men pass 
through 
maturity 
and youth 
to child- 


10 hood and 


infancy, 
and so pass 
away. 

And in 
harmony 
with the 
same move- 
ment, the 
bodies of 


15 those who 


slept in 
earth arise 
again. 
This was 
the giant 
brood, of 
whose last 
relics the 
memory 
has been 
preserved 
to us by 
those who 
grew up 
at the 
beginning 
of this pre- 
sent cycle. 


54: 


TOV χρόνον ἐκ γῆς πάλιν ἀναστρεφόμενον, ἀπεμνὴ- p. 271) 


ITAATQNOZ 


/ Ace vad ¢ / / σ΄“ / 
μονεύετο δὲ ὑπὸ TOV ἡμετέρων προγόνων TOV πρώτων, 


δ x / \ lal / ΄σ Ν tan 
οἱ τελευτώσῃ μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιφορᾷ Tov ἑξῆς 


/ / “ \ \ 
χρόνον ἐγειτόνουν, τῆσδε δὲ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἐφύοντο" 


/ \ - / > / , € la cal 
5TOUT@Y yap οὗτοι κήρυκες ἐγένονθ᾽ ἡμῖν τῶν λόγων, 


A a « Ν lad > > “ > a Ν Ν 
οἱ νῦν ὑπὸ πολλῶν οὐκ ορθῶς ἀπιστοῦνται. TO yap 


᾽ “ 5 \ lal / 7 ΄ 
ἐντεῦθεν, οἶμαι, χρὴ Evvvoelv. ἐχόμενον yap ἐστι τῷ 


Χ / 3. ΟΝ \ A XN "57 / > 
Tous πρεσβύτας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἰέναι φύσιν, εκ 


a , 5 ΄ Ns a ΄ 
τῶν τετελευτηκότων αὖ, κειμένων δὲ ἐν γῇ, πάλιν 


I. ἐκ γῆς πάλιν ἀναστρεφόμε- 
vov] The bodies which Earth 
has absorbed she gives forth 
again to be the habitations of 
other souls. It appears cer- 
tain from infr. 273 (however 
strange the conception) that 
the γηγενεῖς are born like the 
army of Cadmus, in full matu- 
rity, and then follow the stages 
which are here described: 
first attaining to early man- 
hood, then to youthful prime, 
and then to childhood, and so 
disappearing from the Earth : 
old age being literally un- 
known, as in the description 
of Hesiod. 

3. mepipdpal _ Not “ period” 
but “revolution” = the time 
during which the Universe 
revolved in the former way. 
Cf. supr. a, τῇ τότε φύσει: infr. 
274 6, Tov ἐκ τῆς νῦν περιφορᾶς 
καὶ γενέσεως βασιλέα. 

4. ἐγειτόνουν] “ Were neigh- 
bours to” —i.e. next in point of 
time. Our first ancestors lived 
in the times immediately suc- 
ceeding the end of the former 
motion. ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν 
ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος, Gorg. 523 Ὁ. 

5. τούτων γὰρ οὗτοι κήρυκε---- 
τῶν λόγων] Compare the care 


which is taken, in Tim. 22, 23, 
to account for the preservation 
in Egypt of the legend of 
Atlantis, and the disappear- 
ance of the same in Greece. 

6. ὑπὸ πολλῶν---ἀπιστοῦνται] 
Cf. Pheedr. 229 6: σὺ τοῦτο πεί- 
Get τὸ μυθολόγημα ἀληθὲς εἶναι ; 
K.T.A, 

τὸ yap — συννοεῖν] “ For 
we must seek to comprehend, 
methinks, that which follows 
what has now been said.” 

7. ἐχόμενον γάρ ἐστι τῷ] The 
dative after ἐχόμενον is curious, 
but ἐχόμενόν ἐστι is not quite 
the same as ἔχεται : and the 
change of τῷ into τοῦ (if a 
change were required) would 
be easier and also better than 
Stallbaum’s conjecture of ἕπο- 
μενον for ἐχόμενον. “ For it is 
of a piece with (hangs together 
with) the aged men’s returning 
to the nature of infancy that 
from the dead also,” &e. 

8. ἐκ τῶν τετελευτηκότων --- 
φυομένου] The irregularity of 
the construction is caused by a 
feeling that the dead persons 
are not the same with those who 
rise. This does not, however, 
prevent the sentence from con- 
tinuing as if τοὺς τετελευτ- 


a 





ΠΟΛΙΓΙΚΟΣ. 5D 


3 “ 7 ᾽ 7 AY 4 
a7i. ἐκεῖ ξυνισταμένους Kal avaBiockopEvovs,|* | τῇ τροπῃ 


7 7 lal / 
συνανακυκλουμένης εἰς τἀναντία τῆς γενέσεως, καὶ 


a Ν \ ΄σ ἊΝ / » fe ᾽ / 
γηγενεῖς On κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐξ ἀνάγκης φυο- 


/ oS γ΄ yf Ν Ν > / “ \ 
μένους, OVTWS EX ELV ΤτΤουνομὰ και TOV ογον, οσοὺς μὴ 


Ν ᾽ an ᾽ 327) lal > / 
Geos αὐτῶν εἰς ἀλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν. 


nxéras were the subject. Cf. 
Theet. 182 b: ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀμφο- 
τέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων 
τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπο- 
τίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα γίγνε- 
σθαι, τὰ δὲ aicGavdpeva—where 
see note. So that the γηγενεῖς are 
composed of the elements 
which have been restored to 
Earth from the life of the for- 
mer cycle. The word γηγενεῖς 
is a “tertiary predicate.” 
“Being born by generation 
from the Earth.” 

I. ἀναβιωσκομένους] 
ing to life again.” This, as 
afterwards appears, is the 
quickening of a soul which 
has been “sown” into the 
earth, infr. 272 8. 

ἕπεσθαι, which is commonly 
inserted before τῇ τροπῇ, is 
omitted in Bodl. At. The word 
is unnecessary, and is very likely 
to have been added, from con- 
jecture, by some one who 
thought the apodosis too long 
deferred. 

2. cvvavaxukdouperns| Stall- 
baum, following a hint of 
Schleiermacher, writes cvvava- 
κυκλουμένους, Which he finds in 
one MS. (Zittav). But this only 
increases the obscurity, for the 


“ Com- 


phrase εἰς τἀναντία τῆς γενέσεως ᾿ 


is hardly intelligible. Téveous 
is here used in the widest and 
most abstract sense for the 
general process of Nature, the 
current of which is reversed 
with the motion of the Sphere 


ge of mo- 


old erow 


(τῇ τροπῇ =the chan 
tion), whence the g 

young, and the buried rise 
from earth again: diminution 
taking the place of growth, 
and generation of decay. See, 
for a parallel notion in mo- 
dern poetry, “The thoughts 
of men are widened with the 
process of the Suns ;” and cf. 
infr. 273 6: τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν νῦν γένε- 
σιν ὁδόν. 274 6: τῆς νῦν περι- 
φορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως. Also Pheedv. 
245 6: πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσαν 
See also Tim. 82 c: 
ὅταν ἀνάπαλιν ἡ γένεσις τούτων πο- 


΄ 
τε γένεσιν. 


ρεΐηται, τότε ταῦτα διαφθείρεται. 

Badham, rejecting ἕπεσθαι, 
conj. ἥκειν for ἐκεῖ. But cf. Prot. 
320 d: τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ (sc. τὰ 
θνητὰ γένη) θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς 
καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες κιτ.Ὰλ. 

4. τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον] Se. 
For ἔχειν, 
<a , 
THY ἐπωνυμίαν 


τοῦ γηγενεῖς φύεσθαι. 
cf. Thucyd. ΠΕ 9: 
στσχειν. 

ὅσους μὴ --- ἐκόμισεν,͵ Who 
they were that were thus ex- 
empted from the cycle of na- 
ture may be gathered from 
Phedo 82 c: εἰς δέ ye θεῶν 
γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παν- 
τελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις 
ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τῷ. φιλομαθεῖ. 
Cf. Phedr. 249 a. 

5. αὐτῶν] I. 6. of those 
who should have been born. 
The elements which should 
have been united with the soul 
are identified in the language 
with the soul herself. 


A. few, in- 
deed, were 
exempted 
by Divine 
ordinance 
from being 
thus born 
again. 
There can 


be little 
doubt to 
which of 
these cycles 
belongs 
Hesiod’s 
description 
of the gold- 
en age. 
God was 
then the 
guide of 
the Uni- 
versal Mo- 
tion: and 
every το- 
gion and 


every tribe 10 


ofcreatures 
was ‘‘ quar- 
tered to” 
several 


56 


NE. ΣΩ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ye ἕπεται τοῖς p. 273) 


ἔμπροσθεν. 


MAATQNOZ 


’ \ ἊΝ A ΄- 
ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸν βίον ὃν ἐπὶ τῆς Κρόνου 


\ 5 ᾽ὔ ΄ > > / 53 ΄σ 
φὴς εἰναι δυνάμεως, πότερον ἐν ἐκείναις ἣν ταῖς τρο- 


΄' Δ rn \ \ \ “ ΕΒ Ν 
παῖς ἢ ἐν ταῖσδε; τὴν μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄστρων τε καὶ 


ταῖς τροπαῖς γίγνεσθαι. 


βἡλίου μεταβολὴν δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἑκατέραις ξυμπίπτει 


EE. Καλῶς τῷ λόγῳ ξυμπαρηκολούθηκας. 0 δ᾽ 


a 7 3 / / lal 
ἤρου περὶ τοῦ TavTa αὐτόματα γίγνεσθαι τοῖς av- 


/ a “ “ > A / la 
θρώποις, ἥκιστα τῆς νῦν ἐστὶ καθεστηκυίας φορᾶς, 


> 3: VS: Ν a “ yy ͵ \ Sars 
ἀλλ nv καὶ τοῦτο τῆς ἐμπροσθεν. TOTE yap αὑτὴης 


πρῶτον τῆς κυκλήσεως ἦρχεν ἐπιμελούμενος ὅλης ὃ 


/ al \ / 3. A eX “ 
θεός,----[ὡς νῦν κατὰ τόπους ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, ὑπὸ θεῶν 


2. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸν βίον] The 
fable of the γηγενεῖς has been 
applied: the application of 
the story of Atreus is evi- 
dent: it only now remains to 
find a place for the legend of 
the golden age: when κάρπον 
ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἀρουρὰ αὐτομάτη. 
In that former cycle the spon- 
taneous productiveness of the 
Earth was as apparent in the 
vegetable as in the animal 
kingdom. 

3. ταῖς τροπαῖς) The plural 
marks the concrete form of 
expression, as In μέσαι νύκτες. 

10. αὐτῆς---κυκλήσεως) “ For 
first the whole revolution was 
itself guided by the Divine 
care.” αὐτῆς gives emphasis to 
κυκλήσεως as Opposed to τὰ ζῶα. 
I. e. The universal movement 
which involves all else. 

11. ἐπιμελούμενος] It is per- 
haps implied that he acts only 
through the inferior deities. 

12. tos νῦν --- διειλημμένα] 
The general meaning of this ap- 
pears from infr. 272 6 : οἱ κατὰ 
τοὺς τόπους συνάρχοντες τῷ με- 


γίστῳ δαίμονι θεοί. But the 
exact construction is not ob- 
vious. Stallbaum proposes to 
read ὡς δὲ viv—mavr ἦν---διει- 
λημμένα. The words as they 
stand, however, will afford the 
same sense without any tor- 
ture, by supposing μέρη to be, 
like τὸν κολοφῶνα in Theet. 
153 6, or δύο μέρη infr. 283 ¢, a 
cognate accusative in apposi- 
tion, expressing the mode of 
the action of ἦρχε. “ The 
parts of the universe every 
way being divided under the 
rule of deities, just as is now 
the case in certain parts.” (ὡς 
νῦν κατὰ τόπους ταὐτὸν τοῦτο SC. 
γίγνεται.) This last idea, though 
hardly consistent with the gene- 
ral spirit of the myth, receives 
some illustration from Legg. 5, 
74 6, where the superiority of 
the inhabitants of particular re- 
gions is attributed to a Divine 
influence: ὡς ois θεία τις ἐπί- 
πνοια καὶ δαιμόνων λήξεις εἶεν. 
Compare Milton, Comus,18—29. 
Pheedo 111 ο: καὶ δὴ θεῶν ἕδη 
—ev οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς 


d 








ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. oT 


271. ἀρχόντων πάντῃ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μέρη διειλημμένα. 


Ν ‘ Ν \ “- Ν / Ν > / - a 
καὶ On καὶ τὰ ζῶα κατὰ γένη καὶ ἀγέλας οἷον νομεῖς 


σι 7 , > / > ’ o 
θεῖοι διειλήφεσαν δαίμονες, αὐτάρκης εἰς πάντα ἕκα- 


ΕἸ Ἃ - τ yf σ“ se αν 
στος εκαστοις WY OLS AUTOS ἐεἐνέμεέν, WOTE OUT ay plov 


53 5ῸΝ 3, / / “ / I,” 
ἦν οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀλλήλων ἐδωδαί, πόλεμος TE οὐκ ἐνὴν 8 


5ῸΝ , Ν ’΄ 57 ΒΝ “ / 
οὐδὲ στάσις TO παράπαν᾽ ἄλλα θ᾽ ὅσα τῆς τοιαύτης 


/ « / 7» 
ἐστὶ κατακοσμήσεως ἑπόμενα, μυρί 


δ By 
av em λεγειν. 


> 5 ΄σ ’ \ > / 
τὸ δ᾽ οὖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων λεχθὲν αὐτομάτου πέρι βίου 


Ν Ν , 5 
διὰ τὸ τοιόνδε εἰρηται. 


εἶναι. For διειλημμένα, οἵ. Ar. 
Pol. VII. 6: βλέψας---πρὸς πᾶ- 
σαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διείληπται 
τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. Cf. also Critias 
109 b: Θεοὶ---ἅπασαν γῆν ποτε 
κατὰ τοὺς τόπους διελάγχανον οὐ 
κατὰ ἔριν. For ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, cf. 
infr. 308 6: ταὐτὸν δή μοι τοῦθ᾽ 
ἡ βασιλικὴ φαίνεται κιτιλ. Lege 
4, 713 6.. Le. as now there is 
a presiding deity in the Sun, 
the Earth, the Sea, and in sacred 
groves, &c., so then no place 
was devoid of the Divine Pre- 
sence and control: πάντα da- 
μόνων πληρῆ, as Thales said, 
not θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα (Plat. 
Legg. 10, 908 6). It must be 
admitted that the text is not 
wholly free from suspicion. Cf. 
infr. 272 6: οἱ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, 
and note. Qu. an. legend. 
ὡσαύτως δ᾽ αὖ κατὰ τόπους κ-τ.λ. 2 
αὐτως being dropped from ho- 
moioteleuton, the remaining 
letters, δ᾽ αὖ, might easily be 
corrupted into νῦν. The go- 
vernment of μέρη 1s in this case 
less harsh: the clause ὑπὸ θεῶν 
-Οδιείλημμένα being explanatory 
of κατὰ τόπους ταὐτὸν τοῦτο (86. 
ἔδρα, 1. 6. ἦρχεν ἐπιμελούμενος τοῦ 
κόσμου). 


2. καὶ ἀγέλας] As the subdi- 


Ν yy 3 \ Sew 
θεὸς ἐνεμεν αὐτοὺς αὑτὸς 


visions of each tribe. The word 
recals the previous discussion. 

3. διειλήφεσαν | Answering 
to διειλημμένα. As the parts 
of the universe generally were 
distributed to several gods, so 
the lesser deities had the tribes 
of animals distributed amongst 
them. θεῖοι is to be joined with 
δαίμονες. 

adtapkys| Not self-sufficing, 
“ but sufficient of himself ;” = 
αὐτὸς ἀρκῶν. Cf. supr. 268 a. 

5. οὔτε ἀλλήλων ἐδωδαί] This 
thought is probably associated 
with the Orphie abstinence 
from animal food. 

6. τῆς τοιαύτης] Se. θείας. 

7. κατακοσμήσεω] The ge- 
nitive is accounted for by 
supposing the participle to be 
added pleonastically. ‘“ What 
belongs to this mode of ten- 
dance and is consonant there- 
to.” Cf. however Rep. 6, 504 
b: τῶν----προειρημένων ἐπομένας 
ἀποδείξεις. 

8. τὸ δ᾽ οὖν] “And accord- 
ingly (to return to the point) 
the tradition that mankind in 
particular had a spontaneous 
subsistence is to be accounted 
for in the following way.” 

9. θεὸς ---- ἐπιστατῶν | 


The 


a! 


Deities, 
each of 
whom was 
all-suffi- 
cient for 
his own 
flock in all 
things. 
Then was 
nothing 
wild: no 
devouring 
one an- 
other: no 
war or dis- 
cord of any 
kind. All 


was order- 
ed as you 
might ex- 
pect under 
a Divine 
sway. 
Hence 
amongst 
mankind 
there was 
no code of 
ordinances, 
for the Di- 
vine Will 
was their 
law: nor 
possession 


58 


> ΄σ 4 an » lal Δ 
ἐπιστατῶν, καθάπερ νῦν ἀνθρωποι, ζῶον ον 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


/ ϑ, / / « od / 
θειότερον, ἄλλα γένη φαυλότερα αὑτῶν vopevovor. 


’ ’ / rovut 4 > 3 Oe / 
νέμοντος δὲ ἐκείνου πολιτεῖαί TE οὐκ ἦσαν οὐδὲ KTN- 


a 7 ᾽ tad Ν » 7, 
σεις γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων" ἐκ γῆς yap ἀνεβιώσκοντο 


΄ 7O\ / a fd > Ν Ν \ 
5 TAVTES, οὐδὲν μεμνημένοι τῶν πρόσθεν. ἀλλὰ TA μεν 


cal > 5 / \ λὼ 9 / 5 3 / 
τοιαῦτα ἀπῆν πᾶντα, καρποὺς Oe ἀφθονους εἰχον amo 


τε δένδρων καὶ πολλῆς ὕλης ἄλλης, οὐχ ὑπὸ γεωργίας 


/ ᾽ > > / > / “ - 
φυομένους, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτομάτης ἀναδιδούσης τῆς γῆς. 


OX \ Ν 57 lal Ν Ν I, 
γυμνοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀστρωτοι θυραυλοῦντες τὰ TOAAG ἐνέ- 


same belief in a past theo- 
cracy is expressed in the Laws, 
with a similar allusion to the 
Saturnia regna, and is used to 
point the same lesson,—that a 
paternal government, as man- 
kind are now constituted, is a 
visionary dream, and that the 
rule of Law, devised by rea- 
son, which is all which re- 
mains to us of Divine guid- 
ance, is the best available 
substitute ; 4, 713 Οἱ οἷον νῦν 
ἡμεῖς δρῶμεν τοῖς ποιμνίοισι καὶ 
ὅσων ἥμεροΐ εἰσιν ἀγέλαι ov βοῦς 
βοῶν οὐδὲ αἶγας αἰγῶν ἄρχοντας 
ποιοῦμεν αὐτοῖσί τινας, ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς 
αὐτῶν δεσπόζομεν, ἄμεινον ἐκείνων 
γένος. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα 
καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ὧν τὸ γένος 
ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν δαι- 
μόνων, ὃ διὰ πολλῆς μὲν αὐτοῖς 
ῥᾳστώνης πολλῆς δ᾽ ἣμιν ἐπιμε- 
λούμενον ἡμῶν, εἰρήνην τε καὶ αἰδῶ 
καὶ εὐνομίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν δίκης 
παρεχόμενον ἀστασίαστα καὶ ev- 
δαίμονα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπειρ- 
γάζετο γένη. 

I. ἐπιστατῶν] Cf. Gorg. 523 
C: οἱ ἐπιμελῆται. 

3. πολιτεῖαι] Forms οὗ go- 
vernment are rendered super- 
fluous by the presence of a 
Supreme Will. 


τε] The apodosis is broken 
off through the expansion of this 
clause by an afterthought, and 
is resumed in κάρπους δὲ infr. 
Compare with this passage the 
description in the Protagoras, 
p. 321, of the state of man be- 
fore the introduction of the 
arts of life; and Glaucon’s ὑῶν 
πόλις in the Republic, 2,372. The 
absence of property and mar- 
riage in the perfect state is again 
mentioned in the well-known 
passage of the Laws, 5, 739. 

4. ἀνεβιώσκοντο] Rising from 
the dust of former generations. 
Cf. supr. 271 b. 

5. οὐδὲν μεμνημένοι] Hay- 
ing been steeped in the river 
of forgetfulness, Rep. 10,621 e: 
and therefore ignorant of all 
previous relationships. 

6. ἀπό te δένδρων͵; Cf. Hes. 
Op. et D. 233 : ἰθυδίκαισι per’ 
ἀνδρασι τοῖσι φέρει μὲν γαῖα 
πολὺν βίον, οὔρεσι δὲ δρῦς [ ἄκρη 
μέν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ 
μελίσσας κιτιλ.; and Hom. Od. 
T. 111: φέρῃσι τε γαῖα μέλαινα 
πυροὺς καὶ κριθὰς, βρίθησι τε δέν- 
δρεα καρπῷ, quoted elsewhere 
by Plato, Rep. 2, 363. 

9. ἐνέμοντο] “ Lived under 
their shepherd’s care.” 


ἕτερον Pp. 271... 


Ρ. 272 








ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 59 


‘\ \ ΄- « a val A > 
272. μοντο TO γὰρ τῶν @Mpov αὐτοῖς ἄλυπον ἐκέκρατο, 


‘ \ 3 \ S > / » aN / 
μαλακας δὲ εὐνὰς εἶχον ἀναφυομένης ἐκ γῆς πόας 
> / \ \ 9S / 5 \ \ 
b ἀφθόνου. τὸν δὴ βίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀκούεις μὲν TOV 
lal \ / / A , SIN Ν 3 
τῶν ἐπὶ Kpovov' τόνδε δ᾽, ὃν * λόγος ἐπὶ Διὸς εἶναι, 


NX ς \ » ὌΝ 5} ω ’ > a x 
TOV VUVL TAPOV QvuTos no Onoa. Κριναι ὃ αὐυτοιν TOV 5 


» , Brass oN , / Aes , 
εὐδαιμονέστερον ap ἂν δύναιο τε καὶ ἐθελήσειας 5 


ΝΕ. 
mE. 


NE. 


SOQ. Οὐδαμῶς. 


I. τὸ yap τῶν ὡρῶν] Cf. 
Odyss. A. 565-8; Hdt. I. 142; 
Plat. Lege. 5, 747. 

3. ἀκούεις pev]  Subaud. 
ἤσθησαι δ᾽ οὐ (“although you 
have ποῦ seen’”’). 

4. ὃν * λόγος --- εἶναι] ὃν 
ὡς CH τὸ Β ὡς cett. This pro- 
bably implies the same feeling 
of half-credulous or ironical 
respect towards the popular 
religion which appears in Tim. 
40d. To Plato the mythology 
of his countrymen was but a 
rumour, an echo from the past. 

5. παρὼν] “ As an eye-wit- 
ness.” So the word is fre- 
quently used (pleonastically as 
here) by Sophocles, e.g. Cid. 
Col. 1587. 

κρῖναι δ᾽ — roy εὐδαιμονέστε- 
ρον] Compare the judgment 
between the just and unjust 
life in Rep. 2, 360 d, and _ be- 
tween pleasure and knowledge 
in Phileb. 52 e. 

8. τρόπον τινὰ] 1. 6. hypo- 
thetically. 

το. Ei pev—ypeias] Compare 
with the doubt here expressed 
as to the happimess of the 
golden age, the rejection in 
the Republic (2, 372) of the 


Βούλει δῆτα ἐγώ σοι τρόπον τινὰ διακρίνω ; 
ΣΏ. Πᾶανυ μὲν οὖν. 


᾽ Ἁ / . , Qn / 
Ei μεν τοίνυν οἱ τρόφιμοι τοῦ Kpovov, πα- το 


simple or primitive state as a 
basis for the definition of jus- 
tice. The picture of an earthly 
paradise has been purposely 
heightened, in order to enforce 
the remark that this is not the 
chief good of man. Cf. Eu- 
thyd. 289 Ὁ: οὐδέ ye et τις 
ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ὥστε ἀθανάτους 
ποιεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ 
ἀθανασίᾳ χρῆσθαι, οὐδὲ ταύτης 
ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδέν. See also 
Lys. 221 6: Πότερον, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
πρὸς Διός, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, 
οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ διψῆν, 
οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων 
κιτιλ. The identification of 
the king with the shepherd, 
and the notion of a theocracy, 
to which Plato here inclines, 
but which he rejects as un- 
suited to the present state of 
man, seem to be of Pythago- 
rean origin. Cf. Pythagor. Fr. 
ὃ 2. (Mullach p. 533): Ἔχει δὲ 
καὶ ws θεὸς ποτὶ κόσμον βασιλεὺς 
πρὸς πόλιν, καὶ ὡς πόλις ποτὶ κόσ- 
μον, βασιλεὺς πρὸς θεόν. ἁ μὲν γὰρ 
πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ διαφερόντων 
συναρμοσθεῖσα κόσμω σύνταξιν 
καὶ ἁρμονίαν μεμίμαται, ὁ δὲ βα- 
σιλεὺς ἀρχὰν ἔχων ἀνυπεύθυνον, 
καὶ αὐτὸς dv νόμος ἔμψυχος, θεὸς 


θη ὦ 


of wives 
and chil- 
dren, for 
they sprang 
from Earth, 
not know- 
ing whence 
they came. 
Contrast 
their life, 
devoid of 
care, in a 
perfect cli- 
mate, tak- 
ing no more 
thought for 
raiment 
than the 
lilies of the 


field, with 
our state in 
this present 
Jovian 
cycle, and 
say which 
is the hap- 
piest. 

Or rather, 
shall I tell 
you that 
this de- 
pends on 


60 


ρούσης αὐτοῖς οὕτω πολλῆς σχολῆς Kal δυνάμεως p. 272}) 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


πρὺς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίοις διὰ 


λόγων δύνασθαι ξυγγίγνεσθαι, κατεχρῶντο τούτοις 


/ pax ® if / / . > 
ξύμπασιν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν, μετά τε θηρίων καὶ μετ 


» ΄ a 7 \ / 
5aAAnA@Y ὁμιλοῦντες, καὶ πυνθανόμενοι παρὰ πάσης 


’ 5] “ 57 / 3) BA ΄ 
φύσεως εἴ τινά τις ἰδίαν δύναμιν ἔχουσα ῃσθετο τι 


διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων εἰς συναγυρμὸν φρονήσεως, 


ἐν ἀνθρώποις παρεσχημάτισται. 


Ibid. § 3, p. 535: θεόμιμόν 
ἐντι πρᾶγμα βασιλεία. These 


fragments, however, belong to 
a later time. See Introduction 
to the Statesman, § 3. It is 
left uncertain what deity had 
charge of the human race. But 
the notion of Deity is so far 
generalized that this matters 
little. See, however, the words 
τῶν ἐπὶ Kpdvov—oi τρόφιμοι τοῦ 
Κρόνου. 

(9.) of τρόφιμοι τοῦ Κρόνου] 
“The flock or charge (lit. 
‘nurslings’) of Κρόνος." The 
name is peculiarly applicable 
in the present case, where the 
Deity in charge not only go- 
verns, but attends to all the 
varied wants of those whom 
he governs, αὐτάρκης ὧν ois 
αὐτὸς νέμει. So also in Rep. 
and Laws, those for whose 
education the speakers are 
providing are spoken of by 
the same affectionate name. 
Rep. 7, 520 d: ᾿Απειθήσουσιν 
ἡμῖν ot τρόφιμοι ; Lege. 7, 804 
a: ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρους 
τροφίμους δεῖ. 

2. ἀλλὰ καὶ Onpios|] The 
traces of this in the regular 
mythology were few. (Cf. 
however, the stories of Procne, 
Philomela, and the like.) But 
the Fables of Aisop, and the 


cycle to which they belonged 
— partly invented to please 
the childish imagination, but 
probably not without sugges- 
tions from Egypt and the East 
—were sufficient to suggest 
the idea to Plato. See also 
Porphyr. V. Pythag. το : (Πυθα- 
yopas φησὶν) ὅτι πάντα τὰ γιγνό- 
μενα ἔμψυχα ὁμογενῆ δεῖ νομίζειν. 
5. καὶ πυνθανόμενοι] Τῇ other 
creatures besides man could 
tell their experience, science 
would rest on a wider basis. 
7. εἰς συναγυρμὸν φρονήσεως] 
“To contribute to the store of 
wisdom.” (Cf. Legg. 8, 845 e: 
idap —auvayuprév.) The idea 
that knowledge comprises all 
the actual relations of things, 
and arises only from the in- 
terrogation of the most varied 
experience, belongs to the 
maturity of Plato’s thought. 
Cf. Soph. 259 ἃ For πᾶσα 
Φύσις, cf. Rep. 2, 359 ¢: 6 
πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς 
ἀγαθόν. The close and friendly 
intercourse with Nature, which 
Plato here imagines, is well 
described in the little German 
fable ‘The Story without an 
Ἐπα. One point of coinci- 
dence may be quoted—when 
the child goes to sleep in the 
cave, the grass springs up spon- 
taneously to make his pillow. 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


61 


ἣν, a a cf , / Ν » 7 
472. εὔκριτον ὅτι τῶν νῦν οἱ τότε μυρίῳ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν 


/ > \ 3 / / Ὁ Ν lal 
διέφερον, εἰ δὲ ἐμπιπλάμενοι σίτων ἅδην καὶ ποτῶν 


διελέγοντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰ θηρία μύθους, οἷα 


\ Ν A A ν Dit a 7 Ν a “ 
d δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν περὶ αὐτῶν λέγονται, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς γε 


\ \ SiN / ’ » Ν 7. ΕἾ 
κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν ἀποφήνασθαι, καὶ μάλ᾽ εὔκρι- 


ῳ ’ 5 a \ > ἴω “ a‘ [eat Ἔ π 
τον. ὅμως δ᾽ οὖν ταῦτα μὲν ἀφώμεν, EWS αν ἡμιν 


᾿ς ec Ἃ -“ / « / \ > 
μηνυτὴς τις LKaVOS avn, ποτέρως οἱ τότε Tas ἐπιθὺυ- 


Ὥ / a “ a / 
μίας εἶχον περί TE ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν λόγων 


7 3 @ Ν “ \ 50 > 7 a x 
χβειας ου ενεκὰ τὸν μυσον ηγειραμεν, TOUTO €K:= 


if? / ἊΝ Χ a) > \ 4 / 
TEOV, ἵνα TO μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς TO πρόσθεν περαίνωμεν. 


> \ \ / / / > / \ 
Ἐπειδὴ yap πάντων τούτων χρόνος ἐτελεώθη καὶ 


μεταβολὴν ἔδει γίγνεσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ γήινον ἠδὴ 


a lA ΄ «ε a lal 
πᾶν ἀνήλωτο γένος, πάσας ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς 


The same conception of in- 
quiry, as a conversation with 
the object of study, appears in 
Legs. a 689 e: πάσας ὡς ἔπος 
εἰπεῖν διηρώτηκα τὰς κοινωνίας. 
“ Inquiring from every nature, 
to see if one having some 
peculiar power had perceived 
something different from the 
rest which might be gathered 
into wisdom’s treasury.” 

2. ef δὲ ἐμπιπλάμενοι---] ΟἿ, 
Legg. 7, 807 d: τοῖς δὴ ταύτῃ 
κεκοσμημένοις ἄρα οὐδὲν λειπόμε- 
νόν ἐστιν καὶ παντάπασιν προσῆ- 
κον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τρόπῳ βοσκήματος 
ἕκαστον πιαινόμενον αὐτῶν δεῖ 
ὧν. Rep. 3, 407 a,b: ὁ δὲ δὴ 
πλούσιος --- οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον 
ἔργον προκείμενον, οὗ ἀναγκαζο- 
μένῳ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀβίωτον. 

3. οἷα] Flor. b. Ven. Ξ. οἷοι. 
In either case μῦθοι is to be sup- 
plied as the subject of λέγονται. 

6. δ᾽ οὖν But to resume. 

7. ποτέρως] The clause de- 
pends on the verbal notion in 
μηνυτὴς. 


9. τὸν μῦθον ἠγείραμεν] “ We 
have waked from long slumber 
a ghost which seems unwilling 
to be laid.” Cf. Rep. 5,346a: 
ὅσον λόγον πάλιν κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς 
πολιτείας !—ov« ἴστε ὅσον ἑσμὸν 
λόγων ἐπεγείρετε. 

10. ἵνα---περαίνωμεν] “ That 
we may get forward with what 
is still before us.” Cf. Rep. τ, 
346 a: ἵνα τι kal περαίνωμεν. 

11. πάντων τούτων χρόνος] 
“The time required for all 
that has been described.” 

12. ede | Cf Prot. 321 ΟΣ 
ἡ εἱμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρῆν ev 7 ἔδει 
καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς 
φῶς. Compare Emped. vy. 66-- 
69: Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μέγα Neikos evi 
μελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη | ἐς τιμάς τ᾽ 
ἀνόρουσε, τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο, | 
ὅ σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλατέος παρελή- 
λαται Ὅρκου. 

τὸ γήινον ---- γένος] ‘ The 
race whose generation was 
from the Earth.” 

13. πάσας — ἀποδεδωκυίας | 
“ Having completed her pro- 


the way in 
which the 
nurslings 
of Saturn 
employed 
their gold- 
en time. 
Now when 
that cycle 
was at an 
end, and 
each soul 
had ful- 
filled the 
number of 
her births 
from Earth, 
the pilot 
of the Uni- 
verse let go 
the helm. 
Rebound- 
ing with a 
shock, the 
mighty 


mass caus- 
ed a new 


s > 8 ὃ 7, “ 3 νι ἢ θέ jj 
γενέσεις ἀποδεδωκυίας, OTH ἣν εκάστῃ προσταχθέν, p. “72 


per cycle of births.” For Pla- 
to’s doctrine of transmigra- 
tion, see Pheedo 82, 113, 114; 
Rep. 10,618-620; Pheedr. 248, 
249; Tim. 42. According to 
the Phedrus (248 6), the pe- 
riod here spoken of must be at 
least 10,000 years. Empe- 
docles and Pindar speak of 
30,000. Tpis μὲν μυρίας ὥρας 
ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλαλῆσθαι. 

I. ὅσα---πεσούσης] “ Having 
fallen in so many sowings into 
the earth as it was appointed 
unto each (to fall) :” i.e. having 
been sown in earth so many 
times. These words have oc- 
casioned some difficulty. Cor- 
narius, followed as usual by 
Stephanus, read καὶ ὅσα, but 
the clause is explanatory of 
the preceding, and hence the 
asyndeton. (Modestus cau- 
tusque quum alias tum in 
Platone criticus Stephanus, 
interdum tamen, ubi Ficinum 
Cornariumye temeré sequitur, 
aded sui est dissimilis vix ut vi- 
rum agnoscas. Heindorf.) Most 
MSS. have προσταχθέντος αὐτά. 
Badh. con}. ὅσα ἢν ἑκάστῃ τὰ προσ- 
ταχθέντα, τοσαῦτα εἰς γήινα σπέρ- 
ματα εἰσδύσης. And the Zurich 
editors, adopting a conjecture 
of Sauppe’s, read γῆς σπέρματα 
(“having fallen into so many 
germs of earth”). But the clod 
cannot be called a germ until 
united with a soul. The soul 
is rather the seed implanted in 
the earth. Stallbaum suggests 
two renderings, making τοσαῦτα 
σπέρματα equivalent either to 
κατὰ τοσαῦτα σπέρματα, OF tO ὡς 
τοσαῦτα σπέρματα, the accusative 
in the latter case being put for 
the genitive by attraction from 


ITAATQNOZ 


ὅσα. The latter alternative is 
to be rejected, not only because 
of the harshness of this attrac- 
tion, but because no one who 
wished to say “a soul must be 
born so many times from the 
earth,” would think of expres- 
sing himself thus, “a soul 
must fall into the earth as so 
many seeds.” In the former 
Stallbaum has perhaps (for he 
speaks obscurely) indicated the 
true rendering : according to 
which σπέρματα retains more 
than usual of a verbal signi- 
fication (ef. the unusual mean- 
ing of θρέμμα, inf. 289 b), and 
is in the accusative cognate 
after πεσούσης, while εἰς γῆν 
depends partly on πεσούσης, 
but directly and chiefly on 
σπέρματα. The sense becomes 
clear when σπαρείσης is substi- 
tuted in thought for πεσούσης. 
If Plato had written τοσαῦτα 
εἰς γῆν σπέρματα σπαρείσης (or 
πτώματα πεσούσης, οἷ. Aisch. 
Prom. 921), there could have 
been no doubt as to his mean- 
ing. Cf Legg. 8, 841 d: 
dura δὲ παλλακῶν σπέρματα μὴ 
σπείρειν, μηδὲ ἄγονα ἀρρένων παρά 
φυσιν : and compare Tim. 41 6: 
δέοι δὲ σπαρείσας αὐτὰς (τὰς ψυχάς) 
εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάσταις ἕκαστα 
ὄργανα χρόνου φῦναι ζώων τὸ 
θεοσεβέστατον. Ib. 42 d: ἔσπειρε 
τοὺς μὲν εἰς γῆν, τοὺς δ᾽ εἰς σελή- 
νην, τοὺς δ᾽ εἰς τἄλλα ὅσα ὄργανα 
χρόνου. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὸν σπόρον 
τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκε θεοῖς σώματα 
πλάττειν θνητά κιτ.ιλ. Thus the 
souls are sown into the earth 
and there a body is given to 
each. The verbal meaning of 
σπέρμα (=the act of sowing, 
not the seed,) occurs in Hes. 


| 





IIOAITIKO®. 05 


a “ / / / \ a 
272. τοσαῦτα εἰς γῆν σπέρματα πεσούσης, τότε δὴ τοῦ 


\ ς A , - , 7 » ΄ὕ 
παντὸς ὃ μὲν κυβερνήτης, οἷον πηδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέ- 


\ « a \ > 7] Ν \ \ 
μενος, εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη, Tov δὲ δὴ 


[ / > / C / Ν / 
κόσμον πάλιν ἀνέστρεφεν εἱμαρμένη τε Kal ξύμφυτος 


» / 7 3 τ Ν \ / 7 
ἐπιθυμία. TaVvTES οὖν οἱ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους συνάρχον- 


Op. et D. 779, σπέρματος ἄρξα- 
σθαι, and Soph. Cid. Tyr. 
1246, μνήμην παλαιῶν σπερμά- 
τῶν ἔχουσα. See Passow’s Lex. 
s. v. Although the imagery 
is different, the word πεσούσης 
recals not only the passage of 
the Timzeus just quoted (41 e), 
but the prime calamity of the 
soul described in the Phedrus. 
The above rendering is also 
given by (Οὐ. F. Hermann. This 
additional reason for the ter- 
mination of the cycle gives fresh 
plausibility to the story. 

I. τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνή- 
tys| τοῦ παντὸς heads the sen- 
tence, displacing μὲν, because 
the Universe is the real sub- 
ject of all that follows. 

2. πηδαλίων οἴακος] “ The 
tiller of the helm.” The otaé 
was the part of the steering 
apparatus next the steersman’s 
hand (Pollux, I. 89: οἵ. Aisch. 
Ag. 649, οἴακος θιγών). 

3. εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν 
ἀπέστη] ““ Retired to his own 
pinnacle of contemplation.” 
Cigebliome see 9. 25, ὅθι; 
Od. K. 146. The conception 
of the Timeus is more ele- 
vated (42 e): καὶ 6 μὲν δὴ 
ἅπαντα ταῦτα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν 
τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει. 
Though the idea of place is 
almost entirely absent here, 
it may be remembered that 
the central fire of the Pytha- 
goreans was called Διὸς φυλακή: 


and we may recal the νῶτον τοῦ 
ovpavod, which is the vantage- 
ground of speculation in the 
Pheedrus. 

4. εἱμαρμένη] Cf. ἔδει above, 
and the necessity pointed out 
inp. 269 d,e. Cf Tim. 47 e, 
566. : μεμιγμένη yap οὖν ἡ τοῦδε 
τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη. 

σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία] This “in- 
nate proclivity” may be com- 
pared with the blind principle 
of spontaneous motion alluded 
to in Tim. 30 a: πᾶν ὅσον ἢν 
ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν 
ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς 
καὶ ἀτάκτως. It is to be ob- 
served that this has a direction 
opposite to the will of God. 

5. οἱ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους---θεοὶ] 
It is evident from this that the 
government of the several re- 
gions was not wholly commit- 
ted to the subordinate deities. 
The Divine operation, imme- 
diate on the whole, was at 
once immediate and mediate 
in every part. If the text of 
251 e is sound, there is a false 
echo in κατὰ τοὺς rérovs—since 
κατὰ τύπους, in the former pas- 
sage as it now stands expresses 
the partial nature of the Divine 
superintendence in the present, 
and not its distribution in the 
former, cycle. The language 
resembles Pheedr. 246 e: τῷ δ᾽ 
ἕπεται otpatia θεῶν τε καὶ δαι- 
μόνων κατὰ ἕνδεκα μέρη κεκοσμη- 


destruction 
of all kinds 
of life: till, 
settling by 
degrees 
into his 
own path, 
he followed, 
as far as 


memory 
served, his 
father’s in- 
struction. 
But he 
forgot this 
by degrees, 
from being 


64 


΄ ͵ ὃ 7, θ / / "ὃ \ fo 
TES τῷ μεγίστῳ Oalpovl CEol, yvovTEes 10H TO γιγνο- Pp. 27 


ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ 


heres: 5 \ / A ͵ a we 
μενον, ἀφίεσαν αὖ Ta μέρη TOV κοσμου τῆς αὐτῶν 


» / 
ἐπιμελείας. 


ὁ δὲ μεταστρεφόμενος καὶ ξυμβάλλων, p. 27) 


ἀρχῆς τε καὶ τελευτῆς ἐναντίαν ὁρμὴν ὁρμηθείς, σει- 


ΒΥ 53 Ν / 
enclosed in ὅσμὸν πολὺν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ποιῶν, ἄλλην αὖ φθοραν ζώων 


“muddy 
ae of 
decay,” 
which 
clung to 
him from 
the chaos 
out of 
which he 


was at first 


\ ΄σ / 
παντοίων ἀπειργάσατο. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προελθόντος 


΄ ΄ / / Ν “ yy 
ἱκανοῦ χρόνου, θορύβων τε καὶ ταραχῆς ἤδη παυ- 


7 \ vat a / » / oy 
μενος καὶ τῶν σεισμῶν, γαλήνης ἐπιλαβόμενος εἰς 


XN ’ / / Ν « ΄σ / 
τε τὸν εἰωθότα δρόμον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατακοσμούμενος 


μένη----τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ 
τῶν δώδεκα ἀριθμῷ τεταγμένοι 
θεοὶ ἄρχοντες, ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τάξιν 
ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη. ξυμβάλλων 
se. ἑαυτῷ :—“ coming together 
with a shock :” οἵ, Theophr. de 
Sensu I: τοὺς τύπους ἀνάγκη 
συμβάλλειν ἑαυτοῖς, Soph. Cid. 
Col. gor: 
συμβάλλουσιν ἐμπόρων ὁδοί. Hom. 
Tl. π. 565. And compare the 
frequent use of συμβάλλω in 
Hdt. to express conflict in war. 

I. τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονι θεοί] 
Badham conjectures τῷ με- 
γίστῳ δαίμονες ew. Cf. supr. 
270d; ifr: 274 b, Leg gg. 8, 
848 6; θεῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων 
θεοῖς δαιμόνων. Ib. 7, 821 a: 
τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν 
κόσμον. See however supr. 
271 d,e, where δαίμων and θεός 
are interchanged. 

4. ἀρχῆς Te καὶ TeA. — ὀρμη- 
θείς] “ Having received an im- 
pulse opposite, both in respect 
of beginning and end,”’—the 
πόθεν ‘and the ol. This of 
course happens when a circular 
motion is reversed: and aggra- 
vates the violence of the imme- 
diate shock. Had the world 
“gone off at a tangent,” the 


ἔνθα δίστομοι μάλιστα 


ΕἸ » / Ν 7 ΒΩ Sy oN - 5 ec ΄σ 
10 €L, ἐπιμέλειαν και Κρᾶτος EX@V QUTOS τῶν εν αὐτῷ b 


beginning would have been the 
former end, but the end not 
the former beginning. 

5. ἄλλην αὖ φθοράν] Supr. 
270 6. 

8. εἰς τὸν εἰωθότα δρόμον] The 
vibrations are supposed to 
cause a temporary perturba- 
tion or nutation of the cir- 
cular motion, as in a top that 
is not “asleep.” 

The notion of vast cycles is 
assumed in the Laws. Cf. 3, 
680 a, where the first survi- 
vors of the flood are called οἱ 
ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς περιόδου 
γεγονότες. Ib. 6, 782 ἃ: πόλεων 
συστάσεις καὶ φθορὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύ- 
ματα παντοῖα ταξέως τε καὶ ἀταξίας 
καὶ βρώσεος καὶ πωμάτων τε ἅμα καὶ 
βρωμάτων ἐπιθυμήματα παντοδαπὰ 
πάντως καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γὴν 
οἰόμεθα γεγονέναι, καὶ 
στροφὰς ὡρῶν παντοίας, ἐν αἷς 
τὰ ζῶα μεταβάλλειν αὑτῶν παμ- 
πληθεῖς μεταβολὰς εἰκός; 

εἴς τε---κατακοσμούμενος] ‘Set- 
tling down into his accus- 
tomed course.” Cf. Rep. 8, 
500 a: αἰδοῦς τινος ἐγγενομένης 
ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ---κατεκοσμήθη 
πάλιν. Supr. 271 6. Qu. an. 
omittend. τε ? 


a 2 > 
ap OUK 





ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 65 


μνημονεύων διδαχὴν εἰς δύναμιν. 


Ay, Ε fal ‘ a A Ν > 
273. TE καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπο- 


> \ \ 
κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς μεν 


ΩΣ > / lal \ 4 
οὖν ἀκριβέστερον ἀπετέλει, τελευτῶν δὲ ἀμβλύτερον. 


΄ \ > rc Ν \ vad , 
τούτων δὲ αὐτῷ TO TwparoEdes τῆς συγκράσεως 


+ \ a / \ / ΄ σ 
αἴτιον, τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως ξύντροφον, ὅτι 5 


[3 Dy / > ! Ν > Ν r , 
πολλῆς nv μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κοσμον 


> / ‘\ \ \ ZS , 7 Ν 
ἀφικέσθαι. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ συνθέντος πᾶντα τα 


\ Dp \ \ 2 yY sd “ 
καλὰ κέκτηται παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἕξεως, ὅσα 


λ Ν Ν χὃ > > ἴω / al ξ 5 ΜᾺ 
χὰ εἐσὰ και AOLKA EV ουρᾶνῳ γίγνεται, ταυτα ἐς EKEL 


SI / 3) Ν an - 3 , \ 
vns αὐτὸς τε ἔχει Kal τοῖς ζώοις ἐναπεργάζεται. μετὰ 


\ 3 a β 7ὔ ἈΝ ζ 7 3 ς a 
Mev οὖν του KU EpvynTOV τὰ (wa τρέφων εν αὐτῷ 


σμικρὰ μὲν φλαῦρα, μεγάλα δὲ ἐνέτικτεν ἀγαθά" 


/ \ / / > lad 
χωριζόμενος δὲ ἐκείνου τὸν ἐγγύτατα χρόνον ἀεὶ τῆς 


1. πατρὸς) Cf. Tim. 28 e, 
47 ἃ. The word is used here 
for the sake of the metaphor, 
“Calling to mind his father’s 
instruction ;? as in Tim. 42 6: 
νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πα- 
τρὸς διάταξιν, μιμούμενοι τὸν 
σφέτερον δημιοῦργον. 

3. ἀμβλύτερον]! “ With less 
sharpness and precision,” as if 
making an inferior copy of 
some masterpiece of sculpture 
or painting, or, “ with dimin- 
ished powers,” “ with less in- 
sight,” “with less keenness of 


vision.” The latter is more 
probable. 
4. τούτων δὲ --- ἀφικέσθαι | 


“ Now this falling off comes to 
the world from the _ bodily 
element of her composition, 
which was inherent in her pri- 
mal nature, since this partook 
of much disorder, before at- 
taining the present organised 
form.” Cf. Tim. 30 a: say 
ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ 


c , oy 5) \ ΄ 
ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον 


πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν 
αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. ὅτι---- 
ἀφικέσθαι is epexegetic of the 
previous clause. For the iden- 
tity of the ὁρατὸν and ceparo- 
evdes, cf. Pheedo 80c¢: τὸ épa- 
τὸν αὐτοῦ τὸ σῶμα. Several 
MSS., including ΔΙ, have μέ- 
τοχον. 

ὃ, παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν 
ἕξεως] Thus a time is ima- 
gined before the alternate cy- 
cles began. Compare the 
thought in Rep. το, 613, of 
the just man: ὅσα ye ἀπὸ θεῶν 
γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεθαι ὡς οἷον 
TE ἄριστα, εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον 
αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας 
ὑπῆρχεν. 

παρὰ δὲ -- ἕξεως, ἐξ ἐκείνης] 
The expression at first cor- 


responds to παρὰ pev—rod συν- 


θέντος, but when resumed for 
the sake of emphasis in a pro- 
nominal form, is more strictly 
adapted to the immediate con- 
text. 

13. τὸν ἐγγύτατα χρόνον ἀεὶ 


*K 


brought by 
his Crea- 
tor: from 
whom he 
derives all 
that he has 
of good : 
and in con- 
junction 
with whom, 
in that 
former 
cycle, the 
evil within 
him is re- 
duced to a 
minimum. 
But that 
guiding 
hand being 
withdrawn, 
as forget- 
fulness in- 
creases the 
ancient 


anarchy 
gradually 
returns, 
until the 
world and 
all depend- 
ent organ- 
isms are in 
danger of 
ruin. 
Wherefore 
then the 
first dis- 
poser of the 
world, lest 
he should 
founder in 


66 


> / / , ΄ of \ fal 
ἀφέσεως κάλλιστα πάντα διάγει, προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ p. 27: 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


χρόνου καὶ λήθης ἐγγιγνομένης ἐν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον καὶ 


/ Ἀ lad qn / / 
δυναστεύει TO τῆς παλαιᾶς ἀναρμοστίας πάθος, τε- 


a ΄σ vad / \ \ 
λευτῶντος δὲ ἐξανθεῖ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ σμικρὰ μὲν 


’ 7 Ν \ ‘ lal > / lal ’ 
stayaba, πολλὴν δὲ THY τῶν ἐναντίων κρᾶσιν ἐπεγκε- 


ραννύμενος ἐπὶ διαφθορᾶς κίνδυνον αὑτοῦ τε ἀφι- 


=~ ΩΝ a > e ΄σ Ν Ν Ν 13, 2. Ν ε 
κνεῖται καὶ τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ. διὸ δὴ καὶ TOT HON θεὸς ὁ 


UA > / an > > / 3) / 
κοσμήσας αὐτὸν, καθορῶν ev ἀπορίαις ὄντα, κηδό- 


μενος, ἵνα μὴ χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς 


τῆς ἀφέσεως] Proximum quod- 
que ab remissione tempus. 


2. μᾶλλον καὶ - πάθος] “The 


influence of the old habit of 
disorder also gains a greater 
ascendancy.”  Plato’s use of 
πάθος, as of γένεσις, is often 
dificult to render from its 
generality. Cf. Theet. 193 d. 
4. ἐξανθεῖ] “Breaks out 
into full bloom.” Se. τὸ τῆς 
dvappootias πάθος. Cf. infr. 
310 d: τελευτῶσα δὲ ἐξανθεῖν 
παντάπασιν μανίαις. Aesch. Pers. 
821.: ὕβρις yap ἐξανθοῦσ᾽ ἐκάρ- 
mace σταχὺν ἄτης. So Stallb. and 
Passow s.v. In what follows, 
the sentence returns to the ge- 
neral subject, 6 κόσμος. The 
other rendering, however, de- 
serves notice ; in which 6 κόσ- 
pos is the subject of ἐξανθεῖ, 
which is explained to mean 
“leaves blossoming,’ “ ceases 
to produce anything good.” 
5. πολλὴν ----ἐπεγκεραννύμενος] 
“ Administering evil to itself 
in large measure.” ἐπεγκεραν- 
vopevos, lit. “ pouring into itself 
additionally.” The world is a 
great vessel, in which differ- 
ent elements are mixed: and 
during this cycle is itself the 


author of the mixture. (κρᾶσιν, 
abstract for concrete). Or per- 
haps the participle is passive, 
“ Receiving large admixture of 
evil.” (The passive of a verb 
which governs the dative in 
the active voice appears in 
Rep. 1, 337 a, and Legg. ΤΙ, 
925 8, 926 a, 937b.) For 
the image, cf. Rep. 8, 562 c¢ : 
πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα κακῶν 
οἰνοχύων προστατούντων τύχῃ 
καιλ. For the force of the 
prefix in ἐπεγκεραννύμενος, cf. 
ἐπεγχέω, 6. g. Asch. Ag. 1137. 

6. διαφθορᾶς] This word, 
if alone, would have been 
passive, but by the addition 
of the genitives is turned to 
an active meaning. 

8. κηδόμενος ἵνα pn] “In 
care for the world that it may 
not” ἄορ. A similar feeling 
appears in Legg. 2, 653 ¢: 
θεοὶ δὲ οἰκτείραντες τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώ- 
mov ἐπίπονον πεφυκὸς γένος --- 
Μούσας ᾿Απόλλωνά τε μουσηγέτην 
καὶ Διόνυσον ξυνεορταστὰς ἔδοσαν, 
iv’ ἐπανορθῶνται τὰς τροφὰς γενο- 
μένας ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς μετὰ θεῶν. 

9. ἵνα py — bin] “ Lest 
being tost with tempest it 
might be shaken in pieces and 


| 








ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 67 


273: τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα τύπον δύῃ, πάλιν 


ἐφεδρος αὐτοῦ τῶν πηδαλίων γιγνόμενος, τὰ νοσή- 


σαντα καὶ λυθέντα ἐν τῇ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν προτέρᾳ περι- 


"ὃ Ψ ᾿ εἴ 1 ἐπανορθῶν ἀθάνατον 
ὁδῳ στρέψας, κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶ 


NN Wk) / 3 / - \ a / 
QUTOV και aynpav ἀπεργάζεται. TOUTO μὲν ουν τέλος 5 


« ΄ 7 \ Ὁ Ὁ aks \ a ,ὕ > / 
ἁπάντων εἴρηται. τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ THY τοῦ βασιλέως ἀπο- 


« Ν » las 7 ε 7 al / 
δειξιν ἱκανὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρόσθεν ἁπτομένοις τοῦ λόγου. 


΄ὕ \ 5 a , \ ἌΝ χ = 
στρεφθέντος yap av τοῦ κοσμου THY ἐπὶ THY νῦν 


f SENN x a ξ , 5 ΄ Ψ \ 
γένεσιν ὁδὸν TO TS ἡλικίας av παλιν ἱστατο καὶ 


founder in the abyss of dis- 
similitude.” For a glimpse of 
the darkening path towards 
this limbo of “chaos come 
again,” see Parm. 165 ; Tim. 
48 e-52 ἃ. In the chaos of 
Anaxagoras, the ὁμοιομέρειαι 
were at least latent; but to 
this new and worse chaos even 
this degree of consistency is 
denied. The words ἄπειρον 
ὄντα recall Pythagorean asso- 
ciations. 

I. τόπον has been objected 
to. Stallbaum would read 
πόντον, and M. Wagner, in the 
Rheinische Museum, has sug- 
gested τυπόν, which is too ab- 
stract for the context (χει- 
μασθεὶς--- δύῃ). Stallbaum’s ob- 
jection (Displicet istud τόπον, 
quo metaphor elegantia pes- 
sumdatur) forgets the differ- 
ence between metaphor and 
allegory. The vagueness of τό- 
πος in Plato’s use (= “region”) 
exactly suits the passage. ΟἿ. 
Theet. 176 a; Phedr. 247 ¢, 
274 ἃ; Soph. 254 a; Rep. 
G508) ce 7510}: 532d: τ; 
614 ο. 

πάλιν ---- γιγνόμενος] “ Again 
presiding at the helm.” ἔφεδρος 
not = “successor,” (Ast. Lex. 


v.,) but according to the 
tragic use with the genitive, 
“seated on or at.” 

3. ἐν τῇ---περιόδῳ] “ In the 
former circuit which the world 
made by himself.” καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν 
depends on the verbal notion 
in περιόδῳ. 

4. στρέψας] “ Having re- 
versed.” Not only arresting 
decay, but causing growth : 
τῇ τροπῇ συνανακυκλουμένης εἰς 
τἀναντία τῆς γενέσεως, as before. 

5. τέλος ἁπάντων εἴρηται] Our 
account of each recurring cycle 
is complete. ‘“ The wheel is 
brought full circle.” 

7. ἱκανὸν] Subaud. ἡμῖν 


λέγειν. 

ἐκ τοῦ πρόσθεν ἁπτομένοις 
τοῦ λόγου] “Taking hold of 
the story by the previous 


part.” I. 6. attaching what 
we have to say to an earlier 
point in the fable, viz. the 
φθορά mentioned in 273 a, as 
ensuing on the change from 
the obedient to the self-di- 
rected movement of the world. 

ὃ. τὴν -- ὁδόν] “ Towards 
the present operation οἵ na- 
ture.” Cf. note on γενέσεως, 
supr. 271 b. 


Ke 


the abyss 

of dissimili- 
tude, re- 
verses the 
process of 
decay, and 
restores 
him to im- 
mortal 
youth. 
The wheel 
is thus 
brought 
full cirele : 
but for our 
present 
purpose 


we must 
revert to 
the begin« 
ning of the 
period in 
which we 
live: when, 
the uni- 
verse being 
left to it- 
self, the 
bodies that 
were dwin- 
dling began 
to grow, 
and those 
which had 
just sprung 
in full ma- 
turity from 
the Earth, 
put on grey 
locks, and 
went be- 
neath the 
ground. 
Then, as 


68 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


\ , / > o / \ \ Ν c Ν 
καινὰ τἀναντία ἀπεδίδου τοῖς τότε. τὰ μὲν yap υπο Pp. 278} 


/ x, 7 ΄ > / a“ 4 
σμικρότητος ὀλίγου δέοντα ἠφανίσθαι τῶν ζώων 


> / \ > > lal ΄σ΄ ͵ὕ \ / 
ηὐξάνετο, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ γῆς νεογενῆ σώματα πολιὰ φύντα 


΄ > U > - / Ν Ε᾽ ΄ 
πάλιν ἀποθνήσκοντα εἰς γὴν κατῃει. καὶ τάλλα TE 


’, / > , 
επᾶντα μετέβαλλεν, ἀπομιμούμενα καὶ ξυνακολου- 


a ἴω A Ν / Ν \ Ν Ν Sed 
θοῦντα τῷ τοῦ παντὸς παθήματι, Kal δὴ καὶ TO τῆς 


/ 5 / 
κυήσεως καὶ γεννήσεως Kal τροφῆς μίμημα συνείπετο 


ἴω a Ga) > 7, > \ fen OL5:3' 5, ~ > 
τοις πάσιν UIT avayKnsS. οὐ yap ἐξῆν eT ἐν YN δι 


lol \ 4 
ἑτέρων συνιστάντων φύεσθαι ζῶον, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ 


a / 4 » ΄ 9S “ « ων 
Io TO KOO L@ TT POOETETAKTO AUTOKPATOPA ELVAL TIS AVTOV 


/ o ᾽ν ᾿ (γον δὰ - ΄ ᾽ vad 
πορείας, οὕτω δὴ KATA ταὐτὰ καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν αὑτοῖς 


5 «ε lad GY oly ny 5. , Ν “ 
dt αὑτῶν, καθ᾽ ὅσον οἷόν T ἦν, φύειν τε καὶ γεννᾷν 


/ 7 ce SS “ ες / > “ 
καὶ τρέφειν προσετάττετο ὑπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας ἀγωγῆς. 


οὗ δὲ ἕνεκα 0 λό 0 ἃς, ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ νῦν ἐσμὲν 
ὁ λόγος ὥρμηκε πᾶς, ET ATE μ 


I. καινὰ---τότε] ‘“ Made an 
opposite inversion of the phe- 
nomena.” 

Ta μὲν yap—karje| Those 
who according to the previous 
order had risen from earth in 
full maturity, and had passed 
through the stages of youth 
and childhood, and were on 
the point of disappearing from 
the earth, returned to child- 
hood, youth, and manhood ; 
while those who had been 
lately born, and were there- 
fore in full maturity, instead 
of becoming more youthful, 
passed into old age and died 
and went below the ground— 
so preparing the soil for the 
next crop of earth-born men. 

3. νεογενῆ] It is to be re- 
membered that they are al- 
ready full-grown. 

πολιὰ φύντα ῇ]Ὶ “ Having 
grown grey.” The aorist re- 


tains the temporal significa- 
tion. 

6. τὸ--μίμημα] 1. 6. τὸ τῆς 
-- τροφῆς μεμιμημένον συνείπετο. 
dv ἐτέρων συνιστάντων] Se. θεῶν. 
Cf. Tim. 43a; Protag. 320d. 

9. φύεσθαι ζῶον] Bodl. ALY 
ζώων. 

13. ὑπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας ἀγωγῆς] By 
a similar entrainement, by an 
eddy from the same current. 
Cf. Phedr. 238 ὁ: νικήσασα 
ἀγωγῇ. Rep. 10,604b: ἐναντίας 
δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ av- 
θρώπῳ. As the world is moved, 
so human beings are brought 
together, by destiny and innate 
desire (εἱμαρμένη καὶ σύμφυτος 
ἐπιθυμία) : οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνάγκαι. (Rep. 5, 
458 d.) 

14. ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ---ἐσμὲν] Cf. Rep. 
5, 473 6: ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ (v.1. αὐτῶ) 
δὴ εἶμι ὁ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζο- 
μὲν κύματι: Ib. 7, 532¢: er 


p- 274 








ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 


09 


274. ἤδη. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων πολλὰ ἂν καὶ 


μακρὰ διεξελθεῖν γίγνοιτο, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστα καὶ Ov as 


αἰτίας μεταβέβληκε: περὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων βραχύτερα 


= a / 
καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκοντα. 


“ Ν a 
τῆς γὰρ τοῦ κεκτημένου 


καὶ νέμοντος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος ἀπερημωθέντες ἐπιμε- 5 


a lal 3 7 \ \ , 
λείας, τῶν πολλῶν αὖ θηρίων, ὅσα χαλεπὰ Tas φύ- 


5 / > \ - yay 
σεις ἦν, ἀπαγριωθέντων, αὐτοὶ de ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι 


A ὦ , ΄ ,ὕ ee | IA N 
καὶ ἀφύλακτοι γεγονοτες, διηρπάζοντο ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, καὶ 


“4 / Ν a \ ἊΝ / 3 
€T ἀμήχανοι καὶ ἄτεχνοι κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους ἦσαν 


χρόνους, ἅτε τῆς μὲν αὐτομάτης τροφῆς ἐπίιλελοι- το 


/ / \ > > , , \ \ 
TTVLAS, πορίζεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοί πω διὰ τὸ 


Χ Pg 
μηδεμίαν αὐτοὺς χρείαν πρότερον ἀναγκάζειν. ἐκ 


7 ἊΝ 5 7 > / 53 “ Ν 
τούτων πάντων ἐν μεγάλαις ἀπορίαις ἦσαν. ὅθεν δὴ 


τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα παρὰ θεῶν δῶρα ἡμῖν δεδώρηται 


> - Ν “ \ 
per ἀναγκαίας διδαχῆς καὶ παιδεύσεως, πῦρ μὲν 


παρὰ ἸΠρομηθέως, τέχναι δὲ παρ᾽ Ἡφαίστου καὶ τῆς 


αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέ- 
ε ε 

Ae. Soph. Cid. Rex. 1168: 

πρὸς αὐτῷ γ᾽ εἰμὶ TO δείνῳ λέγειν. 
6. αὖ] Used here almost as 

a conjunction. 


χαλεπὰ] The opposite of 
tractable: fierce and unman- 
ageable. Cf. Rep. 6, 493 b, 


500 a; bis. Legg. 11, 922 b, 
950 b. 

7. ἀσθενεῖς ---- καὶ ἀφύλακτοι] 
The myth at this point touches 
closely on that of Protagoras. 
Prot. 321 6: τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον 
γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ 
ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον. The whole 
passage, giving an account of 
the origin of the arts of life, 
should be carefully compared 
with this. 

11. διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ---- avay- 
xa¢ew| “ Because no previous 
necessity had driven them to 


invention.” Cf. Thet. 149 c: 
ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ 
λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν ἂν ἢ ἄπειρος. 

14. τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα! Still 
more of the existing fragments 
of mythology are incorporated 
into the Great Myth. 

15. pet ἀναγκαίας διδαχῆς] 
The Deity “left not himself 
without witness.” The parts 
of the Universe were left to 
guide themselves as far as was 
possible (εἰς δύναμιν, supr. 273 
a); but in their extreme need, 
such Divine instruction as they 
could not do without (ἀναγκαίας) 
was still afforded them. 

16. καὶ τῆς συντέχνου]! CF. 
Prot. 321 6: τὸ τῆς ᾿Αθηνᾶς καὶ 
Ἡφαίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ 
ἐφιλοτεχνείτην. Legg. 11, 921 
d: Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱέρον 
τὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν γένος, οἱ τὸν 


the world 
was self- 
impelled, 
so the races 
of animals 
were left to 
propagate 
themselves, 
And men, 
being de- 
serted by 
their Di- 
vine Shep- 
herd, were 
torn by the 
now savage 
beasts, 
while the 
earth no 
longer gave 
them spon- 
taneous 
sustenance, 
W hence 
the gods, 
whostill ho- 
vered near, 
gave them 
fire, mecha- 
nical arts, 
the vine, 


the olive, 
the sustain- 
ing corn, 
accompa- 
nied with 
such in- 
struction 
as was 
indispen- 
sable: and 
thereafter 
left them to 
themselves. 
Such is the 
fable which 
we must 
now apply. 


The myth 


has brought 
to light the 


15 


70 


ΠΛΑΤΏΩΝΟΣ 


, ΄ \ 5 N ‘ . Ἂμ 7 
συντέχνου, σπέρματα de αὖ καὶ puta παρ ἄλλων 


Ν ΄ ’ € / Ν > / / 
καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὁπόσα τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον συγκατε- 


/ > / / > Χ Ν \ ᾽ “ 
σκεύακεν, ἐκ τούτων γέγονεν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θεῶν, 


ὅπερ ἐρρήθη νῦν δή, τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐπέλιπεν ἀνθρώ- 


᾽ ς ta A / ‘ Ν \ 
ὅπους, Ot ἑαυτῶν δὲ ἔδει THY TE διαγωγὴν καὶ τὴν 


> / > Ν « cal y / ad ec 
ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοὺς αὑτῶν exe καθάπερ ὁλος ὁ 


7, Ὁ 7 , ‘ OWS 
Koo MOS, @ ξυμμιμούμενοι καὶ ξυνεπόμενοι τὸν ἀεὶ 


/ A \ “ , \ > / ἴω / Ν 
χρόνον νῦν μὲν οὕτω, τότε δὲ ἐκείνως ζῶμέν τε καὶ 


, Ν Χ \ \ a , / > / 
φυόμεθα. Kai τὸ μὲν On τοῦ μύθου τέλος ἐχέτω, 


/ δὲ EN / θ Ν Ν ὃ ΄σ 
ιοχρήσιμον O€ αὐτὸν ποιησομεθα πρὸς TO κατιόειν 


od ¢ ΄ > ΄ Χ Ρ ΄ Ny 
ὅσον ἡμάρτομεν ἀποφηνάμενοι Tov βασιλικὸν τε καὶ 


Χ lal / / 
πολιτικὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθε λογῳ. 


NE. ΣΩΏ. Πῶς οὖν καὶ πόσον ἁμάρτημα φὴς εἶναι 


γεγονὸς ἡμῖν ; 


EE. Τῇ μὲν βραχύτερον, τῇ δὲ μάλα γενναῖον 


\ A ΄ ἂν / Ἃ “, 
καὶ πολλῷ μεῖζον καὶ πλέον ἢ τότε. 


βίον ἡμῖν ξυγκατεσκευάκασι τέ- 
χναις. 

I. map ἄλλων ]Ϊ Demeter 
and Cora, Triptolemus, Diony- 
sus. Cf. Legg. 7, 782 b. 

3. TO—ek OeGv—rtis ἐπιμε- 
λείας] Double constr. with the 
article, τῆς émm. being added 
epexegetically. Cf. supr. 271 
€: τὸ τῶν avOpamov λεχθὲν αὐ- 
τομάτου περὶ βίου. 

7. ᾧ ξυμμιμούμενοι καὶ ξυνε- 
mopevat] Cf. supr. 2736 : ἀπο- 
μιμούμενα καὶ ξυνακολουθοῦντα---- 
μίμημα συνείπετο, Evy. appears 
to be added by a sort οἵ at- 
traction from ξυνεπ., by which 
the dative is in the first in- 
stance governed. It may per- 
haps occur to the student to 
render ξυμμιμούμενοι “helping 
the Universe to imitate (the 


movement of the Divine 
Hand) :” comparing supr. 273 
a: τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πα- 
τρὸς ἀπομνημονεύων διδαχὴν εἰς 
δύναμιν, and infra 293 6, 297 6. 
And this sense would not be 
unsuitable to this expression 
taken singly, and to τὸ τῆς--- 
τροφῆς μίμημα. But these words 
cannot be interpreted apart 
from the previous phrase, peré- 
βαλλεν ἀπομιμούμενα καὶ ξυνακο- 
λουθοῦντα τῷ τοῦ παντὸς παθήματι, 
which can only be rendered in 
one way. 

9. τέλος ἐχέτω] Cf. Phedo 
71 Ὁ; Legg. 4, 717 6. 

II. ὅσον ἡμάρτομεν] Cf. 268 
b,c: πῶς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος 
ὀρθὸς φανεῖται καὶ ἀκέραιος ὁ περὶ 
τοῦ βασιλέως κ.τ.λ. 

15. Τῇ μὲν βραχύτερον] “ Our 


—o 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 71 


274. NE. ΣΏΩ. [los ; real grava- 
ἘΞ Ψ \ ᾿ ͵ Ν 5 ἘΞ ᾿ς men of our 
BE. Ὅτι μὲν ἐρωτώμενοι Tov ἐκ τῆς νῦν περι- error. 
ἊΣ x ἢ ; ἕ ἐξ τ 4 Our defini- 
φορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως βασιλέα καὶ πολιτικὸν τὸν ἐκ tion of the 


ruler of the 


a 5 ie / / ΄σ / > / 
τῆς ἐναντίας περιόδου ποιμένα τῆς τότε ἀνθρωπίνης state is not 





mistake in one way is less im- 
portant” (than in another of 
which we are now to speak 
—not Bp. ἢ τότε). 

(15.) μάλα γενναῖον] “We have 
erred on a grand scale, and 
our error is much more serious 
and important than I then af- 
firmed it to be.” Cf. Phedr. 
257 6: συχνὸν διαμαρτάνεις. γεν- 
ναῖος is often used with reference 
to size, cf. Rep. 2, 372 b. Our 
object was not only to shew 
that the king has many rivals 


᾿ amongst his flock, but also to 


see an image of the “ king in 
his beauty,” and to establish 
his sole authority above other 
artists. The image is found, 
however, to transcend the re- 
ality of the office in the present 
order of the world, in which 
the statesmen are not Gods 
but men, whose natures and 
training are not far different 
from those whom they seek to 
rule. 

(16.) τότε] Se. ἔφην. In 
speaking of the king as the 
herdsman of men we erred in 
two ways—first, while truly as- 
serting that his rule extended 
to the whole state, we did not 
sufficiently define the man- 
ner of his rule; so that our 
definition included some func- 
tions which belong to other 


craftsmen : and secondly, which 
is of more importance, we con- 
fused the Statesman of this 
present cycle with the Divine 
shepherd of the golden age. 

2. τὸν ἐκ τῆς νῦν--- γενέσεως 
βασιλέα] Cf. Legg. 5, 740 a, 
where the community of goods 
is said to be μεῖζον ἢ κατὰ τὴν 
νῦν γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ παί- 
ΤΌ. 9, 853 6: ἐπειδὴ δὲ 


3 ΄ c ‘ 4 
ov, καθάπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθέται 


δευσιν. 


θεῶν παισὶ νομοθετούμενοι τοῖς 
ἥρωσιν, ὡς 6 νῦν λόγος, αὐτοί τ᾽ 
ἐκ θεῶν ὄντες ἄλλοις τε ἐκ τοιού- 
τῶν γεγονόσιν ἐνομοθέτουν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἀνθρωποί τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων σπέρ- 
μασι νομοθετοῦμεν τὰ νῦν, ἀνεμέ- 
σητον δὴ φοβεῖσθαι κ-.τ.λ. 

The same thought is present 
also in Legg. 10, 906: τὰς τῶν 
φυλάκων ψυχὰς--κυνῶν ἢ Tas τῶν 
νομέων ἢ---τὰς τῶν παντάπασιν 
ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν. Compare 
also Parm. 134 d: Οὐκοῦν εἰ 
παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβε- 
στάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀκρι- 
βεστάτη ἐπιστήμη κιτιλ. Arist. 
Pol. III. 8: ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐν ἀν- 
θρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον 
(τὸν διαφέροντα κατ᾽ ἀρετῆς ὑπερ- 
βολήν). 

6. παρηνέχθημεν)ὺ “ Went 
astray.” Cf. Phileb. 60 d: εἰ δέ 
γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν 
ὁστισοῦν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον 
εἰπάτω. 


| SEE 5} \ a \ amet. - , merely in- 
275. ayeAns εἴπομεν, καὶ ταῦτα θεὸν ἀντὶ θνητοῦ, ταὐυτ 5 adequate, 
\ ΄ 7, Banco! Si asc ΄ Ξ as we fear- 
μεν πάμπολυ παρηνέχθημεν" OTL δὲ ξυμπασὴς τῆς ed, but, 
, » > N » 7ὔ of \ / what is 
πόλεως ἄρχοντα αὑτὸν ἀπεφήναμεν, OVTWVA δὲ τρόπον — more se- 
rious, we 


have con- 
fused the 
modern 
Statesman 
with the 
Divine 
Shepherd, 


The myth 
was intro- 
duced that 
we might 
see ina 
clearer 
light the 
image of 
the king. 


72 ITAATQNOZ 


ov διείπομεν, ταύτῃ δὲ αὖ TO μὲν λεχθὲν ἀληθές, οὐ p. 27. 1] 


μὴν ὅλον γε οὐδὲ σαφὲς ἐρρήθη, διὸ καὶ βραχύτερον 


x ee) a c 7 
7) ΚΑΤ €EKELVO ἡ μαρτήκαμεν. 


NE. 50. ᾿Δληδῃ. 


ἘΠῚ Δ a / Ν / ε » ὃ / 
ee J. ει TOLVUY TOV τρόπον, WS EOLKE, OLOPLOAVTAS 


ω > ad vad / “ / Ν Ἀ 
τῆς apxns τῆς πόλεως οὕτω τελέως τον πολιτικὸν 


ἡμῖν εἰρῆσθαι προσδοκᾷν. 


NE. 20. Kados. 


BE. Διὰ ταῦτα μὴν καὶ τὸν μῦθον παρεθέμεθα, 


“ bd / Ν “ > / Χ ΄, « 
τοΐἵνα ἐνδείζαιτο περὶ τῆς ἀγελαιοτροφίας μὴ μόνον ws 


/ Ey Ata) Aa lal / \ ΄ 
πάντες αὐτῆς ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῷ ζητουμένῳ τὰ νῦν, 


» Ν > “ ΤΣ > / 5) ΟΣ 
ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνον αὐτὸν ἐναργέστερον ἴδοιμεν, ὃν προσ- 


if / \ XN 7 / Ν 
KEL, μόνον κατὰ TO παράδειγμα ποιμέενῶν TE Και 


/ a ’ / > , ya = 
BovkoAwy τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐπιμελειαν ἔχοντα τροφῆς, 


NE. ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς. 
EE. Οἶμαι δέ γ᾽, ὦ 


I. ταύτῃ δὲ αὖ] δὲ repeated 
in the apodosis. 

τὸ μὲν--- ἀληθὲ] This was 
said previously, p. 268 ὁ: οὐ 
μέντοι ἀπειργασμένοι ye εἶμέν πω 
δύ ἀκριβείας k.T.d. 

6. τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς πόλεως] “Οἵ 
his rule over the city.” In 
what follows, it is shewn that, 
although distinguished from 
others, his function is still su- 
preme. 

9. παρεθέμεθα] “Introduced.” 
Cf. Phileb. 46 b: οὐ μὴν Φιλήβου 
γε ἕνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον. 
Phedo 65 6: μήτε τὴν ὄψιν 
παραθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι. 

10. ἵνα ἐνδείξαιτο----κμὴ μόνον---- 
ἀλλ᾽ ἴδοιμεν] The structure of 
the sentence is slightly altered 
by the change of subject. 


/ / a an / 
15 TOUTOU [LOVOV ἀξιωθῆναι του προσρηματος. 


if > \ f 
Σώκρατες, τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι 


Il. τῷ ζητουμένῳ τανῦν] 1. 6. 
τῷ πολιτικῷ. For a similar 
formal allusion to the subject 
of inquiry, cf. Soph. 2230: οὐ 
fe τι φαύλης μέτοχόν ἐστι τέχνης 
τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον, ἀλλ᾽ εὖ μάλα 
ποικίλης. Phileb. 50 b: τὰ νῦν 
πολλάκις λεγόμενα. Cf. Gorg. 
451 6: οὐδέν πω σαφές. Tim. 
49 a: εἴρηται μὲν τἀληθές, δεῖ δ᾽ 
ἐναργέστερον εἰπεῖν περὶαὐτοῦ. 

12. ὃν προσήκει, μόνον---προσ- 
ρήματος] “Τὸ whom it belongs, 
having, in accordance with our 
image, alone of shepherds and 
herdsmen the care of human 
nurture, alone to be thought 
worthy of this title.” The 
order of the words is pecu- 
liar, as is the case frequently 
throughout these dialogues. 


| 











( 


ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 


79 


ἮΝ ΕἾ \ 5 - \ a 
γ75. μεῖζον ἢ κατὰ βασιλέα εἶναι TO σχῆμα τὸ τοῦ θείου 


[4 \ > > / “ + \ rn 
© νομέως, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐνθαδε νῦν ὄντας πολιτικοὺς τοῖς 


3 / ε ͵ 9 “- \ \ / 
ἀρχομένοις ὁμοίους TE εἰναι μᾶλλον πολὺ Tas φύσεις 


Ν , / / ‘ 
καὶ παραπλησιαίτερον παιδείας μετειληφέναι καὶ 


τροφῆς. 
NE. >Q. Πάντως που. 


a iy \ \ Ἃ 7 3, 
mE. Ζητητέοι γε μὴν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴησαν οὔθ᾽ 


ἴοι δ a af? “ wpaty ΓΤ , , 
nTTOV οὔτε μᾶλλον, εἰθ οὕτως EIT ἐκείνως πεφυ- 


κασιν. 


NE. ΣΏ. Πώς γὰρ οὔ; 


EE. Tide δὴ πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν. ἣν γὰρ ἔφαμεν 


3 Χ \ 53 / > Ν 7 » \ 
αὐτεπιτακτικὴν μὲν εἶναι [τέχνην] ἐπὶ ζώοις, οὐ μὴν 


ἰδί χλλὰ a NX > aN xy ὡς 
ἰοιὰ γε a a KOLWY) THY ἐπιμέελείαν εχουσᾶν,. και 


, on , » θὺ 3 λ 7 7ὕ 
προσείπομεν δὴ τότε εὐθὺς ἀγελαιοτροφικὴην,---μέ- 


μνησαι γάρ : 
NE. ΣΩ. Nai. 


EE. Ταύτης τοίνυν πη διημαρτάνομεν. τὸν yap 


Ν > a ’ >” 5 7 
πολιτικὸν οὐδαμοῦ συνελάβομεν οὐδ᾽ ὠνομάσαμεν, 


» 3 e a a N A > / 3 Ly 
ἀλλ᾽ ημᾶς ἐλαθε κατὰ τὴν ὀνομασίαν ἐκφυγῶν. 


NE. 2Q. Πώς; 


= “ \ / ΄ / las \ 
HE. Τοῦ τὰς ἀγέλας ἑκάστας τρέφειν τοῖς μὲν 


yA a / val lod ω \ 
ἄλλοις TOU πᾶσι μέτεστι νομεῦσι, τῷ πολιτικῷ δὲ 


3. μᾶλλον πολὺ] So all the 
MSS. except Ven. "Ξ., which, 
with the old editions, has πολὺ 
μᾶλλον. ‘The inversion is per- 
fectly in keeping with the ge- 
neral style. For τῆς, supra, most 
MSS. have τόν. And the Bodl. 
has ἐπιμελείας, with ATI. 

4. Ζητητέοι-- πεφύκασιν] Ac- 
cording to the principle laid 
down in Soph. 227 b, and re- 
peated supr. 266 d, that de 
minimus ceque ac de maximis 


curat scientia. 

11. ἐπανέλθωμεν] “ Let us re- 
trace our steps.” 

14. ἀγελαιοτροφικήν | 
262 6. 

17. Ταύτης --- διημαρτάνομεν] 
“Our error lay somewhere in 
this.” The genitive is governed 
by πῃ; and not by the verb. 

IQ. κατὰ τὴν ὀνομασίαν] The 
verbal noun ὀνομ. occurs here 
for the first time in Greek 
literature. 


Supr. 


ae 


But the 
form that 
we have 
seen is 
higher than 
the states- 
men of the 
earth, who 
are but 
men. 


On retra- 
cing our 
steps, we 
find that 
we gave 
too narrow 
a designa- 
tion to the 


15 art which 


is sove- 
relon over 
living crea- 
tures. 

An “art of 
nurture” 
does not 
include the 
Statesman 
at all, 
though the 
name ap- 
plies to all 
other 
herdsmen. 


We should 
have spo- 
ken more 
generally 
of an art 
of tending. 


And then 
by follow- 
ing the 


same series 
of divisions 15 & 


we before 
employed, 


74 


MAATOQNOZ 


> \ 3, / ΄“ “ > ih 
οὐ μετὸν ἐπηνέγκαμεν τοὔνομα, δέον τῶν κοινῶν ET- p. 47} 


ἐνεγκεῖν τι ξύμπασιν. 


NE. ΣΏΩ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις, εἴπερ ἐτύγχανε γε OV. 


EE. Πῶς δ᾽ οὐκ ἦν τό γε θεραπεύειν ποῦ πᾶσι 


skowvov, μηδὲν διορισθείσης τροφῆς μηδέ τινος ἄλλης 


πραγματείας ; ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τινα ἀγελαιοκομικὴν ἢ θερα- 


Ν Ἃ / > \ 3. a > ’ 
TEVTLKYY ἢ Και τινα ἐπιμελητικὴν αὐτὴν ονομασασιν, 


«ε ἈΝ / 5 Ta) / Ν 3 
ως KATA TAVTOYV, ἐξὴν περικαλυπτειν καὶ τὸν πολι- 


Χ “ la yy » \ lad mn 3 5 / 
τικὸν ἅμα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπειδὴ [δεῖν] τοῦτ᾽ ἐσήμαινεν 


100 λόγος. 


NE. ΣΏ. Ὀρθῶς. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μετὰ τοῦτο διαίρεσις 


5 7 / ae 17, > + 
αὖ TWA τρόπον ἐγίγνετ ἂν; 


EE. Κατὰ ταὐτὰ καθ᾽ ἅπερ ἔμπροσθεν διῃρού- 


\ Ἂν σ΄ a 
μεθα τὴν ἀγελαιοτροφικὴν πεζοῖς τε καὶ ἀπτῆσι, καὶ 


» 


7 ΄ > lal » fe 
μίκτοις TE καὶ AKEPATOLS, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἂν που τούτοις 


/ Ν Ν 7 a Ν 
διαιρούμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀγελαιοκομικὴν τὴν τε νῦν καὶ 


2. ξύμπασιν] Governed by 
κοινῶν. 

3. ὄν] Se. κοινόν τι. 

4. ἦν---ἐξῆν----ἐσήμαινεν] The 
imperfect is used because we 
are imagining what might have 
been done. 

6. θεραπευτικὴν----ἐπιμελητικὴν] 
The prefix ἀγελαιο- is to be 
resumed in thought with each 
of these words. 

8. ὡς κατὰ πάντων] “ For the 
general expression” —“ for the 
generic name.” 

9. [δεῖν] τοῦτο] Se. ποιεῖν. 
δεῖν om. Bodl. ΔΠ. 

12. ἐγίγνετ] Bodl. ἐγγίγνετ᾽. 

13. Κατὰ ravta—rois αὐτοῖς] 
Note the resumption. 

15. ἀμίκτοις Te καὶ ἀκεράτοις] 
Thus the twofold distinction is 
resumed. Supr. 265 d. 

τοῖς αὐτοῖς ---ἐν τῷ λόγῳ] 


“ Dividing by means of these 
same differences the care of 
herds also, we should have 
comprehended in the terms of 
our definition alike the present 
kingship (τὴν νῦν βασιλείαν) and 
the royal dignity which existed 
in the time of Kronos.” Al- 
though the former term ex- 
cluded one of these, that now 
employed includes them both. 

16. ἀγελαιοκομικὴν -js] A va- 
rious reading in both places is 
-vopix-. The word ἀγελαιοκομική 
is of course invented for the 
occasion, ἀγελαιοκόμος would 
be derived, like ἱπποκόμος (vy. 
supr. 261 d), from κομεῖν or κο- 
μίζειν, in the sense of “tend- 
ing.” 

“ Tf the name had been thus 
expressed under the form of 
tendance, we clearly should not 


e 


Ρ. 27 


ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 75 
Ν ᾽ 3 5 

76. τὴν ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλείαν περιειληφότες ἂν ἦμεν we should 

lave in- 
ὁμοίως ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. cluded al 
= ‘ a Divine anc 

NE. 30. Φαίνεται: ζητῶ δὲ αὖ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ; human 
a o ° ~ ra > sovereigns 
HE. Δῆλον ore λεχθέντος οὕτω τοῦ τῆς ἀγελαιο- under one 

form. 


cal > , > 37 / > « lal / 
κομικῆς ὀνόματος οὐκ ἂν ποτ᾽ ἐγένεθ᾽ ἡμῖν TO τινας 5 
) lot « In > 4 Ἃ 7 ᾿ 7 
ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἐπιμέλεια τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν, 


ὥσπερ τότε δικαίως ἠμφισβητήθη μηδεμίαν εἶναι 











/ aN / / a a 
τέχνην ἐν ἡμῖν ἀξίαν τούτου τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ προσ- 
Α > > iy - “ woes 
ρήματος" εἰ δ᾽ οὖν τις εἴη, πολλοῖς πρότερον αὐτῆς 
\ ca) LA yx “ / 
καὶ μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἢ τινι τῶν βασιλέων. 10 
NE. 2Q. ‘Opéas. 
— > / / ’ ΄ 
BE. ᾿Επιμέλεια δέ γε ἀνθρωπίνης συμπάσης κοι- 
/ > / Ἂ » , ΡΥ, cal Ν 
νωνίας οὐδεμία ἂν ἐθελήσειεν ἑτέρα μᾶλλον καὶ 
/ > “ ΄ \ 4 
προτέρα τῆς βασιλικῆς φάναι καὶ κατὰ πάντων 
; at a 
ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς εἶναι τέχνη. 15 


NE. 30. Λέγεις ὀρθῶς. 


by \ a / 3 5 » 
HE. Μετὰ ταῦτα δέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ap ἐννο- 


a σ ἊΝ ᾽ “ Χ fas / XN 53 
οὔμεν OTL πρὸς αὐτῷ δὴ τῷ τέλει συχνὸν αὖ διημαρ- 


7 
TQVETO : 


have been troubled with the 
objection that there was no 
sort of care of men, as it was 
then fairly objected that we 
had no art amongst us which 
merited this attribute of nur- 
ture, and, moreover, if there 
was, there were many who 
might claim a share in such 
an art more easily than a 
king.” 

5. eyeve?’] So the Bodleian 
as well as the Coislinian MS. 

12. ᾿Επιμέλεια δέ γε---- τέχνη] 
MSN. πραοτέρα: in the Bodl. 
without any accent. “ But 
there is none” (i.e. no art: 
τέχνη is understood from what 
precedes and follows) “ which 


rather and sooner than king- 
craft, would claim to be a 
mode of tendance of human 
society as a whole, and to be 
an art of sovereignty over- 
taking all men.” προτέρα for 
mpaotépa would be almost re- 
quired by the context (πρότερον 
—kal μᾶλλον, supr.) even if any 
good meaning could be given 
to the latter word. Stallbaum 
makes the last word, τέχνη, the 
subject, and joins ἐπιμέλεια dp- 
x7s—but ἐπιμέλεια and ἀρχὴ are 
co-ordinate, and not interde- 
pendent. 

18. πρὸς ait@—7@ τέλει] The 
former error has been detected 
in an early stage of the process 


ἘΣ, 2 


But we 
made the 
further 
error of 


neglecting 


to divide 
this. 


76 
NE. >Q. To ποῖον: 


MAATOQNOZ 


« 9 > “ f 
EE. Τόδε, ὡς ap εἰ καὶ διενοήθημεν 6 τι μά- 


κι 3 5 \ 
Lista τῆς δίποδος ἀγέλης εἶναί τινα θρεπτικὴν 


» val c a 3, A > 
τέχνην, οὐδέν TL μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς ἔδει βασιλικὴν av- 


᾿Ξ \ > x Ν \ e > / 
ὅτὴν εὐθὺς καὶ πολιτικὴν ὡς ἀποτετελεσμένην προσ-- 


/ 
αγορευειν. 


ΝΗ ΣΟ ἫΝ μη]: 


EE. Πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ Ἐλέγομεν Ἑ, τοὔνομα μετα- 


͵ Ἂν Ν 3 / a) 
σκευωρήσασθαι, πρὸς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν μᾶλλον προσ- 


/ x \ 7 y / ΄, A ᾽ 
1oayayovTas ἢ τὴν τροφὴν, ἔπειτα ταύτην τέμνειν" οὐ 


ap σμικρὰς ἂν ἔχοι τμήσεις ἔτι. 
γὰρ σμικρ χοι τμή 


ΝΕ. ΣΏ. Ποίας: 


of division: that now to be 
named is an omission with 
which we were chargeable at 
the close. Supr. 267 α. 

(18.) συχνὸν διημαρτάνετο | 
“We erred largely.” Cf, Pheedr. 
257 ©: συχνὸν διαμαρτάνεις. 

2. Τόδε — προσαγορεύειν | 
“ This was our mistake, that it 
might be said (ἄρα) that how- 
ever clear we were as to the 
existence of a nurturing art, 
we were not therefore justified 
in at once calling this by the 
names of ‘ kingcraft’ and ‘state- 
craft,’ as if perfectly defined.” 

7. Ti μὴν ;) Se. ἔδει ; “ Why, 
what ought we to have done Ὁ 
See note on τί μὴν ; supr. 
258 b. 

8. Πρῶτον μὲν ὃ ἔλέγομεν Ἔ] 
Bodl. AT. ἐλέγομεν : cett. ὃ ἐλέγ- 
ομεν. Cf, Rep. 3, 402 c: ἄρ᾽ 
οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως 
οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα---. 
Ib. 5, 464 6: ἄρ᾽ οὖν οὐχ, ὅπερ 
λέγω, τά τε πρόσθεν εἰρημένα καὶ 
τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀπερ- 


γάζεται αὐτοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύ- 


λακας; Lege. 3,681 b: εἰς τοὺς 
παῖδας ἀποτυπουμένους καὶ παίδων 
παῖδας, ὃ λέγομεν, ἥκειν κιτ.λ, 
Compare Thezt. 188 ¢: 6 @- 
τοῦμεν : Where Bodl. ΔΠ. give 
ἐζητοῦμεν. 

μετασκευωρήσασθαι] Se. ἔδει. 
“We ought first, as we are 
now saying, to have remo- 
delled the name.” The word 
is ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, and it is a 
little difficult to catch the exact 
shade of association which sug- 
gested it. The literal meaning 
is “to rearrange furniture :” 
and the word is perhaps chosen 
because this step is prepara- 
tory to the real business in 
hand, since names are the fur- 
niture or utensils (σκεύη) of 
thought. Cf. Rep. 7,540 6: δια- 
σκευωρήσονται THY ἑαυτῶν πόλιν. 

9. ἐπιμέλεια»"͵ὴ The word is 
used technically by Aristotle, 
Pol. VII. 14: σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα 
ταῦτα συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέ- 
λειαν. 

10. ταύτην] Se. τὴν οὕτω μετω- 
νομασμένην (ἐπιμελητικὴν) τέχνην. 





γ6. 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. Yi 


HE. “He τε τὸν θεῖον av που διειλόμεθα νομέα 
χωρὶς καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐπιμελητήν. 

NE. 2Q. ᾿Ορθῶς. 

RE. Αὖθις δέ ye τὴν ἀπονεμηθεῖσαν ἐπιμελητικὴν 
δίχα τέμνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἦν. 

ΝΗ ΣΟ. Tir ; 

EE. Τῷ βιαίῳ τε καὶ ἑκουσίῳ. 

NE. >Q. Τί δή; 

= Ν 7 Χ / « 7, 

mE. Καὶ tavrn που τὸ πρότερον ἁμαρτάνοντες 
5» / a / > STEN / \ , 
εὐηθέστερα τοῦ δέοντος εἰς TavTov βασιλέα καὶ TU- 
ραννον ξυνέθεμεν, ἀνομοιοτάτους ὄντας αὐτούς τε καὶ 
τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑκατέρου τρόπον. 

NE. ΣΏ. ᾿Αληθῆ. 

HE. Νῦν δέ γε πάλιν ἐπανορθούμενοι, καθάπερ 
τ" \ > / 5 \ / ΄ 
εἶπον, τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμελητικὴν δίχα διαιρώμεθα, 

a , \ ¢ “ 
τῷ βιαίῳ τε καὶ EKOVOLO ; 
“4 3 
NE. 30. Πᾶανυ μὲν οὖν. 
SE. Καὶ τὴν μέν γέ που τῶν βιαίων τυραννικήν, 


\ WaeG 4 Nie / / 3 Χ 
τὴν δὲ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἑκουσίων διποδων ἀγελαιοκομικὴν 


I. “He τε--- Αὖθις δέ ye] The 
correspondence of clauses is 
not strictly preserved. 

4. ἀπονεμηθεῖσαν] 1. 6. “ As- 
signed to the human ruler.” 
The word is partly suggested 
by a false echo from νομέα. 

6. Τίνι----ἑκουσίῳ] “ By what 
mark of distinction? That be- 
tween the compulsory and the 
voluntary.” Cf. 265 d: 
σχιστῷ καὶ--μώνυχι, alib. 

10. εὐηθέστερα τοῦ δέοντος | 
“ With undesirable simplicity 1" 
a simplicity that might cost 
us dear. Cf. Rep. 3, 409 a: 
εὐηθεῖς — καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοι ὑπὸ 


τῶν ἀδίκων. Ib. το, 598 d. 


τῷ 
c 


II. αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν--τρόπον] 
“ Most unlike in themselves, 
as also the mode of either’s 
government is most unlike.” 
Cf. Symp. 221 ἃ: οἷος---οὑτοσὶ 
γέγονε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ 
αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ. 

15. ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμελητικὴν | 
“The human art of superin- 
tendence” as distinguished from 
the Divine. 

18. τὴν--- τῶν βιαίων] “ The 
superintendence of the violent.” 
The genitives βιαίων and ἑκου- 
σίων are different, the former 
pointing to the rulers, the latter 
to the persons ruled. 

1g. τὴν δὲ---ζ(ώων} “That tend- 


We should 
have dis- 
tinguished, 
first, the 
Divine 
Shepherd 
from the 
human 
ruler, and 
then, the 
king of a 
willing 
people from 
the tyrant 
ofunwilling 
subjects, 
than which 
no differ- 
ence can be 
greater, 


But this 
is not all. 
Even with 
the cum- 
brous help 
of our 


Ἂ « ἴω a Y 
5QV μιν OUTWS EXELV 


78 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


-/ , ΄ Ν "7 3 / “r 
ζώων προσειπόντες πολιτικὴν, TOY ἔχοντα αὖ τέχνην P+ 2.17’ 


/ > 5, 4 / Ν 
ταύτην καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν ὄντως ὄντα βασιλέα καὶ πολι- 


\ > ͵7 
τικὸν ἀποφαινώμεθα ; 


΄ Ψ / 
NE. 2Q. Καὶ κινδυνεύει γε, ὦ Eeve, τελέως 


δειξις. 


EE. Καλῶς av, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμῖν ἔχοι. 


« Ν Ν Ν > / 
ἡ περὶ TOV πολιτικον ἄἅπο- 


δεῖ δὲ 


Χ Ν a 2 \ > Ν \ “ pu 
μὴ σοὶ μόνῳ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καἀμοὶ μετὰ TOV κοινῃ 


- a \ ΄, Ν ce. y / 
ξυνδοκεῖν. νῦν δὲ κατά ye τὴν ἐμὴν οὔπω φαίνεται 


/ ἊΝ a a 27 > \ / 
pens fa- τοτέλεον ὁ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν σχῆμα ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ 
Θ 


we 
have only 
obtained 

a shadowy 
outline of 
our subject. 


> Ν Ν Ν a, / / 
ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ παρα καιρον E€VLOTE σπεύδοντες πλείω 


/ “ ° lo y > / 
καὶ μείζω τοῦ δέοντος ἕκαστα τῶν ἔργων ἐπεμβαλλό- 


/ lat « rn fod Χ x “ 
μενοι βραδύνουσι, καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς, ἵνα δὴ πρὸς τῷ 


\ νΝ rn J Ν “ yy 
ταχὺ Kal μεγαλοπρεπῶς δηλώσαιμεν TO τῆς εμ- 


ance of animals in herds whose 
principle is voluntary and 
whose subjects are bipeds hay- 
ing free will.” 

8. κοίνῃῇ! Cf. supr. 260 Ὁ: 
τούτου τοίνυν (τοῦ ὁμονοεῖν) pé- 
χριπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ κοινωνῶμεν, ἐατέον 
τά γε τῶν ἄλλων δοξάσματα χαί- 
ρειν. 2586: τοῦτο ἤδη σον, 
οἶμαι, τὸ ἔργον, ὦ ξένε, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
ἐμὸν γίγνεται. Ξ. Δεῖ ye μὴν---- 
αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ σόν. 

9. κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν CF. 
Phileb. 41 b. 

11. πλείω καὶ μείζω is governed 
by ἐπεμβ., and does not agree 
with ἕκαστα τῶν ἔργων, which is 
governed by βραδύνουσι. 

12. ἕκαστα τῶν ἔργων] Badh. 
conj. τῷ ἔργῳ. But there is no 
need of change if the words 
are taken alternately, as often 
in these dialogues, and βραδυν. 
be transitive :—Spadvvovow ék- 


15mpoobev ἁμάρτημα διεξόδου, TH βασιλεῖ νομίσαντες 


αστα τῶν ἔργων ἐπεμβαλλόμενοι 
μείζω καὶ πλέω τοῦ δέοντος. Τῇ 
this is thought harsh, I should 
prefer to read ἑκάστοις. 
emepBardopevac | ““ Throw- 
ing in additional material.” 
Cf. Tim. 51 d: οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ λόγου 
μήκει πάρεργον ἄλλο μῆκος ἐπεμ- 
βλητέον. The middle voice sig- 
nifies “‘into their own work.” 

13. ἵνα πρὸς τῷ ταχὺ καὶ peya- 
λοπρεπῶς] “That not only with 
speed but with magnificence.” 
πρὸς τῷ ταχὺ Sc. δηλῶσαι. πρὸς 
τῷ ταχεῖ would be a more 
usual expression, but the ad- 
verb is suggested by the suc- 
ceeding adverb. 

14. τὸ---διεξόδου] Stallbaum 
well compares Tim. 39 d: πρὸς 
τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως. 
Ib. 506, Hipp. Maj. 300 «. 

15. βασιλεῖ] Governed partly 
by πρέπειν, partly by ποιεῖσθαι. 


Ρ. 2; 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 79 


77. πρέπειν μεγάλα παραδείγματα ποιεῖσθαι, θαυμαστὸν 


᾿ 3 ΄ὔ fal / / a / ’ 
ὄγκον ἀράμενοι τοῦ μύθου, μείζονι τοῦ δέοντος ἠναγ- 


κάσθημεν αὐτοῦ μέρει προσχρήσασθαι. διὸ μακρο- 


΄ ‘ Day? ΄ N ΄ a 
τεραν Τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πεποιίηκαμὲεν καὶ πᾶντως T@ 


> > ΄σ « / 
μύθῳ τέλος οὐκ ἐπέθεμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτεχνῶς ὁ doyoss 


ΩΣ “ las \ 54 \ \ yy 
ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ζῶον τὴν ἔξωθεν μὲν περιγραφὴν ἔοικεν 


« a 4 ἊΝ \ - cad Δ Ν “ 
ἱκανῶς ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ οἷον τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ 


’ὔ’ ray / , , > 
Ov/YKpacel TOV χρωμαάτῶν EVAPYELAV OUK ἀπειλη- 


I, θαυμαστὸν ὄγκον----τοῦ μύ- 
θου] “Taking up in the fable, 
as if were, a monstrous lump, 
we have been obliged to use 
more of it than was good for 
our purpose.” The image of 
the statuary (or modeller) is 
continued. But there is also 
in ὄγκον ἀράμενοι an association 
from the other meaning of dy- 
κον αἴρειν, to assume a lofty 
vein. Cf, Soph. Aj.129: μηδ᾽ 
ὄγκον ἄρῃς μηδέν᾽. 

2. τοῦ μύθου is a genitive of 
apposition or of respect. Cf. 
Protag. 329 a: δολιχὸν κατα- 
τείνας τοῦ λόγου. 

4. πάντως] “ With all,” like 
the Homeric ἔμπης. 

6. ὥσπερ ζῶον] “ Like a pic- 
ture” of some living thing. 
The illustration passes from 
statuary to painting. 

7. τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρωμά- 
των] “Harmony of colour.” 
Cf. Legg. 6, 768 ¢: οἷον περι- 
γραφή τις ἔξωθεν περιγεγραμμένη 
τὰ μὲν εἴρηκε, τὰ δ᾽ ἀπολείπει 
σχεδόν. Ib. ἃ : τὸ δὲ ὅλον καὶ 
ἀκριβὲς περὶ ἑνός τε καὶ πάντων 
τῶν κατὰ πόλιν καὶ πολιτικὴν 
πᾶσαν διοικήσεων οὐκ ἔστι γενέ- 
σθαι σαφές, πρὶν ἂν ἡ διέξοδος 
ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς τά τε δεύτερα καὶ τὰ 
μέσα καὶ πάντα μέρη τὰ ἑαυτῆς 


ἀπολαβοῦσα πρὸς τέλος ἀφίκηται. 
Ib. 769 b: καθάπερ ζωγράφων 
οὐδὲν πέρας ἔχειν ἡ πραγματεία 
δοκεῖ περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἢ τοῦ χραίνειν ἢ ἀποχραίνειν, ἢ 
6 τι δὴ καλοῦσι τὸ τοιοῦτον οἱ 
ζωγράφων παῖδες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε μοι 
δοκεῖ παύσασθαι κοσμοῦσα, ὥστ᾽ 
ἐπίδοσιν μηκέτ᾽ ἔχειν εἰς τὸ καλ- 
λίω τε καὶ φανερώτερα γίγνεσθαι 
τὰ γεγραμμέναυ The question, 
How far is the requirement 
of artistic proportion appli- 
eable to philosophical  dis- 
course? is partly suggested 
here, and is fully discussed in 
the sequel. 

Plato’s contempt of the mere 
artist comes out in the same 
passage (769 c): ἐντριβὴς----οὐδα- 
μῶς γέγονα τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ. 
ΑΘ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἐβλάβης. Com- 
pare Soph. 234. 

8. ἐνάργειαν] “ Distinctness.” 
Here, as in Theext. 203 Ὁ, 
the Bodl., with ΔΠ., has ἐνεργ. 
—the more familiar word. 
The word expresses the way 
in which the parts come out 
in relief (ὥστε ζωοὶ βροτοί) as 
the last touches are added to 
a painting. 

Aristotle uses the same 
combination of metaphors to 
describe the necessary imper- 


80 ITAATOQNOZ 


φέναι πω. γραφῆς δὲ καὶ συμπάσης χειρουργίας Ρ. 27)" 


/ Ν / 5 ΄- ue ΄- / 
λέξει καὶ λόγῳ δηλοῦν πᾶν ζῶον μᾶλλον πρέπει 
va δ a x J \ 
τοῖς δυναμένοις ἕπεσθαι: τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις διὰ χειρουρ- 
γιῶν. 


5s NE. SQ. Τοῦτο μὲν 


φὴς ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι, δήλωσον. 


5 θῶ » “ δὲ Ci 2 5, 
ορθως omy O€ ἡμιν οὕπω 


No great 
thing can 
be made 
clear with- p ᾿ nae ᾿ a ᾿ ΕΥ̓ Ψ 
out exam- VEVEL yap μων EKAOTOS OLOY ονὰρ εἰδὼς ATTAVTA 
ples. Even p95 8 ; Ψ τ é a 

the nature 107 QVYT αὐ παλιν WOTEP ὕπαρ αγνοειν. 


ΞῈ. Χαλεπόν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώ- ἃ 


“ 3 / / “ / 
μενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαί τι τῶν μειζόνων. κινδὺυ- 


fection of an Ethical discourse : 
ἀμυδρῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδεί- 
κνυσθαι ---τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ 
περιγραφῇ. 

For what follows, οἵ. Gorg. 
450 Ὁ: τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διὰ 
χειρουργίας ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη. 

2. λέξει καὶ λόγῳ] λέξις 15 
introduced because λόγος does 
not sufficiently express a pro- 
6688. 

πᾶν ζῶον] And _ therefore 
human society, which is a liy- 
ing organism. 

3. τοῖς δυναμένοις] Governed 
by δηλοῦν. 

τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις διὰ χειρουρ- 
γιῶν] “To the other sort the 
creatures may be shewn through 
works of art.” This is a good 
illustration of Plato’s manner 
of displaying both sides, even 
when a subject is mentioned 
by the way, and when one side 
only is required for his pur- 
pose. Cf. Rep. 7, 520 6, Legg. 
1,632 d: τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις ἡμῖν 
οὐδαμῶς ἐστι καταφανῆ. 

7. Xaderov—rti τῶν μειζόνων] 
This remark is preparatory to 
the example of the art of weay- 
ing; which, however, is not 


introduced till p. 279, a di- 
gression on the nature of Ex- 
ample being put between. The 
thought is one of frequent 
occurrence. Phedr. 262 ¢: ὡς 
νῦν ye Ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν, οὐχ 
ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα. Soph. 
219 ὍΞΕ: 
λων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι ---- πρότερον 
βού- 
λει δῆτα περὶ τινὸς τῶν φαύλων 
μετιόντες πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα 
αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος : In 
the Laws the use of Example 
is recognized as a necessary 
preliminary to discourse. 1,632 
6: ὅπως δ᾽ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διεξέλ- 
θωμεν, πειρασόμεθα αὐτὸ παρά- 
Sevypa θέμενοι καὶ τἄλλα οὕτω 


a > > “- ΄ 
ὅσα δ᾽ αὖ τῶν μεγά- 


5 Ξ = = 
ἐν σμικροῖς---δεῖν μελετᾶν. 


διαμυθολογοῦντες παραμύθια ποιή- 
σασθαι τῆς ὁδοῦ. 

9. οἷον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα] 
Compare Lys. 218 ¢: κινδυ- 
νεύομν ὄναρ πεπλουτηκέναι. 
Thezt. 208 b: ὄναρ δὴ---ἐπλου- 
τήσαμεν (“In sleep a king, in 
waking, no such matter”). A 
similar feeling appears in Phi- 
leb. 16 b: οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων 
ὁδὸς οὐδ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο, ἣς ἐγὼ ἐρα- 
στὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ με 
ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημόν τε καὶ 





277: 


e 


78. 





IIOAITIKO2. 


8] 


NE. >Q. Πῶς τοῦτ᾽ εἶπες ; 


μ- Ν Yh) ΦΧ ἢ YY , ᾽ A 7 
mE. Kati par ἀτόπως ἐοικὰ ye ἐν τῷ παροντι 


a) 5 7 > € a 
κινήσας TO περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν. 


NE. 50. Τί δή; 


5 ΄ 5 \ 
BE. Παραδείγματος, ὦ μακάριε, αὖ μοι καὶ TO 


παράδειγμα αὐτὸ δεδέηκεν. 


NE. ΣΏ. Τί οὖν ; λέγε μηδὲν ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα 


ἀποκνῶν. 


, δ / oa 3 - 
HE. Λεκτέον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ γε ἕτοιμος ἀκολουθεῖν. 


N » vad 7 oS yy 4 
τους γὰρ ποὺυ παῖδας ἰσμεν, ὁταν ἄρτι γραμμάτων 


3 / 
EMTELPOL γίγνωνται---- 


NE. 2Q. To ποῖον ; 


BE. Ὅτι τῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυ- 


᾽ὔ φ ff a lal ta Lal ᾽ὔ 
τάταις καὶ ῥάσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἱκανῶς διαισθά- 


νονται, καὶ τἀληθῆ φράζειν περὶ ἐκεῖνα δυνατοὶ 


γίγνονται. 


NE. 30. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ: 


ἄπορον κατέστησεν : with which 
compare Legg. 2, 6546: εἰ δὲ 
ταῦθ᾽ ἡμᾶς διαφυγόντα οἰχήσεται. 
Pheedo 89 Ὁ, : ἐάν περ γε ἡμῖν 
6 λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα 
αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. 

3. τὸ περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πά- 
Gos] Cf. τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος, 
Theet. 193 d. “After a strange 
fashion, it would seem, I have 
now touched upon the expe- 
rience of our minds in regard 
to knowledge.” For the par- 
ticiple with ἔοικα, cf. Xen. Hell. 
Vi 3, ro (Passow, Lex. 5: v. 
ἔοικα), and for κινήσας, cf. infr. 
297 ©: κινήσας τις τοῦτον τὸν 
λόγον. Theeet. 163 a: τὰ πολλὰ 
καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. 

5. Παραδείγματος] The illus- 

* 


tration to be drawn presently 
from boys learning their let- 
ters is an example of what is 
meant by Example. 

μηδὲν ---- ἀποκνῶν] I. 6. 
Don't be afraid of seeming 
tedious to me. 

9. σύ ye] So also the Bodl. 
MS., where the omission of ye, 
noted by Gaisford, is after ἐμοῦ 
in the previous line, perhaps 
caused by λέγε preceding. 

13. ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ 
ῥάσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν] See 
the same illustration more 
fully drawn out in Rep. 3, 402 
ce, where however the notion 
of syllables is not distinctly 
present ; Thezt. 206 a, 207, 
208 ; Phileb. 17. 


M 


wn 


of example, 
it would 
seem, is no 
exception 
to this rule, 


We know, 
then, that 


to children 


learn to 
read by 
being re- 
ferred from 
syllables 
which they 
cannot 
spell to 
others havy- 


15 ing the 


same let- 
ters, which 
they al- 
ready 
know. 


82 


EE. Ταὐτὰ δέ γε ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις ἀμφιγνοοῦντες Pp. 27]; 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


πάλιν δόξη τε ψεύδονται καὶ λόγῳ. 


NE. 2Q. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


μαι 3 3 Δ en 0, 5 ἢ 
ΞΕ. ‘Ap οὖν οὐχ ὧδε ῥᾷστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπά- 


> \ \ / / 
5 yew QUTOUS ἐπι TA PNT γιγνώσκομενα 3 


NES Os Moss 


—E "A , a » 98 5 a > - > Ν 
joy Ls. VAYELW πρῶτον €7 €EKELVA EV OLS Ταῦτα 


ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἐδόξαζον, ἀναγαγόντας δὲ τιθέναι παρὰ 


\ , / Ν ΄ » 
τὰ μήπω γιγνωσκόμενα, καὶ παραβαάλλοντας ἐνδεικ- 


’ὔ Ν 5 ἂν € / \ / > » / 
1O YUVAL THY αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ φύσιν ἐν ἀμφοτέραις 


3 An a , Ay na a 
οὖσαν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς, μέχριπερ ἂν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγνο- 


ουμένοις τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀληθῶς παρατιθέμενα δειχθῇ, 


δειχθέντα δέ, παραδείγμαθ᾽ οὕτω γιγνόμενα, ποιήσῃ 


lal / / ͵ » , lol 
TOV στοιχειῶν TAVT@V ἕκαστον εν πασαις TALS συλ- 


oa ἊΝ \ o ε a 2) “ yy XN 
15AaPais, TO μὲν ἐτερον ws τῶν ἄλλων ETEPOY OV, TO 


\ Sea ε XN SPAN XN » Ν e “ 
δὲ TQUTOV ὡς ταὐτὸν αει KATA ταῦτα εαὐτῷ σροσα- 


γορεύεσθαι. 


NE. ΣΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


I. Ταὐτὰ δέ γε ταῦτα] CT. 
Theset. 207 6 : ὅταν---Θεαίτητον 
γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἶ--γράψῃ, 
καὶ αὖ Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γρά- 
φειν ταῦ καὶ εἶ--- ράψη. 

2. δόξῃ τε ψεύδονται καὶ λόγῳ] 
The possibility of which two- 
fold phenomenon has been 
proved with some difficulty 
this morning. Soph. 262-264. 

4. ῥᾷστον καὶ κάλλιστον] Se. 
ἐστίν. 

8. τιθέναι] Se. τὰ ἐν οἷς ὀρ- 
θῶς ἐδόξαζον. 


\ DEN ς , ‘ 
IO. τὴν αὑτὴν opotoTnTa Kal 


giow] “The same kindred 
form and nature.” ὁἍὁμοιότης 
here = ὁμοῖον εἶδος. Cf. Pheedo 


"ἢ a: ἐνθάδε---τὴν αὑτοῖς ὁμοι- 
ὄτητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξουσιν. 


τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα -- ὁμοῖον τῆς 
αὐτῆς ἰδέας πάθος. 

ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς συμπλο- 
xais]| The same letter in two 
different combinations or syl- 
lables (i.e. the same idea or 
law in two widely different 
things). Cf. Soph. 253, 261. 

11. μέχριπερ---δειχθῇ] “ Until 
the things of which they think 
truly (supr. ἐν ois ταὐτὰ ταῦτα 
ὀρθῶς ἐδόξαζον) have been shewn 
in comparison with all the 
things which they do not 
know.” There is a slight al- 
lusion to the etymology of 
παρά-δειγμα. 

15. τὸ μὲν ἕτερον---προσαγο- 
ρεύεσθαι)])͵ Cf. Rep. 3, 402 6; 
Theet. 207 ; Soph. 259 d. 











ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 


83 


jn > o qn .Y e ΄ / A 
ΜΞ, Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν ἱκανῶς συνειληφαμεν, ort 


/ , / / e , Ἃ > 
παραδείγματός γ᾽ ἐστὶ τότε γένεσις, ὁπόταν ὃν ταὐ- 


ὩΣ > Cas. / / bd a Ν 
τὸν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ δοξαζόμενον ὀρθῶς καὶ 


συναχθὲν, περὶ ἑκάτερον ὡς συνάμφω μίαν ἀληθῆ 


δόξαν ἀποτελῇ ; 
NE. ΣΏΩ. Φαίνεται. 


μα ΄ Ἂ > ’ Saw a Corn « 
BE. Θαυμαζοιμεν ἂν οὖν εἰ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἡμῶν ἡ 


2. ὁπόταν--- ἀποτελῇ} ‘ When 
that which is the same in 
another separate thing, and 
which is rightly conceived, is 
brought into comparison, and 
so effects one true opinion 
about each of the two things 
which are thus regarded in 
one view.” 

3. διεσπασμένῳ] Cf. Soph. 
253 d: μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, 
ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου γωρίς, 
πάντῃ διατεταμένην. 

4. συναχθὲν)] <A technical 
word. Cf. Phedr. 266 Ὁ : τῶν 
διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν. 

περὶ ἑκάτερον ὡς συνάμφω--- 
ἀποτελῇ] Have completed one 
true opinion respecting the 
several ebjects, and combined 
them in one conception. 

7. Gavpacousev—ayvoet | “ Will 
it seem wonderful then if our 
mind is naturally lable to the 
Same infirmity in relation to 
the first elements of things, 
and sometimes in some sub- 
jects is firm and settled about 
each element by the help of 
truth ; but at other times and 
in other subjects wanders up 
and down them all: and forms 
right opinion of some of them 
here and there amongst the 
combinations” (ἁμῇ γέ πῃ τῶν 
συγκράσεων. cf. supr. 275 d: 
ταύτης πῃ), or, “forms right 

sk 


M 


opinion of some things here 
and there even in the com- 
binations ;” but when they are 
transferred to the long and 
difficult (syllables) complexities 
of real life, is unable to re- 
cognize the same?” For συν- 
ίσταται ---- φέρεται, οἵ. the ac- 
count of opinion in Tim. 37 a, 
43, 44; and Phedr. 265 c: 
ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς twos ἐφαπτόμε- 
νοι, τάχα δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παρα- 
φερόμενοι. Ib, 262 ἃ. 
Compare the language of 
Bacon in recommending a dif- 
ferent kind of inquiry. Ad- 
vancement of Learning (quoted 
by Mr. Ellis in General Preface 
to the Philesophical Works, 
p. 26): “The forms of sub- 
stances, I say, as they are now 
by compounding and_ trans- 
planting “multiplied, are 50 
perplexed as they are not to 
be inquired ; no more than it 
were either possible or to pur- 
pose to seek in gross the forms 
of those sounds which make 
words, which by composition 
and transposition of letters are 
infinite. But on the other side 
to inquire the form of those 
sounds or voices which make 
simple letters is easily com- 
prehensible, and bemg known 
induceth and manifesteth the 
forms of all words which con- 


Ὁ 


- 


Hence it 
appears 
that Exam- 
ple comes 
into use, 
when the 
same 
element 
rightly dis- 
cerned in 
something 
else, and 
brought 


into com- 
parison 
with the 
thing in 
question, 
creates a 
single true 
judgment 
including 
both the 
things. 
Now this 
applies 
equally to 
the ele- 
ments of 
universal 
Being: in 
contem- 
plating 
which the 
soul is like 
a child 
learning to 
read. 

Let us, 
then, 
choose an 
example, 
which will 
at once 


84. 


ITAATQNOZ 


4 7 ν᾿ \ 5 ͵ὕ ΄σ “ { yi 
ψυχὴ φύσει περὶ τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα πεπονθυΐα P- 2711) 


\ \ (ae > / Ass re “ yy / 
ToTe μὲν ὑπ ἀληθείας περὶ ἐν EKaTTOV ἐν τισι συνι- 


\ \ Ν “ ᾽ one 53 / 
σταται, TOTE δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα ἐν ἑτέροις αὖ φέρεται, 


\ \ \ 9 νοὶ a 7 A , > - 
και TH μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμῃ γε ΤῊ TOV συγκράσεων ορθῶς 


΄ς ΄ > > val ¥ 
5 δοξάζει, μετατιθέμενα δ᾽ εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων 


\\ \ ΄ \ / 
μακρὰς καὶ μὴ padlovs συλλαβὰς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πάλιν 


ἀγνοεῖ ; 


NE. 3Q. Καὶ θαυμαστὸν γε οὐδέν. 
EE. Πῶς fyapt, ὦ φίλε, δύναιτ᾽ ἄν τις ἀρχό- 


> \ - > a > 
™ iopevos ἀπὸ δόξης ψευδοῦς, ἐπί τι τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ 


μικρὸν μέρος ἀφικόμενος κτήσασθαι φρόνησιν ; 
NE. ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς. 


ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα εἰ ταύτῃ πέφυκεν, οὐδὲν δὴ 


La) ἊΝ 7, Ἂ ΄σ \ 
πλημμελοῖμεν ἂν ἐγώ TE καὶ σὺ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιχει- 


7ὔ “ 7 EK Wated \ , > 
rspyoavTes ὅλου παραδείγματος ἰδεῖν τὴν φύσιν ἐν 


“ \ / XAA ὃ / Bs δὲ 
σμικρῷ κατα μέρος a @ Tapa εἰγμᾶτι, μετα [s 


sist and are compounded of 
them. In the same manner, 
to inquire the form of a lion, 
of an oak, of gold—nay, of 
water, of air—is a vain pur- 
suit ; but to inquire the forms 
of sense, of voluntary motion, 
of vegetation, of colours, of 
gravity and levity, of density, 
of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and 
all other natures and qualities, 
which like an alphabet are not 
many, and of which the es- 
sences upheld by matter of all 
creatures do consist,—to in- 
quire, I say, the true forms of 
these, is that part of meta- 
physique which I now define 
On 

I. τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα] 
“ The alphabet of things,” 1. 6. 
the ideas. Cf. Thezt. 201 sqq. 

2. τό τε pev—epera] Cf. 


Phileb. 15: τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα 
κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς ἕν, τότε 
δὲ πάλιν ἀνελίττων καὶ διαμε- 
ρίζων. 

9. Πῶς tyapt] Stallbaum 
is probably right in conj. πῶς 
ap —. 

15. ὅλου] The “whole” is 
often put by Plato for the 
universal, to which κατὰ μέρος 
is here opposed as the par- 
ticular. Cf. Rep. 6, 491 ¢: 
AaBod τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ; ὅλου 
Thest. 178 a: 
παντὸς τις τοῦ εἴδους 


Ib. 182 b: κατὰ 


αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς. 
εἰ περὶ 
ἐρωτῴη K.T.A. 
μέρη οὖν ἄκουε. 

τό. ἄλλῳ] Other, as the par- 
ticular is other than the ge- 
neral. ; 

peta δὲ ταῦτα μέλλοντες ---Ἶ 
“ Intending, however, after- 
wards to bring the same na- 


d 











278. 


270. 








ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 85 


a / > A Ν a 7 / *» 
ταῦτα μέλλοντες, ἐπὶ TO τοῦ βασιλέως μέγιστον ὃν 
SIN 5 ἢ / / / \ 
ταὐτὸν «dos am ἐλαττόνων φέροντές ποθεν, διὰ 
/ > a 5 \ “- \ / 
παραδείγματος ἐπιχειρεῖν αὖ τὴν τῶν κατὰ πόλιν 
/ / to o Oy / 
θεραπείαν τέχνῃ γνωρίζειν, ἵνα ὕπαρ ἀντ᾽ ὀνείρατος 
Ca / 
ἡμῖν γίγνηται; 
΄ ᾿ 5 A 
NE. 2Q. avy μὲν οὖν opdas. 
μααὶ i“ \ Ν " , ,ὔ 
BE. Ἰ]άλιν δὴ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον ἀναληπτέον, 
¢ 3 δὴ “ B λ lat / ia) Ν \ 5A 
ὡς ἐπειδὴ τῷ βασιλικῷ γένει τῆς περὶ Tas πόλεις 


3 / > a a 7 > 
ἐπιμελείας ἀμφισβητοῦσι μυρίοι, δεῖ δὴ πάντας ἀπο- 


,ὔ , / a κ᾿ \ \ 
χωρίζειν τούτους καὶ μόνον ἐκεῖνον λιπεῖν. Kal πρὸς το 


a XN 7 yf a N οὐ μὰ 
τοῦτο δὴ παραδείγματος ἔφαμεν δεῖν τινὸς ἡμίν. 
7 
NE, 2Q. Kai μάλα. 
“ ΄ 3, 32) \ 5 ‘ 
BE. Τί δῆτα παράδειγμά τις av, ἔχον THY αὐτὴν 
πὸ , / 
Ἐπολιτικῇ ὃ πραγματείαν, σμικρότατον παραθέμενος 
ε la Ἃ “ S / / \ / 
ἱκανῶς av εὕροι TO ζητούμενον ; βούλει πρὸς Διός, 
53 Ἅ » / ΄ “ y ᾽ > 
ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ TL πρόχειρον ἕτερον ἔχομεν, ἀλλ 
3 7 \ ’ὔ, 5 
οὖν τὴν γε ὑφαντικὴν προελώμεθα ; καὶ ταύτην, εἰ 
a \ a i \ \ 
δοκεῖ, μὴ πᾶσαν 3 ἀποχρήσει yap ἴσως ἡ περὶ τὰ EK 
A , « ΄' ΄ \ Ἂ Coa a N 
TOV ἐρίων VpaTpaTa τάχα yap ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο TO 
“ See / \ ἃ / 
μέρος αὐτῆς μαρτυρήσειε προαιρεθὲν 0 βουλομεθα. 


NE. 2Q. Τί γὰρ ov; 


ture from some lesser subject 
to bear on the most important 
nature of the king, and to 
endeavour—.” The construc- 
tion is determined by a sort 
of attraction from the previous 
participle. 

I, μέγιστον ὃν ταὐτὸν εἶδος] 
Cf. Rep. 4, 435 a: 6 γε ταὐτὸν 
ἄν τις προσέιποι μεῖζόν τε καὶ 
ἔλαττον. 

3. τῶν κατὰ πόλιν] Mase. 

4. ὕπαρ ἀντ᾽ ὀνείρατος] Cf. 
supr. 277 d. 


\ a , > 
7. τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον ava- 


ληπτέον] P. 268d: ἕως ἂν τοὺς 
τῆς 
ἀντιποιουμένους 


περικεχυμένους καὶ 
συννομῆς 
περιελόντες καὶ χωρίσαντες ἀπ᾽ 
καθαρὸν μόνον ἐκεῖνον 
ἀποφήνωμεν. Also 275-277. 

TO. ἐκεῖνον] τὸν βασιλέα im- 
plied in τῷ βασιλικῷ γένει. 

14. ἔπολιτικ ] MSS. πολιτι- 
κήν. The correction occurred 
also to Ast and Stallbaum. 

20. μαρτυρήσειε προαιρεθὲν | 
The participle, as ἴῃ πρέψει 
ῥηθὲν, supr. 269 6, and the 
like. 


αὐτῷ 
αὐτῷ 


> , 
EKELV@V 


illustrate 
for us this 
point of 
method, 
and pre- 
pare the 
way for a 
more en- 
lightened 
view of the 
States- 
man’s 
office. 
Reverting 
then to 
what has 
been pre- 
viously 
said, that 
we must 
try to clear 
away from 
the King 
the crowd 
of rival 
artists, we 
select as an 
example 
the art of 
weaving 
woollen 
cloth. 


Aswe have 
already 
done in the 
case of 
statecraft, 
let us di- 
vide the 
arts and 
sciences 
until we 
come in 
sight of 
what we 
seek. 

We do 

this briefly, 
so as to 
bring the 


. I 
question to 


the same 
point at 
which we 
have left 
the parallel 
inquiry. 

Of produc- 
tions and 


~ / 7 A \ 
possessions, 15 σόλεμον ὁπλίσματα, τὰ δε 


some are 
for action, 
some for 

protection. 


86 ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ 


EE. Τί δῆτα οὐ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τέ- p. 296)" 


΄- “ / lal 
μνοντες μέρη μερῶν ἕκαστον διηρούμεθα, καὶ νῦν 
ε 4“ ὦ al > td \ 
περὶ ὑφαντικὴν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐδράσαμεν, καὶ κατὰ 
σ \ / Ν / 
δύναμιν ὅ TL μάλιστα διὰ βραχέων ταχὺ πᾶντ᾽ ἐπελ- 
μ μ 
/ , ” 5s Ν a / 
5θοντες πάλιν ἤλθομεν ἐπὶ TO νῦν χρήσιμον ; 
“ / 
NE, 20. [as λέγεις ; 
> ‘ / / / 
ΞΕ. Αὐτὴν τὴν διέξοδον ἀπόκρισίν σοι ποιή- 
σομαι. 


NE. ΣΩ. Καλλιστ᾽ εἶπες. 


μααὶ 3 / id CoS € / a 
ο ἐπ, “Kore τοίνυν πάντα ἡμῖν ὅποσα δημιουργοῦ- 


Ν / Ν \ (4 “ 5 Ἂν \ 
μεν Kal κτώμεθα, TA μὲν ἕνεκα τοῦ ποιεῖν τι, τὰ δὲ 
a Ν 7, / Ν la / ‘\ 
τοῦ μὴ πάσχειν ἀμυντὴηρια᾽ καὶ TOV ἀμυντηρίων τὰ 
\ > ΄ Ν las ΄ \ \ 
μὲν ἀλεξιφάρμακα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ 
, lal \ 7 \ \ Ν \ ἢ 
προβλήματα τῶν δὲ προβλημάτων τὰ μέν πρὸς τὸν 
, na 
φράγματα: Kal τῶν 
/ A \\ ΄ὔ A \ XN 
φραγμάτων Ta μὲν παραπετάσματα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς 
I. Τί οὐ -- ἐδράσαμεν | Οἵ, 


Soph. 251 6. Phileb. 54 ὁ. 


. κατὰ δύναμιν----διὰ βραχέων] 


talismans or of drugs. 
14. τῶν d€—ovvoera] “ De- 
fences from the weather are 


This is fulfilled in the follow- 
ing sentence, in which the 
method of dichotomies is ex- 
emplified as it were in short 
hand. Perhaps also there is 
here a sly anticipation of 
the length to which the illus- 
tration is allowed to run, 
which is made the occasion of 
comment afterwards. 

7. Αὐτὴν --- ποιήσομαι] Cf. 
Soph. 250 a: πειράσομαι δρᾷν 
τοῦτο ἐρωτῶν σε καθάπερ ἐκείνους 
τότε, ἵνα ἅμα τι καὶ προΐωμεν. 

10. δημιουργοῦμεν καὶ κτώμεθα] 
ποιητική and κτητική (Soph. 219) 
are thus combined. 

13. ἀλεξιφάρμακα καὶ θεῖα καὶ 
ἀνθρώπινα] Preventives divine 
and human—in the form of 


housing and body-shelter: of 
the latter sort are mats and 
envelopments ; which are of 
one piece or of several. Those 
of several pieces are stitched 
or otherwise compacted, of 
vegetable fibre or of hair or 
wool: and of these some are 
felted together with the help 
of water and earth, while some 
are compacted of themselves.” 
τό. παραπετάσματα] “ Cur- 
tains—to shut out the view.” 
Hesych. : παραπετάσματα, παρα- 
Cf. Prot. 316 e: 
ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετά- 
σμασιν ἐχρήσαντο. The word is 
used also by Herodotus of the 
Persian hangings found in the 
tent of Mardonius at Plateea. 


καλύμματα. 





9: 


280 








MOAITIKO®X. 87 


Χεη ῶναν καὶ κατ ἀλεξητήρια: τῶν δὲ ἀλεξητη- 
ρίων τὰ μὲν στεγανμαπα; τὰ δὲ σκεπάσματα᾽ καὶ 
τῶν σκεπασμάτων ὑποπετάσματα μὲν ἄλλα, περι- 
ἊΝ \ “ / \ \ \ 
καλύμματα δὲ ἕτερα᾽ περικαλυμμάτων δὲ τὰ μὲν 
ε / ,ὔ We i a Ν / \ 
ὁλοσχιστα, σύνθετα δὲ ἕτερα" τῶν δὲ συνθέτων TA 
\ ’ \ > 7 ΄ ΄ a 
μέν τρητὰ, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ τρήσεως TVVOETA καὶ TOV 
3 / \ \ / “ > a \ \ / 
ἀτρητων τὰ μέν νεύρινα φυτῶν EK γῆς; τὰ δε τρίχινα" 
fal \ / \ \ “ Ν “ , \ \ 
τῶν δὲ τριχίνων τὰ μὲν ὕδασι καὶ γῇ κολλητά, τὰ δὲ 
Daa - / \ - > a « a 
αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς συνδετά. τουτοισὶ δὴ τοῖς EK τῶν εαυτοῖς 
/ > , \ ΄, 
συνδουμένων ἐργασθεῖσιν ἀμυντηρίοις καὶ σκεπάσ - 
NS \ 4 « ’ / \ \ - 
μασι TO μὲν ὄνομα ἱμάτια ἐκαλέσαμεν" τὴν δὲ τῶν 
/ / > / / “ / 
ἱματίων μάλιστα ἐπιμελουμένην τέχνην, ὥσπερ τότε 
‘SS a / \ By, 4 Ν - 7 
τὴν τῆς πόλεως πολιτικὴν εἴπομεν, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ταύ- 
/ a a 7 ec 
τὴν προσείπωμεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ἱματι- 
/ 
ουργικὴν᾽ 
«- , 5 / 7 53 / \\ / 
ἱματίων ἐργασίᾳ μέγιστον ἣν μόριον, μηδὲν διαφέρειν 


“ δὲ Se i σ SN a a 
φῶμεν δὲ Kat ὑφαντικην, ὅσον ἐπὶ TH τῶν 


7. The genitive φυτῶν de- 
pends on ἐστὶ, which is to be 
supplied, but at the same time 
defines more particularly the 
idea of νεύρινον, “of fibres, 
from plants.” 

9. τούτοισι] Several MSS. 
have τουτοισί: but this is a 
case where the dwrior lectio is 
preferable. 

to. ἀμυντηρίοις | Cf. Lege, 
11,920 6: οἱ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν 
Oe Cie τέχναισιν ἑτέραις ἀμυν- 
τηρίοις ἔργα. 

15. ὅσον] This can hardly 
mean “Inasmuch as.” In 
Rep. 1, 328 d, which Ast com- 


pares (Lex. s. v.), ὅσον is 
distinctly an accusative of 


measure, and is answered by 
τοσοῦτον, which could not be 
introduced here without de- 
stroying the sense. And if so 


- the making of clothes.” 


rendered, the words must be 
understood to anticipate what 
is brought out afterwards, 
that weaving is only a part of 
the making of clothes. This 
should be kept in the back- 
ground here. The word al- 
ludes to what is said above 
and explained immediately be- 
low, that only a part of the 
art of weaving is concerned 
with making woollen  gar- 
ments. 279 b: καὶ ταύτην, εἰ 
δοκεῖ, μὴ πᾶσαν κιτιλ. This is 
confirmed by ἦν. “Δὐ least 
that very large portion of this 
art which we saw to be for 
ὅσον 
therefore limits the subject οἵ 
διαφέρειν. 

ἐπὶ] As in Gorg. 463 6: 
τέτταρα ταῦτα μύρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν 
πράγμασιν, 8110. 


σι 


σι 


Protections 
are prophy- 
lacties and 
defences. 
Defences 
are armour 
and bar- 
riers. Bar- 
riers are 
screens and 
weather- 
stops. Wea- 
ther-stops 
are shelter 
and clothes. 
Clothes are 
rugs and 
integu- 
ments. In- 
teguments 
are of one 
piece or 
composite, 
The compo- 
site are 
stitched or 
otherwise 
combined. 
Those un- 
stitched 
are of 


vegetable 
fibre or of 
hair. Those 
of hair are 
compacted 
with earth 
and water, 
or com- 
bined of 
their own 
substance 
without 
such help. 
These last 
are called 
clothing : 
and the 
art which 
tends on 
these may 
be called 
cloth- 
making : 
which dif- 
fers from 
the weay- 
ing of wool, 


as the King ;5 


and the 
Statesman 


δῶ 


πλὴν ὀνόματι ταύτης τῆς ἱματιουργικῆς, καθάπερ p. “8 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


> o / \ \ ~ “ 
κακεῖ TOTE τὴν βασιλικὴν τῆς πολιτικῆς. 
NE. 2Q. ᾿Ορθότατα γε. 


cal “ \ 
EE. To pera τοῦτο δὴ συλλογισώμεθα, ὅτι τὴν 


cd / « \ “ ε ΄- ΄ ΚΑ ἊΝ © 4 
5uatiov ὑφαντικὴν οὕτω ῥηθεῖσαν Tis TAX ἂν ἱκανῶς 


εἰρῆσθαι δόξειε, μὴ δυνάμενος Evvvoeiv ὅτι τῶν μὲν 


> ΝΝ a 357) / ΄σ \ εν 
ἐγγὺς ξυνεργῶν οὔπω διώρισται, πολλῶν δὲ ἑτέρων 


ξυγγενῶν ἀπεμερίσθη. 


NE. 2Q. Ποίων, εἰπέ, ξυγγενῶν ; 
EE. Οὐχ ἕσπου τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν, ὡς φαίνει" πάλιν 


3 ξ yy 3 / 3 Uj 5 Χ “ > 
OUV +7 €ouKev ETTAVLTEOV APKOMEVOVY ἀπὸ τελευτῆς. ει 


\ lal \ b / \ \ / > 
yap ξυννοεῖς THY οἰκειότητα, THY μὲν διετέμομεν ἀπ 


a A ΄ \ cr / , 
αὐτῆς νῦν On, THY τῶν στρωμάτων σύνθεσιν, περι- 


βολῇ χωρίζοντες καὶ ὑποβολῇ. 


NE. >Q. Μανθαάνω. 


μι Ν \ \ » a / ιν / Ν 
EH. Kat μὴν τὴν ἐκ τῶν λίνων καὶ σπάρτων καὶ 


2. κἀκεῖ τότε] 250 b,c. See 
also 274 6. 

4. συλλογισώμεθα] “ Let us 
reflect.” “Let us think, put- 
ting together what has been 
said.” Or, perhaps, “Com- 
paring this argument with the 
preceding.” As the definition 
of the king seemed to be com- 
plete, at the end of the first 
series of divisions, so might 
the definition of the weaver at 
this point. Yet neither has 
been distinguished from his 
ereatest rivals. 

10. πάλιν οὖν ΤΊ ἔοικεν ἐπανι- 
τέον] Hither ὡς ἔοικεν or ἔπανι- 
τέον εἶναι Seems to be required. 

II. ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τελευτῆς] 
“ Beginning from the end.” 
As in resuming the “ gene- 
alogy” of the Sophist, 226 a, 


ib. 268. This order is not 
strictly followed, however, un- 
less the “end” includes all 
from καὶ σκεπασμάτων 
downwards. 

εἰ ξυννοεῖς τὴν οἰκειότητα] 
Young Socrates’ question, Ποίων 
— ξυγγενῶν : shewed that he 
had not observed the likeness 
or kindred, e. g. between ἐσθὴς 
and στρώματα. 

12. τὴν μὲν διετέμομεν] μὲν 15 
answered by καὶ μὴν. 

τὴν μὲν -- ὑποβολῇ] “ We 
just now cut off from the 
weaving of garments that of 
bed clothes, distinguishing 
them by the one being put 
under us and the other round. 

13. περιβολῇ καὶ ὑποβολῇ] Supr. 
ὑποπετάσματα μὲν ἄλλα, περικα- 
λύμματα δὲ ἕτερα. 


τῶν 


Cc 





HMOAITIKOS. 


δὺ 


/ « ὦ a "7 σ΄ \ 7 7 
80. πάντων, oTOTAa φυτῶν apTL νεῦρα κατὰ λογον εἴπο- 


/ a ’ / / ᾽ κε 
μεν, δημιουργίαν πᾶσαν ἀφείλομεν᾽ τήν T αὖ πιλη- 
Χ ΄ὔ Ν lol ε lal 
τικὴν ἀφωρισάμεθα Kal THY TH τρήσει καὶ ῥαφῇ 
χρωμένην σύνθεσιν, ἧς ἡ πλείστη σκυτοτομική. 


NE. ΣΏ. Πανυ μὲν οὖν. 


= Ν / Χ lal « / / 
SE. Kat τοίνυν τὴν τῶν ὁλοσχίστων σκεπασμα- 


/ 4 \ a 
Tov θεραπείαν, δερματουργικὴν, Kal τὰς τῶν στεγασ - 


’ “ 5 5) fa) SS GY “ Ν 
μάτων, ὅσαι TE ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ καὶ ὅλῃ τεκτονικῇ καὶ 


» ΕΣ / e / 
ἐν ἄλλαις τέχναις ῥευμάτων στεκτικαὶ γίγνονται, 


» / “ Ν \ \ Ν 
συμπάσας ἀφείλομεν, ὅσαι τε περὶ Tas κλοπᾶς καὶ 


\ Bi LE ὃ λ δ ΠᾺΡ / / 
Tas La T pa ELS OLAKDAUTLKA epya παρέχονται τέχναι 

΄ὔ ΄ > 
φραγμάτων, περί τε γένεσιν ἐπιθηματουργίας οὖσαι 


Ν “ lad > 
Kal Tas τῶν θυρωμάτων πήξεις, γομφωτικῆς ἀπονεμ- 


1. φυτῶν νεῦρα---εἴπομεν] Viz. 
in saying νεύρινα φυτῶν supr. 

κατὰ λόγον] Following ana- 
logy. 

8. ὅσαι te—vylyvovra] I.e. 
ὅσαι τε ἐν OLKOO. kK. OA. TEKTOV. στε- 
κτικαὶ (OY στεγαστικαὶ) γίγνονται, 
καὶ ὅσαι ἐν ἄλλαις τεχν. ῥευμάτων 
στεκτ. γιγν. 

9. ῥευμάτων στεκτικαὶ] “ Hous- 
ing” is not an adequate trans- 
lation of στεγαστική, as this 
includes the damming of rivers 
and the lke: “the art of 
making wind-and-water-tight.”’ 
Many of the words in this 
passage are quoted, with others 
from the Politicus, by Pollux, 
Onomasticon 7, 208-10, who 
adds : etre σπουδάζων ἔχρητο τοῖς 
ὀνόμασιν, εἴτε καὶ μή---λέγω δὲ, 
διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν ὀνομάτων βιαι- 
ότερον χρῆσθαι. 

10. ὅσαι τε-- τέχνης] “And all 
the arts which produce pre- 
ventive barriers, as against 
theft and violence, such as are 
the process of lid-makingand the 

eS 


fixing of doors, being separate 
portions of the art of joining.” 
The order is ὅσαι τέχναι παρέ- 
χονται---διακωλυτικὰ ἔργα φραγμά- 
The genitive of apposi- 
tion again recals the language 
of tragedy. This class was not 
strictly included in the παραπε- 
τάσματα of the previous enume- 
ration, 

13. γομφωτικῆς ἀπονεμηθεῖσθαι 
μόρια τέχνης] Hither “set apart 
as portions of the joiner’s art,” 
or “haying had assigned to 
them several portions of the 
joiner’s art.” For the latter, 
ef. infr. 281 ¢: μεγάλα δὲ (μέρη) 
καὶ σφίσιν αὐταῖς ἀπονέμουσαι. 
The use of the passive would 
then be analogous to πιστεύ- 
ομαί τι, “1 am entrusted with 
something”—a trace of which 
occurs as early as Plat. Ep. I. 
309 a: διοικῶν τὴν ὑμετέραν ap- 


των. 


χήν πεπιστεύμενος πάντων μά- 
λιστα. Other instances in 
which a noun which would 
have followed the active verb 


N 


σι 


differed, in 
name only. 
But though 
the defini- 
tion is spe- 
cious, we 
see on re- 
flection 
that the 
art has still 
to be dis- 
tinguished 
from those 
most akin 
to it. Se- 
veral kin- 
dred arts 
have in- 
deed been 
parted off, 
such as the 
making of 
bedclothes, 
of skins, of 
linen cloth, 


and rush- 
matting, of 
felt, of 
shoes, of 
houses and 
dams, of 
lids and 
doors, of 


90 


a « \ ? / 
ηθεῖσαι μόρια τέχνης" τήν τε ὁπλοποιικὴν ἀπετεμο- P. 21} 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


μεθα, μεγάλης καὶ παντοίας τῆς προβληματουργικῆς 


a 5 / Ξ Ν Ν \ Ν ‘ 
τμῆμα οὖσαν δυνάμεως" καὶ On καὶ THY μαγευτικὴν 


5 = / > > \ > ἈΝ 
τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀλεξιφάρμακα κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς εὐθὺς διω- 


, / Ν 7, ε ὃ / ya 
armour, all δρισάμεθα ξύμπασαν, και λελοίπαμεν, ως ὀξαιμεν αν». 


of which 
are in- 
cluded in 
the cate- 
gory of 
defences. 
The art of 
magical 
charms was 
early re- 
jected, so 
that one 
only art, 
that of de- 
fying wea- 
ther by the 
production 
ofa woollen 


Ν Ν ς lal \ / > ΄σ 
αὐτὴν τὴν ζητηθεῖσαν ἀμυντικὴν χειμώνων, ἐρεοῦ προ- 


βλήματος ἐργαστικήν, ὄνομα δὲ ὑφαντικὴν λεχθεῖσαν. 
NE, ΣΏ. Ἔοικε γὰρ οὖν. 


> > 3, ΄ 53 5 a 
HE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι πω τέλεον, ὦ παῖ, τοῦτο λε- 


« > > “- “ ~ ς 7 » / 
ολεγμένον. O γὰρ εν ἀρχῇ της τῶν LUaTLOV εργασιᾶς 


΄ / > / « a ΄σ / 
ἁπτόμενος τοὐναντίον ὑφῇ δρᾷν φαίνεται. 


NESS OM ilast 
EE. To μὲν τῆς ὑφῆς 


in the dative case is made the 
subject of the the passive verb, 
are Lege. 11, 925 6: τοὺς ἐπι- 
ταττυμένους. Lb.g26 a: τοῖς νομο- 
θετουμένοις (mase.). Ib. 937: ἐὰν 
ἐπισκήφθῃ. Rep.1,337 ἃ: ἐλεεῖ- 
σθαι----μᾶλλον---ἢ χαλεπαίνεσθαι. 

For a generalization similar 
to those in the present pas- 
sage, cf. Lege. 12, 944 ὁ : και- 
ροὶ---λύσεως---νέως ἢ ζώου τινος, 
ovs ἐντόνους τε καὶ ὑποζώματα καὶ 
νεύρων ἐπιτόνους μίαν οὖσαν φύ- 
σιν διεσπαρμένην, πολλαχοῦ πολ- 
λοῖς ὀνόμασι προσαγορεύουσιν. 

3. payevtexny | The word 
μαγεία and the almost equally 
rare word ἀλεξιφάρμακον occur 
move: ΠΡ ΤΡ Ὁ ΠΣ ΡΣ 

There is a slight inaccuracy 
of reference in putting toge- 
ther the ὁλόσχιστα σκεπάσματα 
and the στεγάσματα, the former 
of which came after, while the 
latter preceded, the mention 
of στρωματὰ. 

7. λεχθεῖσαν] The participle 
is added, as in tragic poetry, 


- πλοκή. 


ene? 5 , 
συμπλοκὴ τις ἐστι που. 


to round the sense. Cf. Soph. 
Trach. 1: ἀρχαῖος φανείς. 

9. τέλεον λελεγμένον] CF. 
supr. 271 a: ἄδηλον διεφθείρετο. 

II. τοὐναντίον ὑφῇ If we 
compare Soph. 226 b, where 
the process of carding is made 
the symbol of the Elenchus 
(a figure which may have 
partly suggested this), it will 
not seem fanciful to suppose 
an allusion here to the logical 
process of διαίρεσις, which, as 
was shewn in the Sophist, is 
imperfect without the converse 
process of συναγωγή or συμ- 
The work of the 
Statesman also has these two 
elements, in common with 
every art that is based on 
knowledge. Cf. infr. 308 ο: 
πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη πανταχοῦ τὰ μὲν 
μοχθηρὰ εἰς δύναμιν ἀποβάλλει, 
τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιτήδεια καὶ χρηστὰ ἔλα- 
Bev, ἐκ τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁμοίων καὶ 
ἀνομοίων ὄντων, πάντ᾽ εἰς ἕν αὐτὰ 
ξυνάγουσα, μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν καὶ 
ἰδέαν δημιουργεῖ. 








MOAITIKOS. 91 


por. NE. SQ. Nai. 
| BE. To δέ ye τῶν συνεστώτων καὶ συμπεπιλὴη- 
μένων διαλυτική. 

NE. ΣΏ. Τὸ ποῖον δή ; 

ΞΕ. To τῆς τοῦ Eaivovros τέχνης ἔργον. ἢ τὴν 
ξαντικὴν τολμήσομεν ὑφαντικὴν καὶ τὸν ξάντην ὡς 
ὄντα ὑφάντην καλεῖν ; 

NE. 20. Οὐδαμώς. 

EE. Kat μὴν τήν ye αὖ στήμονος ἐργαστικὴν καὶ 
κρόκης εἴ τις ὑφαντικὴν προσαγορεύει, παράδοξόν τε 
καὶ ψεῦδος ὄνομα λέγει. 

NE. ΣΏΩ. Hes γὰρ οὔ; 

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; κναφευτικὴν σύμπασαν καὶ τὴν 
ἀκεστικὴν πότερα μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν μηδέ τινα 
θεραπείαν ἐσθῆτος θῶμεν, ἢ καὶ ταύτας πάσας ὡς 
ὑφαντικὰς λέζομεν ; 

NE. SQ. Οὐδαμώς. 

EE. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τῆς ye θεραπείας ἀμφισβητή- 


Ὁ 7 Ν a 7, lo a 
σουσιν QAUTAL ξύμπασαι καὶ TNS γένέεσέεως TiS TOY 


ε 7ὔ lal ΄σ lal 7 , \ 
ἱματίων τῇ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς δυνάμει, μέγιστον μὲν 20 


/ » / ὃ ὃ a aN δὲ Ν / ᾽ la 
μέρος ἐκείνῃ διδοῦσαι, μεγάλα δὲ καὶ σφίσιν αὐταῖς 
/ 
ἀπονέμουσαι. 


NE, ΣΏ. Πάνυ γε. 


ρικήν καλεῖς, ἡ ἂν ἢ περὶ λόγους ; 
17. Οὐδαμῶς] Se. ὑφαντικάς. 
Only the latter half of the 


2. Τὸ δέ γε---διαλυτική] Se. 
ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς τῶν ἱμάτιων 
δρώμενόν ἐστι πρᾶξις 


τὸ δέ γε 
ἐργασίας 


διαλυτική. 

13. κναφευτικήν͵] Cf. Gorg. 
491 a: σκυτέας τε καὶ μαγείρους 
λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει. 
Soph. 227 ἃ. 

16. ὑφαντικάς 1 Cf. Gorg. 
450 Ὁ: τί δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας 
τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας 
περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταυτην ῥητο- 


question is answered: hence 
Socrates calls attention to the 
former part, with ἀλλὰ piy— 
ὝξαστΑ 

18. τῆς --- θεραπείας] For 
the construction without περί, 
ef. infr. 275 b, 279 a, Phileb. 
22 C: τῶν νικητηρίων οὐκ ἀμ- 
φισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ. 


FN 2 


5 


defence (by 
name weav- 
ing), would 
seem to be 


left. 


The defini- 
tion, how- 
ever, is not 
yet com- 
plete. 
Other pro- 
cesses be- 
sides weav- 
ing are 
engaged in 
the making 
of cloth. 


10 Forcarding 


or 


is not com- 
bination 
but. divi- 
sion. Nor 
are spin- 
ning and 
weaving 

to be con- 
founded. 
Once more, 
fulling and 
darning are 
processes 
concerned 
with cloth, 
from which 
weaving 
must be 
distin- 
guished. 
Here are 
several 
rival arts, 
whose land- 
marks must 


be placed 
with care, 
To which 
must be 
added those 
which forge 
the wea- 
ver’s tools, 
and which 
may be 
viewed as 
adminicu- 
lar. The 
definition 
of weaving 
in wool will 
not be com- 


Q2 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


ec > cad \ C « -“ 
δημιουργοὺς τέχνας, Oc ὧν ἀποτελεῖται τὰ τῆς ὑφῆς 


ΕΣ “ \ / / 32 f 
εργα, δοκεῖν ΧΡῊ TO γε συναιτίιας εἰναι προσποιή- 


Ν “2 ΄, 
σασθαι παντὸς ὑφάσματος. 


NE. ΣΏ. ᾿Ορθότατα. 


/ 3 « ΄σ “ . “ , 
mE. Πότερον οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς λο- 


@ / 7] tg fol 3, 
γος, οὗ προειλόμεθα μέρους, ἱκανῶς ἔσται διωρισ- 


9 > 


/ aN 
μενος, ἐὰν 


\ ΄σ > va « / Ν 
ἂρ auTnv τῶν ἐεπιμελειῶν, ὁπόσαι περὶ 


\ > a 3 “ 9} X / Ν / 
τὴν ἐρεᾶν ἐσθῆτα, εἰς THY καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην 


2. δύ ὧν] Se. ἐργαλείων. 

3. τό γε--- προσποιήσασθαι 
“ Lay claim to be at least co- 
operative causes :” cf. ἀμφισ- 
βητήσουσιν supr. 

7. οὗ προειλόμεθα pepovs] An 
explanatory limitation. “ The 
art of weaving, that part of it 
which we selected :” supr. 279 
Ὁ: τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς ---προαι- 
ρεθέν. The second noun limits 
the first, with which it is in 
apposition : as In such expres- 
sions as of ᾿Αθηναῖοι----οἱ στρατη- 
γοί in Thucydides. 

8. ὁπόσαι --- τιθῶμεν) The 
reading of most MSS., εἰς τὴν 
καλλίστην, is sufficiently de- 
fended by Soph. 235 a (where 
see note); Tim. 57e: κώῴώησιν 
δὲ εἰς ἀνωμαλότητα ἀεὶ τιθῶμεν. 
Legg. 867 Ὁ : εἰς εἴκόνα που 
θῶμεν. For the omission of 
the substantive verb after 
ὁπόσος, which frequently hap- 


pens, cf. infr. 285 a: πάνθ᾽ 
ὁπόσα evtexva. The Zurich 


which is 
The Bodl., 


editors read εἰσί, 
found in Flor. 1. 
with A, has εἰς γῆν. 

9. εἰς τὴν καλλίστην καὶ peyio- 
τὴν πασῶν | This recals the 
example by which the last 
hypothesis concerning know- 


ledge in the Theztetus is il- 
lustrated (p. 207 d): τὸ ἔχειν τι 
σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ᾧ TOY ἁπάντων 
διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτώμενον---οἷον--- 
ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι 
ἀποδέξασθαι ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν 
ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων 
περὶ γῆν. Since that definition 
was given, the argument of the 
“‘Sophist” has intervened. We 
now see that it is not enough 
to describe the sun as different 
in brightness from other hea- 
venly bodies. These other 
bodies, which are τού the sun, 
have a nature of their own, 
which is defined by and de- 
fines their difference from the 
sun. Ido not know the sun, 
or any other thing, therefore, 
until I have determined the 
exact limit between each of 
these other natures and the 
one in question. Comp. Legg. 
6, 768 d: τὸ δὲ ὅλον καὶ ἀκριβὲς 

we <a? Ξ Ἶ 
TEPL €VOS TE και παντων Τῶν KATA 
πόλιν καὶ πολιτικὴν οὐκ ἔστι γί- 
γνεσθαι σαφές κι τι λ. Parm, 
136 Ὁ, 6: περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ 
ὡς ὄντος καὶ οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὁτιοῦν 
ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκο- 
πεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὑτὸ 
καὶ πρὸς ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, 
6 τι ἂν προέλῃ κ.τ.λ. 











ΠΟΛΙΓΙΚΟΣ. 93 


d \ / Oe , Ν 53 Ν , re) 
μὴν σαφές ye οὐδὲ τέλεον, πρὶν αὖ καὶ ταύτας αὐτῆς 


/ 
πάσας περιέλωμεν ; 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς. 


= O > qn \ a ᾽ὔ aA r 4 de> 
iu, Ovkovy μετὰ TaUTa ποιήτεον O Λέγομεν, ιν 5 


ἐφεξῆς ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἴῃ ; 
NE. 3Q. Πῶς δ᾽ ov; 


« 


΄σ a δ \ x ’ > 
81. πασῶν τιθῶμεν ; ἢ λέγοιμεν μὲν av τι ἀληθές, οὐ 


=a Il la \ / δύ / yf \ 
wey Lue P@TOV μεν TOLYUY OVO τέχνας ουσὰς πέρι 


4 Ἁ / / 
πάντα τὰ δρώμενα θεασώμεθα. 


NE. ΣΩ. Twas ; 


ἘΠῚ Τὴ \ a “ > / \ 
»- Le HV μὲν TS γενέσεως OVO QV ξυναίτιον, ΤΡ 


> SEEN yt 
δ᾽ αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. 


NE. 2Q. [las ; 


EE. Ὅσαι μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, 


> \ , yf , 
ταῖς δὲ δημιουργούσαις ὄργανα παρασκευάζουσιν, 15 


52 N Τὰ 5 a» / XN 
ὧν μὴ παραγενομένων οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐργασθείη TO 


/ «ς ΄ lo a 7 \ 
προστεταγμένον EKAOTY TOV τέχνων. Ταῦτας μὲν 


,ὔ \ \ SN \ n ’ 7 
ξυναιτίους, τὰς δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀπεργαζομένας 


ot) 
QITLAS. 


NE. 3Q. "Ἔχει γοῦν λόγον. 


a XN \ \ 7, 
BE. Mera τοῦτο δὴ τὰς μὲν περί τε aTpaKTous 


Ν / Nae UN, 2 a a Ν \ 
καὶ κερκίδας καὶ ὁπόσα ἄλλα ὄργανα τῆς περὶ τὰ 


/ , las 7 , 
ἀμφιέσματα γενέσεως κοινωνεῖ, πάσας ξυναιτίους 


2. πρὶν αὖ So all the 
MSS. except SY. αὖ is suffi- 
ciently in point: and for the 
omission of ἂν (more common 
in tragedy), cf. Tim. 57 b: 
πρὶν---ἐκφυγῇς, where there is 
no good reason to suspect the 
text. 

8. δύο --- τέχνα] The dis- 
tinction between cause and 
condition, which is the essen- 


tial point in this part of the 
argument, is also stated in 
Phedo 99 a, b; Phileb. 27 a; 
Tim. 46 Ὁ; d. 

22. τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀμφιέσματα 
γενέσεως ]͵ Cf. Soph. 251 6: 
τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως. “ All 
the instruments that share in 
the operations for producing 
clothes.” 


plete until 
all these 
have been 
parted off. 
We must 
not be con- 
tented with 
saying that 
it is the 
noblest of 
the indus- 
tries which 
have to do 
with wool- 
len cloth, 
First, then, 
we may 
draw a uni- 
versal dis- 
tinction 
between 
productive 
and admi- 
nicular 
arts; and 
then apply 
this distine- 
tion to the 
case in 
point. 
Washing, 
mending, 
and other 
furbishing 
of clothes, 
carding, 
spinning, 


20 and the 


other em- 
ployments 
operose 
Minervee 
included 
under wool- 


working, 


are pro- 
ductive 
arts. 


94: IAATQNOS 


/ \ ἃ > \ / \ / 
εἴπωμεν, τὰς δὲ αὐτὰ θεραπευούσας καὶ δημιουργού- p. 2 


> / 
σας αἰτιας : 


NE. ΣΩ. ᾿Ορθότατα. 


ZE. Tov αἰτιῶν δὴ πλυντικὴν μὲν καὶ ἀκεστικὴν Pp. 488 


Βκαὶ πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα θεραπευτικήν, πο. 


οὔσης τῆς κοσμητικῆς τοὐνταῦθα αὐτῆς μύριον, εἰκὸς 


7 ’ > Lag rat ΄ ͵7ὔ 
μάλιστα περιλαμβάνειν ὀνομάζοντας πᾶν τῇ τέχνῃ 


τῇ κναφευτικῇ. 


NE. 2Q. KadAds. 


EE. Kal μὴν *€avricn® ye καὶ 


Ἐγηστικὴ Ἔ καὶ 


7 3 Ν Ν Χ / 5 A nm “ “-“ 
παντα αὖ τὰ περὶ τὴν ποίησιν αὐτὴν τῆς ἐσθῆτος ἧς 


/ / 7 / 3 / lal « Ν / 
λέγομεν μέρη, μία TIS ἐστι τέχνη τῶν ὑπο πάντων 


λεγομένων, ἡ ταλασιουργική. 


I. αὐτὰ] Se. τὰ ἀμφιέσματα. 

4. Τῶν αἰτιῶν ---- πλυντικήν] 
The partitive genitive, as in 
τῆς γνωστικῆς ὅσον ἐπιτακτικὸν, 
supr. 263 6; τὰ πεζὰ τῶν ἡμέρων, 
supr. 265 b. 

5. πολλῆς ---- μόριον] Appo- 
sition. The genitive is not 
absolute, but is resumed in 
αὐτῆς because of the interven- 
tion of the participle. See 
Thest. 155 6, and note. 

ἡ. περιλαμβάνειν----κναφευτικῇ] 
The dative is governed by 
περιλαμβάνειν, Which ὀνομάζοντας 
explains. Cf. Soph. 225 a: 
τῷ---σώματι πρὸς σώματα γιγ- 
νομένῳ--- ὄνομα λέγειν τι τοιοῦ- 
τον τιθεμένους οἷον βιαστικόν. 
Phedr. 273 6; Theet. 148 6; 
Soph. 226 6. The accusative 
πᾶν depends on the participle 
and the infinitive taken toge- 
ther. 

πᾶν] Agreeing with μόριον, 
and of course including πλυντι- 
κὴν, ἀκεστικήν K.T.A, 


το. ἔξαντικὴ" ἕνηστική"} MSS. 
ξαντικὴν----νηστικὴν. The correc 
tion is due to Stephanus. 

II. ἧς λέγομεν] Se. τῆς ἐρεᾶς. 

12. μία τίς ἐστι τέχνη] “ Form 
a single art which is one of 


those universally acknow- 
ledged, that of working in 
wool.” Cf. Legg. 7; 805 e: 


κερκίδων ἄρχειν καὶ πάσης ταλα- 
σίας. ἐστι follows the num- 
ber of the nearest word, and 
is also assisted by the neuter 
plural μέρη. Cf infr. b, πᾶν 
τοῦτο, and 284 6, 288 d: Χρυ- 
σόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον καὶ πάνθ᾽ 
ὁπόσα μεταλλεύεται K.T.A. — καὶ 

φλοιστικὴ ---- καὶ ὅσαι --- εἰσὶ 
τέχναι" ἕν δὲ αὐτὸ προσαγορεύομεν 
πᾶν. Where αὐτὸ, referring to 
all the preceding nominatives, 
is made singular by ἕν. 

τῶν --- λεγομένων͵] “ Used 
in common parlance,” so that 
it is needless to invent a 
technical name. Cf. Soph. 
220d: ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν 


Ως, «δ 











! 


Ι 





b 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 95 


482. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ov ; 


EE. Τὴς δὴ ταλασιουργικῆς δύο τμήματά ἐστον, 


/ c 7 “ ΄- / / 
καὶ τούτοιν ἑκάτερον ἅμα δυοῖν πεφύκατον τέχναιν 


μέρη. 
NE. 3Q. Πώς: 


μοὶ Ν \ Ν ὡς Ν a n 
HEH. To μὲν ξαντικὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς κερκιστικῆς 


Ψ Qe? 


\ > / > / 
ἥμισυ καὶ ὅσα τὰ ξυγκείμενα ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἀφίστησι, 


“-“ a A ¢ a / td Heo) 
πᾶν τοῦτο ὡς ἕν φράζειν τῆς TE ταλασιουργίας αὐτῆς 


» / Ν ΄ \ ἈΝ 7 cacy yy 
€OTL TOU, Και μεγάλα τινε κατὰ TAVTA μιν στὴν 


/ « / / 
τέχνα, ἡ συγκριτικὴ TE καὶ διακριτική---- 


NE. ΣΩ. Ναί 


θήραν πυρευτικὴν ῥηθῆναι συμ- 
βέβηκεν. The Stranger loves to 
parade the commonness of his 
examples. For the genitive, 
cf. Rep. το, 615 d: ἐθεασόμεθα 
—kal τοῦτο τῶν δείνων θεαμάτων. 
An art acknowledged by all 
men is distinguished from one 
for which a name has to be 
invented, such as δοξομιμητική 
in the Sophist. 

3. τούτοιν ἑκάτερον---πεφύκα- 
τον] The dual verb is used 
because τούτοιν ἑκάτερον = τούτω 
ἕκατερον, Which is rather sug- 
gested by the plural μέρη. 
Cf. infr. 284 6: διαφέρον ἀλλή- 
ow. “And these are parts, 
each of them of two arts at 
once :” viz. the one of rada- 
σιουργικὴ and συγκριτικὴ, the 
other of ταλασ. and διακριτ. 

6. τὸ τῆς κερκιστικῆς ἡμισύ] 
The use of the κερκὶς or 
“comb” was partly to drive 
the threads of the woof close 
together, but partly also (as 
appears from Cratyl. 388 a) 
to keep the threads of the 
warp and woof (here especially 
the warp, infr. στήμοσι) dis- 


tinct. This latter “half” of 
the use of the comb belongs 
to διακριτική, ‘ divisive art.” 

9. μεγάλα τινὲ --- διακριτική | 
The course of the sentence is 
interrupted by the introduc- 
tion of this clause. The words 
should have run, τῆς τε ταλα- 
σιουργίας αὐτῆς ἔστι που καὶ τῆς 
διακριτικῆς. But the last word 
required explanation, which is 
conversationally interposed. 


Ci oma Oda th 424-4 5): 
alib. Soph. Cid. Col. 471- 
473: Ο. Grav δὲ τοῦτο χεῦμ᾽ 


ἀκήρατον λάβω: X. κρατῆρές 
εἰσιν, ἀνδρὸς εὔχειρος τέχνη, ὧν 
κρᾶτ᾽ ἔρεψον καὶ λαβὰς ἀμφιστό- 
μους. Hjusd. Trach. 750-75 


“sy? ec 3 , > ᾿»{Ἰ 
ὅθ᾽ εἷρπε----ἀκτή τις---ἐστιν, ἔνθα 


-- βώμους ὁρίζει ---- οὗ νιν --- 
ἐσεῖδον. 
9. ἤστην] “There are two 


comprehensive arts of univer- 
sal application, with which we 
are familiar.” Cf. Soph. 228 
e: ἐγενέσθην. Ib. 258 6: ἦν τε 
ν»»-» 

καὶ ἔστι. Compare the frequent 
use of the perfect : 6. g. νενόμικα 
Soph. 557 ὃ 59 ἂν 5ύη ἢ 
infr. 293 b. 


Now of 
wool-work- 
ing there 
are two 
chief kinds, 
each falling 
under one 
of the two 
great cate- 
gories of 
division 
and compo- 
sition. 
Carding 
and one 
use of the 
comb be- 
long to 
wool-work- 


ing and 
division. 
But our 
concern is 
with that 
part of 
wool-work- 
ing which 
is a part of 
composi- 
tion: of 
which one 
kind twists 
and the 
other inter- 
laces. 


96 


SE. Ths τοίνυν Sle puna 1) TE ξαντικῇ καὶ τὰ p. 284 ἢ 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα ἅπαντά ἐστιν; ἡ γὰρ ἐν ἐρίοις τε καὶ © 


στήμοσι διακριτική, κερκίδι μὲν ἄλλον τρόπον γιγ- 


/ \ 9 yy “ > / 5 / 
νομένη, χερσὶ δὲ ἕτερον, ETXEV OTA ἀρτίως ὀνόματα 


βἐρρήθη. 


NE. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
ΞΕ. Αὖθις δὴ πάλιν συγκριτικῆς μόριον ἅμα καὶ 


7 > CY. was / / “ Ν 
ταλασιουργίας ἐν αὑτῇ γιγνόμενον λαβωμεν" σα δὲ 


τῆς διακριτικῆς ἦν αὐτόθι, “μεθιῶμεν᾽" ξύμπαντα, δίχα 


a If 
κριτικῷ τμηματι. 


ΝΕ. 2Q. Διῃρήσθω. 


’, \ / “ 
τοτέμνοντες τὴν ταλασιουργίαν διακριτικῷ τε καὶ συγ- 


μ- x XN 5 
EE. To συγκριτικὸν τοίνυν αὖ σοι καὶ ταλασι- 


2. ἐν ἐρίοις τε καὶ στήμοσι] 
ξαντική being employed with 
the former, τὸ τῆς κερκιστικῆς 
ἡμισύ with the latter. 

3. kepxidv] Viz. in the case 
of the warp. 

4. χερσὶ] In that of the 
raw wool. 


ἔσχεν ---- ὀνόματα] Cf. Soph. 
227 ἃ, ὄνοματα ἔσχεν, and note. 
Tim. 39 ἃ: ὅσα δὲ οὐρανοῦ 


πορευόμενα ἔσχε τροπάς. 

8. ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνόμενον] “ Find- 
ing place therein :” viz. ἐν τῇ 
ταλασιουργίᾳ, which is the ge- 
neral subject. “'To be referred 
thither as contained therein :” 
as when a segment of one 
circle is contained in another 
circle. Stallbaum punctuates 
before αὐτόθι, which he trans- 
lates Hic statim, an emphatic 
sense, which in Attic Greek 
is generally reserved for αὐτοῦ, 
“ Let us now turn and take a 
part of the process of wool- 
working, which is at the same 
time a part of composition ; 


and let us dismiss (μεθιῶμεν) 
all the parts of division which 
we found there (ἦν αὐτόθι, sc. 
ἐν αὐτῇ), separating the art 
into two halves, distinguished 
by composition and division.” 
MSS. μετίωμεν. No attempt 
is made to “follow up” (pe- 
tievat) the divisions of διακρι- 
tixn. Probably therefore for 
μετίωμεν we should read μεθι- 
ὦμεν or μεθῶμεν, as Hermann 
has already seen. The present 
tense agrees better with réuvov- 
which is in immediate 
construction with it. The 
pres. subj. occurs Phileb. 62 
d: pe&io. It is surprising 
that Dr. Badham should prefer 
μετῇμεν to this. Cf. Soph. 267 
b: τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν pa- 
λακισθέντες---μεθείσθω. 

13. Τὸ συγκριτικὸν----διαιρετέον] 
“You must again, Socrates, 
divide the part which belongs 
at once to combination and to 
wool-working.” 


TES, 











ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 97 


8 \ o , 53 , ’ ” 
702, ουργικον Apa μόριον, @ Σώκρατες, διαιρετέον, εἰπεὲρ 





d 


e “Ὁ / \ - « \ ΄ 
ἱκανῶς μέλλομεν τὴν προρρηθεῖσαν ὑφαντικὴν αἱ- 


ρήσειν. 


NE. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν χρή. 


HE. Χρὴ μὲν οὖν" καὶ λέγωμέν γε αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν 5 


5 , Ν \ , 
εἰναι OTPETTLKOV, TO δὲ συμπλεκτικον. 


NE. 2Q. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν μανθάνω ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὸ 


\ \ lal 2 / / 
πέρι THY TOV στήμονος ἐργασίαν λέγειν στρέτπτικον. 


HE. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ κρόκης. ἢ γένεσιν The warp, 


57 / De) e / 
aOTpopoy τινα αὐτῆς εὑρήσομεν ; 


ΝΕ. ΣΏ. Οὐδαμώς. 


EK A {7 δὴ Ν 7 € ’ : 57 \ 
μα 1... ἰορίσαι 1) Και TOUTOLV EKATEPOV lows yap 


« ‘ yy 4 , 
0 διορισμὸς ἐγκαιρος ἂν σοι γένοιτο. 


NE. ΣΩ. πῇ; 


HE. Τῇδε. τῶν περὶ ξαντικὴν ἔργων μηκυνθέν τε x5 


N Ν , , 5 ͵ 4 
καὶ σχὸν πλάτος λέγομεν εἰναι καταγμὰ τι; 


NE. ΣΏ. Ναί. 


\ 
EE. Τούτου δὴ τὸ μὲν ἀτράκτῳ τε στραφὲν καὶ 


Ἃ “ ip \ XN a 
στερεὸν νῆμα γενόμενον στήμονα μὲν φάθι TO νῆμα, 


8. τοῦ στήμονος] The woof 
has not yet been mentioned. 
Cf. supr.: ἐν στήμοσι. 

9. ἀλλὰ καὶ κρόκης ] The 
woof was more loosely spun: 
hence, as well as for the rea- 
son just given, (that no men- 
tion had been made of the 
woof,) Young Socrates’ over- 
sight is more excusable. 

γένεσιν---εὑρήσομεν 3] “ Shall 
we find any mode of producing 
it without twisting ?” 

15. τῶν περὶ ξαντικὴν ἔργων 
τι is to be supplied from below. 
It often happens in these dia- 
logues that a word is contrived 
to “pay a double debt.” Cf. infr, 


226 Ὁ: τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι k.T.X. 


τό. σχὸν πλάτος] Cf. supr. ec, 
note on ἔσχεν. 

κάταγμα] The word is used 
by Sophocles, Trach. 695, and 
the corresponding verb κατάγειν 
occurs in Soph. 226 ὁ : ξαίνειν, 
κατάγειν, κερκίζειν. 

18. ἀτράκτῳ] It would ap- 
pear from this that the woof 
was spun by the hand without 
the use of the spindle. 

19. στερεὸν νῆμα] Probably 
hinting at a derivation for 
στημτ-ων, Quasi στερρονημ-. 

στήμονα----στημονονητικὴν] The 
sentence becomes irregular from 
expansion. The Bodl. has στη- 
povoyntixny with AZILEY. 


* oO 


and also 


10 the woof, 


are made 
by twist- 
ing. Hence 
spinning 

is distin- 
guished 
into two 
branches : 
the one 
producing 
a compact 
and hard, 
the other 

a looser 
and softer, 
yarn—each 
being pro- 
portioned 


to the other 


with a view 
to the final 
result, 


These dis- 
tinctions 
bring the 
art of wool- 


98 


\ 


/ 
τικην. 


NE. ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς. 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


δ 3 \ \ \ ΄ 
EE. Ὅσα δέ γε αὖ τὴν μὲν συστροφὴν χαύνην 


5 λαμβάνει, τῇ δὲ τοῦ στήμονος ἐμπλέζει πρὸς τὴν τῆς 


/ « \ 5 \ / 5, 
γνάψεως ὁλκὴν ἐμμέτρως τὴν μαλακότητα ἰσχει, 


3, ΤΩ / \ \ / 34) We ΄ 
TQUT ἀρὰ κροκὴν μεν τὰ νηθέντα, τὴν δὲ ἐπιτεταγμε- 


> o 5 ’, NIA νων. \ la 
νὴν αὐτοῖς εἶναι τέχνην *TwWwa™ KpokovyTiKny φῶμεν. 


NE. ΣΏ. ᾿Ορθότατα. 


EE. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῆς ὑφαντικῆς μέρος ὃ προὺ- 


θέμεθα, παντί που δῆλον ἤδη. 


I. αὐτὰ] Se. τὰ ταύτης τῆς 
συστροφῆς (viz. τῆς νήσεωςῚ) ἔργα. 
Vague neut. pl.: cf. Theset. 
207 6. 

4. χαύνην͵ῇ Used literally 
— “ open” (from χαίνω). Cf. 
Aristoph. Ay. 819; Passow, 
ex. s. v- 

5. τῇ δὲ Tov—itoye] “ But 
have a softness proportioned 
to the intertexture of the 
woof, with a view to the de- 
gree of force to be used in 
dressing the cloth.” So the 
gentle and brave natures are 
combined with a view to their 
profiting by the rubs which 
give the finishing touches to 
a state. Cf. infr. 310. The 
reading of =, τοῦ κναφέως, de- 
serves consideration. 

8. χτινὰκ 7 MSS., τήν : Κὶ 
om. Cf. Theset.172e: ubi vulg. 
τὴν: four MSS., τινα. Soph. 
218 c: τέχνη τις κτητικηῆ. Ib. 
220 €: τριοδοντία τις. κροκο- 
yntikn 18 ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, hence 
the article is out of place. 

10. μέρος ὃ πρ.] Se. τὸ τῆς 
ἐρεᾶς ἐσθῆτος ὑφαντικόν. 


τὸ γὰρ συγκριτικῆς 


11. τὸ γὰρ---ὑφαντικήν] “ For 
when one part of the composi- 
tion contained in wool-working 
creates a fabric by the direct 
intertexture of warp and woof, 
we call the whole result wool- 
len cloth, and the art which 
presides over this we call 
weaving.” Lit. “ That portion 
of the combining branch of 
wool-working (which finds 
place) when” &e. Cf. supr. 
282 ¢. Or, perhaps, “ When 
the branch of the art of com- 
bination which is contained in 
wool-working creates” ὅσο. In 
the latter case the genitive is 
either (1) gen. of apposition, 
like τινὸς γένους in Soph. 257 6: 
or (2) τῆς is genitive by attrac- 
tion to συγκριτικῆς for τὸ, “ the 
part of composition included 
in wool-working :” or (3) there 
may be a transition from the 
former to the latter meaning : 
1. 6, συγκριτικῆς is at first par- 
titive, but as resumed with τῆς, 
is the genitive of apposition. 
But the meaning given above 
is the most natural, and is not 


; 


\ ’ ’ \ / 3 
τὴν δὲ ἀπευθύνουσαν αὐτὰ τέχνην εἶναι στημονονῆή- Ῥ. 48" 


Ρ. 28 




















TIOAITIKO®. 99 


a > / / “ » ‘ , 
τῆς ἐν ταλασιουργίᾳ μόριον ὅταν εὐθυπλοκίᾳ κρόκης 
ἈΝ / 3 / vA ἊΝ \ \ 
καὶ στήμονος ἀπεργάζηται πλέγμα, TO μὲν πλεχθὲν 
ξύμπαν ἐσθῆτα ἐρεᾶν, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τέχνην οὖσαν 

ε / 
προσαγορεύομεν ὑφαντικήν. 
J 
NE. 2Q. ᾿Ορθότατα. 
[5 / ΄ 3 δ ΄ 
ΞΕ. Kiev’ τί δή ποτε οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπεκρινάμεθα 
\ 53 / / . 
πλεκτικὴν εἶναι κρόκης καὶ στήμονος ὑφαντικήν, 
\ 7 ,ὔ 7 / 
ἀλλὰ περιήλθομεν ἐν κύκλῳ πάμπολλα διοριζόμενοι 
» 
μάτην: 
NE. ΣΏ. Οὔκουν ἔμοιγε, ὦ 
ῥηθέντων ἔδοξε ῥηθῆναι. 


(ate 7 » \ lal 
ξένε, μάτην οὐδὲν τῶν 
/ , \ 7 3, 
HEH. Kai θαυμαστὸν γε οὐδέν: ἀλλὰ τάχ᾽ ay, 
5 ΄ , Ν ΝΥΝ , \ = 
ὦ μακάριε, δόξειε. πρὸς δὴ TO νόσημα TO τοιοῦτον, 
DY) y ΄, Ψ Ties, \ \ 
av apa πολλάκις ὕστερον ἐπίῃ--- θαυμαστὸν yap 
7 YA “/ VY 7 
οὐδέν--- λόγον ἀκουσόὸν τινα προσήκοντα περὶ TaVv- 
ἴω , lol 
τῶν τῶν τοιούτων ῥηθῆναι. 
, 
NE. 2Q. Λέγε μόνον. 
— na , 3/ a ’ ε 
EE. Πρῶτον τοίνυν ἴδωμεν πᾶσαν τήν τε ὑπερ- 
Ni \ 37. ¢ \ 7 a 
βολὴν Kat τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ἵνα κατὰ Aoyoy ἐπαινῶμεν 
/ \ / a / 7 
καὶ ψέγωμεν TA μακρότερα τοῦ δέοντος ἑκάστοτε 
, Ν 3 / \ \ ΄ 
λεγόμενα καὶ τἀναντία περὶ tas τοιάσδε δια- 


τριβας. 


the less probable for being 
somewhat involved. ἡ ἐν ταλα- 
σιουργίᾳ συγκριτική τηιιϑὺ in this 
case be supplied as the subject 
of ἀπεργάζηται. 

6. τί δή more] This raises 
the whole question of the uti- 
lity of the present method, for 
which see General Introduc- 
tion. Cf. also Gorg. 453, 454. 

13. τὸ νόσημα τὸ T.| Se. τὸ 
δόξαι ἄττα μάτην ῥηθῆναι. 

14. πολλάκις] “ Haply, as it 
very likely may.” Cf. Pheedr. 


238 6: ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφό- 
ληπτος προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένω- 
μαι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς. 

21. τἀναντία] 1. 6. βραχύτερα 
τοῦ δέοντος. 

περὶ τὰς τοιάσδε διατριβάς | 


These words depend on ἐπαι- 


νῶμεν καὶ ψέγωμεν as well as on 
héyoueva. ‘That with refer- 
ence to such interviews as this 
we may apportion praise and 
blame reasonably to the argu- 
ments used in them.” (Cf. 
Phedr, 234 e: Ti δέ: kat 


* OQ 2 


10 


15 


20 


weaving 
into clearer 
light: as 
that part 
of the com- 
position 
included 

in wool- 
working in 
which a 
webismade 
by the di- 
rect inter- 
texture of 
woof and 
warp. 

But why 
could we 
not say at 
once that 
weaving 
was the 
intertex- 
ture of 
warp and 
woot 7 
Lest some 
one should 
think our 
labourvain, 
let us exa- 
mine the 
whole ques- 
tion of 
length and 
brevity. 


100 MAATQNO® 


NE. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν χρή. 


» al ΄ / ΄ ΄ 53 
BE. Περὶ δὴ τούτων αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, οἶμαι, 


p. 28:0} 


/ > “ ᾿᾽ 
γιγνόμενος ὀρθῶς ἂν γίγνοιτο. 
NE. ΣΩ. Τίνων ; 
— / 7 Ν " εν 4 
5 ΞΕ. Mnkous τε πέρι καὶ βραχύτητος καὶ maons 
« ΄Ὁ 3 « 7 \ 
ὑπεροχῆς τε Kal ἐλλείψεως. ἡ yap Tov μετρητικὴ ἃ 
περὶ πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα. 


NE. 2Q. Ναί. 


| 


4 Ἁ , / lal A \ 
There are EE. Διέλωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὴν δύο μέρη" δεῖ yap δὴ 
two kinds Nl eae ͵ 
of excess: 10 7TPOS ὃ νῦν σπεύδομεν. 
one merel , δ \ , is 
relative, z NE ΣΏ. Λέγοις ἂν τὴν διαίρεσιν omy. 
the other 


ΞΕ. Tyde τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα μεγέ- 


ταύτῃ δεῖ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τὸν 
λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα 
εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
ἐκείνῃ μόνον, ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρογ- 
γύλα κ-.τ.λ. 

5. Μήκους τε πέρι----ἐλλείψεως | 
For an application of the fol- 
lowing idea, cf. Legg. 4,719 d: 
οὔσης yap ταφῆς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβε- 
βλημένης τῆς δὲ ἐλλειπούσης τῆς 
δὲ μετρίας. Ib. 722 a: τὰ γὰρ 
βέλτιστα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ βραχύτατα 
Tim, 82 
a: τὸ τῶν νόσων ὅθεν ξυνίσταται, 
δηλόν που καὶ παντί---γῆς πυρὸς 
ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος, τούτων 7 
παρὰ φύσιν πλεονεξία καὶ ἔνδεια. 
Theset. 172 6: καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ 
βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν 
μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος. 

6. ἡ γάρ mov] So the Bodl., 
with T=: cett. ἢ. 

μετρητική] Cf. Phileb. sub 
fin. The first mention of pe- 
τρητικὴ is in the Protagoras, 
where it has not been suffi- 
ciently observed that the ‘utili- 
tarian’ hypothesis is only used 
as a means to bring Protagoras 


οὐδὲ τὰ μήκη τιμητέον. 


to acknowledge that virtue is 
science. Thus expediency is 
the point of transition from 
the arbitrary to the just, as in 
Theset. 178 τὸ ὠφέλιμον is the 
point of transition from the 
apparent to the real good. 

9. δύο μέρη] For the accus., 
cf. Hdt. VI. 100: ἐφρόνεον δι- 
φασίας ἰδέας. 

10. πρὸς ὁ] I. 6.,πρὸς τοῦτο ὃ. 
Cf. Theeet. 177 6: τοῦτο δέ που 
σκῶμμ᾽ ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. 

II. ὅπῃ] Se. διαιρετέον. Cf. 
Soph. did. Tyr. 926, Aj. 103, 
874. 

12. The words τὴν πρὸς ἄλ- 
Ana μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος 
κοινωνίαν are not free from 
doubt. For they may mean 
either “the mutual communion 
of greatness and littleness,” 
(where the article seems to be 
required,) or “ the participa- 
tion (of things) in greatness 
and littleness relatively to one 
another.” The latter is right ; 
although the former meaning 
may not unnaturally suggest 








ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 101 
/ ‘ a 
83. θους καὶ σμικρότητος κοινωνίαν, TO δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῆς — referenceto 
the stand- 
γενέσεως ἀναγκαίαν οὐσίαν. ard of what 
a ΄ is Meet: 
NE. 2Q. Ids λέγεις ; the More 
oy lal -“ 4 d the 
mE. ΓΑρ᾽ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ σοι TO μεῖζον Too Much. 


ἊΝ « vad ΄ / ΩΝ al ΄, 
μηδενὸς ἑτέρου δεῖν μεῖζον λέγειν ἢ τοῦ ἐλάττονος, - 





3, 3 “ / yf. A \ 
καὶ τοὔλαττον αὖ Tov μείζονος ἔλαττον, ἄλλου δὲ 


μηδενός ; 
NE. ΣΩ. "Ἐμοιγε. 


eH. Ti δέ; τὸ τὴν 


itself to a reader of the So- 
phist, where the κοινωνία chiefly 
spoken of is the mutual com- 
munion of ideas. Compare 
with this whole passage Phzedo 
too, 101. Note that τὸ μεῖζον 
-- τὸ μεγέθους κοινώνουν πρὸς τὸ 
And τὸ ἔλαττον = τὸ 
σμικρότητος κοινώνουν πρὸς τὸ 
μεῖζον. 

1. τὸ δὲ --- οὐσία"Ζζυ These 
words are meant to be enig- 
matical, like the definition 
of rhetoric as πολιτικῆς μορίου 
εἴδωλον in Gorg. 463 d, or as 
τῆς τῶν ἐπῳδῶν τέχνης μόριον In 
Euthyd.289e. (ἀνάπαυλα γὰρ τῆς 
σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιά, 
Phileb. 30 6.) But they are 
less clearly explained in what 
follows. They seem to be 
connected with the assertion 
that a standard is necessary 
to the existence of the pro- 
ductions of art (infr. 284 a, 
b), and may probably be ren- 
dered “ according to the other- 
wise impossible existence of 
production.” ἀναγκαίαν is then 
used in the same sense as in 
Rep. 2, 369 6: εἴη δ᾽ ἂν ἡ avay- 
καιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε 


ἀνδρῶν. “A city could not 


ἔλαττον. 


a / ΄ 
τοῦ μετρίου φύσιν ὑπερ- 


possibly consist of less than 
four or five men.” And γένεσις 
is a general word for the ope- 
rations of all the arts. Cf. 
Soph. 235 8, Phileb. 27 a. 
Compare Legg. 10, 9093 d: 
κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τῆς κοινῆς γενέ- 
σεως. I.e. “So far as it was 
possible that both should be 
combined.” Translate, therefore 
—‘“ TI divide the art of measur- 
ing in the following way. One 
part is determined by the fact 
that things partake of great- 
ness and smallness relatively 
to each other: the other by 
this, that without it the exist- 
ence of production would be 
impossible.” A similar verbal 
use of the word οὐσία occurs 
immediately below (e, οὐσίας) 
and in p. 285 b: γένους τινὸς 
οὐσίᾳ. The meaning of this 
passage will appear more 
clearly on comparing Phileb. 
25d, 26 ὁ: 

9. Ti δέ;--- ἀγαθοὶ ;| “ But, 
again, shall we not say that 
there is really found that 
which exceeds or is exceeded 
by the nature of the Meet, in 
words, or, if so be, in deeds, 
and that herein consists the 


102 


΄, ε / « δ τ τ " 
βάλλον καὶ ὑπερβαλλόμενον ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐν λόγοις εἴτε p. 28}! 


ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ 


Ν > »y Ye > 9 / « "7 ΄ 
και εν εργοις ap οὐκ GU λέξομεν ως OVTWS γίγνο- 


a , ͵ ΄ ra cd Ἂς 
μενον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ διαφέρουσι μάλιστα ἡμῶν οἵ τε κακοὶ 


Ν ἘῸΝ / 
καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί ; 


NE. ΣΏ. Paiverac. 


\ 3, / > / Ν / o 
GE. Aurras ἄρα ταῦτας οὐσίας καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ 


val lal / 5 ,’ > e y+ 
μεγάλου Kal τοῦ σμικροῦ θετέον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς ἐφαμεν 


3, Ν 3, vad 2 3. la) 7 
ἄρτι πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον δεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ νῦν εἴρη- 


ται μᾶλλον τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα λεκτέον, τὴν δ᾽ αὖ 


\ Ν ΄ὕ Ὄ δὲ “ bei; 3 OX 
ιοπρὸς TO μέτριον. οὗ δὲ ἕνεκα, μαθεῖν ap av βου- 


λοίμεθα ; 
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Τί μήν: 


chief mark of difference be- 
tween bad men and good?” 
Compare Rep. 1, 349, where 
it is shewn that the good and 


wise man does not aim at 
“more” but at “what is 
meet.” 


“When workmen strive to do 
better than well 
They do confound their skill in 
coyetousness.” 


(9.) τοῦ μετρίου φύσιν] Com- 
pare the θατέρου φύσις of the 
Sophist, the ἀΐδιος φύσις of the 
Philebus, and the ἐξαίφνης φύ- 
σις of the Parmenides. The 
word φύσις expresses the more 
concrete or determinate con- 
ception of the Idea. 

6. Arras ἄρα---Θετέον] “ We 
must therefore assume that 
great and small exist and are 
discerned in these two ways, in- 
stead of following what we just 
now said, that one must only 
judge or speak of them (δεῖν 
sc. κρίνειν implied in κρίσεις, 
or perhaps λέγειν from supr. 
d) relatively to each other : 


instead of this we must speak 
rather in accordance with what 
has just fallen from us, of one 
mode of their existence which 
is mutually relative, and of an- 
other which is relative to an 
ideal standard.” The minute- 
ness of the antithesis, ἀλλὰ---- 
οὐχ---ἀλλὰ, and the explicit re- 
sumption of the first clause 
with the second ἀλλά, make the 
sentence rather tortuous, but 
the meaning is clear. In the 
words ἀλλὰ----δεῖν the chief pre- 
dicate is absorbed, as frequently 
happens, in the relative clause. 
Cf. Phileb. 54 d: ὅπερ---εἶπον 
— dev. 

10. οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα] Plato’s dia- 
lectical subtleties have gene- 
rally an end beyond them- 
selves. Here the end is the 
vindication of the Arts, in 
order to establish an Art of 
Rule. Cf. Theet. 184 d: rod δέ 
τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβῶμαι. 

βουλοίμεθα]! The first per- 
son is used, as more gentle 
than the second, 


o_o SSG 








84. 


MOAITIKO®. 103 


’ Ν \ o \ “- , 
HE. Ei πρὸς μηδὲν ἕτερον τὴν Tov μείζονος ἐάσει 
Ἂ Ν 3 ᾽ 3, \ \ Ν 
τις φύσιν ἢ πρὸς τοὔλαττον, οὐκ ἔσται ποτὲ πρὸς τὸ 
/ 53 , 
μέτριον. ἢ yap; 
NE. ΣΏΩ. Οὕτως. 
μι > na \ / LEN Ν " 5 3 
mE. Οὐκοῦν ras τέχνας τε αὑτὰς καὶ τάργα av- 
a , τι “ ἐκ 7 ἴω / Ν Ἀ 
τῶν ξύμπαντα * διολοῦμεν ὃ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ δὴ 
\ / al \ Χ « σ΄ 
καὶ τὴν ζητουμένην νῦν πολιτικὴν καὶ τὴν ῥηθεῖσαν 
- Χ lal “ \ a 
ὑφαντικὴν ἀφανιοῦμεν ; ἅπασαι yap αἱ τοιαῦταί που 
ἘΝ lal / / Ν ay > « 5 ΕΝ 
TO τοῦ μετρίου πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον οὐχ ὡς οὐκ OV 
ΕΝ Ν A / ᾽ὔὕ 
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὃν χαλεπὸν περὶ τὰς πράξεις παραφυλάτ- 


N ip \ na , \ , 7, 
τουσι, και TOUT@ δὴ T@ TpoT@ TO μέτρον σώζουσαι 


Ζ, > \ \ Ne ΄ 
πάντα ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀπεργάζονται. 


NE. ΣΟ. Τί μήν: 


ἴω ὮΝ \ XN / 77 
HE. Οὐκοῦν ἂν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀφανίσωμεν, ἀπο- 


1. ἐάσει] “ Will admit.” Sc. 
εἶναι, to be supplied from ἔσται 
infr., for which ellipse οἵ. 
Thezet. 195 d: ἀμφότερά ye κιν- 
δυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν (50. εἶναι 
or αἱρεῖσθαι). 

5. τὰς τέχνας τε] τε iS an- 
swered by καὶ δὴ καὶ : αὐτὰς καὶ 
τἄργα αὐτῶν ξύμπαντα is epexe- 
getic of τέχνας. 

6. * διολοῦμεν x | MSS. διε- 
hodpev. The correction is due to 
Bekker. 


8. ἅπασαι yap | 


Cf. Arist. 


’ Eth. Nic. V. 4,12: ἐστι δὲ καὶ 


ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τέχνων τοῦτο. ἀν- 
ηροῦντο γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ὁ ποιῶν καὶ 
ὅσον καὶ οἷον K.T.X. 

το. ὡς ὃν χαλεπὸν] “ As being 
baneful.” Badham objects to 
χαλεπὸν on the ground that 
this adj. placed absolutely can 
only mean “ difficult to ob- 
tain :” and conjectures χαλεπῶς 
— παραφυλάττουσ. But cf. 
Symp. 176 ἃ: ὅτι χαλεπὸν τοῖς 


ἀνθρώποις ἣ μεθη ἐστί. Ib. 204: 
αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία. 
Infr. 308 a: Χαλεπὸν εἶπες καὶ 
δεινὸν πάθος. For παραφ. cf. 
Lege. 4, 715 a. 

The distinction between the 
two kinds of μετρητικὴ is not 
present in Protagoras, p. 357. 

ὡς ὃν χαλεπὸν περὶ Tas πράξεις 
παραφυλάττουσι] περὶ τὰς πραξ. 
has a double reference to xan. 
and παραφ., like περὶ τὰς---δια- 
τριβάς supr. 283 6. Cf. Prot. 
315 d: 6 τι--- πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ 
σῶμα. 

12. πάντα --- ἀπεργάζονται | 
Compare the rhythm of Rep. 8, 
546 C: πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ 
πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν, and for 
the expression, Legg. 4, 711 d, 
6, 780 6: πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἀπερ- 
γάζεται. Ib. 783 6. Tim. 50 6. 

14. ἀφανίσωμεν] Cf. Soph. 
240 C: ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην---ἀφανί- 
ζων ἰσχυρίζηται περί τινος ὅπη- 
ovy. 


σι 


Without 
such a 
standard 
as is here 
postulated, 
the arts 
and their 
produc- 
tions would 
be destroy- 


10 ed, or ra- 


ther made 
impossible. 
For it is by 
keeping 
just mea- 
surement 
that the 
arts per- 
form their 
functions, 


Shall we 
then, as in 
defining 
the Sophist 
we forced 
the point 
that Not- 
Being has 
Being, now 
demon- 
strate that 
excess 15 
not merely 
relative, 
but has 
sometimes 
referenceto 
a standard ? 
Without 
this the 
art of 
statesman- 
ship must 
perish with 
all the 
other arts. 
And yet 


104 


pos ἡμῖν ἡ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔσται ζητησις τῆς βασιλικῆς p. 28} 


ἐπιστήμης ; 


ΝΕ. ΣΏ. Καὶ μάλα. 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


ho 53 Z 2 Ἂ a 
&E. Tlorepov οὖν, καθάπερ ev τῷ σοφιστῇ προσ- 


΄ 5 \ Ν 7 \ ‘ 5 
βηναγκασαμεν εἶναι TO μὴ OV, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τοῦτο 


ὃ 7 ΕΣ δι « , “ Ν an Ν / 3 
ιέφυγεν ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος, οὕτω καὶ νῦν TO πλέον αὖ 


ΑΛ \ ’ \ 
καὶ ἐλαττον HET PITA 7 POO AVAYKAOTEOV γίγνεσθαι μῆ 


XN 37) » »"Ζ 
πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου 
ρ UY] 


, > \ \ ω y+ x yf ? 
γένεσιν ; ov yap On δυνατὸν ye οὔτε πολιτικὸν OUT 


yy \ a Ν \ ΄ 5 ῇ 3 
τοἄλλον τινὰ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράζεις ἐπιστήμονα ἄναμ- 


φισβητήτως γεγονέναι τούτου μὴ ξυνομολογηθέντος. 


NE. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ viv 6 τι μάλιστα χρὴ ταὐ- 


Ν lad 
TOV TTOLELV. 


μααὶ ,ὔ 53 ᾽ὔ ϑι al \ a Sy 
BE. Πλέον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι τοῦτο TO ἔργον ἢ 


» la / 3 / / \ a rf 
15 KELVO’ καί TOL κἀκείνου γε μεμνήμεθα TO μῆκος ὅσον 


53 9 5. ἰξ , \ ἣν ΄ὔ N x A \ 
nv. ἀλλ᾽ ὑποτίθεσθαι μὲν TO TOLOVOE περὶ αὑτῶν καὶ 


’ 
μάλα δίκαιον. 


4. ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ] ‘In treat- 
ing of the Sophist.” A form 
of reference like ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ 
τῶν βίων, Phileb. 33 Ὁ : ἐν τοῦ 
σκήπτρου τῇ παραδόσει. Thue. 
I. το. 

5. ἐπειδὴ ---λόγος] “ Because 
at this point the question 
eluded our grasp.” 

8. mpos—mpos] There is a 
slight variation in the mean- 
ing of πρός. “ Not only in com- 
parison with each other, but 
with a view to the production 
of that which is meet.” Τὸ 
μέτριον is the result of the ap- 
plication of μέτρον to produc- 
tion. 

9. γένεσιν] Cf. supr. 283 d. 
The frequent use of the word 
γένεσις, in the most general 
sense, is one of the character- 


istic points of diction which 
connect this dialogue with 
Philebus, Timzeus, and Laws. 


7? 


οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον τινὰ---- γεγονέναι] 
Eight MSS. (including the 
best) have τὸν, but τῶν is pro- 
bably right ; because the ad- 
verb seems to require that 
ἐπιστήμονα should be taken 
after γεγονέναι. “Neither the 
Statesman nor any other artist 
of those concerned with action 
can be proved an artist beyond 
dispute.” Cf. infr. 293 Ὁ: 
ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας Kat ov δο- 
κοῦντας μόνον. 

14. Πλέον----ἢ ᾿κεῖν]Ὶ There 
is a further task indicated in 
Lege. 4,719 6: σοὶ δ᾽ οὐχ οὕτω 
ῥητέον, ὡς νῦν εἶπες μέτριον εἰπών, 
ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μέτριον καὶ ὁπόσον 
ῥητέον. 

















li, 
ἱ 











i 84. 
ἃ 








IIOAITIKOS. 


NE, >Q. To ποῖον ; 


105 


μ- eA 7 - a 
EE. Ὡς ποτε δεήσει τοῦ viv λεχθέντος πρὸς τὴν 


2. Ὥς more δεήσει --- ἔσται 
ποτέ] It has been thought that 
this passage is seriously cor- 
rupt: but when 6 τι (or ὃ) is 
rendered as a pronoun, and 
either καὶ introduced before 
μεῖζον, with six MSS., or re read 
for τι (or τέ τι, with Hermann), 
the words as they stand give 
a better meaning, and one 
more suited to the context, 
than any which it has been 
proposed to substitute. “ That 
some day there will be need 
of that which has now been 
mentioned” (the proof that 
“more” and “less” are relative 
to a standard of right measure 
as well as to each other, supr. 
b) “for the demonstration of the 
highest problem of all.” (αὐτὸ 
τἀκριβές is that absolute prin- 
ciple which is essential to and 
identical with perfection of 
method. Cf. 1 Alc. 130 ἃ: 
αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό). “ But (to dwell 
only on) what is fairly and 
sufficiently shewn for our pre- 
sent purpose, this argument, 
T think, comes grandly to our 
aid, that we must alike believe 
in the existence of the arts, 


and at the same time (ἅμα), 


in a greater and less being 
measured, not only in relation 
to each other, but with a view 
to the production of the mean. 
For if the latter is true the 
former is true (for ἐκεῖνα, cf. 
Thezet. 207 d, αὐτὰ, and note), 
and if the former exist, the 
latter is the case ; and if either 
is not, neither will ever be.” 
This explanation is substan- 
tially the same as Stallbaum’s. 


It appears from the Philebus 
that the absolute standard 
(μέτρον) was closely allied in 
Plato’s mind with Reason and 
the Idea of Good. The de- 
monstration of the “very ex- 
actness of truth” is probably 
reserved for the “ Philosophus.” 
Even in the dialectical dia- 
logues Plato complains of an 
imperfect method. For 6 τι 
almost = 6,=“ a thing which,” 
cf. Gorg. 508 d: ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς, 
ὅστις πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται 
οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγε- 
σθαι οὔ φημι κιτλ. The in- 
definite relative is used be- 
cause the antecedent is only 
determined as the sentence 
proceeds. “ But as for that 
which,” &e. And for the 
clause in apposition, cf. Thezet. 
158 Ὁ: ὃ πολλάκις. infr. 293 a. 
A similar looseness of con- 
struction occurs in Gorg. 4540: 
ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὴ θαυμάσῃς--- ὅπερ yap 
λέγω κιτιλ. For the notion of 
ἀκρίβεια, cf. Rep. 4,435¢-e, 504. 
Comp. esp. with πρὸς τὰ νῦν, 
435 d: 
ἀξίως. 504 b: τῶν---ἔμπροσθεν 
ἑπομένας ἀποδείξει. For περὶ 
αὐτὸ τἀκριβὲς, οἵ. Rep. 7, 525 a: 
ἡ περὶ τὸ ἕν μάθησις. The Bod- 
leian has δείκνυται, with most 
other MSS. 

The distinction here brought 
out obviously resembles and 
may have suggested that drawn 
by Aristotle in Eth. Nic. 11. 
between the absolute and re- 
lative mean. But what is 
absolute in Aristotle is rela- 
tive in Plato.  Aristotle’s 
πλέον, ἔλαττον, αὐτὸ τὸ 


τῶν τε προειρημένων 


’ 
Κατ 


* p 


this 15. a 
harder 
piece of 
work than 
that. 


We may 
content 
ourselves 
for the pre- 
sent with 
the indirect 
proof, that 
if more and 
less are not 
thus mea- 
sured with 
reference 
to what is 
meet and 
proper, no 
art can 
ever exist. 
Hence we 
may pro- 
ceed to di- 
vide the 
art of mea- 
surement, 
making 
one seg- 
ment to 
consist of 


Io 


106 


7 EEN > > / δ \ Ν \ ΄σ 
περὶ αὐτὸ τἀκριβὲς ἀπόδειξιν. O τι δὲ πρὸς τὰ νῦν p. 28 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


καλῶς καὶ ἱκανῶς δείκνυται,----δοκεῖ μοι βοηθεῖν με- 


A ΄ ΄ @ « / c yy «. / 
γαλοπρέπῶς ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ Aoyos, ὡς apa NHynTEOoV 


ε , \ , ΄, 5 Ν nel “ 
ὁμοίως τὰς τέχνας πάσας εἶναι [καὶ] μεῖζον τι ἅμα 


3, - \ 5) / > \ 
5 καὶ ἔλαττον μετρεῖσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ 


ἈΝ Ἁ a / / \ 
καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν. τούτου TE γὰρ 


7 a yf / “ μ ᾿ς, fa) 
ὄντος ἐκεῖνα ἔστι κἀκείνων οὐσῶν ἐστι καὶ τοῦτο, 


\ Ne, / / ’ / > al BA 
μὴ δὲ OVTOS ποτέρου τουτῶν οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν EOTAL 


/ 
TTOTE. 


τοῦτο: 


NE. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς" ἀλλὰ τί δὴ τὸ μετὰ 


ΞΕ. Δῆλον ὅτι διαιροῖμεν ἂν τὴν μετρητικήν, 


/ 3 / ΄ / 4 A \ 
καθάπερ ἐρρήθη, ταύτῃ δίχα τέμνοντες, ἕν μὲν τι- 


͵ 3 Lal / 7 vA «ες ἢ Ν 
θέντες αὑτῆς μοριον ξυμπάσας τέχνας, ὁποσαι τον 


πρᾶγμα are here viewed as 
πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον. Aristotle’s 
πρὸς ἡμᾶς is Plato’s πρὸς τὴν 
τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν, where the 
appeal is to an absolute stand- 
ard. This difference strikes 
deeply into the character of 
each philosophy. Vid. supr. 
note on 259 b. It should be 
noticed that Plato does not 
speak of a mean in the former 
case, but only of excess and 
defect, and that Aristotle’s 
subjective mean is connected 
with his distinction between 
virtue and the arts, which 
must be regarded as a forward 
step in ethical inquiry. Com- 
pare Legg. 5, 757 a (where we 
seem to find the point of tran- 
sition from the Platonic to the 
Aristotelian μεσότης) : τοῖς γὰρ 
ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν, 
εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου. 

_ 2, βοηθεῖν μεγαλοπρεπῶς] ΟἿ, 
Theet. 168 c: μεγαλειότερον ἂν 


τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν. 

4. ὁμοίως — γένεσιν | Cf. 
Pheedo 76 6: εἰς καλόν γε κατα- 
φεύγει ὃ λόγος, εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι 
τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι 
ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν δὴ σὺ νῦν 
λέγεις. A direct proof of the 
existence of such a standard is 
still to seek. But it is enough 
for our purpose that no art 
can exist without it. 

μεῖζόν τι ἅμα καὶ €datrov| 
“ There is a greater and less 
whose measure is not merely 
relative.” 1 6: {Uhismisigone 
kind of “ greater” and “less.” 
But perhaps καὶ should be re- 
jected and re read for τι. Cf. 
Theet. 195 6: λιθωδές τε. 
MSS. τι. 

8. ποτέρου] “ Hither,” “ one 
or other.” ; 

13. ἕν μὲν μόριον----τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον] 
According to the reasoning of 
this passage, the former are 
clearly subordinate to the latter. 











MOAITIKO?2. 


107 


84. ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθη καὶ πλάτη καὶ ταχύτητας 


SS > , a ‘\ eo « / Ἁ 
πρὸς τοὐναντίον μετροῦσι, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον, ὁπόσαι πρὸς 


‘\ / Ν ἈΝ / Ν XN Ν Ν Ν / 
TO μέτριον καὶ TO πρέπον καὶ TOY καιρὸν καὶ TO δέον 


Ν , ΠΕ / 5" s ΄ 3 / las > ΄ 
καὶ πανθ᾽ ὁπόσα εἰς TO μέσον ἀπῳκίσθη τῶν ἐσχά- 


TOV. 


NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ μέγα γ᾽ ἑκάτερον τμῆμα εἶπες, καὶ 


πολὺ διαφέρον ἀλλήλοιν. 


pF ἃ \ , 5 7 , , 
mE. Ὃ yap ἐνίοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἰόμενοι δή τι 


N ’ ΄ ΄ 
σοφὸν φραζειν πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν, ὡς 


a \ Z, XN / ~ > 
Apa μετρητικὴ περὶ πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα, TOUT 


SEN Ν a \ Ἃ ’ / \ \ 
αὐτὸ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν ov τυγχάνει. μετρήσεως μὲν yap 


if , fp « / 3, 
δή Twa τρόπον πάνθ᾽ ὁπόσα evTexva peTeiAnhe διὰ 


τ. ταχύτητας.] The Bodleian, 
with AZIIS, has παχύτητας, οἵ. 
infr. 299 6, where the intro- 
duction of παχέσιν would be 
more intelligible than of πα- 
χύτητας here, but the MS. au- 
thority is slight. The tran- 
sition from solid quantity to 
speed is less obvious and more 
Platonic and philosophical than 
that from depth and breadth 
to thickness: and density 
(which Stallbaum speaks of) 
can hardly be in question. See 
the connexion between solid 
geometry and astronomy (as 
φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους) in Rep. 7, 
528 foll. See esp. 529 ἃ: τῶν 
δ᾽ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἃς τὸ dv 
τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτὴς ἐν τῷ 
ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς 
ἀληθινοῖς σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς 
ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα 
φέρει. Where the distinction 
of the two kinds of astronomy 
is essentially analogous to that 
suggested here. Also Legg. 7, 
820 sqq., 10, 896 d: μήκους 
σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους Kat βάθους 


καὶ ῥώμης. 


4. ἀπῳκίσθη] “Have removed 
their abode”—as to a safe dis- 
tance from evil. The word 
seems to have been adopted 


by the Pythagoreans. See 
Mullach. Pyth. Fr. p. 537: ov 
μακρὰν οὐδ᾽ ἀπῳκισμένως. (Tic- 


phantus ap. Stob.) 

Q. πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν] Evi- 
dently the Pythagoreans, who 
are spoken of in similar terms 
in Gorg. 4030: κομψὸς ἀνήρ, 
ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός. Crat. 
405 d: as 
φασιν of κομψοὶ περὶ μουσικὴν 
καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἁρμονίᾳ τινι πο- 
λεῖ ἅμα πάντα. 

II. τὸ νῦν λεχθέν] That there 
could be no γένεσις without the 
μέτριον, Which is the first em- 
bodiment of τὸ μέτρον, ef. 
Phileb. sub. fin. and 55 e. 

12. διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ----περιβάληται] 
“ But from never having been 
habituated to distinguish every 
subject of inquiry according to 
real forms, they not only jumble 
indiscriminately, from a notion 
that they resemble each other, 
these widely different things, 


τ! a 
οτι TavuTa πάντα, 


those arts 
which mea- 
sure the 
size and 
number of 
objects in 
relation to 


each other, 
and one of 
those which 
measure 
with refer- 
ence to a 
mean or 
standard. 
This is the 
truth which 
underlies 
the doc- 
trine that 
all is 
measure- 
ment.” 


But, for 
want of the 
power of 
distin- 
guishing 
kinds, the 
authors of 
this doc- 
trine con- 
fuse the 
More and 
the Too 
Much, and 
elsewhere 
distinguish 
inoppor- 
tunely. 
Whereas 


one ought [9 


not to rest 
short of any 
real dis- 

tinction, or 


108 


ITAATOQNOS 


ταῦτά τε τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα ξυμβάλλουσιν εὐθὺς 


Ε] > Χ “ > / 3 ’ 
εἰς TAVTOV OMOLA νομίσαντες, καὶ τοὐναντίον αὖ τού- 


a ° , \ - / 
Tov δρῶσιν, ἕτερα ov κατὰ μέρη διαιροῦντες, δέον, 


“ \ Ν ΄ a / ” 
SoTay μὲν THY τῶν πολλῶν τις πρότερον αἰσθηται 


/ \ / Ν Ἂ » » “κ᾿ \ 
κοινωνίαν, μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ Tas 


ὃ Ν 10 / « ,ὔ > 16 “ Ν 
ιαφορᾶς l ἢ σπασαᾶς, οποσαίπερ εν εἰθεσι κεινται, TAS 


\ 5 \ ᾽ / “ ᾽ , 
δὲ αὖ παντοδαπὰς ἀνομοιότητας, ὅταν ev πλήθεσιν 


ὀφθῶσι, μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι δυσωπούμενον παύεσθαι, 


Ἂ ΄ Ν vad > ‘ a ε / 
πρὶν ἂν ξύμπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐντὸς μιᾶς ὁμοιότητος 


Y / Χ > / ΄ “ \ 
ἔρξας γένους τινὸς οὐσίᾳ περιβάληται. ταῦτα μεν 


5 « a U , Ν Ν “ 3 / 
οὖν ἱκανῶς περι TE τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐλλείψεων 


but fall into the converse error 
of distinguishing other things 
not according to their real di- 
visions: whereas the right way 
is, when one has first perceived 
a common nature running 
through a great variety of 
things, not to desist till one 
has seen all the differences 
which subsist within that na- 
ture, and which constitute dis- 
tinct kinds, and on the other 
hand, not to be able to look 
contentedly upon the endless 
diversity which has been seen 
in a multitude of objects, until 
one has brought all kindred 
objects within the pale of a 
single resemblance, and invest- 
ed them with the real nature 
of a single kind.” 

I. τὸ μὴ κατ᾽ εἴδη] Cf. Rep. 
5, 454 a, Pheedr. 265 6. 

5. ὅταν τις τῶν 
κοινωνίαν ͵ἢὴἠ This “ divinatio” 
seems always to be assumed as 
the first step in a dialectical 
inquiry. Cf. Phileb. 16 ἃ: μίαν 


5» , A x c ’ la 
ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμέ- 


πολλῶν ---- 


κ ΄ 7 
vous ζητεῖν" εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἔνουσαν. 


7. ὁπόσαιπερΊ,͵Ἡ This is the 
same thing which is expressed 
in the Philebus (16 d, e) in the 
words μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς 
ἕν μὴ ὅτι ἕν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά 
ἐστι μόνον ton τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσα. 

ἐν εἴδεσι κεῖνται) Cf. Rep. 
8, 544 ἃ: ἥτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει δια- 
φανεῖ τινι κεῖται. 

8. ἐν πλήθεσιν] “ Numbers,” 
or “multitudes,” he cannot say 
classes because they are not 
yet classified. Cf. Theet.157 ¢: 
ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν τε τί- 
θενται καὶ λίθον x.7.r., and the 
ὄγκοι of the Parmenides, 164, 5. 
This process corresponds to 
that described in Phileb.18 a—d. 

9. δυσωπούμενον] “ Looking 
upon with discomfort or dis- 
like.” Cf. infr. 291 b, e. 

11. γένους τινὸς οὐσίᾳ] “ With 
the reality (dasein) of a genus.” 
οὐσία is used in nearly the 
same sense as supra 284 bis. 
Ξ- τῷ γένος τι εἰναι. 

The latter half of this de- 
scription (from τὰς δὲ αὖ) is the 
opposite of the second error 
mentioned above. 


\ \ \ > 5, / ~ : 
δὲ τὸ μὴ κατ᾽ εἴδη συνειθίσθαι σκοπεῖν διαιρουμένους p. 28 β 


‘| 











ΠΟΛΙΓΙΚΟΣ. 


109 


] i ᾿ “ 
85. καὶ ὑπερβολῶν εἰρήσθω: φυλάττωμεν δὲ μόνον ὅτι 


’ὔ » > na na 
α Ovo γένη περὶ αὐτὰ ἐξεύρηται τῆς μετρητικῆς Kal 


ad φαμεν αὖτ᾽ εἶναι μεμνώμεθα. 
NE. ΣΏΩ. Μεμνησόμεθα. 


Ν al \ ἈΝ " 
ΞΕ). Μετὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἕτερον προσδε- 


/, ἐν > ΄σ a , Ν Ν ΄ 
ξώμεθα πέρι αὐτῶν Τε Τῶν ζητουμένων και πέρι TT a— 


“ » - lol / a 
ons τῆς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε λόγοις διατριβῆς. 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


_E E7 τ eon Ν Ν ΄, 
myth. He τις ἀνέροιτο ἡμᾶς τὴν πέρι γραμματὰα 


,ὔ a , « , « aA 
συνουσιὰν TOY μανθανοντων, OTTOTOVY TLS Οοτιουν 


y+ > a 77 3 Ν i) 7] > an 
ὄνομα ἐρωτηθῇ τίνων ἐστὶ γραμμάτων, πότερον αὐτῷ 


7 a / δὰ [4 CAEN oS a 
τότε φώμεν γίγνεσθαι τὴν ζήτησιν ἑνὸς ἕνεκα μᾶλλον 


a 7 3 fod 7, Ν , 
τοῦ προβληθέντος ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα τὰ προβαλλό- 


μενα γραμματικωτέρῳ γίγνεσθαι ; 


NE. ΣΏ. Δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ ἅπαντα. 


BE. Τί δ᾽ αὖ νῦν ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ 


/ “ἶἤ » a / 7 lal 
Cytnow ; €vexa αὐτοῦ τούτου προβέβληται μᾶλ- 


1. φυλάττωμεν] Let us fix 
this in our minds. Cf. infr. 
207 ἃ: μέχριπερ ἂν ἕν μέγα φυ- 
λάττωσιν κοτιλ. 

9. Et τις--ογίγνεσθαι :] “Were 
one to ask us of the intercourse 
of students in grammar (with 
their teacher), when one of 
them is asked to spell a word, 
whether shall we say that the 
inquiry in which he then en- 
gages is for the sake of the 
single problem thus set before 
him, or for the sake of be- 
coming more expert in all 
orthographical problems ?” 

The question which is the 
object of ἀνέροιτο is to be 
sought in πότερον φῶμεν k.t.d., 
which is the apodosis of the 
sentence: just as when part 


of a relative clause becomes 
absorbed in the antecedent. 
“ If we were asked of the in- 
tercourse of learners with their 
teachers about their letters, 
when one of them is asked of 
what letters any noun is com- 
posed, whether shall we say 
that his study at such a time 
is for the sake of the parti- 
cular question, or for the sake 
of his becoming more expert 
in such subjects generally ?” 
Compare the structure of Soph. 
237 b: εἰ σπουδῆ δέοι x.7.X. 

10. συνουσίαν is used in some- 
thing of a technical sense. 

16. Ti δ᾽ αὖ] For the punce- 
tuation, ef. Phedr. 234 d: ri 
σοι φαίνεται----ὁ λόγος ; οὐχ ὑπερ- 
φυῶς --- εἰρῆσθαι ; 


5 


10 


15 


omit any 
real gene- 
ralization. 
One more 
observation 
by the way. 
Gramma- 
tical ques- 
tions have 
an end be- 
yond them- 
selves, 

that of 
making 
eramma- 
rians. So 
the present 
inquiry has 
an end be- 
yond itself, 
that of 
making us 
better dia- 
lecticians, 


Still less is 
such an art 
as weaving 
to be fol- 
lowed for 
its own 
sake. But 
(though 
few are 
aware of 
this) the 
highest 
things have 
no sensible 
mean 
through 
which they 
can be ex- 
plained, but 
areshadow- 
ed forth by 


110 


MAATOQNOZ 


δ ΄ , ᾿ / / 
Aov ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικωτέροις γίγνε- P- 


σθαι ; 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ πάντα. 


ΞΕ. Ἦ που τὸν τῆς ὑφαντικῆς γε λόγον αὐτῆς 


/ a / > Ν Ὁ ᾽ / ΄σ yy 
sTavTns ἕνεκα θηρεύειν οὐδεὶς av eOeAnoee νοῦν ἔχων. 


> ᾽ δὶ \ 7 7 “ la \ “ 
ard, οἰμαι, τοὺς πλείστους λέληθεν OTL τοῖς μεν τῶν 


Ε « , ἘΠ ΡΞ / f / 
ὄντων ῥᾳδίως καταμαθεῖν Ἑαἰσθηταί ἢ τινες ὁμοιότητες 


, aA >a\ Ων A cd > lad 
πεφύκασιν, as οὐδὲν χαλέπον δηλοῦν, ὅταν αὑτῶν τις 


βουληθῇ τῷ λό ἰτοῦ ' ἡ μετὰ πρα- 
ουλησῃ τῷ λογον αἰτουντι πέρι TOV μὴ μετὰ TPA 


τογμάτων ἀλλὰ χωρὶς λόγου ῥᾳδίως ἐνδείξασθαι" τοῖς 


> 3 / 3 Ν ΄ > y 2) 
δ᾽ αὖ μέγιστοις οὔὐσι και τιμιωτατοιῖς οὐκ ἐστιν εἴδω- 


> \ \ \ 5 > ᾽ lal 
λον οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς, 


οὗ δειχθέντος τὴν τοῦ πυνθανομένου ψυχὴν ὃ βουλό- 


> ΄ Ν lon > , / 
μενος ἀποπληρῶσαι, πρὸς τῶν αἰσθησεῶν τινα προσ- 


4. Ἦ mov] This is not really 
inconsistent with Soph. 227 a: 
τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστι- 
κῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἧττον 
οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον. 
In both cases it is the method 
alone which gives importance 
to the particular subject. 

6. ἀλλ᾽, οἶμαι, ---- λεγόμενα | 
“ But I think that it has es- 
caped most men, that, while 
some things are endued with 
resemblances which are sensi- 
ble, and therefore easily known, 
which there is no difficulty in 
shewing, when one wishes to 
point out any of them (re un- 
derstood from περί τοῦ) to any 
one who asks about it, with 
no trouble, but easily, without 
argument, — there are also 
things, and those the greatest, 
and of priceless worth, which 
have no image wrought so as 
to strike human perceptions, 


by pointing to which he who 
would content the mind of 
an inquirer, shall fully satisfy 
him by imprinting this on 
some one of his _ senses. 
Wherefore one ought to study 
to be able to give and receive 
a rational account of every- 
thing, for things bodiless, which 
are the fairest and the greatest 
things, for the sake of which 
all that is now said is spoken, 
are made clearly manifest by 
reason alone.” Cf. supr. 277 ¢. 

7. MSS. αἰσθητικαὶ. 

10. ῥᾳδίως καταμαθεῖν] Per- 
haps padios should be read, 
with Hermann and Badham. 
Badham further conjectures ais 
οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν 6 TL ἂν αὐτῶν τις 
βουληθῇ τῷ Δ. α.---ἐνδείξασθαι. 
But the whole sentence is la- 
boured and pleonastic, so that 
there is little cause for omit- 
ting an inconvenient word. 


.....................ὕ0.....-..ὕ....ὕὅὄὕᾧ 


Ῥ. 28 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 11] 


86. αρμόττων, ἱκανῶς πληρώσει. διὸ δεῖ μελετᾷν λόγον 


Cle \ 3 A \ 7 A \ 
ἑκάστου δυνατὸν εἶναι δοῦναι καὶ. δέξασθαι: τὰ yap 
> ’ὔ / ΒΥ Ν / / / 
ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα OVTA καὶ μέγιστα, Aoy@ μονον, 
37 A > \ “ /, \ oa 
ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ σαφῶς δείκνυται, τούτων δὲ ἕνεκα 

’ὔ’ > > Ν A a / Cus eo) lad > ΄ 
TaVT ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν λεγομενα. ρᾷων δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς €AaT- 

« / Ἂς ͵ lal Ὁ Ν \ 

Tool ἢ μελέτη παντὸς πέρι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ TA 

/ 
μείζω. 

4 5 53 
NE. ΣΩ. Καλλιστ᾽ εἶπες. 





- 7 ͵ > « a Ass 
HE. Ὧν τοίνυν χάριν ἅπανθ᾽ ἡμῖν ταῦτ᾽ ἐρρήθη 


‘ / a 
περὶ τούτων, μνησθῶμεν. 


NE. ΣΩ. Τώων ; 


ἘΠῚ T , - > v4 OLS oS fad 
i. Lavrns τε οὐχ ἥκιστα αὑτῆς EVEKA TIS 


δυσχερείας, ἣν Ἱπερὶ τὴν μακρολογίαν τὴν περὶ 


τὴν ὑφαντικὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς, καὶ τὴν περὶ 


5. ῥάων--μᾶλλον ἢ] Cf. Pro- 
tag. 317 6 : καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην 
οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμο- 
λογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι. 

12. Ταύτης τε---λέγοιμεν] The 
construction is obscured by 
the attraction of the latter 
part of the sentence into the 
relative clause. Strict syntax 
would require ταύτης te—xal 
τῆς (δυσχερείας) περὶ τὴν (μακρο- 
λογίαν) περὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς K.T.X.: 
instead of which the latter 
clause, with what follows, is 
made to depend on ἀπεδεξάμεθα 
δυσχερῶς, with which the re- 
mainder of the sentence, ἐννοοῦν- 
τες- καὶ- -ἐπεπλήξαμεν k.T.A., 15 
also connected. 

3. ἣν Ὑ περὶ ἡ τὴν μακρολο- 
γίαν] Hermann suggests ἥνπερ. 
Wagner, Rheinische Museum, 
vol. xii. (1857) p. 309, prefers 
ἧπερ. This avoids the collo- 
cation of the two accusatives, 
which is the objection to ἥνπερ. 


But ἣν is unobjectionable. ΟἿ, 
Soph. 264 b: τὴν προσδοκίαν ἣν 
ἐφοβήθημεν, and note. Gore. 
509 6: ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἱσ- 
χίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βυ- 
Also Legg. 2, 666 Ὁ: 
τὴν ----παιδιὰν, ἣν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 
ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ γήρως αὐστηρό- 
τῆτος ἐδωρήσατο τὸν οἶνον φάρ- 
μακον. And περὶ also may be 
defended if we suppose ἀπε- 
δεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς (SC. τὴν μακ- 
ρολογίαν) to be substituted for 
ἐδυσχεράναμεν. Such a change 
in the form of a sentence will 
not astonish the attentive stu- 
dent of these dialogues. 

Plato here seems determined 
to “ bestow all his tediousness” 
on his critics, whoever they 
were. 

μακρολογίαν͵͵ “ Lengthiness 
in argument,” not in speech, as 
in Gorg. 461 d, alib. 

14. ἀπεδεξάμεθα δυσχερῶς (se. 
τὴν μακρολογίαν) is unexpectedly 


ηθεῖν. 


σι 


analogies 
which can 
only be ex- 
pressed in 
argument. 


Let us 
recal the 


Io motive of 


this digres- 
sion. It 
was chiefly 
to calm the 
disquiet 
which we 
felt at the 
length to 
which our 


remarks on 
weaving,as 
well as the 
mythwhich 
preceded, 
and the 
discussion 
on the na- 
ture of the 
Sophist,had 
been spun: 
by shewing 
that length 
was not 
lengthiness 
unless ex- 
ceeding 
what is 
meet. 


112 


\ a Ν > Ἀ ΄ ΄ 
τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀνείλιξιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ Ρ. 8}. 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


/ “ a \ JA > > a [2 37 
πέρι τῆς τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐσίας, ἐννοοῦντες ὡς ἔσχε 


oe / a Pa Jes , \ a > , 
μῆκος πλέον, Kal ἐπὶ τούτοις On πᾶσιν ἐπεπλήξαμεν 


Caw ΕἸ a a ‘ 
ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, δείσαντες μὴ περίεργα ἅμα καὶ μακρὰ 


/ σὰ 9 5 » a \ / a 
5 λέγοιμεν. iv οὖν εἰσαῦθις μηδὲν πασχωμεν τοιου-- 


/ ov / \ / lal > lal 
TOV, τούτων ἕνεκα πάντων τὰ πρόσθεν νῷν εἰρῆσθαι 


φάθι. 


NE. >Q. Ταῦτ᾽ ἐσται. 


λέγε ἑξῆς μόνον. 


EE. Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι χρὴ δὴ μεμνημένους ἐμὲ καὶ 


A ΄ ΄- ’ὔ / / e , 
100€ τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων TOV TE Ψόγον ἑκάστοτε καὶ 


yy ω , ad “4 - a» 
ἔπαινον ποιεῖσθαι βραχυτητος apa καὶ μήκους ὧν ἂν 


ἀεὶ πέρι λέγωμεν, μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ μήκη κρί- 


ΕἸ \ a “ / a / 
νοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ TO τῆς μετρητικὴς μέρος, O TOTE 


By ΕΞ a ἈΝ \ 7 
ἐφαμεν δεῖν μεμνῆσθαι, πρὸς τὸ πρέπον. 


ΝΕ. 50. Ὀρθῶς. 


ἘΠῚ O ᾽ / ἡδὲ Ν a ψ + ΝΥ 
ey th. U TOLVVY OVOE TPOS ΤΟῦΤΟ TTAVTA. οὔτέ γὰρ 


substituted for ἐδυσχεράναμεν : 
hence the introduction οἵ 
περί. 

I. ἀνείλιξιν |] Supr. 269 6. 
τὴν (SC. μακρολογίαν). 

τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι] It is 
better to take πέρι thus with 
τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, in which case it 
can easily be resumed with the 
explanatory words τῆς τοῦ μὴ 
ὄντος οὐσίας. Otherwise the 
preceding dialogue would be 
referred to as ὁ σοφιστής, a 
form of reference which has 
no parallel in Plato. Cf. supr. 


284 Ὁ: ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ, and 
note. 
6. τούτων --- πάντων͵] “‘ The 


above-mentioned and all simi- 
lar arguments.”’ 
13. τότε] Supr. 284, 255. 
14. μεμνῆσθαι) One is at first 
sight inclined to read perpei- 


σθαι, after the conjecture of 
Schleiermacher, and to sup- 
pose that an error has grown 
out of μνησθῶμεν, μεμνημένους 
above. But the text is seen 
to be perfectly sound when a 
comma is placed after μεμνῆ- 
σθαι, and πρὸς τὸ πρέπον is thus 
joined with τὰ μήκη κρίνοντες. 
The opening of the next speech 
favours this view. And in 
support of μεμνῆσθαι, ef. supr. 
284 6: ὑποτίθεσθαι ὥς ποτε δε- 
ήσει τοῦ νῦν λεχθέντος. 285 Ὁ: 
φυλάττωμεν .---ὅτε δύο γένη τῆς 
μετρητικῆς ----καὶ ἅ φαμεν αὐτὰς 
εἶναι μεμνώμεθα. Ν. Σ. μεμνησό- 
μεθα. 

16. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο 
πάντα] “Νού, however, even 
with a view to this in all 
things. The standard by which 
arguments are to be measured 

















ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


118 


86. πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μήκους ἁρμόττοντος οὐδὲν προσδεη- 


΄ \ > " ΄, , , 5 \ 
σομεθα, πλὴν εἰ μὴ πάρεργον TL TO TE αὖ πρὸς 


δ a / / e » en Ν 
τὴν τοῦ προβληθέντος CTTW, WS ἂν ρᾷστα Kat 


΄ὔ “ 7 > ᾽ » lal « Ἧ 
τάχιστα εὕροιμεν, δεύτερον ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρῶτον ὁ λόγος 


’ lal / \ \ / Ν a 
ἀγαπᾷν παραγγέλλει, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον 5 


\ ΄, TUE a = > » \ 5 
τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν τιμᾷν τοῦ κατ᾽ εἰδὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι 


διαιρεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ λόγον, ἄν τε παμμήκης λεχθεὶς 


is that which is becoming 
or suitable, not with a view 
to pleasure, or persuasion, 
or gracefulness, but to the 
awakening of reason and the 
furtherance of truth.” Cf. 
Lege. 2, 655 ὁ: λέγουσί ye οἱ 
πλεῖστοι μουσικῆς ὀρθότητα εἶναι 
τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν 
δύναμιν" ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὔτε ἀν- 
εκτὸν οὔτε ὅσιον τὸ παράπαν φθέγ- 
γεσθαι. We might be disposed 
to conjecture πάντῃ, but πάντα 
is used elsewhere adverbially. 
Soph. 233 a: ὡς εἰσὶ πάντα πάν- 
τῶν αὐτοὶ σοφώτατοι. 

(16.) οὔτε γὰρ---λόγων] “ For 
first we shall have no need 
of a length that is suitable 
for pleasure, unless merely by 
the way: and our argument 
further enjoins that we esteem 
only as of secondary import- 
ance that which helps investi- 
gation and facilitates and 
hastens discovery, but that 
we should prize by far most 
highly, and in the first place, 
the method itself and the 
power of dividing according 
to the real species, and feel 
an interest in that discourse 
which makes the hearer more 
inventive, whether it be brief 
or interminable alike: more- 
over, that the man who blames 
lengthiness (ἀδολεσχίαν) in this 

* 


kind of intercourse, and is in- 
tolerant of circuitous digres- 
sions, ought not so quickly 
and all at once to have done 
when he has blamed the dis- 
course as long, but should con- 
sider that it is his duty to shew 
further that a shorter one would 
have made those conversing 
better reasoners, and would 
have improyed their power of 
finding a mode of declaring 
realities by speech: all other 
blames and praises, made with 
reference to any other stand- 
ard, our argument bids us dis- 
regard and to seem deaf to any 
such remarks.” 

I. μήκους ἁρμόττοντος] Cf. 
Phileb. 36 d: χαίρειν δεῖ λέγειν 
τοῖς ἄλλους μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν 
τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον λεγομένων. 
Ib. 28d. Rep. 5; 450}, Legg. 
1, 640 a, Ὁ 

2. πλὴν εἰ μὴ See Lobeck 
ad Phrynich. p. 459, who ad- 
duces Ar. de An. I. 3: πλὴν εἰ 
μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The greater 
frequency of the expression in 
later Greek throws some doubt 
on the few instances of it in 
Attie Greek which, like the pre- 
sent, have full MS. authority. 

τό τε] Se. μῆκος ἅρμοττον. 

6. τὴν μέθοδον ---τοῦ----δυνατὸν 
εἶναι] Cf. Ale. 115 b: κατὰ τὴν 
ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σῶσαι ods ἔδει, 


Q 


And yet 
not “meet” 
for plea- 
sure, nor 
even for 
discovery, 
but for the 
end of de- 
veloping 
the dialec- 
tical me- 
thod and 
of making 


men inven- 
tive rea- 
soners, 

To return, 
and apply 
our ex- 
ample. 
Kingeraft 
has been 
distin- 
guished 
from other 
arts of tend- 
ing ani- 
mals in 
herds. 

But there 
remain 
those arts, 
both opera- 
tive and 
assistant, 
which are 
found 
within the 
state. 


114 


Ν » / ε / > / 
TOV GQKOVOQAVTA E€UPETLKWMTEPOV ἀπεργάζηται, 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ὃ (Ce ὶ τῷ μή δὲν ἀγανακτεῖν. ἄν τ᾽ αὖ 
σπουδάζειν καὶ τῷ μήκει μηδὲν ἄγ . 


37 


/ « 
βραχύτερος, ὡσαύτως" ἔτι 


3 Ν / Ν 
δ᾽ αὖ πρὸς τούτοις τὸν 


Ν Ν / / / / 
περὶ Tas τοιάσδε συνουσίας ψέγοντα λόγων μηκη 


\ / / > > / σ 
skal τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ περιόδους οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενον, OTL 


\ Ν ΄ \ , \ δ᾽ Ov ὕτω 
χρὴ TOV TOLOVTOV μὴ πάνυ τάαάχυ PHO EVUUS OV 


« \ \ / 3 
μεθιέναι ψέξαντα μόνον ὡς μακρὰ τὰ λεχθέντα, ἀλλὰ 


> rn / > 
καὶ προσαποφαίνειν οἴεσθαι δεῖν ws βραχύτερα av 


/ \ / ΄ / 
VYEVOMEVA TOVS DVVOVTAS ἀπειργάζετο διαλεκτικωτε- 


ω “ 57 / vA ε / 
10 pous καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων λογῳ δηλώσεως εὑρετικωτε- 


lal \ 32) Ν 5, 357 / Ν 
ρους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων καὶ πρὸς GAN ἀττα ψόγων καὶ 


\ / \ Ν ΄ > , 
ἐπαίνων μηδὲν φροντίζειν μηδὲ TO παράπαν ἀκούειν 


΄ a / / 
δοκεῖν τῶν τοιούτων λόγων. 


ἊΝ / \ vA 
Kat τούτων pev aris, 


/ lal N \ \ Χ Ἂ 
εἰ καὶ σοὶ ταύτῃ ξυνδοκεῖ: πρὸς δὲ δὴ τὸν πολιτικὸν 


ροντες τὸ παράδειγμα. 


3, ᾽ὔ a ς ΄σ > lal 7 
15 ἴωμεν πάλιν, τῆς προρρηθείσης ὑφαντικῆς αὐτῷ φέ- 


a 3 > aA 
NE. ΣΏ. Καλῶς εἶπες, καὶ ποιῶμεν ἃ λέγεις. 


an / 5 a « x σ 
EE. Οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ γε τῶν πολλῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ὅσαι 


I. τοῦτον σπουδάζειν] This 
construction appears in Gorg. 
500 6: ov τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδά- 
σειέ τις, aS well as in Soph. 
251 0, 259 c. Compare Legg. 
7,792 6: ὁ μὲν yap ἐμὸς δὴ 
λόγος οὔθ᾽ ἡδονάς φησι δεῖν διώκειν 
τὸν ὀρθὸν βίον οὔτ᾽ αὖ τὸ παράπαν 
φεύγειν τὰς λύπας, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ 
ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ μέσον, ὃ νῦν δὴ 
προσεῖπον ὡς ἵλεων ὀνομάσας. 

2. ἄν τ᾿ αὖ βραχύτερος] Se. 
Aex Geis. 

5. τὸν----ψέγοντα] We seem to 
detect in these words an apolo- 
getic tone. Comp. Gorg. 453 b. 

5. ὅτι χρὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον] These 
words depend immediately on 
ὁ λόγος παραγγέλλει. 

6. πάνυ ταχὺ] Bodl. πανταχυ. 


7. μεθιέναι] Cf. Phileb. τό 6: 
εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾷν. 

10. τῆς---δηλώσεως}] This is 
probably a genitive of respect. 
λόγῳ depends on the verbal 
meaning in δηλώσεως. 

12. φροντίζειν again depends 
on παραγγέλλει. 

15. αὐτῷ φέροντες τὸ παρά- 
δειγμα] “Applying to him 
( = ἐπιφέροντες) our example.” 
Cf. supr. 278 e. The dative 
is probably dativus commodi, 
“Bringing for his benefit.” 
Hence there is perhaps a touch 
of liveliness in the omission of 
the preposition. 

18. Οὐκοῦν ἀπὸ ye TOV πολλῶν] 
Supr. 276 a. 

ὅσαι ξύννομοι] 


Se. 


τέχναι. 


Se 


ee 


τοῦτον p. 2k 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 115 


287. ξύννομοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀγέλας 
διακεχώρισται. λοιπαὶ δέ, φαμέν, αἱ κατὰ πόλιν αὐ- 
τὴν τῶν τε ξυναιτίων καὶ τῶν αἰτίων, ἃς πρώτας ἀπ᾽ 
ἀλλήλων διαιρετέον. 
NE. ΣΩ. ᾿Ορθῶς. 5 
EE. Otc οὖν ὅτι χαλεπὸν αὐτὰς τεμεῖν δίχα ; 


ΝΣ > / 3 “A » @ ΕΣ 
τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον, ὡς οἶμαι, προϊοῦσιν οὐχ ἧττον εἐσται 





καταφανές. 


NE. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ δρᾷν οὕτως. 


\ , 4 ῪἷΝ Φ ε a 7 
HE. Κατὰ μέλη τοίνυν αὐτὰς οἷον ἱερεῖον διαιρώ- 10 These, for 


μεθα, ἐπειδὴ δίχα ἀδυνατοῦμεν. δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐγγύ- 


“ , ( > x τι 
TATA ὃ τι μάλιστα τέμνειν ἀριθμον ἀεί. 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Πῶς οὖν ποιῶμεν τὰ νῦν ; 


aD "CO yy 4) ε / / 57 
bey Le σπέερ EMTPOOVEV, OTTO AL TAPELXOVTO ορ- 


Ν \ « / / ,ὔ / 4 ἢ 
γανα περὶ τὴν ὑφαντικὴν, πάσας δήπου τότε ἐτίθεμεν 


ς ἢ 
ως συναιτιους. 


NE. >Q. Nai. 


~ \ Χ \ “-“ yA \ ἴω 
ΞΕ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ ταὐτὸν μὲν τοῦτο, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον 


“That occupy part of the same 
field :” with a slight etymolo- 
gical allusion to νομευτική. The 
comparison of infr. 289 b shews, 
however, that the word is not 
to be taken actively or accented 
ξυννόμοι. 

7. τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον---καταφανὲς | 
I. 6. The enumeration itself 
(αὐτὴ ἡ διέξοδος) will shew that 
the analysis cannot be carried 
further. 

9. δρᾷν οὕτως] προϊέναι. 

10. οἷον ἱερεῖον] Cf. Pheedr. 
265 €: καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν κατα- 
γνύναι μέρος μηδὲν κακοῦ μαγείρου 
τρόπῳ χρώμενον. The same image 
occurs in Emped. Fr. 1. 86: 
γνῶθι διατμηθέντος eve σπλάγ- 


χνοισι λόγοιο, with a further 
allusion to divination. 

ΤΙ. det yap] Cf. once more 
Phileb. τό d: δύο, εἴπως εἰσί, 
σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τρεῖς ἤ τιν᾽ ἄλλον 
ἀριθμόν. 

15. δήπου] Bod. δέ που. 

18. ταὐτὸν μὲν τοῦτο, ἔτι δὲ 
μᾶλλον] For the slight inex- 
actness of μὲν and δὲ, ef. Thezt. 
150 b: τὸ μὲν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦ- 
τον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. 

ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον] Because they 
are no less indispensable, and 
are still less to be confounded 
with the art itself. Cf Rep. 
2, 370 ὁ: 6 yap γεωργός, ὡς 
ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἑαυτῷ 
τὸ ἄροτρον K.T.X. 


ΕἼ 
Q 2 


reasons 
which will 
appear as 
we proceed, 
do not ad- 
mit of di- 
chotomy, 
but must 
be carved, 


15 like a sacri- 


fice, in 
several 
joints. 


There are, 
first, in- 
struments ; 


110 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


ἢ τόθ᾽ ἡμῖν ποιητέον. ὅσαι γὰρ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα τι Pp. 28 "7: 


n \ / A , ΄ / 
δημιουργοῦσι κατὰ πολιν ὄργανον. θετέον ἁπάσας 
μ ἢ 


, ε " / oy \ ΄, > 
TAVUTAS WS OVOAS συναιτιους. ανεὺ yap TOUT@MVY Οὐκ 


" / / > Or , , ’ 3 
ἂν ποτε γένοιτο πόλις οὐδὲ πολιτικὴ, τούτων δ᾽ αὖ 


5 βασιλικῆς ἔργον τέχνης οὐδέν που θήσομεν. 


NE. 2Q. Οὐ yap. 


EE. Kat μὲν δὴ χαλεπὸν ἐπιχειροῦμεν δρᾷν 


3 / a > ‘ a iy Ν ie ἃ 
ἀποχωρίζοντες τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ γένος 


“4 \ 3 > yy 
ὃ TL yap οὖν TOY ὀντων 


y id S e / 
*eorw ὡς Ἐ evos γέ 


7 , “- / U 
Secondly, τοτίνος ὄργανον εἰποντα δοκεῖν εἰρηκέναι TL πιθανον. 


“ Δ ὦ 3 ω » / , 3, 
ομως δὲ ετέρον αὖ TOV εν πόλει Κτήηματων εἰπῶμεν 


τόδε. 


NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον : 


ἘΠῚ ‘O » y / \ δύ yy > 
Hu, ἃς οὐκ ἐστι ταυτὴν THY ουναμιν EXOV. OV 


4. τούτων δ᾽ αὖ — θήσομεν] 
“Nor, again, shall we rank 
any one of these things as a 
function of the regal art.” 

9. 6 τι yap οὖν --- πιθανόν | 
The words as they stand in 
the MSS. (ὡς ἔστιν ἑνός γέ τι- 
νος ὄργανον) give no construc- 
tion to δοκεῖν. Stephanus 
read ἔστι for ὅ,τι, which can- 
not be spared. Ast supplied 
det; Stallbaum, ἀνάγκη; Her- 
mann omits os; Wagner, in 
Rheinsch. Mus. vol. xii. (1857) 
p- 307, reads δοκεῖ. The com- 
parison of Legg. 4, 709 b—ro δ᾽ 
ἔστι περί τε ναυτιλίαν καὶ κυβερ- 
νητικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ στρατη- 
γικὴν πάντα ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόντα δοκεῖν 
εὖ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁμοίως καὶ 
τόδε ἔστι λέγοντα εὖ λέγειν-- 
leaves no doubt that Hermann’s 
(which is nearly that of Ste- 
phanus) is the right method. 
But os is to be retained by 
being placed after ἔστιν. Cf. 


Legg. 6, 768 c: ἃ δὴ φαμὲν ov’ 
ὡς ἀρχὰς οὔθ᾽ ὡς μὴ ῥάδιον εἰ- 
πόντα ἀναμφισβητήτως εἰρηκέναι. 
Crat. 404 b: Δημητὴρ φαίνεται 
—os μητὴρ κεκλῆσθαι, and supr. 
ἐτίθεμεν ὡς συναιτίους, infr. 289 6, 
201 ἃ, supr. 281 a, b, Pheedo 
99 Ὁ. For the position of ἔστι, 
cf. Legg. 6, 769 ὁ: οἷός τε εἰς 
TO πρόσθεν ἔσται φαιδρύνων ποι- 
εἶν ἐπιδιδόναι. Bodl. MS. ὡς ἐστι 
without accent. 

11. εἴπωμεν τόδε] “ Let us say 
what follows regarding another 
of the possessions that are in 
a city.” “Say what?” “That it 
has not this power” (i. 6. is not 
πολιτικήῆ. Cf. infr.: καὶ τῇ ζητου- 
μένῃ γε προσῆκον οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς 
ἐπιστήμῃ). “ For it is not com- 
pacted with a view to being 
employed in production, as was 
the case with the genus imstru- 
ment, but for the preservation 
or retention of what has been 
made,” 


d 


a, 


Mente 

















ΠΟΛΙΓΙΚΟΣ. 


117 


87 ‘ AY / Ses, / ba y 
- Yap ἐπι YEVETEWS αἰτιᾷ πήγνυται, καῦύαπερ οργᾶνον, 





ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα τοῦ δημιουργηθέντος σωτηρίας. 


NE. SQ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


HE. Τοῦτο ὃ δὴ ξηροῖς καὶ ὑγροῖς [καὶ ἐμπύροις 


NS 3 / Ἂν 9 > / 5 4 
kai ἀπύροις)] παντοδαπὸν εἰδος ἐργασθέν, ἀγγεῖον 5 


+O Ont μιᾷ κλήσει προσφθεγγόμεθα, καὶ μάλα γε 


N 5 “ἧς ΄ ec ©} 
συχνὸν εἰδος Kal TH ζητουμένῃ γε, ὡς οἰμαι, προσ- 


“Ὁ Ia\ a / 
NkKov οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς ἐπιστήμῃ. 


NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 


6 5 ΄ὕ 
SE. Τούτων δὴ τρίτον ἕτερον εἶδος κτημάτων 


[4 / \ Ν y Ν 
πάμπολυ κατοπτέον πεζὸν καὶ ἐνυδρον καὶ πολυ- 


I. ἐπὶ γενέσεως αἰτίᾳ] “Ῥτο- 
ductionis causa.” ἐπὶ as in ἐπὶ 
τέχνῃ μανθάνει. in 
ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις δια- 
φέρειν. 1. 6. With the view of 
having production referred to 
them. 

4. Τοῦτο ---- προσφθεγγόμεθα] 
This place also appears easily re- 
mediable by rejecting the second 
ὃ δή, which is either a gloss or a 
clerical error. Stallb. is wrong 
in saying that two arts must 
be developed here. (How would 
he distinguish ἐργαλεῖον from 
ὄργανον ?) The ὄργανον has been 
already distinguished, though 
with difficulty, as a separate 
kind, being lightly passed over 
because already spoken of under 
ὑφαντική, and that here named 
(ἀγγεῖον) has been previously 
spoken of as ἕτερον, “a second.” 
The next is therefore properly 
introduced as τρίτον. 

[καὶ ἐμπύροις καὶ ἀπύροι-ς]] 
For things prepared by fire 
and not so prepared. Thus 
caldrons and pitchers are both 
included. In Legg. 3, 679 a, 


αἰτία as 


σκευῶν ἐμπύρων te Kal ἀπύρων, 
the distinction is made between 
pottery and wickerwork, the 
former of which is baked and 
will bear heat. 

9. Πῶς yap ov;] Se. εἴπωμεν 
ὡς οὐκ ἐστι ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν 
ἔχον. This form of assent to ἃ 
negative proposition has been 
questioned, and πῶς yap, πῶς 
yap οὖν, πῶς yap ἄν, suggested. 
But for a similar inexactness 
in reply, if this be inexactness, 
cf. Gorg. 467 6: ἾΔρ᾽ οὖν ἔστι 
τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν 
γ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, 
οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν ; Π. πολλὴ 
ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σ. (SC. μὴ εἶναί τι τῶν 
ὄντων ὃ ete. 

10. Τούτων δὴ ---- γιγνόμενον | 
“ And there is a third kind 
of possessions, different from 
these and very extensive, which 
we must descry, on land and 
on water, perambulatory and 
stationary, honourable and dis- 
honoured, to which one name 
is given, because it is always 
intended to be sat upon, and 
is a seat for some one.” 


10 Thirdly, 
platforms, 
or vehicles ; 


Fourthly, 
defences ; 


Fifthly, 


sports ; 


118 MAATQNOZ 


\ Ν ’ \ Ν / Ν » Δ 
mAaves καὶ ἀπλανὲς καὶ μῶν ἐλευ ἄτιμον, ἕν δὲ 
ὄνομα ἔχον, διότι πᾶν ἔνεκά τινος ἐφέδρας ἐστί, θᾶκος 
ἀεί τινι γιγνόμενον. 

NE. 2Q. Τὸ ποῖον ; 
5. SE. "Oynua αὐτό που λέγομεν, οὐ πάνυ πολιτι- 

mo A a \ lad \ 
κῆς ἔργον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολὺ τεκτονικῆς καὶ κερα- 
μικῆς καὶ χαλκοτυπικῆς. 
᾽ὔ 

NE. 2Q. Μανθάνω. 

— / \ / opt) oS 9 , 

mE. Ti δὲ τέταρτον ; ap ἕτερον εἶναι τούτων 

/ > a \ - BD lal Mf e / 

10 AEKTEOV, ἐν ᾧ τὰ πλεῖστα ἐστι τῶν πάλαι ῥηθέντων, 
3 Ip / Ν lad σ \ Χ Ν / 
ἐσθής τε ξύμπασα Kal τῶν ὅπλων TO πολὺ καὶ τείχη 

7 > “ ΄ Uf Ν / Ν 
πάντα θ᾽ ὅσα γηινα περιβλήματα καὶ λίθινα, καὶ 
/ oS les \ Ge bs ΄ ’ a 
μυρία ἕτερα ; προβολῆς de ἕνεκα ξυμπάντων αὑτῶν 
x ο ΄ ΄ 
εἰργασμένων δικαιότατ᾽ ἂν ὅλον προσαγορεύοιτο πρό- 
a a / o Ἵ 
τόβλημα, καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον τέχνης οἰκοδομικῆς ἐργον 
«᾿ an N a 7 95 oN 9 , x 
Kal ὑφαντικῆς τὸ πλεῖστον νομίζοιτ᾽ ἂν ὀρθότερον ἢ 
πολιτικῆς. 
, \ 5 
NE. 2Q. Tavu μεν οὖν. 
Ni: Ἂ / 
GE. Πέμπτον δὲ ap ἂν ἐθέλοιμεν τὸ περὶ Tov 
, Ν Ν lat NCH 7 , 
20KOT LOY καὶ γραφικὴν θεῖναι Kal ὅσα ταύτῃ προσχρώ- 


la / lod € 
μενα καὶ μουσικῇ μιμήματα τελεῖται, πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς 


I. τίμιον καὶ ἄτιμον] Cf. προ- g. Τί δὲ τέταρτον :1] Cf. Gorg. 
εδρία, πρῶτον ξύλον. Hom. Il. 474 6: τί δὲ δὴ αἴσχιον ; πότερον 
Μ. 311: τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα κ.οτ.λ. 


ἕδρῃ τε κρέασίν te κιτιλ. Dio 10. τῶν πάλαι ῥηθέντων] Supr. 

Cass. 58,18: ἕδραι τε ἄτιμοι kat 270, 280. 

στάσεις ἐπονείδιστοι. II. τῶν ὅπλων τὸ πολύ] Le. 
6. μᾶλλον πολὺ] Cf. supr. Defensive armour. 

275 ¢, and note. 16. τὸ πλεῖστον ͵]͵ “ Most,” 


κεραμικῆ) The exact bear- not “all.” Not ὁπλοποιϊκή, for 
ing of this would be more evi- example. 
dent if we knew more of the ὀρθότερον pleonastically re- 
details of Greek life. sumes πολὺ μᾶλλον, as suiting 
7. χαλκοτυπικῆς) By which better with νομίζοιτ᾽ ἄν. 
chariots, for example, are made. 


-- 


i 
| 
| 


cane a ἀεαιΞ Ἐπ 
zz = See ον 
pr ποτα ας :..........-----ς- -᾽- - ὠἘ --- 5 ὀἧὈὀ-Ὀο--  --- --.-ς-ς--.------.---------. 











ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 


/ « al 5 / 
288. μόνον ἡμῶν ἀπειργασμένα, δικαίως 


περιληφθέντα ἑνί; 
NE. ΣΩ. Ποίῳ ; 


119 


“δ ᾽ ͵ 
αν ονομαᾶτι 


Ρ" / ΄ ΄, 
HE. Παίγνιόν ποὺ τι λέγεται. 


NE. ΣΏ. Τί μήν ; 


=! r a 7 / a + “ / 
=H. Tovro τοίνυν τούτοις ἕν ὄνομα ἅπασι πρέψει 


lal 3 > n 7 
προσαγορευθέν: ov yap σπουδῆς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χάριν, 


A 7 7 rn 
ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα πάντα δρᾶται. 


NE. 2Q. Καὶ τοῦτο σον ἔτι μανθάνω. 


5 


SE. To δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις σώματα παρέχον, ἐξ ὧν το Sixthly, 


καὶ ἐν οἷς δημιουργοῦσιν ὁπόσαι τῶν τεχνῶν νῦν εἴ- 


\ 3 ἴω ε ΄ 
ρηνται, παντοδαπὸν εἰδος, πολλῶν ἑτέρων τεχνῶν 


» yf 5.3 5 “ , 
ἔκγονον ὃν, ap οὐχ ἐκτον θησομεν ; 


4. Παιίγνιόν πού τι] ‘There 
is such ἃ word in use as 
‘ child’s-play.’” Cf. Soph. 226 
Ὁ: λέγομεν. We have here 
the larger kind, of which μι- 
μητική is part. Cf. Soph. 234 
b: παιδιᾶς δὲ ἔχεις ἥ τι τεχνι- 
κώτερον ἢ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος 
ἢ τὸ μιμητικόν : 

10. Τὸ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις σώματα 
παρέχον] This (if earlier than 
the Timzus) is probably a 
nearer approach than philo- 
sophy had hitherto made to 
the distinction of matter and 
form, of which the doctrine of 
elements in the earlier Greek 
philosophy was the anticipa- 
tion. The ἄπειρον of the Phi- 
lebus (see esp. 25 6) is a more 
abstract mode of the same 
conception, taken from Pytha- 
gorean philosophy (ef. ib. 54 ¢: 
γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε 
καὶ πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὑλὴν 
παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν) : and the 
notion of formless matter oc- 


curs once again in the Timzus, 
in a passage of which the germ 
may be found in the text, 49 a: 
νῦν δ᾽ ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν εἰσαναγ- 
κάζειν χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἶδος 
ἐπιχειρεῖν λόγοις ἐμφανίσαι. τίνα 
οὖν ἔχον δύναμιν καὶ φύσιν αὐτὸ 
ὑποληπτέον 2 
πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν 
αὐτό, οἷον te Ὅλ (Cf, Ars 
Rokk (8): 
πότερον ὡς ἡ repaid) TH 
ὑφαντικῇ, ἢ ὡς ἡ χαλκουργικὴ TH 


τοιάνδε μάλιστα, 


αἱ re Cs ‘ 
GE Gh Gan seatiayy 


> Poy > \ c ’ 
ἀνδριαντοποιΐᾳ' οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως 
ς ~ > >? c \ als 
ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἡ μὲν ὄργανα 


δὲ 
ὑποκείμενον, ἐξ οὗ τι 
ἔργον, ὑφάντῃ 
μὲν ἔρια, ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν. 

11. ἐν οἷς] Matter is that 
in which art works as well as 
out of which art produces. Cf. 
Phileb. 59 d: καθάπερ δημιουρ- 
yots ἡμῖν, 
δημιουργεῖν τι, παρακεῖσθαι. 

12. 
γονον oy | 


παρέχει, ἡ δὲ THY ὕλην. λέγω 
ὕλην τὸ 


> “ - 
ἀποτελεῖται οἷον 


- BD ἘΣ “ 
ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ 


πολλῶν ἑτέρων τεχνῶν ἔκ- 
Hence it appears 


materials, 
(which 
should 
have been 
put first :) 


120 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ποῖον δὴ λέγεις ; 


» Ν / , « ’ 
EE. Χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον καὶ πανθ᾽ ὁπόσα 


NA / Va ὃ \ Ν Ν & / 
μέτα €VETAL, και OOH ὀρυοτομικῇ Και κουρα υμπᾶασα 


/ / “ Ν ‘el Ν » 
TEMVOVO A παρέχει TEKTOVLKY) και πλεκτικῇ»; και ετι 


‘ ΄- > / / / 
5 φλοιστικὴ φυτῶν τε Kal ἐμψύχων δέρματα σωμάτων 


A / NG / Ν \ ΚΤ, 
περιαιρουσα σκυτοτΤομικῆ. Καὶ OOAL TE pl TA TOLAVT 


> a / ΄σ 
εἰσὶ τέχναι, καὶ φελλῶν καὶ βύβλων καὶ δεσμῶν 


» a / XN 
ἐργαστικαί, παρέσχον δημιουργεῖν σύνθετα ἐκ μὴ 


/ yA “ ἃ \ > τ 7 
συντιθεμένων εἴδη γενῶν. ἐν δὲ αὐτὸ προσαγορεύωμεν 


“ Ν \ b) / te] Ἂς »45“.’ 
τοπτᾶν τὸ TpwToyeves ἀνθρώποις κτῆμα, καὶ ἀξυνθετον 


Ν a > / » ΄σ y y 
καὶ βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδαμῶς ἔργον OV. 


that matter is a relative no- 
tion: for which thought, see 
also Tim. 49 b, e. 

2. Χρυσόν — yevav] “I 
mean gold and silver and 
all mineral productions, and 
all that wood-cutting and 
every sort of cutting provides 
for the arts of carpentry 
and plaiting ; and all wherein 
the process of barking, strip- 
ping off the cuticle of plants, 
and the currier’s art, denud- 
ing animals of theirs, and the 
other arts connected with such 
produce, that manufacture 
corks and papyrus and fasten- 
ings, provide for the manufac- 
ture of composite species from 
simple kinds.” Note the rhythm 
of the concluding words. 

The structure resembles 
Soph. 227 a: καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων 
σωμάτων (καθάρσεις), ὧν γναφευ- 
τικὴ καὶ ξύμπασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπι- 
μέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ, 
πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα ὀνόματα 
So here: καὶ φλοιστικὴ 
- περιαιροῦσα k.T.A. παρέσχον. 
The words from καὶ downwards 


aa 
EO XEV. 


are part of the relative clause, 
though not to be construed 
strictly with ὅσα. Compare 
the order of words in Legg. 6, 
779 d: πάντα ὅσα διδασκαλεῖα 
κατεσκευασμένα περιμένει τοὺς 
φοιτητὰς καὶ θεατὰς θέατρα. Ib. 
8734: ἐν τοῖς τῶν δώδεκα ὁρίοισι 
μερῶν. 

3. κουρά] Τὰ. g. the cutting 
of osiers and brushwood, the 
mowing of grass and reaping 
of straw, the cropping of 
horses’ and camels’ hair, the 
shearing of sheep. 

7. δεσμῶν] Such as glue 
and thread. 

10. TO πρωτογενὲς ἀνθρώποις 
κτῆμα] The first-born of hu- 
man possessions, because ne- 
cessary to the production of 
all else. The word is a rare 
one, and occurs in the Orphie 
verses, where also Nature 
(φύσις) is called πρωτογένεια. 
It seems probable that Plato 
had this, in common with 
other terms employed in these 
dialogues, from a Pythagorean 
source. 


a 


ΠΟΛΙΓΙΚΟΣ. 
NE. ΣΩΏ. Καλώς. 


—_ \ \ ΄“ a a a ὦ , ἈΝ 
BE. Τὴν δὴ τῆς τροφῆς κτῆσιν, καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ 
σῶμα ξυγκαταμιγνύμενα ἑαυτῶν μέρεσι μέρη σώμα- 


> Ν ΄ / if 7 / 
Tos εἰς TO θεραπεῦσαί τινα δύναμιν εἴληχε, λεκτέον 


121 


Y > 7, uN / ε vad τὶ 
ἕβδομον ὀνομάσαντας αὐτὸ ξύμπαν ἡμῶν εἶναι τρο- 
/ (4 7 yy » rod 
hov, εἰ μὴ τι κάλλιον ἔχομεν ἄλλο θέσθαι. γεωργικῇ 
\ \ ied Ν “ > ” ἊΝ 
δὲ καὶ θηρευτικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἰατρικῇ καὶ 


tal cal / / ’ DY 
μαγειρικῇ πᾶν ὑποτιθέντες ὀρθότερον ἀποδώσομεν ἢ 











τῇ πολιτικῇ. 


NE. 20. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 


N o / Χ 
mE. Σχεδὸν τοίνυν ὅσα ἔχεται κτήσεως, πλὴν 


a ἘΠΕ Σ ΄ > ΄ ε \ 5 / 
TOV ἡμέρων ζώων, εν TOUTOLS ETTTA οἶμαι γένεσιν 


» 7 , LS \ , \ 3 \ 
εἰρῆσθαι. σκόπει δέ; ἣν yap δικαιότατα μὲν av τεθὲν 


> > \ Ν \ 5 \ \ an 5 
KQT αρχᾶς ΤΟ πρρῶώτογεένες εἰδος, μέτα δὲ TOUTO Op- 


yavov, ἀγγεῖον, ὄχημα, πρόβλημα, παίγνιον, θρέμμα. 


, \ 7 Χ 
παραλείπομεν δὲ εἴ τι μὴ 


3. ἑαυτῶν μέρεσι] The po- 
sition of ἑαυτῶν μέρεσιν, which 
is for the sake of emphasis, 
determines the order of the 
following words. The whole is 
a periphrasis for φάρμακα. 

μέρη σώματος εἰς τὸ θερα- 
πεῦσαι δύναμίν τινα] Note the 
inversion : for δυν. τ. εἰς τὸ θερ. 
σώματος μέρη. 

7. γυμναστικῇ] Because the 
trainer prescribes a certain 
diet. 

11. ὅσα ἔχεται κτήσεως] ΟἿ. 
Theet. 145 a: ὅσα τε παιδείας 
ἔχεται, alib. 

12. ἣν γὰρ] “ For we had, 
what would rightly have been 
placed first, the primitial kind.” 

15. θρέμμα] “ Nourishment.” 
This meaning is not noticed in 
the Lexicons, but Stallbaum 


ΩΣ 


μέγα λέληθεν εἴς τι τού- 


well compares the use of γέν- 
νῆμα in Soph. 266 ἃ. Both 
uses originate in the “ cog- 
nate” object of the active 
becoming the subject of the 
passive voice. θρέμμα retains 
a verbal signification also in 
Lege. 7, 789 b: τρέφουσιν — 
ὀρνίθων θρέμματα. 

16. παραλείπομεν----συμφωνήσει] 
“But we pass over whatever 
insignificant kind may have 
escaped us, which may pos- 
sibly be made to fit into one 
of these, for instance, -the na- 
ture of coins, seals, and stamps 
of all sorts.” [μέγα], which 
Bodl. Vat. Ven. M1 omit, is re- 
tained, not as genuine, but as 
possibly preserving the trace 
of a lost reading, perhaps of 
μόγις, suggested by Stallbaum. 


R 


Seventhly, 
nourish- 
ments. 


σι 


Το 


Into these 
seven kinds 
all posses- 
sions ex- 
cept living 
creatures 
can, by 
hook or 

15 by crook, 
be distri- 
buted. 


Animate 
posses- 
sions, with 
the excep- 
tion of 
slaves,were 
previously 
included in 
the art of 
tending 
herds. 
There 
remains 
therefore 
the class of 
servants, 
amongst 
whom to 


look for the 19 


nearest 
rivals of 
the king. 
But slaves, 
who are 
servants in 


122 ITAATQNOZ 


των {{μεγὰ]} δυνατὸν ἁρμόττειν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ νομί- p. 8} 


᾽ / Ν / Ν Ν lal 
σματος ἰδέα καὶ σφραγίδων καὶ παντὸς χαρακτῆρος. 


/ \ > > ΄ rc Ia\ 32) / 
γένος TE yap εν AUTOLS TAVUTA οὐδὲν Exel μέγα ξύν- 


> \ \ \ > / \ \ > yy 
νομον, ἀλλὰ τὰ pev εἰς KOTMOVY, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὄργανα 


/ / σ \ ’ὔ e , ͵7 
δβίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δὲ πάντως €AKopeva συμφωνήσει. 


\ \ Ν / “ “ ε / Ν ΄ 
τὰ δὲ περὶ ζώων κτῆσιν τῶν ἡμέρων, πλὴν δούλων, 


ἡ πρότερον ἀγελαιοτροφικὴ διαμερισθεῖσα πάντα 


εἰληφυΐα ἀναφαίνεται. 


NE. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


EE. Τὸ δὲ δὴ δούλων καὶ πάντων ὑπηρετῶν λοιπόν, 


> - Ν / \ Ν 3 ωΝἪἮ x , 
εν OLS που και μαντεύομαι TOUS TrEpl QUTO TO πλέγμα 


ἀμφισβητοῦντας τῷ βασιλεῖ καταφανεῖς γενήσεσθαι, 


, a c , ΄ \ κ᾿ \ 7, 
καθαπερ τοῖς ὑφάνταις τοτε τοὺς περὶ τὸ νήθειν TE 


3. γένος--συμφωνήσει] “ For 
these, while they have not in 
them the nature of any exten- 
sive kind which can be classed 
along with them, yet can, by 
hook or by crook, be made to 
harmonize, though not without 
some violence, either with the 
ornaments or the instruments 
of life.” 

τε γὰρ — adda] δὲ and 
even μέντοι and ἀλλὰ may 
sometimes follow re, when the 
opposition between two paral- 
lel clauses is thought of as 
the sentence proceeds. Cf. 
Pheedo 63 ¢: παρὰ ἄνδρας τε--- 
ὅτι μέντοι mapa θεούς, where 
however μὲν is interposed, and 
Theeet. 143 ©: περὶ αὑτοῦ τε ἢ 
αὖ περὶ τὸν ἀποκρινομένου. The 
two clauses here answer to μὴ 
μέγα and δυνατὸν ἁρμόττειν supr. 

4. εἰς κόσμον] Which is a de- 
partment of παίγνιον : 288 ο. 

5. Bia μέν---Κὅἥμως δὲ] Cf. 
Rep. 10, 607 6: βίᾳ μὲν, ὅμως 


δὲ ἀπέχονται, and Soph. Ant. 
ITI16: οἴμοι μόλις μὲν, καρδίας 
δ᾽ ἐξίσταμαι τὸ δρᾷν, τε is used 
because their not being refer- 
rible to an important class is 
one of the two reasons for 
omitting them. 

7. ἡ πρότερον ἀγελαιοτροφικὴ 
διαμερισθεῖσαΪ ~=Note the in- 
verted order. 

II, ἐν ois που] “Somewhere 
amongst whom.” 

τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πλέγμαϊ 
He refers to the difficulty 
about the king in the language 
of the example of weaving: 
i.e. those who dispute with the 
king about the fabric of the 
web itself and not only about 
the instruments of the manu- 
facture. Cf. 268, 281; and 
vid. infr. 305 6: πάντα ξυνυ- 
φαίνουσαν ὀρθότατα --- τὴν δὴ 
βασιλικὴν συμπλοκήν. 

13. τοῖς ὑφάνταις] Se. ἀμφισ- 


βητοῦντας φαίνεσθαι. 





: 








ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 123 


\ , “ yy 7 ε ” , 
289. καὶ ξαίνειν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα εἴπομεν. οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πάν- 


τες, ὡς συναίτιοι λεχθέντες, ἅμα τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς νῦν 
δὴ ῥηθεῖσιν ἀνήλωνται καὶ ἀπεχωρίσθησαν ἀπὸ βα- 
σιλικῆς τε καὶ πολιτικῆς πράξεως. 

NE. 2Q. Ἔοικασι γοῦν. 

EE. Ἴθι δὴ σκεψώμεθα τοὺς λοιπούς, προσ- 
ελθόντες ἐγγύθεν, ἵν᾿ αὐτοὺς εἰδῶμεν βεβαιότερον. 

NE. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν χρή. 

SE. Τοὺς μὲν δὴ μεγίστους ὑπηρέτας, ὡς ἐνθένδε 
ἰδεῖν, τοὐναντίον ἔχοντας εὑρίσκομεν οἷς ὑπωπτεύσα- 
μεν ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ πάθος. 

NE. ΣΩ. Twas : 

ΞΕ, Tous ὠνητούς τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ κτη- 
τούς" ods ἀναμφισβητήτως δούλους ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν, 
ἥκιστα βασιλικῆς μεταποιουμένους τέχνης. 

NE. ΣΏ. [los δ᾽ οὔ: 


mE. Τί δέ; τῶν ἐλευθέρων ὅσοι τοῖς νῦν δὴ ῥη- 


9. μεγίστους----ὡς ἐνθένδε ἰδεῖν] 
“The greatest—as seen from 
where we now stand.” 1. 6. 
the greatest servants, because 
most essentially such, this 
being the only measure which 
our method allows. Cf. infr, 
303 6, for the same use of 


τῷ καλῶς δουλεῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ 
καλῶς ἄρξαι. Ib. 763 a: αὐτοὶ 
dv αὑτῶν διανοηθήτωσαν ὡς βιω- 
σόμενοι διακονοῦντές τε καὶ δια- 
κονούμενοι ἑαυτοῖς. 

10. οἷς] = ἐκείνοις ἃ. Plural, 
because of the two antecedents, 
ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ πάθος. 


μέγιστος. Also Phileb. 45 a: 11. καὶ πάθος] “ And feel- 
μέγισται τῶν ἡδονῶν. Legg. 1, ing,” viz. ambition. 

e ‘ > ~ , Cm “A δ c ~ > 
630 a: τους εν τῷ βεγίστῷ ; 17. τοῖς νυν δὴ ῥηθεῖσιν εἰς 
πολέμῳ γιγνομενους αριστοῦυς ὑπηρετικήν | Qu. an legend. 
διαφανῶς. The contempt here ὑπηρεσίαν See, however, Eu- 


thyphr. 13 ἃ. “To the task of 
ministering to those just now 
mentioned” (the artificers of 
the seven kinds of posses- 
sions). All trade, especially 
in money, is viewed by the 
Greek philosophers as essenti- 


implied for διακονία may be 
contrasted with a striking pas- 
sage of the Laws, where the 
power of ministering to them- 
selves and others is made es- 
sential to the officers of state, 
6, 762 6: καλλωπίζεσθαι χρὴ 


Ὁ ἢ 


2 
2 


15 


the highest 
degree, 
have no- 
thing in 
common 
with the 
king. Nor 
have those 
freemen 
who en- 
gage as 
birelings 
in the ser- 
vile opera- 
tions of 
trade. 


124 


΄- , [ὦ \ e / « Ἁ / ve 
θεῖσιν εἰς ὑπηρετικὴν EKOVTES αὑτοὺς τάττουσι, τὰ TE p. 28 9. 


ITAATQNOD 


/ Ν Ν “- » lal A / 
γεωργίας καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ἔργα διακομίζον - 


aid) ..9 / Ai 3 lal « \ yes) , 
Tes ἐπ ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀνισοῦντες, OL μὲν KAT ἀγορᾶς, 


ε / > , > ͵ὕ \ / 
οἱ δὲ πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλάττοντες κατὰ θάλατταν 


ἵν Sa / , Ν 53 Ν ae. ‘ ee. 
5 καὶ πεζῇ, νομισμά TE πρὸς τάλλα καὶ AUTO πρὸς AUTO 


¢ 5 5» / A 
διαμείβοντες, ods ἀργυραμοιβούς τε Kal ἐμπόρους καὶ 


» 7 a lal 
ναυκλήρους καὶ καπήλους ἐπωνομάκαμεν, μῶν τῆς 


an ΕἸ / 
πολιτικῆς ἀμφισβητήσουσί τι; 


NE. 2Q. Tay’ ἂν ἴσως τῆς γε τῶν ἐμπορευτικῶν. 


ΙΟ 


EE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ μήν, οὕς γε ὁρῶμεν μισθωτοὺς καὶ 


a a « , lal / 
Onras πᾶσιν ἑτοιμότατα ὑπηρετοῦντας, μὴ ποτε βα- 


΄ / v4 
OLALKNS μεταποιουμένους εὕρωμεν. 


ally inferior to other forms of 
industry. Cf. Rep. 2, 371 b: 
Καὶ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων που 
τῶν τε εἰσαξόντων καὶ ἐξαξόντων 
ἕκαστα. οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν ἔμποροι. 
Ib. α: εἰσὶν οἱ τοῦτο ὁρῶντες 
ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάτ- 
τουσι ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς 
οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι οἱ 
ἀσθενέστατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ 
ἀχρεῖοί τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν. --- 
αὕτη ἄρα ἡ χρεία καπήλων ἡμῖν 
γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἢ οὐ 
καπήλους πρὸς 
ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ; 
and for πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως in this 
connexion, cf. Soph. 224 b, 
and note. 

The statesmen are viewed 
as διάκονοι in the Gorgias, 
p. 517. Cf. Theet. 175 e: 
τορῶς τε καὶ ὄξεως διακονεῖν. 
Legg. 8,831 e (of the influ- 
ence of commerce) : ἐμπόρους τε 
καὶ ναυκλήρους καὶ διακόνους πάν- 
τως τοὺς φύσει κοσμίους τῶν ἀν- 
θρώπων ἀπεργαζομένη. 

I. τά τε —  διαμείβοντες | 
“ Bringing over to each other 


A ‘ 
καλοῦμεν τοὺς 


and equalizing the work of the 
husbandman and of the other 
artificers (ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους, 56. τοὺς 
γεωργούς, &e.): some in the 
market-place and some trans- 
ferring them from city to city 
by sea and land, exchanging 
money for other commodities, 
and these for money.” 

3. ἀνισοῦντε) This seems 
to point to a doctrine of ex- 
change approaching to that of 
Aristotle in Eth. Nie. V. 

4. πόλιν -- ἀλλάττοντε)]) Cf. 
Soph. 224 b, and note. The 
words are usually taken to 
mean “going from city to 
city ;” for which cf. Theet. 
181d: χώραν ἐκ χώρας pera- 
βάλλῃ. 

9. τῆς γε τῶν ἐμπορευτικῶν 
(sc. πολιτικῆς)}] “ The science 
of directing commercial inter- 
course.” The merchant may 
profess political economy, but 
not statesmanship or political 
science. 

το. καὶ θῆτας] Cf. Euthyphr. 
Hae: 


Ρ. 28 


..........».................- - Ἐς. 


IIOAITIKO2. 125 


290. NE. SQ; ΠΠὡς γαρ; Then hee 
᾿ 2 δι aes are public 
RE. Τί δὲ ἄρα τοὺς τὰ τοιάδε διακονοῦντας ἡμῖν semua 
8ucn as 


ἑκάστοτε: heralds 
and scribes, 
who are 


NE. 2Q. Τὰ ποῖα εἶπες καὶ τίνας ; 


= n x 2 ς , not to be 
b ΞΕ. Ὧν τὸ κηρυκικὸν ἔθνος, ὅσοι τε περὶ γράμ- 5 confound- 
x ; ; Ξ i, ed with the 
ματα σοφοὶ γίγνονται πολλάκις ὑπηρετήησαντες, rulers. Yet, 
N Γ ACs Bo 5 n 5 \ zs however 
καὶ πολλ᾽ ἄττα ἕτερα περὶ Tas apxas διαπονεῖσθαι strange the 
Α “ ͵ὕ , 7 5 7 thought 
τινὲς ἕτεροι πάνδεινοι, TL τούτους αὖ λέζομεν ; that the 


claimants 
for the art 
of rule are 
10 to be found 
amongst 


NE. 2Q. Ὅπερ εἶπες viv, ὑπηρέτας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ av- 
Pp » UMNPETAS, 
\ la “ a» 
τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας. 


=! > > / 53 / / \ 5 
BE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ μὴν, οἰμαί γε, ἐνύπνιον ἰδὼν εἶπον 


servants, 
; , \ , 3 it was 
ταὐτῃ πῇ φανήσεσθαι τοὺς διαφερόντως ἀμφισβη- το mere 
> a ἮΝ a , / ὃ ey dream. 
τοῦντας τῆς πολιτικῆς. καί TOL σφόδρα YE ἄτοπον ἂν There are 
5 / X a , D ¢ a other pub- 
ο εἶναι δόξειε τὸ ᾧηγτεῖν τούτους ἐν ὑπηρετικῇ μοιρᾳ τὰ εν ΡοΣ 
ἢ ters whom 
τινι. Τὸ we have 
aN 53 not yet 
NE. 2Q. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. που 
7 Ν 3 , > Ν . 
HE. "Ere δὴ προσμίξωμεν ἐγγύτερον ἐπὶ τοὺς ΤῊΘ priest, 
, ΄ὕ τ Ν ἘΝῚ Ὁ \ s diates be- 
{ATT @ βεβασαν ὌΠ ous. εἰσὶ δὲ οἵ ἦν I eS ra gods 
+ ΄ » , oa 3S + and men 
EXGVTES τινος STDS OUGID! Be ptO Se AE ae 
if / a 5 
ap ποὺ νομίζονται παρὰ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις. 20 prophet, 
Yap 7 μ ζ Ὥ ρ = who inter- 


2. Tovs—Otakovodvras] Ne. εὕ- ΤΙ. AAN od—polpa τινί] “Yet 








popev or λέξομεν. 

5. περὶ γράμματα 7 H.g. the 
public γραμματεῖς at Athens. 

6. copoi—innperncarres| Cf. 
Legg. 4, 720 Ὁ: ἐάν τέ γ᾽ ἐλεύ- 
θεροι ὦσιν ἐάν τε δοῦλοι, κατ᾽ ἐπί- 
ταξιν δὲ τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ θεωρίαν 
καὶ κατ᾽ ἐμπειρίαν τὴν τέχνην κτῶνται. 

7. καὶ πόλλ᾽ ἄττα---πάνδεινοι] 
* And certain others most 
accomplished in performing 
many other processes con- 
nected with government.” 

9. Ὅπερ εἶπες] Supr. ὑπηρε- 
τήσαντας. 


I am convinced it was no 
mere dream which prompted 
me to say that somewhere 
hereabouts would appear the 
men who above others put in 
an opposing claim to the poli- 
tical art—though it may in- 
deed be thought very absurd 
to look for these in any servile 
department.” 

17. προσμίξωμεν ἐγγύτερον | 
Cf. Thezet. 179 ¢: προσιτέον οὖν 
ἐγγυτέρω. 

19. τινος --- μόριον] “ A por- 
tion of ἃ kind of servile 


prets the 
will of hea- 
ven,assume 
an impos- 
ing atti- 
tude. In 
Heypt the 
king must 


always be 5 7Q@pa 


a priest, 
and the 
Archon- 
Basileus at 
Athens 
performs 
the most 
ancient 
sacrifices. 
At last, 
then, we 
have hit 
upon a 
trace of 
those whom 
we seek. 
These 
archon- 
kings, 
elected by 
lot, belong 
with their 
ministers 
toa certain 
motley 
and shift- 
ing throng: 
some of 


126 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 
NE. ΣΟ Nai. 
EE. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἱερέων αὖ γένος, ὡς TO 


νόμιμόν φησι, παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δωρεὰς θεοῖς διὰ θυ- 


al > a , > \ a > / “Ὁ 
σιῶν ἐπιστῆμον ἐστι κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις δωρεῖσθαι, 


Ν 


\ > / « lal > lad lad lal 7 
δὲ ἐκείνων ἡμῖν εὐχαῖς κτῆσιν ἀγαθῶν αἰτή- ἃ 


fal \ / / 3 ὔ / 
σασθαι. ταῦτα de διακόνου τέχνης ἐστί που μόρια 


ἀμφότερα. 


NE. 2Q. Paivera γοῦν. 


— 7 / “ ey, 
ZE.” Hon τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦμεν οἷόν ye τινος ἴχνους 


x43 δ / 7 \ \ \ “ 
τοέφ᾽ ὃ πορευόμεθα προσάπτεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ δὴ τῶν 


ς 7 “ Ν \ ΄σ΄ , 5 7 i; 
ἱερέων σχημαὰ καὶ TO τῶν μάντεων εὖ μάλα Ppovn- 


ματος πληροῦται καὶ δόξαν σεμνὴν λαμβάνει διὰ τὸ 


/ 6 lod 3 , Cd Ν \ Αἴ 
μέγεῦος των ἐγχειρημάτων, WOTE περὶ μεν Διγυπτον 


οὐδ᾽ ἔξεστι βασιλέα χωρὶς ἱερατικῆς ἄρχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν 


yy Ν , J 5 yy / , 
τἄρα Kal τύχῃ πρότερον ἐξ ἄλλου γένους βιασάμενος, 


A 3 a > a 5 STEN Χ 
ὕστερον ἀναγκαῖον εἰς τοῦτο εἰστελεῖσθαι αὑτὸν τὸ 


γένος. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν Ελλήνων πολλαχοῦ ταῖς με- 


/ a Ν / a A An 
γίσταις ἀρχαῖς τὰ μέγιστα τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα 


, “ ΔΟ / 7 3, \ 
θύματα εὕροι τις av προσταττόμενα θύειν. καὶ On 


art,” viz. of that of the inter- 
preter, who is a species of 
servant. 

2. ὡς TO νόμιμόν φησι] The 
irony of this appears from 
Legg. 10, 906, Rep. 2, 364 e. 

4. κατὰ νοῦν éxewous] CF. 
Soph. id. Col. 1768: κατὰ 
νοῦν κείνῳ, where the expres- 
sion conveys a similar reveren- 
tial feeling. 

9. οἷόν γέ twos txvovs] Cf. 
Rep. 4, 432 d: κινδυνεύομέν τι 
ἔχειν ἴχνος. 

10. τὸ yap—yevos] “ For we 
see that the priest and prophet 
assume an attitude of proud 


importance, and have im- 
pressed mankind with awe, on 
account of the greatness of 
their undertakings, so that in 
Egypt it is not lawful for a 
king to reign without the 
priesthood, but if it should so 
happen that he has previously 
forced his way to the throne 
from some other caste, it is 
necessary that he be after- 
wards initiated into this.” 

18, τὰ μέγιστα----θύματα] “The 
most important sacrifices con- 
nected with such things,” viz. 
with propitiation. Qu. an le- 
gend. θυμάτων 1 


Ρ.2 | 


— 
~m— 


δε τ σεν 65. 














ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


\ SING. A , ov a A , . a 
90. καὶ Tap ὑμῖν οὐχ ἠκιστα δῆλον ὃ λέγω" τῷ 
] / rn - \ , 
λαχόντι βασιλεῖ φασὶ τῇδε τὰ σεμνότατα Kal 


197 


γὰρ 
μά- 


λιστα πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσιῶν ἀποδεδόσθαι. 


NE. ΣΏΩ, Καὶ πάνυ γε. 


Χ \ / 
HE. Τούτους re τοίνυν τοὺς κληρωτοὺς βασιλέας 5 


vA Ν 7 AGP να / Sey / aS 
Aa και ἱερέας; και υπηρετας αὐτῶν καὶι τινὰ ETEPOV 


΄, “, 7 A "7 ΄, a 
πάμπολυν ὄχλον σκεπτέον, OS ἄρτι καταδηλος νῦν 


« lal / a yf 
ἡμῖν γέγονεν ἀποχωρισθέντων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν. 
NE. 3Q. Tivas αὐτοὺς καὶ λέγεις ; 
/ \ YY 
HE. Καὶ μάλα τινὰς ἀτόπους. 


NE, 50. Τί δή; 


, , , SN 7 ,ὕἷ 
HE. Παμφυλὸόν τι γένος αὐτῶν ὡς γε ἄρτι σκο- 


’ὔἅ / Ν \ \ / - 3 
πουμένῳ φαίνεται. πολλοὶ μὲν yap λέουσι τῶν av- 


2. τῇδε] “Here in Athens.” 
Cf. the Rex Saerificulus at 
Rome. He might have in- 
stanced Agamemnon in Ho- 


in Greek 


mer and Theseus 
tragedy. τῶ 
τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μάλιστα 


πάτρια] He presided at the 
Lenean or older Dionysia: 
superintended the mysteries 
and games called λαμπαδηφο- 
piat, and had to offer up sacri- 
fices and prayers in the Eleu- 
sinium, both at Athens and 
Eleusis. (Smith’s Dict. of Ant., 
s. v. Archon.) 

5. κληρωτοὺς] Following up 
the notion of λαχόντι. In men- 
tioning the ἄρχων βασιλεὺς we 
have at last hit upon one of 
the real pretenders to political 


power. 
6. καὶ ὑπηρέτας αὐτῶν] Cf. 
Ar. Pol. IV. 12: ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ 


“ , e/ , - 
τοῦτο διορίσαι ῥᾳδιον, ποίας δεῖ 
ε > (Fe a \ > 
καλεῖν ἀρχάς᾽ πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπι- 
στατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖ- 


"» 
OUTE 


ται διόπερ πάντας τοὺς 
αἱρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρωτοὺς 
ἄρχοντας θετέον, οἷον τοὺς ἱερεῖς 
πρῶτον. 

ὑπηρετὰὲ αὐτῶν ἢ] The λο- 


γογράφοι are perhaps included, 
who furnished public speakers 
with arguments. 

9. Tivas—xai| Cf. Theet. 
πόσα: 
χάνει ὄν. 


ὃ τι δήποτε καὶ τυγ- 
Euthyd. 271 a: Ὃπό- 
τερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων ; 

13. πολλοὶ --- θηρίοις 7 Le. 
“Some strong and fierce, some 
weak and cunning.” Compare 
Bacon, Ady. of Learning, Ellis’ 
ed., p. 394. ‘And although 
we have said that the use of 
this doctrine (of Elenches) is 
for redargution, yet it is mani- 
fest the degenerate and cor- 
rupt use is for caption and 
contradiction : which passeth 
for a great faculty, and no 
doubt is of very great advant- 
age: though the difference be 
good which was made between 


whom, like 
lions and 
Centaurs, 
are fierce 
and strong; 
others 
weak and 
cunning, 
like Satyrs. 
Yet their 
strange- 
ness is only 
the igno- 
rance of 
an unfami- 
liar vision. 
The mon- 
sters just 
described 
are no 
other than 
the band 
who man- 
age the 
affairs of 
states. 


128 ITAATQNOZ 


n » ΄ ΄ cu 
δρῶν εἴξασι καὶ Kevravpous καὶ τοιούτοισιν ἑτέροις, p- 29 i! 
΄ \ / a / Ν 
πάμπολλοι δὲ Σατύροις καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι καὶ πολυ- b 
/ / \ \ ’ / ΕῚ 7 
τρόποις θηρίοις" ταχὺ δὲ μεταλλάττουσι Tas τε ἰδέας 
Ν ‘ / > ’ / Ν / a 
καὶ τὴν δύναμιν εἰς ἀλλήλους. καὶ μέντοι μοι νῦν, 


om / 4 “ Υ̓͂ ‘ ᾿, ᾿ 
5@ Σώκρατες, ἄρτι δοκῶ κατανενοηκέναι τοὺς ἂν- ᾿ 


This is 
Arch-So- 
phist, the 


Opas. 


NE. 50. Λέγοις av’ ἔοικας yap ἀτοπόν τι καθ- 


ορᾶν. 


=E N Le ἊΝ Ν ΒΩ » ᾿ val 
EE. Nai: τὸ yap ἀτοπον ἐξ ayvoias πᾶσι συμ- 


/ Ν Ν \ Ν a aN a "ἊΝ ε 
το βαίνει. καὶ yap δὴ καὶ νῦν αὐτὸς τοῦτο ἐπαθον 


5 7 > , \ Ν Ν A lal "2 
ἐξαίφνης ἠμφεγνόησα κατιδὼν τὸν περὶ τὰ τῶν πὸ- 


λεων πράγματα χορόν. 
NE. >Q. Ποῖον: 


EE. Tov πάντων τῶν 


orators and sophisters, that 
the one is as the greyhound, 
which hath the advantage in 
the race, and the other as the 
hare, which hath her advantage 
in the turn, so as it is the 
advantage to the weaker crea- 
ture.” And cf. Legg. 6, 781 
a: τὸ θηλὺ ἐπικλοπώτερον διὰ τὸ 
ἀσθενές. 

4. καὶ pevtor—avdpas] “ And 
come, I do think I now this 
moment have perceived the na- 
ture of the men.” 

7. ἔοικας — kabopav] 1. 6. 
“ Judging from your looks.” 
Cf. Soph. Ant. 20: δηλοῖς γάρ 
TL καλχαίνουσ᾽ ἔπος. Legg. 3 
810 €: τί ποτε τοῦτ᾽ ὦ ξένε, 
φαίνει πρὸς σαυτὸν ὄντως ἠπορη- 
Kas λέγειν ; 

The principle of election by 
lot, which Plato ridicules here, 
is admitted within very narrow 
limits in the Laws. Cf. Lege. 
3, 690d: Θεοφιλῆ δέ ye καὶ 


rn / / 
σοφιστῶν μέγιστον γόητα 


εὐφιλῆ τινα λέγοντες ἑβδόμην ap- 
χὴν (compare the seven forms 
of government and seven c¢a- 
tegories of possession in the 
Politicus) εἰς κλῆρόν τινα προ- 
ἄγομεν κ.τ.λ. 

. τὸ γὰρ ἄτοπον ἐξ ἀγνοίας] 
Cf. Arist. Met. I. 2. 982b: ὁ & 
ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ay- 
νοεῖν. 

10. αὐτὸς τοῦτο ἔπαθον] “1 
myself fell into this snare,” 
viz. of thinking strange what 
was only strange to me. The 
Stranger is like the philoso- 
pher as described in the Thez- 
tetus, who knows nothing of 
public assemblies or the de- 
tails of civic life. For πάσχω 
in this sense, ef. Soph. 232 a, 
Ar. Pol. IV. 7: τοῦτο πάσχουσιν 
οἱ λέγοντες διὰ TO μεμῖχθαι καλῶς. 

11. ἐξαίφνης belongs by an 
hyperbaton to κατιδών. 

14. Tov—ydnta] Cf. Soph. 
235 a: els γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μι- 











ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


129 


ἈΝ , aA 7 , A κ a 
ΟἹ, και TQAUTNS TS TEXVNS ἐμπειρότατον᾽ OV ἀπὸ TOV 


ww + “-“ \ al , 
OVT@S OVTMY πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καίπερ παγ- 


7 57 - > / ᾽ “-“ 
χάλεπον ὄντα ἀφαιρεῖν ἀφαιρετέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἰδεῖν 


ἐναργῶς τὸ ζητούμενον. 


NE. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε οὐκ ἀνετέον. 


HE. Οὔκουν δὴ κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν. καί μοι φράζε 


τόδε. 


NE. >Q. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


= 5 > 3 7 a od ἘΝ a 
BE. “Ap ov μοναρχία τῶν πολιτικῶν ἡμῖν ἀρχῶν 


2 Ν / 
ἐστὶ μια: 


NE. 2Q. Ναί. 


=A) K \ \ , 3) yx 5 x 
py te αι μετὰ μοναρχιᾶν εἴποι TLS AV, οιμαι, ΤῊΡν 


ΘΙ ΘΝ, a ON Se ͵ 
ὕπο τῶν ολίγων δυναστείαν. 


NE. 2Q. Ids δ᾽ οὔ; 


H&E. Τρίτον δὲ σχῆμα πολιτείας οὐχ ἡ τοῦ πλή- 


θους ἀρχή, δημοκρατία τοὔνομα κληθεῖσα ; 


NE. ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε. 


σ΄ > 3 vad > / / \\ 
mE. Τρεῖς δ᾽ οὖσαι μῶν ov πέντε τρόπον τινὰ 


/ / 3 ἐ an yf SN ε ων ΕῚ 7 
γίγνονται, δύο ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἄλλα πρὸς αὑταῖς ὀνόματα 


TLKTOVOAL 5 


μητὴν apa θετέον τινα. The sin- 
cular after χόρον is curious, but 
this is only one more instance 
of the transition from the class 
to the ideal individual, which 
we have had frequent occasion 
to notice. 

I. ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἐμπειρό- 
τατον] Sc. τῆς σοφιστικῆς. Cf. 
Gorg. 465d: φύρονται ἐν τῷ 
αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ 
ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρή- 
σωνται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ 
ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. 

5. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν] “ Well, we 
must not relax our efforts in 


regard to this.” 
Se. τὸ ἐναργῶς ἰδεῖν 
τὸ ζητούμενον. 

6. κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν] Cf. supr. 
27 a. 

13. ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων] Depend- 
ing on the verbal notion in 
δυναστείαν. Cf. Rep. 2, 359 a: 
τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα. 

19. δύο----τίκτουσαι)]7Π So the 
three categories of the Sophist, 
Being, Rest, and Motion, be- 
came five through generating, 
“by their own dialectic,” the 
categories of Sameness and 
Difference. 


τοῦτο] 


χ 
5 


5 


sie) 


μι 


σι 


impostor of 
impostors, 
who must 
be sepa- 
rated, how- 
ever diffi- 
cult the 
task, from 
the true 
Statesman 
and King. 
We com- 
monly 
speak of 
three forms 
of govern- 
ment, mon- 
archy, oli- 
garchy,and 
democracy. 
And the 
distinctions 
of compul- 
sion and 
freedom, 
poverty 
and wealth, 
observance 
of the laws 
and law- 
lessness, 
give rise to 
the further 
division 

of mon- 
archy into 
royalty and 


20 tyranny, 


and of oli- 
garchy into 
aristocracy 
and pluto- 
cracy. 

The same 
distine- 
tions no 
doubt arise 
in demo- 
cracy, but 
without 
changing 
the name, 
Thus the 
common 
way of 
thinking 
recognizes 
five forms. 
But is any 
one of these 
based on a 
real prin- 
ciple ? 

For we 
have as- 
sumed from 
the first 
that there 
is a science 
of govern- 
ment. 


130 
NE. Q. Ποῖα δή; 


— \ \ « / 5» 
=E. Πρὸς τὸ βίαιόν που καὶ ἑκούσιον ἀποσκο- 6 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


a a ΄σ Ν / Ν 
ποῦντες νῦν, καὶ πενίαν καὶ πλοῦτον, καὶ νόμον καὶ 


᾽ / > > vad / “ « ΄ὔ cr 
ἀνομίαν, EV αὐταῖς γιγνόμενα, διπλὴν εκατέραν τοῖν 


a "τι \ 7, ec 
5 δυοῖν διαιροῦντες μοναρχίαν μὲν προσαγορεύουσιν ws 


, > “ ‘ \ 
δύο παρεχομένην εἴδη δυοῖν ὀνόμασι, τυραννίδι, TO δὲ 


βασιλικῇ. 
NE. 20. Ti pny; 


SE. Τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ ὀλίγων ye ἑκάστοτε κρατηθεῖσαν 


J > / Ss 2 / 
IOTOAL ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ ολιγαρχίᾳ. 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Καὶ πάνυ ye. 


, , ΄ ΩΣ τὶ ee Che 
mE. Δημοκρατίας ye μὴν, ἐὰν τ᾽ οὖν βιαίως ἐάν 


« / lat ἊΝ > / 3 / \ “Ὁ 
τε ἑκουσίως τῶν τὰς οὐσίας ἐχόντων τὸ πλῆθος 


57 “ \ DY δ / 3 ia / 
ἀρχῇ. Kal ἐὰν TE τοὺς νόμους ἀκριβῶς φυλάττον 


μεταλλάττειν. 
NE. ΣΏΩ. ᾿Αληθῆ. 


EE. Τί οὖν ; οἰόμεθά 


3. νῦν] “ According to pre- 
sent notions.” Cf. Soph. 236 a. 

In Rep. 8, 9, we have the 
picture of four imperfect states, 
Timocracy, Oligarchy, Demo- 
eracy, and Tyranny, nearly cor- 
responding to the four which 
are distinguished from Kingly 
Monarchy here. But the esti- 
mate of each, and the mode in 
which their relation to the 
ideal government is conceived, 
are very different in the two 
passages. Plato is avowedly 
speaking here according to 
the common opinion. The 
acknowledgment that, after all, 
democracy, under legal con- 
ditions, is the least bad, is a 


27 , 7 oy > Ν x, ἢ 37 
ιϑέαν τε μῆ, πάντως τοὔνομα οὐδεὶς αὐτῆς εἴωθε 


2 na nan 
τινα TOUT@Y TOY πολιτειῶν 


point of approximation to the 
Laws. See the Introduction to 
the Statesman. 

πενίαν καὶ πλοῦτον] Wealth 
being the mark of the tyrant 
and oligarch, as distinguished 
from the king and the aristo- 
crat, as well as from the 
people. 

6. τυραννίδι, τὸ δὲ βασιλικῇ] 
Cf. Soph. 221 6: νευστικοῦ μέ- 
ρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες (where 
see note). Phedo 105 e: 
Δμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. τὸ, 
Se. εἶδος. 

10. ἀρ. καὶ ὀλιγ.7 Se. διαιροῦσιν. 

15. αὐτῆς] Resuming δημο- 
κρατίας, which is placed at the 
beginning for emphasis. 


Ρ. 29} 


p- 29 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 151 


» ‘ 53 , ΄- “ « σι δὺς 

92. ὀρθὴν εἶναι τούτοις τοῖς ὅροις ὁρισθεῖσαν, ἑνὶ καὶ 
ον Ν - Ν ΄ Ν / Ν ad 
ολίγοις καὶ πολλοῖς, καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ πενίᾳ, καὶ τῷ 


/ Ν «ε / Ν \ 4 Ν yA 
βιαίῳ καὶ ἑκουσίῳ, καὶ μετὰ γραμμάτων καὶ ἄνευ 





/ / / 
νόμων ξυμβαίνουσαν γίγνεσθαι ; 


» NE. 3Q. Τί γὰρ δὴ καὶ κωλύει ; 


5 
EE. Σκόπει δὴ σαφέστερον, τῇδε ἑπόμενος. 
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Πῃ: 
— eae / \ / / > a 
ΞΕ. Τῷ ῥηθέντι κατὰ πρώτας πότερον ἐμμενοῦμεν 
ἢ διαφωνήσομεν ; 
NE. ΣΏ. Τῷ δὴ ποίῳ λέγεις ; 10 


= A \ \ “ “ 5 
SE. Τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἶναί 


y > 
τινα ἐεφαμεν, οἶμαι. 


NEO. Ναί. 


— / 2 « a A \ 
ΞΕ. Καὶ τούτων ye οὐχ ἁπασῶν, ἀλλὰ κριτικὴν 


uA Ἂν Ν. 3 Ἂ » “ BA Uf 
δήπου τινὰ καὶ ἐπιστατικὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων προειλό- 15 


μεθα. 


2. τῷ βιαίῳ καὶ ἑκουσίῳ] CE 
Arist. Pol. III. 1: ὡς ἐνίας τῶν 
πολιτειῶν τῷ κρατεῖν οὔσας, ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐ διὰ τὸ κοίνῃ συμφέρειν. 

3. καὶ--- γίγνεσθαι] Plato re- 
verts to the main construction 
(here participial) instead of add- 
ing another dependent clause. 
The words pera—ypapparav— 
γίγνεσθαι stand in apposition to 
τούτοις---ὁρισθεῖσαν. 

μετὰ γραμμάτων καὶ ἄνευ νό- 
pov] Note the variety of ex- 
pression. The laws are spoken 
of with some contempt as 
mere γράμματα, and are thus 
compared to written rules of 
art. Compare Phedr. 258 a, 
Gorg. 451 b: of ἐν τῷ δήμῳ 
συγγραφόμενοι. Lege. 9, 858 ¢: 
γράμματα μέν που καὶ ἐν γράμμασι 
λόγοι καὶ ἄλλων εἰσὶ πολλῶν ἐν 


st 
“Ss 


ταῖς πόλεσι γεγραμμένοι, γράμματα 
δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ λόγοι. 
Ib. 9ο57 ¢. The expression is 
often used also by Aristotle in 
the Politics. 

8. κατὰ πρώτας] A parallel 
idiom to κατὰ μόνας. κατὰ as in 
κατ᾽ ἀρχάς. Some such word as 
ὑποθέσεις may be here supplied. 

11. τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἶναί τινα] 
Supr. 258 b. 

14. KpiTikny τινα καὶ ἐπιστατι- 
knv| ‘One which is at once 
critical and commanding.” This 
appears from 260 a, where, 
however, κριτική, or rather γνω- 
στική, and ἐπιτακτικὴ, are the 
terms opposed. Compare supr. 
ΠΡ Ca ΘΟΡΠ 225 "Κ΄ “5110 
where there is a similar verbal 
inexactness of reference. 


2 


But scien- 
{πῆς go- 
vernment 
is not se- 
cured by 
the rulers 
being 
many, few 
or one, 
rich or 
poor, or by 
their rule 
being com- 
pulsory or 
voluntary. 
We have 
still, then, 
to discover 
under 
which of 
these forms 
there is 
contained 


132 
NE, 2Q. Nai. 


mE. Kak τῆς 


2, \ \ ὡς / Ν Ν al \ ‘\ 
ἔργοις, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ζώοις. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


> a ‘ \ ee. 5 / 
ἐπιστατικῆς τὴν μὲν ἐπ ἀψύχοις 


/ / Ver ROS / » , 
τρόπον μερίζοντες δεῦρ᾽ ἀεὶ προεληλύθαμεν, ἐπιστή- 
᾽ , \ “ ϑὦ ge a 
5 ns οὐκ ἐπιλανθανόμενοι, TO δ᾽ ἥτις οὐχ ἱκανῶς TH 
΄ὔ / 
δυνάμενοι διακριβώσασθαι. 


NE. 2Q. Λέγεις ὀρθῶς. 


"ΠῚ ay n°? SN / Ὁ. 5 a [2 \ “ 
μ- Le OUT αὐτο Τοινυν αρ εννόοουμέεν, OTL TOV ορον 


/ \ / \ Χ « / xa\ Ν 
οὐκ ὀλίγους οὐδὲ πολλούς, οὐδὲ τὸ ἑκούσιον οὐδὲ τὸ 


» / > \ / > \ a / Ν 
το ἀκούσιον, οὐδὲ πενίαν οὐδὲ πλοῦτον γίγνεσθαι περὶ 


5 “ / 5 4 5 id + 5 
αὐτῶν χρεὼν, ἀλλα τινα ἐπιστήμην ; εἴπερ ἀκολου- 


θήσομεν τοῖς πρόσθεν : 
NE. ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν 


ποιεῖν. 


σὰ πο 5. ἡ \ 
TOUTO γε ἀδύνατον μὴ 


» » Χ an A 7 
SE. “EE ἀνάγκης δὴ viv τοῦτο οὕτω σκεπτέον, 


> / \ / 5 / / / 
ἐν τίνι ποτὲ τούτων ἐπιστήμη ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι 


Ν 2 » 3 a N a , \ 
περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς, σχεδὸν τῆς χαλεπωτατης καὶ 


μεγίστης κτήσασθαι. 


/ , 5 / 
σώμεθα τίνας ἀφαιρετέον 


2. τὴν μὲν----τὴν δὲ] προειλό- 
μεθα cannot be repeated here, 
but some notion contained in 
this verb, such as ἐθέμεθα, must 
be supplied. 

5. τὸ δ᾽ a7ymis| aan e fameAeschi: 
Prom. 765: τί δ᾽ ὅντιν᾽ ; 

8. τὸν ὅρον] “ The distin- 
guishing principle of the state.” 
Cf. supr. τούτοις τοῖς ὅροις. Rep. 
8,551 ΘΟ: ὅρος αὐτῆς (τῆς ὀλι- 
γαρχίας) οἷός ἐστιν. Lege. τ, 626 
b: ὃν γὰρ ὅρον ἔθου τῆς εὖ πολι- 
τευομένης πόλεως. 

11. αὐτῶν͵] Neut. 

13. τοῦτό γε] Se. ἀκουλουθεῖν 
τοῖς πρόσθεν. 


δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν αὐτήν, ἵνα θεα- 


3 ἈΝ “ / 
amo Tov φρονιμου βασι- 


16. ἐν τίνι ποτὲ τούτων] For 
the irony of this, compare the 
Search for Justice in the State, 
Rep. 2, 363 ὃ: 
πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι 
ἐνείη καὶ ῥάων καταμαθεῖν. Ib. 
5.13.6: 

17. ἀνθ. ἀρχῆς, τῆς χαλεπωτά- 
της ---κτήσασθα) There is a 
strong emphasis on ἀνθρώπων. 
Cf. Theet. 174 ἃ : δυσκολώτερον 
δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον Kai ἐπιβουλότερον 
ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νο- 
μίζει αὐτούς. See also Xen. 
Cyrop. I. 1. 

18. αὐτήν] Se. τὴν περὶ ἀν. 
ἄρχ. ἐπιστήμην. 


+ ’ 
Ισως τοινυν 














ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


VO 


»)» ἃ a \ 3 Ν Ν 7 
02. λέως, οἱ προσποιοῦνται μεν εἰναι πολιτικοὶ καὶ πεί- 





93 


. 


> \ lal 
θουσι πολλούς, εἰσὶ δὲ ovdapas. 


NE, ΣΩΏ. Δεῖ γὰρ δὴ ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ὡς ὁ λόγος 


ἡμῖν προείρηκεν. 


an 3 a lal , / / 
HE. Μῶν οὖν δοκεῖ πλῆθος ye ἐν πόλει ταὐτὴν 5 


Ἀ / \ “Cy 7 
τὴν ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἰναι κτήσασθαι ; 


NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ πώς; 


mE. ᾿Αλλ᾽ dpa ἐν χιλιάνδρῳ πόλει δυνατὸν ἑκα- 


,. ὮΝ Ν 2 Sa c a / 
TOV TWAS ἢ Καὶ TEVTYKOVTA αὐτὴν lKAV@S KT1)- 


σασθαι: 


NE. 30. ‘Paorn μέντ᾽ ἂν οὕτω γ᾽ εἴη πασῶν τῶν 


“ 5) N 7 - 3, 
τεχνῶν" ἴσμεν γὰρ ὅτι χιλίων ἀνδρῶν ἄκροι πεττευ- 


a7 Ν \ > ° + σ 
ταὶ τοσοῦτοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις “λλησιν οὐκ 


δ , / 7 Ν a 
ἂν γένοιντο ποτε, μὴ TL δὴ βασιλεῖς ye. 


δεῖ γὰρ δὴ 


/ Χ \ yf 3 ῇ ΒΩ 9 ¥ 
Tov γε τὴν βασιλικὴν ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην, ἂν T ἄρχῃ 


Ν aN , N ὮΝ y / “ 
καὶ ἐὰν pln, κατὰ τὸν ἐμπροσθε λόγον ὅμως βασι- 


XN , 
λικὸν προσαγορεύεσθαι. 


= aA ᾽ , clus, VS 
EE. Καλῶς ἀπεμνημόνευσας. ἑπόμενον δὲ οἶμαι 


, δὰ δ > bn; 3 Χ δ ΟΣ \ Ν δύ 
τούτῳ τὴν μὲν ορθην ἀρχὴν περὶ Eva τινὰ καὶ OVO 


5. πλῆθός γε] “The people 
at least.” I.e. “ Whoever else 
has wisdom, do you think the 
masses have it?” Cf. Rep. 6, 
494 a: φιλόσοφον μὲν apa— 
πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι. 

13. τοσοῦτοι] Se. ἕκατον ἢ πεν- 
τήκοντα. 

πρὸς--“Βλλησιν] “ First-rate 
as compared with those in 
the rest of Greece.” Even 
these few are still judged, 
therefore, by a relative stand- 
ard. 

14. μή τι δὴ---γε1] Cf. Dem. 
ΘΙ: ἢ 29: δ᾽ αὐτὸν 
ἀργοῦντα οὐδὲ τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτάτ- 
τειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τι ποιεῖν, μήτι γε 


> “᾿ 
OUK €EVL 


δὴ τοῖς θεοῖς (Passow, 5. v. μή). 
Compare Rep. 2, 374: ἢ οὕτω 
ῥάδιον ὥστε---ἄξια. And for the 
general tenour of this passage, 
Rep. 4, 428, Cratyl. 389 a: 
ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιουρ- 
γῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν ἀνθρώποις 
γίγνεται. 

16. κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθε λόγον] 
Viz. 259 a. 

18. ἑπόμενον ---τούτῳ] These 
words are in apposition. 

19. τὴν μὲν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν] The 
context shews that ἀρχή is used 
here generally of all authority. 
Cf. Rep. 1, 342 6: οὐδ᾽ ἄλλος 
οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ ἀρχῆ. 

περὶ ἕνα τινὰ καὶ δύο] 


Cf. 


the hardest 
of all ae- 
quisitions, 
the art of 
governing 
men, be- 
fore we can 
clear away 
the rival 
impostors 
from the 
true king, 
The mul- 
titude 
cannot 
have this 
science. 
Nor can 
fifty in a 
thousand 
be found 
possessed 
of it. 


The true 
rulers, 
then, if 
more than 


one, must 
needs be 
very few. 
And whe- 
ther they 
be rich or 
poor, whe- 
ther their 
subjects be 
willing or 
unwilling, 
whether 
they go- 
vern with 
or without 
law, we 
must es- 
teem them 
as such, so 
long as 
they rule 
according 
to the prin- 
ciples of 
their art, 


134 


Ν ΄ » σ΄ σ΄ Ν 
καὶ παντάπασιν ὀλίγους δεῖ ζητεῖν, ὅταν ὀρθὴ γί- p.m 


γνηται. 


ΝΕ ΣΟΙ μὴν; 


MAATOQNOZ 


— / / SEF C257 x7 ᾽ / 
ΞΕ, Τούτους δέ ye, ἐάν τε EKOVT@Y ἐὰν TE ἀκον- 


ΕΣ Δ, ‘ 4 5 Ν yy 
5 TMV αρχῶώσιν, εαν TE κατὰ γραμμᾶτα εαν TE ανεὺυ 


/ Ν xX A Ὁ / 
γραμμάτων, καὶ ἐὰν πλουτοῦντες ἢ TEVOMEVOL, νομι- 


/ “ ΄ «ε 7 ‘ LA « cal 
στέον. WOTTEP VUV nyovpeba, κατὰ TEXVHVY NVTWOVV 


ἈΝ 3, \ \ [χά 
ἀρχὴν ἄρχοντας. τοὺς ἰατροὺς δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα νενομί- 


Ἄ « / Cir 37 ec la al 
καμεν, ἐᾶν TE ἑκόντας ἐὰν TE ἄκοντας ἡμᾶς ἰῶνται, 


/ 3 / 327) a» ’ / 
τοτέμνοντες ἢ καίοντες ἡ τινα ἄλλην ἀλγηδόνα προσ- 


ἅπτοντες, καὶ ἐὰν κατὰ γράμματα ἢ χωρὶς γραμμά- 


NIN / y Ἂ 7 ΄ »ῸΝ 
τῶν. καὶ EGY TTEVIITES OVTES ἢ πλούσιοι, TTAVT@S οὐδὲν 


- > / oS Ἂ » fal / 
YTTOV LAT POVS φαμεν, εῶσπεέερ ἂν ἐπιστάτουντες TEXYNs 


Phileb. 66 Ὁ : περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ 
μέτριον καὶ ὅποσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα 
νομίζειν τὴν ἀΐδιον ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν. 

6. πλουτοῦντες ἢ πενόμενοι] 
Cf. τ Ale. 107 ©: ἄν τε πένης ἄν 
τε πλούσιος 7 ὁ παραινῶν οὐδὲν 
διοίσει᾽ Αθηναίοις ὅταν----βουλεύων- 
ται πῶς ἂν ὑγιαίνοιεν, ἀλλὰ ζητοῦ- 
σιν ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν σύμβουλον. 

νομιστέον---ἄρχοντας] ἄρχοντας 
is to be taken twice in con- 
struing. “They must be es- 
teemed as rulers, whatever rule 
it be which they conduct ac- 
cording to art.” 

8. νενομίκαμεν͵]ἢ[]ἠ The verb is 
resumed in φάμεν below. Cf. 
Soph. 230 ¢, d: νομίζοντες γὰρ 
ὦ παῖ---πλείω δὲ py, and note. 
ἰατρούς is to be repeated in 
thought after νενομίκαμεν : or the 
verb is perhaps used absolutely, 
as in νομίζειν θεούς. Cf. Rep. 5, 
476 ὦ Gorg. 466 b. “ And 
physicians more especially we 
allow to rank as such, whether 
they heal us with or against 


our will, by incision or cautery, 
or by the application of any 
other pain,” (these words τέμνον- 
τες---προσάπτοντες are explana- 
tory of ἄκοντας,) “with or with- 
out written precepts, in po- 
verty or wealth,—in every case 
we call them equally physi- 
cians, so long as those who 
minister preside according to 
art over that to which they 
minister, and preserve the same 
by purging and reducing, or 
by adding flesh, if only they 
do this for the good of the 
bodies which they make better 
from being worse.” (Perhaps 
however the sentence was at 
first intended to run νενομίκα- 
μεν ----φάναι = “‘ We are accus- 
tomed—to speak,” ἅς.) The 
meaning is further perplexed 
by the redundancy of ἂν μόνον in 
the same construction as ἕωσ- 
περ av with σώζωσιν. Compare 
Rep. 7, 529 b: ἐγὼ yap ad— 
μανθάνῃ. 








᾿ 
| 








ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 195 


/ 5) y , / "} iN ᾽ , 
καθαίροντες εἴτε ἀλλως ἰσχναίνοντες εἴτε καὶ αὐξά- 


a‘ / pyres δ, Ὁ vad ἴω a , 7 
νοντες, ἂν μόνον ἐπ᾿ ἀγαθῷ τῷ τῶν σωμάτων, βελτίω 


lal / td / o 
ποίιουντες ἐκ χέεέίρονων, σώζωσιν οι θεραπεύοντες ἕκα- 


Ν / , / € 9 Ν 
στοι τὰ θεραπευόμενα. ταύτῃ θήσομεν, ὡς οἰμαι, καὶ 


> »” A “ > \ 3 7 » va Ν 
οὐκ ἄλλῃ, τοῦτον ὅρον ὀρθὸν εἶναι μονον ἰατρικῆς καὶ 5 


ἄλλης ἡστινοσοῦν ἀρχῆς. 


NE. 20. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 


μ---ἰὶ ᾽ a \ : A ε "7 ͵, 
GE. ᾿Αναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ πολιτειῶν, ὡς ἔοικε, ταύ- 


> Ν 7 cy ἧς / / > 
τὴν ὀρθὴν διαφερόντως εἶναι καὶ μονὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν 


@ A ἘΠ Ν ey > a ᾽ ΄ 
ἢ τις GV EVPLOKOL τοὺς ἀρχονταὰς ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας 


κ᾿ > > , ΄ \ , 27 
καὶ οὐ δοκοῦντας μόνον, ἐᾶν TE KATA νόμους ἐᾶν TE 


A / A Cee Oe Ἃ 
ἄνευ νόμων ἄρχωσι, καὶ ἑκόντων καὶ ἀκόντων, ἢ πε- 


/ ‘ a % 7 e 7 > A 
YOMEVOL ἢ πλουτοῦντες" τούτων ὑπολογιστέον οὐδὲν 


3 a 3 » 3 7 » / 
οὐδαμῶς εἶναι κατ᾽ οὐδεμίαν ὀρθότητα. 


NE. 2Q. Καλώς. 


— Ν 7 , 3 , \ 
GE. Καὶ ἐάν τέ ye ἀποκτιννύντες Twas 


“Ὁ Ν 
ἢ καὶ 


» fe , - Χ ΄ 3, 
ἐκβάλλοντες καθαίρωσιν ἐπ᾿ ἀγαθῷ τὴν πολιν, εἴτε 


ΩΝ / © / a Υ͂ / 
καὶ ἀποικίας οἷον σμήνη μελιττῶν ἐκπέμποντές ποι 


4. ταύτῃ----ἄλλῃ] “ This, and 
no other, will be our decision, 
that ”—. 

5. τοῦτον ὅρον] Se. τὸ 
τέχνῃ καὶ ἐπ᾿ ἀγαθῷ ἄρχειν 
τῶν ἀρχομένων. The doctrine 
of this passage coincides with 
Hege. 45 cf. esp. 712 e: ἃς δ᾽ 
ὠνομάκαμεν νῦν, οὐκ εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι, 
πολέων δὲ οἰκήσεις δεσποζομένων 
τε καὶ δουλευουσῶν μέρεσιν ἑαυτῶν 
Ib. γ13 Ὁ: ἀρχή τε καὶ 
οἴκησις----ἐπὶ Κρόνου pad εὐδαί- 
μῶν, is μίμημα ἔχουσά ἐστιν ἥτις 
τῶν νῦν ἄριστα οἰκεῖται. Ib. 715 
b. Compare the rejection of the 
false pleasures in Phileb. 51 a. 

τοῦτον---ἀρχῆη}] This clause 
is an explanatory resumption 
of ταύτῃ. 


τισίν. 


9. καὶ μόνην πολιτείαν] “ And 
alone deserving of the name.” 

11. δοκοῦντας] I. 6. ἐπιστή- 
μονας δοκοῦντας, like δεινότητες 
δοκοῦσαι in Theet. 176 d. 

12. καὶ----καὶ] “Whether—or.” 
Note the variety of expres- 
s1on. 

13. ὑπολογιστέον] Cf. Rep. 
I, 341 d: οὐδὲν, οἶμαι, τοῦτο 
ὑπολογιστέον, ὅτι πλεῖ ἐν TH νηΐ, 
οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶ κλητέος ναύτης" οὐ γὰρ 
κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν κυβερνήτης καλεῖται 
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν 
ναυτῶν ἀρχήν. 

16. ἀποκτίννυντες ---- ἐκβάλλον- 
tes] Cf. Gorg. 468. 

17. καθαίρωσιν] Cf. Legg. 5, 
735, Rep. 7, 540 6. 


ο 


σι 


whatever 
that art 
may be. 
That is the 
only true 
form of go- 
vernment, 
which has 
scientific 
rulers. 
And as the 
physician 
is no less 
esteemed, 
whether he 
heal us 
with or 
without our 
will and by 
whatever 
means ; so 
the ruler 
is no less 

a ruler, 
though his 
subjects be 
unwilling, 
if he suc- 
ceed in 
preserving 
them and 
making 
them better 
men ; whe- 


ther he 


have re- 
course to 
banish- 
ment, or 
emizration, 
or the im- 
portation 
of fresh 
citizens. 
Young 
Socrates is 
scandalized 
by the pro- 
position 
that there 
may be 
good go- 
vermment 
without 
law. He is 
answered, 
that al- 
though le- 
gislation 

is certainly 
a function 
of the king, 


yet the best , 


conceiy- 
able go- 
vernment 
would be 
the supre- 
macy, not 
of the laws, 


σι 


190 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


ee - 


/ -“ » / 4 AL 
σμικροτέραν ποιῶσιν, ἢ τινας ἐπεισαγομενοί ποθεν p. ay’ 


y 357 / ΄- > ‘\ 57 
ἄλλους ἔξωθεν, πολίτας ποιοῦντες, αὑτὴν αὔξωσιν, 


aS Ἃ > / Ν a / tf 
ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ προσχρώμενοι, 


/ > / / a \ / 
σώζοντες, εκ χείρονος βελτίω ποιῶσι κατα δύναμιν, 


/ vA Ν \ \ / cd Cr. 
5STAUTNVY ΤΟΤΕ Καὶ KATH τοὺς Τοιουτοὺυς ορους μιν 


, \ 53 td / “ \ 
μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ῥητέον. ὅσας de ἄλλας 


/ » / > Sy 7 / Ν 
λέγομεν, οὐ γνησίας οὐδ᾽ ὄντως οὔσας λεκτέον, ἀλλὰ 


μεμιμημένας ταύτην, ἃς. μὲν ὡς εὐνόμους λέγομεν, 


> \ ! Ν \ 7 Ν \ 
ἐπὶ Ta καλλίω, Tas δὲ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίονα με- 


10 μιμῆσθαι. 


ΝΕ. 2Q. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, ὦ ξένε, μετρίως ἔοικεν 


‘end Ν \ Ἂς SA / fal yy 
εἰρῆσθαι: τὸ δὲ Kal ἄνευ νόμων δεῖν ἄρχειν χαλε- 


/ ’ / > / 
πώτερον ἀκούειν ἐρρηθη. 


ΞΕ. Σμικρόν γε ἔφθης με ἐρόμενος, ὦ Σώκρατες. 


ay i“ / a / 5 
ἔμελλον yap σε διερωτήσειν ταῦτα πότερον ἀποδέχει 


7 yy Ν / a / lo) \ 
πάντα, ἢ τι καὶ δυσχεραίνεις τῶν λεχθέντων" νῦν δὲ 


+ XN (vf a / Ν ἣν val lal 
ἤδη φανερὸν ore τοῦτο βουλησομεθα τὸ περὶ τῆς τῶν 


δ᾽ ’ ᾽ i? Ε) / lol « ΄σ 
ἄνευ νόμων ἀρχόντων ὀρθότητος διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς. 


I. σμικροτέραν ποιῶσιν] This 
answers to ἰσχναίνοντες above. 

3. ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ] 
Which in regard to politics 
are the same. Cf. Thezet. 150 
a: ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἄδικόν τε καὶ 
ἄτεχνον ξυναγωγήν κ.τ.λ. 

ie λέγομεν] Se. πολιτείας. 

9. ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίονα] ΟἿ. 
Phileb. 40 6: ἡδοναὶ μεμιμη- 
μέναι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοι- 
ότερα. 

μεμιμῆσθαι | There is a 
return from the participial to 
the direct construction. In 
the above sentences there is 
assumed the same analogy be- 
tween the individual and the 
state, the body natural and the 


body politic, which is largely 
applied in the Republic. The 
notion of “the physician in- 
creasing the body” is obviously 
suggested by the parallel of the 
state. 

12, τὸ δὲ---ἐρρήθη] The formal 
courtesy of these words, like 
much else in this dialogue, ap- 
proaches the style of the Laws. 

17. θουλησόμεθα---διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς] 
The first person being used for 
the second (cf. Thezet. sub fin., 
κυοῦμεν. Supr. 283 6: ap’ av 
βουλοίμεθα), the subject of Bou- 
λησόμεθα is not the same as 
that of διελθεῖν, hence the accus. 
ἡμᾶς. 

τῆς--- ὀρθότητος] “ The right- 








ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 597 
NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 


A o A a 
SE. 'Τρόπον τινὰ μέντοι δῆλον ὅτι τῆς βασιλικῆς 


> Ν « 7 Ν τ > \ / 
ἐστὶν ἢ vomoberiKn? τὸ δ᾽ ἄριστον οὐ τοὺς vopous 


> 3, Ν Ν ’ὔ 
ἐστὶν ἰσχύειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασι- 


/ 5 © 
Auxov. οἰσθ᾽ orn; 
ι 


NE. ΣΩ. Πῇ δὴ λέγεις: 


— ov , » , , ¥ 
EE. Ὅτι νύμος οὐκ av ποτε δύναιτο τὸ τε ἄριστον 


Ν Χ i? 3 lo lal “ Χ \ 
καὶ TO δικαιότατον ἀκριβῶς πᾶσιν ἅμα περιλαβὼν TO 


΄ὔ e \ 5 Me ~ 
βελτιστον ἐπιτάττειν αἱ yap ἀνομοιότητες τῶν TE 


ness of rulers without laws.” 
I. e. How it can ever be right 
to govern without laws ? 

2. μέντοι] “ Certainly.” Giv- 
ing assent to something which 
qualifies the foregoing asser- 
tion ; as in Soph. 245 Ὁ: ἀλη- 
θέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. Symp. 
176 b: τοῦτο μέντοι εὖ λέγεις. 

4. ἀλλ᾽ ἄνδρα --- βασιλικόν] 
“ But the man who, having 
wisdom, is capable of sovereign 
rule.” 

5. ὅπῃ] Se. ἀριστόν ἐστιν. 

η. Ὅτι] ““ Because.” 

Ὅτι νόμος οὐκ ἂν δύναιτοϊ ΟἿ, 
Arist. Pol. ΠῚ 10: ᾿Αρχὴ δ᾽ 
ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὕτη, πότερον 
συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου 
ἀνδρὸς βασιλεύεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἀρίστων νόμων. 
νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι 
τὸ καθόλου μόνον ὁ νόμος λέγειν, 
ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα 


Δοκεῖ δὴ τοῖς 


> ~ ΄ 
ἐπιτάττειν" ὥστ᾽ ἐν ὁποιᾳοῦν τέχνῃ 
" > , 
τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρχειν ἠλίθιον. 
Κ ἊΝ 15 Αἱ , \ \ U 
αἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τετρή 
ae ς ἘΠ ΤΣ ΠΕ τα 
μερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἰατροῖς" 
ἐὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ 
, 3 r r 
κινδύνῳ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνον δεῖ 
ς , A , ‘A , 
ὑπάρχειν τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου 
κ + > i 
τοῖς ἄρχουσι κρεῖττον δ᾽ ᾧ μὴ 
πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως, ἢ ᾧ 


συμφιές. 


~ ‘ > ΄ ~ 
To μεν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο 
ε ε 


οὐχ ὑπάρχει, Ψυχὴν δ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνην 
ἀνάγκη τοῦτ᾽ ἔχειν πᾶσαν. "ANN 
ἴσως ἄν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου 
βουλεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα 
κάλλιον. Aristotle concludes 
that there must be a lawgiver 
and laws: which, however, 
must not be absolute where 
they do not rightly apply. And 
there must obviously be an au- 
thority to determine cases not 
provided for by the laws. 
Should this authority be many, 
few, or one? The many are 
more difficult to corrupt—as 
much water is less easily fouled 
than littl—but are less likely 
to care for the preservation of 
existing laws. One is better 
than a few, because the few 
are hable to division. See 
Plat. Legg. 9, 875. 

7. τό τε ἄριστον----ἐπιτάττειν 
The dative πᾶσιν depends 
equally on περιλαβὼν and ἐπι- 
τάττειν. Having comprehended 
exactly what is noblest and 
most righteous for all, at once 
to appoint what is best for all. 

9. ai yap ἀνομοιότητες ἡντι- 
νοῦν] “ For the dissimilarities 
both of men and actions, and 
what may be termed the abso- 
lute unrest of human things, 


ὡς T 


but of a 
wise and 
soverelon 
will, The 
reason 15 
that a fixed 
law can 
never be 
exactly 
applicable 
to the infi- 
nite variety 
and com- 
plexity of 
human 
affairs. 


5 


Law is like 
a stupid 
and wilful 
man, who 
insists at 
all hazards, 
in spite of 
circum- 
stances, on 
obedience 
to his com- 
mands. 


15 


W hence 
arises,then, 
the neces- 
sity of ma- 
king laws? 20 
This is 

shewn by 

an ex- 

ample. 


138 


> / Ν lal / Ν Ν / / 
ἀνθρώπων καὶ TOV πράξεων καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε μηδέν, Ρ. 26 
ε Μ“ἷ > a «ς / 4 σ > / Iat 
WS €7TOS ELTTELV, NTVXLAV αγειν Τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οὐδεν 

cal ¢ ΄σ΄ » > \ Ἂν .« ’ὔ’ Ν 3 Ν , 
ἐῶσιν ἀπλοῦν εν οὐδενὶ περι ἀπαντῶν Και ἐπὶ TAVTA 


\ , > / xm OC an aA 
τὸν χρόνον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχνην οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν. ταῦτα 


δὴ συγχωροῦμέν που ; 


ΝΠ ΣΟ, 7 μην: 


« vad Ν 

HE. Τὸν δέ γε νόμον ὁρῶμεν σχεδὸν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ 

Lal / “ \ 577 3 / Ν 
τοῦτο ξυντείνοντα, ὥσπερ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον αὐθάδη καὶ 


» ‘a Ν / \ an lal Ν Ν 
ἀμαθῆ καὶ μηδένα μηδὲν ἐῶντα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὴν 


3, / \ XN / δ Ἐς Δ. 
ἄρα τῷ ξυμβαίνῃ βέλτιον παρὰ Tov λογον ὃν avTos 


> 7 
ETETAEED. 


NE. 2Q. ᾿Αληθῆ: ποιεῖ yap ἀτεχνῶς, καθάπερ 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ec a 7 yD) las / > Vf / 
10 €AUTOU τάξιν, μηδ ETEPOT AV μηδένα, μηδ᾽ av τι νέον 


Sy an ε ,ὔ ς« α ΕἸΣ 
εἰρῆκας νυν, O νομος ἡμιν εκαστοις. 


» an DS 2 SS \ jf 
EE. Οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον εὖ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε 


ε vad NS \ ἊΝ / ε a 
ἁπλᾶ TO Ola παντὸς γιγνόμενον ἁπλοῦν ; 


NE. >Q. Κινδυνεύει. 


Q , , > 5 ᾽ A = 
ZE. Διὰ τί δή ποτ᾽ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον νομοθετεῖν, 


3 , 5 > / « 7 5 Tj / 
ἐπειδηπερ οὐκ ὀρθότατον ὁ νόμος ; ἀνευρετέον τούτου 


XN 


/ 
τὴν αἰτίαν. 


NE. 50. Ti uty; 


| 5) a Ν τ 5 > / - Se. 
=. Οὐκοῦν καὶ παρ ὑμῖν εἰσι τινες, οἷαι καὶ ἐν 


(join μηδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων,) 
suffer no art whatever to lay 
down in any matter any simple 
rule which shall be applicable 


to all cases for all time.” Cf. 
Theeet. 180 a. 
4. ἐπ᾿ αὐτὸ τοῦτο] Se. τὸ 


ἁπλοῦν τι ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ ἀπάν- 
τῶν καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον. 

ἐπ᾿ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ξυντείνοντα] 
“ Bending all his energies to 
this.” 

8. ὥσπερ k.T.A.| 


Hi. g. the 


Creon of Sophocles. Cf. Antig. 
795-723. 

10. μηδ᾽ av τι----ἐπέταξεν] “ Not 
even if some fresh thing, differ- 
ent from the terms of his en- 
actment, should happen to be 
better for some individual.” 
For συμβαίνῃ βέλτιον, cf. infr. 
295 C: συμβαινόντων ἄλλων Bed- 
τιόνων τοῖς κάμνουσιν. 

16. διὰ παντὸς] Se. τοῦ χρόνον. 

22. Οὐκοῦν καὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν] This 
is one of the places where we 


c 


d 


| 


ἡ 





! 











a] 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


139 


y+ / > > , ", 
94. ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, ἀθρύων ἀνθρώπων ἀσκήσεις, εἴτε 


Ν ,ὔ 3, 3, o 
πρὸς δρόμον εἴτε πρὸς ἄλλο τι, φιλονεικίας ἕνεκα ; 
NE. 2Q. Καὶ πάνυ γε πολλαί. 


μ- ἴω ἴω 
HE. Φέρε νῦν ἀναλάβωμεν πάλιν μνήμῃ τὰς τῶν 


4 / , ᾽ va / > 
τέχνῃ γυμναζόντων ἐπιτάξεις EV ταῖς τοιαύταις ἀρ- 


χαΐῖς. 
NE. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


al ͵ vay > - lal » 
EE. Ὅτι λεπτουργεῖν οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν ἡγοῦνται καθ 


a “ a 7 Ν a « 7 
ενα EKAOTOY, T@ σώματι TO 7 POO1)KOV EKAOT@ 7 POO ~ 


7 3 \ / / “ « ΒΝ Ν 
τάττοντες, ἀλλὰ παχύτερον οἴονται δεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 


miss the dramatic liveliness of 
Plato’s earlier style. The scene 
of these dialogues is a paleestra. 
But this can hardly have been 
present to the author’s mind 
when these words were written. 
Unless the Stranger is sup- 
posed, like the philosophers in 
the Theztetus, to be wholly 
ignorant of what is going on 
around him. 

I. ἀθρόων --- ἀσκήσει) Cf. 
Legg. 12, 942 ὁ: ἀθρόον ἀεὶ καὶ 
ἅμα καὶ κοινὸν τὸν βίον ὃ τι μά- 
λιστα πᾶσι πάντων γίγνεσθαι. 

ἀσκήσεις The abstract word 
is used, as supr. 264 b: τιθα- 
σείαις τῶν ἰχθύων --- χηνοβωτίας 
--γερανοβωτίας. 

4. ἀναλάβωμεν ---- μνήμῃ,: CF. 
Phileb. 34 b. 

5. ἀρχαῖς] The word is used 
in the most general sense. Cf. 
Rep. 1, 345 €: ἔν τε πολιτικῇ 
καὶ ἰδιωτικῇἢ ἀρχῆ. Ib. 343 d: 
πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἀρχή. 
And for the plur., οἵ. Prot. 
354 Ὁ: σωτήριαι καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαί. 
Supr. 293 ¢, alib. 

7. Τὸ ποῖον ;| 
spect ?” 

8. λεπτουργεῖν] “To work in 

* 


“ In what re- 


T 


minute detail.” The word is 
used above, 262 b, of dividing 
too minutely at the beginning 
of an inquiry. The only other 
passage where the word oc- 
curs in classical Greek is Eur. 
Hippol. 923, where it is ap- 
plied to subtlety in discourse. 
Another coincidence between 
the language of these dia- 
logues and that of the trage- 
dians. 

10. παχύτερον] Opposed to 
λεπτουργεῖν. “In larger masses. 
More in the gross.” Cf. supr. 
277 a-c. Contrast Aristotle’s 
view, that the work of the 
gymnast and physician regards 
the individual—padrkov δ᾽ ἴσως 
τὴν τοῦδε, Kad’ ἕκαστον yap ἰα- 
Eth. Nic. I. 4. 

παχύτερον --- ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] 
We find an echo of these words 
in the language of Aristotle, 
ἘΠ INGE 1 τς: 


\ 4 0:9 ΄ ΄ 
περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέ- 


, 
TPEVEL, 


: Εἰ 
ἀγαπητὸν οὖν 


γοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς 
ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ 
τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέ- 
γοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνε- 


σθαι. 


Ὁ 


“- 


σι 


He who 
trains men 
for athletic 
contests 
does not 
adapt his 
precepts to 
each indi- 
vidual case, 
(that would 
be impos- 
sible,) but 
is con- 
tented with 
preseribing 
general 
rules. 


140 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


Ἀ τας \ Ν ΄- Cal “ 
πολὺ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοὺς τὴν τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος τοῖς p 


/ lal ἾΊ Se 
σώμασι ποιεῖσθαι τάξιν. 
NE. 2Q. Καλώς. 
Ν / Ν » / ΄ / 
mE. Aw δὴ ye καὶ ἴσους πόνους viv διδόντες 
5 ΄ “ \ ᾽ a “ \ Ν , 
5 ἀθρόοις ἅμα μὲν ἐξορμῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ Kal καταπαύουσι 
/ / 7 “ Ν 3.8 7 
δρόμου καὶ πάλης Kal πάντων TOV κατὰ τὰ σώματα 
[2 
πόνων. 


NE. ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. 


‘ Lev \ ,ὔ / (3 7 Ν “ 
poe SE. Καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην τοίνυν ἡγώμεθα, Tov ταῖ- 
giver, being 5 7 5 7 es 7 , τ ἐΞ 
unable to ro σὰν ἀγέλαις ἐπιστατήσοντα τοῦ δικαίου πέρι καὶ τῶν 
provide for 


every case, 
enactswhat ee ὃ ἢ Ἢ 4 a Pec 
isgenerally σέσθαι πᾶσιν ἀθρόοις προστάττοντα ἀκριβῶς ἐνὶ 
tor the 


mpos ἀλλήλους ξυμβολαίων, μή ποθ᾽ ἱκανὸν γενή- 


€ 7 Ν la 3 ΄ 
best. ἑκάστῳ TO προσῆκον ἀποδιδόναι. 
Ν a ΄ 
NE. 2Q. To γοῦν εἰκὸς. 
μ--ἰ Ν A a a 53 Ν διὰ 
15 ΚΞ δ. ᾿Αλλὰ τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς γε, οἶμαι, καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ 
\ \ ε , 7 XN 
TO πολὺ καί πως οὑτωσὶ παχυτέρως ἑκάστοις TOV 
΄ , N 3 , ‘ > \ Ν > 
νόμον θησει, καὶ ἐν ypappaowv ἀποδιδοὺς καὶ ἐν 
3 7 / Ne, n 
ἀγραμμάτοις, πατρίοις δὲ ἔθεσι νομοθετῶν. 
NE. 2Q. Ὀρθώς. 
— 9 an 7 A \ ¥ X , 
He who 20 EE. ᾿Ορθῶς μέντοι. πῶς yap ἂν τις ikavos ye- 
could pro- 5 910 3 , σ \ / SN 
vide for VolT av ποτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥστε διὰ βίου ἀεὶ παρα- 
every case, 7 ates 5 , \ 
could do καθήμενος ἑκάστῳ Ov ἀκριβείας προστάττειν TO προσ- 
50, while ~ = x Ν “ “- ΡΞ κ᾿ 
present, NKOV ; ἐπεὶ TOUT ἂν δυνατὸς ὧν, ὡς οἶμαι, TOV τὴν 


1. τὴν --- τάξ.] “To pre- 12. maow] The dative de- 


scribe what is profitable for the 


body.” 
4. νῦν] “As the matter 
stands.” Cf. supr. 291 e. 


9. ταῖσιν ayedas| The lonic 
form of the dat. plur. occurs 
four times in this dialogue 
(supr. 261 6, διπλασίοισι : 201 a, 
τοιούτοισιν : infr. 304 6, ἑπομέ- 
νοισιν), and often in the Timzeus 
and Laws. 


pends partly on ἱκανὸν and 
partly on προστάττοντα ἀποδι- 
δόναι. 

15. τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς γε] Se. 
προσῆκον. 

16. ἑκάστοις] 
tion.” 

17. ἀποδιδοὺς “ Exhibiting ; 
prescribing.” Cf. supr. ἀποδι- 
δόναι. 


“ To each na- 





ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 141 


Ν A ” > ΄, 4 7 
95. βασιλικὴν ὁστισοῦν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότων, 


σχολῇ ποτ᾽ ἂν ἑαυτῷ θεῖτ᾽ ἐμποδίσματα γράφων 
τοὺς λεχθέντας τούτους νόμους. 

NE. ΣΏ. Ἔκ τῶν νῦν γοῦν, ὦ ἕένε, εἰρημένων. 

EE. Μᾶλλον δέ γε, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἐκ τῶν μελλόν- 5 
των ῥηθήσεσθαι. 

NE. 2Q. Τίνων δή; 

ΞΕ. Τῶν τοιῶνδε. εἴπωμεν γὰρ δὴ πρός γε ἡμᾶς 
αὐτοὺς ἰατρὸν μέλλοντα ἢ καί τινα γυμναστικὸν ἀπο- 


lal \ 5 4 a / / c 
δημεῖν καὶ ἀπέσεσθαι τῶν θεραπευομένων TvYXVOY, ὡς 10 


7 ΄ \ / / \ 
οἴοιτο, χρόνον, μὴ μνημονεύσειν οἰηθέντα τὰ προστα- 





/ Χ / Ἃ ἊΝ ’ὔ c 
χθέντα τοὺς γυμναζομένους ἢ τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὑπο- 


/ 7 Ων 5. » ΄ ΕΝ a 
μνήματα γράφειν ἂν ἐθέλειν αὐτοῖς, ἢ πῶς ; 


NE. 2Q. Οὕτως. 


HE. Ti δέ; εἰ παρὰ δόξαν ἐλάττω χρόνον ἀπο- is 


, χὰ ΄ CYS) 3 EN “-“ Ν 
δημήσας ἔλθοι πάλιν, ap οὐκ ἂν παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ 


γράμματα τολμήσειεν ἄλλα ὑποθέσθαι, ξυμβαινον- 


v / a , N , ᾿ 
Tov ἄλλων βελτιόνων τοῖς κάμνουσι διὰ πνεύματα ἢ 


aN \ \ / “ ᾽ Χ , 
τι καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τῶν ἐκ Διὸς ἑτέρως 


3. τοὺς λεχθέντας τούτους νό- 
pous|] Cf. infr. 299 c: εἰς δή 
τι δικαστήριον, where there is 
the same distant way of 
speaking of what is familiarly 
known. 

8. εἴπωμεν---ἰατρὸν κιτ.λ.1 Cf. 
Rep. 6, 488: νοήσωμεν --- vav- 
κληρον κιτιλ. Theet. 159 Ὁ: 
λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ κιτ.λ. 
“Tet us put to ourselves the 
case of a physician, ὅσο. 

9. ἀποδημεῖν] The passage 
recals the expression of Scrip- 
ture: “ Going into a far coun- 
try.” .The case of Solon is 
probably in Plato’s mind. 

10. ὡς οἴοιτο] The optative 


is similarly used in putting a 
supposed case, Rep. 2, 360 b: 
οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, ov- 
Tas ἀδαμάντινος. 

13. ἐθέλειν) Governed by 
εἴπωμεν, which must be repeated 
in thought. 

15. Ti δέ ; εἰ] Bodl. τί δὴ. 

16. παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνα----ὑποθέσθαι | 
“To suggest other things not 
contemplated in his former 
prescriptions.” 

18. διὰ πνεύματα---γενόμενα | 
“On account of winds or other 
heavenly influences which have 
come unexpectedly out of the 
usual course.” Note the alter- 
nation of words. 


by word 

of mouth, 
and would 
not need to 
hamper 
himself 
with writ- 
ten laws. 
But if such 
anone were 
going into 
a far coun- 
try, he 
would pre- 
scribe, like 
a wise phy- 
sician, what 
on the 
whole was 
likely to be 
for the best. 
Yet, should 
the physi- 
cian come 
back sooner 
than he 
expected, 
would he 
not venture 
to contra- 
vene his 
own ordi- 
nance, if 
some un- 
expected 
change of 


climate or 


some other 


circum- 
stance 
made a 
different 
course ex- 
pedient for 
his pa- 
tients ? 


And were 
the law- 
giver, or 
another 
like him, 
to come 
again on 
earth, shall 
he not be 


Io 


142 


a > , 7 “- 4 ἃ ε “ 
πως τῶν εἰωθότων γενόμενα, καρτερῶν δ᾽ ἂν ἡγοῖτο P- 2) 


MAATQNOZ 


rad ‘ > 7 Ν > σ΄, 4 / 
δεῖν μὴ ἐκβαίνειν τὰ apxaie ποτε νομοθετηθέντα punTeE 


Φ ΩΝ , 3, / Ν / “ 
αὐτὸν προστάττοντα ἄλλα PTE τὸν κάμνοντα ἕτερα 


ad \ \ / “- «ς lal 7 
τολμῶντα παρὰ τὰ γραφέντα δρᾶν, ως TAUVTH OVTA 


> \ Ν 6 ΄ὔ \ \ « 4 If 4 
5ἰατρικὰ καὶ ὑγιεινά, Ta δὲ ἑτέρως γιγνόμενα νοσώδη 


» »Μἶ > ἴω Ἂς “ vy 5» 
ΤΕ καὶ ουκ εντέεχνᾶ 5 ἢ πᾶν TO TOLOUTOV EV Ye ΕΖ Γ- 
/ “- ν > la / Ν “ 
στημῃ ξυμβαῖνον καὶ ἀληθεῖ τέχνῃ περὶ ἅπαντα 
΄ / Ἂ ε , 7 lal ΄ 
παντάπασι γέλως av Ο μέγιστος γίγνοιτο τῶν TOLOU- 


/ 
τῶν νομοθετημάτων 5 


NE. ΣΏ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 


΄σ Ν 3, Ν 
EE. Τῷ δὲ τὰ δίκαια δὴ καὶ ἄδικα καὶ καλὰ καὶ 
> \ Ν » \ Ν \ / Ν yy 
αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ γράψαντι καὶ ἀγραῴφα 


/ Qn Lal > 7 > / «ε ἤ 
νομοθετησαντι ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀγέλαις, ὁπόσαι 


\ Uy ΄ , \ \ ΄- 
κατὰ πόλιν ἐν ἑκάσταις νομεύονται κατὰ τοὺς τῶν 


I. καρτερῶν ---νομοθετημάτων ; | 
“ But would think it right, 
both for himself and the sick 
man, stubbornly to avoid trans- 
gressing the ancient laws once 
given, he giving no new com- 
mandment, and his patient not 
daring to do otherwise than 
was prescribed, accounting this 
the medicinal and wholesome 
course, any deviation from 
which is inartistic and un- 
wholesome: or would every 
such proceeding in the case of 
a science or genuine art, in 
any circumstances involve such 
lawgiving in the most utter 
ridicule ?” 

2. Ta ἀρχαῖα vopobernberta | 
1. 6. τὰ ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς voy. The par- 
ticiple, as in Soph. Trach. τ: 
ἀρχαῖος φανείς. 

6. ἢ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον---τέχνῃ] 
What is at first expressed ge- 


, ΄ x « Ν 7 ΄ y 
Isypayavrwy νόμους, ἂν ὁ μετὰ τέχνης γράψας ἢ 


nerally in the nominative is 
resumed in the genitive in a 
more particular form, by a 
change of construction like 
that in Hom. Il. Z. 510: 6 & 
ἀγλαϊῆφι πεποιθὼς ῥίμφα € γοῦνα 
φέρει. Pheedr. 229 6. Cf. Rep. 
4,434 ἃ, 7, 521 a, Legg. 6, 
751 b: rov—dpyas ἀνεπιτηδείους 
ἐπιστῆσαι ----γέλως ἂν πάμπολυς 
ξυμβαίνοι. Pheedo 69 ο, Lach. 
185 a, Xen. Mem. I. 2. 

7. ἀληθεῖ τέχνῃ True art, 
either as opposed to ἐμπειρία, 
mere practice, which pretends 
to the name of art, or as op- 
posed to the profession with- 
out the reality of art. 

περὶ ἅπαντα belongs to ξύμ- 
βαινον, παντάπασι ἴο γίγνοιτο. 

14. νομεύονται] ‘Are herded,” 
but with a play on νόμος. Cf. 
Lege. 4,714 a: τὴν τοῦ νοῦ δια- 
νομὴν ἐπονομάζοντες νόμον. 


} 
| 
: 





























ΠΟΛΙΤΓΊΚΟΣ. 


142 


Ny “ σ“ 4.17 . »»" \ \ a 

195. Tis ἕτερος ὅμοιος ἀφίκηται, μὴ ἐξέστω On Tapa ταῦτα 
eg , Ὰ lal Ν > / »ῸΝ 

οὔ. ἐτερα προσταττειν ; ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀπόρρημα οὐδεν 


fe ν Ἃ » 7) a > θ , x vad / - 
TTOV ἂν EKELYOU ΤΊ) αλῇ ειᾷ γέλοιον φαίνοιτο 3 


NE SO. Τὶ μήν: 


μ- 3 53 a , 7 Ν \ 
HE. Οἰσθ᾽ οὖν ἐπὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγον τὸν Tapas 


-“ σ΄ / 
τῶν πολλῶν λεγόμενον 5 


ΝΠ SQ. 
ΞΕ. Καὶ 


3 lal lal ᾽ “ 
Οὐκ ἐννοῶ νῦν γ᾽ οὕτως. 


μὴν εὐπρεπής. φασὶ γὰρ δὴ δεῖν, εἴ τις 


7,ὔ \ \ a yy / ἢ 
γιγνώσκει παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἐμπροσθεν βελτίους νομους, 


rn \ « a / “ἤ / 
νομοθετεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν ἕκαστον πείσαντα, 


δὲ μή. 


NE. 3Q. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ὀρθῶς ; 


EE. Ἴσως. 


ἂν δ᾽ οὖν μὴ πείθων τις βιάζηται τὸ 


/ > / / 5, “ / ay \ 
βέλτιον, ἀπόκριναι, τί τοὔνομα τῆς βίας ἐσται; My 


/ \ a 3 ΄ 
μέντοι πω, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν πρότερον. 


NE. SQ. Ποῖον δὴ λέγεις ; 


I. τις ἕτερος ὅμοιος] 1. 6. A 
new lawgiver. Compare Legg. 
11,026 α: ἢ μὴν παρόντα καὶ 
ζῶντα αὐτὸν τὸν νομοθέτην μήποτ᾽ 
ἂν ἀναγκάσαι πράττειν οὕτω. 

μὴ ἐξέστω δὴ] “~ Must he 
really not be permitted?” Cf. 
Rep. 1, 357: μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ; 
Lege. 7, 800 6: ἐπανερωτῶ ----εἰ 
Sane ἡμῖν----κείσθω. Ib.6,719 
€: πότερον ---- μηδὲν ---- προσαγο- 
ρεύῃ---ἀλλὰ----τρέπηται :---ἔξεσται 
corr. F. 

2. 7—aivorro :] “ Or would 
this prohibition not seem in 
reality to the full as ridiculous 
as the former one ?” 

‘8. φασὶ yap δὴ de] Cf. 
Lege. 784 ¢. Pseudo-Zaleue. 
ap. Stob. (Mullach. p. 543 b): 
᾿Εὰν δέ τις βούληται τῶν κειμένων 


νόμων κινεῖν ἢ ἄλλον εἰσφέρειν 


νόμον, εἰς βρόχον εἴρας τὸν τρά- 
xndov λεγέτω τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ 
καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ψηφιζομένων 
δόξη λελύσθαι τὸν νόμον ἢ ὑπάρ- 
χειν τὸν εἰσφερόμενον, καὶ αὐτὸν 
ἀθῷον εἶναι" ἐὰν δὲ ὁ προ πα DOE 
pales, δοκῇ καλῶς ἔχειν ἢ ὁ εἰσ- 
φερόμενος, ἢ ἄδικος, τεθνάναι τὸν 
κινοῦντα ἢ εἰσφέροντα νόμον, ἐπι- 
σπασθέντος τοῦ βρόχου. 

9. τῶν ἔμπροσθεν] 
men of former time. 

10. νομοθετεῖν----μή] “That he 
should legislate when he has 
persuaded his own state, but 
not otherwise.” 

15. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν πρό- 
τερον] “ But answer me first 
with regard to our previous 
instances, 1. 6. the physician, 
&e.” 


αὐτοῦ" 


Of the 


permitted 
to change 
his own 
appoint- 
ment ? 


The cur- 
rent saying 
is specious 
enough : 
“Let aman 
wil over 
his state 
to accept 


ἄλλως Io new laws, 


and then 
let him im- 
pose them.” 
But sup- 
ose he 

force them 
on her ac- 
ceptance, 
what shall 


15 be said? 


If a physi- 
cian forced 
a patient 
to do con- 
trary to 
prescrip- 
tion, and 
the treat- 
ment so 
forced were 
best, would 
it be called 
unwhole- 
some treat- 
ment ? 

No more 
should the 
proceeding 
of one who 
forces a 
state to do 
a great 
right con- 
trary to the 
laws be 
called un- 
righteous. 


Nor does it 15 


make any 


144 


3, 3 \ ‘ , / 
BE. "Av τις apa μὴ πείθων τὸν ἰατρευόμενον, p. 29 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


ἔχων δὲ ὀρθῶς τὴν τέχνην, παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα βέλ-- 


᾽ , δ κι κ ” ” ΕΣ ‘ 
τιον ἀναγκαζῃ δρᾷν παῖδα ἢ τινα ἄνδρα ἢ καὶ 


“ / ΕἾ ΞὉ, / » / μ | > 
γυναίκα, TL τούνομα τῆς Plas εσται ταύτης ; ap ov 


κι σι Τὶ Ν \ \ 7 , ε ΄ 
5πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ Tapa τὴν τέχνην λεγόμενον ἀμαρ- 


Ν a \ / > lal 5 ΄σ aA 
τημα TO νοσῶδες ; Kal πάντα ορθῶς εἰπεῖν ἐστι 


΄ a β θέ \ \ a pe “ 
7 POTEPOV T@ ἰασῦεντι πέρι TO TOLOVTOV “σπλὴν OTL 


/ Ν ΕΣ / « ἈΝ a / 
νοσώδη καὶ ἀτεχνα πέπονθεν ὑπὸ τῶν βιασαμένων 


ἰατρῶν ; 


NE, ΣΏ. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. 


EE. Τί δὲ ἡμῖν δὴ τὸ παρὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην 


c , / / 3 σαν > Ν > ‘ Ν 
αμαρτὴμα λεγόμενον €OTLY 5 ap Ov TO alo x pov Kat 


Ἂν \ +S 
κακὸν καὶ QOLKOV 3 


NE. 2Q. Παντάπασί ye. 


ΜΞ ΕΣ. 


I. "Av τις ἄρα μὴ πείθων τὸν 
ἰατρευόμενον] Cf. 1,6ρο..5,684 6: 
Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε οἱ πολλοὶ προσ- 
τάττουσι τοῖς νομοθέταις, ὅπως 
τοιούτους θήσουσι τοὺς νόμους οὺς 
ἕκοντες οἱ δῆμοι καὶ τὰ πλήθη δέ- 
fovrar, καθάπερ ἂν εἴ τις γυμνα- 
σταῖς ἢ ἰατροῖς προστάττοι μεθ᾽ 
ἡδονῆς θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι τὰ 
θεραπευόμενα σώματα. 

ἄρα] “ According to the 
theory we are considering.” 

5. mav—vooades| “ Anything 
rather than the error which is 
spoken of as a violation of the 
art, namely unwholesome treat- 
ment.” 

6. καὶ mavra—iatpov| “And 
the man who has been com- 
pelled in such a case has a 
right to say anything sooner 
than that he has suffered un- 
wholesome and _ unscientific 
treatment from the physicians 


‘ov δὴ βιασθέντων παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα 


who compelled him.” 

11. Ti δὲ---ἐστιν] “ But what 
is the error which is named as 
a violation of the political 
art 1" 

15. Τῶν δὴ ---βιασαμένων)] A 
redundant and irregular sen- 
tence. The first genitive is 
resumed in τῶν τοιούτων go- 
verned by Ψόγον, which is an 
accusative without an explicit 
construction, but governed by 
εἰπὲ implied in φέρε. The words 
μέλλει, καταγελαστότατος, αὐτῷ, 1D. 
what follows, are to be referred 
to ψόγον, which the pronoun 
αὐτῷ resumes in a more definite 
construction. “ Now in the 
case of those who are compelled 
to do contrary to written and 
hereditary laws, other things 
more just and better and no- 
bler than their former doings, 
say again of the exclaimer of 






yh 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


145 


A 7 an “ / > Ν 
6 ὃ Ν / 
290. και TAT Pla pav ἑτέρα δικαιότερα καὶ ἀμεινὼ και 


7 an » , a ΄σ΄ 7 53 
ἃ καλλίω τῶν ἐμπροσθεν, φέρε, τὸν τῶν τοιούτων αὖ 


΄ A a 7 / “τ ol) > / Ν 
ψόγον περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης βίας, ap, εἰ μέλλει μὴ 


/ 53 7 / » a a 
καταγελαστότατος εἶναι πάντων, πάντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον 


/ ἘΝ ον Ν «ε Ν yy 
λεκτέον ἑκάστοτε, πλὴν ὡς αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀδικα καὶ : 


\ / « 7 ε \ a 
kaka πεπονθασιν οἱ βιασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν βιασα- 


/ 
μένων 5 


NE. 3Q. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. 


ME. ᾿Αλλ᾽ apa ἐὰν μὲν πλούσιος 6 βιασάμενος ἢ 
το μ HD 


Ou Ἃ » y+ 7 7 A / > 7 
Kala, ἂν δ᾽ apa πένης, ἀδικα τὰ βιασθέντα ἐστίν ; 


δ Ὁ / x Ν / 7 Ἂ / » 
ἢ κἂν πείσας κἂν μὴ πείσας τις, πλούσιος ἢ πένης; ἢ 
\ , x Ν ΄, avi , K 
κατὰ γράμματα ἢ παρὰ γράμματα, Opa τα ξύμφορα ἢ 
a a \ Q A Ν “ cy , : 
τοῦτον δεῖ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα TOV ὅρον εἶναι τὸν γε ἀλη- 


such men about such violence, 
must not this, to avoid being 
utterly absurd, say everything 
rather, on each occasion, than 
that those who are compelled 
have suffered what is dishon- 
ourable and unjust and evil at 
the hands of those who com- 
pelled them ?” 

Cf. Lege. 9,875 ¢: ἐπεὶ ταῦτα 
εἴποτε Tis ἄνθρωπος, φύσει ἱκανός, 
θείᾳ μοίρᾳ γεννηθεὶς, παραλαβεῖν 
δυνατὸς εἴη, νόμων οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο 
τῶν ἀρξόντων ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπιστήμης 
γὰρ οὔτε νόμος οὔτε τάξις οὐδεμία 
κρείττων, οὐδὲ θέμις ἐστὶ νοῦν οὐ- 
δενὸς ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ δοῦλον ἀλλὰ 
πάντων ἄρχοντα εἶναι, εἴπερ ἀλη- 
θινὸς ἐλεύθερός τε ὄντως ἢ κατὰ 
φύσιν. 
δαμοῦ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ βραχύ. 
διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἱρετέον, τάξιν 
καὶ νόμον, ἃ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 


a Se > ΄ > > 
νυν O€, OU γαρ εστιν OU- 


πολὺ ὁρᾷ καὶ βλέπει, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶν 
ἀδυνατεῖ. Ib. 3, 691 «. 

2. φέρε] Cf. Aristoph. Ach. 
541. Stallbaum makes ψόγον 


dependent on λέγειν δεῖ implied 
in λεκτέον. Perhaps rightly : 
but cf. infr. 306 e. 

12. x τὰ ξύμφορα | Most 
MSS. have μὴ ξύμφορα ἢ Evp- 
gopa. The rest are divided 
between μὴ ξύμφορα ἢ ἀξύμφορα 
and μὴ ξύμφορα. The correc- 
tion is due to Cornarius. Cf. 
Soph. 259 6, δυνατά, for traces 
of a similar process of cor- 
ruption. 

13. τοῦτον---κρείττω] “Herein 
consists the rule of right go- 
vernment as strictly conceived : 
according to which rule the 
wise and good man will order 
the condition of his subjects. 
As the pilot ever watching 
over the interest of the ship 
and her crew, not laying down 
prescriptions, but getting from 
his own mind his art for his 
law, preserves his comrades on 
board ship, so in like manner 
a right constitution of a state 
would be got from those who 


difference 
whether he 
who does 
so be rich 
or poor. 
The light 
of reason 
and science 
determin- 
ing what is 
expedient 
and just, is 
the only 
criterion of 
good go- 
vernment : 
and he who 
acts by 


° this light, 


howsoever 
his actions 
may be de- 
scribed, is 
the true 
ruler. 


ae 
WN 


U 





140 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


θινώτατον ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως, ὃν ὁ σοφὸς καὶ Ρ. 2:}:᾿ 
ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ διοικήσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ; ὥσπερ ὃ 
κυβερνήτης τὸ τῆς νεὼς καὶ ναυτῶν ἀεὶ ξυμφέρον 
΄ » 7 Ν > \ \ / ἡ 
παραφυλάττων, οὐ γράμματα τιθεὶς ἀλλὰ τὴν τέχνην P- 26)! 
δνόμον παρεχόμενος, σώζει τοὺς συνναύτας, οὕτω καὶ 
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον παρὰ τῶν οὕτως ἄρχειν 
δυναμένων ὀρθὴ γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν πολιτεία, τὴν τῆς τέχνης 
ῥώμην τῶν νόμων παρεχομένων κρείττω ; καὶ πάντα i 


A lal “ yy > » e ’ 
ποίουσι TOLS ἔμφροσιν αρχουσιν οὐκ ἐστιν ἁμαρτΉμα, 





΄ x A , ΄, \ \ = Ν 
το μέχριπερ ἂν ἕν μέγα φυλάττωσι, τὸ μετὰ νοῦ καὶ 
/ / SN / ΄σ 5 > / 
τέχνης δικαιότατον ἀεὶ διανέμοντες τοῖς ἐν TH πόλει, Ὁ 
/ 5 Χ (ae A i‘ Aes. / > If 
σώζειν τε αὐτοὺς οἷοί TE ὦσι καὶ ἀμείνους ἐκ χειρόνων 
» “ Ν ἊΝ 7 
ἀποτελεῖν KATA TO OUVATOV ; 


That can- NE. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἐστ᾽ ἀντειπεῖν παρά ye ἃ νῦν 


not be ᾿ 
gainsaid. 15 εἰρηται. 


\ ἊΝ “ \ , 
EE. Kai μὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα οὐδὲ avtippyreov. 


should be able to govern thus, 
and should bring to the work a 
power in their art superior to 
the laws.” For περὶ ταῦτα, cf. 
Theaet. 176 c: ubi fors. le- 
gend. περὶ τοῦτο. 

5. οὕτω--- γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν πολιτεία] 
The clause was at first meant 
to be in apposition with ὅρον 
εἶναι, but in ytyvour ἂν there is 
a return to the direct form. 

8. καὶ πάντα ποιοῦσι----δυνατόν] 
“Απᾷ the wise governors, what- 
ever they do, can do no wrong 
so long as they fulfil one great 
condition,—so long as by dis- 
pensing to the citizens justice 
enlightened by reason and 
knowledge, they are able to 
preserve them, and, so far as 
that is possible, to make them 
better.” 

10. μέχριπερ ἕν μέγα φυλάττω- 


σιν} Cf. Rep. 4; 423 6: ἐὰν τὸ 
λεγόμενον ἕν μέγα φυλάττωσι. 

τὸ μετὰ νοῦ---διανέμοντες] Cf. 
Lege. 4, 714 a: τὴν τοῦ νοῦ 
διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντες νόμον. 

12. σώζειν τε----καὶ ἀμείνους--- 
ἀποτελεῖν] For, as Aristotle 
afterwards said, the end of a 
city is not life merely, but a 
good life. Cf. supr. 293. 

οἷοί te oot] In apposition 
with φυλάττωσι. 

14. παρά ye—etpyra| “ At 
least in contradiction to what 
has now been said.” The re- 
spondent wishes to reserve his 
opinion on the main point, like 
Adeimantus in Rep. 6, 487 b: 
πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός 
T εἴη ἀντειπεῖν" ἀλλὰ yap —. Cf. 
Gorg. 475 €: οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά 
γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. 

16. ἐκεῖνα]! P. 292 6. 











ΠΟΛΙΤΊΙΚΟΣ. 


147 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Τὰ ποῖα εἶπες ; 


μ-- ε > y a δ. 216 τ \ 
BE. Ὡς οὐκ av ποτε πλῆθος οὐδ᾽ ὡντινωνοῦν THY 


, Ν > I? el Lm | / \ 
τοιαύτην λαβὸν ἐπιστήμην οἷον T ἂν γένοιτο μετὰ 


a - / \ / Ν 
νοῦ διοικεῖν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ σμικρὸν τι καὶ ὀλίγον 


Ἂς Ν A > G / \ / ’ / / 
καὶ TO ἐν ἐστι (ζητητέον THY μίαν ἐκείνην πολιτείαν 5 


τὴν ὀρθήν, τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας μιμήματα θετέον, ὥσπερ καὶ 


> U / > / \ \ STEN \ / 
oAtyov πρότερον ἐρρήθη, Tas μὲν ἐπὶ Ta καλλίονα, 


\ συ ς Ν > / / , 
Tas δὲ ἐπὶ Ta αἰσχίω μιμουμενᾶς TAUTHV. 


NE. 3Q. Πῶς; τί τοῦτ᾽ εἴρηκας ; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄρτι 


δῆθεν κατέμαθον τὸ περὶ τῶν μιμημάτων. 


Ν an 7 ij 7 ΄- 
HE. Καὶ μὴν οὐ φαῦλόν γε, ἂν κινήσας τις τοῦ- 


Ν if a 7 Ἂν \ ‘ 
Tov Tov λόγον αὐτοῦ καταβάλῃ Kal μὴ διελθὼν ἐνδεί- 


2. οὐδ᾽ ὡντινωνοῦν] 1. 6. Whe- 
ther rich or poor. 

ἡ. Tas peyv—pipoupevas ταύ- 
my] An epexegetic or redun- 
dant clause. 

9. Πῶς τί τοῦτ᾽ εἴρηκα] Cf. 
Legg. 12, 968 ὁ: πῶς τί τοῦτο 
εἰρῆσθαι φῶμεν ad; which the 
Zurich editors have pointed 
differently, putting a mark of 
interrogation after més. If 
this is right, it should be ap- 
plied consistently to all such 
expressions, 6. 9. πῶς ; τί τοῦτ᾽ 
εἶπες ; which is of frequent 
occurrence. 

ἄρτι P. 293 e. 

το. δῆθεν] “I suppose.” He 
had accepted the former state- 
ment, but is now forced to 
confess that he had not under- 
stood it. That δῆθεν is not 
always ironical appears from 
Herod. VI. 138: τί δὴ ἀνδρω- 
θέντες δῆθεν ποιήσουσι; and 
similar uses of it are more 
frequent in later Greek. Schol. 


Ν a , ε 7 » / 
ἃ ἕζηται τὸ νῦν γιγνόμενον ἁμάρτημα περὶ αὐτό. 


Apoll. Rh. (quoted in the Paris 
Stephanus): τὸ δῆθεν ποτὲ μὲν 
πληρωματικόν, ποτὲ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ 
δηλαδὴ ἢ ὡς δή. Compare the 
use οἵ δήπουθεν, Phileb. 62 6, lon 
534 ἃ. Badham, who objects 
to the word, very plausibly 
conjectures ῥηθέν. 

11. Καὶ μὴν---περὶ αὐτό] “And 
yet it were a remark of no 
little weight, even if one merely 
threw it out and left it, without 
discussing and making plain 
the error which men now com- 
mit in this matter.” 

ἂν κινήσας — αὐτοῦ κατα- 
βάλῃ}] “If, having started this 
question, one should leave it 
where he took it up.” For 
used metaphorically as 
ef. Gorg. 490: Ἔχε δὴ 


αὐτοῦ 
here, 
αὐτοῦ. 

13. τὸ νῦν ---ἁμάρτημα] 1. 6. 
The capricious defiance of law, 
which is worse even than the 
maintenance of imperfect laws. 
See infr. 300 a, b. 


TD 


I 


ο 


Still less 
can the 
former pro- 
position, 
that scien- 
tifie go- 
vernment 
must of 
necessity 
be in the 
hands of 
very few: 
and that 
the other 
forms are 
imitations, 
more or 
less imper- 
fect, of this. 
This is a 
weighty 
truth, 
especially 


when fol- 
lowed into 
its applica- 
tions : 
whereby 
may be 
revealed 
the error 
into which 
politicians 
now-a-days 
are fallen. 
Their best 
course is to 
follow the 
traces of 
the perfect 
state which 
have been 
preserved 
in laws ; 
although 
the main- 
tenance of 
law is only 
a second- 
best course, 
and not 
ideally the 
best. 

This ap- 
pears, if we 
consider 
the origin 
of law, as 
we may do 
under a 
familiar 
image. 


148 MAATQNOZ 


NE. ΣΩ. Ποῖον δή ; 

EE. Τοιόνδε τι δεῖ γε ζητεῖν, οὐ πάνυ ξύνηθες 
οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν: ὅμως μὴν πειρώμεθα λαβεῖν αὐτό. 
φέρε γάρ' ὀρθῆς ἡμῖν μόνης οὔσης ταύτης τῆς πολι- 

5τείας, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τὰς ἄλλας δεῖ τοῖς 
συγγάμμασι χρωμένας 
δρώσας τὸ νῦν ἐπαινούμενον, καίπερ οὐκ ὀρθό- 


/ a / 
TAUTNS οὕτω σώζεσθαι, 


A 
τατον OV; 


NE. ΣΩ. To ποῖον ; 


— Ν \ \ / \ / “ 
10 ΞΕ To παρὰ τοὺς νόμους μηδὲν μηδένα τολμᾷν 


a - > a ͵ N lal \ ΄ 
ποιεῖν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸν τολμῶντα δὲ θανάτῳ 


lod a a 4 oy 13 RY, 
ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. καὶ TOUT ἐστιν 6 


> / Ν ΄΄ > “0 € / > \ \ 
ὀρθότατα καὶ κάλλιστ᾽ ἔχον, ὡς δεύτερον, ἐπειδὰν TO 


πρῶτόν τις μεταθῇ τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν. ᾧ δὲ τρόπῳ 
ρῶτὸν τις μεταθῇ τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν. ᾧ pore 


νώμεθα. ἢ γάρ; 


΄ » a ἃ Ν , 3 / 
15 γεγονὸς ἐστι τοῦτο ὃ δὴ δεύτερον ἐφήσαμεν, διαπερα- 


NE. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


\ \ , > 
HE. Eis δὴ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπανίωμεν παλιν, ais 


’ a » ΄ SPUN 
αναγκαιον ἀπεικάζειν QEL 


20 χοντᾶς. 


NE. SQ. Ποίας: 


2. δεῖ ye ζητεῖν] “ We must 
certainly examine—with what 
success we may.” 

5. ἣν εἰρήκαμεν] P. 293, viz. 
That which is guided by the 
consciousness of what is best, 
in which, according to the lan- 
guage of the Republic, philoso- 
phers are kings. 

7. οὐκ ὀρθότατον͵] Cf. supr. 
294 d: ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ὀρθότατον 
ὁ νόμος. 

13. ὡς δεύτερον] Cf. Lege. 
9, 875 ὁ, quoted above. 

ἐπειδὰν — ῥηθέν] “ When 


\ Χ 37 
τοὺς βασιλικοὺς ap- 


one has withdrawn from the 
first and best principle, which 
we described just now.” 

15. διαπερανώμεθα. ἢ γάρ ;| Cf. 
Theet. 173 ¢: λέγωμεν δή, ὡς 
ἔοικεν----, 

18. ἐπανίωμεν πάλιν] The 
image of the physician was 
employed above, p. 293. But 
the γενναῖος κυβερνήτης seems to 
be an echo of Rep. 6, 488 a. 
Cf. also Legg. 12, 963 b, and 
Arist. Pol. III. 2, where the 
virtue of a citizen is inferred 
from that of a sailor. 























ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


Ἀ a / 
BE. Tov γενναῖον κυβερνήτην καὶ 
“ > ΄ > lA 
πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἰατρόν. 


149 
Ἀ « / 
τὸν ἑτέρων 


γὰρ δή τι 


/ 
κατίδωμεν 


oe 3 ’ὔ > al / 
σχημα ἐν TOUTOLS AUTOLS πλασάαμενοι. 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Ποῖόν τι: 


͵ - , x 
HE. Towovde, οἷον εἰ πάντες περὶ αὐτῶν διανοη- 5 


a “ / > > ΄ ’ a \ 
θεῖμεν ὅτι δεινότατα ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν πάσχομεν. ὃν μὲν 


Ἁ Ey ’ y € a , « 7 , 
yap av ἐθελήσωσιν ἡμῶν τούτων EKATEPOL σώζειν, 


ὁμοίως δὴ σώζουσιν, ὃν δ᾽ ἂν λωβᾶσθαι βουληθῶσι, 


“ 72 "4 ’ὔ 
λωβῶνται τέμνοντες καὶ κάοντες καὶ προστάττοντες 


᾽ ΄ 7 see \ - 7, - 
ἀναλώματα φέρειν map ἑαυτοὺς οἷον φόρους, ὧν το 


\ \ > Χ ΄ Ν >a\ > , 
σμικρὰ μὲν εἰς TOY κάμνοντα καὶ οὐδὲν ἀναλίσκουσι, 


I. ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον 
Hom. Il. A. 514 : Ἰητρὸς γὰρ 
ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων. 

2. τι σχῆμα πλασάμενοι] This 
expression also recals the pas- 
sage of the Republic just cited: 
δεῖ ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὸ ξυναγαγεῖν 
εἰκάζοντα. 

The unchangeableness of in- 
stitutions is less absolutely 
fixed in the Laws, where room 
is left for partial changes and 
adaptations by constitutional 
means. Legg. 6, 769: εἴποτε 
τις ἐπινοήσειε γράψαι Te ὡς κάλλι- 
στον ζῶον καὶ τοῦτ᾽ αὖ μηδέποτε 
ἐπὶ τὸ φαυλότερον ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ 
βέλτιον ἴσχειν τοῦ ἐπιόντος ἀεὶ 
χρόνου, ξυννοεῖς ὅτι θνητὸς ὧν, εἰ 
μή τινα καταλείψει διάδοχον ---- 
οὐ τοιοῦτον τὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου --- 
πρῶτον μὲν γράψαι τοὺς νόμους 
--Ἴἔπειτα----ἀρ᾽ οἴει τινὰ----ἀγνοεῖν 
ὅτι πάμπολλα ἀνάγκη παραλεί- 
πεσθαι τοιαῦτα, ἃ δεῖ τινὰ ξυνε- 
πόμενον ἐπανορθοῦν ; 

3. ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς] ἐν of 
the material in which one 
works ; as supr. 288 c: ἐξ ὧν 

Np DS: ὩΣ 
καὶ ἐν οἷς. 

5. οἷον εἰ) The apodosis is 


deferred by the explanation of 
this clause, and the sense is 
resumed and continued in «i δὴ 
κιτιλ., infra. 

10. οἷον φόρους] The physi- 
cian, as being an image of the 
king, is made to assume a 
kingly σχῆμα. 

11. σμικρὰ---καὶ οὐδὲν] “Little 
or nothing.” Cf. Theet. 173 6. 
The influence of the following 
argument appears in Ar. Pol. 
II. 5: ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἀλλῶν em- 
στημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν᾽ οἷον 
ἰατρικὴ κινηθεῖσα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια, 
καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι 
Ibid. : 


Weddos δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ 


΄“ ‘ « , 
πασαι Και αἱι δυνάμεις. 


περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν, οὐ γὰρ ὅμοιον 
τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον᾽ ὁ γὰρ 
νόμος ἰσχὺν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ 
πείθεσθαι πλὴν διὰ τὸ ἔθος κ-τ.λ. 
Ib. II]. rr: τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν 
εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος, ὅτι 
τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι 
φαῦλον... ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς 
ὅταν ὑποπτεύίωσι πεισθέντας τοῖς 
ἐχθροῖς διαφθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, 
τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θερα- 
πείαν ζητήσαιεν ἂν μᾶλλον. 


Suppose 
men, indig- 
nant at the 
harm done 
by the ca- 
price of 
physicians 
and pilots, 
devised a 
constraint 
for them by 
calling an 
oligarchi- 
cal or de- 
mocratic 
assembly, 
where all 
who chose 
might 
speak, and 
the advice 


of unpro- 
fessional 
persons 
might often 
be pre- 
ferred, and 
by there 
making 
decrees 

for the re- 
culation of 
the prac- 
tice of na- 
vigation 
and medi- 
cine, which 
should be 
binding on 
those pro- 
fessions 
for all 
time. 


150 


a 7 wv > / Ν cf ᾽ / “ - Ν 
τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ οἰκέται χρῶνται' καὶ p. 2% 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


\ κ᾿ A ἦν \ A x , 
δὴ καὶ τελευτῶντες ἢ παρὰ Evyyevov ἢ Tapa τινων Ὁ 


ἐχθρῶν τοῦ κάμνοντος χρήματα μισθὸν λαμβάνοντες 


» / 
ATTOKTLYVUGOLV. 


6 5 ΄- 7 a 
οἵ T αὖ κυβερνῆται μυρία ἕτερα τοι- 


ω » 6 / / yf » “ 
5. αῦτα ἐργάζονται, καταλείποντές τε ἔκ τινος ἐπιβουλῆς 


> lol lal if 7 ΄- 
ἐν ταῖς ἀναγωγαῖς ἐρήμους, καὶ σφάλματα ποιοῦντες 


> a ΄ > ΄, 9 \ , 
ἐν τοῖς πελάγεσιν ἐκβάλλουσιν εἰς THY θάλατταν, Kal 


led “ > \ ΄ / 
ἕτερα κακουργοῦσιν. εἰ On ταῦτα διανοηθέντες βου- 


/ Ν 3 o / / a 
λευσαίμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν βουλὴν τινα, τούτων τῶν 


lal 3 3, ’ 
τοτζέχνων μηκέτι ἐπιτρέπειν ἄρχειν αὐτοκράτορι μηδε- 


τέρᾳ μήτ᾽ οὖν δούλων μήτ᾽ ἐλευθέρων, ξυλλέξαι δὲ 


5 y «ε na > a x / XN “ ἊἋ 
ἐκκλησίαν ἡμῶν αὑτῶν, ἢ ξύμπαντα τὸν δῆμον ἢ 


\ 7 (2 ΕῚ ΄- \ ΩΝ ΕΣ lal Ν a 
Tous πλουσίους μόνον, ἐξεῖναι δὲ Kal ἰδιωτῶν Kal τῶν 


yy a / a Ἂς Ν / 
ἄλλων δημιουργῶν περί TE πλοῦ καὶ περὶ νόσων 


I. τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοι] The phy- 
sician’s fee is glanced at also 
in Rep. 1, 341 ¢: ὁ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ 
λόγῳ iarpos—adrepov χρηματι- 
στῆς ἐστιν ἢ τῶν καμνόντων θερα- 
πευτής ; καὶ λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι 
ἰατρὸν ὄντα. 

2. ἢ---ἤ τινων] Supr. 261 ἃ: 
ὥσπερ βοηλάτην ἤ τινα ἱππόκομον, 
et passim. 

7. ἐκβάλλουσιν] Note the re- 
turn from the participle to the 
indicative. 

10. pndetépa] Bodl. pnderepa 
(sic). 

11. μήτ᾽ οὖν δούλων μήτ᾽ ἐλευ- 
θέρων] “No, not over slaves, 
still less freemen.” See the 
picture of the slave physician 
of slaves in Legg. 4, 720. 

13. ἐξεῖναι 5€ — δημιουργῶν | 
Sub. ὠτινιοῦν, Cf. Prot. 319 ἃ, 
Gorg. 456. 

καὶ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ 


ἄλλων 


τῶν 


τὸ γνώμην ξυμβαλέσθαι, καθ᾽ ὅ τι χρὴ τοῖς φαρμάκοις 


δημιουργῶν] “ Other,” 1. 6. than 
physicians and pilots. Cf. 
Protag. 319 ¢, d. 

15. καθ᾽ ὃ τι χρὴ---ἔτερα τοι- 
atta] “ What is to be the me- 
thod of using drugs and sur- 
gical instruments in our treat- 
ment of the sick, and vessels 
also, and the tackling of ves- 
sels in navigation, and in en- 
countering dangers, whether 
those incident to the voyage 
in the shape of winds and 
waves, or in encountering an 
affray with pirates, or perhaps 
the necessity of fighting at 
sea with old-fashioned galleys 
against an armada of the like 
build.” The words πρὸς ras— 
τοιαῦτα, though in point of 
meaning explanatory of περὶ 
τοὺς κινδύνους, return to the 
construction with καθ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ 
--χρῆσθαι----τοῖς πλοίοις. 





, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. hi 


ῷῳτ 
--- 





. a Ν lal cal 7 ἈΝ \ 4 
18.208. ἡμᾶς Kal τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς ὀργάνοις πρὸς τοὺς κάμνοντας 
ΗΝ Ν Ν a / a A 
d χρῆσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς πλοίοις τε αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς 
lal 7 ’ \ lal Ν 
ναυτικοῖς ὀργάνοις εἰς τὴν τῶν πλοίων χρείαν καὶ 


ni \ / 7 Ν SAN Ν σι 
περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους τοὺς τε πρὸς αὑτὸν τὸν πλοῦν 


ἜΣ \ ΄ ΄ κ \ \ a = 
ἀνέμων καὶ θαλάττης πέρι καὶ πρὸς Tas τοῖς λῃσταῖς 5 
» 4 Ν aX rn 37 / a 
ἐντεύξεις, καὶ ἐὰν ναυμαχεῖν apa δέῃ που μακροῖς 
/ Ν a a ‘\ \ 4 , 4s 
πλοίοις προς ETEPA τοιαῦτα τὰ δε τῳ πληθει δοξαντα 
/ / nN a a #7 3 
περὶ τούτων, εἴτε τινῶν ἰατρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν εἴτ 
a» a {/ / > / 
ἄλλων ἰδιωτῶν ξυμβουλευόντων, γράψαντας ἐν KUp- 
/ Ν / \ \ ΩΝ 3) ΄ 
βεσί τισι καὶ στήλαις, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀγραφα πάτρια ιο 
7 ay, NX rn? BA / Ν 3) 
e θεμένους ἐθη, κατὰ ταῦτ ON πᾶντα τὸν ἐπειτα 


’ \ “- ΄ 
χρόνον ναυτίλλεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν καμνόντων θερα- 


, a 
πείας ποιεῖσθαι. 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Κομιδῇ γε εἴρηκας aroma. 


EE. Kar ἐνιαυτὸν δέ γε ἄρχοντας καθίστασθαι 


> , " » a / 5 > a / 
τοῦ πλήθους, Eire EK τῶν πλουσίων ETE EK τοῦ δήμου 


7 A AY ΄, ͵ \ \ 
παντὸς, ὃς av κληρούμενος λαγχάνῃ" τοὺς δὲ κατα- 


The present is of course a 
wholly imaginary case. The 
ἰατρῶν αἵρεσις alluded to in the 
Gorgias, 455 b, is not the de- 
cision of the question who are 
to be physicians, but the selec- 
tion of certain physicians for 
some public duty connected 
with their profession. Cf. Ar. 
Pol. III. 6: ὥσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν δεῖ 
διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω 
τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. 

6. μακροῖς πλοίοις] The most 
antiquated kind of fighting 
vessel, of which Plato speaks 
as an English writer of the 
present day might of the old 
three-decker. He imagines the 
effect of perpetuating such a 
mode of warfare in written 
laws, like those of “ the Medes 


and Persians, which alter not.” 
In the same spirit he recals the 
old word κύρβεσι just below. 

8. εἴτ᾽ ἄλλων ἰδιωτῶν] “ Or 
else private citizens.” The 
Platonic use of ἄλλος already 
noticed. Cf. Gorg. 473 ¢: ὑπὸ 
τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ TOV ἄλλων ξένων. 

11. ἤδη τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ναυ- 


τίλλεσθα)] Cf. Soph. Antig. 
717: ὑπτίοις κάτω στρέψας τὸ 


λοιπὸν σέλμασιν ναυτΐλλεται. 

15- δέ γε] “ Yes, and more- 
over.” 

17. 6s—Aayyavy] This seems 
to refer only to ἐκ τοῦ δήμου 
παντὸς, see infr, 6 : ἢ τῶν---λα- 
χόντας. 

The practical and speculative 
physician are again contrasted 
in illustration of the lawgiver’s 


15 Then sup- 
pose them 
to elect 
annually, 
either by 


vote or lot, 
those to 
whom au- 
thority in 
each de- 
partment 
should be 
given. 
Who, when 
their term 
of office had 
expired, 
might be 
summoned 
before an 
unprofes- 
sional 
court, and 
perhaps 
condemned 
and pun- 
ished for 
breaking 
the written 
regulations 
in their art. 
Not con- 
tent with 
this, sup- 
pose them 
to enact, 
that who- 
ever is 
found in- 
quiring 


15 


152 


IAATQNOZ 


στάντας ἄρχοντας ἄρχειν κατὰ τὰ γράμματα κυβερ- p. 26}, 


a \ al Ν / 
νῶντας τὰς ναῦς καὶ TOUS κάμνοντας ἰωμένους. 
NE. 2Q. Ταῦτ᾽ ἔτι χαλεπώτερα. 


πὴ ἢ Θ a δὴ ν Ν A ΄- « / > δὰ 
ei. €@ O77) Και TO μετὰ Ταῦτα ETTOMEVOV., ETTELOAV 


ἈΝ Ν cal > / ε / € ᾽ Ν 54“. 7 
5γὰρ δὴ τῶν ἀρχοντῶν EKAOTOLS O ενίαυτος ἐξέλθῃ, 


, ᾽ὔ / > ΄-“ ΕΥ a 
δεησει δικαστήρια καθίσαντας ἀνδρῶν, ἢ τῶν πλου- 


/ » / X / 53 a 74 \ 
σίων ἐκ προκρίσεως ἢ ξύμπαντος αὖ τοῦ δήμου Tous 


/ > / 7 * JA Ν 
λαχόντας, εἰς τούτους εἰσάγειν τοὺς ἀρξαντας καὶ 


» , - \ Ν / € > \ 
εὐθύνειν, κατηγορεῖν δὲ τὸν βουλόμενον ὡς οὐ κατὰ 


\ 7 Ν > \ ’ , \ a Ia\ 
τοτὰ γράμματα τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκυβέρνησε τὰς ναῦς οὐδὲ 


\ \ \ “- / 4 \ Ena \ 
κατὰ Ta παλαιὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔθη: Ta αὐτὰ δὲ 


an Ν lol \ 7 ’ὔ © > 
ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν τοὺς κάμνοντας ἰωμένων. ὧν ὃ 


x a “ σ“ Ν cad δ... at \ 
av καταψηφισθῇ, τιμᾷν ὃ TL χρὴ παθεῖν αὐτῶν τινὰς 


ΩΝ > , 
ῃ ἀποτίνειν. 


NE. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅ γ᾽ ἐθέλων καὶ ἑκὼν ἐν τοῖς 


΄ YA ΄ ’ x lal 7 
τοιούτοις ἄρχειν δικαιότατ᾽ ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχοι καὶ 


/ 
ἀποτίνοι. 


EE. Καὶ τοίνυν ἔτι δεήσει θέσθαι νόμον ἐπὶ πᾶσι 


art in Legg. 9, 857 d. The 
“slave” says to the true phy- 
siclan: ὦ μῶρε, οὐκ ἰατρεύεις τὸν 
νοσοῦντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν παιδεύεις, 
ὡς ἰατρὸν ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς ὑγιῆ δεό- 
μενον γίγνεσθαι. 

10. ἐκυβέρνησε]͵ He passes 
from the general enactment to 
the form of indictment in a 
particular case. 

11. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα] For the 
ellipse, cf. Thezt.148 b: καὶ 
περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. 

13. τιμᾷν --- ἀποτίνεν 1 Cf. 
Legg. 8, 843 b, 9, 875 d, 4110. 

15. καὶ ἑκὼν] “To hold office 
amongst such people, at least 
when he has the choice.” Com- 
pare the representation in the 


Republic (1, 347, 7, 521) of the 


unwillingness of good men to 
rule. καὶ implies that there are 
cases in which a good man may 
be compelled to rule. 

18. Kal τοίνυν ἔτι] 
further still.” 

Καὶ τοίνυν--- δεήσει] Cf. Legg. 
1,634 d,e (the Athenian is ad- 
dressing the Cretan and Spar- 
tan): ὑμῖν μὲν yap—eis τῶν καλ- 
λίστων ἂν εἴη νόμων μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν 
νέων μηδένα ἐᾷν ποῖα καλῶς αὐτῶν 
ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, μιᾷ δὲ φωνῇ καὶ 
ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος πάντας συμφω- 
νεῖν ὡς πάντα καλῶς κεῖται θέντων 
θεῶν κιτιλ. And for the ex- 
pression, Legg. 5, 741 6: πρὸς 
τούτοις δ᾽ ἔτι νόμος ἕπεται πᾶσι 
τούτοις. 


“ Well, 


Pp: 29) 


ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 153 


, yy Ν Ν ‘ ΕἸ Ν 
99. τούτοις, ἂν τις κυβερνητικὴν καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἢ TO 


ε Ν a) a i Ν ΄ ΄ Ν 
ὑγίεινον καὶ ἰατρικῆς ἀλήθειαν περὶ πνεύματα τε καὶ 
\ \ “ \ \ ΄ 
θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ ζητῶν φαίνηται παρὰ τὰ γράμματα 

, a \ “- “ \ 
καὶ σοφιζόμενος ὁτιοῦν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, πρῶτον μὲν 
’ Ν \ τ. \ , 
μήτε ἰατρικὸν αὐτὸν μήτε κυβερνητικὸν ὀνομάζειν 

\ 4 / \ / Sf? 
ἀλλὰ μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστὴν, εἰθ 
3, 7 
as διαφθείροντα ἄλλους νεωτέρους καὶ ἀναπείθοντα 
7 lal lal \ \ / 
ἐπιτίθεσθαι κυβερνητικῇ Kal ἰατρικῇ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, 
γι. / ἴω a 
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοκράτορας ἄρχειν τῶν πλοίων καὶ τῶν voo- 
/ / > , Ν ΄ - 
οὐντων, γραψάμενον εἰσάγειν τὸν βουλόμενον, οἷς 
», » 4 7 ΕΝ \ \ \ 
ἔξεστιν, εἰς δή τι δικαστήριον. ἂν δὲ παρὰ τοὺς 
2 Ν \ 4 7 / 3, / 
νόμους Kal τὰ γεγραμμένα δόξῃ πείθειν εἴτε νέους 





” , , a > ΄ 5. Ν A 
εἴτε πρεσβύτας, κολάζειν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. οὐδὲν yap 


2. πνεύματα! ‘* Winds,” as 
affecting health. Cf. supra 
205 d: ξυμβαινόντων ἄλλων Bed- 
τιόνων τοῖς κάμνουσι διὰ πνεύματα 
7 τι καὶ ἄλλο. 

καὶ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρά] 1. 6. the 
more general inquiry which in- 
cludes the subject of winds. 

6. petewpoddyov, ἀδολέσχην 
τινὰ σοφιστήν ͵ἢ] See the well- 
known passage, Rep. 6, 488 6: 
τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐχ 
ἡγεῖ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε 
καὶ ἀδολέσχην καὶ ἄχρηστόν σφισι 
καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὕτω 
κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ πλωτήρων. 
The phrase τὰ μετεωρὰ πράγματα 
would apply equally to the 
winds, the subjects of the phy- 
sician’s study, and the stars, 
which the true pilot must un- 
derstand. 

μετεωρολόγον ---- διαφθείροντα 
ἄλλους νεωτέρους----μὴ κατὰ νό- 
μους] The indictments of Ari- 
stophanes and Meletus against 
Socrates are here combined. 


In both clauses there is perhaps 
an allusion to the death of So- 
crates. Cf. also Soph. 225 e. 

7. ws διαφθείροντα! This de- 
pends on γραψάμενον. 
9. αὐτοκράτορας] 

208 6. 
αὐτοκράτορας ἄρχειν 7 CF, 
Ar. Pol. I. 6: διόπερ οὐκ αὐὖτο- 


γνώμονας βέλτιον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ 


Cf. supra 


κατὰ τὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους. 
Tbe 7: 

ἄρχειν depends immediately 
on πείθειν, and is codrdinate 
with ἐπιτίθεσθαι, though ἀλλὰ 
strictly requires some construc- 
tion dependent on ἐπιτ., 6. g. 
the participle ἄρχοντας, 

ΤΟ. τὸν βουλόμενον, ois ἔξεστιν 
“ Whoever will of those who 
have the legal power.” 

11. εἰς δή τι δικαστήριον] ΟἿ, 
Meno 81 ὁ: τελευτᾷν, ὃ δὴ ἀπο- 
θνήσκειν καλοῦσιν. 

12. γεγραμμένα] Se. γράμματα 
περὶ τούτων. 


13. οὐδὲν yap δεῖν] ““ΕῸΣ no 


pc 


σι 


Io 


into the 
truth of 
medicine 
and navi- 
gation, and 
is therein 
κε wise be- 
yond what 
is written,” 
he shall 
first be 
called no 
artist, but 
a dreamer 
ora prating 
sophister, 
and then 
be publicly 
indicted of 
corrupting 
the youth, 
and per- 
suading 
them to 
address 
themselves 


to these 
sciences in 
a manner 
contrary to 
the laws. 
Lastly, if 
he be found 
guilty his 
punish- 
ment shall 
be extreme. 
For no one 
needs be 
wiser than 
the laws, 
which he 
who runs 
may read, 
both on the 
public mo- 
numents, 
and in the 
voice of 
eustom. 


154 


MAATQNOZ 


vad fal 53 > / \ ’ “ 
δεῖν τῶν νόμων εἶναι σοφώτερον᾽ οὐδένα γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν P- 26,5} 
ἰ 


Us , Ν \ Ν « Ν Ia \ Ν 
TO τε ἰατρικὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κυβερνητικὸν 


καὶ ναυτικόν" ἐξεῖναι γὰρ τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν 
sere UG, feos 


Ἢ , 3, “ ‘ ΄ 
γεγραμμένα καὶ πάτρια ἔθη κείμενα. ταῦτα δὴ περί 


’ \ / / “ἤὕ c tA 
STE ταῦτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰ γίγνοιτο οὕτως ws λέγο- 


3 a / 
μεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ στρατηγικῆς καὶ ξυμπάσης 


ἡστινοσοῦν θηρευτικῆς καὶ γραφικῆς ἢ ξυμπάσης 


«ε a a ἴω / 
μέρος ὁτιοῦν μιμητικῆς Kal τεκτονικῆς καὶ ξυνόλης 


a Ἃ ΄- / Ν x Ν 
ὁποιασοῦν σκευουργίας ἢ καὶ γεωργίας καὶ τῆς περὶ 


\ \ Ey ε , 3 
ιοτὰ φυτὰ Evvodns τέχνης, ἢ καί τινα ἱπποφορβίαν αὖ 


κατὰ συγγράμματα θεασαίμεθα γιγνομένην ἢ Evp- 


\ ΕΝ Ν oD lal ad / 
πασαν ἀγελαιοκομικὴν ἢ μαντικὴν ἢ πᾶν ὃ TL μέρος 


one need be wiser than the 
laws.” οὐδὲν is adverbial. The 
inevitableness of the philoso- 
pher’s fate is again stated in 
the Gorgias, p. 521. 


4. kat πάτρια ἔθη] These 
are described in Legg. 7, 
USS) 


ταῦτα δὴ περί----κατὰ τέχνην ;| 
“Tf such were the proce- 
dure, Socrates, about these 
sciences, and about generalship 
and the other kinds of hunt- 
ing, or painting and every 
department of imitative art, 
or carpentry and every handi- 
eraft, or husbandry and_ all 
vegetable culture, or were we 
to see an art of horsebreeding, 
or the tending of any herd 
conducted according to written 
rules, or soothsaying, or any 
other ministerial function, or 
draught-playing, or any other 
science conversant with num- 
bers, whether simple, or square, 
or cube, or comprising motion 
—what aspect would be pre- 


sented by a world in which 
everything was done in this 
way, in which written pre- 
scriptions took the place of 
scientific principles ?” 

The Stranger takes every 
opportunity to exercise his 
pupil in recognizing the 
“ kindred ” between divers 


arts. Many threads of pre- 
vious discussion are here 
taken up. 

6. στρατηγικῆς Kat — θηρευ- 
τικῆς | CE. Sophy) 222 ane 
robe Πὰς 


7. γραφικῆς ἢ ----μέρος ὁτιοῦν 
He reverts to the accusative 
after περὶ (ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας 
supr.) in order to avoid the 
confusion of a double genitive. 
For the μέρη τῆς μιμητικῆς, cf 
Soph. 235 6. 

9. okevovpyias| Soph. 219 a. 

γεωργία! Ibid. 

ΤΟ. ἱπποφ.--ἀγελαιοκομ.] Su- 
pra 261 ἃ, 276 ἃ. 

12. μαντικὴν----διακον.] Supra 
290 6. 








ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


155 


; ὃ \ / ΕῪ / “Δ / > 

99. διακονικὴ περιείληφεν, ἢ πεττείαν ἢ ξύμπασαν apt- 
/ 4 5 . 5) ΄ 7 

© θμητικήν, ψιλήν, εἴτε ἐπίπεδον εἴτε ἐν βάθεσιν εἴτε ἐν 


’ 53 / 4 lal “ 
τάχέεσιν ουσαν που,---περὶ ATTAVTA TAVTA OVTW πτρατ- 


/ / 7 \ / 
τόμενα τί ToT ἄν φανείη, κατὰ συγγράμματα γιγνό- 


aN A / 
MEV και μὴ KATA ΤΕΧΡΉΡ 9 


NE. ΣΏ. Δῆλον ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι παντελῶς 


δ > i? CS \ xAa\ > a / See sy, 
av ἀπολοινθ᾽ ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐδὲ εἰσαῦθις γένοιντ᾽ ἂν ποτε 


\ Ν 3 7 al ΄- ΄ “ « 
διὰ TOV OTOK@AVOVTA TOUTOV Gyre νομον" WOTE O 


/ aA Ν lal / > Ν , 5) cn 5 ͵ 
βίος, ὧν καὶ νῦν χάλεπος, εἰς TOV χρόνον ἐκεῖνον αβι- 


/ Ἂ XN / 
ὠτὸς γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ παράπαν. 


1. πεττείαν] Infr. 292 6. 
πεττείαν ---- ἀριθμητικήν | 
Legg. 7, 820 d: 
πεττεία καὶ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων τὰ pa- 

θήματα οὐ πάμπολυ κεχωρίσθαι. 
ἀριθμητικήν, ψιλὴν ---- ἐν τάχε- 
ow] Supra 258 c, 284 6. 


> pak} 
2. eit ἐν βάθεσιν εἴτ᾽ ἐν τάχε- 


Cf. 


»ὕ a 4 
€OLKE YOUV ἢ TE 


ow] Τάχεσιν Par. E; πάσχεσιν 
ParH. Cf.supr. 284 τ »ταχύτητας, 
and note: 294 d, παχύτερον : ubi 
Par. F, ταχύτερον. Arithmetic 
here includes mathematics, pure 
and mixed. Cf. Legs. 5 1466: 
νομίσαντα πρὸς πάντα εἶναι χρησί- 
μους τὰς τῶν ἀριθμῶν διανομὰς 
καὶ ποικίλσεις, ὅσα τε αὐτοὶ ἐν 
ἑαυτοῖς ποικίλλονται καὶ ὅσα ἐν 
μήκεσι καὶ ἐν βαθέσι ποικίλματα, 
καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν φθόγγοις καὶ κινήσεσι 
ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν εὐθυπορίαν τῆς 
ἄνω καὶ κάτω φορᾶς καὶ τῆς κύκλῳ 
περιφορᾶς. (The last clause 
affords a further comment on 
ταχέσιν.) 

3. οὕτω πραττόμενα] Imper- 
sonal. For the form οἵ sen- 
tence, cf. Rep. 4, 434 a: τέκτων 
—ravta τἄλλα μεταλλαττόμενα, 
dpa σοι ἄν τι δοκεῖ κιτλ. In 
connexion with this passage, 


: slapaa : 
see Gorgias 455 Ὁ: 
> cal c ,ὔ ε fod , 4 
ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλο- 
γος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου 
A a Ww > 
τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι 
x , ec \ > ΄ 
ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύ- 
a ‘ a > c ΄ « 
σει, δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἷ- 
ρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖ- 
σθαι. 


a 4 
oTav Tepe 


4. κατὰ συγγράμματα γιγνό- 
μενα] Contrast with this the 
praise of the Egyptian conven- 
tionality in art, Legg. 2,656 6: 
ΑΘ. παρὰ ταῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἐξῆν οὔτε ζωγρά- 
φοις οὔτ᾽ ἄλλοις ὅσοι σχήματα καὶ 
ὁποῖ᾽ atta ἀπεργάζονται καινοτο- 
μεῖν οὐδ᾽ ἐπινοεῖν ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα ἢ τὰ 
πάτρια, οὐδὲ νῦν ἔξεστιν, οὔτ᾽ ἐν 
τούτοις οὔτ᾽ ἐν μουσικῇ ξυμπάσῃ. 
σκοπῶν δ᾽ εὑρήσεις αὐτόθι τὸ μυριο- 
στὸν ἔτος γεγραμμένα ἢ τετυπωμένα, 
οὐχ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν μυριοστὸν ἀλλ᾽ 
ὄντως, τῶν νῦν δεδημιουργημένων 
οὔτε τι καλλίονα οὔτ᾽ αἰσχίω, τὴν 
αὐτὴν δὲ ἀπειργασμένα. 
ΚΛ. Θαυμαστὸν λέγεις. ΑΘ. Νομο- 
θετικὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ πολιτικὸν ὑπερ- 
βαλλόντως. 

6. Δῆλον ---τὸ παράπαν, infr. 
ἄρα οὐ --- κακόν, ἁμαρτήματος ---- 
ξυγγραμμάτων] Note the tragic 
cadence of these clauses. 


τέχνην 


*x 2 


10 


What 
would be 
the result 
of this pro- 
cedure, if 
applied to 
these or 
any other 
arts ? 
Theywould 
simply be 
destroyed, 
and that 
without 
hope of re- 
covery : so 
that life 
would be 
an intole- 
rable bur- 
den. 


But things 
would fall 
into still 
greater 
confusion, 
if the men 
appointed 
under such 


156 


/ / >, ‘ 7 A 
EE. Ti δὲ τόδε ; εἰ κατὰ συγγράμματα μὲν ἀν- Pp. 361} 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


’ - ΄- ΕἸ ) ἢ ΄ 
αγκαάζοιμεν ἕκαστον γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ τοῖς 


͵, ε a > lal Ν / 
συγγράμμασιν ἡμῶν ἐπιστατεῖν τὸν χειροτονηθέντα 


Ἂ » - \ \ fal 
ἢ λαχόντα ἐκ τύχης, οὗτος δὲ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν 


Vd Δ oa / » 7 / 
enactments 5 γραμμάτων ἢ κέρδους ἕνεκέν τινος ἢ χάριτος ἰδίας 


disregard- 
ed them, 
not in the 
interest of 
science, 
but of 
their own 
private 
wishes. 
For the 
laws have 
at least 
some basis 
of experi- 
ence and 
of plausible 
counsel. 
Hence if 
laws are 
made, it 

is best, 
though 
only second 
best, that 
they should 
be en- 
forced. 


a > o fa) a \ / 
Tapa ταῦτα ἐπιχειροῖ δρᾷν ἕτερα, μηδὲν γιγνώσκων, 


53 » A an a“ / a Ἃ yy a 
apa. OU TOU KQKOU TOU πρόσθεν μεῖζον αν ετι TOUTO 


tf / 
γίγνοιτο κακον 5 


NE. 30. ᾿Αληθέστατα. 


=E Il \\ XN 53 \ , Ν » / 
poy Ls. apa γὰρ OLUAaL τοὺς VO{LOUS TOUS EK πειρᾶς 


“ 7 / / 4 
πολλῆς κειμένους καί τινων ξυμβούλων ἕκαστα χα- 


᾽ὔ / 4 a 
ριέντως ξυμβουλευσάντων καὶ πεισάντων θέσθαι τὸ 


“ € Ν - lal las « if 
πλῆθος, ὁ Tapa ταῦτα τολμῶν δρᾷν, ἁμαρτήματος 


ε ΄ , 3 / > / 
ἁμάρτημα πολλαπλάσιον ἀπεργαζόμενος, ἀνατρέποι 


a Ἂ a 7 / a 
15 77ACQV QV πρᾶξιν ἔτι μειζόνως τῶν ξυγγραμμάτων. 


NE. ΣΩΏ. Πώς & οὐ μελλει; 

EE. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τοῖς περὶ ὁτουοῦν νόμους καὶ 
ξυγγράμματα τιθεμένοις δεύτερος πλοῦς τὸ παρὰ 
ταῦτα μήτε ἕνα μήτε πλῆθος μηδὲν μηδέποτε ἐᾷν 


2000GV μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν. 
PEy μὴ 


10. Παρὰ γὰρ οἶμαι] The 
sentence begins with an under- 
stood subject, viz. οὗτος supra, 
but as the πρότασις lengthens 
this is forgotten, and hence, in 
resuming, the article is intro- 
duced : 
δρᾶν. 

II. χαριέντως} [. 6. by right 
opinion without science. Cf. 
Ar. Eth. Nic. I. 3: oi—xapi- 
έστεροι. 

Pseudo-Zaleuc. ap. Stob.(Mul- 
lach. Ὁ. 543 8): τῶν δὲ κειμένων νό- 
pov ἐάν τις δοκῇ μὴ καλῶς κεῖσθαι, 


6 παρὰ ταῦτα τολμῶν 


μετατιθέναι ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον. μεν- 
ὄντων δὲ, πάντας πειθαρχεῖν᾽ ὡς 


ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων μὲν ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦς 
κειμένους νόμους οὐ καλὸν οὐδὲ 
συμφέρον, ὑπὸ δὲ νόμου βελτίονος 
ἡττώμενον κατακρατεῖσθαι καὶ κα- 
λὸν καὶ συμφέρον. 

18. δεύτερος πλοῦς] Cf. Pheedo 
99 b; Phileb. 19 ¢, 596; Az: 
ἜΠΗ. Nic. V. 2.0; Rol Wali 
2,6. After failing to make one 
course, we tack and try an- 
other. 

19. πλῆθος μηδὲν] None, 
whether rich or poor. Cf. 
infr. 300 6: τὸ τῶν πλουσίων 
πλῆθος. Note the emphatic 
accumulation of negatives. 











ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 
NE. ΣΏ. Ὀρθῶς. 


= O ’ a , \ x . / n 7 
4. Ovkovy μιμήματα μεν ἂν EKATT@V ταῦτα EL) 


157 


“-“ > , \ \ “ Ε / > / 3 
τῆς ἀληθείας, τὰ παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι 
/ 
γεγραμμένα ; 
NE. SQ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ ; 
i \\ » / 32) Ν 57 
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τόν γε εἰδότα ἔφαμεν, τὸν ὄντως 
λιτικόν, εἰ 7060 | ἢ τέ λλὰ 
πολιτικὸν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, ποιήσειν τῇ τέχνῃ TOAAG 
\ « a val ΄“ 7 \ 
εἰς THY αὑτοῦ πρᾶξιν τῶν γραμμάτων οὐδὲν φρον- 
,ὔ ¢€ / δ᾽, > > lal / / \ \ 
τίζοντα, ὁπόταν ἄλλ αὐτῷ βελτίω δόξη παρα τᾶ γε- 
, ΠΣ € a 5 / a 
γραμμένα vp αὑτοῦ Kal ἐπεσταλμένα ἀποῦσί τισιν. 


NE. ΣΩ. Ἔφαμεν γάρ. 





π- “ « a - oN “ a 
ΜΞ Εἰ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνὴρ ὁστισοῦν εἷς ἢ πλῆθος ὁτιοῦν, 


ray Ἃ ΄ / 7 
OlS AV VOMOL KELLMEVOL τυγχάνωσι, 


Ἂ > 7 a ε , 
ἂν ETLXELPHTwWOL ποιεῖν ὡς βέλτιον 


\ a o 
παρὰ TAVTA ὁ TL 


oS + SN 
ETEPOV OV, TAVTOV 


δρῶσι κατὰ δύναμιν ὕπερ ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἐκεῖνος ; 
NE. ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


με 5 3 3 9 \ » 7 + \ 
=H. “Ap οὖν εἰ μὲν ἀνεπιστήμονες ὄντες TO TOL- 


πὸ nr a \ 
οὗτον Oper, μιμεῖσθαι μεν 


2. μιμήματα ---- τῆς ἀληθείας | 
Compare the account in Rep. 
6, 500, 501, of the procedure 
of the πολιτειῶν ζώγραφοι. The 
word γεγραμμένα here contains 
associations both from writing 
(cf. γράμματα above and ἐπε- 
σταλμένα below) and painting, 
as appears from the word 


μιμήματα. 

ἑκάστων----τῆς ἀληθείας] For 
the structure of this, οἵ. 
Phedo 65 d: τῶν ἄλλων... 


ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας. 

3. παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων] From 
the lips of those who know : 
i.e. dictated by them. Cf. Soph. 
Oed. Tyr. 285: παρ᾽ οὗ τις ἂν 
σκοπῶν. Sc. τῶν χαριέντως ξυμ- 
βουλευσάντων supr. Cf. infr. 


ΕΝ > “ Ν » / 
ἂν ἐπιχειροῖεν TO ἀληθές, 


305 C: παρὰ νομοθέτου βασι- 
λέως. 

εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι] Like 
τὸ νῦν εἶναι, Rep. 6, 506 6. 
Protag. 317 a. Crat. 396 6: 
TO μὲν τήμερον εἶναι. 

10. ἀποῦσί τισιν] 1. 6. For 
men from whom he should be 
absent. The present is used by 
anticipation for the future, as 
in Soph. 265 d: τῶν eis τὸν 
ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξα- 
ζόντων. Or, perhaps, because 
the injunctions continued in 
force during his absence. 

13. mapa ταῦτα---ὔν] “When- 
ever they do contrary to what 
is written in their laws, in the 
belief that another course is 
better.” 


Io 


Such insti- 
tutions are 
at least an 
imitation 
of the 
truth. But 
15 whoever 
contra- 
venes them 
for the 
sake of the 
general 
good, as- 
sumes the 


158 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


ἣ Η “- ΣΝ , a a ΜΔ, a 
function of μιμοῖντ ἂν μέντοι πᾶν κακῶς" εἰ δ᾽ EVTEXVOL, τοῦτο 
the law- > » ” ͵ > ? yas, \ ᾽ ΄ 
giver. οὐκ ἐστιν ἐτι μίμημα, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ TO ἀληθέστατον 
Only we ane 
have seen EKELVO 5 
that no Σ 
mass of NE. 2Q. Πάντως που. 
men, either ἘΞ ᾿ ἣν , € , in 
poor 5 ili. Καὶ μὴν ἐμπροσθὲ ye ὡμολογημένον ἡμῖν 
rich, is 


a \ a 476 A \ 5 
competent Κεῖται μηδὲν πλῆθος μηδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν δυνατὸν εἶναι Aa- 


to do this. a , 
And if an βεῖν TEXYNV. 


individual “ i 
Teen NE, 3Q. Κεῖται yap οὖν. 


aaa EE. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἔστι βασιλική τις τέχνη, TO 
Bere 10T@V πλουσίων πλῆθος καὶ ὃ ξύμπας δῆμος οὐκ ἂν 
pen ne ΠΌΤΕ λάβοι τὴν πολιτικὴν ταύτην ἐπιστήμην. 

nearest a \ Oy 

oe ee ee λαός | 
ἘΣ ΕΠ HE. Δεῖ δὴ τὰς τοιαύτας γε, ὡς ἔοικε, πολιτείας, 


ΡΝ ἜΣΕΙ ΄, = \ \ , \ -" res 
torightgo- εἰ μέλλουσι καλῶς τὴν ἀληθινὴν ἐκείνην τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς 
vernment 


by states, Σ 7 » τ A } cf : 
by stag, τὸ μετά τέχνης ἄρχοντος πολιτείαν εἰς δυναμιν μιμησα- 


the strict σθαι O€MOTE κειμένων αὐτοῖς τῶν VO δὲ 
observance abel) Wis εἰμ ie Ἢ 5 me ae μῆοεν 
of the laws σριεῖν Tapa τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ πάτρια ἔθη. 
and cus- ρ γέγραμμ ρ μ) 


toms of NE. 30. Καλλιστ᾽ εἴρηκας. 

their fore- ὩΣ “7 ὧν β " ᾿ A 
ee HE. Ὅταν apa ol πλούσιοι ταύτην μιμῶνται, 
YY hen Θ 


Ἂ ’ 35 / ἴω Χ ᾽ὔ 

rich do so, 20TOTE ἀριστοκρατίαν καλοῦμεν τὴν τοιαύτην πολι- 
it 15 arl- a! Beas Q νι i x ; 5 
stocracy; τείαν᾽ omoTay δὲ τῶν νόμων μὴ φροντίζωσιν, ὀλι- 
when they ; 

neglect the γαρχίαν. 

laws, it is ‘ 

oligarchy. NE. >Q. Κινδυνεύει. 

When one — NRT 5 a » Nee 
rules ac- HE. Kai μὴν ὁπόταν αὖ *ris* εἷς ἀρχῃ κατὰ vo- 
cording to , δ > , , = 
law, itis 25 MOUS, μιμούμενος TOV ἐπιστήμονα, βασιλέα καλοῦ- 
royalty ; > l > 7 N 2 9 7 ΕΣ 
ean μεν, ov διορίζοντες ὀνόματι Tov μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης ἢ 
spite of ὃ , Nt a 

law, falsely δόξης κατὰ νόμους μοναρχοῦντα. 


1. πᾶν] Cogn. or ady. ace. 24. αὖ κτις κα 1 MSS. αὖθις. 
as in πᾶν τοὐναντίον. Cf. Legg. The correction is due to 
4, 718 6: πᾶν ἀγαπητόν. Badham. Cf., however, Soph. 

2. οὐκ---ἔτι μίμημα] Cf.Soph. Trach. 1234: μητρὶ μὲν θανεῖν 
240 a: ἕτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ---σοί τ᾽ αὖθις ὡς ἔχεις ἔχειν. 
ἀληθινόν ; Cratyl. 432 ¢. 26. ἢ δόξης κατὰ νόμους] The 


Ρ. 30}} 
e 


————————— 


p- 301 





΄ 
™ 





ol. 


MOAITIKOS. 
NE. 2Q. Κινδυνεύομεν. 


=A O 3 an 3) 37 > / yA x - 
μ᾿. υκουν καν TLS ἀρὰ ἐπισΤΉμων οντῶς ὧν εἰς 


yf ty / 5 ον \ Ν > \ 
ἄρχῃ. πάντως TO γε ὄνομα ταῦτον βασιλεὺς καὶ οὐδὲν 


σ “ > aA \ \ / > / 
ἕτερον προσρηθήσεται" Ov ἃ δὴ τὰ πέντε ὀνόματα 


a ΄“ / - A / jf 
τῶν νῦν λεγομένων πολιτειῶν EV μόνον γέγονεν. 


ΝΕ. ΣΏ. Ἔοικε γοῦν. 


μ- / > of / \ / / i EY 
EE. Ti δ᾽ ὅταν μήτε κατὰ νόμους μῆτε κατὰ €On 


΄ - yf “-“ \ og τ 
TT party Tls εἰς aPpX@V, TT POO TTOLNT At δὲ WOTTEP O €7TL- 


στήμων, OS ἄρα παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα TO ye βέλ- 


΄ 3) v > / Ν y+ 7, 
TLOTOV ποιητέον, ἢ δέ τις ἐπιθυμία καὶ ayVOLa τουτοῦυ 


words κατὰ νόμους are a limita- 
tion of μετὰ δόξης----μοναρχοῦντα, 
not of ἐπιστήμης, and distin- 
guish the constitutional mo- 
narch from the tyrant. 

4. OC ἃ δὴ----γέγονεν] “ Where- 
fore we have found that the 
five names of the constitutions, 
of which men now speak, 
are resolved into one only.” 
Badham corrects A (i.e. τέτταρα) 
δὴ τὰ πέντε ὀνόματα τῶν λε- 
γομένων πολιτειῶν μόνον γέγονεν. 
But how can the five have be- 
come four, when the fifth kind 
immediately reappears; and 
all five are enumerated just 
below? It is true that the 
distinction of knowledge or 
ignorance (or of the better 
and worse imitation of know- 
ledge) is substituted for the 
distinction between persuasion 
and force. But this applies in 
a Measure to ἀριστοκρατία and 
ὀλιγαρχία as well as to βασιλεία 
and τύραννις. The true βασιλεὺς 
is only introduced here in 
order to define the tyrant who 
affects to act the same part ; 
and the words δ ἅ-- γέγονεν 
recall the assertion of supr. 


293 ὁ, that the government of 
knowledge was the only go- 
vernment (διαφερόντως ὀρθὴν καὶ 
μόνην πολιτείαν), and the rest 
not governments but imita- 
tions of government, some 
better and some worse. Cf. 
also supr. 300 6: τὴν ἀληθίνην 
ἐκείνην, THY τοῦ ἑνός. μετὰ τέχνης 
ἄρχοντος. infr. : 
μόναρχον. 302 6: τὴν ὀρθὴν ζη- 
τοῦσι τοῦτο TO τμῆμα οὐκ TV 
χρήσιμον. For νῦν, οἵ. 291 6: 
πρὸς τὸ βίαιόν που καὶ ἑκούσιον 


A a > ~ 
TOV €Va εκεινον 


ἀποσκοποῦντες νῦν---προσαγορεύ- 
ουσιν. Lege. 4, 714 Ὁ: πολιτειῶν 
--- ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν ὅσα λέγου- 
σιν οἱ πολλοί. 

8. προσποιῆται --- ἐπιστήμων | 
Se. πράττειν. Compare the el- 
lipse of the infinitive after φαί- 
νομαι, εἶδον, &e. 

ὥσπερ ὁ ἐπιστήμων) Se. πράτ- 
τειν. 

9. τό γε βέλτιστον] 7. 6. 
Although in all else the laws 
be observed. 

10. ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ ἀγνοια---- 
ἡγουμένη] Cf. Rep. 8, 554 Ὁ: 
οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ 
χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα. 
Compare also the picture of 


5 


affecting 
wisdom, 
tyranny. 
And when 
one rules 
by wisdom, 
and is su- 
perior to 
the laws, 
this too is 
royalty, but 
in a sense 
which an- 
nihilates 
the other 
so-called 
govern- 
ments, 


The reason 
of these 
forms is, 
that the 
true mon- 
arch is no- 
where to 
be found : 
and men, 
despairing 
of his ad- 
vent, have 
had re- 
course to 
convention 
and law. 


— 


160 MAATQNO> | 


- / ξ΄ cad > / Ν -“ 
τοῦ μιμήματος ἡγουμένη, μῶν οὐ τότε τὸν τοιοῦτον Ῥ. 3011: 
- / 
ἕκαστον τύραννον κλητέον ; | 
/ 
NE. 20. Ti pv; 
- a \ / , , ͵, Ἀ 
ΞΕ. Οὕτω δὴ τύραννος τε γέγονε, φαμέν, καὶ 
\ Ν > / \ > / Ν 
5 βασιλεὺς καὶ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἀριστοκρατία καὶ δημο- 
/ ΄ A > ΄, Ν “ ἈΠ a) 
κρατία, δυσχερανάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων TOV Eva ἐκεῖ- 
/ , / “ / 
νον μόναρχον, καὶ ἀπιστησάντων μηδένα τῆς TOLAVTNS 
> ΄“ ΕΥ x ͵ , cd > / Ν 
ἀρχῆς ἄξιον ἂν γενέσθαι ποτέ, ὥστε ἐθέλειν καὶ ἃ 
Ν 3 \ o / + \ 
δυνατὸν εἶναι μετὰ ἀρετῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἄρχοντα τὰ 
/ ͵ / lal ΄σ lal 4 
10 δίκαια καὶ ὅσια διανέμειν ὀρθῶς πᾶσι, λωβᾶσθαι δὲ 
Ν 5 / Ν lad a x nm ¢ / 
καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι καὶ κακοῦν ὃν ἂν βουληθῇ ἑκάστοτε 
ε a / / > a - / Cal / 
ἡμῶν" ἐπεὶ γενόμενόν γ᾽ ἂν οἷον λέγομεν, ἀγαπᾶσθαί 
Ἂ Ν 5 a a ’ ΄, > \ 
TE ἂν καὶ οἰκεῖν διακυβερνῶντα εὐδαιμόνως ὀρθὴν 
lat 7 / 
ἀκριβῶς μόνον πολιτείαν. 
an > 2, 
ι5 ΝΕ. ΣΏΩ. Ios & οὔ; 
= > ΄, ee > "7 , ε \ 
BE. Nov δέ ye ὅποτε οὐκ ἐστι γιγνόμενος, ὡς δὴ 


΄ὕ 3 ΖΞ: ὯΝ r \ @ > ,ὔ 
φαμέν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς οἷος ἐν σμήνεσιν 





ἐμφύεται, τό τε σῶμα εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρων e 


the individual in a state οἵ 
“tyranny” in book 9, esp. 572 
6, Sqq. 

4. καὶ βασιλεὺς] In the former 
of the two senses mentioned 
above. 

7. καὶ ἀπιστησάντων]] Com- 
pare the language of Aristotle 
and of Plato himself in the 
Laws, already quoted supr., 
notes on pp. 294, 296. 

10. λωβᾶσθαι de] Se. ἡγου- 
μένων πάντα twa ἂν, supplied 
from ἀπιστησάντων μηδένα ἄν, 


supr. Cf. Soph. Ant. 263: 
alib. 
12. ἀγαπᾶσθαι —adv| He 


would be welcomed. Cf. Rep. 
6, 499 6: Ὦ μακάριε, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, 


μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κα- 
τηγόρει, ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἕξουσιν 
κιτ.λ. 

14. μόνον] Masculine. Note 
the inverted order and tragic 
rhythm. 

τό. ὁπότε οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενος] 
“Since there does not arise a 
king in states as in hives (at 
least so we think), one un- 
mistakeably surpassing both in 
body and mind, it follows that 
we are obliged to meet and 
make enactments.” For this 
meaning of ὁπότε = quoniam, 
οἵ, Euthyd. 297 d, and com- 
pare Ar. Pol. IIT. 8. 

18. τό τε σῶμα εὐθὺς] 1. 6. 
At the first glance, before his 





ΠΟΛΙΓΙΚΟΣ. 


161 


ΟἹ. εἷς, δεῖ δὴ συνελθόντας Evyypappara γράφειν, ὡς 


A / Ν “ ᾽ ΄ / 
ἔοικε, μεταθέοντας τὰ τῆς ἀληθεστάτης πολιτείας 


ἴχνη. 
NE. 3Q. Κωνδυνεύει. 


SE. Θαυμάζομεν δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς τοι- 


/ / oe / / \ Ν 
αὑταῖς πολιτείαις ὅσα ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι κακὰ καὶ 


o a a ε ΄, 
οσα ξυμβήσεται, τοιαύτης τῆς κρηπῖδος ὑποκειμένης 


> rn a \ jp yy, \ \ > / 
QUTQLS, TNS KATA γράμματα καὶ ἔθη μὴ μετὰ ἐπιστη- 


μῆς πραττούσης τὰς πράξεις ; ἑτέρα προσχρωμένη 


Ν ,ὕ ς / δ / Nie Se 30 5. AS 
παντὶ κατάδηλος ws πάντ᾽ ἂν διολέσειε TA “ET αὐτῇ" 


/ Ἃ ἴω ὌΝ ΡΝ / a ¢ 
γιγνόμενα. ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἡμῖν θαυμαστέον μᾶλλον, ws 


> ΄ / 3 Ν / 7, \ Χ 
ἰσχυρὸν τι πόλις ἐστὶ φύσει ; πάσχουσαι yap δὴ 


an , a / 5 / “ ay / 
TOLQUTQA αἱ πολεις νυν χρόνον ATTEPAVTOV, OM@S EVLAL 


> a / / / Ν > 3 7 
TLVES αὐτῶν μονιίμοι TE εἰσι και οὐκ QUQT PETTOVTAL® 


mental qualities can be known. 
Cf. Ar. Pol. VII. 13 : Ei μὲν τοί- 
νυν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον διαφέροντες 
oe nr ΕΣ [τὲ \ \ 
ἅτεροι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς 
καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα ἀνθρώπων 
διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ 
σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντες ὑπερβολήν, 
εἶτα κατὰ τὴν Ψυχὴν, ὥστε ἀναμ- 
φισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν 
ὑπεροχήν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν 
9 ͵ = [τ , ΘΝ 
ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον αἰεὶ 
τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ᾽ 
ay , . > x ‘ a? 
ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ' ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ 
οὐ ῥάδιον λαβεῖν, οὐδέ 
ὥσπερ ἐν Ἴνδοις φησὶ Σκύλαξ εἶναι 

\ @ “- , 
τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον διαφέρον- 
τας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερόν, κιτ.λ. 

2. μεταθέοντας --- ἴχνη ἢ (ΟἿ 
Soph. 226 ἃ : τοιόνδε τι μεταθέ- 
οντας ἴχνος αὐτοῦ. Perhaps 
there is a slight allusion to the 
Homeric per ixvia βαῖνε θέοιο. 
Cf. Pheedr. 266 "Ὁ. 

7. τῆς κρηπίῖδο----τῆς--πρατ- 
τούσης | Viz. ἃ responsible 
executive. 


ἐστιν, 


9. ἑτέρα] Se. ἀρχὴ, or τέχνη, 
which is naturally suggested 
by the preceding argument. 

προσχρωμένη | Se. τοιαύτῃ 
κρηπῖδι. Stephanus conjectured 
7 from the version of Ficinus : 
quo si alia quedam gubernatio 
vel civitas utatur. But for 
the asyndeton, which is as- 
sisted by παντὶ κατάδηλος as a 
kind of particle, cf. the usage 
with πάντως, 6. g. supr. 268 6. 
Badh. con]. πραττούσης, 7 πρᾶξις 
ἑτέρα. 

10, τὰ ἐπ᾿ αὐτῇ | MSS. 
τὰ ταύτη. Badh. corr. raw αὐτῇ. 
Qy. ὑπ᾽ αὐτῇ 1 

II. ὡς ἰσχυρόν τι πόλις ἐστὶ 
φύσει] Compare Legg. 4, 708 
6 : ἔμελλον λέγειν ὡς οὐδείς ποτε 
ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι 
δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτου- 
σαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ 
πάντα ἡμῖν. 

14. μόνιμοι] E.g. Sparta. Cf. 
Legg. 3, 686 a, b. 


x Y 


And do 
we wonder 


that many 
evilsshould 
arise in 


states thus 
based on 
ignorant 
custom ? 
Ought 


10 we not 


rather to 
admire the 
strength of 
the social 
bond which 
can endure 
this strain ? 
For there 
are still 


cities of 
men which 
have exist- 
ed from 
unknown 
time, 
though 
many from 
age to age 
are seen to 
founder, 
like ships 
at sea, 
through 
the preten- 
tious igno- 
rance of 
their pilots 
and mari- 
ners. 

Now let us 
ask which 
of these 
bad go- 
vernments 


162 


MAATQNO2 


Ν ᾿ al / 
πολλαὶ μὴν ἐνίοτε καὶ καθάπερ πλοῖα καταδυόμεναι p. 3:}} 


/ ΄σ΄ \ Ἀ 
διόλλυνται καὶ διολώλασι καὶ ἔτι διολοῦνται διὰ τὴν 


νΆς A σ΄: 7 “ Ν \ 
Tov κυβερνητῶν καὶ ναυτῶν μοχθηρίαν τῶν περὶ τὰ 


/ » 5) / a Ν \ 
EYLOTA με (OT) V αγνοιαν εἰλγ OT@MV, οἱ περι TA πο- 
ead Y: ’ 


\ , aN / € lal \ ΄ 
5 λιτικα ΚΑΤ οὐδὲν γιγνωσκοντες NYOVVTAL κατὰ TTAVTA 


/ ΄σ ’ ΄σ / ΕῚ / 
σαφέστατα πασῶν ἐπιστημῶν ταύτην εἰληφέναι. 


NE. 30. ᾿Αληθέστατα. 


> \ a ΄ lad / 
BE. Tis οὖν δὴ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν τούτων 


“ Χ κι a lal » lad Ν 
ἥκιστα χαλεπὴ συζῆν, πασῶν χαλεπῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ 


7 a a c n 7 ΄ 
τοτίς βαρυτάτη ; δεῖ τι κατιδεῖν ἡμᾶς, καίπερ προς γε 


Ν al \ Chae / , > \ 
TO νῦν προτεθὲν ἡμῖν πάρεργον λεγόμενον ; οὐ μὴν 


3 ’ 3) Ν “ 5 7 LY a / 
adr εἰς ye TO ὅλον tows TavO EvEeKa TOU τοιούτου 


πάντες δρῶμεν χάριν. 


I. πολλαὶ μὴν --- εἰληφέναι | 
“Many however also from time 
to time are seen to founder 
like ships at sea, and thus are 
perishing, have perished, and 
shall hereafter perish, because 
of the vileness of their pilots 
and crews ; men guilty of the 
greatest ignorance on the 
greatest subject ; who, having 
absolutely no inkling of po- 
litical science, believe them- 
selves at all points above all 
other sciences to have master- 
ed this.” Compare the de- 
seription of the “ship’s crew” 
in Rep. 6, 488. 

καθάπερ πλοῖ] Cf. Legg. 
6,758 a: vats τε ἐν θαλάσσῃ 
πλέουσα -- πόλις δὲ ὡσαύτως ἐν 
κλύδωνι τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων. 

2. διόλλυνται ---- διολοῦνται | 
Cf. supr. 268e; Tim 22 ¢; 
Legg. 3, 676 Ὁ; 688 d. Hat. 
is 

3. τὰ μέγιστα] Sc. τὰ πο- 


λιτικά. CF. Legg. By, (tex) ὩΣ: 


τῇ λοίπῃ τε πάσῃ κακίᾳ διεφθαρ- 
μένα, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ περὶ τὰ 
μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγ- 
Rep. 6, 504 6: 
τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας 
ἀξιοῦν εἶναι τὰς ἀκριβείας. 

4. μεγίστην ἄγνοιαν ἡ 1. 6. 
the conceit of knowledge. ΟἿ. 
Soph. 229 ¢: ἀγνοίας ---- εἶδος, 
πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθ- 
μον μέρεσιν. 

5. kar οὐδὲν] Opposed to 


κατὰ πάντα. 


, > , 
μάτων ἀμαθίᾳ. 


9. χαλεπὴ συζῆν] Like 
χαλεποὶ συγγενέσθαι, Rep. 1, 
330 6. 


II. οὐ μὴν---χάρι»)] Cf. Ar. 
Eth. Nic. 11. 3: τὸ redos οὐ γνῶ- 
σις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. 

12. ἕνεκα---χάριν)] Cf. Legg. 
3, οι ἃ: τὸ τίνος δὴ χάριν 
ἕνεκα ταῦτα ἐλέχθη. 

τοῦ τοιούτου | Not τοῦ 
παρέργου (Stallb.), but “for 
the sake of making life toler- 
able.” 





R02, 
c 


d 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


109 


NE. ΣΏ. Δεῖ" πῶς & οὖ: 


EE. Τὴν αὐτὴν τοίνυν φάθι τριῶν οὐσῶν χαλε- 


Χ / / 4 es 
πὴν διαφερόντως γίγνεσθαι καὶ ῥᾷστην. 


ΝΕ. ΣΏ. Πῶς φής: 


ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἄλλως, πλὴν μοναρχίαν φημὶ καὶ ὀλί. 


a 5 ἴω / c ΄σ΄' 
γων ἀρχὴν καὶ πολλῶν, εἶναι τρεῖς ταύτας ἡμῖν λεγο- 


a an / ᾽ 3 ’ 
μένας τοῦ νῦν ἐπικεχυμένου λόγου κατ᾽ ἀρχᾶας. 
NE. Σῶ. Ἦσαν γὰρ οὖν. 


/ / / / / ς ’ὔ’ 
HE. Ταύτας τοίνυν δίχα τέμνοντες μίαν ἐκαστὴν 


ἃ A \ 3 \ Ν 3 / , 
ἐξ ποιῶμεν, τὴν ὀρθὴν χωρὶς ἀποκρίναντες τούτων 10 


ἑβδόμην. 
NE. ΣΩ. Πώς: 


is the least 
intolera- 
ble? The 
same under 
different 
conditions 
is the worst 
and the 


5 least bad. 


For of the 
three men- 
tioned— 
monarchy, 
the rule of 
few, and de- 
mocracy— 
each may 
be divided 
into two, 
so that the 
forms, in- 
cluding the 
best and 


HE. Ἔκ μὲν τῆς μοναρχίας βασιλικὴν καὶ τυραν- nly form, 


/ 3 > 3 lod Νὴ la / yt? 
νικὴν, EK O αὖ τῶν μὴ πολλῶν THY TE εὐώνυμον 


2, ay > / ἊΝ 3 / 0) 
εφαμεν εἰναι ἀριστοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν 


a a {/ \\ ε lal ΕῚ 7 3207 
τῶν πολλῶν τότε μὲν ἁπλῆν ἐπονομάζοντες ἐτίθεμεν 


a \ 5 ,ὔ Coa ,ὕ 5. ΣῊΝ 
δημοκρατίαν, νῦν δὲ αὖ καὶ ταύτην ἡμῖν θετέον ἐστὶ 


διπλῆν. 


NE. ΣΏ. Πῶς 67; καὶ τίνι διαιροῦντες ταύτην ; 


EE. Οὐδὲν διαφέροντι 


8. Οὐκ ἄλλως κιτ.λ.} “1 only 
revert to what I said before. 
I say that monarchy, the rule 
of few, and the rule of many, 
were the three forms of go- 
vernment of which we spoke 
at the beginning of this new 
discussion.” 

ἡ. τοῦ viv—kar ἀρχάς] ΟἿ, 
Legg. 7, 793 Ὁ : 6 νῦν δὴ λόγος 
ἡμῖν ἐπιχυθείς. Cf. Rep. 1, 344 
d: ὥσπερ Badaveds ἡμῶν καταν- 
τλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὦτων ἀθρόον καὶ 
πολὺν τὸν λόγον. Soph. 264 ¢: 
ἔτι μείζων κατεχύθη σκοτοδινία. 
See also Legg. 3, 682 a: τοῦ 


w 


are seven 
in all. 


Under 


ἐκ δ᾽ αὖ 15 monarchy 


we have 
already dis- 
tinguished 
royalty and 
tyranny : 
under the 
rule of few, 
aristocracy 
and oli- 


an 7 5» + 
τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ᾽ εἰ TOU- 2° garchy. 


νῦν ἐπελθόντος ἡμῖν μύθου. 

14---τό. τῶν μὴ πολλῶν----τῶν 
πολλῶν] Abbreviated for τῆς 
τῶν μὴ π.---τῆς τῶν π. 

14. εὐώνυμον] “ Of auspicious 
name.” Compare the turn of 
the sentence in Rep. 8, 544 d: 
καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πα- 
σῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα. 

20. Οὐδὲν διαφέροντι] By the 
same mark as in the other 


cases. Lit. “By a mark in 
nowise different from the 
rest.” 


29? > ela 4 
οὐδ᾽ εἰ τοὔνομα--- ταύτης 1 If 
we translate, “Even though 


2 
- 


And the 
same dis- 
tinction 
enters into 
democracy: 
although 
in this case 
both parts 
are called 
by the one 
name, 
There is 
one demo- 
cracywhich 
observes, 
and ano- 
ther which 
neglects, 
the laws. 
Now of 
these six, 
constitu- 
tional mon- 
archy is the 
best and 
tyranny is 
the worst. 
Oligarchy 
and aristo- 


"ι 


104 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 





3 “ » Ν ᾽ \ , Ν " 
νομα ἤδη διπλοῦν ἐστὶ ταύτης" ἀλλὰ TO TE κατὰ p. 30 Ἢ 


/ » ΄ yy Ν ’ Ν 
νόμους ἄρχειν καὶ παρανόμως ἐστι καὶ ταύτῃ καὶ 6 


ταῖς ἄλλαις. 


NE, ΣΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν. 


/ ΄ Νὴ Νὴ ΄“ lal Ν 
EE. Tore μὲν τοίνυν τὴν ὀρθὴν ζητοῦσι τοῦτο τὸ 


“ > 53 c ’ ΄σ / 
τμῆμα οὐκ ἢν χρήσιμον, ws ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀπε- 
δείξαμεν᾽ ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐξείλομεν ἐκείνην, τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας 


Wy, 3 / ’ / Ν Ν 7 Ν 
ἐθεμεν αναγκαίιᾶς, EV ταῦταις δὴ TO παράνομον και 


"7 c 7 ΄σ ’ 
ἔννομον ἑκάστην διχοτομεῖ τούτων. 


NE. 2Q. [Ἔοικε τούτου νῦν ῥηθέντος τοῦ λόγου. 


΄σ ‘ 7 
=E. Movapxia τοίνυν ζευχθεῖσα μὲν ἐν γράμμασιν 


> la A / 7 ert? “ “ “ 
ἀγαθοῖς, ovs νόμους λέγομεν, ἀριστὴ πασῶν τῶν ἕξ 
yy \ \ Ν ie - 

ἄνομος δὲ χαλεπὴ καὶ βαρυτατὴ ξυνοικῆσαι. 


NE. ΣΏ. Κινδυνεύει. 


Χ ΄ lal a CoN 
EE. Τὴν δέ ye τῶν μὴ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἑνὸς Kal 


the name of this constitution 
is already twofold,” this seems 
inconsistent with 292 a. But 
Stallbaum ingeniously suggests 
that Plato here alludes to 
a distinction, which, though 
not in common use, had been 
invented by some philosopher. 
Still it is difficult to see the 
bearing of the clause when 
thus interpreted. Something is 
required im which democracy 
may be seen to differ from 
the other names. And this is 
supplied by the accidental dif- 
ference that democracy has a 
twofold meaning, is one word 
for two things, whereas in 
each of the former cases there 
was a name for either side of 
the division. “ Even though, 
when we come to democracy 
(7δη ταύτης), we find that the 
name has a twofold mean- 


ing.” 


λοῦν. 


Cf. Pheedr. 244 ἃ, ἀπ- 


5. τοῦτο τὸ τμῆμα] This 
section, viz. the distinction 
between the use and neglect 
of law, which was shewn to 
make no essential difference 
in the conduct of the perfect 
ruler. Supr. 292, sqq. 

6. ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀπε- 
δείξαμεν] It has been shewn 
that questions of law are in- 
different to the ruler who 
has perfect knowledge. Supr. 


293: 

8. ἀναγκαίας} I.e. Such as we 
are compelled to put up with. 
Compare ἀναγκαίως, e.g. Rep. 
7,527 a: λέγουσι ---- γελοίως τε 
καὶ ἀναγκαίως. 

11. ζευχθεῖσα μὲν ἐν γράμμασιν 
ἀγαθοῖς] ‘Subject to a yoke 
of good prescriptions.” 

15. ὥσπερ ἑνὸς καὶ πλήθους τὸ 





p- aa 








ΠΟΛΙΤΊΙΚΟΣ. 


105 


03. πλήθους το ὀλίγον μέσον, οὕτως ἡγησώμεθα μέσην 


Qe) > / Ν ᾽ 53 a / Ν ΄ 
ἐπ᾿ ἀμφότερα τὴν δ᾽ αὖ τοῦ πλήθους κατὰ πάντα 


ἀσθενῆ καὶ μηδὲν μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν μέγα 


/ « \ \ aA ὃ \ Ν \ > ‘ » 
δυναμένην ὡς προς Tas ἄλλας διὰ τὸ Tas apxas ἐν 


7, “ \ ‘\ > / Ἂς 
ταύτῃ διανενεμῆσθαι κατὰ σμικρὰ εἰς πολλους. διὸ 5 


/ a \ , a ΄σ > ΄σ 
γέγονε TACOMVY μὲν νομιμῶὼν τῶν πολιτειῶν ουσῶν 


/ > ny lal 
τούτων χειρίστη, παρανόμων δ᾽ οὐσῶν ξυμπασῶν 


βελτίστη" 


» / My a » lal 5 
καὶ ἀκολάστων μὲν πασῶν οὐσῶν ἐν 


7 lal ζω / » > lal (vA > 
δημοκρατίᾳ νικᾷ ζῆν, κοσμίων δ᾽ οὐσῶν ἥκιστα ἐν 


, , ἢ - ΄ \ Ν κ᾿ ᾽ 
ταύτῃ βιωτέον, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ δὲ πολὺ πρῶτον TE καὶιο 


y+ Ν A « " a \ > / 
ἄριστον, πλὴν THs EBdouNns’ πασῶν yap ἐκείνην γε 


ὀλίγον μέσον | There is a 
Pythagorean tone ἴῃ these 
words, similar to that which 
is observable in the Politics of 
Aristotle. 

4. διὰ τὸ Tas ἀρχὰς---εἰς ποὰλ- 
λούς] The remarks of Aristotle, 
that much water is less easily 
fouled than little, and that bad 
influences in a democracy are 
neutralized by admixture with 
wholesome elements, as in the 
case of food, have an analogy 
with this observation of Plato. 

8. καὶ ἀκολάστων μὲν---βιω- 
τέον] This opinion is quoted 
by Aristotle as that of one of 
those who had gone before 
him. Pol. LV. 2: τὴν τυραννίδα 
χειρίστην οὖσαν, πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν 
Δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλι- 
γαρχίαν᾽ ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία δι- 
έστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς 
μετριωτάτην δὲ τὴν 
δημοκρατίαν. Ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις 
ἀπεφήνατο καὶ πρότερον 
οὕτω, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ βλέψας 
ἡμῖν" ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἔκρινε, πα- 
σῶν μὲν οὐσῶν 


πολιτείας. 
, 
πολιτείας" 
τῶν 
Ὃν 
οἷον 


ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρηστῆς καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, 


ἐπιεικῶν, 


τῶν δὲ φαύλων ἀρίστην. ᾿Ἡμεῖς 
δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἐξημαρτημένας 
εἶναί φαμεν" καὶ βελτίω μὲν ὀλι- 
γαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς 
ἔχει λέγειν, ἧττον δὲ φαύλην. 
See also ib. c. 4. It will be 
observed that the last words 
exactly express the doctrine 
of the Politicus: so that if 
Aristotle is alluding to this 
dialogue he has misunder- 
stood the author's meaning. 
This does not prove that he 
does not refer to this passage, 
but it does tend to shew that 
he is quoting loosely without 
thinking of the context, and 
perhaps without distinctly re- 
membering the author from 
whom he quotes. τις τῶν 
πρότερον is certainly a cu- 
rious expression for him to 
use, if he remembered that he 
was quoting Plato. But the 
saying may perhaps be older 
than either of them. See 
Introduction to the States- 
man. For the infinitive, as 
subject of νικᾷ, cf. Soph. Cd. 
Col. 1225 : μὴ φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα 
νικᾷ λόγον. 


cracy are 
interme- 
diate, and 
democracy 
is the least 
powerful 
for good or 
harm. 
Whence a 
democracy 
is the worst 
of law- 
respecting 
communi- 
ties, but the 
least bad 
amongst 
thosewhich 
I Z 

despise the 

laws. 

Still, there 


is no com- 
parison be- 
tween even 
constitu- 
tional roy- 
alty and 
the ideal 
state. 
None of 
these forms 
deserve the 
name of 
govern- 
ment: and 
their up- 
holders are 
not states- 
men, but 
factious 
partisans. 
We have 
done, then, 
with this 
“crew of 
Centaurs 


166 


MAATQNOZ 


’ , - Ν 5 ΕἸ /, > cal Μ ; 
ἐκκριτέον, οἷον θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων p. 30}. 


πολιτειῶν. 


NE. ΣΩ, Φαίνεται τοῦθ᾽ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν τε καὶ 
! 


/ τ / 
ποιητέον ἧπερ λέγεις. 


boomed > ΄ \ ἐν Ν ἈΝ / ΄σ 
5 ΞΕ, Οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ τοὺς κοινωνοὺς τουτων τῶν 


΄ ΄- Ν lad > / 5 / 
πολιτειῶν πασῶν, πλὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμονος, ἀφαιρετέον 


« > "7 Χ > \ / Ν 
ὡς οὐκ ovTas πολιτικοὺς ἀλλα στασιαστικοῦς, καὶ 


a7 7 ΄ ΕΣ κ » \ 5 
εἰδώλων μεγίστων προστάτας OVTAS καὶ αὐτοὺς εἰναι 


\ 3, \ LA 
τοιούτους, μεγίστους δὲ ὄντας μιμητὰς καὶ γόητας 


/ / a ΄σ , 
το μεγίστους γίγνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν σοφιστας. 


a \ 
NE. 50. Κινδυνεύει τοῦτο εἰς τοὺς πολιτικοὺς 


λεγομένους περιεστράφθαι τὸ ῥῆμα ὀρθότατα. 


5 a \ “ (5D cd qn 
SE. Elev’ τοῦτο μὲν ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὥσπερ δρᾶμα, 


I. οἷον θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων] 
Compare Aristotle, Pol. III. 8: 
ei δέ τις ἐστὶν εἰς τοσοῦτον δια- 
φέρων κατ᾽ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολὴν --- 
ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις 
εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. 

ἡ. οὐκ ὄντας πολιτικοὺς ἀλλὰ 
στασιαστικούς] Cf. Lege. 8, 832 
b: τὰς οὐ πολιτείας ἔγωγε αἰτίας 
εἶναί φημι ἃς πολλάκις εἴρηκα ἐν 
τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις, δημοκρατίαν 
καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ τυραννίδα. τού- 
τῶν γὰρ δὴ πολιτεία μὲν οὐδεμία, 
στασιωτεῖαι δὲ πᾶσαι λέγοιντ᾽ ἂν 
ὀρθότατα. 

στασιαστικοὺ}] This is the 
salient point also in the al- 
legory of the ship: Rep. 6, 
488. 

8. εἰδώλων] Viz. τῶν οὐ πο- 
λιτειῶν ἐκείνων. 

9. τοιούτου: 7 Se. εἴδωλα. 
“The very substance of the 
ambitious is but the shadow 
of a dream.” Cf. Phedo 67 b: 
καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ---- μετὰ 
τοιούτων---ἐσόμεθα. 

11, Κινδυνεύει----ὀρθότατα] So 


above, 291 6, the same cha- 
racter is described as τὸν πάν- 
τῶν τῶν σοφιστῶν μέγιστον γόητα 
καὶ ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἐμπειρότα- 
τον, in both places with direct 
reference to the argument of 
the Sophist, in which the false 
politician (not πολιτικὸς but 
δημολογικὸς) is distinguished 
from the Sophist last of all 
(Soph. sub. fin.). Cf. Gorg. 
465 6: φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ 
περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες. 
Ib. 520 a: ταὐτὸν ὦ μακάριε, 
ἐστὶ σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ. 

12. περιεστράφθαι probably al- 
ludes to the windings of the 
argument in the  Sophist. 
“ After so much turning and 
twisting, the word has at last 
fixed itself on them.” 

13. τοῦτο μὲν --- ἐχωρίσθη | 
τοῦτο has no verb, because the 
end of the sentence is altered 
to agree with the middle: 
thus ἐχωρίσθη is substituted 
for ἐπεράνθη, or some such 
word. The clause καθάπερ---- 


eee eee ae 





ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 167 


1) 3°3- καθάπερ ἐρρήθη viv δὴ Kevravpixov ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ 


/ 7 A ‘ / > Ν 
Σατυρικὸν τινα θίασον, ὃν δὴ χωριστέον amo πολιτι- 
a SA / a 0 7 7 > 
ἃ κῆς εἴη τέχνης, νῦν οὕτω πάνυ μόγις ἐχωρίσθη. 
NE. ΣΏΩ. Φαδνεται. 
7 oO ΕἾ , 
mE. Τούτου δέ γ᾽ ἕτερον ere χαλεπώτερον λεί- 
πεται τῷ ξυγγενές τε ὁμοῦ εἶναι μᾶλλον τῷ βασιλικῷ 
ιν γγένες μου ε μ . 
, / / 
γένει καὶ δυσκαταμαθητότερον. καί μοι φαινομεθα 
a A Ν 7 “ 
τοῖς τὸν χρυσὸν καθαίρουσι. πάθος ὅμοιον πεπον- 
ie 
θέναι. 
ΠΣ ΩΣ Πός: 
lal 7 7ὔ “ 
HE. Γῆν που καὶ λίθους καὶ πόλλ᾽ ἄττα ἕτερα 
,7ὔ ΄σ , « 7 \ 
ἀποκρίνουσι καὶ ἐκεῖνοι TPOTEPOY οἱ δημιουργοί μετὰ 
\ a / \ ω ΄σ 
δὲ ταῦτα λείπεται ξυμμεμιγμένα τὰ ξυγγενῆ τοῦ 
“ / / 4, Ν Ν 
χρυσοῦ τίμια καὶ πυρὶ μόνον ἀφαιρετά, χαλκὸς καὶ 
3) 3 ἐλ Ne, , x aA % \ ΄’ 
ἄργυρος, ἐστι δ᾽ OTE καὶ ἀδαμας, *|a|* μετὰ βασανων 
a ε , y 5... 7 Ν / 
ταῖς ἐψήσεσι μόγις ἀφαιρεθέντα τὸν λεγόμενον 
’ Ν 57 ἴω a Ν ΄ ΕῚ 
ἀκήρατον χρυσὸν εἴασεν ἡμᾶς ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν μόνον ἐφ 


ἑαυτοῦ. 

ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα οὕτω γίγ- 
νεσθαι. 

SE. Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον ἔοικε καὶ νῦν 


eon \ \ a Ἀν RG , 3 ῇ Ν \ \ 

ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν ETEPA καὶ ὁποσα ἀλλοτρια καὶ τὰ μὴ 
, - 3 , 3 / , 

φίλα πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀποκεχωρίσθαι, λείπεσθαι 
\ \ / a 7 

δὲ τὰ τίμια καὶ ξυγγενῆ. τούτων δ᾽ ἐστί που στρα- 


θίασον is suggested by the word more striking image. See this 


δρᾶμα. 

6. τῷ ξυγγενές τε ὁμοῦ εἶναι] 
So Bodl. MS. Vulg. τῷ ξυγγενές 
θ᾽ ὁμοῦτ᾽. 

12. καὶ ἐκεῖνοι] Here also the 
text follows the Bodleian MS. 

13. Ta ovyyevn τοῦ χρυσοῦ 
τίμια] The fusion of platinum 
would have afforded a still 


described in Faraday’s Che- 
mistry of a Candle, pp. 184- 
204. 

15. «[a@]* 1 So Stephanus 
and Ficinus. MSS. om. 

τῇ. αὐτὸν μόνον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ] 
Cf. supr. 268 ¢: χωρίσαντες ἀπ᾽ 
ἐκείνων καθαρὸν μόνον αὐτὸν ἀπο- 


φήνωμεν. 


and Sa- 
tyrs,” and 
have sever- 
ed them, 
once for all, 
from the 
King. 
But there 
5 remains an 
element 
still harder 
to separate, 
becauseless 
easy to be 
discerned, 
and more 
of kin to 
the subject 
of inquiry. 
Like re- 
finers of 
gold, we 
have got 
rid of the 
earth and 
dross, but 
have not 
1z yet elimi- 
nated the 
precious 
metals 
which are 
in combi- 
nation with 
that which 
we seek to 
bring out 
20 Clear. 
These pre- 
cious and 
kindred 
elements 
are gene- 
ralship, the 
judicial 
function, 


Io 


and that 
nobler rhe- 
toric which 
is the ally 
of good 
govern- 
ment. 

We must 
do our best 
to part 
these off 
from the 
supreme 
science. 
Take music 
and the 
mechanical 
arts. There 
can be no 
doubt that 
they must 
yield prece- 
dencetothe 
art which 
determines 
which of 
them is to 
be learnt. 


168 


ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


/ Ν \ ἂν “ ΄“ “A 
τηγία καὶ δικαστικὴ καὶ ὅση βασιλικῇ κοινωνοῦσα Pp. 36 }}: 


e Ν ΄σ \ 
ῥητορεία πείθουσα τὸ δίκαιον ξυνδιακυβερνᾷ Tas ἐν 


a ͵ ΄, ἃ A . , es , 
ταῖς πόλεσι πράξεις" ἃ δὴ *Tin* τρόπῳ ῥάστά τις 


᾽ 1% / Ν Ν / > lad > 
ἀπομερίζων δείξει γυμνὸν καὶ μόνον ἐκεῖνον καθ 


CaN \ / c ’ e a 
5QavTOV τὸν ζητούμενον ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν ; 


NE. 3Q. Δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτό πῃ δρᾷν πειρατέον. 


,ὔ κ΄ \ 7 \ 
SE. Πείρας μὲν τοίνυν ἕνεκα φανερὸς ἐσται" διὰ 


δὲ μουσικῆς αὐτὸν ἐγχειρητέον δηλῶσαι. 


λέγε. 
ΝΕ. ΣΏΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 


! 
και μοι 


“ 3, « ΄ 7, 
HE. Μουσικῆς ἔστι πού τις ἡμῖν μάθησις, καὶ 


7 a ΄- 
ὅλως τῶν περὶ χειροτεχνίας ἐπιστημῶν ; 


ΝΕ. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν. 


BE. Τί δέ; τὸ δ᾽ αὖ τούτων ἡντινοῦν εἴτε δεῖ 


I. καὶ ὅση --- πράξει] Such 
a higher rhetoric is hinted at 
in the Phedrus and Gorgias, 
but more ironically than here. 
Cf. Gorg. 480 0,6: Pheedr. 
271 ἃ, e. The word ῥητο- 
peta is peculiar to this place. 
Perhaps, as Stallbaum thinks, 
it conveys a nobler idea than 
pntopxn. The admission of 
rhetoric into the state is a 
return to nature similar to 
the adoption of paid teachers 
which accompanies it in the 
Laws. Cf. Lege. 4,711 d,e: ἢ 
τὴν Νέστορος---φύσιν, ὃν τῇ τοῦ 
λέγειν ῥώμῃ φασὶ πάντων διενεγ- 
κόντα ἀνθρώπων πλέον ἔτι τῷ 
σωφρονεῖν διαφέρειν κιτιλ. The 
προοίμια ΟΥ̓ νουθετητικοὶ λόγοι οἵ 
that dialogue are an example 
of the kind of rhetoric here 
meant. Compare also the re- 
admission of the practical sci- 
ences in the Philebus. 

3. xTlvex τρόπῳ ῥᾷστα] I have 


ventured to accent ri and to 
add the mark of interrogation, 
as the superlative seems to be 
otherwise without meaning ; 
and the answer of Young 
Socrates is at least equally 
apposite when the words are 
thus taken. Cf. Soph. 241 e; 
Legg. 6, 779 6 : ἣν δὴ τίνα τρό- 
πον χρὴ ζῇν νύμφιον καὶ νυμφήν ; 
A similar change has still to be 
made in the text of Phileb. 26 
Θ᾽: τέταρτόν τι τότε ἔφαμεν εἶναι 
γένος σκεπτέον : ubi legend. τέ- 
ταρτον τί tore. See Mr. Poste’s 
translation. 

14. Τί δέ; τὸ δ᾽ αὖ] Ast’s 
conj., τί δὲ τόδ᾽ ad; has been 
adopted by the Zurich editors. 

τούτων ἡντινοῦν κιτ.λ.}] This 
thought was afterwards deve- 
loped into the ἀρχιτεκτονική of 
Aristotle. See esp. Eth. Nie. 
I. 2.. Pol. VIL. 9 Compare 
Plat. Euthyd. 289, 290 ; Cra- 
tyl.390a. Gorg.517e. Legg. 


b 


—- ---- ———— 
CN 


- 


ζω 





ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 


109 


3 / 53 > ‘ an Ἃ lal 
αὖ καὶ ταύτην εἰναί τινα περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς; 
o Cy / 
NE. 2Q. Οὕτως, εἰναι φησομεν. 


ἘΠῚ) Οὐ an Chee « / 5 7, Ss 
joy Ld υκουν ετερὰν ομολογήησομεν EKELYMV εἰναι 


/ 
TQUTNY ; 


NE. =Q. Nai. 


HE. Πότερα δ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἄρχειν Sew ἄλλην 


yy Cayee de / , ΕΝ ’, σ΄ » ’ 
ἄλλης, ἢ ἐκείνας ταύτης, ἢ ταυτὴν δεῖν ἐπιτροπευου- 


37) a “ yy 
σαν ἄρχειν ξυμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ; 
NE. ΣΏ. Ταύτην ἐκείνων. 


EE. [Τὴν] εἰ δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ μὴ τῆς μανθανο- 


Υ͂ Ν ὃ ὃ / 357 ᾽ὔ Ε] > / ὃ “ 
μενὴς καὶ ὀιθασκουσης apa σὺ γ ἀποφαίνει ειν 


ἡμῖν ἄρχειν ; 
NE. ΣΩ. Σφόδρα γε. 


BE. Καὶ τὴν εἰ δεῖ πείθειν ἄρα ἢ μὴ τῆς δυνα- 


/ , 
μένης πείθειν : 


NE. 2Q. Πῶς δ᾽ ov ; 


— 5 τε ͵ Ν ἈΝ 53 3 / > 
SE. Kiev τίνι τὸ πειστικὸν οὖν ἀποδώσομεν ἐπι- 


στήμῃ πλήθους τε καὶ ὄχλου διὰ μυθολογίας ἀλλὰ 


μὴ διὰ διδαχῆς ; 


NE. 2Q. Φανερόν, οἶμαι, καὶ τοῦτο ῥητορικῇ δο- 


, " 
ΤΕΟΡν OV. 


ΜΞῈ. Τὸ δ᾽ εἴτε διὰ πειθοῦς εἴτε καὶ διά τινος βίας 


12, 963: νοῦν γὰρ δὴ κυβερνη- 
τικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν εἴπομεν --- 
τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἐλέγχοντες ἐν- 
ταῦθ᾽ ἔσμεν νῦν. 

τι. [Τὴν] εἰ δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ μή] 
The old editors, supported by 
few MSS., insert τὴν before «i, 
which Stallbaum has retained. 
The Zurich editors read ταύτην 
ἐκείνων, εἰ δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ μή. 
=. τῆς μ. καὶλ. But the tenor 


ἜΣ 


of the argument makes the 
retention of τὴν almost impe- 
rative. Compare similar spe- 
cimens of analogical reasoning 
in the Gorgias. 

18. πειστικὸν͵] This word is 
used again in Legg. 4, 723 a. 

20. μὴ διὰ διδαχῆς] Cf. Gorg. 
445a; Theet. 201 a,b. Com- 
pare the opposition of μῦθος 
and λόγος in Gorg. 523 a. 


, CR AN "} ΄ / / > , 
o4. mavOavew ἡμᾶς εἴτε μὴ, πότερα φήσομεν ἐπιστήμην δ of the 


art of per- 
suasion. 
This must * 
yield to 

the art 
which de- 
cides whe- 


5 ther per- 


suasion or 
force is to 
be used: 

i. 6. the art 
of states- 
mansbip. 
Then gene- 
ralship de- 
cides how 
war is to 
be conduct- 
ed: but the 
prior ques- 
tion of war 
or peace 
must be 
decided by 
another 
and more 
authorita- 
tive art, 
which can 
be nothing 
less than 
royal. 


170 ITAATQNOZ 


’ ᾽ « a“ ΕΥ ‘ , 
δεῖ πράττειν πρὸς τινας ὁτιοῦν ἢ καὶ TO παράπαν Pp. 3h 


” Als 5 / ΄ 
7 ἐχειν 7, τοῦτ᾽ αὖ ποίᾳ προσθήσομεν ἐπιστήμῃ ; 


NE. 2Q. Τῇ τῆς πειστικῆς ἀρχούσῃ καὶ λεκτικῆς. 


SE. Εἴη δὲ ἂν οὐκ ἄλλη τις, ὡς οἶμαι, πλὴν ἡ 


lal cal / 
5 τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δύναμις. 


NE. 2Q. Καλλιστ᾽ εἴρηκας. 


- 


la \ \ 
EE. Kai τοῦτο μὲν ἔοικε ταχὺ κεχωρίσθαι πολι- 


΄σ Ἂς ε , ad “5 37) « cal 
τικῆς TO ῥητορικὸν, ὡς ἕτερον εἶδος OV, ὑπηρετοῦν 


μὴν ταύτῃ. 


1 ΝΣ. 2. Nai. 


HE. Ti δὲ περὶ τῆς τοιᾶσδ᾽ αὖ δυνάμεως διανο- 


/, 
NTEOV 5 


NE. 3Q. Ποίας: 


a € «ε , - x 
SE. Τῆς ὡς πολεμητέον ἑκάστοις οἷς av προ- 


7 lal 5) OAS δ, 3 yay 
τ ελώμεθα πολεμεῖν, ELITE αὐτὴν ατέεχνον εἰτε EVTEXVOV 


ἐροῦμεν ;: 


NE. ΣΩ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν ἄτεχνον διανοηθεῖμεν, ἣν γε 


ἡ στρατηγικὴ καὶ πᾶσα ἡ πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις πράττει ; 


EE. Τὴν δ᾽ εἴτε πολεμητέον εἴτε διὰ φιλίας 


5 7 “ / ΄ 
“οἀπαλλακτέον οἵαν TE καὶ ἐπιστήμονα διαβουλεύ- 


I. ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν Τἔχειν}] 
Schleiermacher conjectured ἐᾷν 
(cf. Soph. 242 a: τὸ παράπαν ἐα- 
réov. And ἐᾷν may perhaps have 
been mistaken for a contraction 
of ἔχειν) ; Stallbaum ἀπέχειν = to 
refrain— supposing ἀπ to be 
absorbed in παράπαν. (ἀπέχειν 
sc. τοῦ πράττειν.) Herm. conj. 
ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν.  Badh. λέγειν, 
with a view to λεκτικῆς infra. 
But λεκτικῆς is only an ex- 
pansion of πειστικῆς. The 
conjecture of Hermann is the 
best. 

9. μὴν] μὴν is thus used in 


qualifying an assertion supr. 
263 €: ἀγελαίων μὴν ζῴων. So 
μέντοι in Rep. 1, 334 b: ἐπ᾽ 
ὠφελείᾳ μέντοι τῶν φίλων k.T.A. 

14. ὡς] How, in what way. 

15. εἴτε] Interrogative, de- 
pending on διανοητέον. 

17. ἥν ye] “ Why it is the 
function on which generalship 
and all warlike action is em- 
ployed.” Cf. Protag. 322 b: 
πολιτικὴν----ἣς μέρος πολεμική. 

1g. Τὴν δ᾽ εἴτε π.] Bodl. τὴν 
δὲ π. with ATI. 

20. οἵαν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα] 


Able through knowledge.” 





305. 


b 


MOAITIKO®. 


, 
TQAUTY) 5 


11 


« « 7 Ἃ ‘ > ἃ 
204. σασθαι, ταύτης ἑτέραν ὑπολάβωμεν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν 


NE. SQ. Τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀναγκαῖον ἑπομένοισιν 


eR 4 
ετεραν. 


EE Ov A yy / > \ > / 
=H. Οὐκοῦν apyovoay ταύτης αὐτὴν ἀποφανού- 


μεθα, εἴπερ τοῖς ἔμπροσθέν ye ὑποληψόμεθα ὁμοίως ; 


NE. ΣΩ. Φημί. 


3 \ , a 
BE. Ti’ οὖν ποτὲ καὶ ἐπιχειρήσομεν οὕτω δεινῆς 


καὶ μεγάλης τέχνης ξυμπάσης τῆς πολεμικῆς δε- 


7 > , / \ \ A 53 
σπότιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι πλὴν γε δὴ τὴν ὄντως οὖσαν 


βασιλικήν : 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Οὐδεμίαν ἀλλην. 


ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἄρα πολιτικήν γε θήσομεν, ὑπηρετικὴν 


53 Χ a ~ 3 / 
οὖσαν, THY τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐπιστημην. 


NE. ΣΩ. Οὐκ εἰκός. 


SE. Ἴθι δή, καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν τῶν ὀρθῶς 


δικαζόντων θεασώμεθα δύναμιν. 
NE. ΣΏΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


cy 53 / An 
HE. “Ap οὖν ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται τοῦ περὶ τὰ 


8. οὕτω----πολεμικῆς) ‘ What 
science shall we go about to 
make supreme over the whole 
of strategy, a power so for- 
midable and so mighty ?” 

το. THY ὄντως οὖσαν βασιλικήν] 
So the argument is strength- 
ened by an appeal to language 
in Soph. 221 ¢: ἢ παντάπασιν 
ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν. Supr. 260 
Ο: δεσπόζοντά γε. 

13. ὑπηρετικὴν οὖσαν] Viz. 
Subservient to the end of po- 
litics. So ὑπηρέτιν ἐκείνης infr. Ο. 
Cf. supr. 260. 

τό. Ἴθι----καὶ] Cf. supr. 267 a: 
φέρε----καὶ συνείρωμεν. 

10. "Ap οὖν---διαιρεῖν ;| “ Can 


the judicial art do anything 
more than, on questions of 
contract, to determine what is 
legally just and unjust by re- 
ference to those fixed laws 
which she receives from the 
lawgiving king ; while she 
brings to the performance of 
this office her own peculiar 
virtue, that of being incapable 
of yielding to bribes or intimi- 
dation or the appeal to pity, 
or to any other feeling, whe- 
ther of enmity or favor, so as 
to be willing to determine 
suits between parties other- 
wise than as the lawgiver has 
appointed 2” 


* 72 


σι 


The gene- 
ral, then, is 
a servant, 
and not a 
governor. 
Let us now 
examine 
the judicial 
faculty. 
What can 
this do be- 
yond the 
impartial 


and incor- 
ruptible 
administra- 
tion of ex- 
isting laws? 


This power, 
then, is 
only the 
guardian, 
and not the 
directress, 
of the laws. 
The science 


of govern- 15 


ment must 
be different 
from all of 
these. Her 
business is 
not imme- 
diate ac- 
tion, but 
the guid- 
ance of 
action 
through 
her discern- 
ment of 


172 


, ΄ ote , a , A ᾿ 
ξυμβοόλαια, πανθ᾽ ὁπόσα κεῖται νομιμὰ πάρα νομο- Ῥ. 861" 


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


, a i ~ 
θέτου βασιλέως παραλαβοῦσα, κρίνειν εἰς ἐκεῖνα 


A , 7 7 5 Ν + 
σκοποῦσα Ta TE δίκαια ταχθέντα εἶναι καὶ ἀδικα, 


Ν σὲ "507 > ‘ / lal ‘7? e , 
THY auTNnS ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν παρεχομενὴ TOV μηθ ὑπὸ 


δτινων δώρων μήθ᾽ ὑπὸ φόβων μήτε οἴκτων μήθ᾽ 


ὑπό τινος ἄλλης ἔχθρας μηδὲ φιλίας ἡττηθεῖσα παρὰ 


\ ΄ ᾽ a ἈΝ > / 
τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου τάξιν ἐθέλειν ἂν τὰ ἀλλήλων 


ἐγκλήματα διαιρεῖν ; 


NE. 2Q. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὅσον εἴρηκας, ταύτης 


> a ΄ y 
10 €OTL τῆς δυνάμεως ἔργον. 


"ΠῚ Κ Ν \ a ὃ a + ey en am , 
μι τ. αι Τὴν τῶν οιἰκαστῶν Apa ρωμῆν AVEUPL- 


᾽ \ 5 \ / , Ν 
σκομεν οὐ βασιλικὴν οὖσαν ἀλλὰ νόμων φύλακα καὶ 


e 7 / 
ὑπηρέτιν ἐκείνης. 


NE. 2Q. "Eouké γε. 


, a 
HE. Tode δὴ κατανοητέον ἰδόντι συναπάσας Tas 


3 ῇ Δ 9) “ ΄ ea » / 
ἐπιστήμας αἱ εἴρηνται, OTL πολιτικὴ γε αὐτῶν οὐδεμία 


3 ΄ \ N yy 5 \ 3 SS 
ἀνεφάνη. τὴν yap ὄντως οὖσαν βασιλικὴν οὐκ αὐτὴν 


rn a / / 
δεῖ πράττειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν, 


ων ἊΝ 7 SY ‘\ a 7 
γιγνωσκουσαᾶν τὴν ἀρχὴν TE καὶ ορμὴν τῶν μεγιστῶν 


as / / ᾽ / \ 
2οἐν Tals πόλεσιν ἐγκαιρίας TE πέρι καὶ ἀκαιρίας, τὰς 


δ᾽ ἄλλας τὰ προσταχθέντα δρᾷν. 


ΝΕ. 3Q. Ὀρθῶς. 


5. μήθ᾽ ὑπό τινος ἄλλης €xOp.] 
“ No, nor yet hatred ;” accord- 
ing to the well-known Platonic 
idiom. Cf. supr. 298 d: εἴτε 
τινῶν ἰατρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν εἴτ᾽ 
ἄλλων ἰδιωτῶν. 

9. σχεδὸν ---- ἔργον] “ You 
have fairly expressed the limits 
within which this power is ex- 
ercised.” 

17. οὐκ αὐτὴν δεῖ πράττειν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ἄρχει] Cf. supr. 259 6. 


19. γιγνώσκουσαν ---- πολέσιν] 


“ Understanding, as regards 
fitness and unfitness of times, 
the beginning and first im- 
pulse of what is most im- 
portant in states.” Cf Rep. 
4,424 a: πολιτεία ἐὰν ἅπαξ 
ὁρμήσῃ εὖ. ΐ 

20. τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας] Supr. 
27 ἃ: τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις διὰ χειρ- 
ουργιῶν. So, very frequently, 
the obverse of a proposition 
is stated at the close of a 
sentence. 











ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 


— \ a , A \ / , 

SE. Διὰ ταῦτα apa, as μὲν ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν, 
» 3 7 3, “ 
οὔτε ἀλλήλων οὔὐὔθ᾽ αὑτῶν ἄρχουσαι, περὶ δέ τινα 
, eon 5 , "2, \ \ 9 ͵ 
ἰδίαν αὑτῆς οὖσα ἑκάστη πρᾶξιν, κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα 


fal 4 3, 3 3 
τῶν πράζεων τοὔνομα δικαίως εἴληφεν ἴδιον. 


NE. 2Q. Εἴξασι γοῦν. 


»-- Χ \ lad / 57 A a 
SH. Τὴν de πασῶν τε τούτων ἄρχουσαν καὶ TOY 
[2 7 ἴω \\ / / 
νόμων καὶ ξυμπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐπιμελουμένην 
,΄ , ͵ A a an 
καὶ πᾶντα ξυνυφαίνουσαν ὀρθότατα, τοῦ κοινοῦ TH 
Τὰ ΄ \ 7 la) 
κλήσει περιλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς, προσαγο- 
7 / > 7 VA 7, 
ρεύοιμεν δικαιότατ᾽ ἀν, ὡς ἔοικε, πολιτικὴν. 10 
΄ \ 5 
NE. 2Q. Τ]αντάπασι μεν οὖν. 
a \ ὯΝ Ν an ΄- 4 
HE. Οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ κατὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς παρά- 
i? > a δὰ an σ“ ἈΝ 
δειγμα βουλοίμεθ᾽ ἂν ἐπεζελθεῖν αὐτὴν νῦν, ὅτε καὶ 
7 δὴ / \ \ ΄ lal Cas / 
TAVTA τὰ γένη τὰ κατὰ πόλιν δῆλα ἡμῖν γέγονεν ; 
ἤ 
NE. 2Q. Καὶ σφόδρα γε. 15 
μοὶ \ \ \ / y 
SE. Τὴν δὴ βασιλικὴν συμπλοκὴν, ὡς ἔοικε, 
/ / / 
λεκτέον ποία τ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ποίῳ τρόπῳ συμπλέκουσα 
ἴων e a “ > ἢ 
ποῖον ἡμῖν ὕφασμα ἀποδίδωσιν. 


INE SO, Δῆλον. 


173 


occasions, 
and of the 
first begin- 
nings of 
great 
issues. 
The rest 
have each 
5 a particular 
function 
and name: 
the work- 
ing of 
statesman- 
ship is uni- 
versal: and 
hence this 
science 
bears the 
general 
name of 
govern- 
ment, 
Having 
now distin- 
guished it 
from other 
forms of 
civic life, 
let us view 
it in itself 
by the 
light of our 
example. 
What is 
the nature 
of the web 


EE. °H χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαῖον 20 in which 


5 , e , 
apa γέγονεν, ὡς φαίνεται. 


NE. 2Q. Πάντως γε μὴν ῥητέον. 
ΞΕ. To γὰρ ἀρετῆς μέρος ἀρετῆς εἴδει διάφορον 


8. ξυνυφαίνουσαν] This word 
prepares the way for the return 
to the example of weaving in 
what follows. 

TOU κοινοῦ TH κλήσει περι- 
λαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς | 
“ Characterizing the function 
of this art by the name of that 
which it shares with the rest,” 
viz. that they are for the good 
of the state. Se. πολιτικὴν, ἅτε 


this sove- 
reign art 
inweaves 
all other 

arts ἢ 


ἐπιμελουμένην ἁπάντων τῶν κατὰ 


πόλιν. For περιλαβ. οἵ. Theet. 


148 d: ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἕνι 
εἴδει περιέλαβες. 

13. αὐτὴν] αὐτῇ Bodl. ATL: 
cett. αὐτήν. Cf. Lege. 6, 778 6, 
Phileb. 66 d. 

dre — γέγονε] Pp. 287-290, 
303-305. 

23. Τὸ γὰρ --- δόξας] “ That 
one part of yirtue is in some 


The an- 
awer to this 
involves a 
difficult 
question. 
The parts 
of virtue 
are gene- 
rally sup- 
posed to be 
in unison. 
We must 
now ex- 
amine whe- 
ther cou- 
rage and 
temper- 
ance are 
not rather 
opposed, 


Io 


15 


174 


MAATQNOS 


3 / , “ Ν / ᾽ ΄- 
εἰναὶ τινα τρόπον τοῖς περὶ λόγους ἀμφισβητητικοῖς Pp. 30} 


‘ 4y? > Ν Ἁ lal ΄σ 
καὶ war εὐεπίθετον πρὸς Tas τῶν πολλῶν δόξας. 


NE. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμαθον. 


EE. ᾿Αλλ’ ὧδε πάλιν. ἀνδρείαν γὰρ οἶμαί σε 


NE. ΣΏ. Πάνυ γε. 


« cal / A > “ δι 9S 
5 ἡγεῖσθαι μέρος Ev ἀρετῆς ἡμῖν εἶναι. 


HE. Καὶ μὴν σωφροσύνην γε ἀνδρείας μὲν ἕτερον, 


A > 53 \ A / - A 
ἐν δ᾽ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο μόριον ἧς κἀκεῖνο. 


NE. ΣΩ. Ναί 


EE. Τούτων δὴ πέρι θαυμαστόν τινα λόγον ἀπο- 


φαίνεσθαι τολμητέον. 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Ποῖον : 


"-- ε 3 \ \ ΄ , 5 
EE. Os ἐστὸν κατὰ δὴ τινα τρόπον εὖ μάλα 


Ν > / Ν ’ x 
πρὸς ἀλλήλας * ἐχθρὰ ἢ καὶ στάσιν ἐναντίαν ἔχοντε 


» a a“ 3) 
ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν OVTOV. 


NE. ΣΏ. Ios λέγεις ; 


/ lal 
HE. Οὐκ εἰωθότα λόγον οὐδαμῶς" πάντα yap 


way different from another 
kind of virtue is a position 
easily assailable by contentious 
disputants who appeal to com- 
mon opinion.” 

(23.) ἀρετῆς μέρος ἀρετῆς εἴδει] 
The expression is purposely 
varied, perhaps with the inten- 
tion of recalling the still un- 
settled question of the distinc- 
tion between εἶδος and μέρος, 
supr. 263 a. Cf. Lege. 7,791 
6, where ἀνδρεία is called ψυχῆς 
μόριον ἀρετῆς. Ib. 3, 689 d: 
Charm.160 a. The words from 
ἢ χαλεπὸν to δόξας are given to 
the same speaker in the Bod. 
MS. 

4. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὧδε πάλιν] Cf. Theeet. 
191 b: ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε. Rep. 1. 352 6. 
Soph. 262 e: ἔτι δὴ σμικρὸν τόδε. 


8. ἧς κἀκεῖνο]! Se. ἀρετῆς. 

14. στάσιν ἐναντίαν] “ An op- 
posed attitude :” or perhaps, 
στάσιν ἐναντίαν ἔχοντε, “ holding 
opposite sides.” For ἐχθρὰ the 
MSS. and Edd. have ἔχθραν : 
ἔχοντε C.H.: cett. ἔχετον. CF. 
Pheedr. 238 a: δύο τινέ ἔστον 
ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε. 

15. ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων] ΟἿ. 
infr. ¢: εἴτε κατὰ σώματα εἴτε ἐν 
ψυχαῖς εἴτε κατὰ φωνῆς φορὰν, 
εἴτ᾽ αὐτῶν τούτων εἴτ᾽ ἐν εἰδώλοις 
ὄντων. 

17. πάντα γὰρ οὖν----φίλια] The 
present is certainly a modifi- 
cation of the view taken by 
Socrates in the Protagoras, 
where he upholds the simple 
unity of virtue. 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


/ 
© σοὺ φίλια. 


NE. 2Q. Nai. 


175 


an \ a 5 / 
KE. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ προσχόντες Tov νοῦν εὖ μάλα, 


/ “ «ες ω » A lal * Ν lal 
πότερον οὕτως ἁπλοῦν εστὶ τοῦτο, ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον 5 


> a yy \ la / y 
αὐτῶν EXEL διαφορὰν Τοις ξυγγενέσιν ες TL; 


NE, 2Q. Ναί, λέγοις ἂν πῇ σκεπτέον. 


ΞΕ. Ἔν τοῖς ξύμπασι χρὴ ζητεῖν ὅσα καλὰ μὲν 


7 / > 3 \ / / » / 
λέγομεν, εἰς δύο δ᾽ αὐτὰ τίθεμεν ἐναντία ἀλλήλων 


εἴδη. 


NE. ΣΏ. Λέγ᾽ ἔτι σαφέστερον. 


/ / 7 ἊΝ / 5} 
HB. Οξύτητα καὶ τάχος, εἴτε κατὰ σώματα εἴτε 


» an 7 A al t) 537 5 an / 
ἐν ψυχαῖς εἴτε κατὰ φωνῆς φοραν, εἰτε αὐτῶν τούτων 


SY ΔΕ  ΥΟ ΤᾺΣ ’ 7 + ε , δ , X 
εἰτ ἐν εἰδώλοις ὄντων, ὅποσα μουσικὴ μιμουμένη καὶ 


»y \ / , ’ Χ » 
ETL γραφικὴ μιμήματα παρέχεται, τούτων τινὸς ἐπαι- 


5. οὕτως ἁπλοῦν] Cf. Symp. 
183 d: οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν,----οὔτε 
καλὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ---οὔτε αἰσχρὸν, 
ἀλλὰ καλῶς μὲν πραττόμενον καλὸν, 
αἰσχρῶς δὲ αἰσχρόν. 

#—7] “Or whether there 
be of them which differ in some 
respect from theix congeners.” 
The old editions had ἔχον----ἐστὶ, 
which however is only found 
in the margin of Ven. =, and 
is probably due to ἐστὶν having 
been read for ἐς ri. Heindorf 
conj. ἔχον ἐστί τι. But for αὐ- 
τῶν without τι, cf. supr. 285 6, 
and twa or drra is required 
rather than τι. 

8. ὅσα --- αὐτά] Cf. Soph. 
225 b: ὅσον---ἀμφισβητεῖται μέν, 
εἰκῇ δὲ---περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται. 

12. ᾿Οξύτητα---ἤσθησαι: “I 
mean to ask, have you ever 
praised or heard others praise 


any such thing as quickness and 
speed, etc. ?” The construction 
is changed as the sentence pro- 
ceeds, the accusative in ὀξ. 
καὶ tax. being partly due to 
λέγε, and τινὸς to the previous 
genitives. 

etre — Πσθησαι] The first 
two pairs of ecires are hy- 
pothetical, and the third is 
interrogative. “ Whether you 
have either yourself spoken 
or heard others speak in com- 
mendation of any of these 
things—quickness and speed, 
whether in body, or mind, or 
movement of sound, whether 
real, or in such shadowy forms 
as music, and even painting, 
afford by imitation.” 

εἴτε ἐν ψυχαῖς] Cf. Legg. 
3, 689 d: πάντα τὰ κυμψὰ καὶ 
πρὸς τάχος τῆς ψυχῆς πεφυκότα, 


10 


106. οὖν δὴ ἀλλήλοις τά γε τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια λέγεταί We must 


look for this 
amongst 
actions 
which we 
adimire,and 
at the same 
time con- 
trast with 
each other, 
We praise 
quickness 
and bold- 
ness on 
many ocea- 
sions, and 
always by 
applying 
the same 
epithet of 
‘ brave.’ 


170 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 


/ 3 9.τΝ ,ὔ / » y Ν 4 
νέτης ELTE AUTOS πώποτε γέγονας εἴτε ἄλλου παρὼν p. 3 hf 


» cal 5} 
ἐπαινοῦντος ἡσθησαι ; 


NE. 2Q. Ti μήν: 


τ ἢ =) Ν “ yA “ / > N 
SE. Ἢ καὶ μνήμην ἔχεις ὅντινα τρόπον αὑτὸ 


“ > e 7 / 
5 δρῶσιν εν EKAOTOLS TOUTWY 5 


NE. ΣΏ. Ovdapes. 


— 53 > 3 \ 328 x , [2 
=E. *Ap οὖν δυνατὸς αὐτὸ ἂν γενοίμην, ὥσπερ 


καὶ διανοοῦμαι, διὰ λόγων ἐνδείξασθαί σοι: 


NE. 2Q. Tid ov; 


Io 


cn ε ’ "7 c a \ an i , 
HE. Padsov ἐοικας ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον᾽ σκοπῶ- 


» 5 3. ΙΝ 5 “ ς 7, 7 a \ 
μεθα δ᾽ οὖν αὐτὸ ἐν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις γένεσι. τῶν Yap 


ἊΝ ’ ΄ 7 7 
δὴ πράξεων ἐν πολλαῖς Kal πολλάκις ἑκάστοτε τάχος 


\ 4 Ae, 7 if VA Ν / 
καὶ σφοδρότητα καὶ ὀξύτητα διανοήσεώς TE καὶ σώμα- 


ay \ Ν “ “ ᾽ lad iy Ae SS 
TOS, ETL δὲ καὶ φωνῆς, ὁταν ἀγασθώμεν, λέγομεν αὐτὸ 


15 ἐπαινοῦντες μιᾷ χρώμενοι προσρήσει τῇ τῆς ἀνδρείας. 


NE. 2Q. Πώς; 


EE. Ὁ ξὺ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν πού φαμεν, καὶ ταχὺ καὶ 


> / Ν Ν ec 4 Ν 7 5 / 
ἀνδρικὸν, καὶ σφοδρὸν ὡσαύτως" καὶ πάντως ἐπιφέ- 


ay ἃ Zz Χ 4 la / 
ροντες τούνομα Ὁ λέγω κοινὸν πάσαις ταῖς φύσεσι 


/ » la > , 
20 TQAUTQALS ETTALYOUMEVY GUTGS. 


4. αὐτὸ δρῶσι) Cf. Soph. 
233 ¢: Δρῶσι δέ ye τοῦτο πρὸς 
ἅπαντά, φαμεν. 

5. ἐν ἑκάστοις τούτων] “ In 
the case of body, mind, voice, 
or imitative art.” 

4. ὥσπερ ---- διανοοῦμαι] Cf. 
Crat. 435 Ὁ. 

LI. ἐν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις γένεσι] 
“Tn the kinds where the oppo- 
sition appears.” Supr. ¢: ἐναντία 
—eidn. Qy. ταῖς ὑπεναντίαις 
γενέσεσι 1 Cf. infr.: ἠρεμαίας ad 
γενέσεως. 310 Cd: πολλαῖς yeve- 
σεσιν, where some MSS. have 
πολλοῖς γένεσιν. 


τῶν γὰρ δὴ --- ἀνδρείας] “ For 
there are many actions in which, 
and that repeatedly, we praise 
speed and vehemence and quick- 
ness, mental and bodily; and 
on each occasion” (ἑκάστοτε) 
“express our praise of the qua- 
lity which we admire by the 
one appellation of ‘ bravery.’ ” 
12. ἐν πολλαῖς καὶ πολλάκις | 
Cf. Soph. 264 Ὁ: ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε---- 
with which should have been 
compared Phileb. 32 d: 
ἊΣ Ε 4 
Kal €VLa—EOTLY OTE —. 
14. αὐτὸ] Se. τάχος καὶ σῴφο- 
δρότητα καὶ ὀξύτητα κιτ.λ. 


ay, 
€VLOTE 





οὔ. 








ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


NE. ΣΏ. Ναί. 


177 


= 4 amen 3 5 aps 
BE. Ti δέ; τὸ τῆς ἠρεμαίας αὖ γενέσεως εἶδος ap 


> 7 a an ᾽ὔ 
07. ov πολλακις ἐπηνέκαμεν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πράξεων : 


NE. 2Q. Καὶ σφόδρα γε. 


αὶ a 3 ᾽ , / * a / 
BE. Μῶν οὖν ov τἀναντία λέγοντες ἢ περὶ EKEL- 5 


νων τοῦτο φθεγγόμεθα ; 
NE. 2Q. [las ; 


bm e ¢ a? , Gh #2 ἈΝ 
BE. Os ἡσυχαῖα πού φαμεν ἑκάστοτε καὶ σω- 


, ͵ ΄ 7 ’ , 
φρονικα, περί τε διάνοιαν πραττόμενα ἀγασθέντες 


Ν \ \ / 3 7 Ν ΄ eats 
καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις av βραδέα καὶ μαλακα, καὶ ετιῖο 


N \ / a Ν / \ a 
περὶ φωνὰς γιγνόμενα λεῖα καὶ βαρεα, Kal πᾶσαν 


© \ / Ἀνὰ ΤΟΝ a » > 
ῥυθμικὴν κίνησιν καὶ ὅλην μοῦσαν ἐν καιρῷ Bpadv- 


τῆτι προσχρωμένην, οὐ τὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς 


/ Yj , > a , 
κοσμιότητος ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν αὐτοῖς ξύμπασιν. 


NE. ΣΏΩ. ᾿Αληθέστατα. 


— Ν ἊΝ ε / 3 5 , , 
SE. Καὶ μὴν ὁπόταν αὖ ye ἀμφότερα γίγνηται 


- CR 2ὔ 7 ¢ 4 5 a Zz 
ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄκαιρα, μεταβάλλοντες EKATEpA αὐτῶν Ψε- 


5 3 [2 , » ? > > / 
γομεν ἐπὶ τἀναντία παλιν ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. 


2. γενέσεως] The word is 
used in the same sense as supr. 
283 d, 287 6, to express the 
operation of any art, or, more 
generally, the act of doing any- 
thing. 

8. Ὡς ἡσυχαῖα --- - ξύμπασιν] 
“In saying ‘quiet and mode- 
rate’ on each occasion, as you 
know we do (που), when we 
admire what is done slowly 
and softly either in thought 
or action, or, again, what is 
sounded smoothly and gravely, 
and all rhythmical movement, 
and every liberal exercise 
which apples slowness at the 
proper time. To all these we 
attribute not bravery but so- 
briety, as a fitting epithet.” For 


* 


-K.T.A. 


mos; answered by as, ef. Rep. 
6, 510 "Ὁ: πῇ ;--ἣἧ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ 
Theet. 172 ἃ. For the 
asyndeton, cf. supr. 293 b, 


where νενομίκαμεν is resumed 


in dapev, as φαμεν in emupe- 


popev here. 

12. μοῦσαν] 
722 d. 

ἐν καιρῷᾷ, Cf. infr. 6, ἀκαι- 
ρότερον ὄντα ἢ χρή, and Arist. 
Eth. Nic. II. 2, δεῖ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς 


del τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν 


Cf. Lege. 4, 


καιρὸν σκοπεῖν. 

17. ἄκαιρα! This reading is 
found as a correction in E, 
otherwise the MSS. unite in 
giving ἀκέραια. 

18. ἐπὶ τἀναντία πάλιν ἀπονέ- 
μοντες τοῖς ὀνόμασιν] “ Assigning 


Aa 


I 


Again, 

we often 
praise gen- 
tleness and 
qiuetness 
of demean- 
our and 
movement, 
and here 
we use the 
very dif- 
ferent epi- 
thet of 
‘modest.’ 
On the 
other hand, 
both bold- 
ness and 
gentleness 
are often 
blamed, as 
rash and 
cowardly. 
But rash- 
ness and 
cowardice 
are not 
found toge- 
ther, and 
bravery 
and mo- 
desty have 
not a natu- 


ral affinity 
for each 
other. 
Both these 
diverse na- 
tures and 
the indivi- 
duals in 
whom they 
are found, 
most often 
stand op- 
posed and 
are divided 
by mutual 
antipathy. 
This play 
ot antipa- 
thies is, 
however, 

a trifle in 
comparison 
of the mo- 
mentous 
issues to 


178 


NE. 0. Πῶς: 


MAATQNOZ 


> \ / ΄“ “ Ν 
EE. ᾿Οὗύτερα μὲν αὐτὰ γιγνόμενα τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ 


, Ν « Ν Ν 
θάττω καὶ σκληρότερα φαινόμενα [καὶ] ὑβριστικὰ καὶ 


/ 
tavika λέγοντες. Ta δὲ βραδύτερα καὶ μαλακώτερα 
! oY ’ P 


\ Ν « Ν Ν tg 
5 δειλὰ καὶ βλακικά. καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς TO πολὺ ταῦτά 


Ν \ / 7 \ Ν > 7 Ν val 
TE καὶ τὴν σώφρονα φύσιν καὶ THY ἀνδρείαν τὴν τῶν 


7 - / if » 4 
ἐναντίων, οἷον Ἱπολεμίας { διαλαχούσας στάσιν ἰδέας, 


» 3.» ῇ ΄ 3 , > “-“ Ν 
ovr ἀλληλαις μιγνυμένας ἐφευρίσκομεν εν ταῖς περὶ 


‘ a / y Ν 5 lal “ 
Τὰ Τοίιαυτα πράξεσιν, ETL ΤῈ TOUS) (CV ATGS ψυχαῖς 


aN / 
ἐὰν μεταδιώκωμεν. 


τοαὐτὰς ἴσχοντας διαφερομένους ἀλλήλοις ὀψόμεθα, 


NE. 3Q. Ποῦ δὴ λέγεις ; 


lal \ / - lal 3) « 
EE. Ἔν πᾶσί τε δὴ τούτοις οἷς νῦν εἴπομεν, ὡς 


them to the opposite quarters 
again in our nomenclature.” 

3. [καὶ] ὑβριστικὰ] So all the 
MSS. except Ven. =. καὶ op. 
καὶ pav. =“ Not only violent, 
but mad.” 

ὑβριστικὰ] Cf. Pheedr.252 Ὁ: 
ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ Kat ov σφόδρα 
τι ἔμμετρον. Cratyl. 426 Ὁ. 

4. μανικὰ Cf. Soph. 242 a: 
μή ποτέ σοι μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω 
παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω 
καὶ κάτω. 

5. βλακικα] Cf. Rep. 4,432 d: 


βλακικόν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος. Gore. 


488 a: πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλᾶκα εἶναι. 


Euthyd. 287 e: ἐξήμαρτον διὰ 
τὴν βλακείαν. 

καὶ σχεδὸν ---- μεταδιώκωμεν | 
“ And so it is for the most part 
that we find these (the harsh 
and effeminate), and also the 
temperance and manliness of 
the characters opposed to them, 
as ideas diametrically antago- 
nistic, not mingling with each 
other in the actions concerned 


with such things ; and, more- 
over, we find, if we follow up 
the quest so far, that the men 
also of whose minds they are 
attributes are at variance with 
each other.” ἀνδρείαν is pro- 
bably a substantive. 

7. οἷον----ἰδέας] The words as 
they stand must be construed 
“ As hostile forms having taken 
different sides in a quarrel.” 
(Sad. στ.) But I would venture 
to read πολεμίαν, and translate 
“ Forms which as it were have 
severally been put in a hostile 
attitude.” Compare στάσιν 
ἐναντίαν exovre supr. 306 b. 
Alberti’s interpretation, who 
would join τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων 
διαλαχούσας στάσιν, οἷον πολε- 
μίας ἰδέας, = “ participating, as 
hostile forms, in the war of 
opposites,” will hardly com- 
mend itself to scholars. He 
is right, however, in adducing 
Legg. 8, 836 d: τὸ τῆς σώφρο- 


> , / 
vos ἰδέας γένος. 


Pat 


c 


—————— σ“.-.-Ὁ 
—————s 








HIOAITIKO®X. 


/ > cd a 
'}07. εἰκὸς Te, ev ἑτέροις πολλοῖς. 


179 


\ \ 53 \ 
κατὰ yap οἰμαι τὴν 


lal / / \ \ > a € 
ἃ αὑτῶν ἑκατέροις ξυγγένειαν τὰ μὲν ἐπαινοῦντες ὡς 


οἰκεῖα σφέτερα, τὰ δὲ τῶν διαφόρων ψέγοντες ὡς 


ἀλλότρια, πολλὴν εἰς ἔχθραν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πολλῶν 


/ / 
πέρι καθίστανται. 


NE. ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουσιν. 


EE. Παιδιὰ τοίνυν αὕτη γέ τις ἡ διαφορὰ τούτων 


> Ν a PN a) Ν \ \ / , , 
ἐστὶ τῶν εἰδῶν" περὶ δὲ τὰ μέγιστα νόσος ξυμβαίνει 


πασῶν ἐχθίστη γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν. 
NE. ΣΏΩ. Περὶ δὴ ποῖα φῇς ; 


a > \ aA ~ 
HE. Περὶ ὅλην, ὡς ye εἰκός, τὴν τοῦ ζῆν παρα- 


/ « \ A Χ / 5, / Ν 
σκευὴν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δὴ διαφερόντως OVTES κοσμιοι TOV 


“ IN , oS ™~ > Ν ᾽ ες Ν / 
ἥσυχον ἀεὶ βίον ἐτοιμοι ᾧν, αὐτοὶ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς μόνοι 


\ , 3. να , 7 SG 
Ta σφέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν πράττοντες, OLKOL TE προς ATAVTAS 


“ « a QA Ν A ᾿, / e / 
οὕτως ομιλοῦντες, καὶ πρὸς TAS ἔζωθεν πολεις ὡσαυ- 


2. ὡς οἰκεῖα σφέτερα] “As 
their own kith and kin.” Stall- 
baum quotes Demosth. Orat. ec. 
Callic. pp: 1274. 5, 1275. 7: 
ἡμέτερον ἴδιον. Lucian. T. ITI. 
p- 226 e, ed. Bipont.: τοὐμὸν 
ἴδιον. The Bodleian has ἐφέτερα 
(sic). 

4. πολλὴν----καὶ πολλῶν πέρι] 
Cf. ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ πολλάκις 51}. 
206 6. 

7. Wada] Τ. 6. a trifling 
matter. Cf. Alsch. Prom. 314. 

γέ tis] Qy. γ᾽ ere? 

8. EvpBaiver] Se. ἡ διαφορὰ 
αὕτη. Cf. Soph. 228 a. 

11. Περὶ ὅλην --- δοῦλοι] ‘* Em- 
bracing, as might be antici- 
pated, the whole arrangement 
of life. For we know that 
those who excel in modesty 
are always ready to lead a 
quiet life, dog their own 


business by themselves alone, 
and while they live peaceably 
with all at home, they are 
likewise ready at all points to 
be in a manner at peace with 
foreign cities. And from being 
thus in love with quietness, a 
love not suited to their occa- 
sions, they unconsciously be- 
come unfit for war, and create 
the same defect in their young 
men, and are in the power of 
the first aggressor, whence 
ere many years have passed, 
themselves, their children and 
their whole community have 
often, ere they were aware, 
been reduced from freedom to 
slavery.” 

12. ὄντες ----ἐπιτιθεμένων] CF. 
Soph. Cid. Rex. 917: ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι 
τοῦ λέγοντος. Ib. Cid. Col. 


“6 5 > c= c ΄ 
700 : τοὐπιόντος ἁρπάσαι, 


τ 
Aa Ζ 


which this 
contraricty 
leads. 

For the 
lovers of a 
quiet life, 
if they have 
their way, 
by enerva- 
ting them- 
selves and 
the youth, 
will often 
bring their 
country 
into sla- 
very. 


180 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 


"ἢ , ” / \ »” SRE } 
τως ETOLPLOL TAVTA OVTES τρόπον TVA ἀγειν εἰρηνὴν. γ. 30})” 
Ν \ Ν v \ a > / JA δ 4 
καὶ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα δὴ τοῦτον, ἀκαιρότερον ὄντα ἢ Χχρῆ» 
“ aA / ’ yA > / > 
ὅταν ἃ βούλονται πράττωσιν, ἔλαθον αὐτοὶ TE ἀπο- 
7 7 ἈΝ \ , c / / ῃ 
λέμως ἰσχοντες καὶ τοὺς νέους ὡσαύτως διατιθέντες ' 
2 IM: > a > / ’ e > > “ 
δόντες τε ἀεὶ τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων, ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς 
"7 ’ N ‘ Aa ‘ , « , > > 
ἔτεσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες Kal ξύμπασα ἡ πόλις ἀντ 
> / ’ y ec \ / ~ 
ἐλευθέρων πολλάκις ἔλαθον αὑτοὺς γενόμενοι δοῦλοι. 
Ν 53 Ν ‘ a 
NE. 2Q. Χαλεπὸν εἶπες καὶ δεινὸν πάθος. 


— > « Ν \ ΄σ (472 

And the ΞῈ,, Τί δ᾽ οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν μᾶλλον ῥέποντες ; 
sort who 59 > SEN , ιν ἢ \ εἰδῶσιν , 
incline to !0@P οὐκ ἐπὶ πόλεμον ἀεί τινα τὰς αὑτῶν ξυντείνοντες 
bravery, , \ \ a , , ΄, a 
everstire πόλεις διὰ τὴν τοῦ τοιούτου βίου σφοδροτέραν τοῦ 
ring up , > , 7 Ξ = 
πῆμα δέοντος ἐπιθυμίαν, εἰς ἔχθραν πολλοῖς καὶ δυνατοῖς 
provoking ΄ x ΄ δ ΄ ἊΝ ὃ , 5 . 
qaaesels καταστάντες, ἢ παμπαν διώλεσαν ἢ δούλας αὖ καὶ 
ith er- ε ͵ ta > 5 Ἔξω τ ἡ \ econ 
ful nich. ὑποχειρίους τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑπέθεσαν Tas αὑτῶν πα- 

Θ 
bours, pro- , : 
duce the 15 Τρ ἰδας 2 
ol VA lal 
Aare NE. 2Q. ᾿Ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα. 

ΒΗ a 5 \ a , / 
opposite EE. Πῶς οὖν μὴ φῶμεν ev τούτοις ἀμφότερα 


cause. 
a Ν 5, Χ 
ταῦτα τὰ γένη πολλὴν πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀεὶ καὶ τὴν 
μεγίστην ἴσχειν ἔχθραν καὶ στάσιν ; 
> ἴω « » ,ὔ 
2. ΝΕ. 20. Οὐδαμῶς ὡς οὐ φήσομεν. 


=a Dy Οὐ a “ » a 3 3 ΄ 
μ᾿. UKOUV Oo7TEp EMEC KOTIOULEY KAT αρχᾶς, 





2 / “ ΄ 3 a 3 Ν > / 
ἀανευρηκαμεν, OTL μορια ἀρετῆς ov σμικρὰ aAAndAots 
/ , \ \ \ Ἂ sy a 
διαφέρεσθον φύσει Kai δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἴσχοντας δρᾶτον 
SIN ΄- 
τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο: 


Adverbial. 


I. πάντα] 

. πολλάκις --- δοῦλοι] Note 
the rhythm. The style of this 
passage is closely similar to 
that of the Laws. 

10. guvreivovres] Cf. Rep. 
9,590 Ὁ: ὅταν τὸ eovrGdes— 
συντείνηται ἀναρμόστως. 

13. καταστάντες] Qy. καταστή- 
σαντες | 


19. ἔχθραν καὶ στάσιν] Supr. 
306 b. The writer seems to 
pass almost unconsciously from 
the one meaning of στάσις to 
the other. 

20. Οὐδαμῶς ws οὐ] The 
adverbial form of οὐδείς ὅσ- 
TLS οὐ. 

23. δρᾶτον τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο] Se. 
ποιοῦσιν διαφέρειν. 





ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 
SO: Κινδυνεύετον. 


Tode τοίνυν αὖ λάβωμεν. 


ΝΕ. 
=H. 
NE. 


mE. 


ΣΏΩ. To ποῖον ; 


a e a a ot yy ΩΝ > Ν ΄ 
πρᾶγμα οτιοῦν τῶν αὑτῆς ἐργων, κἂν εἰ TO φαυλο-5 


181 


γ / “- “ > a 
Et tis mov τῶν συνθετικῶν ἐπιστημῶν 


΄“- ΄- an a 7 
τατον, ἑκοῦσα ἐκ μοχθηρῶν καὶ χρηστῶν τινῶν Evvi- 


ἋΟ a » / lad \ \ \ 
στησιν, ἢ πᾶσα ἐπιστημὴη πανταχοῦ τὰ μεν μοχθηρὰ 
9 , 9 ΄ \ Ὁ 7, \ \ 
εἰς δύναμιν ἀποβάλλει, Ta δ᾽ ἐπιτήδεια καὶ χρηστὰ 


57 3 / Ἂ Nie / Ν > / 7 
ἔλαβεν, ἐκ τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁμοίων καὶ ἀνομοίων ὀντων, 


7 > A > Ν / / \ / Ν 
TTQAVTQA εἰς EV αὐτὰ ξυνάγουσα, μιὰν τινὰ δυναμιν KQL10 


ἰδέαν δημιουργεῖ. 
NE. ΣΩ. Τί μήν ; 


HE. Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἀληθῶς οὖσα ἡμῖν 


XN (/ > las a > 
πολιτικὴ μή ποτε EK χρηστῶν καὶ κακῶν ἀνθρώπων 


ε a 5 UA / Jy > > 5) 
ἑκοῦσα εἶναι συστήησηται πόλιν τινά, ἀλλ᾽ εὔδηλον 15 


“ “A ” lo \ \ A 7 5 
ὅτι παιδιᾷ πρῶτον βασανιεῖ, μετὰ Oe THY βάσανον αὖ 


a , / Ἂς «ς lo ἈΝ A 
TOLS δυναμένοις παιδεύειν καὶ UTTI)PETELY προς τοῦτ᾽ 


Ν fe ΄ > a 
αὐτὸ παραδώσει, προστάττουσα καὶ ἐπιστατοῦσα 


3 , i? e \ 
αὐτή, καθάπερ ὑφαντικὴ 


5. κἂν ε Cf. Soph. 247 ἃ, 
267 6; Phileb. 58 ὁ. 

13. Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα----ἐπιστατεῖ] “ΝΟΥ 
is it possible then that our 
art of statesmanship, in the 
true and natural sense, will 
ever (if this can possibly be 
avoided) form a city by the 
combination of bad and good : 
but she will clearly first test 
her subjects by some child’s- 
play, after which she will en- 
trust them to those who are 
able to educate youth and to be 
her ministers for this end: and 
over these she will maintain 
authority, just as the art of 
weaving continually presides 


= 7, a 
τοῖς τε Ealvovot καὶ τοῖς 


over and directs the carders 
and the rest who prepare what 
is necessary for her use in the 
production of her fabric.” 

14. ἐκ χρηστῶν καὶ κακῶν] 
Contrast Thucyd. VI. 18 : τό τε 
φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ TO πάνυ 
ἀκριβὲς ἂν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν 
aad 
ἰσχύειν. 

16. παιδιᾷ βασανιεῖ] Cf. Rep. 
3, 413; Legg. 1, 648; supr. 
S047 d. 

17. καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν πρὸς τοῦτ᾽ 
αὐτὸ] Seeing that the art of 
education also is ministerial to 
the state. Cf. supr. 304. 

19. καθάπερ ὑφαντικὴ] Supr. 
p- 282. 


Now let us 
ask whe- 
ther any 
art of com- 
bination 
will not 
first select 
good ele- 
ments to 
be com- 
bined, and 
cast the bad 
away. And 
will not the 
political 
science, 
then, com- 
bine good 
elements, 
whether 
like or un- 
like ? 
There can- 
not be a 
good com- 
bination of 
good and 
bad. 

And as the 
weaver pre- 
sides over 


the prepa- 
ratory pro- 
cesses of 
cardingand 
spinning,so 
this science 
will deliver 
those whom 
she selects 
to educa- 
tors, over 
whose work 
she will 
herself pre- 
side. Those 
incapable 
of moral 
training 
she will 
reject and 
suppress. 
Those of 
an ignorant 
and abject 
nature she 
will en- 
slave. 

The rest, 
who are 
capable 

of being 
moulded 
to a noble 
type and 
drawn 

into har- 
mony, she 


182 


ITAATQNOS 


5 76 o / 4) 
τάλλα προπαρασκευάζουυσιν ὅσα πρὸς τὴν πλέξιν P- 30} 


» PE - na ’ 
αὐτῆς, ξυμπαρακολουθοῦσα προστάττει καὶ ἐπιστα- 


al 5 e / > cal \ v 5 
Tél, τοιαυτὰ EKAOTOLS ἐνδεικνῦσα τὰ εργὰ ἀποτε- 


lal e a ͵ e “ Ν lal eae 3 
λεῖν, οἷα ἂν ἐπιτήδεια ἡγῆται πρὸς τὴν αὑτῆς εἶναι 


5 ζυμπλοκήν. 


NE. ΣΩ. Πανυ μὲν οὖν. 


EE. αὐτὸν δή μοι τοῦθ᾽ ἡ βασιλικὴ φαίνεται 


lad ΄ A [ Lal n ἣν 
πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ νόμον παιδευταῖς καὶ τροφεῦσι, τὴν 


a “ SUN , a4 / 
τῆς ἐπιστατικῆς αὐτὴ δύναμιν ἔχουσα, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψειν 


lad a / Ἂν \ la / 
το ἀσκεῖν O TL μή τις πρὸς τὴν αὑτῆς ξύγκρασιν ἀπερ- 


/ 500 , » Ἂ lal n δὲ 7 
γαζόμενος σος TL πρρέπον ἄποτέλει, ταῦτα OE μονὰ 


, , Ν Χ Ν \ 
παρακελεύεσθαι παιδεύειν. Kal τοὺς μὲν μὴ δυνα- 


’ὔ “ y » / Ν ΄ “ 
μένους κοινωνεῖν ἤθους ἀνδρείου καὶ σώφρονος ὅσα 


yy / XN / ΄ 
τε ἄλλα ἐστὶ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀθεό- 


NE, Ν » / CaN , ΄ 
I5TNTa καὶ ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικιαν ὑπὸ κακῆς Bia φύσεως 


δ ἀπωθούμενους *, θανάτοις τε ἐκβάλλει καὶ φυγαῖς 


ἊΝ lal / / » / 
και TALS μέγισταις κολάζουσα ATLALALS. 


NE. 2Q. Λέγεται γοῦν mas οὕτως. 


\ 5 , 
HE. Τοὺς δ᾽ ev ἀμαθίᾳ τ᾽ αὖ καὶ ταπεινότητι 


7. Ταὐτὸν δὴ τοῦθ᾽] “Precisely 
in the same manner it appears 
to me that the kingly art, 
keeping the presidential office 
in her own hands, will not 
permit those who are educat- 
ing and rearing the young 
under the law to practise 
them in aught but that which 
being wrought with a view to 
her process of commingling, 
creates a disposition suitable 
thereto, but in these things 
only she exhorts them to edu- 
cate the young.” 

Tavtov—rodro | Cogn. ace. 
in apposition with what fol- 
lows. Cf Legg. 2, 660 a: 


ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν ὁ 
ὀρθὸς νομοθετὴς κ.ιτ.λ. 

15. ὑπὸ κακῆς βίᾳ φύσεως] 
Note the inverted order. 

16. * ἀπωθουμένους Ὁ] Par. H. 
ἀπωθούμενος : cett. ἀπωθούμενα. 
The correction is Stallbaum’s. 
The MS. reading requires ἀλλ᾽ 
ὅσα. 1. 6, δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν 
τούτων doa. But the neuter 
may be defended by supplying 
ἤθη, aS implied in τοὺς duvape- 
vous κοινωνεῖν ἤθους. 

1. κολάζουσα] There is a 
sort of zeugma here. Only 
a part of the sense of ἐκβάλλει 
is to be repeated with the 
participle. 


p- 309 








ΠΟΛΙΡΙΚΟΣ. 183 


γένος. 


NE. Q. ᾿Ορθότατα. 


ip / , x \ ΠῚ / 
$309. πολλῇ κυλινδουμένους εἰς TO δουλικὸν ὑποζεύγνυσι 


μι \ Χ σ ΄ 
HE. Tous λοιποὺς τοίνυν, ὅσων αἱ φύσεις ἐπὶ τὸ 


γενναῖον ἱκαναὶ παιδείας τυγχάνουσαι καθίστασθαι 


b καὶ δέξασθαι μετὰ τέχνης ξύμμιξιν πρὸς ἀλλήλας, 


/ Ν \ Cr \ > / a / 
τούτων τὰς μὲν ἐπὶ THY ἀνδρείαν μᾶλλον ξυντεινού- 


- \ , > Sit lew 3 ἈΝ 
σας, οἷον στημονοῴυες νομισασ αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ 


Χ 3 \ tS Ν ΄ 7, / Ν 
στερεὸμ ἦθος, Tas δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ κόσμιον πίονί TE καὶ 


μαλακῷ καὶ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα κροκώδει Ἔδιανήματι Ἔ 
Z ] ρ ὮΜ 


[4 3 / ὃ \ / ἀλλ aN 
προσχρωμενας, ἐναντία Oe τεινουσας aAAnAaLS, πει- 


a , \ a 
ρᾶται τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυμπλέκειν. 


NE. ΣΏ. Ποῖον δή: 


“ΞΕ. 


cas \ ‘ XN \ NS \ 
Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τὸ ἀειγενὲς 


ὃν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῶν μέρος θείῳ ξυναρμοσαμένη 


δεσμῷ, μετὰ δὲ τὸ θεῖον τὸ ζωογενὲς αὐτῶν αὖθις 


» 
ἀνθρωπίνοις. 


NE. ΣΏΩ. Πῶς τοῦτ᾽ εἶπες αὖ: 


μαι Χ a ἴω " / \ 5 
BE. Τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων πέρι καὶ ἀγα- 


τ. ὑποζεύγνυσι] Se. τοῖς ἀλ- 
λοις, “makes subject to the 
rest.” 

7. τὰς μὲν ἐπὶ — ξυμπλέ- 
cev| “ Some natures tending 
more to courage, whose hard 
quality she compares to that 
of the warp, while others are 
disposed to gentleness, as if 
spun thick and soft and, ac- 
cording to the image, in the 
manner of the woof, these op- 
posite tendencies she tries to 
bind and weave together in 
the following way.” 

ξυντεινούσας] Neut. Cf. supr. 
294 b. 

10. ἃ διανήματι ] MSS. dcav- 


θήματι. Cf. διανθίζω. Corrected 
by Cornarius. 

14. Πρῶτον --- ἀνθρωπίνοις } 
“First harmonizing that part 
of their soul which is of eter- 
nal origin with ἃ kindred, 
that is a divine bond; and, 
after that which is divine, the 
animal nature again with hu- 
man bonds.” For the ζωογενὲς 
μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, cf. Tim. 69 ¢, 
566. : 
15. θείῳ --- ἀνθρωπίνοι.] Cf. 
Lege. 1, 631}: διπλᾶ δὲ ἀγαθά 
ἐστι, τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ δὲ 
θεῖα ἤρτηται δ᾽ 
θάτερα. 


> “ , 
ἐκ τῶν θείων 


σι 


will weave 
together in 
the follow- 
ing way, 
taking the 
brave na- 
tures for 
the warp 
and the 
gentle for 
the softer 
woof. 

As nature 
directs, she 
will bind 
the immor- 
tal part in 
them by a 


TO divine 


bond, and 
the animal 
part by 
human ties. 
Right opin- 
ion of what 
is noble, 
just, and 


15 good, when 


confirmed 
by reason 
inthemind, 
is a divine 
principle in 
a godlike 
form. 

The good 
lawgiver 


should 
alone be 
able to im- 
part this 
by eduea- 
tion to the 
natures ca- 
pable of it. 
The effect 
of this is 
to soften 
the brave 
nature, 


and to en- 
lighten the 
gentle. 


184 ΠΛΑΤΏΩΝΟΣ 


θῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐναντίων ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ 

, \ / . ΄ ad ’ 
δόξαν pera βεβαιώσεως, ὁπόταν ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνη- 
ται, θείαν φημὶ ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι γένει 

᾿ )μ μονιῷ LY: γένει. 

NE. ΣΩ. Πρέπει γοῦν οὕτως. 

— ἈΝ \ \ \ \ 

5 EK. Tov δὴ πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἀγαθὸν vopo- 
, 3 7 “ ’ , ‘\ 
Oernv ap ἴσμεν ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνατὸν 
5 in a A ~ 93. Καὶ ΓΞ 
εἶναι τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν 

a > lad a / A » / 
τοῖς ὀρθῶς μεταλαβοῦσι παιδείας, ovs ἐλέγομεν 
΄σ ΄ 
νῦν δη: 
Ν “ » / 
NE. 2Q. To γοῦν εἰκος. 


EE. Ὃς δ᾽ av δρᾷν ye, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀδυνατῇ τὸ 


Io 


τοιοῦτον, μηδέποτε τοῖς νῦν ζητουμένοις ὀνόμασιν 
αὐτὸν προσαγορεύωμεν. 
NE. ΣΏ. ᾿Ορθότατα. 
1 ΞΡ, Τί οὖν ; ἀνδρεία ψυχὴ λαμβανομένη τῆς 
τοιαύτης ἀληθείας ap οὐχ ἡμεροῦται καὶ τῶν δικαίων 
μάλιστα οὕτω κοινωνεῖν ἂν ἐθελήσειε, μὴ μεταλα- 
βοῦσα δὲ ἀποκλίνει μᾶλλον πρὸς θηριώδη τινὰ 
φύσιν: 


NE. ΣΏ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὖ: 


i? Ν a , - 
HE. Τί δέ; τὸ τῆς κοσμίας φύσεως ap οὐ τού- 


20 


Χ a a » lad 
των μὲν μεταλαβὸν τῶν δοξῶν ὄντως σῶφρον καὶ 


τ. ὄντως---βεβαιώσεως] “ Real 
true opinion with confirma- 
tion:” i. e. knowledge, as de- 
fined in Theeet. sub. fin. and 
Meno 98 a, b; Phedo 76 ; 
Tim. 51 d,e; Legg. 2, 653 b. 

3. δαιμονίῳ γένει | Se. τῷ 
τῶν ψυχῶν: which is at least 
Heaven-born, if not Divine. 
Cf. κατὰ τὸ συγγενές supr. 
Legg. 1,644 Ὁ: ὡς πρῶτον τῶν 
καλλίστων 
δράσι παραγιγνόμενον. 


΄ 3) ? 
τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἀν- 


Lbs τὰ; 


0913. 6: κτῆμα ἀντὶ κτήματος ἄμει- 
νον ἐν ἀμείνονι κτησάμενος, δίκην 
ἐν τῇ Ψψυχῇ πλούτου προτιμή- 
σας. 
7. μούσῃ! Cf. Rep. 6, 499 

: αὕτη ἡ μοῦσα. This use is 
frequent in the Laws. 

12. τοῖς νῦν ζητουμένοις ὀνόμα- 
ow] πολιτικὸς, βασιλικὸς, βα- 
σιλεύς. 

15. ἀνδρεία---φύσιν] Cf. Rep. 
3; 410, 411. 


Ρ. 30 
d 
c 











ΠΟΛΙΓΊΚΟΣ. 


185 


] , [2 > / 4 ΄- 
09. φρόνιμον, ὡς γε ἐν πολιτείᾳ, γίγνεται, μὴ κοινωνῆ- 


τ ,ὕ ᾽ 7, ΄, ᾽ , 7 
σαν δὲ ὧν λέγομεν ἐπονείδιστόν τινα εὐηθείας δικαιό- 


τατα λαμβάνει φήμην ; 


NE. 30. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 


ἱπαταὶ > an \ a rn 
EE. Οὐκοῦν ξυμπλοκὴν καὶ δεσμὸν τοῦτον τοῖς 5 


\ - Χ a > ‘ ° va \ 
μὲν κακοῖς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πρὸς 


\ \ / / lal / 
τοὺς κακοὺς μηδέποτε μόνιμον φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, 


/ > 7 > ω a Ν \ , 
μηδέ τινα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῷ σπουδῇ πρὸς τοὺς τοιου- 


Δ lal 
Tous av χρῆσθαί ποτε; 


NE. 2Q. Πῶς γάρ; 


HE. Τοῖς δ᾽ εὐγενέσι γενομένοις τε ἐξ ἀρχῆς 


ἤθεσι θρεφθεῖσί τε κατὰ φύσιν μόνοις διὰ νόμων 


» , Ν SEN , \ a? 5 / 
ἐμῴυεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις δὴ τοῦτ᾽ εἰναι τέχνῃ 


’ 7, 57 a“ / 
φάρμακον, καὶ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοῦτον θειότατον 


3: Ν , > “ a Me 7, 
εἶναι τὸν ξύνδεσμον ἀρετῆς μερῶν * φύσει 


ΩΣ 


NN > / / 
καὶ ἐπὶ TavavTia φερομένων. 


I. ὥς γε ἐν πολιτείᾳ 1] In 
which it is not possible fully 
to embody the highest wisdom. 
Cf. Rep. 4, 430 6: πολιτικήν 
ye (ἀνδρείαν). 

2. εὐηθείας] Cf. Rep. 1, 349b, 
3, 409 a. 

5. τοῦτον, SC. τὸν πολιτικὸν] 
“Must we not then say that 
the social bond can never 
become lasting either amongst 
bad men or between the bad 
and the good: nor would any 
science ever seriously make 
use of such a bond in relation 
to such materials as these ?” 
Qu. an leg. τοιοῦτον 2 

τοῖς μὲν κακοῖς --- ἀγαθοῖς | 
The datives depend on γίγνε- 
σθαι μόνιμον. 

11. Τοῖς δ᾽ εὐγενέσι---φερομέ- 
νων] Se. φῶμεν. “ But in those 
characters which are at once 


noble in thei first origin, 
and have been reared accord- 
ingly, in these alone this har- 
mony grows up when fostered 
by the laws, and this medi- 
cine is scientifically destined 
for them; and, as we have 
said, this is the diviner bond, 
uniting parts of virtue by 
nature dissimilar, and diversely 
bent.” 

τε] MSS. ye. 

13. tovros| The Bodl. MS. 
has τούτους with ATI. 

14. θειότατον] So the Bodl. 
MS., with AZlISY. Vulg. 
—TEpov. 

15. ἃ φύσει x] The conj. of 
Stephanus for the MS. reading 
φύσεως. The expression ἀρετῆς 
---ὀΟ ρύσεως, though at first sight 
resembling Soph. 258 b (@aré- 
pov μορίου φύσεως), is less de- 


*pb 


se / 
ἀνομοίων 15 


ΠῚ this di- 
vine bond 
be once im- 
posed, the 
human 
links are 
easily fas- 
tened. 
These are 
the laws of 
intermar- 
riage and 
union for 
the sake of 
offspring. 
The com- 
mon prac- 
tice is erro- 
neous with 
respect to 
this. 

Not to 
mention 
alliances 
for the sake 
of wealth 
and power, 
in caring 
for family 
connexion, 
men act 


180 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 
on a wrong NE. ZO) ᾿Αληθέστατα. 
principle 
aiming EE. Τοὺς μὴν λοιπούς, ὄντας ἀνθρωπίνους δεσ- 
chiefly at ᾿ Ἔν , ΒΗ J \ rah 
present μούς, ὑπάρχοντος τούτου τοῦ θείου σχεδὸν οὐδὲν χα- 
ease, and 8 ἐϑ 3 : 9 = 
at consort- λεπὸν οὔτε ἐννοεῖν οὔτε ἐννοήσαντα ἀποτελεῖν. 
ing with 


a / Ν / 
their likes, 5 NE. 2Q. [Ids 67, καὶ τίνας ; 
΄ a / / 
HE. Τοὺς τῶν ἐπιγαμιῶν καὶ παίδων κοινωνήσεων 
“ Ν > / 4 c Ν 
καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἰδίας ἐκδόσεις καὶ γάμους. οἱ yap 
Ν \ Ν a > > lal ΄σ Ν 
πολλοὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ὀρθῶς ξυνδοῦνται πρὸς 


\ a / 
THY τῶν παίδων γέννησιν. 


1 ΝΕ. SQ. Τί δή; 


Ν \ / 7 ΄σ ,ὔ 
HE. Τὰ μὲν πλούτου καὶ δυνάμεων ἐν τοῖς τοιού- 


7 , / x ε y+ Γ ΄ 
τοις διώγματα τί καί τις ἂν ὡς ἄξια λόγου σπουδάζοι 


μεμφόμενος ; 
NE. 2Q. Οὐδέν. 


15 


fensible. Virtue was too fami- 
liar an abstraction to be thus 
paraphrased. And the reading 
φύσεως may easily have slipt 
in from supr. κοσμίας φύσεως. 
Cf. supr. 308 b: μόρια ἀρετῆς 
ov σμικρὰ ἀλλήλοις διαφέρεσθον 
φύσει. 

6. ἐπιγαμιῶν ---- κοινωνήσεων | 
“ Intermarriages, and giving 
and taking of children in mar- 
riage between states.” The 
κοινωνία τῶν παίδων is not to be 
thought of here. 

8. ξυνδοῦνται] Rather mid- 
dle voice with reciprocal mean- 
ing than passive: = “ enter into 
mutual bonds.” 

12. διώγματα | 
Eum. 136. 

15. περὶ τὰ γένη] “About good 
family connexions.” Stallbaum 
objects that what follows re- 
lates to individual character 


Cf. Aesch. 


ΞΕ. Μᾶλλον δέ ye δίκαιον τῶν περὶ τὰ γένη 


and not to birth, and suggests 
ἤθη. But the transition from 
wealth to birth is so natural, 
that Plato here applies the 
latter notion metaphorically, 
which is so much the easier 
as the bold and gentle cha- 
racters are spoken of as γένη, 
and as the argument requires 
them to be viewed as here- 
ditary. “ People at present 
are too clannish in their alli- 
ances: the brave seeks union 
with the brave, the gentle with 
the gentle race.” Cf. supr. a: 
τοῖς εὐγενέσι γενομένοις. And in- 
fra: τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν yévos— 
ἀμφότερα τὰ γένη. Also Legg. 3, 
ὅο1 6 : τῇ κατὰ γένος αὐθαδεῖ 
ῥώμῃ. This idea does ποῦ 
seem to be present in Tim. 
18 6: ὅπως οἱ κακοὶ χωρὶς οἵ τ᾽ 
ἀγαθοὶ ταῖς ὁμοίαις ἑκάτεροι ξυλ- 


λήξοντα. But then in the Re- 


Ρ. Sai 


b 





ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ. 


187 


? > ᾽ὔ / / / ov Ν 
10, ποιουμένων ἐπιμέλειαν, τούτων πέρι λέγειν, εἰ TL μὴ 


© κατὰ τρύπον πράττουσιν. 
NE. ΣΩ. Eixos γὰρ οὖν. 


HE. Πράττουσι μὲν δὴ οὐδὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς ὀρθοῦ λόγου, 


d 


\ n “΄“ ͵7ὔ e / qn 
τὴν ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα διώκοντες ῥᾳστώνην καὶ TOs 


‘\ \ U/ « “ > / \ > 
TOUS μὲν προσομοίους αὑτοῖς ἀσπάζεσθαι, τοὺς ὃ 


ἀνομοίους μὴ στέργειν, πλεῖστον τῇ δυσχερείᾳ μέρος 


3 3 
ἀπονέμοντες. 


NE. 2Q. Πός: 


μ- ΄ ἊΝ / x, κ > 
SE. Οἱ μέν που κόσμιοι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἦθος 10 Thus the 


a Χ ’, an / \ / 
ζητοῦσι, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν γαμοῦσί τε παρὰ τούτων 


Ν \ > 7 9 «ε a > , 3 ye 
και TAS ἐκδιδομένας TAP αὐτῶν εἰς τουτοὺς εκπεμ- 


’, «ε “ ΧΝ Ν \ > / / 
πουσι πάλιν" ws δ᾽ αὕτως TO περὶ THY ἀνδρείαν γένος 


public and the opening of the 
Timeeus it is assumed that in 
each individual the active and 
philosophic tempers are com- 
bined. In the Laws the harder 
natures are chosen for the 
highest offices, Lege. 5, 734 e: 
καθάπερ οὖν δή τινα ξυνυφὴν ἢ 
πλέγμ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν 
αὐτῶν οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστὶ τὴν τ᾽ ἐφυφὴν 
καὶ τὸν στήμονα ἀπεργάζεσθαι, 
διαφέρειν δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τῶν 
στημόνων πρὸς ἀρετὴν γένος" ἰσχυ- 
ρόν τε γὰρ καί τινα βεβαιότητα ἐν 
τοῖς τρόποις εἰληφός" τὸ δὲ μαλα- 
κώτερον καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ τινὶ δικαίᾳ 
χρώμενον" ὅθεν δὴ τοὺς μεγάλας 
ἀρχὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρξοντας 
δεῖ διακρίνεσθαί τινα τρόπον ταύτῃ 
καὶ τοὺς σμικρᾷ παιδείᾳ βασανι- 
σθέντας ἑκάστοτε κατὰ λόγον. (ΟἿ, 
Arist. Pol. I. 3: φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν 
ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὸ στημόνιον 
ἐρίου γίνεται τῆς κρόκης, οὕτω καὶ 
τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἔχειν δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς 
ἀρχομένους. The same mixture 
of natures, however, is required 
in the other citizens, Legg. 6, 


773.¢: ταῦτα δὴ διὰ λόγου μὲν 
νόμῳ προστάττειν μὴ γαμεῖν πλού- 
σιον πλουσίου μηδὲ πολλὰ δυνά- 
μενον πράττειν ἄλλου τοιούτου, 
θάττους δὲ ἤθεσι πρὸς βραδυτέ- 
ρους καὶ βραδυτέρους πρὸς θάττους 
ἀναγκάζειν τῇ τῶν γάμων κοινωνίᾳ 
πορεύεσθαι, πρὸς τῷ γελοῖα εἶναι 
θῦμον ἂν ἐγεῖραι πολλοῖς" οὐ γὰρ 
ῥάδιον ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πόλιν 
δεῖ δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην, οὗ 
μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος 
ζεῖ, κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος 
ἑτέρου θεοῦ καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν 
ἀγαθὸν πῶμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργά- 
ζεται. Compare also the com- 
bination of qualities required 
for the guardian in Rep. 2, 
and for the philosopher in 
Rep. 6 and the Theztetus. 

5. τὴν — otepyev] There 
is a change of construction 
from the participial form to 
the dative of the manner. 

7. πλεῖστον — ἀπονέμοντες] 
“Giving far more importance 
to their dislike than to any 
other consideration.” 


εἶναι 


= Ὁ 


sober inter- 
marry with 
the sober, 
the bold 
with the 
bold. But 
they ought 


188 MAATQNOZ 


rather to 
seek con- 


nexionwith TEpa τὰ γένη τούτων τοὐναντίον ἅπαν. 

their oppo- 

sites. For NE. 3Q. Πώς, καὶ διὰ τί; 

the bold ; 7 ͵ 3 a ΄ 
race, un- EE. Διότι πέφυκεν ἀνδρεία τε ἐν πολλαῖς yee 
mixed, is 


vigorous at 5 OEOLV ἄμικτος γεννωμένη σώφρονι φύσει κατὰ μὲν 
first, but 


tends to ἀρχὰς ἀκμάζειν ῥώμῃ, τελευτῶσα δὲ ἐξανθεῖν παντά- 
madness in ; 

the end. πασι μανιαις. 

And the 9) IE 

gentle NE. OQ. Eikos. 


breed, un- 
mixed with 


EE. Ἡ δὲ αἰδοῦς ye αὖ λίαν πλήρης ψυχὴ καὶ 


the brave, ἽΝ, ͵ » , ὧς ἃς \ \ \ 
hasafeeble 10 ἀκέραστος τόλμης ἀνδρείας, ἐπὶ δὲ γενεᾶς πολλᾶς 
progeny. “ a , , an a A: 
Tsien οὕτω γεννηθεῖσα, νωθεστέρα φύεσθαι τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ 
rangements 3 a \ , » A θ 
foravoid. ἀποτελευτῶσα δὴ παντάπασιν ἀναπηροῦσθαι. 
ine this A seen Ψ , 
ΕΠ ΕΙΣ NE. ΣΏ. Καὶ τοῦτο εἰκὸς οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν. 

le, if , \ \ \ / “ 
ἘΠ ΤΣ HE. Τούτους δὴ τοὺς δεσμοὺς ἔλεγον ὅτι χαλε- 
are im- ‘ > Q\ Ze KN A \ A \ 
eee) OWED οὐδὲν ξυνδεῖν ὑπάρξαντος τοῦ περὶ τα καλὰ 
with the 


Ν > \ , y > / \ / ῇ 
καὶ ἀγαθὰ μίαν ἔχειν ἀμφότερα τὰ γένη δόξαν. 


same view 


5. σώφρονι φύσει] ἄμικτος is 
to be joined by hyperbaton to 
σώφρονι φύσει. 


bued with one opinion respect- 
ing what is honourable and 
good. Yes, this is the single 


6. e€avOciv—pavias| Tragic. 
Cf. Soph. Ant. : οὕτω τᾶς μανίας 
δεινὸν ἀποστάζει ἀνθηρόν τε μένος, 
κεῖνος ἐπέγνω μανίαις k.7.A. Aesch. 
Pers. 821 : ὕβρις γὰρ ἐξανθοῦσ᾽ 
ἐκάρπωσε στάχυν ἄτης. The 
dative μανίαις occurs with simi- 
lar meaning in Legg. g, 869 a, 
ib. 881 b, ib. 6, 783 a. 

9. Ἡ δὲ κιτ.λ.] Se. πέφυκε. 

αἰδοῦς γε] Bod. τε. 

II. νωθ. τοῦ κι) 1. 6. ἀκαίρως 
νωθής. Cf. supr. 276 6: 
στερα Tov δέοντος. 308 a. 

14. Τούτους δὴ — ἐπιτρέπειν | 
“Tt was of these bonds I said 
that there would be no diffi- 
culty in creating them, if only 
both the kinds were first im- 


εὐηθέ- 


work in which the whole pro- 
cess of the royal weaving is 
comprised, never to allow tem- 
perate natures to keep aloof 
from the brave, but, warping 
them together by common sen- 
timents, by honours, by repu- 
tation, and by interchange of 
pledges, to form of both a 
smooth and closely-woven web, 
and then to give into their 
hands the offices of state.” Cf. 
supr. 310 a, Ὁ. Rep. 4, 429¢: 
διὰ πάντος δ᾽ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν σω- 
τηρίαν τὸ --- διασώζεσθαι αὐτὴν 
κιτιλ. 

15. ξυνδεῖν ὑπ.] Bodl. ξυνυπ., 
not ξυνδεῖν ξυνυπ. (Stallb.) 

16. καὶ ἀγαθὰ] Bodl. καγαθὰ. 


δρᾷ, τὴν αὑτοῦ μεταδιῶκον φύσιος δέον ποιεῖν ἀμφό- ν. au Bi 


4 


e 






310. 


| 


b 


IIOAITIKOZ. 189 


cal \ A “ 7, 
τοῦτο yap ἕν καὶ ὅλον ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς ξυνυφάνσεως 
yy / ἔχω > 7 / > Ν cal 
ἔργον, μηδέποτε ἐᾷν ἀφίστασθαι σωῴρονα ἀπὸ τῶν 

, 3, , \ ε / - 
ἀνδρείων ἤθη, ξυγκερκίζοντα δὲ ὁμοδοξίαις καὶ τιμαῖς 
/ lal / > / 
καὶ δόξαις Kal ὁμηρειῶν ἐκδόσεσιν εἰς ἀλλήλους, 


tal XN / Vdd v4 / 
311. λεῖον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον εὐήτριον ὕφασμα Evvayovra 5 


3 > a \ > rn / > \ Oi o / 

ἐξ αὐτῶν, Tas ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ κοινῇ TOV- 
(A 

τοις ἐπιτρέπειν. 


NE. 2Q. Πός: 


ΩΣ > 3, , 
EE. Οὗ μὲν ἂν ἑνὸς ἄρχοντος χρεία ξυμβαίνῃ, 


\ an / ys ς / 3 ’ὔ ᾿ 
TOV TQUTA ἀμφότερα EXOVTA ALPOVMEVOY ἐπιστΤαΤΉΡ᾽" τὸ 


@ δ᾽ a‘ x / / / ε / & 
ov 0 ἂν πλειόνων, τούτων μέρος ἑκατέρων ξυμμι- 
, \ \ \ ΄ » / 27) , 
γνυντα. τὰ μὲν yap σωφρόνων ἀρχόντων ἡθὴ σῴφο- 
\ > a Ν / Ν , / 
Opa μὲν εὐλαβῆ καὶ δίκαια καὶ σωτήρια, δριμύτητος 
’ / a 
δὲ καί τινος ἰταμότητος ὀξείας Kal πρακτικῆς ἐν- 


δεῖται. 


NE. ΣΏ. Δοκεῖ γοῦν δὴ καὶ τάδε. 


EE. Τὰ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖα γε αὖ πρὸς μὲν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ 


\ XN - , 
εὐλαβὲς ἐκείνων ἐπιδεέστερα, TO δ᾽ ἐν Tals πράζεσι 


Ττὸ μὲν διαφερόντως ἴσχει. πάντα δὲ καλῶς γίγνε- 


3. ξυγκερκίζοντα ] ““ Making 
the web close.” Vid. supr. 
note on 282 b. 

4. ὁμηρειῶν] ‘ Pledges.” The 
word occurs in Thucyd. VIII. 
45: 
λιπόντες ἐς ὁμηρείαν τὸν προσο- 
φειλόμενον μίσθον. 

5. εὐήτριον] “ Of an even or 
close texture.” The opposite 
is imphed in Phedr. 268 a: 
εἰ apa σοὶ φαίνεται διε- 
στηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἤτριον ὥσπερ 
ἐμοί. 

12. τὰ μὲν γὰρ---ἐνδεῖται] “For 
the character of a temperate 
ruler is very careful and just 
and safe, but is lacking in 


A -~ > , ς 
Tas ναὺς ἀπολείπωσιν πυπο- 


\ 
Και 


thoroughness, and in a certain 
prompt and active determina- 
tion.” 

14. ἰταμότητος] The abstract 
occurs only here. For 
ἰταμὸς ef. Lege. 6, 773 Ὁ, and 
for irns Prot. 349 6. 

18. ἐπιδεέστερα) So Bodl. 
with ATI. cett. ἐπιδεεστέρα. 

TO—ev ταῖς πράξεσι = TO πρακ- 
τικόν. But see next note. 

1g. tro pevt] “This, as op- 
posed to the former.” Cf. Soph. 
252 ἃ: τοῦτο μὲν οἷός Te κἀγὼ 
διαλύειν. τὸ μὲν SC. τὸ ἀνδρεῖον 
ἦθος. The change from plural 
to singular is noticeable, but 
seems to be required by ἀμφοῖν 


of truth 
and right, 
Combining 
these two 
kinds by 
every avail- 
able in- 
fluence of 
opinion and 
custom, the 
kingly art 
will dele- 
gate all 
offices of 
state to 
their joint 
rule, where 
one officer 
is needed, 
taking care 
that he 
combines 
both na- 
tures, and 
where 
there are 
more, se- 
lecting 
equally 
from both, 
that the 
state may 
act with 
energy and 
good heed, 


190 ITAATQNOZ 


σθαι τὰ περὶ Tas πόλεις ἰδία Kat δημοσία τούτοιν μὴ 1 
pl Tas πόλεις ἰδίᾳ ημοσίς μὴ Ρ.3 


/ ΄- ᾽ / 
Tapayevopevow ἀμφοῖν ἀδύνατον. 


NE. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ: 


EE. Τοῦτο δὴ τέλος ὑφάσματος εὐθυπλοκίᾳ Evp- 


lal Ν cal 
5πλακὲν γίγνεσθαι φαμὲν πολιτικῆς πράξεως, τὸ τῶν 


3 / Ν / > / 5 e / 
ἀνδρείων καὶ σωφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἦθος, ὁπόταν 


ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ κοινὸν ξυναγαγοῦσα αὐτῶν τὸν 
μονοίς ὶ ίᾳ κοινὸν γαγ 


, e \ / U / 
Biov ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη, πάντων μεγαλοπρεπέστατον 


e / My, ᾽ , % “ ae 9 
ὑφασμάτων Και αριστον ἀποτελέσασα, “ὡς MW ELVaL 


/ 7 yy nr , / / 
το κοινὸν, τοὺς T ἄλλους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πάντας δούλους 


\ ἮΝ 2 5 / / , a we 
και EAEVUEPOUS ἀαμπισχοῦσα, TUVEX)) TOUT® Τῷ 7 Λε 


Ἂν Do 5 / / / 
γματι, καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσον εὐδαίμονι προσήκει γίγνεσθαι 


πόλει, τούτου μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἐλλείπουσα ἄρχῃ τε καὶ 


ἐπιστατῇ. 


following. The words are re- 
jected by Ast, who conjectured 
ἰταμὸν, and Stallb., who here, as 
elsewhere, unnecessarily sus- 
pects a gloss. Qy. τομὸν 1 Cf. 
Tim. 61 e. 

4. Τοῦτο δὴ----ἐπιστατῇ] “This, 
then, according to our view, is 
the perfection of the web of 
political action, directly woven 
—the brave and temperate in 
human character, when the 
kingly science has drawn the 
lives of such men into com- 
munion by unanimity and kind- 
ness, and having thus com- 
pleted the most glorious and 
noble of all webs that are of 
a public nature, and envelop- 
ing therewith all other denizens 
of cities, whether slaves or 
free, binds them by this con- 
texture into one, and leaving 
out no point of a city’s happi- 
ness, in as far as it belongs to 
a city to attain to happiness, 


so governs and presides.” For 
εὐθυπλοκίᾳ, here metaphorically 
applied, cf. supr. 283 a. 
ξυμπλακὲν) Bodl. AT, ξυμ- 
πλέκειν, Τ', ξυμπλεκὲν. ξυμπλακὲν 
is in keeping with the tragic 
diction of much else in the 
dialogue. Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1171: 
ὅρκος, πῆγμα γενναίως παγέν. 

9. τ ὥς γκ εἶναι κοινόν] MSS. 
ὥστ΄. Cf. supr., ὥς ye ἐν πολι- 
τείᾳ. It seems to be implied 
that, although this is the best 
common life, a higher life is 
reserved for the individual. 
For the inf., cf. Rep. 4, 430 ἃ. 
But perhaps the words are a 
gloss on κοινὸν supra, as Stall- 
baum thinks. 

11. ἀμπίσχουσα] Here the 
Bodleian has ἀμφίσχουσα (sic) 
with ATI. 

12. καθ᾽ ὅσον εὐδαίμονι x.7.A. | 
Cf. Lege. 3, 697 b: τὴν μέλλου- 
σαν --- εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς δύναμιν 
ἀνθρωπίνην. 


SS 


ee «οἰὐὐὔϑυδιδοδες........................ ὅδε κιάκιας, καῦμα 








ΠΟΛΙΤΊΚΟΣ. 


191 


NE. ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα αὖ τὸν βασιλικὸν ἀπε- 
, 2 con 5 / Ων Ν 
τέλεσας ἄνδρα ἡμῖν, ὦ eve, καὶ τὸν πολι- 


fe 
TLKOV, 


I. Κάλλιστα k.7.d.] Some 
editors have adopted Stallb.’s 
conjecture, and have attributed 
these words to the philosopher 
Socrates. But it is not likely 
that he would interpose with- 
out giving Young Socrates time 
to assent to the last proposi- 
tion. The present expression 
is merely an expanded and 
more courteous form of assent, 
marking the conclusion of the 
argument. It has been already 


noticed, that the dramatic is 
subordinated to the dialectical 
interest of this dialogue. Hence 
there is less motive for intro- 
ducing the elder Socrates again. 
Compare the end of the Par- 
menides. Those, however, who 
think that the praise is more 
becoming in the mouth of the 
philosopher, may suppose that 
the answer of the younger So- 
crates has dropt out, 6. g. ᾿Αλη- 
θέστατά ye. Cf. Soph. ad fin. 


The state 
thus consti- 
tuted will 
be as happy 
as a com- 
munity of 
men can be. 








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